Instability and Change in Soviet-Dominated Eastern Europe
S I 8
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Instability and Change in Soviet-Dominated Eastern Europe
Jadtnuim
old notion thai Ihc Soviet Union it gearing whole societies in Eastern Europe io Us own purposes has in recent yean given wayew truth the Soviets must now gear themselves and iheir purposes increasingly lo East Europeaneconomic weaknesses, deeply rooteddiscontent, recurrent political disruptions, spreading ideological decay,ervasive, often ami Soviet nationalism Ii no* seems unlikely, in fact, ihai the empire can be held together over ihe long term without some si Bill tont alterations in iheit is run. At ihe very least, ihc persiiicnce of diversity, disarray, and discord in Eastern Europe will confront ihe Sovietpreoccupied with domestic problems and perhaps troubled by ihe Brezhnevheavy pressures forchange
history of Soviet relations *iih Kntiern Europe since World War II. and particularly since ihe death of Stalin in IMS, is rich in turbulence andfrom riou and atlcmpied coupsevolutions and outright national defections And the highest levels of unrest and political turmoilreached during poods of >ucceiiMnhe USSR when, as in thend the, the Soviet leadership was rent by
r
Specifically, ihe lurmeal inmmunisi Party of trie Soviet Unoo during the Stalin succession. USUI, contributed significantly to tbef mostropeaa ^sdctihipv ihc devclcceneni of serious rsany fKttoaalistn. the rremevginct of least] repressed popular disaffection, and the vigorous riprcataob ofsffeciion in tbe political arena Demands for Imposed living standards, ihe derrtocraluaius of the system, and the end of Soviel controls were particularly strong ia Potand and Haagary and led ultimately so ruironaliH revivals, new leaderships,romisedolicy in ihe former and the collapse of the partye-taUtioo ir the latter
The succession to Khrushchev, which persisted4 unul the, was much less traumatic, bul disagreements and indecision in ihc oligarchy did add in major ways toastern Europe. Romania's ongoing expenmeni with independence became increasingly abusive; the East German regime of Wilier Ulbricht began to speak wiih iu own peculiarly condescending voice; the Zhivkov regime In Bulgaria had to contend with an attempted coup by military officers and former
partisans, who iippiircndy fell thai Moscow lacked the will to interfere: and the parti in Prague startedome apan a* bemused cunservamcs began ui buttle increasing!}reform-minded liberal*
The crisis in Czechoslovakia in posed the moM serious ihrcjl lo Soviet interests inrope since lhe Hungarian revolution here again. I. ycurs later, was it scrie* ol events which centered on iheissuesation and relations with the USSR, and here again was felt thef disagreements timongcnilin Leaders a' lodcm to dump down the situation jnd loavoid the secession ofa whole people from the Soviet empire
fidamk oeeptcd.ere faiflt tranquil in Eastern Europe, though lhe Irend toward divertity and .luionomi persisted Bui toward lhe end of ihe decade, the rasi European economies ocean io sag. and the unwritten contract between peoples andcoopcraiion for moreendangered ,ind. indeed, in Poland, destroyed. The era of relative trunquilits is probably now drawinglow, not just in Poland, butn most of the other East European countries Indeed, two ol the primary preconditions for serious disruption*uccession Crises in one or .mother Bloc capital and severe economic distress are likely in some sulci scon lo conjoin
The LSSR ol course hold, lhe uliimjtc trump cjrd.military power andlremif the will lo use il. It alsoonsiderable variety of Other, less dramatic looh of perwiMim and power. Bui military inierveniion has its drawbacks and the Soviet* arc reluciani in use il. and ihe other instrument* ol control and influence by no mean*ystem of absoluic authority. The Hist European regimes, in fact, are ableon of conditional sovereignty which, if it poses few real threats to Soviet hegemony, certainly constrains it. And. while attempted defections from the Bloc do noi now seeni likely, romance to Soviet dominion will surely
The new Soviet leader. Yuriy Andropov, will, of course, have lo contend with itm problem, among many otnc's. OUl his ability to do so more effectively lhan hi) predecessors is open to question H* may brine more wlf-assuianee io lhe task, and probably will approach issuesore pragmatic way. but there is no quick and easy cure fnrwhul ails Fniern
Europe and relationsihc Bloc. Moreover. Atidric-A. nhilcdominant in ihc area of foreign (including bast European]% rnx likely soonlear supremacy in ihc leadership and "illi (ind himself encumbered b> debates among his Poliiburo sol-
C*.iucs and resistance from aniliicniixl dement- in ihe pari)he
'icrocict
Perhaps the greatest problem llie Soviel leader* will I'jccMtrn Europe is ihc slate of Ihearlous; in some countries and nowhere flourishing. Slagnaling or declining living standards arc pariiculirl) dangerous becauseaBe productivity and 'umiibtc unrcr-i. And none of ihcsc regimesositive popular support Rather, each count,orm of popular sufferance, arising from both hopeoner lite and fear of harassment and arresi Nov. lhal prospects of ihc former arc fait fading, so is the public'* Slake in stability. Some regimes may ,i* aplace more reliance on fear, which may not work and is in any aw economically debilitating, others may cvcnlually succumb to grow ing pressures for greater freedom and/or radical economic reform
Troubled by serious and Ion ^neglected economic problems of its own. ihc Andropov leadership mayie patienceis those of Eastern Europe. Il may be inclined to urge rcirenehnient economic austerity, tougher official crackdoo ns on dissidents, less reliance on Soviel subsidies, greater integration via CEMA. and. in general, more fidelity loSmicl policies and iniercsis. Given Andropov's apparent approval of economic reform in Hungary, the Soviet regime may al Ihc Same lime press the bust Europeans io moveadarisi direction. Buiact. Moscow sponsorsor boih retrenchment andumber of ihe EjsI European regimes can be expected at it minimum to drag iheir feci.
Though the Andropov rcjlmc may be ableurviveime uithoui facing large crises in Eastern Europe.successor, are less likely to be spared. Younger leaden, drawn from the posi-Slolin generation, may be much more inno-aiivc than their predecessors. They might, forrogram of systemic economic reform more ambitious and far reaching tlutn the model provided by Kadar'simulu-ncously or alternatively provide greater substancehc conceptSocialist Commonwealth" in which each purly-Matc would haw> about overall Bloc rolioes and doctrines bul would remain bound to the
USSR:rant ibe various countries real independence, laath likely to leadhe Finlandi"lion of Easternchances ol ihis seem very remote.
Buiold program .uulu not score quick successes, and pressures arising, oui of the East European quest for prosperity and national dignity and sovereignty arc much more likely to grow than to subside oiei the neit severalndeed, over the course of the next decade there will almost certainly be further outbreaks of serious political strife in Eastern Europe; and they will be directed, at least in pan and implicitly, against ihc Soviet Union. If such strife seems to jeopardize Communist power and/or Soviet hegemony. Moscow will almost certainly intervene, witho if necessary.ecade, however, forecasts become much mutaicr. The resolution through force or recurrent imperial problems thai have deep political, economic, and social roots cannot be endlessly appealing in Moscow. Radical changes in the way the Soviets maintain their empire, the local regimes preserve their power, and these regimes conduct their economic affairs do not now seem at all likely, but lime, succession struggles, political crises, and economic adversity may whet the appetite for systemic change, even in the Kremlin. And an estimate thai part or all of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe will one day find its way to freedom would be consonant with both ibe lessons of the past and the trends of (he present.
ultimatef empiresikci. inevitable Bui to Ihechi'.cn ot Athens in. <a>earing lhe jehe of Rome, orhe resident of Praguehrowing stone*oviet lank. iht*ruth thai could provide scam comfon The question for those who suffer lhe miig-mttcs of Sovkitoda* it not thcihrr ine Soviet empire isdtiiined Kcollarite-cir*wtcc diiinicgrair or limply meltratherhat way and
- Seen in theenein perspective of iheo* an) the early i'jq*onolilhle whole, the empire beganallrit ago. Thin of in major piece* <Yig<Mli vie. China, and Norlh Korea I. pttl of aaiihcr (Romaniai and coc chip (Albania) have long iinee been lost aadIrretrievably to
All ihe remaining European piece* lave oneial have tried to escape To be sure, none hat .uceeeded. but each of ihe attempts ha< mealed ihe senoumen and persisttnte of general popularwidespread disenchant menitrong urge tor national indepcndcKe
Economically Iheloundering ind the East Europeanuestioaablc inct for the USSR POIiitcall) and )dce4oGicaKy. theeryai ii is vn theillinices* to use brute forcerevent iheir hegeeiony and doctrinalto belie Ucactnv's claims ol bene vale nee and common sociabu iwereiis. And militarily, though on paper, important coniribuiori to lla* USSR's overall strength, the Eim European members of ihe War-saw Pact provide only niggardly support to (heir defense program 'compared to tbe Soviet per capita effort! and could in any cue lick) armed forces of only uncertain proweu and dubious reliability.
In view of all lha. one r> pcrmitlcd lo wonder whs the Soviet* think lhal their pretence in the area wihe effon and the coin It ii nill true, for csample, that
! at iht meoaint of toiltrn Europe la ike balanceer. we must ihlnlt less of ils ranirlbuUcf. of so mom ron* of'steal, so much groin or so many barrels of ml lhan of lhe Imparl of tht fait thai whole societies are belne fearedhe purposes aaf end' 'if the Sorttt srittm.-
And ail still the ease that
l is precisely Ihr accretion of Eastern Europehe USSR, the rxpowiowrroluxionary Holeonlinenlalwhich tl'ti apparent tuhManrr lo ike commumu claim of bring lhe wait of the future.'
For even aside Irom lhe fact that so many turret! of oil and tntiheU of grain nut> floweverte direction, from eastest, the notion thai ihe East European states arc being geared to Soviet purpose* is. at most,arf-trethro- ing degree, in fact, tbe Soviet* must now gear themselves and their purposes to Fan European realities -economicpolitical turbulence, ideological and political polyceairism. overall diveniiy. And their ultimate goal, whether the eventual establishment of aCommonwealth" or the absorption ofall these states into tbe USSR proper, muil seem increaiingly
Minis L. RoMf is. tuit'n tt-ur*ut.1tW.li lit ii?.
I
c mfimtrui
Communiiiof ihe futureite samc dim. io be braking or* ihtahnaH of economic distress .ibe reeft of (an European ditconicni una resist-ance. It does to. moreover, in full tight not only of the werid ai large but alio of tha non-Bice Comntumst parties, which pause ind waetdtt ni. more d'amalieal-ly is in Italy, camelee ihe Soviet turf.
Ttw isy. of course, thai ike SovKtt loco tehci tec the* jrocaent in ika aluaethcr baleful hrM Indeed tiece* Easternfruca ike KmrliBS ctcady windows these dart, if iacUy cheenrsf. may- eat teem ill lhal badost reassuring I* uibjrctnci mariial law. (hat actnarcntlt lurnrd howite of vnivaiuiage Fastihe CDRi inda remain gracefully docile. Hungary tiperimcntt. bui mi earefuMy;n iioablitomr Romania hat tn many problemome Ihit it tcanely teems hkch
tiir up new wetIhe Soviet Union.
may be thai thr Socio kidcrt hue deluded ihcttselvct into feehni ihal. given the nature of Scniei-doRtiiMted t'aiiernttoiley papula-iiocd milliok. cri<ng from the Baltiche Black Set.uti rich In pride and turbulence >be> haverut at well as cnuld reasonably be eipectedc prime mantes cf toe putt Stalin's mAing hand.tk>ran. after all. ofhi if
Bui ifrevailing "vood *vre one of teif cicilpaiory oesan*san.ould follow lhal the Sonet leaden could uai be "holly aware or" the exrcni and probaBle durabilii) of iheiria fatter nThey art. la (aa. neither stupid nor Wind, they can add ant) subtract, couni the number aloa the headin. and recognin adversity ins multiplicity erf irxrni. But it It also true that these men wear deeply liMed ideological blinders, were raised tn schools of power, not perception: and feast on and assart ideas and convictioni of awetomr banality
ccnnomiet are if nlanuc. nui merelyons or temporary magi, bureaucratic short comings, and bid weather. They do out eomprelunrl inn rati European nationalismhree of tut* whelming sire and complexity thai il mi) ilsellf the futuie. and that the Soviet empire cm not br held logeiher indefinitely at an on namw. trie clog tea i. and wcuriti entity without someot (fcante in the way It it run and.orollary, aunt Units aa dcsltnaUoeis at well It hardly needs sating lhat if ibete men in fsei do nor understand ihete things aad will not ic the future, then they will sot be able to formulaic effective policies sat!laiMuj tululiom
rue, of course, thai Sonci ratcrni aad man-arstal saiseac hate been ffreordamed by cxrnturtet af waunc.ecsUBaic. assd geopol<ucal lux. ml
mom rer-fe-eed byveafi oftamsi myth
Accordingly,evel ef uMtfsiaridirtg. and :rriependef.1ly of in autlny te pursue toptiiiticalcd policies, neither thi Andropov regime am ihc urn Soviet leadership *toistlf presiding over the tohiniary detmcrnbermem ol empire Hui.tVni'd be sturnble bodiv. Andropov may. and hu successors almotl uiiainlvreiialinnl enormnui pecsiurei for chiagr.ting during, ee even becausetruggle for power whin the USSR or one or another of the East ttiropein lountriet id, indeed, both And this. In brier. I* the tabrect of ihu paper: ihc natureoutlook for chant in Eastern Europe and in Sovwi policies then. (Specially duringolitical iuicession
thus do not seem fullyif Ihey understand, certainly cannottheencountered by iheir own and the East European
The Couth nl tmpiir
a rati lalli on an rax aletfiv ike ttw, When an ett lathock, alts fie ih' rate
Old Balkan Saying
The Ret) Army won ihe Soviet impiic in Eastern Europe on its wayictory In Germany Thii"norie, nor'-ef geojtjph> ind <Kt fortunesof wsr Oa the contraryeatl in Slalin't new.i of the areaecessai) formini)oed Ok inne- bowed concept ofWle> tne and *ti det'tst*if*oviet poiiciet ind ocerrinnwne -at wouMpringbna'dSoviet eipannwi BuiSeiner, ttcyoad Ihe achievement of thete two goals. Sulln had Ihaihl >ery muchlo(avcrn hitempoe. whii he wanted II to look like, ind where beo goml nl nil ckui.
Althoughr elected the idea for tbe
immediate poaloii pood. Sinlia may ibe have
gec Ihe eventualot! or all ofn Furopran tiaiei into the mulileatioctal USSR ucertitilaeni reputes* at iheWarxt- Una. andhoe xvc noaga* ofand theea at further ot> wnrcd by Stalin's williagaett aficr Iht air lo perm ft genuine If conditional tovrrrigntynland, dnpiie the fact thai tho country had been allied with Germs ny and had nser belonged lo Kuma. Stahn. of course, wanted to grab lit many tangible goodi fromrope at he could, and he did. through reparations and such devkei at so-called acerii ttoek companies establishediphrn off fait Eiarcrptaa production He also Knew thai, after the period of early comolid* lion ofe would not toleraie any meaningful tion-Coannauui rauiieipaiion ia ibe poor teal affairs as" thesenci. ihongfi be wan wgry enoagb of local aad Western reactions so pretend thai these states reesuainad iadenrndc.nl aad were "people'ather laaa tirtipk parly dmaiorshimil and the defer ian of Yago-sls.la. be -ji determined lo crush any real ormanifestation!of"Iitoum"oi "nationalist devi-oiioaitm" within Ihe individual Communist parties
i alio carelil io Seep nghi cant mlthe pcaicici and pertonnel of ihete parties aad stales and
heir leaders, man) of whomraited and almci all of whom acre Saviei
iramed. in essentially the same way he turned order, -iibrr. the Sovset Lnion. ecu none, on ihc tecrel puttee, gag mtaary. and. ra general, aanert of tenor to tep everyoneboa Al ibe same iimc. he lasmed thai rack ofvureiM ibe SonetMs economic.and cukaraJ entirety
But beyond conirol and Su-icf iratmtn. Stalin's policesurki Suntr of ibem were clearly semepuipose. for cample, could ihe Quest for autarky in each of ihete "ate* possibly strut* It was almost as if the agiaa dictator were inrJiffcrent io Questions of future development, of polilKal and economic via bi tin Still, all this worked, albeit erode-ly. al lea.ii so long at Slnltn raifiained in chargeultitude of problems wat merely being itored fee Stalin'a Sen
Ike Trlailulm at wrmm
arm iwwduicl) afaeiha March Ivyt that Stalmrvmwould not weel Iteguatii UtirSlakn ran)it sticcesurt anhad neglected io bcuuetib idem adeo.uatecontrol Tbe desperate irjrcti for aslo Slaliak prraonal rule ihcnoften split Ihe Snviei leadership ouroi the nest four vet it. and the effects uf thisEurope *err especially pronouncedto be. byilraoidiivaril) dramatic.
