Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through
National Iniclliseoce Estimate
RELEASE fiS
393
D
SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS THROUGH
inloimiiicciit ct2 wasrMinwi c* ihu Ultimate
Note: Leonid Breihnevdied ons this Estimate was going to press. We have not altered the mi to lake account of hii death because our judgments calleriod of maneuvering at various levels in the political md military hierarchy. We believe that sharp changes in defense efforts would be possible only after power is consolidated.
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGNRD CONCURS. EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The fai'owing inlelligence organizations participo'ed in the preparation af the Estimate:
The Cen If o! Intelligence Agency, lhe Detente Intelligence Agency, the Notional Security Agency, ond the intelligence organization of lhe Deportment ol Stole.
Also Participating:
"he Atiiitonf Chie! o' Stall foe Intelligence. Deoortmenl of the Army The Director ol Novel Inlelligence, Deportmenl ol ihe Novy The Aiiiilonl Chiel ol Staff. Intelligence, Deportmenl ol 'he Air Fcree The Director of Intelligence, Headquarter t. Marine Carpi
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE 1
KEY S
1I
3
356
I CURRENT NAVAL STOATECY AND PROGRAMS
A
B Force Composition, Organization, and Readings!
Readiness
C. Key Aspects of Naval
Soviet Wtw of General War
t'
D Strategic
Protection and Support for SSBNs
E Strategic
F Support for Land Theaters of Military Operations
C Interdiction of Sea Lines of Commumcalion 'SLOG
K Ngvg] Diplomacy in Peacetime and Limited Wax
Power
I.aval
Attack25
29
Principal Surface
Amphibious
Replenishmenl
Small Combatants and Mine Warfare
Naval
f Command. Control, and
Automated Battle
K. Soviet Ocean
L Radio-Electronic Combat
FACTORS BEARINC ON THE FUTURE
A Poliucal ami
International
Economic
Domeslic PoliUcal Environment
B Key Issues Facing Soviet Naval Planncri Protection and L'se of the SSBN Fore*.
Soviet Naval Land Attack Cruise
Stralegic ASW Against Ballistic and Land
AnUsurface
Antlalr Warfare at
Atr Power at
Protection of State Interests us Peacetime and Limited
PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET
Estimate...
Courses ol
An ASW
Strategic Armi
Severe Economic
fifes
APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HiSTOIWAL-REVIEW Pf-OGFWM
PREFACE
During lhe eight years since publication ofhe last estimate devoted to the Soviet Navy's strategy and programs, there have been many notable developments in lhat force, particularly concerning new weapon systems. The Soviets have, for example:
Deployed long-range, Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple independently targetablc reentry(MIRVs).
Deployed iheir first sea-based, fixed-wing tactical aircrafl and probably decided to construct their first aircraft carrier capable of handling high-performance aircrafl.
Achieved significant developments in lhe application ofpropulsion to warships
Continued lhe modernization of their fleet throughew class of ballistic missiie submarine, four new classes of general purpose submarines, and four new classes of principal surface combatants
Begunong-range land attack cruise missile capable of being launchedariety of submarine, surface, and air platforms.
The substantial allocation of resources for such programsontinued, and probably growing, recognition by Soviet leaders of the value of naval forces in the attainment of warlime and peacetime goals. These programs also raise questions about ihe future use of such forces and whether their development indicates basic changes in Soviet naval doctrine and strategy.'
Many aspects of Soviel naval developments have already been addressed in publications by individual departments and agencies,
' The termi "naval itntesy"lie <ued .mhu EiTimite in thetewed Dim-
ciolei bv which foicei tie (aided in ibeir idiom In Soviet uui; "millluy doctrine" ind "miliury itrileev" hitweilie rneuUrvts Neither lerrr, iioindindiul lenAcc Millluy doctrine ewniwiwi iiw >lew> ofthe leadership cf lhe Sevier irate on :he nature ol Mure -if and ihe lull ol iheitile ind ihe irmee lorew in piemnng (or ind condumnii iucIiMilitarynUat point to> military itratexy. which direct* the innedhoieornolei rvuem ol inlenkpendenl large-scale itriteste coeiiiiorii Individual lerocei eiecule nutesic aUuioru bui ilwiyi donder Ihe overall unified military irniejy The Soviel Navy'i minima are firmly defined byiaJ militirv Jtratejviiul cannoi he properly undeiPood outride tint eonteii
I
tCftCT
particularly technical studies and short-term assessments. Thc subject is also treated as portions of recent estimates.nd in memorandums (on readiness and on sea lines ofn contrast to those studies the major focus of this Estimate is on the overall significance of current and projected programs for Soviet naval strategy in thend the decade of, including some of the major options open to the Soviets for performing critical naval tasks. (Nonnaval responses to the maritime threat facing the USSR, such as air defense against sea-launched land attack missiles, are treated only peripherally in thishe groundwork fo: this assessment is laid by outlining the Navy's currentmajor tasks and the forces that would seek to accomplish them. In addition toasis for examining future developments, an understanding of current forces is especially important for naval estimates because of the long time needed to develop naval systems and thc long service life of ships and aircraft. Most of the submarine and major surface combatant classes and many of the aircraft lhat will be in thc Soviet Navy5 arein service today.
The Soviets recognize that their Navy is facing severe challenges to the performance of its missionsesult of improvements in Western-naval forces, particularly quieter submarines, longer range SLBMs. greater numbers of sea-launched cruise missiles, and improvingsystems. To meet these challenges the Sovietsariety of research and development efforts. Many of these programs have been identified, and we can make some evaluation of their capabilities based on knowledge of past Soviet programs and current technological state of the art. By extrapolating from such information, the general nature of future Soviet naval weapons and sensors can be discussed. Such extrapolations may prove wrong, however, because assessments of evolutionary technical progress may be upset by "breakthroughs" that cannot be predicted on thc basis of an understanding of the current state of the art. This is particularly important in those aspects of theresearch effort, such as nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare and space-based ocean reconnaissance/ target inn, that involve innovative solutions to naval problems. This Estimate considers some of the poteniial consequences of such breakthroughs in key areas andon how the Soviets might attempt to exploit such successes.
Finally, the development of the Soviet Navy will occur within the broad context of changes in thc Soviet system and the international environment.etailed treatment of such subjects is beyond
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the scope of this Estimate, some of the possible relationships between such (actors as the post-Brezhnev succession, economic problems, arms control negotiations, and an increased emphasis on influencingin the Third World have been sketched out, especially as they might affect force procurement.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Over lhe past decade, thc role of the Navy within the USSR's national strategy has continued to evolve, supported bv additional operational experience and an ambitious naval construction program. This program, emphasizing larger ships with increased endurance and technologically advanced weapon and electronic systems, has enhanced the Navy's capability for sustained conventional combat and distant area deployments.
Within the Soviets' overall wartime strategy, however, the primary initial tasks of the Navy remain:
To deploy and provide protection for ballistic missilein preparation for and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear strikes.
To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers.
Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to control all or portions of the Kara. Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland Seas, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and thc Northwest Pacific Basin, and to conduct sea denial operations beyond those areas toilometers from Soviet territory. We believe that virtually all of the Northern and Pacific Fleets' available major surface combatants and combat aircraft and some three-quarters of their available attack submarines would be initially committed to operations in these waters. Other initial naval wartime tasks arc: support of ground forcein the land theaters of miliiary operations (including countering naval support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such asnd some interdiction of Western sea lines of communication.
We believe this wartime strategy will remain essentiallyover the nextoears Strategicprotection of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarinesand strategic defense against enemy SSBNs, aircraft carriers, and other major platforms capable of striking Soviet territory will continue to be the Soviet Navy's primary initial wartime tasks. We expect thesethe need to counter Western units armed with the new Tomahawk land attack cruisedrive the Soviets to expand the area in which their Navy would initially deploy
the bulk of its Northern and Pacific Fleet forces for sea control/sea denialoutilometers from Soviet
A principal portion of the strategic defensedestruction af enemy SSBNs before they can launch their missilespose increasing difficulties for the Soviets. The deployment of hard-target-capable US SLBMs. improved British and French SSBNs, and the first Chinese SSBNs probably will increase thc importance af this task. The Soviel Navy's ability to detect and track US SSBNs in the open ocean, however, probably will decline, at least over the nextears. This is primarily because we believe lhat the increased patrol areas of SSBNs carrying Tridenl SLBMs will more than offset the increased coverage that could be provided by improved Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platforms. We therefore expect that Soviet naval anti-SSBN operations will continue to be modest,elatively few aitack submarines stationed in chok- points or in the approaches to Western or Chinese submarine bases
We believe that Soviet procurement of naval weapons platforms and systems over the period of this Estimate will be driven primarily by requirements stemming from the strategic offensive and defensive tasks outlined above:
The size of the modern ballistic missile submarine force will probably remain roughly constant at aboutnits throughout. In the absence of new arms control restrictions, the number of SLBM warheads is likely la increase.
The Soviets will develop long-range nuclear-armed land atiack cruise missiles capable of being launchedariely of naval platforms. In the absence of arms conlro! restrictions, we believe they will be deployed primarily on newer nuclear-powered attack submarines for use in theater strike roles and possibly for strikes against some targets in the continental United States.
The first unitew class of nuclear-powered aircraft cairier probably will become operaUonal by
Thc number of principal surface combatants probably will decline somewhat, but the trend toward larger average size, greater weapon loads, and more sophistics led weapon and electronic systems will continue.
6
- The overall number ot general purpose submarines will decline but the number of nuclear-powered units probably will grow substantially.
The Navy's overall amphibious lift capability will increase gradually. We expect an increase in the size of the naval infantry from0 to00 men.
One or more new classes of underway replenishment ships will be introduced, but construction of such ships probably will continue toelatively low priority.
The number of fixed-wing naval aircraft probably will increase somewhat, with the major change being the first at-seaor high-performance, conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft. The continued production of Backfireand the introductionollow-on inill be an essential element in the Soviets' attempts to expand their sea control/denial efforts against Western surface forces in viial areas such as the Norwegian, North, and Mediterranean Seas and the Northwest Pacific Basin. Naval Aviation bombers will alsorincipal feature of Soviet antisurface capabilities in other areas such as the Arabian Sea.
Major technical improvements in Soviet fleet air defense are likely. New surface-to-air missiles, guns, and laser weapons will probably be introduced. Fighter aircraft operating from the protected new aircraft carriers willew dimension to the Navy's air defense resources.
Expansion of both sea control and sea denial operations will be supported by gradual improvements in Soviet capability to surveil Western surface units and provide targeting assistance for antiship missiles. Much of thc improvement probably will involve space-based systems.
In addition to its wartime tasks the Soviet Navy will continue to Play .mportant peacetime roles, ranging from routine show-1he-flagits to support for distant-area client states during crisis situations
TV i' uWT GiVCn tHe like,ihood of continued instability in the Third World, the use of such naval diplomacy and power projection techniques probably will increase during.
The most notable change in the Soviet Navy during the period of this Estimate probably will be the introduction of its first aircraft earners equipped to handle high-performance CTOL aircraft. We
believe lhat the primary mission of such carriers will be lo help expand Northern and Pacific Fleet sea control operationseneral war. The carriers will also give the Soviet Navy for lhe first time an ability lo project power ashore effectively in distant areasimited war. Together with other force improvements, they will provide lhc Soviets the option of using naval forceumber of Third World situations against all but thc most well-armed regional powers. We believe thai major Soviet Navy task force participation in Third World conflicts would, however, be restricted to limited war situations in which the Soviets judged lhe risk of escalation to war with lhe United Stales or NATO to be small.
Our best estimate on the future of the Soviet Navy reflects our judgment that the trends we have observed in ship construction, naval doctrine, and strategy over the pastears wil! continue. Among the variables that couldifferent course for the Soviet Navy ofre:
major ASW breakthrough that gives the Soviets the capability to detect and track enemy submarines in the open ocean. Although unlikely throughout the period of this Estimate, such
a breakthrough would substantially increase lhe Navy'so perform the critically important strategic defensive task of destroying enemy ballistic missile and land attack cruise missile submarines before they launched their missiles. It would probably lead to major changes in the way the Sovieis would deploy their general purpose naval forces before and during general war
Arms control negotiations, which could play an important part in determining the role within Soviet strategy and the force composition of the Soviet Navy in. For example, severe restrictions on sea-launched cruise missile characteristics and/or deployment woulderious maritime threat to the USSR and eliminate much of the pressure to conduct sea denial operations at greater distances from Soviet territory.
Severe economic problems, which could leadeduction of Soviet defense spending in.eduction would be likely to result in cuts in the Navy's budgel. perhaps falling heaviest on major surface ship programs such as the expected new aircraft carrier, projected nuclear-powered cruisers, and large amphibious and replenishment ships. The net result of such cuts wouldavy with less capability than the onein our best estimate to control waters beyond the range
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land-based tactical aircraft and to project power in distant eas. Programs considered essential to the Navy's primaryoffensive and defensiveas ballistic missile bmarines. attack and cruise missile submarines, land-based ike aircraft, and ASW-oricnted surfaceould suffer few, if any. cuts.
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best con
IMUMI
DISCUSSION
CURRENT NAVAL STRATEGY ANO PROGRAMS
y the, when ihis Estimate was last produced, Ihe Soviet Navy had evolvedorce primarily oriented to close-in defense of maritime frontiers lo one designed toide variety of naval tasks, ranging fiom stralegic nuclear strikes to worldwide peacetime naval diplomacy Since then, Soviei naval employment within an overall national strategy has continued to evolve, supported by an ambitious naval construction program and additional operational eiperience This chapter describes our understanding of Soviet programs and current naval strategy, particularly how Soviet forces would be employed Initiallyeneial war.
Composition, Organiialion,
2 The primary forces of the Soviet Navy cosaust otallistic missileeneralarge surface combatants, andaval combat aircraft They are organized Inlo fourNorthern. Baltic. Black Sea. and Pacific Fleets (see figure I) The Soviet Navy maintains two standing deployed forces, the Mediterranean andOcean Squadrons, which draw their forcesfrom the Northern and Black Sea Fleets and the Pacific Fleet, respectively.
ontrol of the armed forces of Warsaw Pact counlries in wartime would be transferredoviet Supreme High Command (VGKX with the Soviet Ceneral Stall as its executive agent To give this centralized command structure some flexibility, the Soviels have divided areas of anticipated military action Into geographical entities called theaters of military operationsncluding probably four ocean TVDs (see figureigh commands established in these TVDs probably would directly control those forces whhin their respective areas, except lor those
forces, including nuclear powered rsalhsticemaining under the control of the VCK
believe the Northern Fleet commanderall general purpme military operations in the Aictsc and Atlantic TVDs Some units, such as those involved in amphibious operations,would be subotdinaie to the command of lhe Northwestern TVD. mphasinng operations against Norway Wc believe lhat. for efficient command andigh command would be created for this TVD We also believe that the bulk of lhe Northern Fleet's forces would operate within the Arctic OceanTVD would probably encompass all sea areas north of the Greenland-Iceland-United KingdomK) gap StrategK lorces. including SSBNs andon strategic minions, operating In these ocean TVDs would be under the direct control of the VCK
The subordination of Pacific Fleet forces and the resporaibslity of the lleet commander probably ace similar lo those of the Northern Fleet. Wo believe lhat lhe Pacific Fleet Commander would control all general put pose military operations In the Pacific Ocean TVD. Some units, such is those planned for coeraboos against China aad lhe Japanese islands, probably would bebv the high command of tht Far East TVD. The Indian Ocean Squadron would be subordinate to tbceparate Indian Oceana highwere foroed in the Southern TVD, In which case, tbc squadron would be responsive to the high eommaod As in the Northern Fleet, forcestralegic missions in theOcean TM)e under lhe direct control of the VCK.
