CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Poland's Prospects
Over the Nextoonths
ill;
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
POLAND'S PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXTOONTHS
Mcumiuaii, of JO; uwd in ilir piciuriTiOD ot iho En.i
approved for release thresh the HISTORIC^ id'IWii oi theo^siligence Agency.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUEDHE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations po/ticipaled In the preparation of lhc Estimate:
The Centre* In'eCgente Agency, 'he Oef'nM Intefc-jertce Agocv. Nolionol Security Agent y, end ol ih* Dcpcfmem of Siol*.
Aho Participating;
Jhe Ai*.vton<l StoH fo* Wrlyiwi.f 'Se Aimj The Direclor ol Naval lolr*aence.ol lhe Novy lha AivMont Chiel ol Stoll. Inieftgonee. DeporlrneM olAw fee* Ihc Director of In'eliigenre. HeodqiHtrtcii. Marine Cot pi
4
KEY JUDGMENTS
Tlvcrc has been little change in lhe internal political situation since tlte issuance of2 in2 Tbc Jaruu-lsli regime tried bul lias not succeeded in gaining popular acceplancc andlo rule through fear and intimidation Ii has not shown any willingness toenuine political accommodaiion with either the Polish people or their spokesmen.
Wiihin Ihe ruling elile. Jaruzclski has shown bureaucratic skill and ail ability lo oblain Moscow's implicit support in order lo solidify his own position Allhough his actions have preserved whal could be saved ol the iiadiliotml Communist system of rule, thev have brought little succoi to lhe party per se It remains moribund. Society al large remains opposed to the regime but so far has limited Its rcsislance largely toresistance Of its two institutional pillars, the Church, under Clemp's leadership, is placing greater emphasis on calm than on support for Solidarity; the latter has established an underground Temporary Coordinating Committee (TKKJ but is slill groping for an effective stratcg. For now it seems to have settled on brief rob actions, peaceful demons!rations, and other forms of protest as well as the threat of istrikeeans of bringing pressure on the regime
Solidarity's showing onugust probably failed to convince Jaruielski of the need for compromise. The leaders of Solidarity and the regime will now bc debating future ladies, and hardliners on both sides may now argue for more aggressive action.
The union's leaders will cite the turnout of demonstrators againsi overwhelming oddsoral victory. Thc regime has claimed0 people tookersons were detained, three dcmonslra-lors were killed andnjured,olicemen were Injured. But Solldarily hasigh price in the Iwo weeks of demonstration*:
Thc authorities seized underground printing presses and report-edly arrested scores responsible for underground literature. The founder of Radio Solidarity was also airested
Many activists were presumably spotted inih the demonstrations and will be apprehended
Solidarity leaders will be under pressure lo come up with more effective ways to force concessions from the regime Their prospects are
i
not brighl For llie next few months, the union will have lo concentrate ontructure less vulnerable to penetration by lhe security services. Radicals probably will want to keep lhe heat on Some may press for more violent forms of resistance Allhough there has been no clear-cut trend toward violence thus far. inololov cocktails have now been used lor the first time And the securily services have shown they are not reluctant lo use their weapons
The demonstrations probably did nothing to shake Jatuzclsfci's conviction that time is on his side and that he can eventually wear down Solidarity's will to resist. He may be pressed by the securily services lo lake an even tougher approach to prevent future demonstrations. They may encourage him to arrest more underground activists and possibly even to dissolve Solidarity altogether If the direct and open challenges to his rule fade away. Jaruzclski may well improve the cosmetics of martial law (possibly even replacing it wiih less odious emergency powers) bul is unlikely to change tls substance.
Jaruzclski talks about economic reforms and has grantedmore flexibility to make decisions on produclion. employment, and investment. Widespread shortages and lhe inefficient approaches of ensconced managers have resulted in little, if any. changes from the centralized approach of the pre-Solidarity period.
The much vaunted turn to Ihe East has produced little increase inituation which is unlikely lo change in view of the widespread economic problems In CEMA Economic interaction with the Wesl will coniinue to be limited by Warsaw's inability to obtain necessary financing, including debt relief.esult of domestic rigidity and the shortage of needed Western economic inpuls. thc economy is likely to stagnate at theevel
Of all the major actors in the Polish drama, the USSR has the most cause to be generally satisfied. Allhough right months of martial law have not brought the Soviet headache over Poland to an end. Jaruzelski hasaluable service for the Kremlin byeasure of stability lo Poland,olerable form of Communist rule, and relieving thc USSR of having lo use ils own forces. Allhough Moscow cannot be salisfied with the state of the Polish Communist Party, it seems resigned to the parly's current inactivity and willing to gratilegree of tacticallong as he continues lo satisfy the Soviets' slrategic requirements on thc fundamental issues of control and Poland's role in Warsaw Pact operations This he is likely lo do since there are no fundamental differences between him and the Soviets on these issues.