East European eadett rtstxndcd oniekiy to Ihe new. posl-Slalm cttcumalancesMateoBut. per kaps naraatrvely. Iht gee tea dadew rrtoathi of Sulir's deannarr therea major not in Puseu. Crrchosknalia iai May. and even rnorcirabUe worker i' ifrvurriciioa in Eau Germany in Jane. The uneasy ccJIactrve acadcnbiposcow, more or less dommaltd by fieorji Maiestlo* taller Ihc secret policeman. Bcria. bid been climtnatcdi. was persuaded even before Ihete usiibreakt irui living saandardt ihroughout the Bine had io improve, and n
proclaimed the era ol theCourse. Combined with emphasis oa the need lot "socialist legality" la diminution ofiseiung or* tensions with lhe Weft,elaxation of demands foiis Eastern Europe, the Ne* Cosine was vubioaucntly adapted by all the East European significantly.noi at the same lone, in Ihe same manner, or lo an equalew era of diversity in Eastern Europe had thus begun
Struggles Between Mak-nio. and the ncwCPSU Hrst Sccrciars. Nikita Khrushchev,. and themergence as ibe victors. resulted in some policy ambivalence. Ihe reassert too of some old verities lhal had been amended byeluding lhe primacy nf heavyno little ran fat ion concerning, and substantial retrenchment nf what "liberal" programs had been adopted in Eastern Europe Bur Khrushchev, as aware as Malcn-kov thai Stalinism coald not be reapplied, actively sought means toe* form of Soviet-East European cohesion, (he establishment of moreand less unpopular regimes, and some nayestore momentum to creaking and badly unbalanced economies. In lhe process, he found it eipcdieni toithin limits, the rating Communist eliteset 'their on pace and even to cieiette primary control over Iheir own affairs This was deliberate policy, notragmatic adjustment to irreversible irends. as, indeed, Pravdo made eaplleil fairly earlyon:
Th* hillOritaleipe'tente id .'V Swirl Union and of Ihremuronti ihowt ihai. given unity ia Ike chiefmilter erf miming thr victory of locialism. vandal ways and means nay br used in different countries toSr specifie problems of socialist contintctian. depending on historical and notional features.'
'/"mull is lul< ivm.tnBin iMe*I'l.l>.
eiilfumt'ispotHi ii h> nxmtui. rtaoirt
ddifeailili ivtMeduui? u* uiheiftrxy imstclminiiK'Ml pwakni b> imff' lllriOis>nhllcin "tfifMl mffm"ti^kft*, almil
ilti turn mad im Swan ihjibeum leucvim af tairi-Blac
in
This, while carefolly hedged and'nm at sovereignty, nil string stulf b> Stalinist siandurdt And if it did not exactly move tbe East European leaders lo independen'. action, it did as "Holy Writ" encourage vame of them to iry to follow policies much more attunedeiucl aaiional needs, and facilitated th* appearance of increasingly influential reformin various parlies. It also paved the way loe lhe lalrr accession lo power in Poland and Hungary oT homegrown Communists wbu had been imprisoned during the Stalinist era and who. justifiably or not. had come to personify the quest for national dignity and autonomy.
Bui even more important lhan official Sovietof new directions in Eastern Europe were lb? effects of Ihe USSR's new approach to iwo other problems, both impinging on the conduct of imperial affairs. But not. ascoaeened. calculated in alter ihem The first was ihe rapprochement wnh Yugoslavia begun by Khrushchevhis, inter alia,public Soviet apologies. Soviet recognition ul thelea Yugoslavialhe Tiltwvl road io Socialism, and. later, the quieting of Soviei condemnation al such umsrtkodoi jnd previouslyaspect) ol that read as worker-councilol industry.
The East European leadersijecity fell betrayed by this. all had applauded Stalin's cipulsion ol Yugoslavia from the Comlnform. many had won power by accusing and imprison ing or eiecutiag comrades who bad allegedly commit led Til out sins, and few had any wish to introduce anything remotely resembling Yugoslavwit hia their own bailiwicks.'
But if these leaders fell, as ihey probably did. that the USSR could inflict nolow to their own ideas and positions than to come tu terms with Tito, they
'hoiictf. cmuta im win lad lha ions donning ill
raitci taj-iimaf lati fmouaIhtif mm lanurii
hi mim kavt nijioab* la/mioion samencM Imomh milt isdiaih* It ran Oatummiinffnai, idsmlmoi" IfillplTI aibllimIhr limits itsmi't
Vint. iWaip lai
'
badly miilakcn KhruOiehev induced eve*tuuma byiibu'i rig Stalin in hoii.iearly <n
i*J* Hit principal pu'pom -rirhe conical af Sonet -ablical Id* batbyreama me caairari. ut Kbn'bcbci inta. ioc recti af laceatairct ma aw owi .nd iheae el the IS.SH dkmaordot-foraa aad wbwaart,rcaatrcd that tit greatest cf allof itiiet lotttStalnY* nmnipreicnt gbovi be rioreurd mca and lot it}'
The Eaapn Tollnv PolandIranian
In1 noi lurprwng that ibe momentous even" of ibe mid-mot Ihr deal* of Stalin ihe iucceiiian iireggk ihni fallowed, the accordTito, uadondemnation olplumed iht Sovici empire Inio lhe giiveMcriti* il ha* ever laced It mi noi. however, to uboouial Ihetime Tbe *fca tiering eveali of 1in Poland and Hungary -ce nca generally loreieco I* lh(nor von thaiCommuaiit pa/lira could undergo mayor u< n'ormnoii fromhai tbe Wen aa* aaa prerured to react' Tarnbe tc-m* naacc lee the wctL* ihe knkage ihai (behite infinitely heller iilof mcdentanrrt pared (ornn ihai craared itack yard, ecruihey hadnadvertently icl in molun
In face. Wladialaw Gomulhai return io power in Paland infter yctri oftunned the Saner Icaikra. la mid-October. *an*
'Son* ul iv laalnti1iiihi nanslnnlttw rwptra*4riti 1 hamuli ihii
wtutmtal aaa btar u. wv hi'*il unit in fullo'inwliwxiaaali iMlaaap mutun sat cim-mat anaanni ha- ttrt
a*aeiwtaiha iMnrt. ttwtviUiVi
; ll etmi4mp> m
rfeeSu'inv
mwaaama
The wru em- iwoh ukr -ul mar*bvtrail ml a aaai* ii-oaaa ikivlainUiaaJf.Si .la. mud ivfurtam
khnbttan bfoiui iln in km mum "trie HnraUiil wa vki bren ti|>hit>faWW> thu ufaaun ina MeJluoiianiTalhui
en. p
inviution. ihey hurriedl) few tn m'uimu1 group.onlroni Comulka and hi- colleagui'* nt iht uirpnn. initiallyrmg of uCrHCniW. then uilhard bargainvag. While ta.it bargaining ullinulcl* paid off for the Sovieli. the worldirtaiedhe hitherto unrecorder,ted ipcetacle of iclf-inolnied a> cippcned to Smirtapnoiaied lait Furopcaa leadenii thru 'P;ncn jbout *uch crucial luuci ai.ind much iwreoadiociabua. iV vanciay of (he Sonet lyuem and Soviet ideate, jad.rgree ofe curenoJbef euarve. rut leu aa ihe Hungir iaav
Tat Hungarian re.ai.ixni al cmi*nd trags. need- no recewniing here Some nf in irneairiliowv aoweaar.crunn) laiofar aaatrj relleci lhe an of Ihe poviibk in hatlern luiope and Soviei anil-do and icnubiliiiei. narticularl) during pariah uf puliticul travail
Tht Soviet kddctihm Mill eomumed by the poiiiicv of *ucce**um and rtinded byof policy und purpoielv buih oOiiioiicii European prublcmv. loand mil' unableie>emlh ihriti>
The So.ieiv' lacilla'.ingorn iu the lu'rnuil ia Hungary encoaraged ihe Hunganamnovt lailer and lunher than aniuae had imiial'i camemplaied The etev- Huaganaa kraaVf Inwt Nip. -rvtwCMhe huhnam rmaaataag fruta tbedrwrufyiag Haaajanaa body nakne mace ihaa from (bePobikaoi
The ScHKtxvaM vtireei. atlaci* aim Iaajaev> iig ui then eninhla prmeiiiviie ire ipprariKr anurs the penileeeling ol violeai hot'ilttyhe Sovieti ind lacirvyilVilugiciii condi lion one Weittin obtervfr hai (ailedemin-cipaiion; the almcsit completeom-munim and Soviet iniirumcrtiv olhe ettibliihment olot- >nd anti-Communiyt poliikilhe (ounding inHungary of aa independent jnivllmuhiun
P ? o
T
^pjttkntial
ihc hanging by feci or neck ol Commu-nisw imcftilv <eeretrom Bodapnaheof ihe Hungarian military io intervene: and ihe announcement of* impendings Austria) and withdrawal from ihe Warsaw Paci.
Uniil thi* latter move b)hc Soviet) had apparently hoped that be end ihe Communis! Parts would be able lo maintain essentia! Control and lhatgreatly changed internally and more independentsurvivelient state. Some Soviet leaden. Khrushchev prcoa-bly among thecv were appureally uilling lo scitk fur ihi* at least until stronger Soviet controlscoihl be reasserted; other* were no doubt opposed toemporary relaxation of tbe relaiionsbip and favored military intervention curly on Nags'* declaration of an impending uiihdrawal from the Warsaw Pact on .'I October luhilc two Soviet leaders. Mikoyanand Sutluv. were actually in Budapest to study iheprobably rnded the disagreement. and iheattackedmember.
While the Soviel* were not directly retpomlblc for the great swell of protest in Hungary and Polandhe patt-Stalin ambiguities, inaptitudes, and angsl uf the leader* in Mot cow, together uith their constant political maneuvering against one another, made it possible for the forces in Eastern Europe lo press so vigorously and even violently for two Interdependent goals, independence aad dcrnotraiiiaiirn.'
By exhibiting uncertainty about bow to ireut ibese issues and forces, by compounding ihc problem by destroying ihc awesome posihumou* aathoeiij ofand failing to find any replacement for n. and. finally, by severely weakening in ihistheof the most pro-Sovici elements in ihe varioushierarchies, tbe Soviets had badly wounded themselves In their own Eatl European fool Though Moscowecovered,ea per alien was painful andigh long-term cost: from nam
ir
iiWills ImI an
i mm* "Tin achiiiar dChrirec* it ihe
bi te refuted sjivu tusk Bntaem iii
ist enwramr at taint's weigai.hr conereo* nl
OuatJ be intfidtd Inall lit<ta hlr aitkin lhrSi sotialltl srUon" II* wKrO tt rWinmliyii
on. Soviel interests, whlk still paramount, woak) have to take divergent East European Intcicsls into more serrou* account. Tht Soviel leaders hud discovered, intex alia, lhal while "theiruidelines for coping with it effcred little for resolving conflicts and or gamrlntt relation) among Communist states."'
For seven years7 through mosin imperfect and urxuiy calm prevailed between the USSR and iu European allies (Albania, which left the Bluexcepted) The Sovieis. underwho had7recatioss supremacy over hit colleagues,easure of divertily but Iheir guidance wai neither ckar nor eonsittent. That tolerance wasegree pressed on Moscow by iwo external factors. Ihe exigencies of Ihe SiisoSoviet conflict and the requirements of anactive <an) demandingi policy of detente wiih ihe Wesi The llrst iaickd iheuropean slates with grater Uiilutic to behaveihc secoid rcsaraincd any tendency the Soviet* may have fei to crack down oa such behavior.
ell aware of the intractability al ike East European problemihe wake of Hungary and Poland, wanted io present ihe Bloc and iheuthority in it by relying oa the good seme and self-interest of East European kadert who knew that their survival couldangtrcd. on ihc one hand, by their anii-Commanit constituents and. On the other, by the USSR's dentinstrated willingness to use force. In return for ibeir fdelity. Khrushchev in effectelter deal fee theseeconomic relations, scene freedom todomestic policies, and substantia] politicalespecially cencerning their own ponies Thut. there emerged an un-rit;tn compact that sanctified both Ihc autonomy of Ihe East European parties and the limits imposed on this autonomy by tht greater needs of the USSR and lire Bloc.
Khrushchev understood, towrver, that to ensure Sevi-ei hegemony, something more -as needed Thi* he also emphasized theeevelament of economic utiegra-lion via the Council ofMutual Assistance
to?
iCF.MAX miliar) integration through ibe Warsaw Pact, and ideological only and orihodosyatins of bilateral and multilateral cen'eteneet.programs, join! declarations, the esxibliih-menioviet-dominatedommunistml. Ihr World Marxist nVv;pv [published in Puguci. and mi on.ariety of reasons, however, njnc ol tbn viorktd "is well: in fact, relationship* remained lor tic mott pari bilateral.the seemingly endless round* of meeting* between Ktiniihehev and theEast European kaden demonstrated most tellingly'
. eaeouraged by tacti (and lateruppvrihinese, provoker! by an apparent Sovici attcmpi lo remove Cheorghiu-Dej fromand inccnicdoviet scheme to lutneconomyemicolonlal raw materialsfor Ihe marc advanced rneinber* ol CEMA. Ihe Romanian Worken' Parly in effect publicly declared itsut Romania's mme and. there, after, any number of vividd ing disruptions of Sonet pHn* for CEMA. ctae relations "lib China, and an undeclared allianceTito'sml prove lo be uonttgious elsewhere in the Bloc Partlyursc-quenct, partly because, to Moscow's relief, tbe Roma* Man parly remained in firm control at home, and partly because tbe Soviei Union could do littleuppress (tie heresy sbon of armed inierveminn. lhe Soviets grudgingly learned to live with ihe problem.
* Thistewlie-reil vlri mbs Kktflthtr ia4un Sudi-tG-mitiiwtuU tome beck In Ssin Kfcwlclev'i
ISM
ihe "Suiiacu oa iht Sind at lhe Ranarun Itiilak
ihf rn*kna of me vvmH (anmnalaid
WhIih Clin WnmiJ, ar-il itxrtitl Imniu
iiinHuvaeil irtirainO in ihrlKnii
locutlalif IA full leililloaf. finf&us.Krraww IPS' IWhen -ere Kaay lenoai whi Ihe ttornmltnh> upf xiSwuili Iher dUiIib.aith minim. Iti, in lunnu-
wed -sFiiei A. rami.Thr
emiTivapicr J. SusAtnOf iiii."IM Socuhn
Re-futWaf
ariurrnIn lavu Mo-iic-i. IVISi p> tC-W.
Romami hashown the wayew form olEast Euicpeiin sovereignly and. unless the Ceauseseuoppledrowing posnbiHlylro-Soviet faction (less liaelyV. Ibe precedent could one day come to confound the post Breihne- Sovici IcmiIc
ashcbrt Saxcnsion
Khnuhdiev was removed from power in the fallictim of has own excesses and his inabilityid pale lhe capacity of his immediate citlieaguct to conspire against him. Despite iheir vigorous deBtncin-(sons of Khrushchev's style and his penchant for radical lotMliont. Ihe successors were wick noi only io proclaim continuity ineneral but alto coniinrty in policy low-aid Eastern Europe to(the maintenance of "fraternal relations wiih the Socialist countries" arid of the "ccdlaboratioa of free peoples who cn)oy equal:
But most of ihe East European leaders were shocked by Khrushchev's ouster and bynderstand'Wei failure of the plotters to provide them wiih advance notice Some bad become quite erase io Khrushchevprubably fell (heyable to influence his decisions, eiany no doubt were concerned lhal the bcw Sovici leadership would jeopardUr the existing tela-ticxuhlpby inshtmg on greater Bloc con forlo Moscow's wishes.
