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A Comparison of Soviet and US DefenseQ
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A Comparison of Soviet and US Defense
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Total Defense Program Foreriod, ihe estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet defenseis, the cost of reproducing them in the UnitedUS defense outlays by aboutercent The estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs12 billion, orercent more than the comparable US outlaysillion.j j
The dollar cosls of Soviet defense activities grew at an average mutual rate ofercent overeriod. In contrast, US outlays grew very little over the periodhole. Furthermore, the growth patterns of the two countries were dissimilar:
The dollar costs of Soviet defense activities (expressed1 US prices) grew during thet an average annual rateercent: growth occurred in nearly all the major missions and resource categories of the defense establishment. Growth continuedat at an average rate of lessercent,eveling off in investment costs.
US outlays for defense declined steadilyhen grew at an accelerating rate until the end of the period. Most elements of the USestablishment reflected this trend. |
esult of these trends, the estimated annual dollar cosls of Soviet defense activities exceeded US outlaysidening margin2hen they wereercent greater. The difference remained relatively constantnd the gap has closed somewhat since ihcn
relativ
In sum, the USSR committed substantially more resources (measuredof dollar costs) over (he period than did the Uniled Stales. Thisfor total defense activities and for almost every component ofas well. Further, the average growth rates of these1 have generally exceeded the corresponding ratesUS defense activities
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Resource Category Companions
growth in overall dolUr costs of Soviet defense aciivities incorporated growth in all of the major resource categories- investment, operating, and RDT&fc (research, development, testing, and evaluation) Althoughshowed considerable growth over the periodhole, these dollar costs leveled ofr duringeriod. Outlays for each of the UScategories show trends similar to those of the US total costsecline throughjhc, then increasing growth throughout the rest
cumulative dollar costs of Soviet investment for the decade were BO percent higher than US investment outlays. The estimated dollar costs for the Soviets were more than twice the US outlays in the, but,of the later leveling off of Soviet programs and growth in US cosu. this margin had decreased toercent1 The estimated dollar costs for Sovietereercent greater than USutlays for the periodhole and were more than twice as greathe dollar operating costs for Soviet activities were aboutercent higher both for the period and in
Mission Comparisons
dollar costs of the two countries' defense establishments can also beerms of the major missions carried out by differentof Ihe forces. The estimated dollar costs (excluding RDT&E) of Soviet strategic forces foreriod were more than three times as large as US strategic outlays. The dollar costs of Soviet general purpose forcestactical air. general purpose naval, and mobilitywere two-thirds more than comparable US outlays for the period. The dollar costs for Soviet support forces, however, were slightly less than US outlays. Q
'Ihe dollar costs for each major Soviet mission grew over the decade US outlays for strategic forces, like the US total, fell through thend barely recovered2 levelnly general purpose forces Brew substantially.
Intercontinental Bombers
Peripheral Muck hirers
Defense Forces
Purpose Forces
Forces
Air Forces
Purpose Naval Forces'
Forces
Forces
Dollar Costs by US Service
Manpower gQ
in Manpower Estimates
Conscription Trends
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A Comparison of Soviet and US Defense
Introduction
goal of (his study is lo make aggregate comparisons of US and Soviet
defense activities. Because the military forces of the two countries arc composed of such diverseimple comparison based on numbers of personnel and weapons would not be very useful. Ii would ignore the differences in design and performance. For example, comparing US and Soviet tactical air forces using only order-of-battle data has limitedomplete comparison of these two forces would require examination of other activities (training, forhich are difficult to measure in physical terms. Q
One way to summarize such diversity is to assign to each activity some suitable value that captures its relative worth and then to calculate the weighted sum. For defenseeighted value in common use is the cost of the resources devoted to each. These costs can be calculated in any currency, but dollars seem the most logical choice for this paper. In this report all comparisons arc made in1 dollars. Dollars capture both (he quantitative and the qualitative dimensions of the forces we are tryingeasure. | |
The use of oneurrencyeasure another nation's activities has practical limitations, however These limitations and US-USSRmade in rubles are discussed on |
The focus of this paper is the measurement of the annual flow of resources devoted to defense, in terms of dollars. Specifically, this report presents estimates of what it would cost, using prevailing US prices and wages, to produce andilitary force of the same sire and with the sameas that of the USSR and to operate that force as ihe Soviets do. We have removed the principal effects of inflation from all costs and outlays by displaying Ihc defense activities of each country in terms of constant dollars.
following US activities and their Soviet counterparts urc included in
the cost comparisons in this report:
National Security programs funded by the Department of Defense.
Defense-related nuclear programs funded by the Department of Energy.
Selective Service activities.
The defense-related activities of the Coast Guard.
The following ire excluded from ihe comparison*
All cost* of military retirement and veterans programs, which reflect payment for past rather than current military activities.'
Soviet space activities thai in the United States would be funded by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Military assistance (except for the nay and allowance of uniformed personnel) and foreign military sales.
- Civil defense programs.
Internal Security Troops, who perform police functions, and Soviet Railroad and Construction Troops, who are not directly involved in national security
The physical quantity data for weapon systems contained in this paper are of two types; delivery data, which refer to the quantities of selected weapon systems acquiredalendar year, and ordcr-of-battlc data, which refer to the existing inventory of weapon systems in active unitsiven time (the middle of the calendar year for the Soviet Union and the end of Ihe fiscal year for the United!
develop the dollar costs of all Soviet defense activities excepty identifying and listing Soviet forces and their support apparatuses Our modelescription ofistinct defensefor example individual classes of surfaceround force divuxms. divided into categories on the basis of type and readiness level; and aircategorized by aircraft type for eachour latest estimates of the order of baltlc. manning, equipment inventories, and new equipment purchases for each of those components. Q
To these detailed estimates of physical resources, wc apply appropriate US prices and wage rates. This procedure is complex, but in general we do the following:
For procuremem. we estimate what it would cost to build the actual Soviet weapons and equipment in the United Stales at prevailing dollar prices for materials and labor (including overhead andsing US production technology and assuming the necessary manufacturingmaterials, and labor would be available.
1 See ttiKuuuMi on pane
'6 Ibe US fiscal year wa* changedeipan to October-September Thcul.ife.nd of ihe fiscal year it JO June for iheeriod and JO Seplember
For operations and maintenancee apply dollar prices to estimates of the labor, materials, spare parts, overhead, and utilities required to operate and maintain equipment the way the Soviets do.
For military personnel, we estimate the military rank of the person in the United States who would be assigned the duties of each Soviet billet and then apply the appropriate US pay and allowance rales to that billet.
The results arc then aggregated by military mission and by resource category.) |
For Soviet RDT&E, on the other hand, we first estimate the cost in rubles. The cost of duplicating that effort in the United States is derived by convening the estimate of aggregate ruble costs into dollars, rj^-j
US data arc in terms of outlays derived from the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) issued by the Department of Defense in2 and from the US budget. The US data have been converted from fiscal to calendar year terms, and defense-related activities of the Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, and the Selective Service have been added tothe comparison with Soviet programs. The outlays for each year have been converted to their equivalent1 dollars using detailed price indexes for each type of military expenditure. In this way. (rends in costreflect real changes in military forces and activities and not theof inflation. The US figures in this report, therefore, do not matchbudget authorizations or appropriations. US order-of-battlc data were also derived from the FYDP; US production data were provided by the Department of Defense,
Changes inestimates presented in this year's paper indicate that for the period
Currentthe cumulative dollar costs of Soviet defense activities (cstimaied
by the methodology described above) were5 percent more than comparable US outlays. We estimate that1 the Soviet level was2 billion and the US level4 billion,
CIA estimates of the dollar costs of Soviet defense activities are revised each year to take into account new information, improvements in costing methodologies, and new assessments of the size, composition, and technical characteristics of the Soviet forces and activities. The US data used for comparative purposes arc similarly revised each year to take into account changes in the FYDP and the Defense Planning and Programming Categorieshe price bases for both Soviet and US defense activities are updated annually to reflect the most receni price index information. Q
' The usethe DI'PC document is explained oni
Set
Thtl year's estimate of the loial dollar costs of Soviet defense activities0 is aboutercent higher than the estimate0 given in last year's report Theargely the result of the change01 price base -thai is. it reflects the higher dollar price levelsur estimate of the physical magnitude of overall Soviet defense activities0 shows little change from last ycar.Q
However, this year's revieweriod of almost no growth in (he dollar costs for Soviet procurement6he difference from last year's estimate results from changes in our assessments of the pace and timing of production of selected weapons in the classes thai make up the bulk ol pro.urement -specifically, ships and boats, aircraft, and strategic missiles. These changes, which impact most heavily on the second half of the decade, are based upon evidence that became availableheprocurement plateau ts noteworthy In that it has lasted longer than previous cyclical fluctuations and mayecular change in (he pace or composition of military procurement.
