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CHINA'S POLICIES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate examines recent sbifls In China's policies toward the United States and Ihe USSR. It focuses on the implications of these changes for the United Slates over the next several months.
KEY JUDGMENTS
A mil ofof which have been debated in Beiiint for severalbehind the emergence over the past two yean of policies that put some distance between Washington and Beijing and that opened the dooreduction of tensions with the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping was attempting totable politicalfor hb successors and. we believe, wanted lo remove foreign poliootentially contentious domestic issue. Longstanding Chinese skepticism about Ihe value Washington placed on Ib China connection and about US Intentions toward Taiwan was reinforcedrowing sense of nationalism about foreign bones in general. Beiiing saw signs that Moscow, because of domestic economic difficulties and foreign burdens, was seriously interested inialogue with China. Some Chinese argued thai reducing tensions wilh the Soviets would
Finally, some in the leadership aim believed that an excessively close identification of China's interests with those of Ihe Uniled States was undercutting China's credentials in the Third World.
This web of interlocking factors, in our view, has produced policy shifts that Beijing hopes will maximize its bargaining power with both the United States and Ihe Soviet Union. It has not. however, altered Beijing's fundamental global balance sheet The Chinese still regard the USSR as their main threat and the United States as the only viable counterweight to Soviet expansionism, in Asia and around the world. The Chinese also believe that continued access to L'S trade and technology are very important to their modernization goals We believe Belting's current tactics are intended in part totronger commitment of support from the Uniled Stales. This objective hi. been frustrated by what they see as continuing US reluctance to make as clear as China would like that solid relations withore
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important lhanighly visible relationship wjlb Taiwan authorities. Thii perception appears to persist in Beijing, despite repeated US reminder* thai the terms of Ihe Taiwan Relations Act obligate Ihe United Statesertain level of support to Taiwan.
We believe the key implication! for the United States of ihese adjustments in Chineae policies are the apparent depth of Beijing's skepticism about US intentions toward China and its new willingness lo pby off its links with Washington against Moscow, and vice versa The Chinese already have demonstrated to the United States that they are nol afraid to deal Independently and directly with the Soviet Union. Chinese perceptions of US attitudes toward China and Taiwan will. In our view,ajor influence on Bering's foreign policiei for the remainder of this year.
In our view, seme important constraintsloor beneath which the Chinese do not wish their relations with the United States to erode. China's bargaining power with the Soviet Union is derived from Beijing's relationship with Washington; by the same token, the Chinese recognize lhal iheir value to the United States comesommon interest in halting Soviet expansionism. Moreover. China's development strategy is keyed to good relations with the United States. Japan, and Western Europe, thus setting some limits on any improvements in Sino-Soviet relations.
Even if the Sino-US relationship improves, we doect ihe Chinese to quickly abandon their efforts lo reduce tensions with the Soviet Union. Any negotiations on Ihe key security issues lhal have long divided the Iwo countries will be protracted and contentious, but we cannot rule out the possibility of significant progress if the Soviets make major concessions or Sino-US reorn remain unsettled
DISCUSSION
lor Momuvarooitify ^
I. Significant change* In China's foreign policy, especlallv toward thr United Sum and the USSR, have emerged over the past two vrart The key ingredlenti have brm an attenuation of diplomats and Kralfspc relations -tlh the l'mied Stales, aa attempt lo reduce trnaton with thr Soviet Union,enewed rmphast* on rrkrtkra wHh the Third World. The Chinnt have describedhanmtactical moves nccoaary lo underscore thaof their foreign DoBcy. which some Chime apparentlyhreatened by an raressively clow reUtlonthlp with Watrangloa We believe, hi (act.vli ol (acton, some ol which are dearly rotated, went into the deesjaon lo put um dutanre between Brutng and Wathanaion. and loialogue with Moscow Thrar facton werr
A IvdcmcM ihat Moscow, brcame ol incrraainc economic difficulties at home anda* prepared to leriouilv eiplore the possibility o( reducing tensions with Chinarain- lo explore the poaubility of obUin-lag from Ihe USSR terhooioa>cal aaUatancr in Upgrading China'* aajna ind uaf rial plan! and rip* mi ing rnotuaRy beneficial iradr
end toward morertlre to removeui foreign policy Usues ihat might complicate the luceetWon ptoapects (or Deng Xlaopina'f
hein.