In any case, thesethe most faithfal among ihem. including Ulbricht and Noveiny--nta.de no secret of Iheir unhappiness, expressed reservations about the coup, and consputuously failed ioin Ike recitation el Khrushchev's alleged sin.'. Thus did the East Europeans, refusing tu support the CPSU in its hoar of need, demonstrate anew Iheii ability to act
- Aigw cciiitrd uuO. eC lhe effeeh of kSi<.
sUi<>'> rum in tivat*uiindo-iini
Ihr ttfrii of ftmnDa oa laiwi tenrr. )
May
I0II3I
< .ir fief,-ril ill
itil. tin*ever, iht nc* Soviel lodes did InuKir the urtvrui.cn cvrtiraci on ihe iciatkinship that had emerged during iht Khrushchev tears,'l burorcuu relation) remained relatively uuicl during Ihe lirsl three year< o( Ihe i
regime. Du during the same period the
IcadcMhip in Moscow sometime* found itself at odds liter both tunes of policy and questions ol power, and. ixirilynnteo^icncc. the East Europeans wete able in insert grnwing authoritytheir own affair*
Konianin'-esmrunent wiih sovereignly Becameabusive: the ifhlvkov rcrime In Bulgaria >ii iiibicc'.ed to an attempted coup by military officers and former roriltans. who might have felt thai theleadership in Moscow would nothe last German regime of Waliei Ulbricht began to souk with its own peculiarly condescending vc.ee jhuui itsostn idec-og-ro) creativity and its own biasesGermany: and Ihe parly In Prague Matted to conic apart as bemused conservatives began battle increasingly vigorous reform minded
The CbsUlissa*echoUosaka
The crisis in Crrehosksiakiaosed ihe most serious threatoviet interests in Eastern Europe and to lhr Soviel system Itself since tbe Hungarian revolution Here again.ears later,eries of event* centered on ibe twin issues of domestic democ-raiiaaiion and relations wiih ibe USSR: Sovietof events from the very unset of thehe pressure of rew-ware politics ihrcaiening to get oui of haad. with potentially disastrous results for the monopoly power of thr party and the positron of Ihe
w>rHii> "ileutls lnli|intustwpr*si ocatrijrde*tn Conn-simi! tutclie patiiUe. paiiill rueni otpllun Ot Pulird nolxutxdM|ioi rush ilii9_nii Sio-i*i ilihics.rvj. iKivrd hisvnu
Jr |ne- votv. lorot re>>Via*
" SvKt-yoil ulihr tin wc/iarnhia idtths
put>t> luuif* iim. tieenwir*diiia fin.lmiw.iiiiimeii, iiriw.
fnintmNt>Un>'i vuiWIua.
ill hi-amubna ii clearis* cmhwin'ia iiaoiithoireirn
(Boh. icrll ihvi ty >uadlntul nrabita) ilmscrdid iKimil"
ii thaind. finally, dr spite crxiuoni rtaisuraniuaof coniinutng fidelity to Ihe LSSH. tht specter if ntulratiun and Wcslerii inroadsey area of the Blue
Hii'trrr fttutfllaV of aiaral our-rag* in iht tact af Soviet lapprtulim of iht literal upennuKl ia Cterho'lo+aiia. ili Soviet frort jaf ihe etraii lo t'Ogvl UifirJ
Ihe /vusjur SpritAi fay lit nam)
ruar af fatlomtm lhat Lemimun in ptw hadfaced ikraatl^ml in Ai no-ax- .. Hot the trttme Spell term pet-mined la tarsus' it* iotiefiMar
bee*in Ofr
t* .orihete tmu Carts-peamawr aitei farirer*eci gaa*
ar."
And yet. while tbra encemous challenge wai crnrrging during ibe early months of IVAb and butsi into flower in the spring aad ttimmci Ihe guardian* uf "scientific socialism" in tht Soviet Uniun mijku able to agree an n< urr tadand howo combat il
To be sure, by March IVAH II hud become tricar lu ihc Soviets and to ihe ooiially alarmed Poles and ttsiif ihe" momentum continued, the
"sure wtikiti anmcri naiiuw lhal ihi nluul tWvuthe time rarnsi foil indtr iMtotin* nl lit "weeimi-e" (aelea.-sild lui iisclf ftum stml mihaniy. ishiiiii ihnany aoisj lairseei lmSwn.-im irurrmlurk. islllsp s> tliiuatratioalcrait ioiwIh*intttriim uT thttunc olocmi omit'"tl ti-en (mailsit iusi: iiaaialia.iun eorvlirh:iooj1 deiisxiaiiniuaorvacusil rvliiiui uc- -inl li rltni thuuinadic awli ol pnv arihed wtssnx-hnsi.anHrul tamitnuiilire
"imarniivei" ireiliivhiii. siowo" prafiriedvahimm
lis the*tfanain otlttei ifsbi wihemi iraait
"fill! ei awndImi>
l
^(uedMen^a
event- in Citchoilcakin couldenacebe Soviel Union aad ihe Bloc at athe collective leadenhip in Moscow wit tot ai all tute how bcal ic iiroceed be>ond exhorting ibe exited Ctecht io calm down.
Should like Sextet leaders/ attempt to ttwit or merely limn pott January dr-ttlosmemtin Citthoslervokioiflimii. how ihould iht limits be defined' Whoi ttxtks ihould hr employed'owrt will? White il remains at ytl im-pouiHeocument them, dtfjtrtnet* with* tht Politburo must certainl, hat ariita over ihtst outsiioni vm early. The resultovtti diptomatU perform-ante loo eanxoluied and toni.-editiory to be termed while li was ol ante e'umSy and iiujttisf*."
In hindsight il leernt reasonable lo assume thai at le.it until the summer, tome Soviel leaders (perhaps Brexhitevaad ihe rieolcgttt Suilov amongven while no dotibl afflicted wiih gloom, milay out. and Kill hoped thai an invasion would noi provehe Ceeehoslovak party leader, Alexander Dubceh, they thought, could be forced intoeeuld be madeontrol hit own party, and could be eoereed lo lake the necettary ttepieassert irte party's diciaiorship
Other kaderi were probably less prone loion and lest rehxiani to use force, tenting in the Oeehe.kr.ak c. penangerout model for all Easternoh the East Gerrnin and Polish
In ihu aioii oai antic* or ill*t.ot*,.
aad VutUtws.i.i -eir. vl it*LillStBsl mm tt ihc ntrtrm SW.1
(woic cwlohwiku tor elmx *haioer
Iht oumo rfhll <no ox hi Jl lelnrO,tttrrmimimthi it aarthvtii. IVm fttiht CnHMMid-jtie WarsawaMi ihtuhtdf.i
Iron Suttitvmmieretutt inix
Ww delotuownpUit mudu,um. Oithtalmta Sm fmintoiVemrnv
mm:
"lVmwrlh.ef.til.pat.
regimet adhered to iho, view; ihe Renvaniam and Yugoslavs .vgoreosly opposeddccisxin and com-ruormse-nrxettiiaiedorm olule in which Brezhnev was usually dominani buteen responsible for the actaal shape o! Soviet policy: lhal it. ihe peculiarw* correct party to-tuny reUUons with lie Dub-ceklan heretics, uarnings of severe political andcounter measures 'few if any ef which were actuallyhe maneuvers and entry into Creelseulovnkia ia June of the Soviet military, iis iLbtecnient [lemporaryi withdrawal, and the peculiar meetings between Soviet and Ciech teeters atnd Cierni in July and August
As in Hungary during tbe brief period6 -hen the Soviel military disengaged and partly witkdtcw and then attacked, the anomalies ia all ihit could have reflectedraduated response or eon-coated outright duphciiy. to gain lime for the later massne blow.ihe case for this r> not persuasive, especially in view ce* signs land reports) of Sonet Itouedceing during both crises. Indeed, even thehandling of Dubcekthe iavaiion is Augusthis kidnaping and forced trip to ibe USSR, his subacQiacni release, and then.hisInmore suggestive of Confusion and disagreement thanarefully crafted ptot
An Era of llelaai-ei TranqtriUty
Withal,8 tbe Soviets began toore knowing and more sophislicaled approach lu their tarobierns In Eastern Europe Surprisingly Breih nev. who thereafter was able more and more to assume control in ihe Poliiburo. seems not lo have concluded from hit Creeh eaperience lhat all macules-laliont of individualislic behavior ia Eastern Europe had to be eliminated ai the outset This was true in Ceechotlovakta ritclf. 'bete the suiting of drsscni and the removal of the liberals were carried oni only over lime and dad not resultevival of Stalinist terror Similarly. Ihreatiof military Intervention inprominent during the fall. were played
jrv) (tenthello-aed hidlc the Hilti( 'iiitv0 and Comalka's
viemoval without iiitilcifnii Ike politicalOl"uMi tjff*ibmhi ffom
kth*alCOraNa-advilli.k*eformm-trcd
m ike uw iom. ihaaagh aaegritaoa Mdrr CEMApa-shed oe* hai#ticacaauard dmcil) and by Sovvetto nerciK ctona-nrc uci -aukhff trade -c- ecu ihe Weil aad ike railriully inplol0 andlearly,f growingastern influence an Ihe area. Ife'haev ind tn understood noi only thaiEufope likeSR. needed Western goods, kw-.how. and crcdui. but-believed that "the economic itrengibcniagcn Europe could helpnh-anc* domestic pohitcal nabiliiy in the area might 'tl-eve lhe USSR of ceriaai economic burdensmi could leadrowingiope-aii oontfibaiion .u lhe proceis of economicin the USSR
Significantly. So>ici leiiiams lattcin fu-tupc luuk place in lha sunleii of in active and foT.irrj Soviei policy of detente in Western Eunspr Tais. la mm. reited on the Soviets' cowinf oonfi-demr wa (heir ability lo maintain heflemony in Uiei> sphere (afletiling then tklrrminaliun lonSjl and is.ru. nr. upimsm about thee peoipecii aioe* Irtrrt iheheutor,lt-.lu Had been ihori lived aads-'iaiea ay lha avoaacaiarn ol Wen Cera-siny '1 Outohaki fMien of ihe KTOaaci.ope appearedead Wrvicrn Europeam'< Aay leahpuiaai ia Mcacow (Od*aa aatreads in theraauiaiaaduuaa. Soviet dtairt to Upton Ihri>.iiaiibar. Iheir aaa-ety for pear*,panted econorrjc relnicai with Ike fan iheir eipccialmni of profit.
1
Reenter Potaa.
fke Sotidamy movement in Poland ina; hme posed the most serious nonviolent indigenous threatovici iaicrcsii aad influence yetastern Europe. TW Hungarian freedom Tighten6 aad IDC Crev-hotauvak democratic rei-iMornSlsoaldi*hcin-rd by militarynd the lineal of Polnhanmuniim in cukh! be rcsr rained aad ultimately diuoltrd by adrea: ou icarensg. Bui the ine of :ht Polnh noekaig-cbna mevemeaiautien ol puaei at least compilablethat of ih* Poliih part, itieliew kind Of chaOenge in Communis! Icgitienaey and Sovm lecuniy Itoreover, ihai might be eipeciaily difftcslt for Ihe Soviei* to quell with brute force without, in the proreu. emailing ihe riskloody, if start, war aiih Poland
eii of Hvtrr workeroUnd go hick enceuarter ofleriurys inhe summee6 and lacladc (be near-reveaat-oa of the worlers an ike BaHie eean'.everts. ihoagK trippad byeqaavikials. rae 1B0 -jebtical siitcc tie aorkers were eipreu^tg profound reaeaitmcni over their own lack of power ami in each imlanx vented lhanagainst th* raiga-ma Corr-enuniii authorn ir. both regionalliu'j
The accessionop Ipatleislilpn! EdwardCerekI >as made possible by Onmulka's imbilily lo cope with the workers' laaistenie onedardviaghaic in lhe (ormutation ol ecoaonwcrrknsag nndards aad
heedrlcrt' CDaaetfiMs aad. for seieral yean thereafter, gnreraed with ifeca trn-Wiea safferaace But (kcecoaomi began to sag in the Uiepartlycrssetrucnc* of Cxrek's praflagatc misnmnagc. ment. and hu standing with the workers declined apace finally0 Glare* lent his job. ard his successors faced an ever growing Im of popularir-ehsding legal recogntiKin of the right uf the workers to strike and to organir* free trade unions. As
turned out. the new leaders' willingness lodeal -iih
( iiatTdrnfial
ted'.
inmiUiniic
Uiittol aj. ihl Bratnci liin.un| usullvil In "iraa ii mm. I*hai i- litl aiii luiete
an woe pendent rimer blocvtiin ,i
Of Ol.'iCail p u : ia (hehrw'aal. and jrsdginf butkuieB
al liaac*tuvaraisbe ftm>
retorirk aakaa lhe pan. aadj inpaiaUir too'tifu* orifiBi aad ii, .iubu> iu Inouc apical <spccifa. paogiaind ii> nppircnllo disrupt ibe naiio's emnum) -
The tolutiun piowil un ihe Pules bi an iiKicuungl} alanrecj Sovici leadership of course,bna a> hUaerw am'icd ia tin Blue but cemusicaiisaii ofrfd>la<a> jndtarnedMibcoiMC ri basso faecenavaar^arai,-.
for Ih*
TirMfh lhe emu i' Hcsand ana in the end Containedanner ullsfil'ois lohe Soviet) have little rcaaMiwt rata late ihemietvei On ihe con-iran. the ifing lej-Scrship in ibes limply fax atu* ai laemnd au:<kl> aad etfeeineis jad aoeld be aire) Pat tv periaade even iu meal dcutednad aaatkd itidf *etl or KCtoned at* Poland indOpe i* in) fund* meant Iiumt
Once agiiii. the Novictsed In Poland ibai thc> here lelvdnni to face op iu the cromngof) mid-September of HBO. aflc lao iBooikiri'in) (antentioeiish workersi bod becoaac clear ihii ihe U'ler
ie* tool the Sosieis.
lo aauat thai lhe partyatext potiml auaaH on Soodarny aad ton Uie loeeainl on lhe unity .ind micmlhl> to preserve Hi own pout ion nt
1 Oh ithalrtMeHihil.nt rt fua .tipB-uaarvim amiili canntwi. ulial In- mikal auh ihrn.r im ih<
k.fewt -a. hei-a anati- ii ttaraav. lat-aa aa* Haa a* hakwa
aantid>iA< kai is anaV <af*afanwn an tui. ki. a> .aclct matiS'iiii'i aaOiukilHapianf* laiiaaaunihSilti
dinvynnua
I 1
2 0
ihc power structure By the beginning1ven loo late (and ihe situation too complex! ioetreat by Solidarity simply by threuicning ihe uie ofrmed Forces
The Srniett hid6 lhat iheir pou-Sialin grant of autonomyie Poles precluded ihe simple wtia nee uf orders lo acquiescent subordinates But over Iheough Ihey were certainly aware of ihc hcsailiiy of the Polish people, ihey may have cunnnccd themselves thai the congrueiscc of Soviel and Polish inicicsis. then fraternal relations with both Gumulia and Gierck. iheir relative not interference in Polish affairs, and their "benciclent" concern for Poliih welfare in general had restored Iheir prestige and authority in Warsaw so the point, at least, where Pcaiih tenders in need of aid won Id eagerly seek and respond lo theirnot necessarily their inttraclioav
It did noi work oat thai way. During most of ihe crisishe Polish leadership, though weakened by internal divisions and the confrontation withnonetheless acted asa surprisirlgljentity.iing with Moscow rather lhan capitulating to it. Even at Ihe end. il is not al all clear lhat Jaruzclski. at some Westerners maintain,lo the Sosiets; rather, as others assert, he may well base moved primarily because he fearedand in threat to ihe established order, and he wished iohreatened Soviel invasion.
The distinction asay teem academic Poland it under marital law whatever the motives behind II. and undeniably, this was the count urged and welcomed by Moscow But ii was the lasi course available tu the Soviets short of savataon. and ilove inspired in iht main by detteralicn. If Jarureltti believesthai he acted for bis own reasons and even in serve Poliih interetis. and be it surrounded by like-minded men in and out of Ihe Polish military, then Poland haseasure of sovereignly which could one day return to plague the Soviet Union anew.
Beyond this, there was much ia the Polish crisis in inspire fear and koihirg ia Moscow. The largest and perhaps closest of all the USSR's allies in Eastern
Europe had come perl lastly close toai least partial secession from ihe empire.eign of almostears, the Communist regime, governed by menskilled in ihe art nf politics icd suppression and backed by the po*er of the USSR, had all but fallen apart Ii had alaaost succumbed io forces thai were unarmed, urrsophe-ticated. and (relatively! urvar-ganixed. Aad these fcices were noice fascists ce Western agents but the workers in whose very earne tbe regime professed to rule
Even il. as seems probable, the Soviets did not sec mailers precisely in this light, they could not haveainful feeling ofnd rekindled apprehensions about the future.ropsgandu utterances lhal must ring hollow even to their authors, recurrent outbreak! of anti-Communism and mil-Soviet ism can no longer be explainedbyto clan enemies. Western imperialism, aid Ihe like. Some leading figures in the Sonet Union, even if they do not question lie need to maintain the emrirc. must be dismayed by iheir paucity of influence ai key junctures, ihc fragility of the Communist party's holdheoretically subjugated soc>eiy.and theirdependence on brute force lo maintain theii positionereof! Ihey mutt wonder If part of the problem docs not Ire in their system, at least as it is applied in Eastern Europe, and if that system should not be changed accordingly.
Soviet Hegemonixttra Furor*
The of recem yean Avoir made it plain lhat tbe Communist tamp is neither homoarrunix. monolithic, nor unchanging.
Zblpdev Bnetmski (fM
latverslty i
Eastern Europe Isabel ol convenienceereieivceomc*enelty The Republic olIn Yugoslavia bean little resemblance politically, economically, culturally, or geographically to. say.rechoslovakia or the province of Bttly-Moh in neeibenstern Polandirarre and backward state.for manylient of China but is no- an indepejident and isolationist Balkan recoubi East Germany,ember of ihe USSR's Eatt Europeanot even In Eastern Europe.n. Ihe pcvni being thai diversity in Ihe area, and in the Bloc, iiecent or iupeeficial paenermeaca. The uniformity impcttrd by Stalin and maintainedesser degree by rto successors (exceptAUuiudi.tense both II is as if ihe Soviets had covered these nateshin fabric which conceals much of Ihe varied, mouriiainous topography beneath but does notr. as we have already seen, eliminate the occasionally active vol
Within the specific corneal of bow the Sovietstheir fabric, especially ia those areas where ii is rent or worn, and how those beneath iithey content io remain tn its shadow or do theyunlighi?-ihe observer it faced with problems of perception ana measurement and even definition
The Soviets posses* substantial power in Sofia bui rarely seemeedxercise ii The Bulgarian leaders not only act swiftly to conformoscow') expressed wishes, they are also adept al anticipating them, dancing lo their superior's tunc even before it is played*
The Soviets wield comparable power in Prague, but here the situation is much more comites rcQuiring dote Soviet altniuon. freoucni intencntiont. and some willingness to hoed the ectniorecr* the Oecho-sluvak leadership.
