Italy's Socialists: The Major Roleinor Party]
Dflrvcloiatt of IntcUliracr
Italy's Socialists: The Majorinor Parts
An ImdlisMtct AssfMmral
of
This paperprepa: Eutapean Analysis" Reference, contribute Comments and addressed, EURA,
Thb paper was eoordinaied wiih Ihe Direeiorale of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.j |
V
Italy's Socialists: The Major Roleinor Paris
Judgment*.
si tfl? Man* IMS
Socialistsivotal position in Italian politics becauseary arithmetic makes il impossible for ihe dominant Christian Democrats toon-Communist coalition without their support or abstention. Bctlino Craxi. the current Socialist leader, has been working for the last six years to give the party greater clout, and his efforls now have reached ihe point where we think heetter chance than any predecessor to become Italy's first Socialist prime minister.
Craxi has extracted more concessions from the Christian Democrats in return for bis party's support than previous Socialist leaders, and he is now weighing whether to try forcing an early national election ihis spring in the hope of strengthening the Socialists and easing his way into theHe is also counting on the precedent established by Republican leader Giovanni Spadolini, whose two governments last year laid the basisew, but not yet firmly established principle lhal the prime-ministry should alternate between theocrats and the lay parties.
Craxi tried futilcly to engineer an election twice in the last six months, and dow wc expect him to proceed carefully. It is our judgment that if Craxi is prepared toovernmenl crlsii and see II through to an election, his cbances of emerging as prime minister are slightly belter lhan even. Evenpring election, we do not rule out the possibility lhat theocrats might attempt to resolve the next crisis by inviting Craxi to become prime minister.
A Craxi government's prospects would hinge largely on its composition.core of variations are possible, we believeenter-left coalition with the Christian Democrats and at least two of the smaller parties is Craxi's most likely choice, given his fear of domination in anywith the much Larger Communist Party and given the dim prospects for cooperation among Ihe intensely competitive smaller parties.
Although Craxi would exert coiisiderablc Influence as theenter-left coalition, we doubt that he could dominateovernment the way he has dominated his party. He nonetheless wouldood chance of altering some traditional patterns of domestic and foreign policy.
Institutional reform has figured prominently in the Socialist platform, and Craxi would probably work to strengthen the office of prime minister, press for measures to streamline the legislative process, and promote direct election of the president. There probably would be few major changes in Ibe ecooojnk sphere. Under Craxi. use Socialists have renounced iheir past espousal of sutc-con trolled economic planning and now base their hopes for an economic renaissance on private enterprise
Although wc would not expect major shifts in the main lines of Italianpolicy. Rome would probablyore prickly ally under Craxi,on matters involving the Middle East. North Africa, Latin America, and tbe Third World. On the other hand. Ihe Socialists have abandoned their traditional ambivalence toward NATO and have become sirong advocates of Alliance policy. Craxi mistrusts the Sovieu and almost certainI; would give tbe United States strong support on East-West reUtions. Wc think Craxi could be counted on to keep Italy's commitment
to base cruise missiles (INF) next year, tsrovided there is no dramatic
_ upsurge in Italian peace movement acimtyj
Italy's Socialists: The Major Roleinor Part
Th* BlggMPercent in Europe
The9 divided Italy's. Parliament into ihree bloa the Christian Democrats, the Commun-iiu. and the Soiialnl* and smaller lay parties The pariUinscnury arithmetic dictates that no one btoc canovernment without the support or iSsier.-iton of cast other. With the Christian Democrats and theis unwilling and/or unable to come to terms with each other, government* have eon tn ted of fragile coalitions linking the Christian Democrats
(DC) with the Socialists (PSIk Social Democrats
tPSDlh Republicansnd Liberals|
Tbeercent share of the vote in ihe parltameniary clcCron9 left them the Largest of the small panics aodeir pivotals iir.pouible to formmajority withoui iherr- Although theag well behind the DCercent4 percent of theof ibe crises that hive.rccked the potitKai scene over the put year can be traced, in one form or another, to the ambitious Socialist leader Bcttino Craal)
Since taking over at leader of the Socinliti Party inraal his halted the party's electoral slide and njr.ifn jimproved its resultseries of local and regional elections. In use process be has moved the party from Use margin*politics to center stage. Described by admirers and detractors alikeutbtcsa infighter who thrives on the "bigrecent biographies emphasize his love for marathon pokerthink he is at the same time careful and calculating1-
has strengthened his personal control of the party apparatus through changing pony statutes andtrusted aides to key posts in the party hierarchy. Most important. Craxi hasleaststop the battling betweenreform-minded Socialists and those with more doctrinaire Marxist views that often rendered the party Ineffective in the past;
Craai, one of Ihc most admired and most detested politicians on the Italian scene,ajor role in shaping opinion and political debate. Yet until6 heirtual unknown. When he succeeded
meercent.