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Tlie polilical stalemate between llie Polish people and its rulers continues It could be broken. Iiowcver. bv the intrusion ofevents such as the reciirrcnce of major strikes, the use of pnhhe.il terrorism by oudcrr.ioiind opposition forces, or an ill-consideredn overconfident regime On balance, however, we lielicve the most likels prospeel isontinuation ol live present situation rule Irom lhc topegime headed by Jaruzrlski. with controlispirited population assured by the use of force.
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DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
Tlie purpose of ihis Memorandum is loieili leadtni of llie Polish situation some eight nionlhi after lhe mi posi lion of martialand to Imik at ihe prospect* lor Polish action* and trendsn- neil scar that might have ramification* lor US policy
Generally, lheMEiS2 have heldight of Polish dcvclep-mcnti since then
does not differtlie Soviels onundamental issues of control andule in Warsaw Pact operations
law has effectively ruled out genuine political accommodation, and the national polilical si ale mite continues
output has siabiliied al leastbutery low level, and the ilandard of living ha* fallen to (be early* level
Soviets aie genera IK satisfied withhich have relieved them of thepiospect of imposing orderly force of aims
sinceowever,ore rclined assessment of
tactics andthey icveal aboul his long-range intentions
interna] and eiternal constraints whichon hi* actions
popular mood and eipectitiom concerning the Jirurersli rrgime.
development of an undergroundm it* nee rnovemenl
The rolf ol lhe Catholic Church
The military and parly establishments a* theof rule and ihe security apparal a* the ley instrument of conirol.
eroiimnic-iinarsculincluding the impact of live Western sanctions and of theEMeonncclion
* perception of tlie Polish situation and laitirrlski. and hoiv tl it Irt ing to influence both
II. THE INTERNAL SITUATION
A. JoryielvVi's Strategy ond Tactics
primary goal, which hasall others, remains thai of the maintenance of control over the society at large. He lias soughi to profcel an appearance of calm and order, while moving Quickly to maintain order in the rounlry by Stifling demoerst ill ions is well as other cspreuiom of dissrni. This will probably bold true over the neu year and circuinscnbc all nlher near- oi mid-termhe now has or may sel for himself
An important coroHaivaintaining conirol ha* been firurefskt* eon vol Hla lion of hi* position wiihui ihe leadership He lias displayed moiesavvy ihan we eailiei attributed lo himhe maneuvered to remove some hardline opponents (particularly hi* reputed rival. Politburo member, and ssow Foreign Minuter. OhtowikiL a* wellev. rclaiivcb liberal part* liguies Irom the Secretaiiat.hal wascleaily intended lo placate Moscow He has cotilinued to place militaty figures loyal to him in kev administrative and party positions as part of the process of eipandmg his still narrow power base and of combating coiruption and incompetence
Jiiuichki's initial hope, as eipressed in his De-ceinbei speeches, seems to have been lhal the Polish people, even including some Solidarity leaden, would accept lhe necesuly and (ad of martial law and come lo termsthe regime That his not happened, and faiurehki now has littleofpolicy reversal -but lo hope tint time is on his side and lhat I'vcpiiulli economic prospects will improve enough to
SEOtEl
crralt- the lusts uf minr actiiujlilc if grudging, modus im-orfii |nc*H| lie apparentlyi'.ii tlx- discipline nl nurlulingeliver with ilh' sic'if icloweredriiax-ljlHMi will continuelunt Sohifjuls plans In turn publK sympailis'l actum
7 In the Tinlimc. larurrlski will continue tn diiposc of iI.-m- parts of maritalthat hr no longer needs and lo proniiM- moreociety al large maintain! ihr dm inline he wants In thishe hopes IObe riiLi nf lieing challenged bi'a resurgent underground movemeni. In split llieandoas Weslern Knscrnmrnls into lifting or easing their economic sjnchnus and Weslern bankers into icschc-dulingebit At Ihe same time be ss-ill nut limi.no Iu ri'iiniMiic measures lhat had been lifted earlier, using CJch iilCtdcnl jl an obiecl lesson lhal rcsislance is noi onls lulile but also counterproductive
Sovel in lale ]ulv and early Augustood illustration ol this dual-track approach In an eagerpeech onuly, he announced lhe lilting of the curfew, the casing of restrictions on internal trasel and com mumcat ions, aad lhe release ofnternees, some on probation He did noi releaseational leaders and advisers and hundreds of political dissidents He also did not parole the several thousand people sentencedail terms for martial la* offenses sincehat the number of people deposed of freedom has not changed materialls since December He did not offer any prospects lor meaningful compromise. At thc same lime, llie BO'crrimttnL ciuuintied to detain impeded rcsiltcrs. lo manhandle peacefuland. ss hen lhc disa pool nlver Jaruzelskis speech produced Increased rcsislance activity, loor reintern some people