The Easl German leaders accept Soviet authority but. short oa humility and longfle orihey do not refleaitcly bou to Sense! wisdom, nee do ihey ihy from profferisg advice of their own.
The Sovset position In Poland rests on uncertain foundations. Instructions are received bul mar be resisted, partly because the military repme is notreature of Ihe Soviets, partly becausecTOOtitiori, the power of the Church, forcompltiste difficult. On balance, if ibe Soviets' ultimate hegemony is noi challenged, aspects of their operational authority probably are.-
In Budapest the relaiioothip is ambigsous On the one hand, the Hungarians move on then own to reassure and placate, and Ihey seem erver lothe Soiiets directly. On Ihc other, ihey feel free to innovate alBig Brother reasonably well-informed bul act alwiyi seeking his advancesometimes to behave as(not simple satrapsl abroad. Thus, totbe oldihe Hungarian nay be content io enter the revolving door behind Ihc Sense's, bul ttaey exert every effort to leave il ahead of them.
There remaimountry thai has raited Ibe level or national Communist policies lo an art Party and state leader Ceausetcu has successfully redefined the roleember or ihc Baec, main taming lies thai are mostly formal aid confining Soviet influence almost entirely to the ntgativt. Ccauscscu accepts certain limits on his country's sovereignty but. within these, he accepts nciiher advice nor inspiration.
erde iht mine SUUn-li* KMortir
tee itKll ir.t iM SawtotMly net
thatSjinvim tatty bmxtl, rtittful initum.ri
kt iiipBsiiMtlei snaurn ecu in
I
r-Sit
5
TV Tooh of the Imperial Craft
Minithe East European BWc statci thuslunger deserve ihe demeimagor if ihey retrain in orbrio vourther rrrrxne oruch more eccentric ellipse. Thi. docs neel course, thai the center or thit system hat lost hi eraviuia-nal pull or simplyns means of influence and control On the cceilrtry. Ihe ussr haionsiderable variety of instruments of persuasion and power, bolh langible nnd intangibleem:
efAtm. The ussr is no granger to the application of nrmec) force or the threat tu use such force. The threat by itself hai failed on oocation. ns in Hungary met Czechoslovakia, but iremed partly in -ort in Poland, and no doubt helped to head off crises etiewherc Whatever, the existence nf Moscow'smilitary capability, logeiter wiih its-illingncs* iu use ii andusiif) ii Ideolog*via ihe Brcrhncv Doctrine,ervasive instrument of ultimaie corirol. Ihe most potent dclerrent lo Fist European defectionnce employed, of course, ii is brutally effeetive. ai leastime. Thererawback, however: ibe Soviets do not want to use il because, among olhcr things, it incurs political costs abroadantamountonfession of policy fail-re. This reluctance, moreover. Is bygenerallyastern Europe, where ihe kssnn of past Soviet interventions and Mninte event volts has been iwceotd: Moscow -ill move militant) if need be. but it willrice lo avoid the necessity Thisin urn. provides ihe East Europeans with some real, though circumscribed, Ic-crage olfor example. romania;.
BWtmntr. in
iseiws.nl eenuWUrufin.nliy hi thii ef iSi uihei wo.li.1nerl,w-bt!>o-Je eu,11 tbr
(annwrnii "WIkh. Thefm niinie-iutfiulm-txnn'
iHsiiMivmJ Tin. While perhaps not us binding as the Soviets would like toreat variety of these means arc available- diplomatic leUtwas; utaiy ob-ligiiiora: semberskip in Blocw.dc bodies tCtMA. the Warsaw Pact, various Cornell* and committees offficial party*to-party Contacts; itecrnalionnl Communist conferences, scientific congresses; cdutu-tionil cultural ind academic exchanges: andsecrci police tits. iThe KGB must stem it most asost ol Eastern turope as in Ihe USSR: while us influence is surety less in part becaase largely indirectonethelessaior pari at tbe preservation of Soviet influence, uad Andropov -ill surel) seek tohaihis panoply of persisted! rrUtionthicis lorms aweb designed and used by Ihe Soviets lo exercise dom.wee. curb disaffection, and. not so incidentally, to keep Informed Still, though generally effective, institutional strings arc much too diffuse and too remotely centre-Bed loingle instrument oforeover, some of lhe most important straids. fee example. CEMA. arc vulnerable to East Eurorean eipressioas of icIMnierest and tccikilratxc.
AVfariMituden. Thisal aspect of the rcUtonship which is at once inngiNc and miangiWe. Meetings between Soviei and East European leaders installs bllsiml. except during inlernaiional Com-munist cOneUiet. including party congresses) provide Ibe lonmor an opportunity io deliver lectures, provide couasd. apply pressure- andemandMost East European leadersfind themselves listening io their Scale! memory atieari.ely. though lhe days of bowing and scraping are eaosily over Aod oncehile,ioc may decide io give as good as he gets
etail. While ihev often operate al crcw-wrrCTct with Moscow's designs, scene purelyi Europeaninterests noi common to ihe Bloc as aaho be an important clement in Moscow's arsenal of influence Poland's aad Crcchoskivaksa's fear of German man-rnism and the bast German regime's fear and haired
c iiiuntiiilal
West Germany ire prominent cases in piinl So too ii Bulgaria's hostility toward Yugoslavia. Greece, and TurHe) Leu obvious, boi potentially tigaiilcani. are the quarreli amoni ihc Bloc waie* themieNet. which, among oibtr thmgi. pretty much preclude Conumlyis the Soviets The USSR ordinarily reprctiei bat on occasion exploit- suchor inuance, tbe Romanian-Hungarian dispute over Transylvania and ill will between the C'icb land* and Slovakia.
There are. inundle ol interests aad altitudes common to one degree or anotherhe regimes ol the Blocnole Such "microinterests" include the doctrinal disapproval ol capitalr.ni.and "degenerate" Western secety injoint suspicion of Western intentions in Eastern Europe and the acrid at large: and. abovehared apprehension lhat Ihey and their systems simply could not wrvrve ilsupport acre withdrawn
14roteAs China and Yugoslavia have repeatedly maderesumably common nieoVjgjell as unite Indeed, unlets orlhcdoiy is defiied and imposed by some higher authviiy.differences within the family rxcoase almost inevitable over time Si ill. as the principal 'eat of Marxist-Leninist thought and as Ihe Communistounding state, ihe USSRerlain ideological prestige and preeminence (trough hardly as much at itast Europeans -ha would contendthe USSR therefore mustharge of heresy as well as Ihe usual secular forms of pressure. While this may not pcoce decline, it it al least discouraging. More impart am,idea logical credentials provide ihe Blocommon means of cemmulocation, givereieal for an endless aeries of pronouncements about mailers lhal otherwise would seem lo impinge on ibe internal affairs of ihe East European land ceberl stales, lend authority to Soviet concepts of intra-Bloc affairs, and define the limits of ihe (unlor partners rcta-aca* with ihe infidels in the outside world. More scbtly.provides ihc same rationale mall Ihc wriiet of Ihe Hit* for their icry enttcncc.himb without belief i* This mean, in lure, that these parlieseluctance lo tamper with doctrine, lest is- and theirpal at risk.
IT
tto'omle Tiea. The sheer volume of Soviet-East European economic intercourse assure, the USSRowerful instrument of influence Though gradually dimlnithlng over the years. Ihc percentage of Last European trade with the Smiet union remains high enough flmporii ranging1ow ofercent in tbe cute of romania io netercent for Bulgaria, capons conformingimilar pattcrni ioubstantial degree of economic depcMence This is especially so since an oLwtous allcrnalic. greatly eapanded Irade wiih the West, is notractical mailer available tu ibe Easi Europeans, cither now |in the wake of Poland's near firurcial collapse) or in ihc foreseeable future. The Soviets alto appear in be tbe primary source of badly needed economic aid over the next few yeatt. even tbeugh the level of such aid will almost certmnlyEast Pumped* economic! sufferonsequence- u> ihe USSR's own economic problems grow
Bui while ihe USSR's economic lies io Eastern Europe are certainly usefulariety of ways -the? creaie tangible means of contact, can be employed as political wessons, and generally inhibit Eastmovet toward Independence they do notserveattery of heavy artillery when there are seriouselationship. Thus. Sonet threats of economic retaliation ind economic warfare have not always proved effective (for example, against Romania and Czechoslovakia in) When they were actually carriedChina0 and against Yugoslavia, virtually scaled off from economic relations with Ihe entire Bloc afterihey failed to produce either an economic collapseavorable change in political behavior. In any event the Fast European regimes retain some smallleverage of their own. and they can argue (hat Soviet failure in protide adequate levelsuance might ieopardiae domestic tranquillity and their own authority.
The Military Co'ttciittm Nothing bat testified in ihc efficacy of Soviet military powerirectof control suite so eloquently at the come Otiences of ill removal from Yugoslavia. Romania.
.tckcaMvakii The maUtl
af unhdriaal riil ve be repeated in the Fncieeable fawn
In addition in using occupy mismeans of iDlnnidatic* indreminderii. ihe USSR hai msuied on maintaining ctrne oversight ol Bloc forcci via lhe Wirsaw Pact and indirectlyany ol iheir ecii-iitci ihrotifh mission assignments and training eierciart iRomamaarlialhe purpose it fourfold; to forcnall ihe tut of Fan European armm in wayt inimitable to Scniti interests, in augment Soviet loroet in the event of air:cveloicadre of pro-Sonai cJfieerioot of pro-Soviet power which can ttt uacd not only agiinsi ihe rmoalailon ai large but unaore* in th* eventocal regime hai embarkedayward coarse and. ini rectaily deitayitWraied fee the fml ijtcuUitO. to rn-ke rot-Hal at* of theie fe-ces when tie caningalseing or distort)
Bni here agam inert art drawback) aadla Rce-ana. forrased force, tapporud it-dltvt haum. of lhe Ht-ngirsaa army da) lb* taaar ia Iaad aaaw ant thought lo have tidedht Savant aad7 areatat area ad itt leyaHyuhrd it* Jii./riw. regimeni" thai ii aoaM helptnontest between the two
reewaaf Cua-aarrt- Very Imlc it known aboul the aoabiy and eatint of lhe pritiie. peiwnal relation thipi between Soviet and East European leaden and other politician and prominent admimilralori.they elilt. tomeilmet Kgni of thit arc reflected in public statements, it when Gomulka. Kadar. Nowatny. and other, .etiiitd lo rtgalcr lome degree of pertoaal ditmay at the nutlet of Khiushehev1 But how much importance thuuld be placed onic aiiachmenti can only be cuniectoral
ower level however,ome firuhandwbtchhai ptrunal contact!EaU Eurtayaaa pan*d other bunaait wiib their Seam or-in aamoen arc very wiaetprcad aad races. N, of great imporuace to lb* Scwretiontinuing, low-key iKia. of txf.^i
iiunjaracc Simple -wwOC-tn apaareaar. dtflaln thai the Eatt Faroewinl May abreast af Sea-ai attieades re-evanl lovofruionti intcrst. timilarly.concern oarr Ihe lecumy al hu nan no.ilion and eagerness fo- ad.arnemem would emc-irase that ofTieial tc pay itrioui atlention lo Soviet advice particularly if he tijtpecU. a. he ihould. lhal timilar concern! prompt compar.hlr beh-.lorhe- level, within -mown orgamraiion While all lha doe. noi automaticallyu Europcaa cunluim.lt aad fidelity, and may al timet help the Caal luropcans in eaererje tome infliKiKe on Ihei muil In general faciei East European ciulbn act anproclivity in bureaucracieslhe avoidance of diaagreernrni. aadt of rnaonic titKeplibililv loi-hc
far- SavierFinally, among the weipoen of influence in ibec-mtthing even more aaa-phoa. thaa pertoaal contacti. th* fan inn the Se-Vea art anattr bat>*tt ia Eastern Ecrorehe tftecr, af thr. prir-dra*rec at atll a. pcrutive. -Ruta. Go Hon* atpuld adeaa fall, half* taster* raanpe -art th* of ihese coamnet at given ta giaTai a. ihri Wcvicn ccarcMirieet tied cam of spray paiai couillrAad lhe cnllreioe tight ofuanUa.ia. Rornarua. aad Chat* la the -akr of mauac waft dra-aHolSoviet miliary eeerv-nncl were clearly ladibk throughoutTie Butelte where the conlmaing Soviet pretence canIIhough it notind of eanui iad revignoeeling of helpletiness why light city hill' la tbe face of tuth awesome odds
The East European Retpon.r
While clearlyay.fluemeuroeteuJikv-cleprnenl and cunt trail tat) turopiuii aovereigaty. Ihe laitrtimenit of pert.tsion. control, and tntiaalatioa outlined above by no meantysiem of absolute aiihorny. On IrM contrary, as hatory aai demonsirated. thel.tensKgedover theinceelta hat don* to in paxaaieal fashion ratbtr than as ih* rtwili al sonte grand design.he nsaia bilateral
than enir-ttwide relaiionthipa. aadonsituni.coheilve mi of rules an) tiaitdardi through *hkh East Earopaan conduct can be filtered mei agaimt which East luroptan behavvor can be judged The tytiem. then, hai many faulii andddition, 'datively inchoate
The East European ttatei have had ccantdcrahle eipercnee in Tperaung within imperiimoat "are enjoyed national indepeadence oaly hrefly ia the esndcra era Then ai*he ways Ihe Ithmli al regimes have oti'i nth the Sonets and the wart thesedeeesscn deah with iht Harattargt.-iin. aadOiicanan Their btivaisor hat bear and ia etatatially oppeetwait-tie, running thr gamut from bargaininglegalities to erut right del una
ley retitiance in innovation and Idordei'- it pcihapa ibe mint firoaem and idling torn ofail European tettXaoe It ii easier and safer, lotample.rag onc't feel than to flatly oppose; ii ia alio taiiciind ColVcgial
for delaying lactic* thaa for clear refusals,former dernandinjie. Ihc taller courage
Ever the most adamant and hereac amongrepeat Commit nail "rglatret" Tito anddid not milially teeh to sew themselves and their cooatres fretn their Soviet atieoaticn. ard Dubcck never cod la the case of Nagy aad Dubcek. both men earaetaiy tought ccanpeamrae. ram coafaiei. buttt.maiefy fottrad Ihew-ehet aeccreaVa by tree-tntieet force, at week wvthia iteir on tcoctcs
Even the mott crbeitant of Ian Laropraa satrips are capable ofacy That. Polst leaden la the,uring aide spread rebel boo. faded loe ag "Call we On Ike scale cknunded byregime! in Cm nd Bulgaria only amrnOed to go aiong "ith Motcow'i callNet> Cosine" in the,brirhi made known hit tcvere resemlions aboui Soviel policy toward Weilin ibe laic
in Hungary ihe Kadsi leadershipcho.cnollow sn innovative cosrte ofovel and related approach lo doeneslic affairs, wiibaul great regard for faahiors in vogue eltewhere ia Ihc Bloc. Assured of Kadar's bask loyally, reassured by hit regime'i public deiolioa lo Soviet foreign policies and turely noi in tresis lo ritk renewed turbulenceation lhat hat heioncallyeluctant client, the Soviet, have apparently cone along with the experiment, though at timet with heiiialiua and anxiety
Particularly ritky nf courte. has been the peculiar 'independent isi" Romanian way of Ghees. Ml-Dci and Ceautcscu This hat imofced the proiostly mentioned "Declaration of Independence"nprecedented public reference! to unredeemedterritory inSSR. frankatioaalitt sentiments among the people at large, an informal (undeclaredi political alliance uiihpotentially directed against the Sovlei Union, and "vetoes- of Soviet initiative! concernboth CEMA and tbe Warsaw Pact, li hoc nlto wnolvcd criticism of Sonet identical precepts designed to reinforce Sonet claims to hegemony andf
' implicitly anii-Sovietemesby the YBgoslnvs and Eurocomnunitis All these moves and postioru have been swallowed by the past-Stalin Soviet leaderships, which sometimes teem less loierant than simply outplayed
Clearly however, there are llraais lo ibe game that both parlies understand. First and most obvious is the Ceactetcu regime's pledge Ml io abandon ihe Ccrnmunisi system atich is not sonicihing ihat regime would wish tony casri and oal formally and completely io abirdon the Soviet Bloc system abroad (which, though less clearlylso an event the regime would rather not undertake, eicn were ilor its part, ihe Smiei leadership has notit has certainly not foresworn thefor roughlyears, has it sought actively io overthrow the obstreperous gang in Bttciareti Presumably. Moscow'sisnown thorn in iht side is better than
tintnd costs and haiards ol seeking to remove it, particularly if lhal thora happen*e. at ii it. the pootett. moH isolated geographically, and ai|uaM> tie leasi important strategically of all Ihc Bloc slates
The "final" options cocohe Easi European .tales rebellion andlest likely in this era of ihe Srexhno Doctrine (and what ilthan in. preciselye invasion threat is credible enough lo make them teemt the same lime, however, because tbese opticus itmotn possible the threat of either ur Doth continues to concern the USSR and gives the Bast European regimes scene room for maneuver.