hb leftbt ctedeniiali is actions are
im. Italian scholars who have
thes pan, leader. Cum avowed "l* pewters"f piny members. By1 Party Corn revs, however. Craii controlledercent of the delegate* and an ovs^hdrningercent of the votehis kadershii
ira;uenuy uy pi _
followed hu career emphasize that he focuses mainly on resulu and has little interest in Maw and Lenin. Fori ii,eftbt means being pragmatict s well as concerned about the human oondsticair
iittrcaxingly. Craxi bas emergedaster of the wxxpectcd. always oa tbe akn fc- situations that he can tan to advantage. For him, politicsar of movtrn-mt aad aisder hb eoenBsand tbe Soeialbts haveoemlla campaign within tbe governingarxty of tooes- Worn his sunds hare threaicaed to create an irreparable breach in the coabtiosv no-wet. Craxi has drawnquality for whichrabed by supporters and harshly cnucued by detract
SocTaiUt leaders,
Crati has been able to torn the Christianhich frequently reduces thai pany to semiparalysb. io hb party's advantage, and he has farced the Christian Democrats to deal -ith the Sodalbu as an equal despite their disparity in voting strength. We believe, however, lhatot content with the cabinet posts, patronage, and financialbe has extracted from the Christian Democr-u; hb idtitnaieoovernment as prime rmabus^
OnlyOtrbtian Democrat has held thtthe postwar period. Tbe Socialists and theforced the Christian Democrau to agreein IMI lhat tbe pretmenhipbraiixn Der^crat and atheir ranks. Craxi -a* unable lo securefor himself and eventually agreed toSpadolini. whose smallercent of the vote^
Pres. reports kad us to cond.de that theiht Spadolini government to be shorthoped the precedenton-Chrbtia.prime minitier would clear the way !ctit became clear, however, that despiteaboul Spadolini lhe other parties wouldin order toocialist-ledfixed on an early national election as his pathHe has contributed to the fall of twosince August In futile elTbru io force such
r.vine
raxi b
ta
raxi has liming a
toercent gomcred In some local elceiiom would vastly improve hb chances ol getting tbe prime roinbtryj
received ooatiadrfwry BOW.national election Some Socialist leaders argue that the pany can affordc iu time, others thai the, mast move as Quickly as possible In any event. Craxi must be careful not tohe gorcreineiU oa woretext becaase lulian votersarty that initiates political instability-
Thb concernoter backlash gecounu for onl> some of the "nop- in the "slop/go" lactics followed by ibe Socialists. President Perlini has been another important restraining factor. We believe lhat at W.ifelong Socialist, is less motrva-rf by partisan ambitions lhan hb junior colleagues. Rather, we believe thai he hai come to view the preservation of lhe stability and healih of Italian institutions as his personal legacy. |"
lrsiiumeinai si rcn Ing the Soeialbts to abandon plan* to trigger an election byovernment crbbP
Tbe "go" *ide of the equation can be attributed in pan toCraxi'i penchant Tor lhe political offensive and hit tactical interest ia keeping the DC off balance. We bcUcvclso attributable, however, to Craxi'* need to demonstraic continuednaintain hi* conirol of lhe partyJ
That Craxi decided to quickly to change course andecond Spadolini government can befirst toarning and, second, to press rumors that the Christian Democrats andhad begun to discuss the possibility ofhristian Democratic-Rcpublkan-Socialgovernment, supported from outside by the Communists. Wc believe that nothing is more alarm-ins; to Craxi than the prospecthristianrapprochement, which would cut the ground out from under tbe Socialists and leave tbcmcsstsxnxtjjinon the margins of the Italian political
ProUesn in tbe Ranks?