9ikely to continue to show arestraint in the treatment of martial law violatorsthe vie* thai hu regime Is preferableumber of suspectedbase received terms of up toears,have not. to the dismay of the moreof the officialdom, applied ihe full forcein eseis case Jiiurelslii tleiibility andappearance was behind his pubindt espicssedend martial law bi lhe end of lhe year
Tlie catch was lhal he would only do so if granted
emergciici jmsveri In ihe Parliament, thai is. martial law would continue under another name
Our asscssenent of the regimes eersriomicll'sregime has taken some refoim measures, but ihese have been limited and o'len sulated lo central programs which allocate resources (roin tlse top laruielsli has repeatedly talked aboul the need for some kind of economic reform but seems unwilling lo permit hum moves to decentralize decisionmaking because of his desire to maintain control Although enlerpriscs have been giv. en more flesibility lo make decisions on production, emplovineni. and investment, thev have continued to be hampered bv shortages and by the enslersce of inviolable priority, sectors which have fust claim on resources (jruzebki has blamed eniei prises for notose new freedoms lo taise labor ptoduciisili. cut material costs, and discharge unneeded workers Reform advocates, ho-ever, have complained that bureaucratic irsislance to change remains Strong Con-secjuentb most of the cconomt will probably continue to be tighlls run bv marital law plenipotentiaries follow Ing cenlrallv dclei mined production plans
In March vse estimated thai farutelski wouldollow policies that are generally loliking He has increasingly lashed oul at the United Stairs and.esser eitent. ils Weslern allies for maintaining sanctions Dy blaming lhe Wesl for Poland's difficulties, he evidently hopes toeasure of Sympathy from the public Thus far. however, there is little evidence lo indicate lhat he has gamed appreciable support Ironically, thenli-US propaganda may have sowed the seeds ol some false assumptions about tlie sanctions. There are some indications that many in theudden and significant turn for the better when thc sanctions are lifted. In fact, this is not likely.
he Other Acloes on (he Oomeslk Scene Ih* Society
society remains opposed to martialil is noi ready, at leatl so far. to mount ato martial law and Jaruzelski Theseveralfeeling of eihausiion had set inDecembri which the shock effect of martialMost impotlaully, a'substantial portionpopulaiion has been Intimidated bv the regime.
StjfKEI
Vnt mils iiood prospect o( bring imprisoned lor dioideiitbul the rret"H* *ol (inn* iliVMiIrM rinpkisrri has damnrf-ilTW (Im'tli* ni-rcil*i'^fi.i'Mi ji'i jim.ih vinlrncr-litimi: effect Kinalli with VVatru hi inlciiMiinil. tin- Polish society today serins lo beliafivmalic leader who iiiiglilliance In rekindle lite spirit ol resistanceIi into uiiiliil oeinc opposition
Titool In say lhat tension "illuii societyInch ot that Poles in large numbers could notIu late action Indeed arturcoolil mount and conscQuenlts incirasrnl ik-mmi-slra lions andhrmnnths In aiMKiiution lhc regime Imrhrtarte and has taLenneasuirsol i'iwc'iiiIi
Ifurther in lelasiiiB nuiti.il la" in fuls and nlis ihe Jul lum; icy (eel thev cannot aflurd the risk* irlcJting Walesa and lhe test nf the mucin leaden
Thr esteiit and nature of therations dcDcnd pirdominanil* on the mood of tlir Polish workers.in the larger factories aadids Out ataililv to gauge their illiludei it limited lis llie impossibility ol estimating how unforeseeable event* could turn ouiet frustration into active opposi-lion Consroucntl*,may noi be in the position to predict much in advance il and "hen theit pieveni mood nl pavine resistance turned to on* of open militaries
The absence of overt opposition bs workers does not mean compliance with governmental wishes Absenteeism and thpthod work continue to aflect economic performance and clcaib worry themuch so lhat the press has implicitlylhat mote workdays are being lost to absenleeism now thanlost lo strikes in lhe heyday ol Solidarity. This continued passive teilslance. In the lung term, could biitig even moic piessuie on the government ihan demonstrations against winch biute force ran be used effectively
Soidority
stated in March, Solidarity at atruly independent national tradein ration is dead But thr intervening months, and
most recently tlir disturbances onugust. Iiave shown that anltdaM* as anif not le-ralli recoguoedalive II is Mels to continue bothosilnry of "ulcls shared nationaliuns as well as an oi gam gallon whose surviving or lebudi iduvlruclorr Ibeen fiireed lo upeialr uie dergrouod This circuinstause lias made it difficult lo sue up us iulute, eileul, and stirnglh Hut il has set in demonstiatc ils ahiliti tn molnlite its fmmer mass membershipcale tliat could force upon Jam rrhl, tlie choice of nrg>aialirsg or irsnrtiiac lo use nf the mihlais