'* adverse reaction lo trrnda In US policy toward China and Taiwan, especially regarding armi aalea to Taiwan and trehoology transfer to China, and the roaueqmn* concHoSon thai the Uniled Si*let was placing decreased value on Chinsraicasc partner
idespread perception thatwai loo ctoae lo the United Statei waa under-culling It* credentUb and inliuence In ihe Third W. -Id
A ludgmant thai reduced tension* wilh the USSR would enable China lo divert reaource* from the BBilitary to ihe nwdrrDmiMn effort.
t In ourthese corttaderaUoaa ied the Ounrse to begin adiwiing iheir potion In war* they hoped would enhance iheir fWibibly and leverage with both Wasninstlan and Moscow. The Chinese landers hoped at the tame lime lo reduce their vulnerability lo cbanjr* ol bring too dose to the United Stale* al ihe aacrificeeirruerraU The domestic priorities of thewhich mcSude reducing ibr iaJlnr-ore of ihe mihtary. prrparing ihr groundajor part* purge, and managing enfksnn fit Ihr nodal effect* of China's opening to iheprobably reinforced the leadenhipi Inclination loore cautious foreign policy.
a Thr ralcnt lo which domestic polilicalhave affected China's foreign policy coursehr past two yean at uncarar Forrign polio wvsrw* own liar Inst few yean have occurredlcne warn Dragoverriding concern haa bora So strrnath-ra Ihr political base of his handptcied mcreason and lob comnrihrnsive reform program. We beiievr China's foreign pofky direction over (hemonth* will continue lo be Influenced by the domestic polilical tockeying unoctaled with Dent Xiaoping'* attempt* lotable polilicalor ha* successors.
4 Fraaa the outart of Sioo-US relnciona, there have bera rlrmraU h* the leadenhip who. Cling wtdeK held reservations about relyingoreign power.arguedore Independent, balanced course. Wc believe ihat ikeplicism about the benefit* China will asm from II* relation* with ihe Uniled Slatesactor wtth which the leadership ha* had lo reckon and ihat tht* factor become* pnrtlcuUHv important when the leadership perceivesrelations lo be strain* d. The Chineserea* iheirhat Ihey perceive as affront* to their national dignity,ighly nationalistic tone ha* marked iheir complaint* about US poUci on Taiwan Moves
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during Ihc pail two yean to lbc direction ofmore balanced posture toward Mcacow and Washington complcrnrnird other policy coinproniiari auch ai tighter controb over Western influences on Chinese aoearly
5 When reUlion* are Brained, ronreMtona by any leadership to the Uniled Slate* could becoene aliability We do not have reliable indications thai policy toward ihe Uniled Sum hasajor domestic political Issue in which hey leaden are
tposinc view*.
onsensus Tuu emerged lo
aulkoui. ikeplical approach Inward both Vt'aihinalon and Moscow. We believe Dena'i sucees-ton would seek to mainUln the current coraensus while conaolklalina iheir authority Nonrtheles. we cannot rule out ihe ocasibilitv that Deng* departure would ciealr dnarrar in the pohomaking eOabluh-metit and that strains with the United Sum would be more difficult lo manage Although wa believe there are no ilrortg pro-Soviet elemenli in the leadership pressures could build on Deng's succeiaon loest inhibited approach toward Moscow If Sinn-US relations remain troubled and the Sovlrts demon-strale increased (leiJbilHy.