Aside from these forms of resistance to Soviet control, the East European statesind of reverse influence on ihc Soviel Union lhal is hardly dramatic bui lhal may help at least iadirecaly to curb Soviet hegemony.
East European Inftattace oa Ihe USSR When (he slakes arc very high, most East European leaders are probably prepared to asserl iheir own interests with vigor and conviction. Indeed, theof all the East European states, even includingof the fiefdom of Bulgaria and of lhal curious contrivance of Ihc Cold War, East Germany, see themselves as it pre tenia lives ef national entities with peculiar national interests. Each regime is capable of seeing problems in its own light, relatively free of the tnadow of Soviet policy and doctrine. Thus it was thai the dean of the faithful. Waller Ulbriehi.hreat to tbe national existence of ihe GDR. actively and effectively resisted irends in Soviet policy toward West Germany in thes and. thus it woald be in Sofia, for roughly the same kinds of reasons. If ihe Soviets should eter side withon ibe question of Macedonia
The point is, noi only do East European interests sometimes conflict with Soviet and sometimes caose trouble; ihe existence and expression of these interests also influences Soviel policy, helps to shape U. even pais limits on it Indeed, ihis none way tbe empire fights back
The Eon Europeans, in addition, offer ihe Soviet body politic, not to mention litariety ofof course is one reason why ibe flow of East European ideas to tbe USSR is so severely restricted by Ihc Soviet authorities. The Easi European leaders can also provide direct political support ce opposition to one or another Soviet leader framing policies or seekingough the East Eiircccin role seems nor to have been large during past pertods of Soviel succession. And finally. Eastern Europe. a> an area of potential turbulence, can help Indirectly to shape Soviet politics and polioes by remaining Calm and acquiescent, or. conversely by becoming agitated and,'or blowing up
In the long run as the empire nutates, the direcl mnueriee of ihc East European stales on Soviel behavior and policy seems likely lo iscrrase The Hungarian economic experiment wai tolerated under Brerhnev and now teems likely to receive greater attention and approbation under Andropov. All the Easi European stales have benefited from Romania's insistence on land the USSR's rcccgruilon oil ihc right ol members in ntteri independentin Bloc councill Moscow hoc demontiratid some willingness io givereater voice inIhis Is asragmatic adjustment to economic realities as ilapitulation lo pctUlscal pressure and has paid at feast some lipscniee to the notice) thai Ihey shouldarger decisionmaking role within the Warsaw Pact as well. The Soviets have alsoisposition to enhance the stains of some
Ens; Europcininul'-e
ample of ihisj. almost as If ihey were ex officio members of the Soviel elite.
Whale the Soviets may wish to vsew such adjustmentsign of growing imperialEast European members of ihe club are simply beingote ihe end retail could of course he quite different if one or another East European leader interprets them as an aocommodotion of his own growing autonomy.
ia I
Sjectuioni ind Their Impact
The approaching succession fin ihe SovietAaiever ihe form and results ef its initial none,ntualljtptotrmenl in the lop leadership and the eeatral establishmmtair mtchthan ihe lastlurreisroni andbe combined with an increased generational turnover of lhe Soviei political elite. This .. has no perctdtnt in Soviet history,aliiiealaf long-itrm duralioa and significance.
Sever tn Biatrt
The Aadropei Succession
mi-Bre7hne> straggle foi leadership wasn the Kremlin "ere visible in been the Soviei pollrena and la Ihe area of Soviet economic policy lone before Brrihnev himself had succumbed io his finalttack Manccenng among ihr praiiblc heirs began earnest in1ey power broker. Mikhailiedupsci Ihe earningigns of ihisquickly reflected in leadership appearances andap. poini meets, and debates over loagstandlng issues of ecoaomk consequence, such as declining labormanagerial responsibilities, and teehnoJogi -csl stagnation, soon thereafter surfaced in ihr Soviet press"
traggleihnrv's mantle, if al all pre(acted androfound impact in Eastern Europe, and in ill probability on relations bctaccn Eastern Europe and the Sosiel Un-Oa as well, seems as close to an ironol empire as one is likely to gel. Bui there is no law. apparently, whieh decrees either the duration or intcroily of saccessicn infight-ieg within lhe USSR, ll look Khrushchev fouryears to succeed Stalin. Brefhnev si> or eight years of subdued struggle to succeed Khrushchev. And it now seems possible, though by no means certain, that Andropov esientiiDi accomplished ihe task in jsitt nine oronths of relatively moderate content Ion.
" Sf. CIaru* Auennui NOVecret I'Wx MWao Profit' ma.
-See MMSFiesi
Fulnfi of ga-in fromm Criliiierd."
Sperifieally. in lerrm of precedenis the succcuicasio KhriShchev was far leva disruptive and traumaiic lilt ihe suceesaioe to Stalin Thispartly becaosc tht -h! left by Sulm'adeath was incompanbl) greater lhan Ihe one openedyree-cil Thoughbruvhcncv'i poli-cursIn leas damaging and pcalhjenaaslv cootro-
j-
aewidfiwatsiaad aoiparane aii-IChrashehe> sccrei soccch) The general aaood atr lM4calmer aad muchaaieiyihan tht paevailag nsoc*ca the Sraiei Kaden aciaaty 'eared lor tbetr tkun> further.suctnaun unlike Stalin's, did am fall out irmedinrty over Iht question ofad thev assured thair constituentici thai Khrashchci's ea-cessei of style, hii penchant for rtwiganirations ard
rioriliet to prl industries, and his lancering* wiih Ihe parly machinery would cease owe snd lor all
Thecoiteetne that lucceeded Khrushchev and the Breilnev legimc that. In luin, luiceeded thee ititfted policy emptiists and inslltutcdPto giaaiover time but in generalattern of leadership lhalreturn lo normalcy"t 'J-irs.il of pelof inmialional continuity, gradualism, accommodatinn. and ri-astu'incc of triehort of-lability."*
Aad ill tro seemed lo argue "for the abalny of thepolity so achieve the (oen) transfer of tht lop leadership centrarloui ma joe drama. >ilhoai anoat shock"
P* irtsama siacceai of VanmaJii aag ha aoibomy most Obvtoally his authority over fcetianBithin hsars ofeath oa IDdid. in fact, luggrst an orCer'i innsfei of tower- 'i success can prohabli beto ihe lick luster character of his comptiuurs. tit
"SmryimviK,n> MISa
<
own superior lalentt and genital rtsourccfelncH. and lo hat ability lo lot up impressive tupport ftoikagars in the Pcaiibvru and oitmn hey miereti grewpt tsorelythe KGB andke
Brohncv't long illntaio have contributed
indirectly lo the overtly dacarout tuccettion process.
Tii'mr wit ilmc lo male various peliiioil ar'iiifc-
i-iiot at teas] w] refloat lew olmacs and lime foe the man
mil" giovpi ine heard and lo bring iheir influence in bear. And all ihii could lake place while Brcihncvit ill able to provideand national leaderihlp and ihe appearance ol luMnyil Ihe lop
Ihunet touy.thai *ataaaa over but theatMpov acemaave wan domiruaccQuickly and efficiently andinimum of political disruption Bul (hit may In pan merely have reflected the ueanimout desire in (he Politburo in anad octtn signs n' dltaaity in therd
en he haa tcinckew already gainedas-tery over the PoIRburo and the Sccreiaiai Homtthing Breil.nrv never didi thr Soviet leadership will coniin-ue in function in pan ai an oligarchy. This meani, inter alia, lhat disagree menu over policy and reiiii ance lu Andropov's rale, though perhapa they will not be eipaeued drtsatca Ii arr likely lo pc'utt'"
In ihr area of polio, eupeeconamicm. Andrnpoi' hav clearly indicated hat deiire fin change. Bui- no daub:ew lo minimiring contention within ihe Politburo and uaeaiincu within the tu reawaeyhe hu airoillingneli la proceed wvih cation Thanat wordvi last rateditrssd ike itatyBpcstJcaoe" ol various economic enterprises, hn ucctaiaiion of IJ Novemberave in pointndropov laid the Ceniral Committee "to ennduci eipcrJiiienii if need be. io make apprataali. and io take account of the
'Ota imttwn aniUMuli limki-.aw.
* m 'aw i'u
tot hiuIimw* awi oTaeWrvitowoMi-ecu 'maunm id ihe lulus nl lta iiHwnbaii i
im ivoavi-n
:of fraternalhit it interonng. even mndrtity litilEatlng. butouting call to action
BViyoad Aadreerov.l. latereood chance of far greater changehe first lime in Soviel kiiiary thai an entire generation of leaden (noihe lop leaderthipeparting history's wage rrore or leu together. Accordingly, precedent arc fragile ami the uncertaianev areai."*
Fmher. etuoting Sewcyr. Baaler
Taw dtpunwt of ikt Uieai fartr ttneia-
lion of leaden ij In ittelf an important
imipoint te Sovwr aWirreaf mulae,
eeumMantr (enari*t dotA ennlhrrtee-
aomti kliiory.'i'i aaatf apemnti for change
The*ti-ptoyrda high fete' of irrnV/Hi.conllnotlt. ondof chonpey ton-itmloa that rfcra . A*
In ike comii deiodr .ikeA aval
b different from ihe Sovier LaitM of iht
m nrd ol all emmta lhalhoneri will late placeo pcireciamfltam Incrrait In
1 be Newof SattM i, Over 'lire, perhaps in iber later yean of thatre- cceileadcr tarhe CPSU wtfj be can up.ounger1 of the pott-Sialin gerveraiion. more hgorout and lett commliied io ihc rnnrea and mylhi of ibe pati Al the tame tune, there willo-nparabie geacatmnalll ibe Savtcl pca>usal etaea Our panteu tarty knowledgeable obtenee.: again, hat tluotcd Ihit new gcncratloa and interviewed a
Iradiimci Amnaieac upi
too. ioi
xil
yLa
li'.iM,.'
.army of il> member* and hasood glimpse ol what It may look like.
One of lis crucial formalistook plate during lie protract' tdftrnitnt and recti of Khruihehev't anii-Sialinampaign lhal autttlontd authority and tstablixkednd iheetbs stimulated critical
thought.
The nrw generationunti teneraiion in ill typical andhe cull of iht uoie. ,'lis membcrt err commuted to/ Ihe boric forms of Soviet politicaltht/ belief lhal the ivtttm Is right andBut/ ihtr tendxhibit liltle of ihttr ptfdrttisoet' xenophobia and much less of their fear and drifli rooted luipklon of ihe tittiuie world
One moil unking trail of ihii group is ill ikepliciim eboul the grander claims of Soviel propaganda concerning ihe mirm'i menu /li members displayell-dtttloped awareness af ihe system's functional ihoricomingind'of!l batkwordneii and provinciality iaThey do noi diiguite their dislike ami lack af respect foe ihe old generationThis generation ii afro/ grorily matt'and/ ii characieriied bydeveloped careernd ell turn.
Iteneral ion that ptrtctti iktaf tkt Breihnev administration to layirection for Soviet development hat li Jewto accept actual or potential Inttrnaiional achievements ai lubsiituttl for internalhet.may betoigher price in terms of political and social change if yeriuaded thairice would assure substantial improvement in the growth and efficiency of the productive and<re protet its"
"b'lto'.ceili.'
21
srwrt.oi Baler see* ii. the pcst-Stalln general ion ol the politically elite is essentially pragmatic andlooking, no lets patrioiic than iu predecessor, but certaroly more realistic about tie fault* ol Ihe system and ihus. in the Soviet contest, basically reform minded This does no! mean, however, that itve bulk of its members is likely lo favor reformsruly liberal or tkmocratica Dubcck, or to seek to emulate ibe barnstorming, highly klt-jlm-eal appproich of Khrushchev Nor. as Bioler notes, need it be "ea&er to deal with in the internationaln Iheight be "less cautious, more prone to lake mis" because il lacks filtihand experience wiih "the cost of building Soviel might' and is accustomed to (he USSR's great power status
One might add lo this analysis ihe notion lhat there nonetheless is at lean one characteristic ihe new age group shares with older gcneraticts. the naturallendeaey lo react against the excesses and failures of ihe preceding regime. Mlknkov and Khrushchev sought io overcome ihc suffocating effects of years of Stalinist tyranny. Breihnev and his associates in turn strove lo eliminate the unsettling consequences of Khrushchev's flamboyant style and controversialAndropov will try lo en ihe USSR moving again, thcaagh without entirely casting off Ihc tauten of his predecessors. The next generation of leaders is likely lo be reactive loo. may discard the hardline wariness of Andropov, try lo expand the number of permissible means to confront problems, and seek lo enlarge and make more realistic ibe vision or what Soviet society should ultimately become."
Most authorities would probably agree lhat. given the seriousness and complexity of ihe problemsihe new Soviet leadership, debates over polrcy are likely lo beuch debate) will surely ittveave
* The Balionl twexavondt and iwttr ntStel iht
ihr ion-Stain taniraiioi. revralett lenumefy byud|at
rill* Rvimn Tim fvsnumi tccrcunttt Ofcj
.tccsvw lumbersbsv gtutuy lasg u> at at naklUelasi oripn. wc bene*. vt mhtitKita ti veJ si aatwiirr-kr'ax came wcaotiinaiah from
in nan baaiuttf titer uviii -
an liwanitlli ioISSt umi mlnn
t.
(orfpeiil^
(cnfidfniial
ms concerning Suva" remans witk (he United States, China, and fasten i pc buisharpest il-sogreeirsenti will probably focus on id L. SSW -iipncwvehere cm hea doubt, ui fici. Ihai it it an ihn area thai the Andropov trade: ihip aad its tutsettoet will 'ace their meatash cutuag anlh aJ aMteetc problem* isat hue foe icro* nm*reeves ledVc/hntvdnimta' lo ic-sawarate. igraof) mir, iihratgh aat all corneal ing aarrruad at general to mudOUtpoieaai that canaM heor eve* pard by placebos aad iradrnnal ermhodi
i wre luarrarmi-id irikf on on*im* and/Or *ttt mpori'itrtann. io io mi. let i'iammi' hir*- Thr nwoorninr problrmi ofOs art iprroa* avoir fnr ecuiro1ffitM.torrai amf rramr* inM/in-rolrd mampulaHon ihr Hralrf of ihr Ho/prl."
Unci pressing, ofil) be quetnora of retuurce allocation and the appcoryiite ndmininritive-minn-gerinlmuctural way to deal with ihem Nearol the growth ufooming energy erltia. impending labor thoriagat. perilling agricullaral shortcaaibk dtcluic in livingeneral tocial ma lahe continuing growth of ia-vetimcnt in the mihtnry sector, and declining in-est-meni elsewhere all three pieharmt and moreoarihcT to demandm, changei impcard from abovean dcaagr.ertod of political urtta aadime "be* il abecraaa<*giacreaaiail| aaoareni thai icarologv and eintiag dear-art no) emry lial Ktuide te prrspciii bat potitveli takdtrt or even preclude prcgreai loward that goal leceim* sirs am stances than cry eat for radical change- aad Ruler, foe erae. taggeita thai, if Androorn dart aa) or cannot respond effectively. Ihe younger leaderi probably will
dialer doci not believe. hoot>ei.adical tola lioa loeeonoroic problem*carry -nh it ihe scedi
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adical change in the political system. He thinks the regime will effectively guard against "dangerous fracture* and ruptures" and thai the system it suffi-ckntly ttrong and liable to survive fundamentalconomicnd yet. to bea new economic program will have to deal with difficulties likely to reach crisis ceoporiioris bv ihe middle of ihe decade and effect truly fundamental reforms. Further, anything this ambitiou( and laruld almost incitubly provoke high-level disagrcemenis oser ihe allocation of resources, even were resources in more pteniilul supply than ihey will be. But Blalea seems to minlmire the likelihooderious political struggle ai the top.
Other eiports. ntOSI notably Myron Rush, disagree in part. Rash, for ciamplc. foresees serious pobliCal coatcntion over (he direction of lhe economy, doubts lhal even radical reform, if agreed upon, would solve the economic problemsossible weakening of ibe USSR's security positiononsequence,that changes sufficient to urn thr economy aroanriact, endanger the systemhole: and imphes thai because of this the effort is not likely to be made."