IT After some false starts, llie organi/atlon or aitive ujliimwidc utidri ground reuslance lias bren assumedemporal*Coriintiisuni (TKk> Il aiithvuiHcd its evidence on the clandesliiH-HadiO Solidarits onVpril. when ils foul original mctubvi* "in* said lo have metecret location to coordinate thc urn-mis underground activity unld its rlcctrd lUjttona) leaders aie released fiom internment All lour arc former irgional Solidarity leaders and represent Warsaw llWik) Cdansk (Lis. who is also former national vice presidentI. Wroclawnd hrako- (Hardekl
kk hasapparenllv been able to maintain some contact wtth lhe rank-and-filespecially in laigrt lactones, through couriers, undergroundand Radio Solrdaiity TKK has developed some audit* lo gauge woikrr irntiment and coordinate work stoppages and othei forms of protests.ess, we suspect some protest activity mas have been rilher sp-mtjiieuus riprrssiom of opposition or the work of numerous smaller and more radical Irin-ge orgaonations (for etampie thc Committer forDefense) or of what is left of the non banned National Student Organisation. There have also been persistent rumors lhat some of the protests were the result of deliberate provocation by the security forces designed lodecimalr thr ranks of union activist*
e do not have solid information on the talent to which lhe union infrastructure has survived or has been reluiH There are indicaiio-as lhat.umber nf legions like Gdansk and Wroclaw, the unionI unci ionseluoik ol live-membercell* linking luge enterprise* The undeigiound Solrdaritt organiialion ts clearly handicapped b. lack of fund* (Ihe union'* assets were tewed by the euthoris slow and curnbeisomc means of communica-
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amine ihc various units, by iht* fact lhal many of (lie more CspciiCticed activists have ctlher beenor imprisoned for marital law violalions. and by the need in maintain esirrmc vigilance against infil-rration bi the security police Despite tlie union's best efforts, it is doubtful that many of its activities escape deled ion hs the seciirily organsery long lime Thev may in fad be purposely leaving someat large in Order to monitor underground activities The success of (he regime's move against Solidarity in1 shows lhat (he security apparatus had' maintainedefficiency even when operating in thepen poliUcal environment ofOSI period
Because of ihese operating restraintsisible TKK strategy for challenging thc regime has So fai not yet emerged There is everj1 reason to believe ihai (he overs* helming majority of theillion siron; membership remains sympathet-ic to tho union and ils ideals. Bui at least so far. the bulk of ihe blue-collar workers have cencrally opted for passive resistance as an expression of opposition in pari because thev believe street demonstrations to be' i"! >y. li"C.
There arereasons why thc underground appeals hate not altracled as much support as the union's former membership might have suggested First, thc indsistrial workers lined up behind the strikes and Ihc union1 because ihey believed tbey could eslrad significant wage and olher economic concessions Irom the regime. They gradually came lo realize that most of the wage increases were riOl cos-ered by consumer goods and that future strikes for economic benefits would be meaningless.
Second, thc occupationalunion's principalbeen rendered very difficult lo use because of fear of violenl retaliation by lhe authorities and divisions within thc TKK. There it considerable dispute both within TKK as well as between it and some of lbc interned Solidariiy leaders and advisers over whether or not loeneral strike. The latter have for some lime been advocating thc need lo prepareeneral slrike. regardless of the consequences. TKK's driftossible gener. al strike has been slow and hampered by thc view (hat lhc underground should limit ilself lo peacefulin trying lo pressure thc regime into resuming diaiOGuc. lifting lbc suspension on Solidarity's activity.
and freeing Ils Interned leaders. Moreover, lhe TKK recognizeseneral strike would certaintyiolent resimnie from the security organs and would nm aiitntisjiitalti result in goirrnmcnt cwiressaons Addiismulls. TKK leaders apparently are motivated by the belief ihai. so long asharter is suspended and not formally revoked, live underground should noi ptovidr thc authorities wiih the escuse lo ban the union forever Jaruzelski and some of his more pragmatic advisers have apparently been aware of this sentiment and lhal is probably why the regime hat refrained from rlelegatiling the union
he disturbances lhat took place thrrnighoui the couniry onugust were comparable lo tliose in earls May Although all the relurns are noi yet in. clearly (he dcnioslraliaos did not exceed the abilily of the securilv "forces.