Craxfs control of the party rests more on tangible accomplishments than on personal stand ing. This record was blemished by his flip-flops during the cabinet crises of last August and October, when he twice insistedational election was the only solution to the political impasse, but then gave way_ and supported new cenicr-lcft governments.!
penior Socialist arere highly critical of his handling of the parly during the crises. We suspect that these sentlmenti are widely shared within the party and couldweaken his hold unless he docs something to reverse the impression of indecisivencssj
Nonetheless, despite the criticism of Craxi fromtbe party, wc believe his position remainssolid primarily because of the change in party statutes he engineered two years ago. The provision for Direct election of tbe secretary by lhe party congress rather than the Central Committee has giveo Craxi unprecedented authority. The new statuteconvening an extraordinary congress in the event Ihe Central Committee votes no confidence in ihe secretary. In effect,arty congress canecretary j
Craxi lo date has dealt effectively with hit internal opposition. He *as moved against those who failedally to hb side after his election to the secretaryship or bow to inducements later on. He has also isolated
Meanwhile, the once dominant left faction ofiy has been seriously curtailed. But leftistarc deeply rooted, and we believe Craxi contin-formulaic most party policies with one eye over
ues to formulaic most par his left shoulder) |
Craxi's approach has been crliicucd by moreparty members both on practical and ideological grounds. Sloiements lo the press byprominent party dissidents throughout Craxi'sas Secretary suggest that while thev arc pleased by the party's successes In local clccti'i't they worry tbat he bas shifted the party so far from lis Ideological mooring* that it will not be able to consolidate these gains al the national level Some Italian observer* argue that Craxi'* pragmatic approach may even be counterproductive among tome group* traditionally favoring ihearticularly union members, young people, and women[_
Many of the sameo are uiKomfortable wiihnterest in modern campaign techniques,hb fascination with the media. TfcU has led to charges both from within and outside the party thatverly preoccupied wiih introducing American-style politics in Italy,
Finally, we bebeve Craii'* practice of immersing himself in all aipect* of party life has been yet another unwelcome reminder of hb personalParty secretaries have traditionally concentrated their energies on directing the party'* political line and left lhe day-to-day running of the party to other*J
Pontes lo Power
Crait knows that iherecarious perch and that if and when he obtain* it. he willosi of adversaries anxious to see him falter. One
leading US observer of lhe Italian icene has suggested lhat because other poliliciaoi reactironily to Craxi-eiiher positively ortime at Palazzo Chigi could become the least stable period of postwar lulianraxi government'swill turn in great part on its composition, and Craxi will be especially careful in choosingcore of variations are possible, we believe ihey derive from three basic options: the leftista bay party bloc/Cbristianontinuation of tbe neo-eenicr left.'