The Baltic Fleet, is partombined fleet with lhe Polish sad East German Navies, would be subordinate to ibe high command of lhe Western
NORTHERN FLEET Hajoi Suiface Combatants Aircraft
Figure 1
Klav-Class Airtiafl
Cart nr.
Cruise': Oeiiioyen
Major Soviel Naval Forces'
MBior Sjrface Com data rvts
Cruisers Destroy an
BALTIC FLEET
Be
<Anae* M
Cruise Mlttack
Submarines "ihlc Mtssrfe
B
lilinnjrid
Sa>iitia*r
2-
Ca'iers Ciutaein Oesiroye's
I'lBJlBi
BLACK SEA FLEET Haior Su^aca Combate-iU Aircrafl
Cm. Aatrefl SOI
Suomaioe*f vm Mute* iwpniSo Aiiac* it
'inloroiallan at2 Thai*etl* in <etene Awio-o. we owe' he
XWM CfMU'ti gS Hiaiiitri| and ISO 0Wa> lonbat alit/al iwimiiik.
This theater would rncixnpao primarily oprrationi again* West Germany, Denmark, lhe Renrlui count net. aod France, and NATO fixer* in the BahSc and North Seas
hc Black Sea Fleet, as partombined fleel willi ibe Bukcanao and Romanianwell at (lie forces ol lhe Mediterraneanwould be subocdinate to the btthol tke Southwestern TVD. encompassini pnmatily oper attorn agairul Turkey. Greece, aod Italy, and NATO lorces In tbe Mediterraneani4 Rviidineii FUiluroohv. Although Soviet naval presence has einarsded globally in the pastelatively small portion ol lhc Soviel Navy is still regularly deployed away from borne walrtiargely doe to lhe Soviet approach lo inadincsi. which diflers markedly Irom lhat ol Western navlei Generally linking, the Soviettresses readiness lo deploy lor combat on relatively short notice rather than routine deployment ol li-ae foices Toaiimuin force generation capa-
bility in tiroes ol crisis, lhe Soviet Navy ernphastaes maintenance and in-port/in-area training rather then estended al-sea operations Even Soviet naval units deployed out-ofatea spend much of thesi time at anchor or in port To the Soviet mind, it apparently is more important to be ready lo go to sea than to be at sea Under this system, operational eaprrieoce and some degree of crew proficiency are sacrificedchieve high material availabilityesult of this readiness phikasoohy the Soviets probably would have more than half of their submaiines and maior surface combatants available for combatew days and someerceni within Iwo weeks Wc estimate that, given several days' warning. Soviet Navalwould have more thaneicefit ol*aircraft available, although this perctntaKc could lie sustained for onlyshort timef)
C. Key Aspects of Novoliese of General War. The Soviets' military writings indicate that theyar with
thewould be decisive, be global In scope, and piobably escalateucleai conflict They probabJi expect thaiar would begin in Central Europeeriod ol rising international tensions and would spread to the Far Easi. as China enters to lake advantage of Soviet involvement in Europe. In the Soviet view, thc conflict would probably evolve through four stages:
A conventional phase inATOis checked by the Warsaw pact
A period ol limited theater nuclear war in which lhe Pact detects NATO pteparations lo useweapons and preempts.
A decisive phase with Urge-scale use ol nuclear weapons, both intercorginenudly and wiihin theatet
A concluding phase in which residual nuclear and conventional lorces come into play.
There have been recent indications thai the Sovietsore protracted conventional war phase :hart was anticipated innd
egardless of the length of the conventional phasc, lhe Soviet! piobably doubtar with the West would be decided at the conventional level. Therefore, initial conventional operations would be conducted with an eye toward escalation. During the initial phase of operations the Soviets probably would attempt to destroy wiih conventional munitions as much as possible of thc enemy's theater- and sea-based nuclear weapons and supporting facilities. We do not believe lhe Soviets consider thai the destruction of poteniial strategic assets, luch as SSBNs, during the conventional phase would br resell trigger anto the use of nuclear weapons
j
8 Soviel Wartime taikt. Our examination ofnaval writings, ere?cues and construction trends allows usstimate the Soviet Navy's initial wartime tasksood deal of confidence It also permits an underslandiriK of the Soviets' relative priorities inar with the West. Since, naval eiercues and writings have consistently emphasized specific offensive and defensive tasks to be performed concurrenllv during the first stager of awith NATO These tasks are
To deploy and provide "combat stability" (that is. protection and support) for ballistic missile submarines in preparation for and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear strikes
To defend the USSR and its allies from enemy sea-based strike lorces
To support ground force operations In the landof military operations, includingPact sea linesmmunacahon (SLOC anc preventing naval support to enemy operations in penpheral areas such as Norway.
To conduct some interdiction of enemy sea lines of communication
he pattern of implementation of these tasks undoubtedly would vary from fleet to fleet The Northern and Pacific Fleets would initially bewith deploying and protecting their SSBNs The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, on the other hand, would initially concentrata on supporting operations In ibe land theaters Combating enemy strike groups especially carrier battle groups, approaching the USSR would alsoa)or initial concern of all four fleets
he Soviets teallzeonflict may not .infold as they expect. In thu case, they would be prepared to reexamine their initial force allocations to these tasks However, readiness to conduct strategic strikes, including the protection of their SSBN force, and to attack enemy sea-based nuclear forces would be likely to remain theit malor concerns, regardless of scenario The following paragraphs examine their Navy's principal tasks In the context of thc standard scenario, ai evidenced by iheir writings and militar. eierciKi
trategic Strike
Ll. The Soviets regard strategic strike against enemy land targets as the primary naval mission. This priority stems fiom the Soviet beliefar with the West would probably escalate to the unlimited use of nuclear weapons and from the capability ofballistic missiles {SLBMs) to strikeimpottant targets. According to Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Umon Corshkov, .SLBM' give navies, lor the first lime in history, the capability to directly affect "thc course and even the outcome'*ar The Soviet Navy'sodern SSBNs. over half of whichlass units capable of striking theUniled States while remaining in home waters,otalLBMs.
Every operational SSBN could probably be depl
he day-to-day disposition of Soviet SSBNs is governed by the wartime requirement to generate maiimum force levels on short notice. The Sovie: Navy seeks to maintainercent of its SSBNs in an operational status, with (he remainingercent in long-term repair!
with three weeks' preparation time. To maintain this high state ofelatively small portion of the modern SSBNaboutercentept deployed at sea. However,lass units are probably keptigh stale of readiness in or near home port in order to be ready to fire their missiles on short notice.
silos, and will remain less vulnerable to subsequent strikes.
rotection and Suooort lorhehave long been concerned with the vulnerability of iheir submarines to ASW lorces Soviet authorscite the experience of the two World Wan to reject the notion that submarines can ensure their own survival through concealed operations father, since at least, thev have discussed the need to use general purpose forces, including large surfaceto protect and support or provide "combat stability" to ballistic missile submarines. Such svritings strongly imply that providing combal stability to SSBNs ts an integral part of lhe strategic strike mission and the most important initial wartime taskignificant number of Northern and Pacific Fleet genera) purpose forces.
e believe that the Soviets plan to suppon and protect their SSBNs through an echeloned defense in depth. This defense would likely begin while trie SSBNs are stiil in port and continue as (hey are dispersed and enter assigned operating areas. Surface combatants, mine warfare ships, and ASW aircraft
We believe mosl SLBMs would be targeted against administrative centers, communicationsand industrial and soft military targets, largely because they do not now have the combination of accuracy and yield to destroy hardened militarySome SSBNs. particularly the forward-deployed i'l. probably would participate in initial strikes against the continental United States. Many SSBNs, however, probably would be withheld fnr subsequent strikes oresidual strategic force, ft is feasible thai by using the three Amga-class missile support ships the Soviets could reload some SSBNs that had participated in the initial strikes SLBMs are ideally suited for follow-on strikes, since thev are more likely to survive initial nuclear operations than ICBMs In fixed
probablv would be used lo sanitize SSBN transit routes General purpose submarines probably would escort transiting SSBNs and. along with aircraft,barrier patrols in the approaches lo SSBNareas. Surface combatant task groups also would probably operate in the vicinity of such areas to assist in combating enemy SSNs and ASW aircraft.
Protection of SSBN operating areas entailsto control all or large portions of the Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland Seas as well as the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the area off the Kamchatka Peninsula. It also Involves sea denial operations beyond these areas toilometers from Soviet territory. Some facets of the echeloned defense, such as the operation of altack submarines in proximity to SSBNs and protection of the waters near the ice edge, would serve only one mainprotection ofthe only Western units likely to be in such areas would be those attempting to attack the SSBNs. Most of the units involved in thc echeloned defense, however, would also contribute to other important tasks, particularly thc defense of Soviet territory from attacks byforces and the prevention of naval support to Allied operations in peripheral areas such as Norway and Korea. Attack submarines, aircraft, and anycombatants operating nearK gap, for example, would seek to destroy any Westernor major suiface combatants detected, thereby protecting both the SSBNs and the Soviet homeland. Forces operating in these waters, therefore, would be accomplishing several important tasks at the same time.
We believe that virtually all mafor surface combatants and combat aircrafi available in the Northern and Pacific Fleets and some three-quarters of their attack submarines would be Initiallyto conducting "sea control" and "sea denial" operations in these waters (seend accompanying texteaving relatively few units available for operations in areas such as the North Atlantic and Central Pacific. Given Ihe likelihood that many SSBNs will be withheld from initial strikes, the requirement to protect SSBNs could tie downassets for an extended period The Soviets probably would be reluctant to release substantial forces from this task until most missiles had been launched, they
perceived that the threat had significanlly lessened, or the course of the conflict dictated increased emphasis on other tasks.
here are indications which suggest that duringleet's assets not assigned to deployed squadrons or "Independent'* operations relatively far from thc Soviet Union would operate as "mixed force" groups We do not fully understand how theof the general purpose forces, normally under fleet control, will be meshed with those of thcCK asset. The fleet commander probably would be responsible for coordinating the operations of the separate groups The Soviets probably intend that this structure would result In simplified transitionartime posture, improved responsiveness to rapidly developing situations, and increased flexibility inallocations, particularly in the support and protection of SSBNs
E, Strategic Oetense
nti-SSBN, The Soviet Navy's most critical defensive task is Ihe destruction of enemy SSBNs before thev can bunch their missiles. The Soviets probably recognize, however, lhat thereide gap between the importance of this task and the capability of their current forces to carry it out Soviet writings acknowledge the enormous firepower present iningle Western SSBN, and we believe they recognize the desirability of attacking such units during the conventional phase of hostilities. They also probably recognize, however, lhat thev do not now have the capability to detect US SSBNs operating in open ocean areas or to maintain coniact or trailhance detection occurs. The deployment of the US Trident missile system, whose greater range opens up even larger ocean areas that must be searched, further complicates the Soviets' Usk The Soviet Navy,the magnitude of tlie problem and Iuprobably will concentrate iU antl-SSBN efforts on choke poinU and the approaches to enemy SSBN bases, rather than attempting to search larger ocean areas. On occasion, surface combatanU, attackintelligence collectors (ACIsX and aircraft have conducted joint ASW operations off the Bockall Bank, west of Ihe US and British SSBN bases near Holy Loch, Scotland, during major exercises. We have also seen joint ACI-SSN operations off SSBN bases in the United
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
Ihc Pacific Ocean
i"ti tu
Stalesthat the Soviets .null
Stationlollrction ships nuclear attacLi-Auhtv even surface combatants oil Western bases mi thrreceding hostilities Bad attempt lu delect and iml SSBNi leaving, pott Once hwhlihci commenced, thev would attack anylliO tbcy hdil In contact Soinu ul their Uvsi ASW Submarine* pi.ili.iliU woiiM be .neil in this effoit.
CUMM
> IP^
' Denial
number would be una II retativ, to the number committed to protect Soviet
nticarrier. The Soviet! continue lo have great iriwi foi II* airtrafl carrier'* imparlance in US naval strategyegard the aircraft carriers not only as ihe backbone o( Aitienciin garteral purpose iu..il lorces. but jIm> an Important nuclear reserve
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TW tenos "seaadderul' we tubeecti- .rr, of interpretit ions.tatc is considered to have "sea control" in an atea If II ii able lo sustain surface combatant aod meichant ship ooeta-taoej there with relative teciaitty.onsidered to exercue "seaf it prevents such use of the area by Its opponent
The terms "sea control" and "sea denial" are used in tba Estimate to indicate Ine type of sural effort lhe SovieU probably expect to conduct in various mantlme areas al lhe beginningATO-Warsaw Paci war Areas labeled "sea control* are those In which the Soviets probably Intend lo operate surface forces, as well aa submarines and naval aircraft, for an indefinite period Areas labeled "sea denial" are those in which the Soviets probably expect Ihe major share of lhe combat to be conducted bv lubrctf irei and land based strike aircraft Surface ship operations in these "tiers will ba either nonexistent orhort duration al lhc Initiation ol hostilities. The term "leas intensive leasedower level of elv submarines.
The delineation of these areas is heavily influenced by the impact of geography on Soviet naval operations Tbe otitic and Black Sea Fleets are seperaled from open 'xcan areas by narrow mails thai would be under Western eontiol at lhe beginning ol hostilities.Fleet uaiU would have lo transitK gap il ihey wished to reach Use North Atlantic MoH of the Pacific Fleer units areimilar situation, with only Petiopivlovsk having direct access lo the open Pacific
The Northernnaior consider anon in Northern Fleet operationsATO control of the pausiei between Creenland, Iceland, lhe Faroes, and ihe Uniied Kingdom. Soviel wartime opersboni In the region of these waten would be likely to Involve primarily submarines, which would attack NATOrae. to enter the Norwegian Sea thiouzh ibex pusiRei Operations in this area would contribute to wverU tasks, including protecting Soviet SSBNs aad territory and countering Western naval support to NATO farces in Norway. This area probably would alioocus for antiship operations by Backfire bombers, which aie much better noted thaa the older Badgers to deal with the likely air defense environment In thu area. Also Backfire and other bomber ullicVs can be expected on ASW. early warning, and air defease facilities In the gap area- Operations within the sea control area are likely lo involve surface whips,urines, and strike aircraft Farther north the SovieU probably intend lo use geegtarsriic features such as the Ice edge and Soviet taaadi such as Novaya Zemlra to laahute the operation o* theu forces.