ohdaiiit't showing onugust probaWs failed to CiMvince JimreMr of the iseed forTlie leaders of Solidarity and the regime will now be deliatmg future ladii. and hardliners on both sides may now argue for more aggressive adion
union's leaders will cile lhe lunioulagainsi ovewhelming odds as aThe regime has claimed0 persons were detained, ihreeraters were killed andnjured,injured but Solidarity hasigh priceIwo weeki of demonstrations
authorities seized underground pi inlineand reportedly arrested scores responsible for underground literature The founder of Radio Solidarity -as abo ai rested
Many adivuts were presumably spotted inwith tbe demonstrations and will be apprehended
leaders will be under pressureup with moie effective ways to forcethe regime Their prospects ate net brightneat few months, the union will have toonlrudufe lest sulnerable loby the securily services Radicals probablyio keep the heat on Some may press forforms of resistance Although ll-rie lias beenIrend losmd violence thus far.have now been used for the first time And
ibe security services have show ii ibei are noi reluctant to useartons
be demonstrations prnbably did nothing in shake Jaruzelsli'* conviction thai timen bi> side and llui he can eventually wttt down Solidarity's svill to resist He mas be pressed bs the security services to ute a" even toucher approach to prevent future rSemoosiralions Thev may encourage himrrest mote undctgiound activists and possibly even toSolidariiy altogether
lthough tbe short-term outlook for the union is dim. continued popular dissatisfaction will leep alivend the possibiliit for more on predict able, spontaneous demotistrations Thc dernonslralions thus far have been sufficiently impressive that the regime seems certain lo continue its repressive activities If the direct and 'jpen challenges lo his rule fade away, larurchli may well improve tlse cosmetics of martial law (possibly even replacing it with less odiouspoweis) hut is unlikely in change its substance
purs [sects arcontinuation ofwar of attrition The regime mayplans forew irade unionwould, at best, be composed of nominallyunions organized slung branch andin factories but without any territorialas Solidarity had From the regime'sit could create even greater divinon inand simultaneously have interrutionalHut it would not mean the end of Solidarityhas come lo esist since the imposition ol martial law
The Cmbolic Church
Under martial law the Church has retained its traditional role as broke! between the regime and society III official position has been largelyby the view, as articulated bv Archbishop-Primate Clem p. that the laruielski regime uto any likely alternative and lhal violence therefore should be avoided to protect society and the country from greater peril Theehavior has also been motivated by Us desire to preserve lhe concessions won for it largely bv Solidarity in thc past two years
The Catholic Churchpecial place inesigns, and his jitit-de to*aid itillusltates his willingness Io compromise Recogniz-
ing liveoral juthurils as well as ilspolitical influence nuw thatlias bren lorced underground, Jaiurrlski has nut milt csemptctl Ihc Church from lhe strlclnri'i nf iiurlial law but also led intact most ol llie gains it mash- after)i. bothmi waulshr importanl tole llie Chuich can pl.is in any attempt al national reconciliation lie mas abocsnviniis of Ihe ir.advisabilits of liking on two enemies al oneonsidciationobabli used in resisting hardline pressure lo trim lhe Church's prerogatives For now. the destruction of Snhdaril) remains his main objective
aruzelski probably has had In defend Inslo delude lhe Church from martial lawin lhe (ace nf crilieism from hardliners The (alter Iicuucntly have argued lhat the Church bas protected fugitive Solidarity leaders and activists,to putting out claisdesiine pubWattoat, ind allow ed chuich sets ices to become siaging grounds for protests On tbe other hand, the Eylsryipale. eipeetall) Clemp. has remained steadfastlypublic Is atWeslern sanctions, arguing thai ihr nation and the economy were eshausied bs lhc prolonged crisis and lhal lifting ihem would benefit lhe people and the couniry more than lhe regime (Pope John Paul II shared this siew originalli but tatei chiriged his petition when he became aware of the difficulties the sanctions were causing the regime I
n contrast to his initial protests against marital lass in open support lor restoration ol Solidarity. Clemp in recent months has become more reticent What backing Solidariiy has received from the Chuich has mostly come from members ol tbe liswc' clergy and several members of Ih* Episcopate The latter have at limes spoken in highly critical tones of what Ihey trrmedeak leadership, athat Is almost ceitainly shaied by many within the hierarchy and Solidarity The criticism has thus far bren muted in large pari in order to protect urnty Nevertheless, wc have heard of instances when some clergymen have gone so far as lo refuse to read Clemp't pastoral letters from lhe pulpits
oee John Paul II has also teportedls been less than satisfied withnability lo stand up to the reicune more forcefully Rut for lhe sale of Church unity, the Pope. too. bas acquiesced in the tole lhe Church has played under Clemp in trying lo calm
Sijwer