Nevertheless. Rush believesundtmental re-form is attempted, it it likely id be associatedhange in leadership. "Radical reform it mostnot simply byut ratheruccession consequent upon lhe mini lest failureeadership aad ils"
Both Rush and Bialer agree (hat the "era fee pro-loand change etuis now and -ill probably become piriicalirly aeate later in ihii decade. Further. Rush does noi teem to disputeharacter)radon of the post-Stalin elite as. essentially, more Open minded and ictlvitt than lis predecessors. To lhe client lhal these two observers disagree, then, the argument may eventually be tell led if the new feneration of Soviet leaders proceedsadical way io refashion tha
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believing t'lortnuily that in iht process no damage need be done iheuperstruciure. And in thit way. ihe future leidersof the USSR could unwiiilagly become the architects of their own fall from power.
The Impact on Eastern fnropr
The nature of the attack on dtyrtctilc problems In the USSR by poit-Brcrhncv leaderships will have mayor Implication! for Easternadical change in Iht administration cf the Soviei economy, forwould inspire motion toward similar reforms in other Bloc stales. Oitcomei would vary accordinghe degree of autonomy cxercBcd by each party, the preferred policies of the individaal leaderships, aad the charaeser and force of Soviet guidance. At during ihe New Course of thehowever, the issue itself would become important nmpry because the USSR had raised it.
There arc. in addition, rather awe indirect forms of fallout from changes in Soviethift in in vestment patterns, for extmjfc. might alfeel ice composition of Sot-itt trade with Easternurn toward more provocative aels abroad might curtail Easl European trade with Western countries and further limn the availability of Weiiern credits And sO on.
All of which might suggest that,uccession period in the USSR inevitably involves questions of policy of interest lo the East Ecrepeans, it would behoove the leaders of those Bates to make iheir feelings known or. if less ca ulcus, to actually try to involve themselves on one or another side of an issue orolitical
At important as the precise rntore of Soviet policies arising out of succession pot Ho and the degree of Btoc involvement, are the consequences in Eastern
-Winter ids his aieeened In ih.mW< Nan iwr*xxiiH Mikalov. iti ainsitm tt iJicnl>it ana IhtnWr-nil* tl voiM hisa OaiQiw vnsMiaieci Ue elrmnutatm but liiiaaid wdetuinin. ihi UtiMun lor lhe Humiwarnoitbtyrd therean cair rum id duals tha* irn Can bmoeatd SuinUin iiamrr al lhal line la cwa Inilf mi ihe Sovietirrai bui thnnetd mi rulioaby tiltlodiislhe Idun
Europe of disarray in Ike top Soiiet leadership. Stability in Ihe Soviet-East Eflropcaa relationship teems to be enhanced during periods of strongor dictatorship in the Krcmbn and neakened during periods of collective rule. Tbe failureoviet oligarchy to agreerogram, to provide clear and coexistent direction, and to protect an aura of certainty and unity had obvious, direct, and even dramatic effects in Faitcrn Europe dunag theattending the St alia success oa Though lest apcerent and direct. Ihe impact of the succession to Kfcrashehev ant almost equally dramatic, at letsl inec the accompjaying chart.)
To be sure, sume of Moscow's troubles ia Eastern Europe have arisen from its own deliberate decisions to diminish lhe worst forms of oppression and to allow greater autonomy, all ia it* name tfore effective aegemcny. But this more enlightenedsometimes hadresults Sovietto interfere in the domestic squabbles ol the East European parties, fee example, occasionally only ciactibaled factionalism, weakceedihcecittingand encouraged other elements in society toolitical role Aad manydecisions affecting Eastern Europe were not clearly tsplainrd. continently applied, or adequitdy backed up. partly
"Thadailmna beiwn nrath of iliairtIK rak and ant-wn daaunhaaumIU ard (awallyaeciaiiOH tui (ia te ^lUciAi* Atl^uileennainiclnoiaaiKcir from Ite Sovin Kere anm Mcauttsiteti UtOtae hfirc taeonetiitetc- li'.rdScarcecr tl rrmUisnu<
tM oMrr ii imana tN ne*Mnandcd hin then
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A Chronology of FieaK hi Iktfid Easier"
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of ihc uncertainty, aniicty. and division which dominated ibedeliberatiorvsofihe Politburoong
Andropov, described by hit supportersan well tquipped io deal with problems intelligently, it pie-iumjhly eager io avoid an> display of Politburo indecision and confusion aad, indeed, to dale hu acted very much as the man in charge And if the
Andropov regime is bow able, in fact, to provide ihe Easi European leaderships with clear firm, andguidance, somee tribulationscf Ihe past isecession periods caa no doubt be avoided. Andropov, (or example, unlitc Khrushchev vts-avii Rabosi and HungaryJ. will probably
no findbe position of faionng one tin Faropran contender for poweranother because
i1/Hit own needs aad pa.icy positioas aiithin the Sonet
Pidnbaro Aadrtnrv. aha coatd neitherorNoaoia, ra Creetealavakia aa Lata Ha'. Andropovapa Ibe aoti ofwapuceas (or ihe sake of anrviraliim lor simply beeaase beuniblrake ap his mindi
Soil, many of ihe basic problems unsuccessfully faced by Khrushchev and Brrahnev continue lo eslsi. and. as Andropov will soon find oal, some are becoming more acute and lha potential burden all (he larger SpTciticaB) in ih* economic area: "The Scant Union is raaaiag out of incentives for enticing. rathe* tbeag. a'legiaoc* from as Eavt Euiopcan alhed chtta That aBegaaaec aby monaiing evaleace af the bathecoaeeawC rsaracte aad tke growvag certainly lhal the Senseso lurrf abk to make good on >is eccncrriic eta^iiirstnts."-
On the other hand whik ihe level of Soviet aid will probe Oly level oil or decline, overall Easl European eoMoaiic raltinuc on (he Soviei Unionartner may not. and-depending in pari on the policies of ike Wen coui: even increaseat tha rata: area cat energy -npo-lt Sovwt eceauraachai bhcry at leas' to be maintained aadAadrceayvougher Sort bargaiaiag uance. greater i'ayhaaa on Bk* irsnjraiaa) through CEMA. and dinvjinhed Soviet gnerotily la geatriil are nal likely to am much Fast European good -ill
A mam decline of Soviet ccanremc support would ib any evenl lilt* (he Easl European leaders with four optioni. all of which Involve unccrtaiaiies. cotia, aad datgert (II in effort to muddle through. |J|. coupledore draeonno domestic politicalhoroughfcieg economk overhaulW bolster pruclactmiy aad eaocataire "trite mealain toward market iceiiliur or through adaniantraiivc devokaricai.urtheiard the West for aid and trade Thewould only rntpeave the dav of reclonmg the secead
'""in ML,*would risk iii.fi popular discontent, strikes, (he formation of nonparty power bloci. iraj so forth, lhe third would he ideologically eofHroversial. probably breed paly ficlionaliim. aad btira* bureau-critically aed ecravomicalt dwrupiive. aad the fourth, if ,'einble at all. would being wiih it tech baraidt at th* tvattttliag growth of pokucal and taliural lies with, andnc*r* dtptadtav* oa. the Wtsl andaddnvn mew Sc-art wrath
Shoahlarrant, iaclteisaoa or mesne eaauoa oa lb* pan of Iht Stwtcu abena iht dweetaaa of ihear own irOBbktd ectaaeaay wound aadentbt bt aceortpanard bv inckcaaaumpcen tcoaom* aaeeb-kms and policvet at aril Ir lha case ihe tail Furcrprai kaden would find inemirrvei pretly much cm Iheir own
These lesdert matt be brlttr Kremlmtfeigisti than the Westernpraclilvyrie'l of (hi crafl--btller able lo decipher the esoteric commas net mm of political combatant In the Sevierthey lurely have, in addition, far richer sources nf hard informs lion than even ihe moti cnttrpriiint of Western observers Thus, if Andropov largely succeeds in imposing hit will and hit policies on the Soviei Pohlbumropetrn wou >tirrong the first to know aad lo react But if Androooi is not abk to assertlear do*unaae* or supremacy, ih* prudent Easl European leader aeaild try to hanker down and avoid dteauoni lit would bt tubjeci. howtvtr. to itrcng prtua.it> frqan within ancoratrtiieeeics ltd fact dwelt problems anhin hat cram society, and he Couldafford in reaaaia tnactivc (or very bage maght noteek greater aatoaceay. he might as effeal bt forced toi is* tame iinwn pendent neighbor ought fiiy ate an aatetilng taarofie bi eavetaaj tsort leckprnaawr* aad atovuag Quickly io caracal thr geaertl corfutacn an Moscow
Trae. even if not tfTtctively donanatcd by one anaa. the immtdratt peat Brerhnev leadsishipctnafaf survive withon! lacing cram in Pattern Furopt rxmiparablc io those of the past Rut if to, they will only pass probkmt on to ihrir lutccsiort who. if ihey are Ihe
soncd mec Biaki dttctibtmilch more bid)oaJrott tram head oa. perhapsa pan Of ihe iBBjato da shoal Soviet problemserenl Bui whatevernaia of action they adopt. Midline or toft ihtrtcaa ba avluaianiec olandn in area toinherently voiatiletiern Europe
Succession la Faakrn laiiaea
All but one(he iop Communisl leaden in ihe Blocnilurope aie -ell Into their sillies and meat ol them ate in or approaching theii aevemiei. Oaneet ate good, therefore, lhal ihe compnimon of one o'of (hew rctimet -lit turn over in (ha fairly near fata re Since nor* of ihe currentropean kaden hai designated aa heir, and since, ai in ihe CPSU. none of Iheteaalear-en: raetni of laccasMor the maneuvering aadchoricWelic of al kau paat Soviei periods of soecctiicri ma. sooner or aitr bt duplicated else -hart in the Blot
The kvel of uabtttty eMianaatttd ia Eastern fcarope cUriaga. aad milm-laiaed aa the lOhCa eactea ia Poland. csaM that caaaa u> aa cad Yean ca* fraatmiaaatvonua ceaald parreedate lo iheio be addressed by coewaden to-po-cr aho would trek lor. alternatively, (ry toear owe political advantage
i prohkraa may ba particularly acale in Ha-sory and Romaait. though foi quite differeni reaiont Thr former hat foi tome lima been in lhe vanguard ofit meant, amant otherhai dniranikdhaee Radar's demtte at aa opportunity io regain power and alter policy. Hardline coarkivailvea "III probably not be able loomeback, bal raodcraie ennserva.aho favor retrenchment ratherival-ara Mill influential and are well aaare thaiort of national conteniui baaed on ceunprnmiu. hat ytl to be mttitulioaaliitd They will be billerly oeaaoacd. (lowever, by refoemitl compoaeau of Ihe body public, aad if lha tlruaale it ai all prolonged, alto by tleiranii of (he population al large, many of ahichrong Hake in the
sarvrvai of Kadar't "woaJeanivV poocatt The lallee de.elopneiii would etpecitlty nr the So-sett who >ould In any caae be concerned about Ike pota-balilycat-Kadar "revision m" drdi in Hungarian
Ceaiiteacu in Romania wa. the designated hen ofedecessor. Cheorgc Cheorgiu Dei. -ho wai ihe figure initially reapontible for lhe coamry'imcular road to independence "llhln Ihe Bloc Ceausescu hat maintained (hit atptel of Ohtorgiu DeJ'i course, which it oterwhalmitgly tupporied by lhe Romamto people, bui hat othtrwii* kai popular lapport becaute of hia int.ttence on bit own absolute authority, bit refutal to significantly moderate old-fashioned. temi-Staliruti economic policial (which em phasiie heavy industry at the etpeaae of ageiculiure and the conumcrl and. In genual hat hirth and arbn.-ary Uyk of leadership.h hot own -cah Ofoty. sartly.he pout -here the political capital .cumulated ay Ccaaseaea theoagh hit defcrete ofaad hat baiting ef ththanted by ha oreMtv srte disregard of pabfac welfare
VVWeher henroad by hta retkagbcia palace coup or dies ia eaTase. Ceauaeteu'i peaVikal demise may setfcaia of react raro wranirabk an .meanly.ot teope.he one in tbe USSRhe deathan he retcmbkimall way. Stalin, thatharp tlruggk wnhi* the pany ewer both sttccession and policyht flgkl over the meal effective ways io ippcase the population at targe, and on* or another element mi|ht teek Soviei support, especially promiKt of sorely needed economic aid
trong leadership in Moscow -illlng lo intervene, the Sovici roleaggle to taceeed Todor Zhi.ko* in gTafgaria wotad probably be dees *ht. But if the Soviets do noiolution,y nonconceivable lhat Bulgaria loo couldajor succession tritit lo th* waka ofeath The placidity ef iht curitnt scene in
Stsfia. imposed land cccatvonally jcccmmodjutiiio doublimmering Balkan stew of diverse altitudes and aspirations. Indeed, from ihe end of ihc "ar until Ihe carl, IvWh. -hen Zruvkovlear ascendancyhb rivals, high- level infightingioie or leu constant feature of Bulgarian polmcalnd Ihcrcumber of forceiand faeiota at word beneath (hesurface Ic-das lhat suggest the reemergence of political strife in Ihc portt-Zhtvkov period.
Nationalism,hc main against Vugcslavia and Greece binnti-Soviet in ihc past, is one of ihose forces. Il has manifested itself dramnii-cnlly in ihc pasi in the formailed (mntdyr Military- coup against WiivkovS, and in visitrche regime's lingccsiic aiiitudss toward the Macedonian questron Ihe largely frustrated desirehoroughgong moderniiailen and rcfnrm of the Bulgarianby one Western observere characierired by iis dependence on wood-burninganother ingredient, one with sirong political overtones lhal could beeeene quite risible andhe post-Zhivkov era. Finally. and related tohivkov has brought into roUiiom or influence in the puny androup of young, -ell-trained leaders who have been responsible for ibe limited reform programsulgar ia to date; these men will wis* in jockey for position ii any posi-Zhivkov regime and may push hard -and jgainst stalwart corrterraiivefurther, more basic changes in ihc acnunisiration andof tbe economy.
Alloc/possible futureconveqiieracc are Bulgaria's relatire geographic itolalion-it is tbe only Bloc state Itave Easi Ceimany) thai docs notorder within comtrson with Romania, its unique good fortune in avoiding permaaeni Soviet military occupation. These circumstances would make any Soviet invasion especially diffieuliount and tusiaia. parity because ibe only land bridge from the
" So ml km. (to. iifvhi-ii lool Nttoe form. Tin. ViiUu Cfhir.of iht imoWrilca>ot-forward* for Hi'tiri.ine .Sri.m.
Saau-aealtitstnoii,
Soviel linkm to Buigaim Crosses unfriendly Rumania, andihct mighi encourage Ihe Bulgarian, -not (he least resolute ofoppose with force'
Far the most part, the people ofppearive reuealcd into light Utile individual shells, seeking through the taiisfnciien of pos-mal desires some recompense for the painJ and some relief from ihe graynevs of life in general Further, mosi former officials of ihc Dsbccknm have been oiled or forced into menial labor and arc in no position lor moudi to challenge ihc cutting regime
SlrM. factionalism -iihin the dcplcicd party remains surprisingly sirong and. concerning ivonomlc reform, appears to be healing up Hi sak't rolreferee between ccat-.estintjeinforced mcr the years by close ties lo Brcahnev. no longer teems quite in cffeclmr. perhaps because of political and policygenerated In part by Ihc succession meneiriering taking place in Meecnw beforedeath Indeed, signs in Pragueigh-level disagreements over the kinds of economic reformor> have 'cflcclcd different signals from the mriuu* contender? for leadership in Mateo* Should disputes within ihe. Ciechoslosak pari,n spite orproraable ef funs by Andropov to curtailperhaps eventually can Hatak hit job. the struggle to replace him tend hx cautious policies! could become quite intense
The two remaining Bkxr siutcs. ihe ODR and Poland, seem somewhat less likely to tuffer disruptive succo-slun struggles lhan iheir southern neighbor. The
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in East Germany It old and smug: in Poland ii ii old. discredited, cynical, and. in effect, out of power. Further, the Soviet- were heavily lavolved in naming lhe tcadet of both stales,trong political andmiliiaiy pretence in each, and arc generally more concerned about tttbility in tbt vital area than to Ihr south The leader! of these lao states, moreover, have not been in power at long at iheir confrere* elsewhere
Hoaeckcr in Hon Germany hatirm hand on hit party and hat regime and doet not teem to be plagued by acraxia disagreements andtcttimony to ml skill and. until recently, to East German cconcraic lucecsaca. The mora seriousthreat to Hoetecker't position and so party control might come nor from within bat rather, from without, from the USSR itself if.ew leadership, it should one day shift toward greater accommodation of Wcii German policiesand aspiratiom. For East German Communistsurn would carry with ii the Specter of reunification which, should it material-lit, -mild tn all likelihood eilinguish the regime and all lis works, thencluded. (For this and oiher reasons, the Soviets are. of coarse, not likely lo makeove, hut much to Pankow't cornierna lion, tnej have ftined with ihe tdeo in the put. and ihey not (he event tome very large gam ia Western Europe seemed attainable have kept the option open)
Jamretski in Poland faces ihe mosi sorely troubled of all bast European societies; ir* vast majority of tbe people are in tarlovs states of repressed oppositinn,
Ik party it weak and fadionaliied and no longer rules: and the economy it desperately ill. JaruicUki't ticublcd tenure teems likelyndure fee some lime,because he controls the Army and there seems now to be no al termther than anarchy or Sovieihit martial law regime
The USSR will of course seek to dominate ihe course ofnu in all these countries But its ability to do so. ahori of military intervention, will be circumscribed in mostEastand Czechoslovakia arc possible partialthe autonomy <or semiaulonamyl of tht individual parties where the struggles will take place. as Andropov well knows, Sotiel assets certainly rani ia ihete parlies, but. as he should also know, Iheir depth and reliability, especially during periods of critle. it open to serous Question. So too is Moscow's ability through poll "cat action to arrest, much lest roerse. ihe course of pants bent on defiance; past attempts to unseat unruly leaders through Soviet-sponsorcd coups fin Belgrade. Tirana, ando< ciamplc. have all failed
Th* FutureEastim Europe
If ihe tombinoilon of theemergent in fac-int ike Soviet Union ond in empire In. logeiher wiih tht epeninti afforded or iheof leadeethlpi and tlittt. do not field effo'li lo reform ihe traditional intern,o not know what may and will
Srweeyn male' Venn at Work
For Ihc panyean or to. Ihr vasl diveraily of peoples and cudum lhal has evolved over ibe centu-riei In Eastern Earope hai been rccrncrging. by Tut and nans, two thrusts up. one down, bulind oforce. History, it may be said, is reasserting itself,ny predetermined or "scion-lilac'* Maraist way. butill ihu ihe Sovieis. so far. have been able to cheek bat not eliminate.