Confidence inannual revision to incorporate new informationethod of
Dollar Cost Estimates assessing how well we estimate the dollar costs of Soviet defense activities.
This method is to examine how much change the estimate undergoes each yeareriod of several years. Presumably, our estimates for any one year (forould improve as lime passes because wc should know more about the quantities and characteristics of the weapon systems and facilities produced in that year. |^
iven year's estimates changed greatly with everydifferent analysts, improved data, and new methodologiesdifferentcould have little confidence thai wethe accurate level of military activities in thai year. Onhand, if the estimates fluctuated onlyew years after theymade, and bymall amount, wc could feel confident thaisubstantially correct, given the methodology used
The graph onhows our total2 as it was estimated each year2t did not change greatly over time, especially in the last few years. All data for this graph have been convened1 dollars to eliminate the effect of inflation We haveimilar review of our estimated series for the major resource categories and discovered similarly minor variations.Q
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Limitations Of Dollar Cost Estimates
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differences in ihect eristics of military hardware, the number and mix of weapons procured, manpower strengths, and the operating and training levels of tbe
But dollar valuations still measure input rather than output and should not be usedeasure of the overall effectiveness of US and Soviet forces. Assessments of capability must take into account military doctrine and battle scenarios; the laciical proficiency, readiness, and morale of forces; the numbers and effectiveness of weapons: logistic factors: and other considerations. Thus, dollar valuations are useful as general indicators of changes over timeountry's emphasis on military forces They are not sufficient to compare the overall capabilities of forces. (The order-of bailie data provided with the dollar estimates will, however, give the reader some addiiional insight into the relative size and composition of the two forces.)
Dollar costs do not measure actual Soviet defense spending, the impact of defense on the economy, or the Soviet perception of defense activities These issues are more appropriately analyzed with ruble expenditure estimates,
It should also be noted thai the Soviet dollar costs given here do not measure manufacturing efficiencies in Soviet defense industries; they are estimates of what it would cost US manufacturers to produce Soviet weapons. Thus, the dollar costs for both countries are based on US efficiencies | |
Finally, cumulative dollar estimates for any single type of weapon do nol represent slock value. Such estimates would take inlo account depreciation, loss, retirement, and previously existing inventories.^ ]
Rubleslate one country's activities in terms of another country's currency will
exaggerate somewhat the size of tbe first country's effort. This called the index-number problem affects the comparisons of US-Soviet resource commitments to defense presented here in terms of dollars. To assess the magnitude of its effect, wc make comparisons in ruble lerr.is, which arc similar though less detailed. The twoogical range within whicheaningful
esult of differences in the two nations' resource endowments, dollar comparisons of US and Soviet defense activities lend to inflate the sire of Soviel costs relative to those of the United Slates Manpower is relatively expensive in the United Slates Therefore, Ihe US military pay scales built into our dollar cost methodology somewhat cxnpgerale the magnitude of
Soviet defense efforts, whicharger number of uniformed personnel than ihc US forces do. To make comparisons in ruble terms, we use Soviel price and wage dataost US defense activities. In the Soviet Union, capital goods arc relatively expensive Such ruble comparisons, therefore, exaggerate the level of US activities that involve capital goods- -the reverse of the distortion that occurs in dollar comparisons. Q
Procedures for Estimating Rubles
To estimate Soviet defense costs in rubles, we use the same methodology as for dollars, described on pageo detailed estimates of physical resources, we apply appropriate ruble prices. We have Soviet data that enable us to estimate RDTAE. construction,ortion. and much of procurement directly in rubles. We calculate the remainder in dollars and convert it to rublesel of ruble-dollar ratios. | |
Our ruble estimate of US defense activities measures what it would cost, in0 rubles, for the Soviets to produce andilitary force of Ihc same size and with the same weapons as that of the United States and to operate that force as this country does. To maintain consistency with the dollar estimates, we use the same definition of national security activities in the ruble-based as in the dollar-based comparisoos. We derive personnel costs- an element of the operating expendituresdirectly, because we have Soviet pa> and allowance data. We apply ruWc-dollar ratiosthe rest of the operating category) and to the other two major resourceandj^
Results of Ruble Cost Comparisons
Whether measured in dollars or in rubles, Soviet defense costs exceeded US spendingonsiderable margin in the.1 the estimated total Soviet defense costs in rubles wereercent greater than those of the United States measured in rubles Measured in dollars, they wereercent greater. The difference between the dollar and the ruble estimates varied by resource
un. unreicitm aiegieaieu leT ptKUIMMnl, bWiiiite Iht USSKeunite difiidin tlie production or high-quality. technologically advancedthat makesrge proportion of ihe US -capons buy. The differences an- unalhnl for military personnel costi. because Ihe difference! in the diitribuiion of ihc ranks of the two force* are offset by differences ine. of puy amoaj ihc ranks I
Siilti
In Ihe aggregate, wc believe thai our total dollar valuation of Soviet defense activities is in error by no more0 percent for any year in the past decade. We believe our aggregate ruble estimate for the USSR is as reliable as the dollar estimate. We arc confident that total ruble expenditures have been increasing in real terms. Wc have far less confidence, however, in our assessments of costs of US defense activities expressed in ruble terms and, therefore, less confidence in the ruble comparison of US and Soviet defense activilic*,! I
Foreriod Ihe estimated dollar cosis of Soviet defense activities (excluding pensions) exceeded comparable US outlays by aboutercent. The major trends in Ihe defense activities of the two countries were quite different.Q
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities grew during thet an average annual rateercent, with growth in all the major missions and resource categories of the defense establishment. Growth in total defense costs continued6 but at an average rate of lessercent, because of the leveling off in this period in investment costs. Q
Annual US outlays fell2ut from then until the end of the period they grew at an increasing rate. The growth was particularly fast in the resource categories of procurement. whereas US personnel cosu continued lo fall
onsequence of these trends, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense acliviiics. which were approximatelyercent greater than US outlaysereerccnl higher1 the disparity had decreased loercent.