passions. Apparently similar consider almii* alto made him agree lo post poor his planned trip tu PnJjiid until some time year Wr do notignifi rani chance in church stale relation* in lhe criming mi-tillis Despilr signs o( emwiugabout Clrmp* ineffectual leaderthr Omuli oJTicialsill coniinue IO use llieir periodic conlaclt with thr legune In press lor (he telrasr of iutrinccs. afflrlfCtv for Ihose arrcsled and imprisoned, and for Idling marital lan In (act. these coot acts, which have lalrn place largely behind lhe scenes, will probablythc only dialogue that can bebetueen the laruielsLl regime ami society in she foreseeable future
Ihe Army ond ihe Security forces
The period Since la si December fusatlern of uneasy calm punctuated- coil disturbances Since protests thus far have beenby reiving On regular police and molo'iied securily forcesaruieUti has been spared Ihe need lo leal regular Arms units in directon with llie workers
There is evidence thai the Army'sh the populace has slipped For esampte. the number of applicants for officers' schools has rv-dentlylo such an citenl (hai the Army has dropped competitive domination* and is apparently accepting almosi all candidates The depth of this decline in popular acceptance and its long-termf any. are not clear
Paradoiieally. lhe fact lhal laruzrhl has made only limited use of the Aimy has made him more reliant on the securily forces over which he has less conirol Despite the fact thai Ihe Ministry of Interior is under Ceneral Kiszczak. who is reputed to be loyal to
ski. hU preder^saor and now Politburo rrsembei Milewski serves as the party's overseer of lhe entire security apparatus Apparently it Is Milewski through whom the Soviels have gained increased influence over ibe past two years This may be one reason why faiuzelsii has not been able lo remove Milewski fiom lhe Politburo as he had allegedly intended
from lhe security apparatus.also has lo take into account lhe viewson the Militaiy Council of NationalAlthough Jaruirlski remains in overall charge of
the council members such as Ccnrrals VtottzykrobaMs ctosrlt. trews during deliberations Over such sensitive mailers as lhe pace of IgfctattsJI nf martial law.diMnnrrtirtri of lulrrnees. relation* with ihr Ctiuich. and ihr now postponed papal visit
Ihe Po*iy
aruzrlski imposed maitial bw in order lo protect what remained ol the traditional system nl Communist rule when it became clear lhat lhe parts bv ilseti wa* incapable of doing to In ihr pasl right months, the paid lias failed to make ani headway toward recovers and there are no prmprctt that it will be able lo reassert il* leading role This is dueto ils continued total rejectionthe public asell a*' lown reservations about it The pari* ha* been reducedillle more than its ptofcsu'-rol cadres, most ol whom are careerisls wlw are satisfied with tbe blow* dealtohdarlt* bul resent their own km of stature and leai lor thru fuiure.
tOanticipate that laruirtsli will cuntiniar lo appoint hi* own mm. mostly military, to key pant positions A* long a* lhe traditional parly has not been revived, which at best will lake years, its careerists wilt not be able lo resume their previously unchallcntrd preeminent roles The question of whctlirr ihe mili-(aiy will turn power over to the civilian sector is. therefore, laigcly meaningless The more mieresling Question, which cannot yet be answered, isll bt the long range effect on lhe functioning andnf the parly of lhc appoinlmcnl* to parlyof men who rose thtough military lalhet than party channels.
tl Takenhole, then, lhe disposition and relative strength* of the key actor* on the Polish scene have not been altered appreciably since MarchJaruzrlski ha* made tome progress toward corisolidatinc hi* peisonal postllon. the parls Is still in disarray His mainstay temains theut he know* he cannot use il without risk and. therefore, continues to reb on the sreurits police ai lhc chief enforcer of martial law. The Church bv appealing for moderation has helped maintain an uneaty calm, but its appeals for dialogue, most forcefullypressed in ils April (hews, have not been answered by the regime Solidarity Pill reprrsenUlhe avpuiitonsof society The impasse belween society and the iryinie continues
SURE I
THE ECONOMYpeed
CcvAomtc performance dufinc the nest year is likely lohe le>el of then lhe absence of substantial new Western credits or massive aid from the USSR Neither seems likely
The government hai slopped live decline in industrial production (seeut ihere is lilllc prospect of much nearrowth Mining output, which is only marginally dependent on imports* from the West, has increased sharply (his year because of compulsory Saturday work. But there will be little further grosvthongerprospect Manufactured goods industries will continue lo be constrained by import shortages caused by lhe lack of Western credit and the need to hold down imports lo pay some debl The regime abo faces grow ing Ubor problems, including increasedand skilled labor shortages, as hundreds of thou sands of older workers have opted for earlyThe regimes drastic investmentpercent in the firsi half2 andercent since
Poland: Monthly Industrial Production
Seasonally Adjusicd. Indci S'o>eniber IviS'lOO
III;
"> IS.. Mii S'di
'ISJ?rtlii,mji> ulnil
Unclassitlrd
also Isold down near term output although the maior impact will conic in future years
The agricultural sector will be unable to meet the needs of the counlrs drspile an estimated above-average harvest of1 million tons Tlie regime plans to double gram procurements Irom private farmers lo make up for some of the alngap resulting from reduced imporls Thethus far has refused, however, lo Increase pro-curemem prices because il wants to include farmers in the austerity program and fears farmers might sell smaller quantities ol higher priced grain and keep more to feed livestock. Instead, lhe government isumber of coercive programs including the possible imposition of compulsory deliveries Theclurlant. however, to Implementi measure because it realizes ihai farmers miglit read bs culling back production, thus drawing the gosetnmcntonfionlalion