rhere isescn some (perhapsistorical consistency in the kinds ol regimes these statesput up with. Thus, beginning in Ihc south. Bulgaria's Zhivkov reignsind of no-ato*aeMe monarch, which is in the national tradition. Ceausescu in Romania resembles nothing so much as another fascist dictator, and there is certainlyfor that: Kadar in Hungary governs as abenevolenta Admiral llorthy between tbe ware Husak ins an eiccptioe. but had tbe Russians not intervened. Dubcck lor hit tocotttors) would loday rule in the manner ol past derrrocratic pecsidenic llonecker in Ibe GDR asserts the kind of sirong. personal authority which, if net exactly Hitlcrian. is familiar to observers of the German scene; and General Jaruaeliki In Poland repots Ihe Pilstidski pattern of esercising powerilitary dicta lor
The decline of Communist ideology, bothuide to behavior and policy andornnvon bond
Tk fragmentation of the Communm world and the establishment of competitive Communist eolers of thought and power.
Tie allenuaiion of tome So-ici insirumeaiiof nflueme and control
TW liaruled bsii mcanangfal lutoavarny of inaividual pariiei and regime*
The emergenceew. pan SibIw eh he. ktss
ia OWItOoh tha*drceoil
cortenl with defined living itiadards.ouoeal and eewvoerve sys-tea. atd with ibe OSS' as ihe tpoaaee aad perse trator al tha synem
Recurrent (hurray aadi* the raliag psr.es aid expecialy daring peratuh of swcottlion ia tase Soviet party aa well!
The pertasreal allure of the Was;
The tlo-iag down, ttagnatatn. or decline of ibe various rcon-vniet. ihe ttchrrolcwttat backward nets of these economies, and ihe gulf between these eooriointci and IhoM of Ihe Weti
Perhaps ihc greatest of thesei the moment it the last, ibe ttate of ihe (Mil Futopean economiet. parous in tome counitiet and nowhera fkyurithlng Recent rates of growth of uni* have been at tallows
bwiMii
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to their essentials, the broad forces at work in Easternof whichts own way and to one degree or another to dlmlnith imperialbe lasted at follows:Strong nationalism throughout ihc area.
'BialtA renuiU lilts, r- tOSi are aJUrttsaO
Itty Save bee* cttcaaBd Owe laacaly ta Ihr imiMehott-
II
The USSRource of relic! it necessary but clearly deficient, given ihe life of its own economic problems The West, greatly cceteeracd about possible dcftilts as dramatized by Poland, it noouni ofossible, per bant Ihe only, long-term
2 2
i
vaiiitca the laauataM of raare or kn*hxMcrm economic in.-Jimpolitical coo (pmcipa I) jmniM-ok and power erf* ihe party mncninesi indmm carry wiibuarantee ofthese pohuculhthai
bitx economic ciangs would Ind lo purely national loce Bkieand Snciatiuf lines of de.elemmeni and perhaps drug roe menu within ihe leadership, the Sn-vm regime ha* in iht paw been lo.il. io eiteoii n< any widespread movement low di.ticmli reform In taw cm Europe.
Uttpming economic stress io Eailern Europe com-bines wiih fmcescf scriilind political decay lo createidling poor in favorable cmcns but rich inNone of ihe tan European regimes en an* ptaitivc popular support Ratber each countsorm of popular tulfenace. uses! Ihe product efof harastmcat. job Ion. impi rsewrTseniaadihat. as prornescd by ihe generaiving standardswan amprosc Now thai proaat laiser are "anng. the publtctO lata, the regaaaea may ccarudcr plating mart and meet rriiasct aa (ear. wtuch may or any aal week aad whs* a. in aay case, teeesoraealli drpilitaiiiig or Ihey may evrniaali succumb lopres lures lor radical cccyaomic reform
Him. and ho- -ell tlaScnrariiabdrcs* these kiaotcf problems in tbe years ahead could make ihe differ rnce between tension and turmoil, between the kind ofstability now evident in most of iht empireevel of disarray and disorder comparable lo or eten greater lhan that of ibe past.
A Maarai Now Satlei Approach
Clearly, cicept in its ibdity to build up the USSR's military power, the Brcrltnts- regime deserxd no applause for its performance in recent years ll was much tetter al custpening problemi thantm. and il was preservauaniti in outlook ratherovativtastern Europehanks largely lose Stali-dt sonB has trdtd Ike melody lingersirriS| reminder of put
What isrstededaa dirftreai score andvcastaally. aa enure.y
A trwly tarw So-vti reasave. beastlyby eat aaaa. aaalg beelter poaaasa So .arsenate if. ef coarse, that man were so disposed. To PC tare,iaclading the USSR's mvnimnaiions (includingreserve bus* and poliiaral rcehtittin Easterncluding ihrenre nf national differences! would consiiatn any movement toward change But. in .it* of the tire and scope of the USSR's prot.cn.-in Fasirrn Europe, lhe failure of past Soviet leader shipteal wiih them successfully, and the general bankruptcy of cutreni Soviei policies and ideasthe area, the need for something much better -ill bt obviousew leader of Andropov's appartrii mien perhaps compel ing
A new. mutt (lenble program designed to co-reci the shortcomings of tht past might focus initially on two seemingly tootradmoiy oe-yeetiaet tbe enhancement of tsaeaual Se-rat conirol* aad the enrichrserit of East tarupusa auiatscaiyehatsc the fvrsi aaglrtaa efTort to. of Sennet daauauca
so
iia which the East bt (ret so pursue po^cart cc* ir swva devising ar-propratt so theireculiar nai-onal circurmiaiccs WHi* ideology would ai iht aatar limt be intended to serveommon bond sndery general guide lo action, its prascrrptrvc role coi Id be greatly re Used so that innova tains (especiallv economic lanovatioasi would not automatically be condemned ai heresies
The Warsaw Pact and CEMA would not be ignored in lhe protest On lhe contrary, each would be sirtniihantd. partlyeans to ensure Soviei tnsMary and economic predominance, but also in aaItcmpi to further ritionalirc command structure and various cconcrnic endeavors. The influence of lhe East Furraprani in both atganiraLont could nesenhekss be allowed to grow without necessarily endangering ihe mitt tut of tht krgest and most senior pariner
? e? f?
Lifx'Calli il the stories aboutupportcilcntivc economicn there oresome high-level Hungarians hdseprivitely said theycontemporary Hungary mirj! terse' ol tsise mndelew Soviei attprotch id Eastern Europe's ciattrnie instability. Kadars singular vMillccrscssjf od political warfare wiih the bulk ul 'be popala-tioe he long ago revised the old adage be who is nor wnfl us is against us"wh1 is is with us" his urge to replace an. cfin ntic and inefficient economic praciices andllow market forcesob. and his apparent ability to run kit own parly in pretty much his own way may all be endorsed by Andropot because lhe>hat is. they hive coniributed to the liability of Hungarian socici) and the relatively geed pr rupee is of Hungarian socialism
Evenprompted by Ardropoi. some of the othei Eail European regimes might be attractedfeatures of Ihe Hungarian ciperiment. paitlcularls b> Kadar't apparent ability to cope reasmabl) well withproblems in new ways willtout endangeringparty power or arousing public opposition in lhe
nilaSnatii su there ire eiiliciiin* iis tn Lrtijna'mrrtr rUsul
8ui there would be no real reed forrogram of this character so long as il da) net threatenet out of hied and so long as Moscow Itself dad not provoke arguments over Iht purity of ideology ami fidelity to the "socialitlndeed, assuming lhal lhe panics osncerned retained uliimaic decisionmaking authority over national life and raised no direct challenges lo the USSR's influence over Iheir foreign policies. Sovltt interests coutd be nell served by Hungarian-siyle eipenments thai promised to alleviate both economic distress and political better prosperous and stable client states lhan poor, volatile protectorates
*ji mil
am law dimmtU in oroauiancts. ilia a
aid ttMlurnttiaBlbecnmiUracciaim and. b> lit nrv iOa. awn litery xiUiiOitt ill taporl uidil 'runatfaroisr iiinrroiet in uUnatd fur ustirrrtti irornait irwiNes Miirr tsin the outer East Eiraca uniiti'daiiiili hah" Itlig. aiMiSiruKkilnltccmanK tunriir. luia jtuuund tti
Kadu nilne na> hi rairaii from m
Rsei" Ibe liat win.
ll does mili iiumat contain then rhiih*t) loui. ta prMice. no* lhan aSanait aad Law Unrsnv auuldtsptctt af aay aaeh aewltolugacallstwrtavKraiicaili dr*raa*a* raaiaaull) risk. rut itcacanaca'b tasotrtaia Aaaaanwaghtaa tiaxrirneeicn. even ifreets light byre hktly la fiad ih* gsangt should iin refornw be acueattt aadraseeahlyhrteaaehof ihr Last Eurcpenn malane nationalisma*a* frmraiua >cnuia bene- Ii the saiface. readymeu* ai ihe first sign thaii he regime wai faltering
Tht
With orew aring th* lines described above, tht Sovietsn, sndropov regime or Is Successors -will slill have Ihe nption ol pursuing Khruthcltev's conceptumrruantullh of oountries ta which, ideally, tha USSR wuuld be the first-airoag equals leader olharninmcius nstoci.ition of Ukt-iBindcd "tociaiisi" state* Though (he termCc*nm<ui*>taltri of Nations is no looter ated and was ne>*tde'ined. ihe idea is stillnd hascant ways beta (xprcised inhe Scwatu' eo**hiaa*at leg miratna of "srparaar road* toaad* tht mad-I'M*oaat* ih* oat)r*nfal Sonetna Ywgo-slans aartag the saaat petted. Tea ass aa efrxi offered rtaoed antmbarshapoviet eaavp recur-si-med alaag cort*ananna*lib laws Cxa th*echcaaC-ahi.casld be aasd to eonfarmhe commonwealthhe sense lhalini So.Fan (uMpran undo Us king against somtthinf ciitnucdommon llireul
In operation thr concrptocliinal twerd; ilorm of indipriidtnit for lhe East Ea'optaa siaies bat at the same time tanriloai dircci tremrnoaacallh) Inierfcienc* in their alfnirs when "socialism" is said lo be threatened Am for the
? ? 2 1
(otil^cm
ihe conceptffered more form lhan substance: Khrushchev, in (act. probably seeking in ihc main lo provide appropriate ideological clolhuc lot Soviet policy as it had actually evolved in the pen-Stalin years.
All ihe same (he nniinn of independence cum core-vpontibility dees offer ihe Easi European regime* in alternative, on ihe One hand.he perpetuation ol Iheir subordinate status and. on Ihe Other. lOScccssioi from the Woe Among other things, il promore meaningful form or partnership status to the Bloc stales: thaieal voice in commonwealth affair* and. ia effect aideans lo participate in ihe exercise of Soviet hegemony
artnership might appealasi Fajropcan Communists who seek moce autonomy but whofear lhal their awn parties could not survive without sirong lies io ihe USSR and ihe Blochole The arrangement, however, would do link to appease those in the Easi European elites who are nationalists and who favor complete sovereignly and/ignificant liberaon of their own political-economic systems. Nor. for the tame reasons, would il be likely to case popular discontent significantly
The Soviet leaders would also have qualm* about granting the Eastarger voice in Bloc and. ai least indirectly. Soviet affairs. How effectiveuitiraaironal Bloc board of directors be? Would each member be granted Ihc right of "taxis inow could serious disagreements amcog members and even rau hist ale alignments be prevent-ed* And. finally, for Moscow, the ultimate outs ton is* If the empire ii ultimately transformed intoresembling an alliance, how could ihe Soviets maintain ihe sirong degree of dominance they believe vital lo their own inween*1
A Radical Alternative
Bui whatever iheir interim approach, ibe Soviets mil find ihe solutionheir prot+eiris with iheof hegemony in Fanern Europe on the day they cease to cierclie ii Although there are no signs thai the Soviet leadership under Andropov entertains any thoughts or surrendering or severely cuilailing lhal hegemony,ourse of action, while doubtful, is conceivable in the post-Andropov futureumber of arguments can be made for Ii:
Sooner or later il may occur loontoi anoihcr Sovieloneenturesome new pecgram with which to advance his own career that there it no necessary heresy inlear-cui liberal change in Soviet policy toward Easternignificant diminution of Soviet dominance; an accompanying increase in Soviet tolerance of diverse routes toelaxation of the standards thai define Ihe achieve' mem of lhat eialted tiatus
Though ideologyommitmentn ever-espanding "socialisthere is nothing in ihe ctolviag body of Maiaist-Lcnintsl thought thatthai the USSR must maintain light conirol of Eastern Europe. The Bccihncv Doctrine, quafralhc lhan asationale for past Soviet invasionsretext for futureoes not provide theoretical justification for Soviel over-lordship. Nor. any longer, does Ike concept or "proletarianhich Is in any caseloganain himself,inbout the untoa of nations in Ihe USSR, insisted {though no doubt disingenuously) onciuiel> voluntary convene aadnion which tftfludei any cot'floa of one eat-on bynd the implications of relevant ideologicalsuch as the ultimate disappearance ofboundaries, scarcelyationale or need foe Soviel hegemony
Deviations from Soviel foreign policies, to apparent in Romanian positions, do noi necessarily harm the USSR, except insofar as Moscow insists thai eon-listerf. and total unity it essentialhe cause Even Yugoslav foreign policy, when noi addressed io Bloc problems, ftequenily eoirsridert, or at least doe* noi conflict, with Souier views
" In. ihere cutis rv taml ihoei of issooaliin ii ihr
amur>si <rsatm .roManas Kipaiiionitaii Is. ai oar tBDiivalowoiiaal frirncwati |Sc-ic< inJClinml.lileulitorii. tnvenr-ed.an f. Trisaa. -The wirtt*
sTrlska..t.
byTnska..