6 Chinese allempti to InsuUle Sine IS trade and acceas to US technology from ihe ocnarludes of IrUngular politics would aho toller under ihrarWhile ihere have been some tensions In ihe Irade arrtor over the past senr.believe these were due lo Belling'* efforts to reduce the large deficit it had wilh the United Stales and lo obtain ecces* lo iheouible share of the lucrative US tratile market In our view, political difflcultle*onfluencedpproach In these problems Over Ihe longer run. if the Chinesr continue lo perceive an uruuble letatlontbip *Mh ihe Untied Stales, we ripect polilical problem, will begin to affeet Other lectors of the retstiornhip AI the same lime, of courseurrent determination lo mhaiwe it* access to US trade and technology provide* ihe lnited Sumsome leverage in the politicala* the economic atpeci* of the rebtinrivhii*
The Tocllcol Approach
& US UUIudes toward China, especially futurr act ton* toward Taiwan. wlUrucial role in determining the eatent lo which Belling pursun iheseolicy directions Wc believe ihe Chinese have no clear-cul. long term erpecUlions for their ulk* with the USSR In fact, ihey clearly mil coo-def the USSR the principal threat to Chins, and ihe* have done nothing over ihe pant two yean to lunar* they ale likely to change lhal view. In any event, ihe conditions ihe Chinese have set for substantial progress in thewithdrawal of support (or Vietnamese eapansaonum. removal of tbe Soviet military presence in AfghanistanuhsUntial drawdown of Soviet troops along ihe Chineselengthy nr totiaitonv wltirfc we beheve the Chinese -ill use to muinucr Iheir bargaining position with the Uniled States
9 The Chinese -ant to use the ducusslon ailh Moscow, in part, to Irs* lo influence IS policy on important bilateral and other luurs. If, (or eiamplc. the Chinese conclude ihat the QuatiUtivr or quant Ha -the artels of US arm* provision* to Taiwan arc moumlerit with the IT Augustespectaut ifs doneichltbebevr Beuang wil increase ihe tempo of it* contact* with Moscow In ihoet we bebeve the Chinesr will enploit conlinued lalks with the Soviet* to make il appear ihai the United State* willeopolitical price (or mil adlielt teeking improvedm The Chinese aho are likely to teek tn make ihc Uniled Stale* appeal out of step with it* allie*ihe China guest km and will continue In cowl broad Mipporl
(ram the Third World, mciadlag mlmim of IS
pobcwi in various retport*.
ie beheve. however,ere are important consideration* that currently serve to comlrain China'* lavolvemeoi in triangular politics. |
^ndicatei lhal the Chinese want In pro!ret and enhance thr bilateral Sino-US relallomhip In our
view, ibe Chinese abo recognlre thai tomeof reasonably wildip wiih (hr Unitedecessary If ihey arr to have any significant If 'tune with ihc USSR. Bv Ihe bub* token. Begins'* aapfra-tions uThird World leader lightingegtmonbv iic" activities of both superpowers would be seriously undercut by toorcoonliatloi with Moscow. On tha other band, the Chi new hawesire to keep Washington guesstlng about the depth of any warming trend In Si no-Soviettth any US kaoerahip Chineae oiflciau over tbe rears have been advised bv leaders of both US parties that no US adminiStiallon willermination of arms sales lo Taiwan. BeUlng't Meiibtll-ty on tbe issue has fluctuated over the years, in our view, depending on lis perception of US atlftudr* and intention* toward the naur. When the Chineae have concluded that the United State* was mindful of their wnwnvitira on Taiwan and moving toward Iheirof Ihehas been geoer-all* upbeat about the overall nature of tbe relation-slstp. On tbe other hand, periodi during which the Cannes* perceivedon Taiwan have been accompanied by stagnation or tensions In other aspects of Iha reUlsonshlp.
H In the eitphorsc aUsKssphere thai followed nor-inalrrafin* of nrtarv-nshe Cfaorsr cfearly behwvedgr*at would be made in all aapactt of tb* rekliomhip In more or less equal fashion. While the Chinese almoU certainly were not entirely salitf led wtth lb* knee nf the normalisationeanectaJy- on the knotty Question of US arms win toriprctarioro lor further progreu were high, and tn retroapect escetstve During Isolowever. Ihe Chineseerkrs of foreign polto review* thai reflected, among othersdgrnenl thai the ihort-term prm-peeta loriheir goals loward lb* Ugggrf Stale* were waning, i
IS. After several months of discussion, somepparentlveadership consensus ontoward the Unitedwell as the Sovietlo crnerge2 Criticism of US pollciet in other parts ol the world was stepped up_
' This approach reflected Chinese resentment over what Ihey perceived as an attempt bv the United Stales toecurity reUUonship in eichange for Chiner acquiescence to US arms sale* to Taiwan. At the same time, senior Chinese officials intensified their com-plaints to US officials and others about the US (allure
io honor miter "commitments" lo trnnifer techrvoleav to China On the othar hand. Chioeae otticlab -ml out of iheir war lo aaaurr USciaU and buatneitmen that trade ihorjld not ba affected bv the teniionj in other aspects of the relationship
he signing of the point coroxnunique In Augustas not lubnar-.tialiv altered Beijing's tactical approach to the United State* OeapHe the difficulties of Ihe pmt two rears, we believe China* long-term objective* In IO US relationship remain basicallyfrom those described earlier in ihis Estimate The Chinese have done nothing either with tha United States or with tbe USSR ihat would close the dooresumption of closer lies In the future In fact. Huangatalemenl to the Council of Forrigii Relations in early2 that China and the United Stale* share many things la common" tn the international arena nam ill lo us that Beijing remains deeply interested insomestrategic dialogue and lhal hit remark* reflect some optimum about tbe loog-lerm prospect* for the retatiorulup
IT. On the other hand, we heceve the Chinese mat be far less sanatrine about any slgniflcanlfa bilateral ties In the short run. The principal obstacleesumption of forward rnoveinent In the rekilotsship. in our view, is Beijing's perception thai the United States underestimate! the importance to China of Taiwan. Indeed.ontent too at ihr prtvale and Influential Council of Foreign Relation* lhal "some people" In the United Stair* are seeking lo use Taiwan lo undermine Sielation* and thai,esult, the relationship could "go down thrlear reminder that the Taiwan issue remain* the key Irritant In bilateral retailors.