Polish consumers face some furtherin hung standards during ihe test2 and have little hope of much rebound in lhe neat several years Consumers have already been hii hard in the first sis months of this year the cost of livingercent and workers Incomes increased onlyercent Supplies of goods on lhe retail marketbyercent during lhe first half of this year Consequents sone consume is cannot afford meat and other basic foodstuffs, while high income earners face shortages ol nuriufaclured goods Consumerwill continue to feed popular unhappiness with lhe martial law regime
Inter rtolioryoJ Aspects
heffort lo turn to the East lo make up for lhc lack of Western imports will probably bring little payoff in the nestonths CEMA countries do not have many of the goods needed by Poland and. in any case, have their own economic problems lhat will conlinuc to hmit their assistance to Warsaw The USSR has reduced its support ihis year by permitting Poland torade deficit (protected lo reachillion) of only some two thirds of1 level The Sovieis apparentlyreplaced onlyillion of traditional Polish imports from lhe West. Although this will ease some bottlenecks, il ssdl not boost output significantly Moreover, the Poles must repay the Soviets with SS perceni of the additional produclion derived from these mated Is
! tV-'-
retlilsornVr1 pa si
Imii" Sln|ll>c
Willmul ciiis mull
IT if il't- Inrsooahli1 (iihiri'. llio rc lutlli nnilid fm IU"L< Ji'- unwilling If n| rt'ari " (| III
dii'ilil rim unicesrli.i! law
IU I 1liveIIui'l.-
rrsosigh Inmimrli ol trial gfeals (loin iht* West and in cut Hi" niinnniim debl service iir'ccssari lo prevenl formal default
IN ui covered llie interestlslicdiilim: agici-nicnti Imi arrears2 obliga
li.'i. ;ir ui ' 'ii" uivri .' Jif .1 least IiiI.'iihi
through August Mjhx Western banks and (lie Poles recent It jpisvd on leinss In illionn. tlie Poles mat not be aide Iu male llie payments (ailed for in llie .lcrsvmcril Pas ment lo IlimLihave In .icceiVr.ilenser llsc0 million which is dueileli scenarioepetition of1 esi**iiencc. sslien Polish failure lo meelem deadlines led lo several posl|ioiH,ni"nisol the signal wc of the agreement Poland is likelt to remain in lechnical default because of its irubdmatobligations The banks lefusal lo declare default despiie arrears,nd broken agreements leslifles to Ibe creditors' desire to amid or delay as long as possible the writing off of Polish loans
eslern governments continue to refuse to reschedule obligations due themlthough several Wesl Eiiiopean rounlnes are pressing lo open debl relief lalls ifto improve their chances for receiving Polish pavmenls ll isowever, that Ihe governments would receive significani payments Poland probably would request total debt relief, and may not be able lo pay obligations which would noi be rescheduled The Poles are likely to place greater priority in paying banks because of lhe recent agire mem and because any one of Ihe multitude ol lhe crediior banks could (rigger default
heunted policy of reorientation of economic relations toward lhe East notwithstanding. Poland probably would respondifting ol sane-lionsenewed reo.ucsl.iu Western governmentsassive aid package including total debl relief and perhaps several hilhon dollars in cssricessionari credits and guaianlces to finance imports of gramspare pat IS and industrial raw materials Such a
packageheecrwsnmt. hut milt if il were large enough in covri iinrrscliediiled debl serviceor rumple. Western gin eminent* provided some Stiilii eiiarantees wludionilar ainimnl nf esporl rarriingi fnr del it service ullicr than resulting in an iiKieise in imports The prospects seem pooravorable icsisnnse fmrn tlien before nuiiial law. Western governments were reiecling the bulk of Warsaw's aid requests because nf budget coiutraints. the fluid political situation in Pnland. tbe ineffectiveness nf Poland's economic policy, and the iincertain prospects for re pas ment These factors probably would continue to dominate their altitudesackage for Poland
IV. THE USSR
51 ough Ciehl inontbs of martial law base not bmiigh: lhe Soviet headache over Poland to an end. Central Jarozcliki hasaluable service lor the Kremlin bseasure of stibdily lo Poland and relieving lhe Soviets ol the unpleasant prospect of using their own arms to work llieir will With his unsuccesiful atlempts to restore lhe Polish reonomt toscailered signs ofmen" iih his failure io revise the Polish pads of which he is formally head, laruzebki mat have disappointed the Soviets. Buiesult ol his action lasl December. Moscow nowhat, if still unpredictable.een as manageable Tl* Sosiet leadership thus has concluded that Jaru zelski ii currenili the Polish leader bestchief of the Aims as well at lhetempera nicnlallt best suited to protect tbeir interests in Po land He itnown quantity In Soviet political and nihtartmamit favor
n stralegic political lerms. Jaiuielski clearly has little independence and musttake lhe Soviet Union m'o aecouni He appreciates the need toiair his generalh Moscow and to iciain ils support (or his policies Whatever his own innermost predilections, he insist haie the implicit backing of Sov let arms in order to govern.