Optio-
Tbe leftet alternative,overnment based on Socialist/Communut cooperation with tbe possible paxiacipaison of the Republicans and Socialcontinues to be tbe preferred choice of the Socialist Party's left wing. Although Craxi has stripped the leftists of roost of their Influence, some, including Craxfs most formidable potential chal-sessger Minister for Southernudio Signraile. have maintained sporadic coniacu with the Communists in anticipation of better days.
by Soviet actie
For his part, Craxieep-rooted distrust of the Communists and tbe Communist Party apparatus ihai dates back to bis formative political years. Hb biographers note hb vivid recollections of the national electionhen the Communbts were able to osc their affiance with the Socialists to decimate them at tbe pods. They contend that these misgivings were later reinforced by Soviet action in Poland, Hungary, andCzecl
partner in any alliance. He has probably altothat such an arrangement would offer lar more opportunity for ihe Communists to siphon offsupport than for the Socialists tojpgkjtsjnificant inroads into the Communlsis' campJ
Still, Craxi has avoided rulingeftistuctic we believe Is designed to assuage his internal party critics, shore up his own leftistandjncrease_hjsjeverag^
almost certainly worries that the Communbts* size, discipline, and wellapparatus would relegate ha party to the role of permanent junior .
' Cwco-lo-iCtaflUa Dcmon.ii. SocUltiu.m, aid Soculmd luly 'tarn IWJ* TW mid-ltTO,eapoWewtwdilWijxMiniCoom-flinsupporthrltui
ladla* isuafcui io sub tie unriemtnt ix "neo-urntrro)
The Uy Center/DC Option
We believe lhal Craxi would ideally prefer to enter negotiation* with ihe Chrbtian Democrat* over the premienhip al the headolidly united bloc or small ponies. The Socialists have long been the dominant force among ihe laynd Craxi**
publicly avowed goal is to bind these parties to the Socialists with some formal agreements on policies and election tactics. This would increase his leverage wiih the Christian Democrats and the Communists and, over the longer term, might put the Socialists in lien to siphon off votes from their allies.
We suspect Cnii has concluded that supporting the current Fanfani government for Ihc time being can ultimately strengthen hit bid for the prime-ministry. Because of the precedent set by (he Spadolinithe small parties will argue lhat Christian Democrat Fanfinl ihould be replacedrime minister from their ranks. With ihc Republicam having had their first turn with Spadolini, Crasi shouldtrong claimhe premiership Ihe next time the post Is vacaotj
n struck alanlani unocr wnven me Prime Ministerto acquiesce in ia el ret ion this ipring inSocialist backing for bit eaad*aacy for usewhen Pcrtini dies or his mandate ends inpromise "not to oppose" an electionvague, and there is no guarantee lhatbring along tbe rest of bis party. DC tradersdetermined that the newoo Idthe end of the current legislature in springDC hierarch> was
initially luftotii oW Iffilll of the Fanfani/Craxi deall
On the other hand, political commentators ia Italy believe that DC Secretary Ciriacob slowly becoming more confident In hisnow more upbeat about the Christian Democrats' chances in an early election. We believe thai if hepring election will show toe DC regaining itsmomentum and the Sociilbts falling shod of ibcS percent attributedhem in public opinion polls earlier thb year, he may accept aa earlyof Parliament. If projected election numbers are unattractive, DeMlta could opt to allow Craxiecome prime minister without an election, but with an eye to making his tenure so difficult thatublic image and his standing within hb party would be damaged beyond repairi
If Craxi does challenge Fanfani thb springss for an election, we think helightly belter than even chance of becoming prime minister. Most Italian
journalists and politicians assumein lheearly election will yieldodest shin of seats among the parties in parliament. Wc believe, however, that so long as the Christian Democrats vain less percentage wise than the Socialists, or do not gain atodest Socialist increase, say' should give Craxi the leverage he i
In short. Craxi must at least demonstrate momentum in the election. Thereafter, ituestion ofarithmetic and his willingness to stand firm in rejecting all other outcomes. If the arithmetic is roughly equal to tbe present situation, Craxi can theoretically block every arrangement shorteal bct-oen the Christian Democrats aad tbeboth DC and PCI Internal politics seem to rule out this possibility for the time being. In addition, be bas the newly rounded principle of "alternation- on his side. If the DC svere to by claim to the premier* ship after Fanfani. it would risk antagonizing not only the Socialists but also the other small parties whose ccopcration the DC need
Ai prime minister, Craxi wouldut histamp on the Italian political scene. His vision for Italy, as describedocialist jurist, is toocial deiBCcracy "midway between Stockholm ande favors strong national leadership but also favorstrengthenedevolution of civil power to local and rejponaj authorities.