Ine Baltic Fleet. Operaiicos of ibe Baltic Fleet in wartime would be heavily influenced by Western conirol of tin* natrow Danish strain and by the pioitm-ilv of ihe Baltic lo maior ground and air operation) in Oftril Europekefv thai rhe major effort of the Fleet andast Cermtn aad Polish Na>ie< -ould be directed at controlling the Baltic through the use of surface units, submarinesariety of aircraft, ircludirtc aaval fighter bembeu The Pactalao attempt to deny NATO lhe use of the North Sea as an operating area for aitetafl carriersraiuit area, loi amphibious groups ind logistic units. The principaluch oceriixoj probably would be medium com bets, although rhey would have to overfly NATO leirilory Iu reach llsrlt large is Because ol its narrow it rub and shallow walers. the Balticarticularly good area for tbe emplonaeni of mines -
The Black Sea Fleet. The SovieU awl their Romanian and Bulgarian ail'i would employ. submarine, aad air aswu in sea central openrioiuhe Slack Sea Sea denial operations by lhe Soviets in Ihe eastern Medtleirajiean could involveeinforcement of their Meditpjnnein idaieu Ihe Padootrooed the Turk' uh strain, however. Sonet attempts to coniinue sea denial operation* in the eastern Mediterranean would be hampered by lW ddficiutv of remfeeeing the Mediterranean Squadron with additional surface shice and 1 once hosUliliei had begun. Air ooera-liom in the Medileirinean would also bav tbe need (or aircraft based on Pact territcev to penetrate Western air defenses AUhough neniiicant numbers of Soviet surface uniu would be involved in initial Operations In the Mediterranean, the SovieU probably do not expect ihese -ould survive moreew days The brunt cf ihe rabieqoeot tea denial ellort would be earned by submarines and aircraft.
The Pacific Fleet Soviet eontiol ol the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk woiid depend oc leabne off seven) narrow waterways, ranging from the Koieahe soulh to the Kuiil Strait al the Up of tlie Kamchatka Pedum la Sea control operations would iho be ceo ducted easi of the Kamchatka Peninsula to protect lhe approaches to Pettopavlonk, thc only in.lor Soviel naval bus with direct access lo the open ocean Sea denial operation would also be conducted in the Yellow Sea aad the northwestern Pacific The outer edae of the sea denial area is less easily defined than in othereas because such efforts cannot be focused en narrow waterways through which Western units meat put
Iy
iiii couldlgnificanl role in determining: lhe outcome of the final phases of Isastilitm Writingsexercise activity indicate lhat thc Soviets esiiect US carrier battle groups to undertake vigorousactions in the maritime approaches to the USSR They believe lhal carrier battle groups would attempt lo use llie Norwegian, llie North, and Ihe eastern Mediterranean Seas and the northwestern Pacifsc Ocean lo attack Warsaw Pact territory, deployed naval forces including SSBNs and their support "it forces, and Pact ground force operations. Destruction of aircraft earners, then.ritical element of several important Soviet naval tasks, (s)
ruise missile submarines and strike aircraftairto-suifacr missiles (ASMs) arc the Soviets' pn rnary anticarrier weapons. In addition to moreaval Backfire (see irtsel and figurend Badger strike aircraft, some elements oJ thc Soviet Air Forces (SAK) ond Air Armies ol the VCK (AAVCK) are also assigned maritime strike tasks (see figureAVCKircraft have been involved in simulated strike missions againsi nnv.il Uriels during recent Northern and Pacific Fleet eseicises One Hear squadron has been modified to carry the AS-4same missile carried by the Backfire Wc believe lhatheoAVCK Bear B'Ci wiR be modified for this capability by the
mid-lWtOi SAK Badgers and Blinders have also been
involved in antiship eiercise* Is nf wn)
Figure 5
ackfire Bomber WithnlKhip Missile
The Backfire
The tntiodurison ol lhe Reel (tie bom let4 Into Ihe Navy ilgnlllcantly improved Soviet strike cipala.li> against NATO surface forces. Becaeae of the modern higher speed ait tn-sj'fice missile rl carrtei. in vatiable flight profiles, ils maneuverability, and its hush tpml eapabililies and electronic counter measures (KM)rouipmenl. thereater pfobih.li Iv ol penetrating iir avoiding NATO naval air defenses and attacking, targets ia lhe open ocean lhan doe, ihr Hadcerf)
Somelretalt are In service withnd additional aircraft air beingal the raltt ol aboulel year SN*curterilly O'utsiaed into lour completein Ihe Balticbe Black Sea andtheillh regiment is luting fortned inFleet For wartime operation! (be Sovietsaircraft irom their oc*:r'Iocs
ii-hh iv those arras from which they could lies'estern luHace unils. especially LS earlier battle groups Thr Soviets often deploy Backfire* from oneres to atiother lor esemses; in part teniae Baltic Fieri aircraft annually deploy to Northern Fleet halesg| wa.)
slihoiigri theapable ofiiwit nfbombs and "
anustiiphe Ay4 mimic thean be armed withanaentionat orpeed c4fas. andhoimuPi nf ntllomrlci Iniiai'iUaekfnc ptobsbKcarts ow ot two o'rarankes To concenirale then dirt"theFiieahh would nt'ack tan arc battleal Ic-sl One leglmenlairctafl) and orefrrabii rareiBackfire ceynabeen wet ocean armmi. rare, the airciali haicipa lee1 in some ariliahii) eseroiiei .ntaimt Sonet units Ir September lttt> ihc dm uw of the BackfiretnUcjinei luttle gtaop occurred wlien Pacificnjvi.i'iill oi the Kuril Iaksasff W
i<unili>ibtcdh new the Backfire Ma.it "Inirtort' "cMon
utiwi Uillaf croups Irom Vrihng impiaiirrt tatceti mllii" thi; Sovidts Thell continui-tn In .in rwiitial feature ot So. ret antisurfacr capubih Iwcmi%jt> sm+ li the NM-Tfljaa. Medatieas ami llie S'oithsvetl Pacific Oram, tu
21
a wartime, then: forces would attack carrier battle group! crossing fleet defensiveilometers Irom Soviet territory Antiship- missile-equipped surface combatants would also be used in areas where they ire in proiimity to US carrier battle groups at the outset ol hostilities or as carrier battle groups approach Soviet sea control areas. Soviet doctrine emphasizes preemptive or "first salvo" strikes against carriers before they can launchThe Soviets would attempt to use tactical surprise and coordinated multiple missile strikes on different threat axe* to overwhelm battle group
f. Support for Lend Theaters of Millrory Operation* (TVDs)
lthough the Soviet Navy has acquiredimportant strategic offensive and defensive tasks, support for combined-arms operations in theTVDsaior responsibility of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleetsecondary responsibility of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. In wartime, the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets would loin wiih navies of other Warsaw Pact nations to form the Combined Baltic and Combined Black Sea Fleets, respectively. Tbe broad objectives of these combined fleets would be to gain control of the Baltic and Black Seas and to help secure access to lhe North and Mediterranean Seas, lit the Baltic, initial naval operations would focus onof NATO submarines, missile-armed patroland naval aviation forces. Western carrier, battle groupa would become primary targets as they moved into the North Sea. Amphibious landings in support of ground and airborne attacks on West Cermany and Denmark also ate likely. In tbc Black Sea, initial naval operations would focus on supporting the movement of ground forces along the western littoral and assisting in seizing tbe Turkish strait* Romanian and Bulgarian naval forces would beresponsible for patrol duties along their own coasts. Tbe Soviet Black Sea Fleet would assistSquadron operations against Western carrier battle groups and amphibious forces. The Northern Flee* would abo conduct amphibious operations in support of giound forces operations against northern Norway. The wartime role of the Pacific Fleet's amphibious forces is lets well understood. These forces could be used for the tenure of key straits such as La
Perouse or could be retained lo defend Soviet coastal regions.
G. Interdiction ofLines of Communication (SIOC)
he So wets view SLOC irsterdictioness urgent task than providing combat stability for their SSBNs and defeating the West's nuclear-capable naval strike force* Tbey believe that Warsaw Pact forces would defeat the main grouping of NATO forces In Centra! Europe or Ihe war would escalate to theater nuclear conflict before NATO's seaborneand resupply of Europe or US forces in the Far Eastritical factor.ewprimarily dieseltherefore beto open-ocean SLOC interdiction from the outset of hostilities The Soviets probably plan to use such unili for attacks on shipping primarily to disperse and tie down NATO naval forces, and to reduce the efficiency of NATO military shipping. Some mining against European ports, primarily by aircraft, abo is likely Such actions prebably would be intended to complicate NATO naval operation* and facilitateof the Pact* more critical initial tasks'The Soviets could increase their emphasis on SLOCbefore orar with tbe United States and its allies in response to their perceptionhanging stralegic situation. One dicumstance that would motivate the Soviets to widen their emphasis on SLOC interdiction would be the lengtheningarrotracted conventional conflict Another clr-cumstanee mightonflict that beganrolonged period of rnobiiiralion during which NATO began the reinforcement and reaupplv of Europe bv sea. Inase, lhe Soviets might see interdiction as an urgent task at the beginning of hostilities, but an increased inteidiclion effort would be at the expense ol SSBN protection and the defense ol the Soviet homeland
H. Novo! Diplomacy in Peacetime ond Limited War
n addition to its wartime tasks, tha Soviel Navy is assigned the important peacetime role of serving as an instrument of state polky or. in more traditional terms, conducting naval diplomacy. Today. Soviet naval forcesontinuous presence in lhe Mediterranean Sea. the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic off West Africa, and thc Soulh China Sea. They alio
Figure 7
So.iei Ship-Diys Inm, b>
Figure 8
eployment ol Soviel Naval
cnn
I nSMnOnin
I Iajtaaa
dinMH4Hna.Mli
.
ll II tily. lib).
Imi
miUM. VitMM.
GS, d. .vnn Mi iv
JI. ll I
coo
mere
Illl'l^l,
depJcroenb lo the Caribbean (tec figurethe level ol presence bai fluctuatedbetween seogiapbirgro.mg in themi PgcitV and declining in therrof Soviet luifacr ship and
submarine presence in distant areai has remained relativclv stable4 Operations by Soviet naval aircraft have increased considerably0 (see IWiie 8) t-ot-areo operation* ol thc Navy
continue to reflect the Soviets' interesl in strengthen ing their position in the Third World (especially In areas of potential Westernalancing Western presence, and coumering potential siiaicgic ihreats. Although strategic mlhlary concerns remain prominent in Soviet distant operations, narticulady In the Mediterranean, the Navy Is performingimportant tasks related to thc projection ol Soviet power and influence in the Third World. !s)
In addition to routine show-the-flagand port visits, Soviet naval forces havesupport for friendly ruUons and sought to inhibit the use of hostile naval forces against Soviet allies During recent Third World crises the Soviets have augmented their naval presence in thc areas of conflict: the Angolan civil warhe Ethiopian-Somali conflict, thend tlie Iranian hostage crisis. Such use of Soviet naval forces Is likely to continue in future distant-area crises. We do not believe, however, that the SovieU would deploy major naval forces in responsehird World crisis in an area other than the Mediterranean and possibly the Indian Ocean, if they fudged the crisisigh risk of escalation to general war with the West The Soviets would probably fear that, if war broke out, such forces would be out of position to perform the initial wartime tasks of protecting SSBNs and the sea approaches to the USSR.
Power Projection. Although Soviet amphibious forces were developed to conduct assault landings on the maritime flanks of the USSR in support of ground theater operations, they could undertake assaultagainst limited opposition in many areas of the Third World. The amphibious exercises conducted on Socotra Island in0 and in cooperation with the Syrians in1 demonstrate an interest inodest capability for distant-area projection. The Soviet Navy has never conducted large-scalelandings away from the periphery of the USSR. Exercise ZAPAD-S1 in thc Baltic, however,arge-scale amphibious exercise that for the first time used ships drawn from all four Soviet fleets. Units involved Included the aircraft carrier Kiev, thecarrier Leningrad, and the amphibious assault ship Ivan Rogov. We believe one of the purposes of this unusual gathering of forces was to test planning concepts for amphibious operations in distant areas. It is still doubtfuloviet amphibious task force could carryuccessful landing abroad againsi substantial opposition, in large part because of thc lack of adequate tactical air support, cither land- or sea-based.
I. Trends in Nervol Programs
Navy's share of lhe growing Soviethas remained basically unchanged in ieccnt
ercent. Much of this share has been devoted to ship construction programs,ariety of surface platforms ranging from small patrol crall lo large cruisers. The lion's share of the constiuc-tion budget, however, continues to be devoted lo submarines (see.
he most notable trend over the decade has been an evolution toward what Admiral Gorshkovavy capable of fighting at both the nuclear and conventional level as well as protecting state interests in peacetime. As late as the, the Soviet Navy could be describedleet with capabilities maximizedhort, intense war thai rapidly escalates to the use of nuclear weapons Thc small weapons loads and limitedof most surface combatants severely limited the Soviet Navy's ability for sustained combat. In, however, new classes of generally larger, more sophisticated ships incorporating greater endurance, larger weapon leads, and extensive communication and electronic warfare systems began to enter service, resulting in enhanced capabilities for sustainedcombat and distant-area deployments.
SSBNj. Beginning in thethrough the, the Soviels allocated considerable resources to the construction of SSBNs. During this period, thc coristnjction rate of Y-lass SSBNs averaged about five per year andfor more than half of Soviet nuclear submarine construction. Allhough construction rates have tapered off and SSBN force levels have stabilized tothe level agreed to in therotocol ofnitsaunch tubes, the SSBN force still receives significant emphasis, as evidenced bv the continued construction ofI! and the new Typhoon-class (see.
lass scriesII being the latest modification) is basically an extensionlass SSBN lechnologyIs have entered the fleet, and an additional two to three are expected. The Typhoon, on lhc other hand, is the USSR's first entirely new SSBN design sincelassl Is probably somewhat quieter than earlier SSBNs and incorporates features that indicate an intention to conduct underice operations, including surfaced launches from within tbe ice pack. The Typhoon is designed to carryLBMs Thehree-stage, lolid-propellant missile with
BEST Copy AVAILABLE
Figure
Sotiei Naval Spending
iar>liic*emimird
UtfCM, OIT.uV
independently iargelaWe reentryMIRVitellar-aided inertial guidance
lhal will probably give il unproved accuracy over olher Soviei SLBMs The fustn tea Uiali
and probably will achieve initial nperallunal capability (IOC) when Hi missile finishes il* lestut certainly4 The second Typhoon was launched innd anolh ef two or three units are under constriielton As many asnits could bo upcralional by the1 it wu)
o maintain lhe number of launch tubesunder [he terms ol theen in Agree menl, as new SSBNs have begun sea trials, the Soviets have dismantledlass SSUNs by removing the entlie missile compartment. One unit ha* been rmin figured bv the insertionew midsection, anil another is undeigolnst probable conversion/modifies -lion There is insufficient evulence al this time lo indicate the purpose ol ibis conversion/modification ot thehe other Y's Kcconfiftiiralion nf some as SSNs is one option, conversion as wa launched ciuise missile (SLCMJnother. Additional
Y's will be ilimsril.nl if lhe Soviets decide to continue adherence lo theccords 0
tlackhe Soviels are currently producing two classes of SSNs,II andlass The VIII, an extensive modification of the earlier VIesign, first became operational9 Il may become Ihe first Soviet submarine classowed passive sonar array greatly increasing ilsdetection range over thai of eiisting hull-mounted sonaill construction may lontlnu*4otal ol as many asnitsr wu)
tasi SSN Is lhe world's faslcit submarine ami probably the deepest diving (with an estimated operating deptheters) The fust unit was launched in9 in Leningrad bul was subse-qoendy dtunanlled because of initial technical diffi cutties Byix units had become operational in Ihe Soviet Northern Fleet In addition to lhe use of titanium alloyasc pressure hulk, an improved reactor and improved propulsion system have been installed The energy required to drivepeed ofonotsachinery iiower
FiEnre 12
Typhoon SSBN FiringLBM
on lhe order of twice lhat of earlier Soviet SSNm production i* continuing at two ship yards,ola! ofrnilj li expected (r> HP wn)
uiwnanne under eonuiuetinn at the Umted Adtnitahv Slupvaid in Leningrad It estimated lo lie lhe lead unitew SSN class thai couldn 1M4 Ihis new submarine probablyroduction follow onthelass SSN series, it Is likrdv loteel bullubmerged displacement greater than that ofll.r.)
