POLAND: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS

Created: 9/2/1982

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

I'OLANDi Implications ol tho Domonstrations

The leaders of the government and of Solidarity both appear to have acme out of demonstrations on Tuesday as losers. The regime wilt find no groundsurther relaxation of martial lau. probably did not prompt enough demonstrators to turn out to persuade the regime it will have to negotiate. Instead, thestalemate continues, and higher levels of violence are being

CCadytur* tactics, hardliners on one or both sides may be tempted to seise the initiative. I

Premier Jaruzelski probably had hoped thattactics would keep Solidarity activists andoff the streets and allow him to claim success for his efforts to restore social calm. The clashes, apparently the largest since the early days of martial law, will reinforce his caution in reducing martial law restrictions.

Jaruzelski has consolidated his position andhis centrist policy, but the demonstrationsnew pressure from conservatives In the partythe security servicesougher approachunion. These groups may urge him to allow thoarrest more of tho underground activists or evenSolidarity's legal status. Jaruzelski'sprobably would argue this would be athat would only radicalize those of theleadership who have hold out some hope forthe government.

Solidarity's*Prospects

Although Solidarity leaders canoralin the union's showing against ovarwhelraing odds, the union alsorice for its two weeks ofdemonstrations." The authorities reportedly have

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closed down numerous underground printing presses and arrested scores of people who prepared and disseminated underground literature as well as the founder of Radio Solidarity.

Many activists who played leading roles in the demonstrations probably were identified and will be interned or arrested. Their loss would hurt the union's acuity to maintain contacts among activists and to spread its message to society.

Thetho threealso wall provoke new debates in the union over tactics. The moderates again will argue that street demonstrations will only lead to reprisals that hurt chances for future activity. The moderates probably will try to create strong factory organizations in preparationeneral strike at some later date.

The radicals, on the other hand, are likely to argue that the regime's tactics show that pressure has to be maintained. Some could adopt more violent forms ofance to vent their frustration or to gain revenge.

Although there has notlear trend toward the greater use of physical force, some demonstrators considered using or used more violent tactics. Aswas the case in Lubin, the security services also showed they will use firearms if seriously. B

Outlook

The government's reaction to the demonstrationsmore evidence that it will use whatever force it deems necessary to quell demonstrations and that it can maintain its physical control. The prospects are poor that the regime will adopt an alternative course, because Jaruzelski probably remains convinced that time is on his side and that he can eventually wear down the opposition' will to resist.

Solidarity leaders will be under continued pressure to devise ways to mobilize public discontent to force concessions from thereqime. They are unlikely to succeed in the near term.

Union leaders may be forced out of necessity toonore secure undergroundthat is not so thoroughly penetrated by the security services. The moderates also may become increasingly concerned about finding ways to discourage the newto violence. '

Soviet Reaction

The Soviet media's detailed coverage of the protests and the regime's response reflects Moscow's satisfaction with the measures taken to quell the disturbances, it alsoobering picture to the Soviet public that mar^^law will be necessary for the foreseeable

Soviet leaders probably feel frustrated that martial law has not ended the problems caused by Solidarity,

which have troubled them for two years. At the same time, however, their patience does not appear to be

wearing thin.

Althouah Moscow is willing to back Jaruzelski's policy, Moscow will expect him toorceful policy of dealing with unrest and will resist any sign Of significant concessions if he should waver. The Soviets also will continue to lUame theits tradePoland's problems.

Original document.

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