S3 As lhe man who -mpiemen!ed mamal law--and who has thus lai made it stick -laruzebkiegree of lactical independence from the Sovietsrom the fact that it is hard to imagine who else could bctlet terse Moscow'i interest in Poland at Ihis
I'liiimui nfm -it leasl iln-appearance nlscfse Smirt mien-sh tosl 'osiersli.-jit .mi. iii Polandiii' Wi-*i
' J' he It lulliul leader allll llul M ., B
WC lllflXtll iVIllllllrV IIK'l.ll nillllK I'ldal-I
ma)ivogllul il umiJiiwialsunal sense tu give Jaiorehii thiiailHal II-ill lie needs to deal Unit I, Is and deosiicli Hilli day to das issues
ih lialetiul Fvcd io hate
oscow-dvice. Il campaign* argued slrnnglyisit Pnland this ve dentlv took into acc
IX'licu'tlan tu
a feeling lhal his irlatalion ol injlurc and may Incline Jam* aelsli has visited theiwn twice llus sear lo confer will* Soviet leaden, and allhough iheie were tome ludts of possible Incimot talso perceptible nine" (jrutelski met withl the CEMA Summit In IsudapeUl lhe ptiieeuol close coovultaiiniiand the Kremlin teems lo be continuing
n thc final analysis the question nl how much lalilude llie Soviels aie willing lo giveill be closely lied to their perception of hov. -ell he is handling theoland
o lai as we know, no potential svecessor io Brezhneview ol" the Polish situation ddlerent Irom hit The Soviel succession thus is unlikely lohift in Moscow's polics toward Poland, especially in tlse sliort leim Ol course, at mdicaied in SNIEf an abiupt turn of cents in Poland coincided with intense pohlKal maneuvering inthe interaction of thecould stgntlicanllt influence the Soviet succession. Moscow's policy to-waid Poland, and nalutalb lhe situalion in Poland In lhe meantime, howevei. Moveow's attitude toward both laruzelski and Poland will be one ol watchful concern
V. PROSPECTS
57 or cootinoedaleniale wiili laiurrhViauliuos imhei (IrSacnrd iu weal down thimcvliv amii| ami lion This pnvluili mivtiiig the lluee cnleru for lilimg the vn.imci js delIsssfd by tlse I'nited States ami its Inil laiure'sli will ciiulinue. whrne.rr iiiieriul conch-lions permit il. to male periodic gesturesradual relaxation of martial law such as he lusa-Si Tins slalenialc ersutd be bruken bj lire intrusionseiiii.illi iiriptediclable events into llie Polish iwhtiral drama as a crmseciiience nf snuitaminri evettls The appearance of polilical terrorism absent yi far. could spark irialiation Irom lhe tecunts sen -id's lhat could ouickly nndstalate tlie crisis An ill-considered action by an men noi idem regime could, as it didnd IWtO.trong social reaction
oli daeadership It likely in reniuin in tensed for as long as lhe regime considers this isolation oecctwry lor illecurity The lulurr of thr in one loo. is unlikely io br resolvedanner that its leaders, both in thc undciground or in inicrnnirut. tan or are likely to accept. This, in turn, is bound to keep the underground resistance movement alive, il not
thru n(
uO Tlie economic situation will shou lillle. il ant.ircumstance whose impact on the Pv^polalioa is difficult to predict Drrspite llie In*among thr populace consumer fiostra-lion could Iradenewal ol ihr strikescale grcater than weested so far this sear ll this happened, il could Irad toall At this pokii. However, we ivdge this lo be an outside doimUI Hi More likrli. Polish society iseriod ol jpalhs and resignation
n sum. Jarutrhki is most likely lo continue hities which will result, at besi. in his continuing loisponed society with only moderate use ol outright force
Sfigref T
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