cries production of lhc Tango SS and Hit rod ikf tbeclass SS arr indicative of theintention Io irlain dlcse) (towered submarines while phasing out llw W-classes of. Theroduced to date) is the largest ne* construction class of Soviet diesel-electric -powered at tad. submanne androdudioii Inllow-on Iolass SS. Tango lus approximatelyercent mote pressure hull volume thanhm. pel milting incirased suhmerged endurance and improved vrnvur. and weapons Tlielags' was launched<
ami Itccaineons' sub-
merged displacement,serceni larger than the V. but considerably smaller than the Tango We estimatelass SS will (ill Soviet lequiremenlstiediiiin range diesel submarine replacingiasses -nd may abo br produced for export is
M WNj
I',
.Sn-
Cp
SCNs. In April IWO lhc SovietsWat imwcred cruise miisile submarine ISSCVlass (seehat is twice at large as ars of linn previous SSCNs It hasissile launchers (three titties the number earned hy Ihe I. IIlass) for theew antiship supersonic iruiv missileange ofautical milcl (nOO to .VSO kilometeuklasi is quieter than earlier Sovietri units is
anrj
Soviets
.mo
currently hove active building programs for at least seven classes ofurface combatants. The fourth ImiiNmii; th, Kiev class aircraft
Mgalg^Agpgcgasi
Figure 13
0-Clau SSGN Launching
(roni earlier units of thc class in (he improvednd early warning radar suits IO he in-Stalled. The second and probably last unit of tlte Kirov-class guided-missilelso fining out. Unlike rhe first unit, it is equipped with an as-yct-unidciitificd vertically launched weaponurface-to air missilehree units (if thetuidi-il-niissili; cruiser are under con-struction. Like lhe Kirov and Kiev classes, lhc BLKhips are multipurpose platforms armedi> of antisubmarine, anlisiiip. and an defense weapons Two classes of guided-missile destroyer, the Sovremcnnyy- and lhc Udaloy. aie also in series pro-iluclinn Tlie Sovrcmennvy is best suited forwarfare- It is equipped with thc SSigh-per foi ma nee antiship cruise missile Hearing lhe end of its test program, theAM system,m gun possibly capable of firing guided munitions (sec photograph on. The Udalov is best suited for antisubmarine warfare using itsissiles and Iwo Helix helicOplei? Production of BLKiivrernennvv. and Utlaloy >hip$ will [irnhahly continue through the. decade Construction of thc
Khvak-class guided-missile frigate and live Crisha-class light frigate Is drawinglosen)
mphibifiutmphibious forces in the Soviet Navyower priority than the Submarine, air. and surface combatant programs Neve ride less, (he Soviets continue to make gradual improvements in these forces Consiruciion of ihc Nan Rogov class, thc Soviets" largest amphibious ship, proceededery slow pace and probably ended after thc recently launched second unit. The Ivan llogov has several unique featuies, however, lhat may indicate theof future improve merits in Sontrl amphibious capabilities. These include the ability In carry helicon lers and air cushion vehicle landing craft The Soviets have an active program (or the development and production of air cushion vehicles Construction of Hopucha-clais amphibious ships for Soviet use has resumed in Poland In addition, thc Iwoing-in-mound vehicles being developed in 'lie Caspianarc piobably naval subordinated While such unils couldide range of maritime applications because of their high speed and load capabilities, use
29
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^iKi*4
amphibious warfare It among the more likely intendedevelopment in recent years has been lhe use of commercial roll -on/rollRo-Ro] cargo ships duung amphibious exercises Then has alsoroiganizalion'be Sovicl Naval InFantryrimarily to Improve fiiepower, which has resultedoderate increase in personnel strength and tbe upgrading of the three western fleets* SNI resnrnenli into brigades The Soviel Navy does not have enough amphibious ships lo lift all of the SNI. If. however, amphibious ships svere combined wiihRrtltns and bar tiell ol the naval infantry and nearly three motorized rifle divisions could theoretically be caused Sotne ground force units routinely Train ciiher for amphibious assault landings or. more usually, as followup lorcesf wn)
Shim. Construction ufships is sporadic and alsoowerthat uf vurtacc combatants and submarinesimportant unit built in recent yean baon multipurposecompleiril7 No luriher units of thisbeen built, noi aie any other underwavsltlp< known In be under torisl ructionol iVetWic support shipi capable ofstrategi, and iil missilesombalaniiunaII Ihe generally low priorityiirolulililinked withol Soviel naval practice andicjiv reliance on merchant (ankers toopehe .nteiilion in operate manvreblivrli ckee In Soviei lerrilcey. and atheiihLelv lo be so prolonged lhalat sea unuld affect its outcomeptoliahh .ilso pieler Iu improvenn naval cuniUilaim hv changes in thei.ither ihanemphasizing llieolnn-const iw tiimants sued as lhe Kiruv amii> nucleai power (Kirov) and
nisuli I'uilv KM
Cr.mliatmtts and Wine WarfareSmirlito tegvatd fiiali surface* rut riuih-ail air units asorta na oilv an- |iarlmiLHv useful Inidaters n| tin-nd HIjcL Seal, but thev
aie also assigned important roles in the echeloned delense of Soviet Iriritory and SSBN operating areas in thc Northern and Pacific FVrt aieas Small sutlacc combalants now in series production include lhe Na-nuchLa. Matka, .md Tarantut |seeiiiidcd-missale par.ro> comhdlantv. equipped primarily for antiship operations, and the Pauk and Muravev boats, whiw inaio' role ii ASW Mine warfare uniti in production itrhidc the Natya and Sonya class mine-swccpeis. and lhc Soviets are. also continuing Iua hehcoptei mine counter measuresarge lumber ul naval units aie also capable of mincUiine is if
il Xaial Avialion. The most sigmlicant receni drvclppineuf was lhe begiiinirig7 of const nit lionatapult and arresting, gear lest facility al the Naki naval air-use in llie Crimea This project prolxi bis will be completedith the lirst aircraft bunchesIaiOr iiidiCiXcir of Smlei intenllon* to construct an aircraft carrier capableeiatmg conventional laleofl and landingi rti-per foietail (seeil Conu'itctioii ulhip niai soon begin at Nikola
on Ihe Black Sea Another facility at Safci. best
as reccnih been identified as an aircraft ltd jumpski mp inch as trial on the Britishnsed to increase, llie pa. loadwi-hai radius of veiiical/siiorl laltolf and landuniSTOI.Iriirciafl Tlie ski rump fadliti may he rrlateil
stent
KSTEOT
twini
to Ihe divtl-Jitetetii ol an improved VSTOL amiafl. primariW (in use on Kiev-elm* aircraft earner*
i
he brn-ehalso continuing llie gradual inlroductiou of lk-ir If ire- medium Immher* andoot, miri'aircrafl into Ihcir bid-based naval pviMtoai Fmgvt tietnei-lnnnbeis aie being bniil foi service in Kirv-clau shiiiv arid deploymenteu
shipr-wie. Ink-rnHer the Helix, has begun tier figure i'lmoil nl tin lleiiv lieiicoplrri i.be mil lur Mime will be evil figured U>
p4uae data ti* antiship missiles, and Mini.
uill Ih-ilii"n* aixmli and Iransporl versions
is
J. Command, Control, and Communlcolions II. Tin-i. uilnrct to llie samt ccntratira-tioii nf aullenits lint cliai.iii.eri/cv mini Soviel mili-
tary opeiaiions. dependsmoothly functioning command, conlrol. and ccenmunseal ora system TV Soviets nonetheless recognize ihc potential weakness inighly cen* rail ted system CooveQurntly Soviet nasal commanders of general purpove forces at ihr fleel and group levels probably enioy some gri-aier lalitude in lactical command and control totheir warfare tasks Naval forces arepu'heater concept but the control of strategic elements ol the Navy remains centralized. Soviet doctrine stresses the need lor reliable, flexible, rednl. and survivable conlrol of naval lorces Thus, thr Sun el Navy's command, conlrol. and communications Structure includes features such as the hardening of command posts and communications facilities and lhe use of mobile command posts and communications units Hcceni cltotls la further improve this structure have included
The continued constiuction of bunkered com nvand posts at eebetom ranging from the Slur. Naval Slaff lo flolillas
Thr ixilabdily of large numbers of communes tiOiM vans at lite national and fleet levels In augment nunmunicaiioni and support field(lenmaasd postv
maiorships withmr
i is capabilities that provide for flexible vcjo mil la ltd ami control
ni-xitdcaliori uf submarines lorteljs Threelass ballistic misulc >iii>in.iiiiiit (Viltslune foimet Hi lassaw hvvii lumllfuel for such use Further we Mmi thai lie- Soviets ate interested in develop itieiit nl sulnuarinr coilnnaiid
i'cliipiiieiti ol probable airborneixrslv Trie brsl Suchoth liedail, was identified8
Iv-stitoJodiliedears an
.urinific riMiitimc minimi meal tons tela> plat turn
IX-vi-lriiKiii-nl ami use nf new and uiplusticaled omiinnimhich offer increasedreliahililv. ami seiuril*
limii'itlf t mi iat'0<i to i'.'in.>w 1 and conlioli wil
o*i problem area in the command, control, ind communication! system Is the lack ol continuous communications with deployedetpeciallv SSBNi Tu deal with this problem, the Sovseti are probably developing an ELF system that will act as an ideal alerting system enabling Soviet submarines In remain at safer patrol depthsrisis
utomated Sallfe Management. Sovietsttesses the commanders reiprmsibillly to achieve the miiimum possible combat effectiveness from his limited resources Soviet naval cc*rurianders at all echelons aie expected to achieve this bv the detailed management of forces in battle. For this battle management, the Soviet Navy seeras to be relying increasingly on computer-aided mathematical combat models as decision aids Such models were probably first used at thu Moscow level during thexercise.8 they were in use at lower echelon, shore-based ceearnand posts, and their cautious introduction into oc*iaitoni) use at sea was probably beginning Potentially thev offer significant improvement in the Quality and timeliness of naval command and control, although there are numerous practical problems in their implementation. Theavailability of small, high-speed, large-memory computers and ol sophisticated computernetworks is likely to alleviate scene of these problems.
K. Soviel Or rem Surveissunc*
he Soviel ocean surveillance lysiem (SOSS) is designed to provide information on the location,and movements of foreign naval forces, especially thosehreat to the Soviet homeland or forces Thc most important elements in the system are land-based SIGINT stations, space-based EL1NT and indar satellites. ACIs, and lecon na usance aircraft Ships of the merchant and fishing fleets can also be tasked lo conduct surveillance. Among Ihe recent Improvements In the system have been:
Tbe addition of land-based SIGINT stations in Vietnam and South Yemen
The construction of the Soviet Navy's largest and most capable AGI. the Balaam Two units of this class are in service,hird ii being buill
An increase in the number of naval unils capable of receiving targeting data directly from
Growing access to and use ol foreignin Cuba. Angola, Ethiopia. Soulh Yemen,andSoviet naval airoperations.
Such tmpiovemcnfs have reinforced the major strength of the SOSS. its ability to detect and identify surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, operating in or approaching waters from which they could strike tlic Soviet Union Its value against surface ihips can still be reduced by Weston cover and deception techniques such as emission conirol (EMCON) against SIGINT collection Radar uteUite* are also amited bv weather and by the dilficullv ol identifying contacts The major weakness of the SOSS. however, remains its lack of any significant capability to detect deployed submarines, especially in open-ocean areas such as the central Atlantic and Pacific
I. Rodio-Electronic Comboi
he operations of Soviet naval forces and the design of their electronic equipment are deeplynccd by the Soviet concept of radio-electronic(BEC1 This concept emphasises lhe importance of both denying the enemy lhe use of his electronic systems and of protecting Soviet systems fiomThe REC concept applies equally to sensors and to command, conirol. and communications systems This concept has broader application than the Western notion of electronic warfare (EW) and includesintegrated use of
Atlacks on enemy electronic emittersEMCON
Surprise
Mullisensor integration.
Redundancy of command, control, and
Active electronic countermeasures (jamming)
Passive electronic couniermeasuies {cbafI).
Dace pi Ion. to include decoys.
The prime focus ol this concept is to ensure that Sovie: forces can opeiate more effectively than their oppo-
estrf"
newsommon EW environment Ideally this would be accomplished bv ensuring 'he rel.tlninv or Soviet command, control, and communicator.,temt exposed to hostile EW through jrn proofing> of the Soviets' own equipment, togclhei with ofleuuve EW and covert tactics to degrade enemy electronic systems Although the Soviet! have encountered problems with both REC equipment and training, ihey regard RECundamental principle of modern electronically dependent warlare and vital to the success oi naval operations.