IB. Huang'i remarks and other similar comment* by top Chinesr leader* over the past severaln our view, abo tugaeat that the Chiaewome polilical advantage to Imprying that China can be "lost" again. Remarks such asherefore, are designed to Imply that Ihe Chinese are prepared to restrict tlieir approach lo the USSR, if ihe United Stale* take* what Bcinng regard* as thr proper atrpa in ihe Stno-US bilateral relationship It aboe believe, thai ihe Chinese sudge thaieceptive audience to this luggettloo In ihr United Stales.
ontinuing Chinese protestations thai theStates does not Intend top to BeiMngi interpretation of the August communique luggettl to the Uniled States "wasupport lo Taiwan The Chinese want lo be rtnasured about both the form and the substance of tbe US hnk with Taiwan. They have shown particular scruftivtly lo Ihc "quality and quantity" provision In the communique, and have warned that they will watch carefullyona fide decline ia US *nles to Taiwan Chmese leaders cite US unwilUngnes* torecise turning point for luch reduction* asack of US sincerity toward fulfilling provision* of the August communique At thr *ameheir concern* about US intent ion* mount when the United Stale* dlaplay* public, official Interest in Taiwan, especially In the military
esptte their public rhetoric about China's abtl-ity to deal "Independently" with the Soviet threat, we believe most Chi new lenders Mill value the UnMed States as the only real strategic counter-eight to the USSR and are trying toloor below which thev do not want the US rebsllonshlp to go. Clearly, the Chineae havea more realistictheir ctprxtarsona about the degree to which the Untied SUles and China are likely to cooperate In any military sense again* the USSR. Nonethelesa, in our view Ihey recognise that without some form olsolid US letationahlp iheir Aeaibtllty to deal wllh the Soviet Union would be reduced sharply. Moreover. Betting's position and Infhaence ka area* where US and Chineae iMereat* coincide aach aa Indorhim aasdalao be reduced
inally. we believe lhal Ihe Chinese recognise that over Ume their area lo US tecfarwlogv and markets would be adversely affected, desprte Bcigatgs ailempts to protect It. rf theot puiore mini footing. Imports of US high technology, especially in areas such as eesrrgy devetoprnrnl and aircraft, are crucial to China's hsng-lermplans Moreover, ihe United Slates ggts China's third hnsJing Irade pariTwr. alter Hong Cong aaalremain an important target market hs China's long-term eiport planning. Even currently, the Chime are deeply concerned lhat growingknarka the Untiedei and the West wlD hamper ibeir nsodarnassstinei effort bv preventing them from earning the foreign nrhange required to pay lor their large capital import needs.
n the final analysis, howrver. we cannot rule out Ihr pcasabililyownward spiral In Slno-US relations will conlmu* wefJ paat any floor that fseutag hopes ta sethe US relationship with Taiwan, aa well aswntactt with Moarow. willifficult for China lo stabilise what, from Belting'turrenttv an unsettledwith tbe Untied States, and one that is potrtlcallv charted at borne
Betljlng't Approach to Moscow
IS Over tbe past decade. China's main foreign pohcy goal has been to contract politic*)and strategic eounirrwergbtt against the Soviet UrMon. In Bettings view, Moscow has been, andn aggiesMvetv espanWontsl power which seeks lo espand its polilical and mililary Influencehegemonrst-throughoul the world. Countering Soviet drtigru while tvoiding the kind of provocation lhat couldeasfrorstatsonal response from Moscow have set Use limits amohcy.
