POLAND: Prospects (or Solidarity
Solidarity is thoroughly suppressed at an independent national trade union, but it remain* active at the local level. Those lead-ere still at large are having some success establishing anorganisation, and they remain confident that they eventually will be able to force th* regime to come to terms with them. most Solidarity leadere urge only passive resistance, the more aggressive activitiesinority of young militants and the consequent police repression aould cause scatteredf
The Solidarity leaders who have avoided internment have not yet tried toationwide organization, and they are still uncertain about what activities they can and should undertake. The relaxation of most travel restrictions allows some contact among differont regions, but the need to rely on couriers makes most communication slow. The regime's apparently close monitoring oftelex and telephone sorvlce and its refusal to
automatic placement of calls has inhibited contacts.
Many of those involved in organizing efforts are largely second- and third-echelon leaders who do not know their counterparts In other regions. This is making reestablishmentational organization difficult.
Concerned about infiltration by the police, union leaders are restricting their organizing activities to tightly knit, independent cells. The concern for security was demonstrated late Last month when the nine Solidarity national leaders' still at liberty sent representativeseeting of an Interfactory Coordinating commission, rather than attend themselves.
The gradual release of interne' Solidarity activists andf the storenterned are still beinghasixed blessing. Although those released may bring new life to opposition groups, they are being closely watched and couldleed the police to underground organizations. Somewith arrest and trial If they become reinvolved in Solidaritydecided to avoid the fray,ew are considering the regime's offer to emigrate.
Differences Over Tactics
Host undergroundZbigniew Bujak, the senior Solidarity loader stillsobered by the experience of martial law and caution against encouraging violence and bloodshed. These moderatesrolongedleaflets, silent marches, short strikes, and passive resistance--to keep the spirit of Solidarity alive and to impress the regime that the union isorce to be reckoned with. As with the intellectual dissidents in the, Solidarity leadersinimum want to prepare theto become more activealn shouldbecome more favorable.
A small number of union activists and supporters advocate violence as the only way to force the regime to negotiate with Solidarity leader Walesa. Such acts could provoke the insecure regime to new repression, which would in turn increese public angwr. Some students now appeartent, making theource of tension. aV
The strength of groups intent on violent resistance is difficult to gauge, in part because the secret police may have organized some in order to flush out Solidarity militants and to entrap anyWestern government or private groups supporting them. '
The government appears to be ostentatiously ignoring the union that once claimed the allegiance of almost one-third of the population. Few, if any, in the regime want to accord the union leaders the status of negotiating partners. The delay Inrade union bill and the recent attacks on Solidarity by the most conservative media, however, suggest some differences over what tactics to pursue against Solidarity.
The authorities are trying to lay the groundworkew, officially sponsored network of compliant unions, organized by craft rather than on geographical lines. These unions are unlikely to gain worker support and will not stimulate greater productivity.
The martial law regime may be frustrated by its failure to gain Walesa's cooperation, but it seems content to keep him isolated and to try to bring him around by showing that it has firm control. The Minister for Trade Union Affairs, who has been in frequent contact with Solidarity leaders, calls Poland on "ammunition dump" and Walesaa "detonator" which will have to be kept t.
Although Solidarity is no longer the principal driving force in politics,adly supported demands for reform will continue to influence policy debates between moderates in the regime who believe someis necessary and hardliners who support strict controls from above. Solidarity will continue to make only limited headway inationwide because police surveillance and fear of police infiltration"will tend to prevent the organization from coordinating above the local or regional level.
In the coming months Solidarity will remain aorganization capable of causing problems for tho government but not strong enough to force its will on the authorities. The principal danger to the regime in the near future is that public discontent withconditions may lead to spontaneous outbursts. IjOriginal document.