II. FACTORS BEARING ON THE FUTURE CF THE SOVIET NAVY
A. PoSticoi and Economic Cfvsnges
As Soviet leaden formulate their naval plant for the period of live, they lace major political and economic uncertainties. They view thc fluid international situation astrong naval posture, both to protect established Soviet interestso exploit situations in which the use of na*al forces can increase Soviet influence Soviet perceptions of Western and Chinese naval improvements and of opportunities for the use ol naval forces in the Third World are likely to be among the arguments for continued qualitative improvement in Soviet mariiime power On the other hand, problems in the Soviet economy probably will increase the opportunity costs associated with defense. To maintainodest rate of economic growth the Soviets must allocate more resources to capital Investment and improve labor productivity Thc competing demands forresources could be reflected in domestictension, particularlyeriod of leadership transition
national Environment. The Soviets view the international arenahifting combination of threats and opportunities likely to last Indefinitely They will continue to be concerned about the prospect that the United States will augment its defense efforts, including major improvements in both strategic and general purpose naval forces. They probably do not anticipate any substantial improvement in relations with China and believe thai instability is likely to persist in border areas such as Iran and Poland They probably will continue to view the Tbtrd World ai fertile ground for the expansion ct Soviet influence and will align themselves selectively with states and
insurgenthat area. On the whole, the Soviets' expectations regarding internationalprobably will supportraditional belief in the value of military powerornerstone of foreign policy Such expectations probably will favor thc continued development of Soviet naval rjowcr. for both its nuclear and conventional wartime value and for its peacetime role in promoting the image of the Soviet Unionlobal power ind projecting power and influence in distant areas.
conomic Environment Soviet leaders in thcill piobably he operating in an environment characterized by severe economicconstraints- Poor agriculturallower increase in laborow rate of CNP growth, labor shortages, and shortfalls in energy production will require tougher choices amonginvestment, and consumption If defensecontinues lo grow at its historical rateercent annually. thc defense share of CNP could increase from aboutercent to approachercentuch growth would drastically reduce the extent lo which additional resources could be allocated to investment and consumption and would also erode future increments to CNP. Such increments have been important in the past in easing political tensions lhat arise from the competition for resources While there is insufficient evidence as yel tohange in the current rate of growth in defense spending,pressures could resultlower rate of growth. Whde lessero growth rate oret reduction is possible- In any case, within thc amount allocated to defense, any competition among the services for resource allocation would be likely to increase.
be Soviet Navy's case for justifying ils share of resource allocation is likely to Include arguments based primarily on its evolving roleATO-Warsaw Pactneed torowing Western naval threat to Pact territory and foices and lo improve the Soviet Navy's capability to strike ihe United States and its allies. Naval programs will also be supported in terms of their contiibutlon to the USSR's capability to defend and expand Sovietin the Third World during peacetime and limited war situations, but any programs that cannoi be solidly defended as essential to the NATO-Pact scenario are likely to be more susceptible to pruning.
omeitic Political Environment It .ithat Leonid Brezhnev will be In office during the period of greatest interest to thi* Estimate. Huprobably will remitiggle for power that could be leflected in defense policies, ll ii not possible to predict the nature and timing of changes in military policy that might result from changes in national leadership, particularly because Brezhnev's Immediate successor is likely to be himself succeededew generation of leaders in rheof oroo is sparse concerning tbe altitude toward defense of leading contenders in thc succession.as such information extsis it suggests lhat ihey would continue totrong emphasis on military spending. Wo have no specific information on the attitude of leading contenders coocrrmng naval issues During any succession period variations tn policy could occur, ll would, however, be difficult lo change basic prioritiesew leader could consolidate power. During the jockeying (or power the defense effort probably would not be significantly redirected Few aspirants for leadership would tisk antagonizing the military or placing themselvesosition to be accused of selling defense short Once power ishowever, severe economic pressures couldto sharp changes in the diieciioo of the Soviet
defense effort such ai those that took place under Khrushchev
uring Ihc same period of transition in the Soviet political hierarchy there will also be changes in the leadership of the Soviet Navy. Whoever succeeds Admiral Corshkov is unlikely to acquire immediately the high degree of authority that items from Gorsh-kov's continuity as commander of the Soviet Navy6 The viewsew leader, moreover, are likely to have been affectedifferent operaUonal background. Although unv officer succeedingprobably will have had experienceleet commander and will thereby have become familiar with all types ol naval platforms and operations, it is possible thai he will favor some shifts in emphasis in Soviet naval programs and policies. It Is unlikely, however, that the personalities or individual back' gtoundsew Soviet naval leadership would cause major near-term changes in the strategy and programs underlying the Navy's role in Soviet military strategy.
ey Issues facing Soviet Naval
rotection and fie of the SSBN Force. The ability to conduct strategic strike ODcrstions willto be lhe single mow important mission of the Soviet Navy throughout the period ol this Estimate Although sca-iaunched cruise missiles will expand the number of potential naval strategic platforms, the bulk of the Soviet Navy's strategic capabilities willhe SSBN force,eel this force lo be further rocderniied and upgraded through the continuedof Typbooo-clau umts and the irrtrcductioaew. Bv the. Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs will have largely replacedlass force, resulting in
A substantial increase in the number of sea-based stralegic warheads becauselass SSBN typically carries ceuVar heads while one Typhoon carriesS-NXissiles, which could have as manyarheads by lhe
A less vulnerable SSBN force because almost al! units could strike targets in the continental United Slates from within the Arctic icecap aod/or from home waters
he use of the SSBN force Inill be governed largely by the status of East-West arms limitation agreements andin strategic offensive and defensive technologyheimitodern submarine launch lubes remains in effect, the number of SSBNs would declineinlass units would have to be rcttiedore than one-For-one basis tofor eke greater number of tubes earned by new classes of SSBNs In the absence of arms limitation restrictions, we believe thc Soviets would increase the size of the SSBN force along with increases in the rest of their strategic arsenal Moreover, the Soviets may increase the proportion ol thc overall strategic arsenal assigned to SSBNs if:
Improvements in thc accuracy of Western ICBM/SLBMs lead the Sovieu lo judge lhat Iheir SLBMs are increasingly more sutvivablc than ICBMs
Soviet SLBMsard-laigct kill capability.
TCSC-*
n lhc other hand. Ihc Soviets probably would reduce the number of SLUM launchen if armi control negotiation) resultedreaty requiring substantial cuts in the overall stralegic arsenal SLBM reductions probably would be proportionate to cuts in the ICBM force, but could be more severe if
The Soviets perceive lhat the West has achieved an ASW breakthrough that Increases thcof Soviet SSBNs.
Soviet SLBMs do not achieve sufficient hard-larget kill capabilily
Tbe survivability of tbe land-based element of Soviet strategic forces is enhanced through the Intioduction of mobilo ICBMs and/or ABM pro-lection
e believe that the Soviets wUl continue to regard their SSBN lorce as vulnerablenemy ASW foices through. In this time frame, the SSBN force will consist primarily of older D-nits will compose over three-quarters of :he force,lass units will still constitute well over half of the force. Therequirement to protect and support these SSBNs Is unlikely to change Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs will be quieternd D's and thus less vulnerable to acoustic detection. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Soviets will regard them as capable of ensuring their own survivability The Soviets probably foresee no slackening in Western interest in ASW and oped that tbe positive effects ol their quietingwill be at least partially negated byin Western ASW capabilities. Moreover, the Soviets' concept of SSBN protection is based on iheir apparent judgment thai all submarines ace Inherently vulnerable to ASW prosecution, particularly as they ent and enter port, if thev are not protected bv fnendty forces. The Soviets, therefore, do not regard SSBN vulnerabilityhorl-lerm problem that will disappear as new. quletet classes arc introduced. The requirement to protect and support SSBNs will thus remain an integral par', of the strategic strike mission and the most important initial wartime taskarge portion of Northern and Pacific Fleet general purpose forces through the remainder of the century
e expect thai Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs would he deployed in wattlme in much the same Fashionrimarily in "havens' close
to Soviel territory Other measures to decrease the vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs probably would include
Moreuse of paired under the icecap
Introduction of an ELF communications system (perhaps. making it possible for units to receive communications while remaining aldepth oa undei ice
Althoughove is unlikely, the Soviets might choose toew Typhoons to open-ocean areas in more southerly latitudes The Soviets might use such open ocean deployments lo complicate the US defensive problem by requiring ASW forces to cortcuct open-ocean search in vasi areas where SOSUS coverage is limited Thai could increase theof SSBN) in havens by dispersing enemy ASW forces Notwithstanding ihis potential benefit, the disadvanlagei ul deploying SSBNs to distant areas would make this an unlikely option (or wartime deployment in particular, the transit throughenemy controlled waters argues against SSBN depiovments to southern latitudes
We do not believe thai hkety changes tn Soviet SLBM capabilities or in the Soviet perception of NATO's ASW capability will lead to significaitt changes in 'he way Soviet SLBMs would be employed inubstantial number of SLBMs probably would still be withheld from the initial slrategic nuclear eicharrgc for subsequent strikes andesidualne ccetsequeocc ofithholding policyeed to sustain SSBN protection operations during ihe nuclear as well as the conventional phase of the war. Thu stealer endurance features thai we believe the Soviets will continue lo build into their general purpose unils will be useful In thu task. Such improved endurance istem from factors integral to the combat waitsas nu* cVat power fot surface ships, Uiger magazineand improved damageihanajor Inciease in the sire of thc naval auxiliary force.
The Soviets will probably coniinue to allocate SLBMs for initial strike operations against the United Stales for targets such as soft roenmand. control, and communications laeiLues and bomber bases.ndfJ SLBMs launchedlass units and possibly SLCMs Irom forward-deployed attackwould assume mote of the Soviet Navy's initial strike colelass SSBNs are retired or converted.
Kinurell-Class SSN
Soviet Navy's ability to participate instrike! wouldenhanced considerably if Ihe accuracy of SLBMs couldipiced to the point where thev would be elleetiveardened tar-sucl is ICBMgencies igrcen Sovietsigh priority on achieving improved accuracy loi the SLBMs planned for testing In the middle and lale lOSOv There arc differentas lo whether and when the Soviet* would opt to deploy SLBMsard target capability. One view holds thai this capability probably will Ik achieved in thc laic lWMb1 Another view holds thatapability COuhi notilii.-vod before thend that it would require major efforts which the Soviets may notwilling to undertake because of cosls in system reliability and ihe ii.iinberll agencies believe lhal. despiie the In-
, tr..'i 1 'I .it -
The foilifrM irl thaare the Dfrecrnr, DetenteAgency, end the Director al Waoal Intettitx'ee OevannW ol At AVn* |U|
lheiuBi fOicc. Centre)fferor. Buteau ol Imelhiyue ami Hhiy/kJi. fJci.nHii.-i: or Stfllc iu
taigei capability could provide, many such SLBMs, if deployed, svouid probably still be withheld from the initial exchaiiues for use in subsequent strikes oresidual forcef ws)
<i3 Soviet Saval Land Attackvv isca-launclsed.ermse mis'M- similar in llie US Tomahawk. i.expected to be
come operationalt is estimated to be compatible wiih the torpedo tubes of all Soviet subma-rinrs and possibly for employmentariety of surface critttliat.intN Wi: believe it is designed tornlnblyenain contoursiiiou update Systemnd Is probably capablem at subsonic speeds'
(SNF)
fviliehrvr that tht pnuiaiy application of"ill heubmarine-launchedt iviif'i: iv:
10dm land utluck enilv mtwlti underiu. la- lor naval usell*Uca* ihu Estimate went WnressMlseru that them submarine bunched in3 mav lie intendedeu pbllorwn* hid unitlsss of nibniaiinri retail iltnlemployf wm;
39
usedirsl strike againstheUniled Stales, such as command, conlrol, and communications lacllilies and naval and bomber bases, despiie ID range and speed limitation' We believe lhe Soviets will choose lo concentrate nuclear-armed SS>ew ot their newest SSNs The best candidate forole is the protected new -lass of SSN. which we believe will be Quieter and larger than current Soviet SSNs and have the command control, and communications and fire control eapabililiesfor employingid (ice figure IS) would also be suitable. Another possible candidate would be those fewlass SSBNi, which presumably will retain their sophisticated ship'snavigation system and require the leastof existing classes to carry SLCMs If the SovieU optedicated SLCM submarine, they may initiate periodic peacetime SLCM patrols off the US east and west coasts Patrob by SLCM submarines could eventuallylass SSBN patroli in the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific In Soviet eyes, such SLCM patrols could offer the dividend of forcing thc Uniled States to invest in an expanded early warning/air defense system lo counter lhe new threat.
oncentration of the missilesew units, however, would place them in the tame category is the earlythat were high-valuefor Western ASW and which, because of their missile range, had to operate relatively close toterritory The Sovieis therefore could deploy thes part of the weapons loadarge number of submarines Assuming thai the missile is compatible with the standardcm torpedo cubes, thcould be employed tn modified SSNs/SSCNi such aslasses or even possibly in diesel-electric units We believe this usearger number of submarines would be less likely because these submarines ara required for important ASW and an'.isurlxce warfare (ASUW) tasks, and some oflhe diesel-electricnot have suffrcicrit command, control, and communications capabilities or space for necessary additional fire control and navigation
e do not know whether thc Sovloti area version of theonnuclear warhead r"
3 SLCM*
armed wiih nonnuclear warheads would oe useful against theater targets (such as US SOSUS facilities) and for concentrated attacks on Iceland, the Uniled Kingdom. Spain, the Philippines, Guam, and other important targets that would be difficult to reach and costly lo attack with Soviet land-based aireralt. Non-nuclear-armed SLCMs could be employed on current atiack submarines with fire control systemSuch deployment, however, would involve some trade-offs for general purpose submarines, reducing their capability to perform their traditional antiship and antisubmarine tasks because:
Eacharried will reduce the number of torpedoes carried by one or two
In some instances the operating areas required for land attack cruise missile launches would differ considerably from those required forASW and antiship operalions.
The Soviets probably recognize that proliferation of SLCMs could alsoignificant impediment to future arms control agieements since it would be virtually impossible io verify which submarines were strategic arms carriers.
Soviets may also be consideringon some of their principal surface combat-
urf ace-launched SS-NX-2Is probably wouldto strikes against theater targets, although occasional peacetime deployments of SLCM-armed surface combatants off the US coasts (for example, to Cuba) might be viewed by the Soviets as having significant political valuc-
successful development ands undoubtedly an item of highthe Soviet national leadership as well as theIf, as wc expect, it is touclear weapon aboard dedicated sub-
marines, the Soviet Navy's strike capability,against theater targets,be enhancedwith minimal impact on its other missions and capabilities. Bv giving llie Soviet Navy yet anothet nuclear-capable land attack system, theould increase the suture and utility ol the Navy within the Soviet military/political establishment and conceivably result in tbc provision oi additional assets to protect Ihearryina unils At lhe same time, lheeapon system with sigmft-cant potential political value lo the Soviet leadership in future arms limitation negotiations In fact, il is conceivable that the Soviet SLCM has been developed parityargaining chip for US nuclear land attack cruise missiles. If it is deployed, theouldew dimension to Soviet Navy capabilities and would complicate the defensive lasks of Western forces
trategic ASW Against Balliitic and Land Attack Cruise Missile Submarines. Toe Sovietsthat their slrategic ASW task will become not only more important but Increasingly difficult duilng. During this period they almost certainly expect:
Longer range SLBMs to enter service in lhe US, French, and British Navies The US/UK Tridentmor example, will greatly increase lhe ocean areas from which such missiles can strike Soviet territory {see
Western SLBMs such as the US Ttidenlo achieve sufficient accuracy for use against hard targets
Western general purpose submarines to be aimed with long-range, nuclear land altack cruisesuch as lhe US Tomahawk.
Western programs to improve SSBN survivability throughduction, mote reliableand better sensors
China's first SSBNsnter service
e expect that the Soviets will seek to improve the ASW capability of their submarines, surface ships, and aircraft in several ways, especially:
sonar systems, most notably theof towed passive arrays, row-frequency sonobuoy systems, and associated signalequipment
Increased emphasis on quieting of attack submarines.
Development of nonacoustic sensors.