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No pioicctions of future Soviet defense activities arc included in this report. Thereumber of factors thatifficult to predict with any confidence these future trends. Experience has shown that new policies concerning defense issues are likely to emergehange in Soviet
leadership. Khrushchev, while in office, promoted the use of newand an orientation toward strategic missiles. During Brezhnev's tenure, conventional forces were reemphasi/.ed It is too soon to determine what changes the Andropov Politburo may introduce]-
At present, the evidence on future directions is conflicting. On the one hand, the leveling off of military procurement noted during thend the flagging performance of the Soviet economy suggest constraints on the growth of military spending. On the other hand, the large number of weapons under development, (heir complexity, and the continuingin production and development facilities suggest that the Soviets may beignificant qualitative upgrading of their weaponry, which couideturn to the historic growth patterns of Soviet military expenditures
Oih.-rihc dollar cost methodology is lo provide comparisons Ihat have some
we must apply US cost factors equally to all Soviet activities. In
so doing, we apply the relatively high US military pay rates to the largeforce. Soviet soldiers, particularly the numerous conscripts, are poorly paid, even in comparison with the average ruble wage in the USSR, and critics of the methodology note (hat this application makes the iui.il disparity between the two defense establishments took greater than it really
The application of US pay rales to Soviet forcesogical necessity id these comparisons,pari of the whole can be withdrawn for calculationeparate set of rules. But even if uniformed military personnel are excluded from both sides, the estimated dollar cosls of Soviet defense activities still exceed US outlays byercent over (he period and byercentl.| |
Aggregate comparisons that include military pensions are not highlighted in this paper because pensions are considered to be the cost of past lather (han current defense activities. For other purposes, however, the CIA regularly makes detailed estimates of Soviet retirement pay. and we recently revised them upwardew methodology. Our estimate of the dollar cost of Soviet retirement1 isillion; US outlays wereillion. The number of military personnel serving to retirement is similar in the (wo countries. Among Sovie( retirees, however, the proportion of officers is much greater (relatively Tew of the conscripts choose toand officer pensions are substantially higher If we add to both sides the dollar cost of retirement, the estimated total dollar costs of Soviet defense activities would be aboutercent more than US outlays over the period andercent more1 I
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Finally, if RDTAI- cost estimates (which arc less reliable lhan those Tor other activities) are excluded from both sides, the estimated Soviet dollar costs exceed the US total byercent for (he period and byercenthe flat trend6 in Soviet costs excluding RDT&F. shows thatas been the primary source of growlh in the costs of total Sovicl activities since the. Q
Athe comparisons in this paper are focused on ihe lastears.
data base includes. This sectionrief look at the en-
eriod. Q
Wc are less confident in our estimates forhan in those for. The information on production, order of battle, and prices on which our Soviet dollar cost estimates depend is more uncertain for the earlier decade Because the present US accounting system beganc have had to estimate the US costs as well for the. The process of converting such data1 constant prices introduces furtherinto both ihe Soviet and the US estimates. Q
Overyear period, US outlays for defense were5 trillion; the estimated dollar cosis of Soviet defense activities were7 trillion.0 the dollar costs of Soviet defense activities have grown continually. The average annual growth rale of these costsercent per year.| |
US outlays for defenseather crrahc pattern,essentially no overall growlh for theears. There were two major peaks, each driven by procurcmenifirst was associated with ihe strategic arms buildup in thend [he second, in the, with the Vietnam war. Q
Sealer
Soviet Defense Activities by Geographic Regions of Concern
The largest part of the dollar costs of the Soviets' investment and operating is in responsehat they perceive as the two greatest threats lo theirsecuritymilitary forces of the NATO countries and (hose of the People's Republic of China. The growth in dollar costs of to(al Soviet defense activities averagedercent per year overeriod. Costs and manpower of Soviet forces opposite China grew at an even greater rate, while those opposite NATO grew more slowly. The forces opposite NATO were modernized but saw little expansion and therefore did not have ihe high growth rates associated with procuring and maintaining increasing quantities of troops and equipment.! |
Sonetforces opposing those of the NATO countries are those stationed in
OppositeNATO Guidelines Areaonsisting of Ens! Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia; in Hungary; in the Leningrad, Baltic. Belorussian. Carpathian. Kiev, Odessa. North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districtsnd in the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets. Most of these arc ground and air force units, although there arc some air defense, peripheral rocket forces, naval, and border guards personnel and
2 the estimated dollar costs of these Soviet forces were moreillion. Over SIS billion of this amount was for (he forces in the NGA, andillion was for those in Hungary and the eight militaryin ihc westernhe forces opposite NATO accounted forercent of total estimated Soviet defense costs andercent of military manpower. Dollar cosl growth averagedercent per year8 and (hen began to decline as some of the larger aircraft deployment programs were completed. However, we believe that as new weapon systems, many cf which have already been identified, arc deployed in, the growth in these dollar costs will resume.Q
Manning in the area increased by0, remainingillion throughout the period. It is estimated that large increases in (he ground and tactical air forceswere partly offsetecline0 in the strategic rocket troops. This declineeduction in the deployment of older missile systems ami their replacement by fewer, and less manpower-intensive, weapons. (Tj
' Bnimate* pawbr> aDTAfc or lor command and support (unciKirs al cither int service or rultonit level No allemrH has been nude to allocate taese cosis genera phicall>.| j
Soviet Forces Opposite China
Soviet Forces in Afghanistan
units and weapons considered lo be targeted against China are those located in the Siberian. Central Asian. Transbailtal. and Far East Mix. in Mongolia, and in the Pacific Fleet.| ]
Wc estimate that2 the dollar costs of these Soviet forces wereillion, orercent of the total.osts for forces opposite China amounted toillionercent of the total Tbe growth in costs averagedercent for the, exceeding that of total forces over the period. We recently reassessed the number of men associated wilh units along the border and have estimated lhat their level increased from less2 lo moren
The Soviets have completed three full years of military operations in Afghanistan. Wc have estimated the costs of this involvement01 and included them in our totals. The estimates include dollar coats of pay and allowances for ground and tactical air forces personnel (located in both Afghanistan and the USSR) who are involved in the operation. They also include costs of operations, the maintenance of equipment, and construction. The dollar costs of Soviet activities in Afghanistan were an5 billion07 billionmounting to justercent of Ihe total dollar costs of Soviet defense activities in each of the two years. Two-lhirds of these totals arc incrementalis. they would not have been incurred except for the military operations inThe remainder would have been incurred by those forces with or without ihe
I
Resource Category Comparisons
The comparison of Soviet and US defense activities presented in this section separates defense cosu into the following resource categories, as defined in the US budget:
- Investmentdollar costs of activities to replace, modernize, or expand forces through (he procurement of equipment, including major spare pari* and the construction of facilities.
Operatingand civilian personnel cosu and other costs associated with operating and maintaining equipment and facilities. These are directly related to the size of the forces and the level of their activity.
RDT&Ecosts of exploring new technology, developing new weapon systems, and developing improvements to existing systems.
Estimated Dollar Costs of Soviet Resource Outlaysercent of Comparable US Outlays
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Investmentcosts can be divided into two subtotals;
Procurement- the estimated costs uf procuring weapon systems and support equipment, including major spare pans
Constructionestimated costs of constructing the required facilities
Foreriod, the estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet investment wereercent greater than US investment outlays (although this margin was higher in thend somewhat lower at the beginning and end of the period) Cumulative procurement estimates wereercent greater, and cumulative construction estimates were three times asj
Soviet Trends
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet investment grew overeriod at an average annual rate ofercent6owever, these cosls showed little or no growth,lowdown in military procurement. Because these estimates are so sensitive to the changes in our assessments of Soviet military programs made in each update, we place less credence in annual changes than in longer term trends. This is particularly true for ihe procurement estimates0hich include the leading edge of costs associated wiih weapons expected to be completed. As we collect additional information on the pace of those programs in the future, our assessments01 are subject lo changcf"]
While we believe we have corrcvtlylowdown in the growth of Soviet military procurement, wc do not yet know what this portends for the coming years. Procurement activities may remain relatively constantew years. However, the Soviets have continued to devote considerable resources to military research and development) activities since the mid-seventies (as measured by growthacilities and number of weapons programs unders well as lo expansion of military production facilities, j j
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In ihe first three years of this decade wc have already identified as many systems under development as in each of the previous two decades. Among these are fighter and airborne warning and control aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, space systems, and submarines. Wc project that more systems will reach initial operational capability inhan in either. The new systems cover the full range of technologically advanced weaponry the Soviets will need to modernize all major elements of their forces, j 11
Steady expansion of production2ercent aalso occurred since ihe. This has provided the Soviets with the potential (once technological and economic problems arc resolved, or the leadership chooses'to raise the already high priority given to defense activities) to translate the new systems into deployments in ihe field. Thus, the dollar costs of Soviet military procurement activities could resume their historical growth. | 1
Factors Underlying the Soviet Procurement Trend
Wc cannot with certainty explain why the growth of Soviet procurement activities has slowed. There arc several factors wc can identify as possible causes, but we cannot yet calculate their relative significance. And there are probably additional factors wc have yet to identify^
Soviet military procurement over the past two decades has grown at an average annual rate ofercent when calculated in dollars. This growth has not been constant, however, and the production cycles for major weaponsubmarines, andintroduced fluctuations in the rate of growth as especially costly systems are phased out of production and retooling for the next generation occurs. Some of these effects arc discernible in the mid- and, as the fourth generation of ICBMs was deployed andlass ballistic missile submarine programs ncarcd completion. Moreover, some new systems encountered technical problems on the test ranges that may have delayed their introduction. The fluctuations introduced by such procurement phasing, however, appear neither to be abnormal nor lo explain moreemporary decline in the rale of growth, one lasting iwo or three years.