he Chineae see military power and military Bantu nee as Moscow't main, if not sole. instrument* of political influence In Ail* Moscow's efforts lorespect for ils power into influence and Its nuvmon of mibtary aid le Hate* around China's periphery have renu.ned thr focus of concern among Chinese leaden.or this reason thai China ha* been moat preoccupied with Soviet influence Inand the Soviet mililary presence in Afghanistan analji
W tuttainrd Soviet military buildup along tbe Sino-Soviet bonier obviously represents China'snational security threat Beijing hat regarded ihb buildup atnee the snid-lMCa. as lar beyond the needs for self-defense, as reason io bold overall Soviet mo-live* In auratSrm. and aa proof ofo use Ihr threat of military force for politicalhile the Chinese behave as rf ihey do not raped ihe Soviets to mount an attack on Chinaerervere provocation, we believe Chinas ilratrfiv andmodernization arr proceeding on the asrump-Ihan that Soviet eapemlilio continue tia trend lhal can onh widen ihe gap brfeen thr duality w* the two forces,
n addition lo this growing sensititllv to the continuing Soviel effort lo encircle China. militarily a* well a*orldwide polilical campaigns pdscy towardho reflected theegacy of racialolitical differences, ideological conflict, and national rrvntmenl lhat had long animated Chinese prrcep-Imbs of Riastla and the USSRlobal competitor with ibe USSR and asen power with cioee He* tohe Unaled Slatesentral role innti-Soviet Security calculus.
elmiled appreciation nlhe farmeri nowheir.
guidance earlt1 caTlrd (or improving peoperW people ik* wllh the USSR The guidanceasedbinete conclusion thai thr Sorict* -ere being impelled by dtlficuluc* al home and abroad to seriously attampi tome notmaliulion In
rrjallons wllri China. The Chineae, lo our view, abo calculated lhal thetificulllra would allow China to compete wllh ihem politically by Improving lira withit European pari lea and pro-Soviet Weatemntil pnrtlei and bvore indeaveaaieaM poature toward the Third World, to abort, iha Initial Chineae respona* to Soviet overturea torea waa couched in cnarnOeflyterms.
yhe Chineae had begun lo view their relations wllh Iha Sovieti Irom diflorlng penpectlvea. Tha Chineae concluded, we believe, lhat their irtodernliatlon el Ion required prolonged stability on theirobscctive thai haa been evident In tbeir initiative* to improve rem ripen with North Korea. India, and the Southeast Asian rouaa-riei and that reduced lenalons on the Smo Soviet border wouldirection ol* reaourcetktailopiirpcaaa. At the same rime, those voice* arguing that Sino-Soviet relallom should be nphHted for their practical benefits, such as technological assistance, apparently began loore receptive hearim amorai top policy makers. We beitn* ihis occurred because the Chinese had begun to ccaarhade that further economic retrenchment was neceaanry and that China would profit more from ualng all sources, including Soviet, lor refitting its esJatlrag mdustrialni il So.seeking new piaals *od euulpmcnt solely Irom Japan and the West.
SI. In our view. Brulng's primary concern about the future of Sino-US relations arongry ItaTruenced Us calculabooa about policy toward Uoarow Knowing that Ihe Soviet proposal in1 to reopen border talk* waa tinted lo exploit Stno-U3 differences. Chfaseae ofllciala clef erredar, while Informtrai the United State* of the offeretsurtrlcr that Belling had others Mcacow pre and Belling with new overtures, Beijing delayed resumption of polilical talks until after tba August communique had eased the Sino-US crisis. This reduced th* potential for negative effects on Sino-US relation! and at the same time allowed Seeing to address htoacowtrvraiihenrd poeltion, enhancing proapectt for exact-Ing rone canons
hina'slrnilar to Its conduct9 when the Chinese delayed opening talks wllh the Soviets until alter the visit ofid*nl MoncUle to Ceinng In Auguat had satisfied :he Leadership about
US iisteotiooa. lodging by9 pattern, we believe Beijing hopes lo make at least torn* prcap-eta during Secretary Shaskta'i vtstt before reawniog contacts to eaplore improved ties with Moscow
ood
e believe lhat Belling in the coming months will continueourse with Moscow lhal will:
ImproveUl.i, In the Sovtet-Chs-rasae-US rruuasir- The Chineae hope that dealing more poauively with Moscow will increase Chf-aa's dwel-term In rrsaye wllh th* l'rnted States, Ihey are probably even more hopeful that It wiD worh to thalr advantage over ih* longer run.