Such efforts probably will ngnificarlly improve Soviet capability lo conduct ASW in relatively small areas. They could, therefore, be vitally important for the protection of Soviet SSBN havens against irilrusion by Western SSNs. Such improvements also could enhance ihe capability of Soviet SSNi to detect Western SSBNs as they cut their bases cr pass through choke points. We do not believe, however, that such efforts will substantially improve the Soviet capability to counter Western SSBNs effectively because none of them are hkefv to solve lhe Soviet Navy's nuorInability to detect SSBNs in open-ocean areas
e believe the So-iets will continue to seeketection capabilily through the development of sensors whose range or search rate can cover broad ocean areas Approaches which the Soviets mayin developingapability Include:
A system of fixed passive sonar arrays installed in Western SSBN operating areas, comparable to tbe US SOSUSajor pioblem in creatingystem probably would be the large number of ariavs needed to have achance of detecting SSBNs. which will be even quieter Innother problem would be the probable requirement for several shore facilities in Third World countries lo serve at initial processing points for tht dala. The Soviets' use of [ixed sensors has thus far been limited to equipment iiutallcd near their own territory We have no evidence thai they ateorldwide system, which would lake several yean to install
Aiicraflpaco-baaed system relying on non-acouslic sensors. To be effectiveystem would have to be able to cover broad ocean areas rapidly and lo relay detection data both to slxore facililies and ASW platforms The devrlopmcnt ofystem wouldogical evolution of current Soviet use of satellites in monitoring the activity of Western surface units. It would, bow-ever,reakthrough in nonacousticdevelopment that cannot be predicted The Soviets are continuing their research into the use of nutiacoustic scnsois,ong history of
BESTCOPY AVAILABLE
Figure 19
JO" 60
JPArlflEHr ITTJ-5
Soviel Navy's View of Polcnlial Search Areas for lis ASW
ift.iine Sor.st Navy'sKlic.4
lOu'ijitnam i
III SOSW <dU*rd Dy tliUlM* withi langef (Poliot.
apparent failure Our limited knowledge nf their program's precise naturefj"
(makes if impossible to predict with confidence their chances of lucceu
The development of towed passive acousticwith increased performance duerray and tutnal processing improvements Such arrays could be developed byf deployed in latge numbers, such as on hundredi of reaearch ihips and intelligencehese arrays could theoretically provide initial detection of older Western SSBNs- Thc arrays, however, probably would not be effective againsi the quieter Ohio-class SSBNs, and their capability against even the older Western SSBNs while patrolling would be very limited In addition, tactical and technical countermeasures couldreduce the vulnerability of older units
e do not believe the Soviets will be able lo solve the initial detection problem during the period of this Estimate. For this reason, we eipect that lhe Soviet Navy will continue lo focus its anti-SSBN efforts on attempting to detect and attack Western SSBNs as they eail their bases oc pass through choke points. IF, however, through some technological breakthrough the Soviets were able to detect Western SSBNs in the open ocean, they would thenew problem of bow to attack them Such attacks might be conducted by the traditional technique of deploying surface, submanne. and/or air units to ihe datum Thiswould require that the Soviets deploy larger numbers of general purpose naval units at greater distances from Soviet territoryurrentlyIn addition to attack submarines, thesemight involve surfacencluding carrier baltle groups ASW aitcralt operating from Third World airfields could cover at least some SSBN operating areas, if access rights were granted and the host country were willing to risk becoming aUnless thereubstantial increase in the size of tho Soviet Navy or the detection breakthrough enabled the Soviets to provide SSBNs protection with fewer general purpose units,hange In naval wartime deployments would require sacrificing some of the capability to protect the SSBN havens.
he Soviel Navy's strategic ASW problem will be further complicated bv the Uniled Stales' plan to arm its newest classes of attack
lyhe land aitack version of the Tomahawk SLCM Although there are plansonventional variant, the Soviets are undoubtedly most concerned with the stralegic implications of nuclear-tipped SLCMs. The employrrient of such SLCMs will complicate the Soviet ASW problem in two ways
The number of USsile firingwill tuple.
The range of the nuclear Tomahawk will allow SLCM-armed submarines lo strike Sovietfrom areas where it will be difficult for the Soviets lo conccnltatc ASW forces.
Much of the defensive requirement against Tomahawk-armed submarines would coincide with and overlap other ASW efforts against Western units within Soviet sea control/sea denial areas To reach targets deep within the USSR from the Norwegian Sea or Northwest Pacific, lor eiample. Tomahawk-armed submarines would have to approach Soviet territory In doing so they would pass through at least scene cf the echeloned ASW defenses the Soviets wouldto protect their SSBNs. Some targets near the Soviet coast, on the other hand, could be reached by SLCMs fired from the outer edges of the Northern and Pacific Fleets' defensive thresholds SLCM-armedoperating in these areas would be able to avoid lhe bulk of tha Soviet ASW defenses in the Norwegian Sea and Pacific Ocean.
One option available to the Sovieis lo counter this threal could be to intend the area of sea denial operations,'possibly out toilometers. The Soviets probably believeapability to conduct more extended sea denial will largely depend on their ability to contest the air superiority and ASWafforded NATO hy carrier and land-based aircraft in areas such asK gap They probably also believe that their ability to coolest such airspace will necessitate operations by future surface combatant task groups, including CTOL aircraft carriers, at greater range from Soviet terntoty lhan currently planned. Any eiiensaon of tbe area for sea denial operations therefore will probably be accompaniedorresponding eitension ol initial sea controlpossibly as farilometm This would be mere feasible for the Northern Fleet than for the Pacific Fleet Given Improved air cover from carrier-based
aircraft innd/or fiom captured airfields In Noi way. the Northern Fleet could ihift the focui of ill ASW efforts away from the SSBN bavem an Arctic waters southward toK gap. Control of the gap would both significantly increase Sovietto contest Western use of the Norwegian Sea as an SLCM launch area and help protect Northern Fleet SSBNs from enemy ASW lorces Access to thePacific Basin, on the other rsassd, is not restricted by any choke points that wouldore forward-oriented ASW strategy. Thc Soviets, however, probably do not believe lhat the threat from SLCMs would be as gieal in Ihc Pacific ai in the Norwegian Sea They probably expect that the majority of US SLCM-armed submarines would be deployed tnwaters from which the more numerous military and economic targets located in the western USSil could be engaged.
he Soviets believe submarine-Uunched cruise missiles car. also reach targets in the western USSB when fired from the central Mediterranean and North Seas, areas where the Soviets plan sea denial operations againsi carrier battle groups bul probably onlv limited ASW efforts (see. Countering SLCMin these areas could pose scene tough choices for the Soviets. Any additional submarines deployed to these aieas would lessen force allocations for other minions such as SSBN protection, prosecution ofSSbNs, and interdiction of Western sea lines ol communication. If tbe Soviets do opt for increased ASW efforts in the North and Mediterranean Seas, they probably would allocate more diesel submaitnes for hairier patrols in the northern entrance to the Notlh Sea and In Mediterranean choke points such as lhe Straits of Cibtaltar and Sicily.
he Soviets could ultimately decide that the required allocation of resources and the opportunity costs Involved in countering SLCM-armed submarines in iheir patrol areas were loo costly. Given iheir limited ASW detection capabilities, moreover, the Soviets probably would be pessimistic about their ability to counter SLCM-armed lubmarinej in areas such as the central Medilerranean and the North Sea. even If substantial forces were deployed there. An allcrnaie strategy might limit efforts specifically aimed at tbe cruise missile submarine toew altack submarines in the approaches to Western attack submarinesimilar to the Soviets' antl-SSBN tactics Major emphasis would then be
placed on countering the missiles themselvesombination of improved land-based air defense
ntUurfaee War/arelthough lhe Soviets view Western submarines as Ihe major naval threat to iheir territory and SSBN havens, theirof tbe threat from Western surface forces and the importance they attach lo ASUW are likely to increase during the next two decides. Carrier battle groups will coniinue to be perceived as major threats to Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory. SSBN havens, and operations in the Und TVDi Concern with carrier battlell remain high because of:
Soviet expectations lhat the number of carriers In
NATO will al least remain constant and probably increase as tbe result of US plans to expandbat tie-group navy, the reernergence of sea-based, fixed-wing aviation in the Royal Navy, and French and Spanish plans for new carrier construction.
Expected unptwmentshe offensive capabd-ity of carriers by equipping iheir aircraft with cruise missiles such as Tomahawk.
Improvements in lhe ability of carrier battle groups to defend themselves against altack through such programs as the AEGIS air defense system.
urther, the Soviets will no longer be able to concentrale oa aircraft carrier! as the only Western surface unitsignificant threat to theirThe Soviets are fully aware of US plans to equip battleships, cruisers, and destroyers with the Land altack version of the Tomahawk missile. They realize that this would resultubstar.fjl increase in lhe number of Western surface combatants capable of striking the USSR with nuclear weapons. This would greatly complicate their strategic defensive taskany surface combatant would have to bea potential nuclear threat
o meet this threat the Soviet Navy willefforts to improve its ASUWmportance will be:
Construexxoo of general purpose sxibmarines equipped with advanced antiship torpedoes and cruise missiles. Construction oflasi SSCN. with itsissiles, it likely to continue
SCOH-*
Figure 20
Soviet View of Tomahawk
believe (hu .iiuatration. atmouen pi/Dume0fiom surface iruaiircia"suCnarinns
anSoviei navaloviel concern itoaraing potential usearaai to* Ine Tornanawt. Soviet caption:
*ttili ii now NATO straicfllsti proposei'il D'onrJ
0
To>matia<akt* Cap' FifjiRcaionov
CCffCT
into. as will thai ofSSNs and SSs The tactical distinction between cruise-miiSiIe-cOUtpDcd submarines (SSCN, SSQ and torpedo atlack units (SSN. SS) would become less clear if the Soviets introduced antiship cruise missiles that can be fired from torpedo tubes
of surface combatants equipped with antiship miniles The number of maior surface combatants armed with such missiles is likely to increase substantiallyesult of current construction programs (Kirov. Kiev.ovremennvv) and their projected follow-ons. There is evidence, moreover, that theSW cruise missile may have aantiship capability
Continued production of Backfire bombers for Soviet Naval Avialionrobable newin iheoo replace thc Badgers and Blinders, as wellossiblein thc number of SNA missile regiments In addition, aircraft introduced inay incorporate Stealth technology to make them less susceptible to detection.
Deployment of more capable sea-based fighter-bombers, both VSTOL aircraft operating from Kicv-claas ships and CTOL aircraft operatingew class of carrier
The introduction of these rtcw platforms will greatly increase the number of missiles available for attack and will coincide with other efforts to Improve ASUW capability In particular
are likely In antiship missiles, especially in target discrimination capabilily. *ur-vivabthlv. and reaction times Theor example, is much fasternd can approach the target at lower altitudcsr
such currently operational missiles asnde believe lheill be operational on Sovremcnnyy- and TarantuI -class units3
The capability of the radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (RORSAT) to detect ships and distinguish target sire probably will be mhaoced-
Evolutionary Improvements are likely in the electronic-intelligence ocean reconnaissance(EORSAT) directed toward iixreasedenhanced probability of detection, and
continuous targeting capability through higher orbits, belter sensors,ider field of view. We expect thc Soviets will continue to convert older subrnarinei and equip new surface and submarine units with the capabilily to use real time EORSAT (and RORSAT) data to support antiship cruise missile systems
The developmentynthetic aperture radar occanographic satellite to provide Improved all-weather, worldwide naval surveillance is possible during the latter period of tha Estimate
Some new AAVGK bombers, possiblyersion of the Blackjack, could be configuredaritime strike role. With an estimated radius ofautical miles, lliecould attack Western surface targets In the central Atlantic from Soviet territory
he execution of the ASUW task probably will continue to be primarily concentrated in areas such as tbe Norwegian and North Seas, the easternand the northwesternprincipal areas from which canter aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles could be launched against Soviet territory. Coordination of Soviet submarine and surface ship operations with those of land-based medium bombers Is improved by concentrating ASUW in these areas Soviet ASUWikely to continue Itson "first salvo"Western surface units during the prewar period of tensions andthe most important of them with mail mum force at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets undoubtedly recognize that this goal will become more difficult to achieve as the number of important targets grows through the introd'setioe of nuclear Tomahawk and increases In the number of NATO surface battle groups and improved missile defensive systems suchC IS. The probferatlon of high-value targets is likely to contributereater emphasis on ASUWof extended duration (days and weeks rather than minutes andndications of such emphasis are already visible in exercises and ut weapons-loading leatures of new unils
llhough most ASUW operations will berelatively dose to Soviet territory, thepiobably will seek by theo extend thc outer edge of the Northern and Pacific Fleet sea denial area sorncwhat beyond the current threshold ofiromelen to counter thc long range of
-6CcnCT
Weitern SLCMs Some attacks al much greater dis-lancet from Sowict territory are possible Among the options they mtghl find atn active for inch operations are lhe deployment of missile-equipped aircraft lo bases outside thethe host country were willing to risk becoming aequipping SNA with long-range bombers such as theow undereas likely possibility is lhe use of ballistic missiles against surface ships at
lthough the Soviets probably do not consider the ASUW problem to be as difficult as ASW, they apparently eipect it toaior and growing challenge through.
istiatr Warfare at Sea. The Soviets recognize that the ability of their surface ships to conduct ASW and ASUW operations and project power beyond the range of land-based air cover is heavily dependent on their capability to defend themselves against airThe successful use of sea-skimming antiship missiles in the Falklands crisis probably has increased the already evident Soviet concern over theof these weapons in Western navies The Soviets also realize that Western use of radar-cross-section reduction techniques will further complicate defense efforts against cruise missiles. In the past, the Soviets' air defense effcrtJ concentrated primarily on point defense and self-protection weapons- Recent Catling and dual-purpose gun systems, the newAM, and the probable Udaloy SAM system continue this philosophy.
heAM being deployed on erulsers of the Kirov andlasses, however,ong-range system that could provide lhe Soviets tbeir first genuine area air defense capability against aircraft-There is disagree merit within the US InteUigence Community on the capability of thengage low-altitude, low-radar-cross-seclion antiship cruise missiles. Some' believe theas such aOthers" believe lhat theay encounter
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severe guidance and fuzing problems when used against cruise missiles, such as the Harpoon, whichmall radar cross
We eipect that ther follow-on area air eTclensc weapons will beon all future cniuen
Soviets abo probably will improvesystems' signal processing capabilitymprove radar performance. Otberin naval air defense will Includein handling multiple targets, betterfining and target detectioneaand additional electroniciECM) and electronic
addition to continued work in guntechnology, tbe Soviets are eiploring thevalue of laser air defense weapons it Is likelySoviet Navy now hasacility let* arealasers to explore shipborne airIt is possiblerototypeow-energy ivstem designed tosysiems. will be installed on somechases in thee abo believehigh-energy laser weapon may be operationalIf laser weapons prove practical In awe eipect them to be deployed onprincipal surface combatants by thc yearfor close-Li and low-level defensemissiles.
oviet fleet air defense capability will beenhanced by the infraction offighter aircraft on the projected new class of aircraft earner (sec neat paragraph) The overallof the Soviets' efforts to protect then surface fleet, however, will depend on their ability to integrate the operations of carrier- and land based aircraft with shipborne SAM, gun, and laser systems. We believe the Soviets are workingystem to coordinate their air defense assets through the use of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and possibly carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft in conrunction with shipborne air warfare control centers toommunlcatiotu/navigation/identification net (CNI) This will allow exchange of command and control and reliable IFF datayslem to differentiate between
friendly and hostile units) andommon navigation base line for participantsoreand effective air warfare ivsiem During the period ot tha Estimate, however, we believe Soviet efforts wiU evolve slowly, primarily because of lack of experience in the complex rnartagemen! of fleet air defense operaltons involving both aircraft and ships.
ir Power at Sea. The most notable change in the Soviet Navy in the nextoears probably will be the Introduction of its first Western-style aircraftis. ships equipped withand arresting gear and thereby capable ofCTOL high-performance aircraft We expect that the first of these ships,on unit with nuclear propulsion, will become operational bv0 and that three oi four could be in service by the end of the century. Each ship probably could carry an air group of someircraft
lthough aircraft carriers will enhance Soviet capabilities to pro-ect power and influence in distant areas, we believe their primary mission will be to help expand the area of Northern and Pacific Fleetsea control operationseneral war, Soviet aircraft carrier operations probably will focus initially on providing air defense for surface groups supporting Soviet SSBNs and defending the seaio the USSR in the Norwegian Sea aad Northwest Pacific Basin. The air cover provided by carrier-based fighter aircraft piobably will allow the Soviets to operate surface units at greater distances from Pact terrilory than- currently envisioned. Other tasks of Soviet carrier aircraft could Include:
Conducting ASW with embarked helicopters.