The Socialists put direct election of the president at the top of their agenda. They favor an election with two rounds, with the winnerive-year term. Under present rules, the president is electedeven-year term by the combined houses of Parlia-ment and three delegates from each regionj j
The Socialists do not propose to alter the president's conitiiutional powers, but proponents of the plan insist that direct election will enhance his moral authority and strengthen his roletabilizing force. Those who oppose the measure argue that the change is partroader plan of Craxi's to move the country from parliamentary to presidential
The PSI also advocates reducing the number of parliamentary deputies, modifying the rules governing their election, and limiting consideration of most legislation to one bouse of parliament. The Socialists argue lhal the lower house, in particular, is too unwieldy as currently organized. They attribute this in great part to the number of parties in Parliament. To remedy the situation, they have proposed that parties be required to win atercent of lhe voteeneral election to qualify for representation. Ifule had existed during the parliamentary electioniveRepublicans, Social Democrats. Liberals. Radicals, and the far leftParty of Proletarianhave been excluded. Under those circumstances tbe Socialists almost certainly would have emergco fromtrengthened claim to bold the balance between the Christian Democrats and the
Policy
The broad outlines ofomestic program have been published. The program, broken down into four broadfour "greatlulian politics, institutions, the economy, and the unions. The Socialists have returned to thisregularly,pecial emphasis onreform.) |
Tbe Socialists would like to see the tower house elected on the basis of single-member districts and the Senate chosen by proportional voting based onlists. They also favor functional specialization between the two chambers, with economic andnutters relegated lo the Senate!
Crnxi and his colleagues have devoted considerable attention to ways of strengthening the office of prime minister. One proposal put forward by lhe Socialists
wculd base ihc prime minister designated for ibe length of ihe legiililure. Anoiher calls for (he Intro-duciion of the German meihod ot "contiruclive no-confidence voting" under whichgovernmenl cannot be forced from officeucccitoreen formed
The Socialists alto wantive Ibe prime minister more authority over hit cabinet. They favor allowing him to choose and replace hn minitters at will. Tbe Socialism would reduce ihe sire of the cabinet and streamline cabinet meetings by limiting atlendaace to minister* vita major poetfc'xs,
Tbe PSI abo wants to revise Parliaments rules and place >eatiHtiuns un the use of secret votes. The present secret billot allows dissident members of Parliament to bolt party ranks wiih impunity.esadt, oacasioat prime ministers have suddenly found themselvesajority. More importantly, kg illation much desired by the Socialists has often failed la pass becauie Christian Democrats have brokca with ihe government and voted against It la:
The Socialists candidly admit that the reformikely to be Infinitely slow. The (anfani government ii committed In principle to some institutionalbul even If it bsts to the end of ihc legislature int is likelyave madetart Wc suspect that if Craxi gains office he will tryapture the public's imagination by some earlystep, such as appointmentpecial minister without portfolio for institutional reform. Craxi would likely discover quickly, however, that his ability to promote reform hinges on hb coalition partners' willingness to pui national interests ahead of partytradition thai has never taken root in lulian politicsf
Economic Iv.iin
The eeonorrue line adopted by theists at1 Congress reflect* Cran'i pragmatk tempera meal. Under bts leadership ihe PSI has attempted to disassociate itself from il* past espousal of mte-controlled economic planning Today. PSI hopes for an lulian economic renaissance rest with private enterprise-j
Socialists have also highlighted ihc need tothe judiciary, to limit the discretionary po-crs of the magistrates, and to allow ihe communes and regions to raise iheir own revenucsj
Reform probably would figure prominently in Craxi's discussions wiih potential coalition partners. Wcthough, lhal Craxi at the beginning of his tenure would try to choose issues on which he thinks he has broad public support. At Ihe start ofduring his only previous attempt to puiabinet, Craxi presented his colleaguespcint program whkh. among other things, called for new initiatives In the areas of public order, civil rights,nd the administration of justice. In addition to these subjects, we suspect thai changes in the penal code and an overhaul of ihe magistrate system would also figure prominently on hb initial agenda. We believe that only later, after establishing some kindrack record for reform, would Craxi be prepared to move on to more controversialuch as limiting the secret parliamentary vote, applying more restrictive criteria for party representation in Parliament, and changing the presidential election rules