ermanent political channel to the USSR to probe Soviet positions on basic iuue* We eapert the Chinese to maintain pressure oo al hey bauea Soviet forces on iheir border aad tnand the Soviet role la Afghani at aa but to gtv* the Soviet-Vietnamaar alliance priori
Reduce tendons and improve acceas to whatever malertal heneflls are available from eipanued trade, economic, academic, and techno logical tan with Ih* Soviets.
DtasaaatiHi' thaiot intra cmgeot io dealing with the Soviets. Beumg etasfcsalryIts aas* af coequalny with Wsihinglrsti and MoBco- tn Irr/raence .tew* of the Sino-Soviet rrmtlowshfp la Europe and tbe Third World.
either Intelligence reporting nor officialstaarvsrnt* Indicate that BeUIng eipects rapidesolution of the basic issues Bcj:og hat aho thown la tsJb so far thai it will push Moscow to lake the larat step to deaUtng with Chhsaa* securitya beahrve. however, that the Chineae are prepared to strike some compromise* wtlh the Soviets on the milrtaiy situation along th*
in
made progress with the Soviets here. Beijing, lew, would nol require immediate, similar on Indochina and Afghanistan to keep the dialogue going. But we would eipect ihe Chinese to keep pressing their can* in these two areas. Ihe
SEtJftEI
ave totid incentive* io maintainhard line on Afghanistan aad Io keep ibe Sovieti' fret lo the (ire oa fUmpochea
ven ifaeajfcle ha dealing withon the military Btaaboa by agreeinglymboUc steps along their common borderMongolia, fordo not believewill follow mil on the other keyChinese ftatnmmt*
point out clearly that chances In the Sovietrelet lornhlpriority (or China. The tactical benefit! from thai Chioeae pcaitlon areHanoii dtatruat of Moscowlready evident la ill reaction to th* Sino-Soviet talks Moreover. China's proDoaal* on Indochina, winch were cabled at tba ftrat round of talks, directly terves ASEAN't inter eifan independent nnd neutralaa adamant Handietnamese presence would. In Ihe ChJ-nese view, threaten to undermine ASEAN abythe needutwllbdrawal
M China doe* not especi the Soviets to negotiateabout thair (reserve in Aalvanhtan Belling knows that the Sennets do not regard China'i peart ionactor ha thehat Moscow hn* detDCautratadn rrerinrrl la aa estausded anti-itsstinassscp effort, and that China rats use Usto the Soviel presence to good effect hs Its anat-heastiaony effort la tha Third World.
ailure to make progress on the basic Issues will not prevent BeUIng from seeking Improvement In other aapocts of relations with tha Soviets, both for their own sake and to cushion the dialogue. Moscow, forure to push (ot an cipanston of mutually beneficial eecajomlc and cultural ties. Tbe Onnrns aree lorthcasming on trade if Moaoow offen to fill Chinese orden (or raw material* anal raaamtal* The Soviets are wiaVng la dhspnach advben to Ckastn a* weft aa to make Soviet Uenooiccr more available to China, bet. except for the lapaiBdina of portion* of China'i aging. Soviet-destined industrial plant, tha political legacy ofnd the more attractive opportunities (or technology transfer from the West will place strict Units on how (orilling to go
a the last year or so, Beijing'* renewed contact* wtth several pro-Soviet partiea In Eastern and Western Kurape. indoding the Freatch Commo rears, htm aasst aniaed tSspaak China'* greaterto theovement appears to be motivatedesire to iiyoesje cssrapetUkon with Moaoow it alsoeneral revival ofesire to puna* an independent line abroad, andariicuUriy in tbahmese idcolospcaJ credentials. The Chf-neae may flirt wilh Moscow's Interest in party dealings; but we do not cipoct them to reciprocate too**.
DISSEMINATION NOIICl
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Original document.
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