Attacking Western surface units
Escorting land-based reeonnausance, strike, and ASW aircraft during part of their operations.
Attacking Western land bases and facilities.
Attacking Western aerial resupply efforts.
ln cutsdueting suchoviet carriers will operate with other surface units and possiblyand land-based aircraft. Their Lack of experience In such complex operations, however, suggests that it will be al least theeasonable standard of operaUonal proficiency can be attained.
Although the constructionew class of aircraft carrier is apparently the policy of the present Soviet political and naval leadership, it is the type of ptogram which could suffer from changes In such leadership and from economic problems Thecosts involved, not only for the ships themselves but for the air group, supporling vessels, and shoie-based infrastructure, could make the programto cancellation or delay if the Polilburo seeks to reduce the burden of defense expenditures
Regardless of Soviet decisions ceeicerriuxg CTOL aircraft carriers, tbe Soviet Navy probably will introduce improvements in its VSTOL aircraft units aboard the four Kiev-class ships. Such improvements are likely toeplacement for the Forger that has greater endurance, speed, payload, and air defense capability
Protection of State Intertill in Peacetime and Limited War. Although the primary emphasis ia Soviet naval developments will continue to be on improving capabilitiesar with NATO, Soviet writings, construction programs, and exercisesrowing recognition of the value of naval forces In situations short of general war. Programs currently identified or projected by the US Intelligencewill result by then lubstantial improvements ia the Soviet Navy's capability to pro-leet power and Influence ia distant areas
The most important improvement will stem from the construction of aircraft carriers capable of handling hlgli-performance aircraft. The lack ofair support has been the major operational weakness of Soviet naval forces in dutantorce of two earnersotal ofircraft would ehminate much of ihis weakness Although much smaller than the US carrier force, it would provide tlie basis for establishing air superiority in many Third World situations in which the West did not become Involved. Soviet writings concerning the use of carriers emphasize their value in show-thc-flag and limited-war situations.
fM. Protected ire prove menti in Soviet amphibious forces will also contribute to an unproved capability to protect power In distant areas We expect continued gradual construction of naval amphibious ships,additional LPDs. as well as smaller units. The
Soviets also will continue exploring the use ofcargo ships such as tell-on/coll-off andbaige carrier (LASH) ships in amphibiousThe Soviet naval infantry (nowtrength ofill grow, perhaps to00 men. Additional amphibious assault lorces will be available from ground forces units trained in such operations.
We do not believe that these estimatedwill be sufficient to enable the Soviets to conduct amphibious operations in distant areasar with NATO. Such wartime operations will continue to emphasize areas on the Soviet periphery. Nor will such improvements make it practical to conduct landings in situations in which Western forces would be in opposition. TIseje improvements,will provide Soviet leaders with acapability to overcome the opposition that could be offered by most Third World countries, especially those that were intrinsically weak or beset bv interna) divisions Such improvements could also be used to support client states involved in military operations against olher states or internal opponents. We believe that certain aspects of the receni eierclseuggest an interest in testing planning concepts for amphibious operations in thc Third World.
The amount of time spent bv Soviet general purpose units outside home waters Is likely to increase only slightly in. Constraintsajor increase in regular out-of-area deployments probably will continue to include:
The need to retain most naval forces close to Soviet home waters andeadiness condition for rapid deployment to maior wartimeareas such as the Norwegian Sea.
Tlie fuel, maintenance, and personnel costs of out-of-arca deployments, even at the low levels of activity typical of Soviet units.
A possible recognition by the Soviets that the usefulness of deployed naval forces is nota direct correlation of size, but alsocapability and the value of any naval presenceignal of Soviet interest in an area.
Changes in out-of-arca deployments are likely to be most significant in terms of thc capabilities of thc units involved (new aircraft carriers, Ivan Bogovs, Kirovs.
and so forth) and the areas in which they will operate. The areas in which the Sovietsermanent naval presence (Mediterranean. Indian Ocean, Soulh China Sea, West Africa) are likely to undergo further gradual expansion in response to political imperatives,esire to support the maintenance ol established "socialist" regimes and lhe creation of new ones Among thc most likely candidate areas for such permanent naval presence are the Caribbean and the Philippine Sea. To support such operations, thc Soviets will continue their attempts to achieve increased access to foreign facilities.
n addition to supporting peacetime navalthe Soviets probably would seek to use facilities in Third World countries inar against NATO and other lesser conflicts. The most likely role of such facilities in wartime would be as positions from which Western force movemenis can be monitored during the period of tension before the outbteak of war. We therefore expect to sec continued efforts to obtain the use of airfields to support reconnaissance flights, as well as the establishment of SIGINT, communications, and possibly submarine-tracking facilities. The Soviets probably will continue to regard the use. especially jhc sustained use, of facilities In Third World countries in wartime as questionable because of their vulnerability and the possible unwillingness of host governments to risk becoming belligerents. The advantages to the Soviet Navy, however, of using such facilities are potentially substantial, particularly in operations against SSBNs and carrier battle groups. We think it likely, therefore, that efforts will be made to develop relations wtth Third World countries that will make wartime use of facilities, especially byore realistic possibility.
Ml. PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET NAVY
e believe that an examination of the current role of thc Navy in Soviet military strategy,, and construction programs and llie key Issues facing Soviel planners enables us toudgment as to the most likely course of development for the Navy over lhe remainder of this century. Wehowever, that an estimate coveringong period of polilical. economic, and technological changes must be viewed with caution An examination of some less likely but still feasible courses ofis therefore included as well These alternative
coursesof development arc not meant to be exhaustive but rathei to indicate some ol Ihe types of variables lhat could change our baseline estimate.
A. Baselino Estimate
believe that thc wartime strategy olNavy will remain essentially unchangednext IS toears in terms of maior tasks andof forces to cany out those tasks.to counter advances in Westerncapabilities, however, probably willSoviets gradually to expand the areas inforces would be deployed foroperations. They will introduce newand systems into the Navy and will seekcapability to use those weapons. Wethat these changes will occur withinof the Soviets' present strategyprobably will continue to view it as offeringchance of accomplishing their vital wartime tasks-
single most important mission of thccontinue to be strategic strike, primarilyand possibly SLCMs. Thc importance ofnuclear strike assets within the USSR'sstrategy could grow because:
Thc percentage of Soviet strategic nuclearassigned to SSBNs will increase aswith MIRVed SLBMs enter service.
New Soviet SLBMs could be sufficiently accurate to be used effectively against hardened targets.
Soviet silo-based strategic systems may become more vulnerable.
The combination of increased SLBM accuracy and fixed ICBM vulnerability could provide powerful incentives for the Soviet Union to move an even larger portion of its strategic strike capability tohift probably would be resisted by other elements within the Soviet armed forces,the Strategic Rocket Forces, it will continue to be advocated by the Soviet naval leadership andeasonable chance of gaining political endorsement.
e nonetheless believe thc Soviets willto regard their SSBNs as vulnerable to enemy ASW forces throughout the period of this Estimate.and support for Soviet SSDNs. therefoie. is likely to remain the most important consideration In the initial wartime deploymentarge portion of general purpose naval forces of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Pacific Fleet forces would bein the Northwest Pacific Basin, the Sea of [apari, and thc Sea of Okhotsk area. The Northern Fleet would deploy ihe bulk of its forces to Ihc Barents, Greenland, and northern Norwegian Seas, although the outer edge of what we describe as the Northern Fleet sea control area probably will expand gradually to include ihe southern Norwegian Sea, primarily to facilitate an extension of sea denial operations beyondK gap. This would be intended principally to counter Western SLCM-armed ships and submarines, but would also support other operations in the Atlantic (see figure SIX Pacific Fleet sea control operations would also expand somewhat (see. The major mission of Soviel CTOL aircraft carriers will probably be to assist in expanding these areas. Concentrating forces there will continue lo appeal to the Soviets because il will enhanceof their submarine and surface units with the land-based air support which, even afterew aircraft carriers, will continue tothe bulk of the foices of SNA.
he Soviets probably will continue to view Western SSNs as the primary threat to their SSBN force and will conclude that the best chance of detecting such SSNs lies in waiting for them to enter relatively confined areas where the Soviets willoncentration of forces and where their short-range sensors can be used to best advantage. Expected improvements in Soviet ASW platforms, tactics, and fixed-sensor technology, such as Cluster Lance, and increased use of underice patrols probably willSoviet Navy'sto protect its SSBNs. We doubt, however, that the Soviets will view such improvements as sufficient toessened initial commitment of foices for SSBN protection.
orthern and Pacific Fleet Operations for the protection of SSBNs will coincide with thoseortionecond important task, strategic defense-Such operations, together with some of those of the
-SeGfiea,
Figure 21
Future Initial Soviet Operating Areas In the Western TVDs
BEST COPT AVAIUBLE
Figure 22
lUiu'l lniljal SovielAreas in (he Pacific Ocean
Scj and Baltic Kirch, will seek lo deslros Western aiiciah cartien and strategic cruise missile platforms as thoy cross Soviel defense ihiesholds. now generallyilometers Irom Soviet terriiiiry Wc ctpect such operations to be of growing irnpor tance io the Soviets because of iheii expcctatiom concerning lite prnliferalion of Western strategic cruise missiles To counter Western cruise missiles launched from surface ships and submarines and the added range these missiles afford ciirser-basrd strike aticraft, the Soviets probably will seek In extend the
outer edge of the sea denial areas of the Northern and Pacific Fleets loilometers III
notlier portion ol ihc strategic defense taskthe destruction of enemy SSBNs before ihey can launch theirpose an increasing dilemma for the Soviets The deployment of hard-targetUS SI.UMs. Improved British and French SSBNs. and the first Chinese SSBNs probably will increase thc importance of achieving such destruction The Soviet Navy's ability to delect and track US SSBNs in lhc open ocean, however, probably will decline, af least
ovcr lhc nextears. This assessment is based on our belief thai;
The increased palrol areas of SSBNs carrying Trident SLBMs will more than offset thecoverage that could be provided by improved Soviet conventional ASW platforms.
The SovieU piobably wilt be unable toroad-ocean acoustic or nonacoustic sensor.
Soviet SSNs will not be sufficientlyleast throughout lhc nextengage in covert trail, and Soviet ASW aircraft will not be deployed in sufficient numbers or have adequate range to maintain contact in US SSBN patrol areas.
Overt trail will continue to be technicallyin choke points and relatively confinedthe SovieU will not have sufficient platforms to threaten the US SSBNecision toubstantial number of SSNs in this manner, moreover, would divert them from other missions such as protecting Soviet SSBNs.
We therefore expect that Soviet naval anti-SSBN operations will continue to be modest, withelatively few attack submarines stationed in choke points or in Ihe approaches to Western or Chinese submarine bases.
e believe that Soviet procurement of naval weapon platforms and systems over the period of this Estimate will be driven primarily by requirements stemming from the strategic offensive and defensive tasks outlined above. The importance of these tasks shouldolid basis for the Navy to continue receiving at least the same share of the defense budget that it has received since. Such an allocation of resources means lhat Ihe Soviet Navy will continue to receive new platforms, Including new classes ot large surface combatants, attack submarines, andThe production rate will not completely offset the retirement of older units. The accelerating cost per Ion of new combatants would make ship-for-ship replacement prohibitively expensive. Indeed,manpower/maintenance constraints, this may not be feasible. The force in the0 will therefore be somewhat smaller than that of today. Newer units, however, will generally be larger than
those being replaced and will be equipped with more sophisticated weapon systems:
The size of thc modern ballistic missileforce will probably remain roughly constant at aboutnits throughout. Thc size of the overall force (nownits) will decline bv approximatelyercent as older unitslass SSBslass andlass SSBNs) are converted or retired. The new units will be larger and will carry more missile tubes than most or all of those units retired In the absence of an arms control or reduction treaty, the number of SLBM launch tubes as well as the number of warheads carried by the SSBN force is likely to increase.
The first unit of the new classton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers probably will become operational byotal of three or four is expected by the0
The number of principal surface combatants probably willnits. New construction programs are likely to include two or three new classes of nuclear-powered guided-missile cruberswo new classes of guided-missile destroyersnd three or four new classes of frigates.esult of these programs the trend toward larger average unit size, greater sveapons loads, and more sophisticated air defense and antiJurface weapons, seniors, and electronic warfare systems will continue, thereby improving the Soviet Navy's capability for sustained operations.
The overall number of general purposeprobably will decline tonits, but the number of nuclear-powered unitswill grow substantially. New classes will include follow-ons tolass and possibly tolass SSCNlass SSN, as well aslass SSN follow-on we expect to reach IOChese units should continue the trend toward quieter platforms wiih improved sensors and increased command and control capability. Construction of unproved diesel submarines with greater submerged endurance will also continue.
The Soviet Navy's overall amphibious assault lift capability will increaseollow-on to the Ivan Ilogov-class assault ship (LPD) and two new classes of tank landing ships (LSTs) are likely
CCB.CT
be Introduced Construction of smaller units, including air cushion vehiclesill alto continue Emphasis on amphibious utility in merchant ship coristfor Ro-and similarremain unchanged. Soviet interest in the use of helicopters inassault mav lead to constructionelicopter assault ship (LPK or LHA) in. Wc expect an increase in the size of the naval inlantry from0 to00 men.
The Soviet Navy's underway replenishmentshould be enhanced by the introduction of one or more new classes of multipurpose replenishment ships. Construction of such ships, however, is likely lo continueower priority than the construction of the ships they are intersded to support.
The number of fiied-wing naval aircraftwill increase somewhat, with the major changes being the first deployment to sea of high-performance CTOL aircraft as part of the air group on the first aircraft earners and tbe introductson to SNA of theomber or. moreackfire follow-on. SNA will be an essential element in the Soviets' attempts to expand their sea conirol/denial efforts againsi Western surface forces in vital areas such as the Norwegian. North, and Mediterranean Seas and the Northwest Pacific Basin. SNA bomben will alsorincipal feature of Soviet antisur-face capabilities in other areas such as theSea
This protected Soviet naval construction program was subjected lo econometric analysis, which determined that it would be consistent with current Soviettrends In ship and aircraft construction.
e believe that major technical improvements in Soviet licet air defense are likely during tbe period of this Estimate New SAMs. guns, and laser weapons will probably be introduced and radio-electronicmeasures will continue toigh priority. Fighter aircraft operating from the protected CTOL carriers of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, probably in cooperation with AWACS and possibly AEWwillew dimension to tha Navy's air defense resources. We cannot confidently assess the
net effect of these changes on ihe abilily of Soviet surface forces to defend themselves againsi air attackai wiih NATO Such an assessment is highly dependent on tactical variables The performance characleristics of key systems, such as there not vet fully understood Changes in the Soviet Navy's air defense systems will be occurring simultaneously with those in Western antiship capability, including the introduction of large numbers of cruise missiles Despite these uncertainties, the major Sovietto the construction of large surface combatants persuades us that the naval leadership probably ludges the overall result of changes in air defense capability as sufficient to support the wartime deployment of surface units farther from Sovietradual expansion of their intended sea control areas
xpansion of both sea control and sea denial operations would be supported by gradualin Soviel capability to survei! Western surface units and provide targeting assistance for antiship missile attacks. Improved ewet-the-rsottzon targeting would allow individual Soviet units to make better use of the range of their missiles, therebyroader ocean area. Much of the improvementxpect in surveillance and targeting will involvesystems We believe thai the Soviets will introduce by tben unproved EORSAT with the capability to detect and identify additional types of radars By the, further improvements in the EORSAT are likely to result in near-continuouscapability by use of higher orbits, better sensors, and expanded fields ofew RORSATwill also be introduced with improvements in probability of detectionider field of view It is also possible the Soviets wtHynthetsc aperture tadar satellite for improved all-weatherWe expect that the improved EORSAT and RORSAT may be used in cooperation withnew satellite data relay system to provide real-time battle manaiemeni information to command authorities ashore In addition, during rhe period of this Estimate, advances in maritime surveillance from manned space vehicles can be expected. The use of satellites, bow-ever, cannot be considered exclusively in the context of Soviet naval operalions Such use will continue to provide one of thc many linkages between naval and overall Soviet military strategy The Navy's ability lo use satelliteartime would depend on such nonnaval factors as the extent
lo which antisatellite warfare would be conducted al lhc outsci of war and (he ability of satellites lo turvive Western atlack Recognizing the dinger of being depended! on any nngle system, lhe Soviel Navy wdl coniinue to integrate surveillance and targetingfiom sateliites with that fiom traditionalsuch as manned aircraft and possibly from new systems such as reconnaissance drones
IOo The Soviets piobably recognize thai future operations in areas such as the southern Norwegian Sea will place greater demands on the Navy's command, conirol. and communications system because of factors such as larger operating areas, more emphasis on the integration of diverse platforms, and thc need toreater number of high-value targets. We expect the Soviets to respond to ihis challenge by improving their capabilities in technica] areas such as satellite communications, vcry-low-frequcncysupport lo submarines, androbability-o! intercept systems, and by striving for greaterdala system compatibility Another maror trend will include increased automation lo support battle management at all levels of the command structure. We believe lhat the major emphasis in the command, control, and communications system wdl continue to be on highly centralized control of wartime operations, but there are indications of an Intention bv ihe fleet naif* toarger portion of their battle management responsibilities to the flotilla- andcommands
n addition lo its primary wartime tasks, the Soviet Navy also will continue to be responsible for supporting ground forces in ihe Und TVDs and for interdicting sea lines of communication Antiship and ASW operations bv the Baltic Fleet in the North Sea and the Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterraneanwill receive increased emphasis to counter the growing capabihty ol Western naval forces to strike targets in lhe land TVDs from Increased ranges. The relatively low priority of open-ocean SLOCin Soviet naval strategy probably will not change radically unless the Sovietsrotractedwar wiih NATO or are responding lo major changes in NATO's force structure or strategy for the reinforcement and resupply of Europe. Despitecapabilities for power ptetection in distant areas. Soviet amphibious forces will continue lo be Structured primarily for landings close to Warsaw Pact territoryar with NATO.
oviet naval oot-ol-area operations mwill continue to focus on maintaining permanent presence in areas such as live Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea. the South China Sea. and off the west coast of Africa We eipect the Soviets wdl attempt to eipand their level of naval activity in areas such ai the Caribbean Sea. the Philippine Sea, and the southwest Indian Ocean Islands Thev also are likely to step up efforts to acquire access to foreign naval support (acilii.es The new ships entering service uridoubtedly will be used in the traditional techniques of Soviet naval diplomacy ranging from routine show-the-flag port visits to demonstrations of support for client states during crisis situations and limited wars Given the likelihood of continued instabilitv in the Third World, the use of such naval diplomacy and power project Ion techniques probably will increase during.
c believe, however, that the most significant change in the Soviet Navy during the period of this Estimate will be lhe ichievemeni tor the first time ef an ability to proieet power ashore effectively in distant areasimited waris, one that does notonfrontation between the USSR and NATO Although we believe thai Sovietrograms are motivated primarily by requirementseneral war with the West, new platforms and weapon systems will help to close some of the current gaps in Soviet capabilily to conduct such distant area operations. In particular, the ability loask force around two or three CTOL aircraft carriers will give the Soviet Navy its first sigaificaM capability to provide tactical air support for ground forceand amphibious landings by Soviel or client fotces in distant areas. The new medium caliber gun and air des'ense systems on new classes of surface ships and the probable acquisition cf additional largeshipseaborne assault helicopterHelix B) will also improve the Soviet Navy's capability to conduct opposed Undines
hese enhanced capabililies will give thcthe option to use naval forceumber of Third World situations against all but ihe most well-armed regional powers Because tbc Soviets probably will have, al most, four CTOL carriers by thehev would have to draw heavily on the assets of mure than onethey did during the Urge portion of eserciseassemble a
force sufficient lo conduct an opposed distant-area landing The assembly oforcereat distance from the USSR would seriously undermine the Soviet Navy's ability to perform its priority strale sac offensive and defensive missions in the event of escalation to general war. We believe, therefore, that ma>cx Soviet naval task force participation in Third World conflicts will be restricted lo limited war situations in which the Soviets judged lhe risk of escalationar wiih the United States or NATO to be small
erhaps thc most compelling argumentore ambitious power projection strategy during the period of ihis Estimate is our judgment that programs directly supporting the Navy's strategic offensive and defensiveballistic missile, cruise missile, and attack submarines, land-based strike aircraft, and ASW-oriented surface combatants--will continue to receive top priority in the allocation of the Soviet Navy's budget. Other factors which east doubtignificantly increased power projectionin the near term include the following;
The naval infantry's grosvth has been modest Since its reeslablishment3 It has grownurrent strength of0
Tht pace of LPD construction has been slow.
Only one berezsna AOR has been built and no otber large replenishment units art known to be under construction.
IK The Ukehhocd of an ambitious naval power project ton strategy during the period of Ibis Fatimaic is further reduced by the practical difficulties involved In rapidlyarge number ol CTOL aircraft carriers, the most important Instruments ofission. We estimate that the Soviets will construct such carriers at the same Nlkolayev shipyard on the Black Sea at which Kiev-class aircraft carriers art built. This facility has been specially configured at great expense (including the installation of the USSH'l largest overhead gantry cranes) for tbe construction of such large warships- We estimate that ihu yard, il operatingormal construct ion pace, will be able lo produce one Urge CTOL aircraft carrier every four years, with the first unit being deliveredt is possible for the Soviets to construct carrieis atlasler rate, by using additional, less suitable shipyards or bv placing construction at Nikolayevrash
basis. Such practices would, however, be inconsistent with past Soviet practice when constructing new types of Urge combatants. (The construction of the first unit of the Kirov-class CCN. for esample, began3 but was not completedc believe lhat the Soviets recognize the com plenty of building and operating CTOL carriers and arc likely to develop this capabilitylow-but-sure pace. For these reasons, we reject the conceptoviet Navy in which power protection by major naval task forcesominant role.
lternate Courses of Development
US. Our best estimate on the future of thc Soviet Navy reflects our judgment that the trends we have observed in ship construction, naval doctrine, and strategy over the pastears will continue The following paragraphs discuss three variables that could precipitate major changes in thc Soviet Navy ofajor Soviet ASWtrategic arms reduction treaty,evere economic crisis lhatut in military spending.
n ASW Breakthrough. The development thai would result in the most profound change In Soviet wartime strategy from that outlined above would be an ASW breakthrough that gives the Soviets the capability to detect and track enemy submarines in the openbreakthrough derived from one of the many research efforts they are conducting on acoustic and nonacoustic sensors. Although unlikely throughout lhe period of this Estimate, such awould substantially increase the Soviet Navy's ability to perform the critically important strategic defensive tasks of destroying enemy ballistic missile and land attack cruise missile submarines before they launched their missiles. It would also increase lhe Soviets' ability to protect their SSBNs. because enemy attack submarines could be identified and attacked long before they closed Soviet SSBN havens.
e believe an ASW breakthrough would lead to major changes in thc way the Soviets would deploy their general purpose forces, particularly attackbefore andeneral war. During thc prehostllities phase, the Soviets probably would opt to deploy substantial numbers of SSNs to suspectedSSBN operating areas, in choke points, and in likely transit lanes near enemy submarine bases. These nuclear-powered attack submarines would attempt to
CCRCT
gain coniact and maintain tiail on delected Western submarines.on sequence fewer submarines would be available for SSBN protection, unless the Soviet SSN order of battle were increased. Surface and air units probably would also be deployed farther forward. Planning for these operations probably would leadreater effort to acquire foreign facilities, particularly to support ASW aircraft.
he developmenteasonable capability to detect and trail Western SSBNs in the open ocean would provide thc Soviet Navyowerful argument for increased budgetary allocations. The Navy could argue persuasively lhat it could notcounter enemy strategic submarines and ensuie tlie survivability of its own SSBNs without aincrease in forces, especially in SSN production rates. Given this choice, the Soviet leadership could grant the Navy increased fundsreater SSN construction effort, perhaps twice as many units per year as the five to si* wc currendy expect
f there were an initial detectionwe cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets would explore techniques for destroyingespecially SSBNs, by means other than the traditional reliance on general purpose navalThere have, for example, been vaguein Soviet writings to the possible use of land-based ballistic missiles against submarines in the open ocean. Exploringechnique would be consistent with past Soviet interest in innovative solutions to naval problems]
"^It would also
be consistent with Soviet doctrinal emphasisull (service approach to the accomplishment oftasks Thc Soviets are probably aware of the myriad technical problems likelv to be encountered in any such use o! land-based ballistic missiles including:
Tbe need toemote sensor that could precisely locate SSBNs patrolling in the open ocean and constantly update that position.
Thc need toystem that could rapidly update ihe trajectoryallistic missile in flight to compensate for target movement.
The need to solve fuzing problems associatedarhead surviving water impact frOrn high altitude.
We are skeptical that such problems could beat least during the period of this Estimate, and believe the Soviets would be unlikely ioourse unless they had high confidence that ihe initial detection problem would soon be solved. This example is menlioned, however,reakthrough in ASW detection could lead to radical changes, not only in Ihe Navy, bul in overall Soviet military strategy
lrategic Arms Control. Arms controlsuch as the ongoing strategic arms reduction talksould play an important part inthe role within Soviet strategy and the force composition of the Soviet Navy in. For example, severe restrictions on SLCM characteristics/ deployment,an, woulderiousthreat to the USSR and eliminate much of thc pressure to conduct sea denial operations at greater distances from Soviet territory. Provisions governing strategic ballistic missile force levels couldignificant impact upon general purposeubstantial portion of those forces will remain dedicated lo protecting SovietTART provision simply limiting or freezing SSBN/SLBM levels probably would have little impact upon Soviet general purpose programs, although SSCN/SSN construction could increase slightly asdedicated lo SSBNs shifted to general purpose programs. Plans to protect Soviet SSBNs probably would not be affected byreeze/reduction. On thc etherTART provision callingharp reduction In land-based ballistic missile systems, which would be likely to encourage both the United States and the Soviet Union toreatci percentage of their strategic arsenals to sea, could provide strong justification for increased production of ASW-capable general purpose forces lo protect the increasedof Soviet SSBNs.reatymove to sea" were signed, we would expect increases in the production of SSNs,r follow-on ASW aircraft, and ASW-oriented surface ships such as the Udaloy.S move to sea could also justify an increased Soviet anti-SSBN effort, we do not believe the Soviets would allocate increased forces against Western SSBNs unless they had first achieved aASW breakthrough allowing them to detect and trail enemy submarines in lhe open ocean.
eoere Economic Stringencies. The Soviets' ability to sustain the ambitious naval program wc
project in out baseline estimate may ultimately dc pend upon the health of the Soviet economy and the willingness of future leaders to continue ihe Breihnev polio of favoring gum over butter. We have no evidencehrushchevian inclination within the next generation of Soviet leaders to bolster theby cutting military spending Indeed, we believeut would be unlikely, at least throughtonceivable that the post-Brezhnev elite would be moie willing to curb military spending, especially if agricultural performance and the economic growth rate continue to falter throughnd/or arms control agreements alloweconomies.
ith the possible exception of the Strategic Rocket Forces, budgetary cuts driven primarily by economic stringencies probably would fall on all branches of the Soviet armed forces Within the Navy, programs considered fundamental to its primaryoffensive and defensive tasks, such as SSBNs. attack and cruise missile submarines, and land-based strike aircraft, probably would suffer few, if any. cuts. Rather, sortie cutbacks or slowdowns in programs relating more to distant-aiea power protection and sea controlas large surface combatants, amphibious ships, and navalbe expected. It li conceivable, however, thatombination of factors budget cuts could fall mote heavily on the Soviet Navy,ubstantial cuts in surface ship programs. These factors include:
A new political leadership that lacks Breihnev 'j apparent commitment toargenavy and/or Is leu Inclined to use naval forces as instruments of foreign policy to project Soviet power and Influence in distant areas.
A new chief of the Soviet Navy who lacks Admiralnfluence within the political and military hierarchies and/or does not fully share his visionlue-water navy in which large surface combatantsrominentuccessor, for example, couldubmariner and could be rnore inclined to push for tbe construction of additional attack submarines.
Technical advancei in antiship weaponry and targeting convince the Soviets that large surface ships are too costly and vulnerable, and that
ASW and ASUW tasks assigned to large surface combatants can be done more effectively by smaller combatants, submarines, and land-based aircraft
oubtful that the interim collectivewe expect to follow Breihnev will be inclined to make major policy Departures such as cutting defenseecision lo make significant reductions in military spending probably would be impossible until the next generation of Soviet leaders is firmly in place and one man has emerged as first among equals. Since this pcoeess is likely to take severalecision to cur naval programs could not be made until they lhat time most ol llie major surfaceprograms currentlyruisers and the Udaloy and Sovremennyy guided-missUebe neanng completion Any reductions then probably would come in Sennetwe protect for thethai probably would be deleted or sharply reduced in order to complyignificant cut in naval spending include
ton nuclear-powered aircraftThe firU unit of thii class, and possibly the second, may be too near completion toudgetary decision made in the. The protected third and fourth units, however, probably would be deleted, and any plansollow-on class carsccied
New classics) of nuclear-powered cruisers
New classes of Urge amphibious ships (LPDs and LPHs) and underway replenishment ships.
In addition, the Soviets may opt for earlysome older destroyers and frigates andunits than originally programed of newfollow the Sovremennyy and Udaloy DDCs.dearly identified with coastal ASW andsuch as the projected
thc Krivak GrUha frigates, probably would be least affectedharp budgetary cutback.
he net result of cuts in surface ship programs such as those outlined above wouldavy with much less capability than the one projected in our baseline estimate to conlrol waters beyond the range of land-based tactical aircrafl and to project power in distant areas. By the. such cuts could
f-
reduce the overall size of the surface navy by
xe oi me surface navy bvthai could be launched from aircraft, sub-
much aiercent, lessening Soviet capabilitiesand land and receive targeting informs-
sustain curreni peacelime deployment levelsfrom satellites, tn addition, they might stress
areas such as the Mediterranean, the Indiansolutions to maritime threats, such as
and off West Africa The Soviets probablyantiballistic missile and air defonse sys-
aticmpt to compensate for any reduction incounter SI.BMs and SLCMs, respective-
capabilnies to perform hev strategic defensivean increased maritime role for ihe Soviet
hy relying even more on advances inForce
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