Socialist economic policy during the past year has been muddied, however, by electoral considerations. Toizable increase In lis voie. the pany must attract new support from ihe center and the left, The Socialists arc trying to tailor heir economk positionsppealoth camps al the same time. Thus, when called upon in Parliament toefinitive stand, ihey have dutifully voted for government-sponsored austerity measures. However, in debate they have geared iheir rhetoricoters on the left, voicing opposition to measures lhal would inhibit job creation ot growth]
The PSI has oflen supported budget austerity In practice -vhile rejecting it in principle. Tothese conflicting signals, Ihc Socialistsess vigorous version of austerity emphasizing crackdowns on lax evaders. This has allowed them to claim they are factoringof social justice into economic"
i
>
sUtemeni* vo ihthai Socialist Minuter of Finance Francesco Fonc sup-potis the Christian Democratic |oal of scaling down the public sector He hat. however, disagreed with them in the past over shoti-term fiscal Holies'. He espouses polities "supply side" tit cuts, additional funds for technological innovation, andwould stimulate investment, even at Ihe expensearge budget deficit
Socialist labor policy has appeared contradictoryihe past year. On the one hand, the head of the Socialist-affiliated unionull-fledgedstrike against the Spadolinl government int that point ihe Socialist! gave the appearance of being more concerned aboul their reputation for re^pottsibility than about ihei, appeal to labor. Their ctnphasis shifted with the highly controversial abroga-ooa of the via moe-'< agreement by privateLastccordinghe US Embassy in Rome, tbe PSI saw the abrogiuon as aa effort by the Christianiheir influence with ConTirsduuna. ibe lulian manufacture'snisdermint the St-dJ-ni governmeaind. by ieJeres.ee. Use by parties- ability to lactic the country* foodamcnul eceasorruc probiemi. PSI Sute Particrpatioiti Ministernstructed Ihe pubbe employers' group not to follow* the lead of ihe private empsOytrv Hb attempt lo divide and conquer onnagarjcni failed, however, and since June, the Sociilrui again have been ksa aisenive in ihdr support for bbor.|
ora Prickly Ally?
How far and bow fastuld be abk io bring lulian foreign policy into line with his thinking would likdy depend on lhe relative strengths and weaknesses of hb coalitioa partners. We doubt lhal he could dominate the policiesoalition cabiaci the same
way that be has dominated hb party. We cipeei. sn fact, that cirenmsunces might require Crati lo give the foreign affairs portfolio lo one of several strong Christian Democratic personalities, or io aEither outcome should work against an abrupt policy shift but would noi prevent Crati from putting his own sump on lulian foreign policy j
Under Craxi. Ihe SodalbU have abandoned their traditional ambivolence toword NATO and havestrong advocates of alliance polity. Craxithe Sovieu and, with him at prime minister, the United States could continue to eapect strong support on East/Weste sees NATO, however, as an alhance limited io Europe. WhiU he probably will advocate consultations among tbe allies onproblems, we behetc thai under hi* leadership ihe United States would Hadore prkkly partner on matters involving the Middk East.he Horn. Latin America, and the Third
Craxi strikes us as pankubrly critical of US poUey in Latin Arnerica. The Sccblisu have supported Cui-Ikrmo Uago, presidenthe Revolutionary Front, in El Salvador and the Sa.idm.sus in Nicaragua and "havetrong voice in Influencing Italy's policies toward the region. Simibrly, the US Embauy in Rome credrt* Craai with shirting the Italianaway from supporting the EC* sanctions against Argentina during the Falkland* *ar. Wc thus believe that wiih Craxi a* prime minrtter. US efforts in Latin America omuld be lubjectore frequent lulian criiicisnj
In Ihe Middle EaU, luly underwould continue lo provide manpower and diplomatic support for the Sinai and Lebanese peacekeeping forces. On the other hand, he believes that Rome should recognise the Palestine Uberation Organization. Accordingourceo report accurately. Craxi sec* recognition of the PLOeans of mollifying ihe Arab *Ute* after Use PLO'* military defeat in Beirutay to stay in step with Italian public opinion which has favored the ftleuiminsjn the wqfct of the massacres a; Shaiib and Sabra.