.14
? t? 2
Complete internatosal ideoleginl harmony, white desirable nttd not tarrune requirement, ihe legitimacyty rak caa be maintainedi* icrot lev. even *tmAnd Maacow't attentat* em the universal vaialiiy of "ion doctrinalhaa ll) en* wcakcd. ill raodactdha nwieeueni.ed to tbe creation of mil cxatart ofsought
The USSR't naiannil ictleiteem not Id nf doabl be damigedthdiaaal Itom ii> Wrst:rn nvarchei.t appeared to be foicecL On ihe oihe* hand, iti tntt*national pruiige. especially in Western Europe, would mrely be enhanced-
The USSR'* presence In Eastern Europe ii imperial in nature berautc il reaia alilmaiely on force Ckaily. Ihe Soviet leaden wouldess Duntensonse and mire effective arranicment. per-fcapialong Ihe common weal tb lino dacintcd atsove-
Bal. ifh in raiiNnhthis
naturerary voluntary and thatff Ihey ma, ftnaaTy rtahae that hkieental preee-dcact rt against ihcaa. ih* aaai bet of eetakcetaiiomImenter ad laao la iheery small (cab Swaaertiad.nedtaly, and prrbapt Germany come lo mirdl and Ibehich in that* few cateiree amalgamation limply ne not proem in the case of tbe USSR and Hamm Europeecognition of thit verity, if ii comes, would of courts imply the need for change, either lhe attempted rettoraiion nf tetneihing akin to Stalinist terror or. conversely, an hcatesi iry for tomciting. perhapt the Finlandiiatin* of Eaitarn Europe
w'naiwuiri lor hmn ramaiw-i'inaniaa ui firw taaraf aa-aaaidaaiaaaanaair itwtawVary metitaae tin mat manewuiats aT laiao. a aia-aarealiuaiai nieaad naan tda iknafi itt ratm ara'rwaw n'oriwaii imirnthtaaair pmi iumini mlaaam aad iniwr-ismrihn i| alwSataa. aadml latitlimui.haanaha rii#fta*ue ta.^ili .hi nunif ibm rtru mm*awniainn 1'iniosjiiiirtli"hi* iwlnvi ihirut
wliil* laesc ar|um*ttt may. ia theonje>tarilcavr knradical chance in Soviet percep loan, they are of coarse tkeereteal in origin aad may be. nvrnentabry. ta general ia aatare lhal they defyippliciiian Evee ihrarU aa* or aad bareirtrr come lo ponder similar propositions and pmrrirem. any urge he might feel io leek radical toOuiicen will encoumei strong contrary pret*ares anting from, inter aha. the inertia of ibe tytltm. ihe resistance ef interest groups, and tbe risks of change
ight prove to be ihe mightkti of these. The old wiyi of doing th-ngsowerful appeal to party, tiaae. aad anburyaa Kbrataehtr* hekicdb discoveredaprctaUy nearrraatal change, conjure* ap laaage* of cowtro-eersy usccrti.its. da-get. ird. not kast. career wreckage
Thee* are. in fact, influential iniereti gioup* in Soviet sccMly thai would seek lo block aay proposed gram of greater sovereignly io Eastern Europe. The military.
fur one. would foresee andoncern. In ntof Sontt aimed forces from Finer-and that damage to Soviet secure, the abandon
meat of ill coalrok over armies ri had helped io
creak, lad the ditsetuiion of an ar.ia act struthe warsawti aoarrahed ted dormaaird fratn bath Aho-catd Be CEMA bureaucrats, uarhert ia'idtentral Commit lee arpa'alihiki ind ilfcilcgius manageri of many eiport indatlras (aha considerind of captiveanagers of armaincntt factories. ofTictn of Ihe KGB with lies lotaitlliit services, and lilted. Soviet (and Russian) (ingmso al large
Any iiitnuiM.il lootening of Soritt authority in East-am Eurec* would ilso incur maior risk* Bloc leaden might try toreat ofauionomy into ar tart ma tknvenn af the poputttioather kVax owniry aaght lake advantage of aay rrtmtic* of OOaneMK CoatroH lo* mu> and active eauaatitiea to the regime, worker* might be encouraged by economic and admmltlratiHr refotm lo
2 3 1
ieek iclfmanagcmcni iml freedom (torn parly eon-
IfOli:.I a/n Fiil. hs'f
happened,e past
Thr bsggesl ink fur ihr Sensed Ihui couldthey would surely bcaalfcofihii that fundamental tMnia in ihe relaiianihip decreed by ihc USSR lUeh* enighi create pnnaHi ihot*.mi*oilii> in Eastern Uropr and. in the face of it. relative impotence in ihc USSR hey "ere -to avovd In truth, voialik Eastern tarti* even freed of Soviet dominance weald nor sperma-en to taubaMy
OdKl hjwificsai corisaStrst tort migbi alio catnet,-zik or etrtci eay Soviet urgehi ft puttitraas. Foreign ohjetsjves, is particular the USSR's desirei panel its iafliicnce aad ultimato eitend ns hegemony into Wctitra Europe, migbl decree the need for ihe praterviiasn of in duminanttpringbcard" Fatiern Europe So loo might Ihe USSR's longstanding comern over ihe Germanand iu fear lhal ihti might one day be resolved without Sossei parttocaiioainnetlo Sovietwomlr tundllloni will afleci
Soviet calculaiioni.oubles in Cast European ecoeomiai mighi pull the Sovteis in rypceisite directicaiie facio loosenirsg ofssiing tdnfi rxcaaiunad by Ikeeluctance or taabitiiy la erase* neerie- aiintaecc (nc tospMUasal or toward tag bur coe trees, rnanptcd by ihe dewtar-as of austerity and adversity and. perhaps,aagering hope ihai ihe East Eiateiean rrpaasnin will somehow recoverealth and eatec moreel oasct for the USSR.
The irgtjrtcitueliberate and sigmfieani kicwn ieg of Soviel lies to feaitern Europe are not. in fact, persuasive Hrtlory doe* not recoid many instances ofvoluntary surrender of imperial powerin this lenlury. ihc Britishench,umple, did dm spoauncoutiy and alltaitlkrally decree freedom for iheir empires: rather they were viciims of iheir own postwaral homr and of acceMiaiing press,res and costs abruad
Much more likely lhan ns tn1. sell generated movementreakup af the Soviet empire is Eastern fur ope would Weave permitted byancet in Mcacow (thaihange in ibe character and perspectives of ihc leadership anilogout, tay. to that in Par.idcGialle'i coming to powerBj and forced by ihe national aspiraiiaan and coaries off the bat burtypegns ibemsvtlvei linperfectly analogous to the 'evoluiaon at Algeriahe late itMk and early IMOil
TV lethal OtWMisviei Ma.ru? Itrttrvf sstiaa
Whether tbe Soviets will iMcewe issahurily aa ease er another East European crisis a. ahianatety. Ihe esses lia!te*iica thai cannot be an acred in abuuu term* Pen iwerven trims have drmonslrsied ihe Kremlin'sett toarily bul have alto revealed substantial reluctance to do so and aopa'ant ditagrecment amcew Ihe leaders en thai acore at well Chraily, at waa apparent ia PoUnd in6gl.lhe Snviei leaders are prepared to run consideiabU risks in order lo atotd mlliiaiy latarvenliun They are aware thai invasion and occupation create their own
Ir.ident. aside fiom effam on wartd (and internaliun-
al Communist)opinion they harm wciseeets for ece-nomtc growth, damage pceailir morale, and endanger the efficacy of the civil contract in general in the courtry concerned Thraa ii lha value of the entity jceserved diminished by tbe raeaat of preiervaitoR
Thereody of Wcatcra ikeasgkt thai betteve*aaal decssatta by Moscow io at* arrttcd force ioa Eaaliri Ear-ape restsoa the Sc-ietteat the isaent al character of lhalthan on their calculation of the odd" that the isirutaon of ibew feeees would enco-ame-oetermined. orgaaiiad rauiaatc from indue corn military fortes and miliiiaIi it argued thau if the Soviets ccetchide lhat they "ill have to fightarge scale, they will not invade
See npcealyueslvrtrr jVo'l.tOlO) fatti "uses illsleviea at tiwiapiiait In s' and
eatceta ranatytravimalnit. ind Ian Eiangeai
Ii aha waw in i
an aunii <Mi Sect armed loror* wouldfierce lid otnuNiwat ISuch estimate m) indeed hive aciDuritrd 'or Stahn't sowiewrat snrpritiri failure in uci null-laiily i* iIk tasc8 and ec-ulbut-ed lo Brezhnev's reluctance to madeMail circumstances nr thusSoviets actually invaded only io ihoic intuncel when massive opposition scentedi Cicchcnlovukia in IfftSi. and they del not Invade wben interned likely la* inui Ihe conicnlton (bat lhe prospect of battle it ihtfactor foi lhe Sovieli certainly can nit be proved Olhcr consideration* nay havearger role could ibe problem be ituxd by meam other lhan military, at ii -aa twice in Poind: or would ihe probleicricus threat to Communis rale in ihe country coneeraed or to Soviet ehyrninaae* of Ik* Bloc aia -bote, aitbe Remaaian challenge dal not
anyeathaniaasiougb hat louard Eastern Euros* in ptatxular. toe improvement of Easltela ton* inei gcowih o* aulonamy in several Fail European capitals aril, ofspaadtd contacti bet-ten Eastern and VVeii ern callurr* and economic* Some taat Luroprani seemed to feel that in the long run dcleele -ould permit their countries to move Iprrhir* iageiher uiih *iime West European slate*)towarda kind of non-alignment, and lo this end they urged the dissolulion ofATO and IhePad
At the same lime, relative tranquillity md pmspcrity tn Pattern Europe made ike job of ihe Soviets in the area easier politically and less burdensomeAwareossible drift toward Westerncacow continued to insist on me need for continuing ideological coefbei and steppedeffort* to use CEMA to itrengihcn its ova hold on tail Furnpean i
ibe tutoiial aaeaion leesaint -si| they or utaVtf ihr* caaewi Be answeredat eaa at lostairly firm estaaatc.aertainly the saate aaai Easl Earoptarii -osiM -jte yes1TVa*de4 thaithe tanumouTtihr lotsax state
Tht VVay af th* Wmi
I he influence of tht West un the course of Eastern Euiopehe character of Soviet-Eatl Europeait rclaliom is not easily quantified. Some tpecfifactions have had an enoimout impact on Laiitrn Earopc-ihe Marshall Plan, iht formation of NATO, tht creation of ihe Fcderil Republic of Germany-but these hate alrnosi always been addresaed in tht first instance to other areas and other problems Ipottsvainhe Sov.fl Ihrtal to Europe, the continued division efo be tare, some major Western polices have been iptcifi-cally directed toward Eastern Europt mple, support of VugeaUwia-bur rarely so. aad the tickearintiar-ce. coectrmng Huagary* snmeunses hjs lee-ned as
ll it nt Ih* area of econoox rektiioat that Ih* West ncnau Urges: direct rote arsdhe greatest leverage. Bat Carres* Western financialaad *acptic*rn ia the face of nurgtenrag Eauern ateaaaeaac raauitca* wall CMCuarrttriu* rrtai-ata far soant tear* to ctra* West Ea>opean nitioniny event char, of seeking to use economic mean* fc-pnliliCBl purpose* (unless Ibrst purposes arc rathrt giand, abstract, and 'ernotei
The growth of independence in Eatirin Europe might in th* long ran be spurredcsumpiion of detente and Western economic support, especially if Iht West conditioned the maintenance of ils good will and aid on Ihe charaeier of Soviei policies there Hut there .an be no guarantee of Ihis. Certainly prcnperiiy alont does noiore Independent or enlightened approach by any particular East European regime, as East Germany hat demonsiraied for quilt some lime.
It it alao possible lhal economic difficulties could IgntJoviei hegemony Popubr prtssu'ts arlaiag initially fromdiSCCMent eir hraad-tn into aa array ofdrrrwriiiranoa.
affected fcister-Becauw it^eer an Ea*ope at gem
turoe* ia different aay* Iran hr reuraini at Stwitl
sovereignty, ind solocal regimes van be persuaded to comply Bul if such demands and such compliance gu too far loo fail, ihc Soviets aic likely lo interfere and try loeverse course
The Wen's most influential role in Ibe area ispassive. Its mere ciistcncc offers an attractive political economic, and cultural beacon to ihe peoples of Eastern Europe and an alternative scarce of ideas and support for ihc regimes. These are nee, to be sure, ray dramatic means of suasion, bul they help hopeurvive,s, ultimately, hope that "ill provide much o' ihe fuel for the nex great rnose toward Change and freedom is Eastern Europe.
Elastic Deformation
Precisely where and whenote might take place is noi an easy calculation- Tbe inclination of Ihe Poles and Hungarians lo make trouble for iheir own iff.met and for iheir Soviet oserlords should not have come as any greal shock to observers familiar will iheir history and naiiceaal character. On the other hand, ihe stillingncts of iheheir systemevolutionary way and ol the
Roman-ins toaspr.n[
giien ihe generally acciuaetcent traditions of ihe Ciechsand Ihe seedily opportunistic nature of most Romanian governments
A lesson nf the recent past may be Ihll. while It is not possible to single out the prime candidates much in advance, off of ihe Easi European slates of the Soviet Bloc are potentially disruptive. Indeed, as has been said of contemporary Poland, the struct ores of conirol are In place throughout the area, "bul just barelyat we teerumbling facadecaffold aroundine times since the end of tbe war, facade and scaffold have threatened lo fall or been lorn down, an average of once every four years or so.
Thus the estimate: over the course of ihe nesi decadewiD be further outbreaks of serious political strife in Eastern Fnrcpe, and they will be directed at leaci in pan and iraplKitly against ihe Soviet Lmon At ihe tame lime if such strife teems to itopttrdiie Communist power and/or Scyrict hegemony. Moscowosi certainly intervene with military force, if necessary
ecade.loracatta becorre muchacial tun through force of rtvurrcnt imcerial proeMenas lhat have deep political, economic, and social roots carina be endietilyn Motcow: iiorm of"socialist"als. internal nail presitae- esoooanac re sources, and even. pcrtSapa.isnegligihae Radteal chatges is Ihc ways the Sov-.cn sustain their eiwjare. tbe local regimes peescivc ihesr power, and these regimes ccduet their cexascotrc alfaart <lo not *oa> ai a>ul irate, txemion uruggrrt potmcal trues, and eccetomic advcriily rray ahet Ihe ipeel He forhange, cvea in Ihc Kreanlat Maior disrupters and manifcs-tatiiras of huh le-eI ditcord aiibxi the icomparable, for ctaaipieose which foikiwed Stalin's dcnih root]hehus, whileualified pred>ciion of fundamrnialcniei policies loward Lasiern Europe would ceitunly beots seem rratnnablelargely on Ihe basis of ihe preceding rtumaic ih.it Eaaitm Europe willourer ofthe ilurwei of1 probably grow
Many tludrnia of iht aiea, in fact, forisaa ma tor charges in Fatter- Fueoprhe Sovirt positron there over Ihc neti few dec idea, and moat seem to be ai Hail measrraieli oprimisiic about Ihc nature of those change* Tta*/btgmrw Btrcaintki. focusing on the erosion of idcoogy and the growing feeling amongommumsi titet thai ihc Sewset-ektaunaied BaOc brakes lha "ifoitseslrc fialfillmcnt of their socialaggCstt lhat Ibe ampin and Comma rraa dacusttrtavpaht sar*ve in form butia s* balance "
*lawumiuu mr*mlwy Wi" aiailrrim tm the taaa UaweawBtgianuam al nl ilaia.nl la-aw. ih*aeriii tan*at awaaraaal IWiaaat ih
. XXXI. lu,
Aagiat ivirn -bini.nsti.tm eh.a* Ill-Ill
c nnctfrnlial
Friii Ermanh, ciling the corrosive effect* on Soviet hegemony ol Eatl European nationalism. SOtvoeco-ncmic rnodrratiaiios, and liberalism, believe* lhaletime differem from that ofughl be attracted by ihe emrmnuruiiesore assertive and flexible policy" but ihai if ih* docs not help, "one may.. bore ihat the development of ihe Soviei stale and society opens the alternative of sysiemsce adds Ihii if Ihe Sovici system simply calcines.an alternative system could arise inliberal principles could dominate Soviet domestic and internationalhile trends in this direction "are not inevitable or evenombi-nation of good fortune and good (Western] statesman ship might someday bring [the USSR) to be ruled by politicians who are not. by instinct or ideology, imperialists**"
. Brown,uccession crisis or series of crises in lhe USSR, writes ihai the future of Soviei hegemony is very uncertain. Soviet authority inEurope, be argues, might decline; factionalism in several leaderships might become more intense and open: some leaders might orient their policies along more national lines; grouping* of East European states mighi form, pressure for seeking closerwith ihe West would likely grow; and so on."
A ihcoeetioan and mcthcdologiu. political scientistriski. adds his ownrspeciive of Ihe Bloc;
With obsolete organizational itmctucr and without an association theory upona modem, rational organtiaiion could be buill. the communist lyttem organisers at doomed to patchlng-up. trmpoHiitf. cad holdinghich tn their sum total, arc inadequate even for synrm maintenance, lei alone for the lociafui development and iftlrmof tht communist party nates. Politically itegnoting and economically Inoc'hi tht tytttm becomesneroblr lo odvtttettti at home and abroad."
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Finally and most boldly. Harry Sehwatli nimpl) forecasts lhe end of tmp'e
{The East European/emain spiritually uneonauered and poliiltally tn-dttnttbh: The West bat consiitmtly tended to underestimate lhe apportunititt ofrrnyrarts for independentand ihrir wtllugntsi lo scire ihoie opportunities There will be more Titos. Nttyt.eargty-Dt)i. and Dub-cehsin Eastern Europe. Thesysiiet breeds then automatically, lormoreover, the Eastern Europeans acne seen coneuerors come and go. tt is not unllkeb ihai lhe Russians will also return home one day"
Wtai these students of the area scran to be suggesting or assumingrocess of deed nee USSR's political, economic, and ideological ability lo hold on to its empireimultaneous peoeeas ofwiibin thai empiremighi reduce Moscow'sto preserve ill posiinn there militarily in Ihe face of rising, perhapuccekiaung. costs
Thus, perhaps Eastern Europe will one day in this century be seen In hindsight as having sufferedemporaryhape, pi educed by an outside agent oferocess known lo physicist* a* an elastic ceforirtation. If so. the area willeturnedur ope. where, as lhe Easi Europeans themselves know best of all, ii truly belongs.
- KarriArSatvl SVn*.
yori.itmio. toe.
Original document.
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