Thus, one component of historic procurementdeploymentclearly present in the declining growth or military investment during the last five years, but it docs not explain the duration of the present
'
Atins conirol constraints mighl also have figured in Ihe slowdown of military procurement, although the evidence is mixed. The ABM andgreements did Utile to curiail the modernization of ihe affected forces, and some force components were expanded throughout Ihe period. Moreover, some production resources were simply shifted from treaty-controlled systems lo uncontrolled systems, as was the case of solid-propellant oulput redirected fromCBM to theRBM. Ii is too early to tell how long the Soviet leadership will adhere to the limits negotiated for the still unratified SALT II agreement and how this willinio future procurement lrcnds.| j
It is possible lhat the Sovietsecision in theo accelerate Ihe modernization of Iheir armedonscious strategy lo upgrade the performance of their weaponry could have contributedrolonged no-growth period of procurement as Soviet planners attempted lo alter Ihe character of futureomewhat similar period was noied in thender Khrushchev, when resources were redirected from conventional to strategic weapons. Delays could be expected as new manufacturing technologies were assimilated in the course of producing more sophisticated sysiems. While there is occasional evidence ofin mastering sophisticated produclion technologies, wc arc unable to assess the extent to which modernization might have contributed to the recent procurement slowdown. Even so. it is clearxpenditures have risentrend which is consistent with acceleratedQ
There is also mounting evidence that bottlenecks in the Soviet economy are interfering with military production, although wc cannot measure the extent of iheir impact on Ihe procuremcnl slowdown. The Soviets have traditionally accorded lop priority to defense industries and in lime of economic retrenchment have shielded military procurement. Since the, however, shortfalls in the production of key industrialoil. coal, and constructioncontributedharp slowdown in industrial output. Problems in rail Iransporl and power generation have delayed deliveries or raw materials and induslrial products lo plants involved in mililary produclion. While there are reports of defense plants being afrccled by disruptions in the economy. Ihcie is no indication of how widespread Ihesc incidents arc or how significantly they might have influenced ihe execution of defense procurement plans.
Moreover, although wc have no direct evidence, we cannot rule out the possibility that the leadership, in response to the country's mounting economic problems, tried to ease pressure on the economy by Stretching Out some procurement programs.olicy would have been consistent with the leaders' decision to scale back overall investment targets as part ofh Hvc-Ycar
olicy could alsoidstream correction of emerging difficulties after the Plan was adopted.ecision was made to hold down procurement growth, the leadership could probably have justified it by pointing out that military procurement levels in Ihe USSR would still be significantly higher than in the United States, as previously
Finally, thendere years of major exports of Soviet military equipment. Political and economicesire to earn hard currency, may haveartecision to divert resources from domestic procurement lo foreign export.
Taken together, the above considerations probably all contributed to depressing the rate of growth of Soviet military procurement, although we cannot be sure that they alone explain the trends of the past five years.
Comparison of US and Soviet Trends
US investment outlaysrend almost directly opposite that of the dollar costs for Soviet investment. The US costs fell by almostercenthile Soviet costs grew.owever, the US outlays had surpassed2 level and were continuing lo grow. Theyercent annual growlh duringperiod when Soviet investment leveled off. Q
esult of these trends, the dollar outlays were most disparate in the, when Soviet dollar costs were more than twice the US outlays. Since then, the gap has narrowed. Kvcn so.1 the dollar costs forinvestment were nearlyercent greater than US outlays. Q
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet missile procurement grew nearlyercent over the period and led the trend in our estimate for Soviet investment. The dollar cosls of ship procurement grew byercent over the period and those of aircraft procurement byercent. [H
On the US side, ihe decline in land armaments procurement led the decrease in investment outlays, and ihe acquisition of new land armaments and aircraft ledpcrceni growth thai followed.I-
Secfci
Cosls
costs can be divided into two subtotals:
Uniformed personnel costs, which include food, clothing, travel, and oihcr pay and allowances for active and reserve military manpower but do not include retirement pay.
osts, the costs of operating and maintaining military equipment and facilities, including those for civilian personnel.
Over the period andhe estimated dollar costs of operating the So-vicl forces wereercent more than corresponding US outlays. Soviet personnel coslsereercent more,osls were slightly Icss.j^
Trends in ihe two countries' operating costs closely followed those of total defense activities. This is because operating costs are directly related to theilitary force and the type and extent of its activities. Q
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet operating activities grew at an average rate ofercent over the period,osts growing faster lhan personnel costs. The largest increaseosts was in the support mission; the largest military personnel cost increase (over half the total) was in land forces.
US operating costs fell7 bul have grownercent overall sinceosts have grownpeeding up somewhat in the lasi two years of the period. This erowth was particularly evident in the general purpose missions. Personnel costs decreased (primarily in the support mission)9 and have fluctuated since then.
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Estimates of ihe dollar cosis of Sovici RDctivities are derived inethodology less ccilain Mian lhat based on detailed sludy of ihe military forces and their equipment. Thestimates should therefore be considered less reliable than the others in this assessment Nevertheless, the available information on particularrojects, published statistics on scientific activities, and statements by Soviet authorities on the financing of research indicate that militaryipenditures were large and growing duringeriod Moreover, our estimates do not take into account the additional costs for research and dcvckipmcn: the Soviets might have incurred had they not been able to obtain Western technology through both overt and covert means. Q
Physical evidence on resources devoted to this effort reinforces this assessment ie Soviets expanded then militaryacilities and manpower by one-third during the period, and construction costs and capital investment at those facilities have been growing annually.j |
Rontinuedigh levelhe Soviets arc developing many new weapon systems, many of them incorporating advancedThese expensive changes are expected to continue to drive up Sovietutlays.
There areew or substantially modified weapon systems currently under development They include ballistic, surface-to-air.and naval cruise missiles; fighter, airborne warning and controlnd support aircraft, the latteride-bodieda large aircraftuided-missile cruiser, and severalground force weapons,ew lank; and several new space systems.
outlays foreclined from the beginning of the period6 but then grew until outlays1 were approximately equal to those2 The dollar costs of Soviet militaryoubled2or the periodhole, the estimated dollar costs of Sovietctivities wereercent larger than corresponding US outlays1 they were moreercent larger Q
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Mission comparisons presented here, except where noted, arc organized in accordance with1 version of the Defense Planning andCategories of the US Department of Defense. This is not Ihe way the USSR organizes its military missions or allocates its defense resources, but it enables us to compare US and Soviet forces and costs in familiar US lerms. The dollar costs presented in the various mission comparisons do not include anyutlays, because we arc unable to divide Sovietosts by missions. Q
In the sections that follow,wc show the major missions divided into each of their components (for example, the general purpose mission is divided into land, tactical air, naval, and mobilityine graphs arc used to show the movements of dollar costs over time, and pic charts show the distribution of cumulative costs between investment, operations andand personnel.
There were considerable differences in the trends of the dollar cosls for the two countries. The estimated annual dollar costs of Soviet missions grew by aboutercent overeriod:
The dollar costs of Soviet strategic forces grew by more than I5 percent, although there was considerable fluctuation of ICBM. ballistic missile submarine, and straiegic air defense activities because of the cyclical nature of procurement.
The cosls of Soviet general purpose forces grew rapidly over Ihcercent) primarily because of increased investment for the land and naval missions and increases in the land forces personnel account
Defense Missions is a
Percent of Comparable US Defense Outlays
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costs of Soviet support forces also grewercent)onsequence of the need to tram, supply, and maintain personnel and equipment in the growing strategic and general purpose missions
US mission activities declined byercent26 and then grew by almostercent6 and the end of the period. Only1 did the US costs surpass2 level:
for strategic forces fell by more thanercent duringthen grew byercent. Leading the increaseprocurement costs for the Trident ballistic missile submarine
Outlays for general purpose forces displayed the largest growth, rising an averageercent per year6ercent over the whole timcspan. The primary causes of this growth were the procurement of new land arms and tactical aircraft andosts for thecomponent of the general purpose mission.
costs, like the other missions, fellnlike other missions, they grew very little over the rest of the period, f
] 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 cwitu- Avct.nc
mix Annual
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Strategicforces are defined to include strategic offense (iniercontinental
and peripherallralcgic defense, straicgic conirol ;ind surveillance, and nuclear weapons. (Although the last isPPC category, we include all nuclear weapon costs with strategic forces.)^
Over the period, estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet strategic force activities (exclusive of RDT&E) were more than triple the corresponding US outlays. This disparity reflects Soviet efforts to add newattack forces during the period, while the United Stales chose instead to modernize its existing inventory. It alsooviet emphasis on peripheral attack forces (for which the United States has no counterpart) and substantially greater Soviet strategic defense forces deployedarge, diversified threat. If peripheral attack forces arc excluded, the level of Soviet activity for strategic forces was still nearly three limes that of ihe United Slates.Q
Soviet strategic activities during the period were characterized by:
Improvement of an already large peripheral attack force.
Continued emphasis on forces for strategic defense against bomber attack.
Expansion and improvement of the land-based and the submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM and SI.BM) forces, resulting in at least rough parity with the United Slates by the end of the period. ( I
US strategic programs, on the other hand, were characterized by:Qualitative- as Opposed toin ihe ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber forces.
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eduction in the number of heavy bombers.
The dcpluymeniystem for defense against ICBMs, which was quickly deactivated.
A reduction in strategic interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missile (SAM) forces)^
Intercontinental Attack Forces
This mission consists of all land-based ICBMs, intercontinental SLBMs and the associated submarines, and intercontinental bombers.[ |
Overeriod the estimated cumulative dollar costs of the Soviet intercontinental attack forces exceeded comparable US outlays byercent.stimated dollar costs of Soviet programs exceeded US outlays by aboutercent:
dollar costs of the Soviet intercontinental attack missionercent higher1 than they werehey were much greater in the, however, primarily because of procurement costs associated with thendCBMs andlass SSBNs
US spending for intercontinental attack forces fell6 with cuts in both procurement and personnel costs, particularly of intercontinental bombers. Spending for this mission, however, grew an average ofear61 as the United States began to invest in the Trident, air-launched cruise missilerograms. Q
During this period the USSR overtook the United States in number of delivery vehicles and overlook (and far surpassed) the United Stales in total
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missile and bomber equivalent throw weight, yield, and equivalentThe United States remained ahead in total online missile reentry vehicles and bomber weapons] j
Because investment cosls were over one-half the total for bolh countries, their trend set the pattern for total costs. Dollar investment costs for Soviet forces displayed the distinct cyclical pattern already noied. while US investment for intercontinental attack forces fell until procurement costs for the Trident SSBN and the Al.CM caused them to
tnlercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The estimated cumulative cosls of Soviet ICBM programs over the period were fivealf times as large as corresponding US outlays.stimated Soviet dollar costs wereimes as large as comparable US outlays.^
The total number of Soviet ICBM launchers decreased slightly2
2 thcSoviets completed the deployment ofndorces and started to deactivate the oldernd SS-8s.
In thehe Soviets began to replace their singlc-RVndCBMs. The SS-II was replaced with improved variants (thend Modnd iwo new systems, thendheas replaced with the newach of the three new systems was more accuratCpCOuld carry MlRVs. and was deployedore survivablc silo]
Byhe Soviet ICBM force includedndariantsndaunchers, most of which replaced older launchers. Altogether, thereewer launchers1 than iherc had beens)
The United Stalesonstanl number of launchers, but improved its force by;
remainingndinuleman II ICBMs with the more accurate and MIRVcd Minuleman III.
Further hardening Minuteman silos and improving command and control capabilities. Among the specific improvements were better suspension systems for the missiles and ground electronics, debris bins on the launch closures to protect the silos from postatlack debris, improved protection from electromagnetic pulses, and more advanced retargeting capabilities.
1 US ICBM forces consistedinuteman Ills, each having threeinuteman Usingle RV; andlder liquid-fueled Titan lisingle RV. The Titan II lacks the accuracy of the Minuteman butarger payload.|
Ballistic Missile Submarines for Intercontinental Attack. This category includes all US ballistic missile submarines and the associated missiles and those Soviet ballistic missile submarines and missiles that are believed to have intercontinental, rather lhan peripheral, attack missions. Alsoon both sides arc the SSBN tenders.^
The estimated cumulative dollar costs of these Soviet activities were aboutercent greater than the corresponding US outlays over the period.1 alone the estimated dollar costs of Soviet aciiviiics were aboutercent greater than US outlays. q
Although the estimated dollar costs of Soviet SLBM forces were less thanercent greater1 than they had beenhe figure fluctuated during the decade in relation to procurement cycles for SSBNs. Procurement oflass SSBN ended in the; procurement oflass peaked in the; and procurement costs associated with the Typhoon class began in the, fj
Annual US SSBN outlays were relatively constant25 because procurement of the present US SSBN force had been completedhe procurement of new types of SLBMs in thiskept outlays from falling. The start of the Trident SSBN program
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1 Dotlari
26 2& M IM
5* 5
4.1
The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force increased byubmarines, from2 to
-25 the Soviet Union deployed an additionallass SSBNs.
A total ofI SSBNs were deployed2
n order to comply withimitations on the number of modern SSBNs and SI.BM launchers, the USSR began to retire theSBNs as itIIs.
The first Typhoon-class SSBN began sea trials inowever, the SLBM that the Typhoon will carry is not yet operalional^-j
The US SSBN fleet was reduced in size during the period, but its capabilities were steadily improved:
In iheany US SSBNs were converted loew SLBM. the.
6 the United States began constructionew class of SSBN to carry the new Trident SLBM. whichonger range and more powerful warhead. The first SSBN of lhat program (the Ohio) was commissioned at the endnd the second (the Michigan) has been launched.
Theissile is being backfilled onlder Benjamin Franklin-class
At the end of fiscal1 ihe United States hadSBNs withaunch lubes each,otalubes. Twenty-five of these were equipped with ihe, or were being converted to the. Six had completed the conversion and been deployed. The remaining three were still armed with the, but they are older SSBNs that will be cither dismantled or converted lo attack submarines by ihe removal of the launch tubes for their inlcrconlinental-range missiles.
1 the Soviet fleet still hadf theSBNs. Some of them are probably being converted lo attack submarines.asaunch lubes equipped with theLBM.l, which carries, had also been deployed. TheSBNs each carrys. and thes eachheIIs each carry 16
Intercontinental Bombers. This component consists of bombers and related tanker aircraft. The Soviet strategic aircraft arc theear andison (some of the Bisons are configured ashe principal US aircraft arc2 andombers and theankers. The US short-range attack missile (SRAM) and Ihc air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) arc also included in this
Cumulative US outlays for intercontinental bombers over the period were sixalf times as large as the estimated cumulative dollar costs of comparable Soviet activities. The difference reflects the much greater emphasis the United Slates attaches lo long-range manned bombers. Q
US outlays for intercontinental bombers were aboutercent greater1 than they had beenhey were considerably less during most of, however, when2 fleet was being reduced)he bomber force was improved with the procurement of SRAMs for bothnds
Near the end of theecision was made to extend the service life of2 and use itarrier for the ALCM. These extension and refurbishment programs, along withosls, were the cause of increased US outlays at the end of the period. Q
Because neither side procured any intercontinental bombers, estimated investment costs did not dominate the trends and totals as they did for ICBMs and SSBNs. Estimated dollar costsere most significant on the Soviet side, while for the United Stales the distribution was about equal. Q
The Soviet Backfire bomber* are included in the peripheral attack and naval missions becausebelieve this is ho* the Soviets intend to ui* them. There is. however, wrnein the Intelligence Community about the range of this
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Strategic Peripheral Attack Forces
This category consists of forces assigned strategic targets along the periphery of the Soviet Union. It includes medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs andedium bombers, older dicscl-powcrcd ballistic missile submarines that formerly had intercontinental attack missions, and submarinehe primary targets of these forces are in Western Europe or China. Q
The United States has no direct counterpart lo these peripheral attack forces in termsPPC mission, although certain US missiles, tactical aircraft, and submarines could perform similar tasks.
The estimated cumulative dollar costs of the Soviet peripheral attack mission over the decadeillion, and they rose at an averageraleercent. In this mission, as in the intercontinental attackthe annual dollar costs of missiles outweighed those of bombers and submarines. The dollar costs of Soviet peripheral land-based ballistic missiles grew at an average rateear. Bomber costs increased slightly. Q
The rapid increase in peripheral attack missile costs was due to the procurement of the thrcc-MIRV mobilen the.heccounted for overercent of ihe costs of the peripheral attack mission and had supplanted its predecessors, theRBM and theRBM, as the most expensive peripheral attack system.ndade up more lhancrceni of the costs of the peripheral attack missionut declined tocrceni by the end of the decade as they were wiihdrawn in favor of the more accurate and survivable
* although somechmt mayeripheral auack mission, we have included iheir costs in the intercontinental auack mission]
42
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" us dppc mission defmilioib place the emund^ironehed cruise missilehe sea-launched enme missilend the pcrthinc ii mrbm in ihe catceory of general purposeheir cumulative procurement costs toillion dollars, are mentioned here to alio* comparisonsoviet peripheral allack j
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Procurement of the Backfire bomber accounted for the small rise in peripheral bomber costs. The older Badger and Blinder bombers were rclircd from service, eliminating their operating
For the peripheral attack missionhole, the cumulative investment and personnel costs were approximately equal over the period. Personnel cosls were declining2owever, while investment costs were rising. Investment was responsible for the overall growth in this mission. | |
Strategic Defense Forces
This mission consists of strategic surface-to-air missile systems, strategic interceptor aircraft. antiWllisiic missile (ABM) systems, and defensive trol and warning systems^ |
con
The estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet strategic defense during the period were more thanimes as great as total US outlays for this mission.1 the Soviet dollar estimate was more thanimes as greal. This disparity reflected differences in the two countries' strategic doctrines as well as differences in the bomber threats facing the USSR and the United States. Q
US strategic policy favored offensive forces over defensive forces aimed at limiting damage from enemy attack. The United States agreed in the ABM Treaty not toationwide ABM system for defense against the Soviet ICBM and SLBM threats, and it chose not lo commit the resources that would have been necessary to modernize its strategic air defenses against the somewhat limited Soviet bomber threat. Q
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Soviet strategic programs favored more balance between offensive and defensive forces. The Soviets also agreed not loationwide ABM system, but they continued lo commit substantial resources to defense against bombers. This relatively higher emphasis was influenced by the threat posed by US strategicforce much larger and more capable than its Soviet counterpart. Soviet bomber defense activities were also influenced by the threat from potentially hostile aircraft in the European and Pacific theaters and in China. ^
Duringeriod, the Soviet Union:
Reduced the number or interceptors assigned to strategic defense fromhite modernizing these forces with theoflagon.oxbat. andloggcr interceptors.
Kept the size of the strategic SAM force stable (ataunch sitesaunchers) while improving its firepower with the continued deployment ofndAMs and the introduction of then
Maintained the Moscow ABM defenses and brought two large battle management radar complexes at Moscow to operational capability.
Completed deployment of the Hen House ballistic missile early warning system and initiated construction near Moscowarge ABM-related facility, which may perform battle management as well as interceptor tracking and guidance. Subsequently,he Soviets undertook what appears toajor upgrading and expansion of the ABM system.
In contrast, the United Slates:
Reduced its strategic interceptor order of battle fromircraft. Most of the remaining aircraft were thes.
5 completed the deactivation of all strategic defense SAM batteries. The only strategic SAM deployed by the US Army during the period was the Nike Hercules."
Deployed one ABM facilityaunchers5 and then deactivated itosts for the program peaked in (he.
r
" The LSAP DtKniue. eliminateds rot included in Ihe accompanying ofiicruf-baille data illustrated al righiJ
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General Purpose Forces
General purpose forces arc definednclude the following DPPC categories:
Land forces.
Tactical air forces.
General purpose naval forces (including ASW, amphibious, and naval support forces).
Mobility forces (including airlift and sealifl forces).
Foreriod the estimated cumulative dollar costs of Soviet general purpose forces were aboutercent more lhan corresponding US outlays. Estimated dollar costs of Soviet forces wereercent more than US oullays2 and aboutcrceni morehe disparity was greatesthen it was almostercent.| |
The dollar costs of Soviet general purpose forces grewairly steady rate over the period as the USSR modernized these forces, increased the buildup along the Sinc-Sovict border and in Warsaw Pact areas, and increased its naval force levels and operations. Naval forces showed the most rapid rate of growth, with mobility closely
US outlays for general purpose forces have grown rapidly3 as these forces were modernized. The largest growth was in the tactical air mission, although costs for the land and naval forces also increased significantly.
Scdrci
Land Forces
On ihc USis mission includes those US Army and Marine elements in the DPPC categories of Land Division Forces and Land Theater Forces. On the Soviet side, it includes all or the Ground Forces combat elements and some otheras ground attack helicopters and portions of the Borderhave roles similar to those of the US uniis in ihc two DPPC categories.| |
Overeriod the cstimaled cumulative dollar costs or Soviet land forces were nearly three times as large as the corresponding US outlays. This margin was maintained each yearrowth in US outlays later narrowed the gap, but1 the dollar costs of Soviet forces were still about two and one-half times the USys. |
The cost trends for the two countries have been dissimilar. Estimated Soviet costs have grown steadily. US outlays, on the other hand, fluctuated in the early years but6 have grown.S outlays wereercent more than2 level.
The manpower and weapons inventory of Soviet land forces expandeds the USSR increased the size of its divisions and addedombat divisions, bringing the lolalhis accountedanpower increaseroops. Other improvements included:
The procurement0 increasingly expensive tanks, primarily42 and their improved versions. We estimate that1 the active medium tank inventory contained0 tanks.
Modernization of the armored vehicle fleet with the procurement of0 armored vehicles. These were primarily BMP infantry combat vehicles, but many BR DM reconnaissance vehicles were procured.
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The introduction of new artillery,mm self-propelledmm self-propel led guns, and new developments in tactical SAMs and surface-to-surface missiles.
deployment4 of theind, ihe first Soviet helicopter designed specificallyunship.1 the USSR hadinds andip helicopters, designed for ground attack missions.^
The United Stales also modernised and expanded its land forces during Ihe period. These improvements were characterized by:
Manpower levels lhatigher1 lhan
The procurementanks incries and productionew tank, the Ml.his was ihe first new tank to be produced in the United States inumberanks were converted to modern configurations.
Expansion of the urmored vehicle inventory through the procurement oflroopcarriers and Mlariants used in other roles.
Improvements tomnch self-propelled howitzers and introductionm towed howitzer.
Modernization of theobra attack helicopter.1 the Army and Marine inventories includedf these helicopters
Manpower, procurement, and inventory levels all reflect tbe Soviet Union's vastly greater requirement for land forces We estimate that1 the USSR had tbrec times as many men in land forces as the Unitedt also had four times as many main battle tanks, three times as many armored troop earners, and over four times as many major artillery pieces.
In the land forces mission, personnel accounted forcrceni of the estimated Soviet dollar costs andercent of US outlays. The Soviet dollar costs increased steadily over the period as the divisions expanded in size and in number. US personnel costs fell3 and rose gradually throughout the rest of ihe period;1 they had surpassed2 level.
Investment costs reflected both countries' procurement of increasingly sophisticated land armaments. The estimated dollar costs for Soviet investmenteneral increase over the period. In the United Stales, investment costs, like the cosu for tbe missionhole, declined through the, but1 they had risen to twice2 level. For both countries, tank procurement costsajor pari of total investment coils. Q
Secret
Tactical Air Forres
This mission consists of all land- and sea-based fixed-wing aircraft that arc usedombat role; on the US side it includes multipurpose aircraftand their aircraft, lo accord with DPPC definitions. It docs not include helicopters used for ground attack nor any aircraft and aircraft carriers whose primary mission is antisubmarine warfare. No strategic defense interceptors have been included in this mission, although in some scenarios they might be assigned to tactical
Overeriod, US cumulative costs wereercent more than the cumulative dollar costs of comparable Soviet activities. The difference reflects the higher US operations level and the inclusion of US aircraft
US outlays declined slightly24 but increasedercent4
Air Force outlays declined by aboutercentut more than doubled.
US Navy and Marine outlays droppedercent2 and
osls grew in the last three years of the period, however, and1 they were slightly greater than they had been
The estimated dollar costs of the Soviet tactical air mission fluctuated with the procurement cycles of various aircraft. In the, procurement of several major aircraft ceased or declined. Production of theloggcr G, which began during this period, was cut sharply in theo make way for the more capableulcrum. (Series production of this aircraft may have begun) Despite theestimated Soviet dollar costs for the missionet increase over the period; they wereercent greater1 thanr^-|
The principal tactical aircraft in the US order of battle over the period washantom, which constitutedercent of the force2 andercentt is no longer being procured; the Air Force is replacing itandthc Navy.f ihese three aircraftere procured over
The principal aircraft in the Soviet order of battle2 wereercent)7ul1 the Fish beds had dwindled toercent of the force and Frescos had disappeared altogether.loggers now make up one-third of the tactical air force and will continue to be its major aircraft throughout. However, we believe Floggcr production has begun to decline in anticipation of the deployment of new. more capable aircraft for this mission. Q
Although wc count some of the Soviet Navy's land-based aircraft in the tactical air mission (the most numerous arche USSR currently has no multipurpose aircraft carrier. (One is underheS multipurpose aircraft carriers and their associated aircraft represent aboutercent of total US outlays over the
Investment constituted more thanercent of the total costs for each country's tactical air mission over the period,howed the most rapid growth.utlays grew at an average annual rate ofercent, reflecting the higher cost of maintaining increasingly sophisticated aircraft. The dollar costs ofor tactical aviation grew by an average ofercent per year.
General Purpose Naval Forces
Included in the general purpose naval forces are:
All majorons) and minor surface combatants.
Attack submarines.
ASW aircraft and ASW carriers."
Amphibious warfare ships.
Naval forces directly supporting the fleets (auxiliaries).^
Not included in this category are multipurpose aircrafl carriers, which are assigned to tactical air forces, and strategic missile submarines and their associated tenders, which arc assigned to strategic forces. The US Coast Guard is included with the support mission rather than with the general purpose naval forces,
Foreriod, estimated dollar cosls for Soviet general purpose naval forces were sliehtly more than US outlays, although the two had similarlight decline2stimated dollar costs for Soviet forces grew an averageercent per year through the end of the period. US cosls also fellince then they have grown al an average annual rate ofercent, f-
Over the decade, Soviet general purpose naval forces underwentmodernization with the procurement of:
Two Kiev-class carriers for vertical and short takeoff and landingTOL) aircraft.
Thirteen cruisers, nine deslroycrs, andarge frigates, all equipped with guided missiles.
ea- and land-based fixed- and rotary-wing ASW aircraft. Over one-third of these were theormone helicopter and about one-fourth were the]
" The Soviet Navy'* tactical, mobility, and support aircraft ate included in their respective missions, (u)
" If ihe US Navy and Marine tactical air force missions (which include carriers) and ihcNavy'a tactical air forces arc includedcentral purpose naval loiceS, US oullays wereercent greater than Ihc estimated dollar owls of Soviet forces forand1
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The US fleet declined during the, while World War II vintage ships were phased out and some were replaced by more modern ships. It then stabilized at slightlyajor surface combatants Acquisitions included:
Twenty-nine nuclear-powered attack submarines, including IS LosSSNs. In addition, five Ethan Allen-class SSBNs were converted lo attack submarines.
Six nuclear-powered missile cruisers,estroyers,rigates,issile frigates. The cruisers' primary mission is anliair warfare, while the destroyers and frigates have an open-ocean escort/ASW role.
Eleven amphibious warfare ships, including five Tarawa-classassault ships.
C Orion (land-based)A Viking (sea-based) ASW aircraft. In addition,ea-based helicopters were upgrad-ed.Q
For the USSR, more thanercent of the estimated dollar costs for this mission consisted of investment. Over the period, investment increasedosts increased aboutercent, and personnel costs increased lessercent. Roughly one-half of the US total went forThe greatest growth for the United Stales was. which more than doubled over the period, taking up nearlyercent of the total outlays. With the decline in US force levels, personnel costs declined; they accounted for less thanercent of totalj
The largest share (aboutercent) of the dollar costs of investment for Soviet general purpose naval forces over the decade was for submarines. This reflects the USSR's effort to modernize its submarinefar the world's largest, and the principal offensive arm or the Soviet Navy. Major surrace combatants accounted for about one-fifth of navalalthough the USSR built many more minor than major combatants. Minor combatants, which accounted for aboutercent of investment, include mine warfare ships, light frigates, patrol combatants, and small missile and torpedo attack boats. Soviet ASW carriers and ASW aircraft accounted for anotherercent of naval investment. During ihe period ihe USSR also built large numbers of small amphibious warfare ships and auxiliaries, which accounted for anotherercent of naval invcstmcnl] ]
On the US side, major surface combatants took up aboutercent offollowed by general purpose submarines, which receivedercent of the total. ASW aircraft accounted for aboutercent, and auxiliary and amphibious warfare ships aboutercent.
Sc.-rli
Mobility Forces
The mobility mission includes airlift and sealifl activities and military port operations. Wc have been unable toeparate Soviet scalift mission, however, so all Soviet sealifl activily is captured in the general purpose naval forces. Wc believe the dollar cost of this Soviet activity
US account rules present another problem ofumber of US mobility services arc charged to other US defense missions, and the mobility mission, as defined by the DPPC, does not reflect these costs. When these "hidden" costs arc included, US outlays for the mobility mission are substantially more. In this section, lo illustrate the true scope of the US mobility mission; wc have arrayed the data to show the total cost of all mobility programs."
Foreriod, US mobility costs were two-thirds greater than the estimated dollar costs of Soviet activities.S costs were twice as high. US airlift costs alone (which are more comparable to the Soviet mission) were IS percent higher than those estimated for the Soviets over the period andercent higherhe United States, with its many overseas baseseed to supply them by sea and by air,reater requirement for mobility forces than the USSR. Wc do not count any rail transport or merchant ships of the USSR or Warsaw Pact countries which serve similar functions, however, and that may cause an understatement of USSR mobility
Both countries expanded their airlift capability during the period:
The USSR introduced its first military jet transport, thendodified version of this plane, which carries more fuel andonger range.
The United Stales increased the volume ofargo cabin (by lengthening the fuselage) and equipped the aircraft with an aerial refueling capability. It alsorogram lo extend the service life ofAing-modification
1 there wereircraft in ihe Soviet airlift mission and approximately half lhat number on Ihe US side. However, ihe Soviet figure includes many short-range propeller-driven aircraft. The United StalessAshe USSRedium-rangeong-range aircraftnd
Supportsupport mission includes those activities that are required lo support
the US and Soviet combat forces. Some of ihe major clcmcnls of this mission are:
The opcralion and maintenance of fixed military installations.
l-ogistic activities, including maintenance and supply.
Training conducted at other than the unit level, primarily recruit/conscript, officer, and general skills training.
Administrative activities, including those of centrally located command personnel, recruitment and conscription, personnel management services, and the administrative costs of the United Stales' participation in NATO and the USSR's administration of the Warsaw Pact Alliance.
Many other support services, such as satellite communications, hospitals and medical clinics, data processing support, security, investigative and judicial activities, and the maintenance of emergency command posts.
In addition, the defense-related activities of the US Coast Guard and the administration of the Soviet KGB are included.^
Overeriod the cumulative US outlays for support were slightly more than the estimated dollar costs of Soviet support forces.1 they were almost equal. Q
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet support activities increased every year exceptrief leveling off7he total increase, almostercent, kept pace with the growth of other missions and reflected anin total military manpower and the cost of supporting increasingly sophisticated military forces.[ |
US support costs fell every year2ecreasing byercent before they began to grow againhe decline paralleled the trend in the overall US costs. Decreasing personnel costs led this trend in the support forcesj ]
Over ihcosts were the largest resource category for the United Stales in the support mission, representingercent of its total costs. Estimated personnel costs had the largest share of the dollar costs for the Soviet mission,osls were almost as large. The proportion of investment in estimated total costs was relatively small, averaging aroundercent each year for both countries j |
A significant pariosts in both countries was the pay and benefits of civilian personnel who operate bases and logistics establishments and serve in administrative capacities. These accountedhird of the annual dollar costsor the USSR's support mission and even more of theosu Utilities and fuel costs and the operation and maintenance costs of auxiliary support activities, especially space and intelligence programs, also accounted foe significant sharesn tbe USSR, preinduction military training programs, conducted at the secondary school level, accounted for aboutcrceni ofosts The US Department of Defense does notarge program of this typc.rn
Cumulative dollar costs for Soviet investment for the support mission were only slightly larger than US investmentarge portion of the construction of airfields, naval bases, and Army and Ground Forces bases arc included in the support mission as it is defined by the DPPC. so construction makesarge share of the investment category relative to other missions.!-
Estimated dollar procurement costs for Soviet support activities were about equal to corresponding US outlays, but Soviet construction costs wereercent more For botharge portion of procurement was for expensive space systems. Other large procurement outlays were for aircraft (for training, intelligence, and logisticlectronto andequipment, training equipment other than aircraft, and baseand supplies. The US category' includes procurement associated with the Coast Guard!
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Ihai wc were unable to assignpecific service. The premilitary training program in the USSR is the most important of these, representing about one-third of the dollar costs of this category. The United States has no prc-
military training program of similar scope
AIIosts arc excluded from this comparison, since wc are unable lo allocate these estimated costs among the Soviet services. Pcnsiuns arc also excIudetLAII Soviet military space activities are assigned to the Soviet
The largest difference is for thestimated dollar costs for the Sovicl equivalent were twice the US Army outlays overeriod. The cumulative dollar costs'for the Soviet "air force" were half again as much as US Air Force outlays. However, the cosis of the US Navy (and Marines) were more thanercent greater than lliose of ihe hypothetical
Soviet
The dollar cosis of Soviet "army" investment were three limes US Army investment outlays, representing the largest difference in resourceThe dollar costs of "air force" investment for the USSR were twice those of the United States, and investment for the Soviet "navy" wasercent more.
Estimated dollar operating costs for the Soviet "army" and "air force" were likewise much greater than the equivalent US outlays. US Navy and Marine operating costs, however, were twice those of the USSR, reflecting the higher operating levels of these US forces
The dollar costs for all of ihe hypothetical Soviet services grew an averageercent per year over the period, but on the US side, only ihe Navy and Marines showed similar growth. (The defense agenciess excluded from bothlthough they decreased during the, the US Army and Air Force outlays were approximately the same1 as they had beenT
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The manpower comparisons in this section are designed to cover the same Defense Planning and Programming Categories as the preceding dollar cost comparisons:
On the Soviet side, this comparison includes personnel in the Ground Forces. Air Forces. Air Defense Forces. Navy. Strategic Rocket Forces, the Border Guards of the KGB. and the national command and support structure.
On the US side, the manpower total includes all members of the armed forces and most of the Coast Guard."
We include only those Soviet personnel who nil what in the United States are considered to be national security roles. Thus, we do not include Soviet military personnel assigned lo the militarized security forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to military construction and railroad troops, or to civil defense troops. These categories totalillion
Over ihe pastears, trends for military manpower have paralleled those for total costs in the two defense establishments:
Estimated Soviet military manpower grew by morendrate ofcrceni per year. We estimate the Soviet manpower level1illion men.
2S military manpower was still declining from its Vietnam-era peak.ecline amounteden.S manpower levels have been relatively stable alillion. Q
The largest manpower increase in the Soviet military services through the decade was in the Ground Forces. This increase amounted toaverage annual growth rateercent.
Although the dissimilarities in structure of US and Soviet forces make organizational comparisons difficult, the allocation of manpower tomissions can be roughly compared using the definitions of the US Defense Planning and Programming Categories. The labtc on pageresents these comparisons.
" TTih probably results in an oversia lenient for the Uniled Stales, since only ihoi* Coast Guard personnel wiiha military mission should be counied. This breakdown is not available, however [ |
" Our current estimate for these troopsSO percent higher than wc estimatedbecause of improved intelligence sources and analytical methods.
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Estimates of US and Soviet Military1
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Because of foundine. iht components may not add lo Ihe totalsncludes Ihe urstcf ic control and surveillancenctodes RDT&F. pernio nel.
The manpower table highlights several differences between US and Soviet military missions:
The Sovietsarge peripheral strike force composed of medium-and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and the older ballistic missile submarines. Tlie United States docs notomparable mission defined by the DPPC.
The Sovietsarge force of men and equipment lo defense against air and missile attack.roops in this mission are assigned to interceptor, surface-to-air missile, anliballistic missile, and control and warning forces. The United Slates hasmall force dedicated to this mission.
Soviet general purpose forces are twice as large as those of the Uniicd Slates. The land forces, which arc nearly three times as large as the US counterpart, account for this difference. Q
Confidence in Manpower Estimates
Soriel Conscription Trends
arc also similarities in the shares of manpower allocated to Ihe missions shown in ihe table.
Intercontinental attack forces requireercent of total manpower in each country.
Support forces account for about one-half of US manpower and more lhanercent of the Soviet total.J
We calculate our total manpower figure by making separate estimates for each of the individual Soviet forces. These individual manning estimates arc producedariety of methods, including order-of-battle studies, information from human and technical sources, photographicand statistical sampling techniques. We believe our estimate of the overall force size is accurate withinercent. Q
A study made0 of the military service experience of0 malef [from the Soviet Union provides the first independent check on ourTblal manpower estimates. lis results support our assessment thai the estimate is in error by no moreercent.
also show how the Soviets have adjusted their conscription
system to Da lance the military demand with ihe changing size of the draft-age population. They show that the length of service has varied widelyhen the average conscript served over six years. The average
term dropped below three years in thend rose again ino compensate for manpower shortages. Since then, conscripts have typically served only the term requited by Sovietyearswo years thereafter-!
estimates of military manpower suggest that5 Ihe Soviets willignificant manpower shortage. We estimate that conscription rates are currently near the maximum supportable in tbe Sovietnding support to ibis conclusion is the almost complete elimination of draft deferments for higher education earlyecause few Soviet high school graduates go on to higher education, however, this measure affords only temporary relief from the worsening manpower shortage. We expect further steps to be taken within ihe next fewix-month extension of the term of service (to twoalf years) is the most likely.f"
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Original document.
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