Tbe Italian Government'i decision to adhere lo9 INF bating decision turned in large pan on Socialist tapport for tbe project. Craai. with an eye to the left *ia| of bis party, has attributed ere*tto the arms conirol aspect of the decision He has enthusiastically endorsed tbe "icro option" and even claimed credit for the idea. We believe thai Craxi and those Socialist leaders close to him see support for the zero optioneant both to reinforce their leftist credentials and compete with the Communists by emphasizing tbe disarmament tide of NATO's dual-track decision. He has been equally oultpoken in favor of Pershing and cruise mitsiVrecision by the United States to withdraw from Use INF negotiations with ihc Soviets might complicate matters for Craxi. but bar nog lhaludden, unlikely upsurge of peace movement activity ia Italy, wc believe be could be counted on to tec the basing project through,
Tbe Socialists have also been instrumental intbe Italian Government'i "pause for reflecticcT on tbe Siberian gas pipeline deal. That stand, bowevcr. has been dictated only partly by concern over Western dcpcncteacc on Eastern energy suppriea. The Socialists believe that Italy's future commercial interests lie ia tbe Mediterranean generally and North Africa inumber of Socialist leaders have North
lucse leaoers, orirsea wrjoie, stand to bene fit Financially from the gas deal thai luly is negotiating with Algeria/-
Outlook
Wc believe that Craxi will continue lo searchay lo trigger an election and gain an advantage over the Christian Democrats, but his two abortiveof last fall will cause him to weigh hit next moves with special care. Although Cratieasoned poker player, hn decision on whether io tryational election this spring wil> be his biggest gamble to datej
Cnlicitmui -ithin his party and the pie" is on the rise. |
initt otntrill uciicve1 ring recent pot iocs! crises have steadily undermined his personal appeal. The past several weeks have also witnessed the first serious stirrings of tha traditional Socialist left since the Palermo Congress. In lateembers of the party's left wing met to consider alternative party policies.
Past performance suggests that Craxi will move quickly to squelch any incipient threat to his power. Accordingbe press. Craxi and hii inner circle are weighing the possibility of convening an extraordinary congress in early spring. Crail probably calculates thatathering will provide an opportunity lo undermine his ttroegesi potential opponents andhis authority over the party's lower ranks. If circumstances allow, we believe that Craxi will also try to useongressaunching padpring election campaign]
At this stage we believe Ihe chances that Craxi will seek to prccipiuu an erection ate iboui even. Howcv-cr,P
:mmuniit leaderrnunx trraxi irocurrent Parliament serve its full term
Craxi'a biographers have noted lhat strong influence of French thinking in the forms lion of his world view. This may account la pan for the appealore independent lulian foreign policy holds for Craxi aod hit inner circle. Lacking any real command of English or German but able to read French, he draws much of his informal,on from ihe French preu and from cor. ia at made through the Socialist International He is attracted to Ihc argument that Western Horace mustialogue wiih the Sovieu during periods of Soviet/US dipleetutie strain. While be advocates cooperation among the West Europeans and supporu the European Community, wc believe be
would pursue lulian national kaicretu more
wvriy than his Christian Democratic predecessors
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: