SOVIET SOCIETY IN THE 1980S: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (SOV 82-10206X)

Created: 12/1/1982

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CM HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM KLBSEfS SANITIZED 9

Soviet Society in: Problems and Prospects

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Soticl Society in: Rrobletm and Prospecis

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Western observers and Soviet officialsthat ihc Soviet Union nowide array of social, economic, and politicaleneral social malaise, clhnic tensions, consumer frustrations, and political dissent. Precisely how these internal problems will ultimately challenge and affect the retime, however, is open lo debate anduncertainty. Some observers believe lhat ihc regime will have little trouble coping with the negative mood among ihc populace. Others believe thai economic mismanagement will aggravate internal problems and ultimately erode Ihc regime's credibility, increasing the long-termfor fundamental political change.

lhe ultimate prognosis, ihese problems willhallenge for ihc new Soviei leadership. The Politburo's approach probably will be based on its assessment of thc threat posed and the degree to which these issues can be addressee! by policy shifts. Three broad categories ofquality of life, ethnic tensions, andsurveyed in this paper. Of these, popular discontenterceived do-llnes In the quality of life represents, in our judgment, the most serious and immediate challenge for

continue to improve. Popular dissatisfaction and cynicism seem to be growing. This popular moodegative impact on economic productive iy ant] could gradually undermine (he regime's: credibility. Such diseonient has already led to some isolated strikes and demonstrations, developments that immediately gel thc leadership's attention. Olher manifcstaiions ofcorruption, andevident as well but pose no direct challenge lo the regime. Such ills, nonetheless,etrimental effect on Soviet economic goals, arc harmful to the social climate in general, and in turn are made worse by ihe slow rate of economic growth

Ethnicin cultural, demographic, and economicas well asatent bul poicniially serious vulnerability. Currently, there is no widespread,disruptive protest or dissent among the Soviet nationalities. The regime'sto national minorities some linguistic,Cultural, and administrative autonomy; raising the standard of living: expanding the educational base: and using overwhelming police power whenbeen largely successful so far. Although ihe potential for political unrest and sporadic violence in the Baltic republics remains

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high- of economic, demographic, and culturalaltic concerns have lilllc impact elsewhere in lhe USSR nnd can be suppressed if necessfliy. wjih more lime (perhapsowever, similar problems could become much more consequential in Muslim Ccnlral Asia, requiring Ihc regime lo manage this problem more adroitly.

Finally, ihc range of political, religious, and cultural discontent ihaiexpressed in lhe Soviet dissideni movement docs not.resent. Kriot>sl> challenge ihemlincal control, but thc regime deals with ii is if it does. Soviet dissidents cause concern because they have an inter national audience and then activities embarrass lhe regime Moreover, ihc leader -ship remains ps>chr>logieally insecure and is unwilling to allow any him of challenge io us authority, apparently because it fears such dissidents could appealider audience by articulating more widely held discontent over food shortages and the like. For these reasons, thc regime, particularly of laic, his used widespread arrcsls and imprisonment of dissideni leaders, confinement in psychiatric hospitals, and exile to crush lhe movement. Thc movement, however, is nol likely io die ond in Ihe long run could grow if it can capitalize on incicasing discontent, cynicism, and alienation among the populace.

. slowdown in economic growth since Ihet the underlying problem ihai lies all these issues together and makes them potentially more troublesome for ihc regime Unless this trend is reversed, increasing alienation and cynicism, cjrjeeaally among young people are likely: and oiheioget worse The regime, to be suic. has impressive resources for (tying to deal wilh particular economicin its centralized control over prioetiies and resources,eturn to the more favorable economic conditions ofnd, when there were substantial improvements in the standard of living, highly unlikely. Thc pervasive police powershe Politburo's disposal, when coupled with thc Soviet populace's iradiiional passivity toward deprivation and respect lorshould, however, continue lo provide lhe regime with lhe ncccstaiy strength to con in in and suppress open dissent.

Difficult decisions regardingocs "ion and new management approaches, nesertheless. will probably bc needed lo deal with ihc Poiilbu-i etooomK prcsWerns and lo reverse ibc malarsc lhal has set in How ihc new leadership will handle these issues over the Long run is uncertain. Us policy opiumsrom undertaking major "reforms" and reallocating resources away from defense lo gtealer reliance nn administrativeand repression. Some ml* of policies involving both direci<gn< might bc Mtcmpied. No solutions it ii likely io alicmpl. however, offer any certain cure fur its growih problem and the malaise related to it. This, situation will likely require the leaders.hip lo fill back even rrsorc on traditional orihodos methods io ccmiiol dissent and luppeess challengess aulbority *htle com inning effortsvoid an overall declinequality of life" lhat has become Ihc regime'sbasil for legitimacy

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Contents

Key Judgment

The So>>ei Regimethc Quality of

Lcadcrltuf

Thc Hard

The Regimessi She

Social

ThfO-dealof Daily

C'ime and

Voftih

Sonet Health

The Family and the Rede of

The Nationality1

Soureet of

Slf

l>mc*raphk

Centraliiatton Veisut Decent ra I

Problcmton the

Thc Baltic

The

Central

Ostent in the Semei

Religious

Intellectual

Thc

Reaction ami

Top of ihe

roblem un the

Political Dtsseai: Suppressed for

Cctrurtg With Problcmi PretrniFuturefor US Pidicy

observer* have reported more on the array oi Sovici social, economic, and

political ills in recent years than before. Intelligence reporting in recent months has also indicated heightened concern over internal problems within both ihe Soviet establishment and Ihc populace. Jun ho* serious these problems will become-and how sueecwfully the Soviet leaders will deal withan area of ereat uncertainly The Sovici regime Still possesses great inner strength, but the challenges arc clearly growing

This overview paperide range of internal problems in theconsumer frustrations, alcoholism, ethnic tensions, dissidencc. toew Treatment of many ol Ihcsc issues is necessarily brief, but thc study, nonetheless,etter bant fot assessing thc Soviet Union's internal strengths and weaknesses in the years ahead This study will be followed by papers lhal ciaminc some of the USSR's more pressingsufficiently covered inor open sourcegreater depth

Soviet Society in: Problems and Prospects

Sovkl Retime und <to Quality ot Life Oiscontcai over ack-iiac ia the Qualiti of life in ibe USSR rcpretenit ihe most immediate and important challenge foi lhcleadership. Undo Khrushchev innd under Brezhnev wniil ihcere increased, more consumer goods were made available, lhc diet was enriched, and services wcie improved. These retain iliifiuli'.zd pop ulsr desireselter life but did noi complciely satisfy ihem As ibe rale ofrowih has declinedhe retime hit had to cope with unfulfilled rising eipecialiont. The new leadership is already hiving lo make some hard ecc-ion* choicesdetente tpeadirg. invcsimeni. and con tump lion The new post-Brezhnev leadership will also haie to decide lhc politically difficult issue of when to place ihcu irrvcsirrten: rubles: in Ccalril Asia, wheie most of the growth ia laboe force will occur in ihe wcttcrn USSR, where ihe industrial plants already eiisi; or in Siberia, where thc exploitation of natural resources iwaits the accessary industrialrt

The seciion below surveys what is perhaps Ihe most important rJcarttaiic issue confronting ihe leadership, the Monorny SubseQcent tections discuss thc range of oihri issues aiiociated wiih ihe quality of Soviet life

Theeadership Oilrmma

The pnrr.ary source of economic growthhe Soviet Union haj been mcreasco amounts of productive resources (laboe and capital) raiher than increased efficiency of iheir use However, additions lotht labor force have thronh and are projected tohcr duringhis hot occurred as access to necessary raw materials and energy supplies hat become mote riperisive Moreover. Soviet agtteuhwicrag on the enure economy, wiih four

ow, and ihe high cosi of Sovietprograms siphons off needed men. material and funds fiom other economic protects, i

TV Hard Oie-icf*

The Soviet Union now faces tome difficult economic decitronihe late Breihncv e'a. invesimew growth apparently was sacrificed lo maintain modest growth in consumption and tubtisniial growth in military spending Continuing Ihii course will bc harmful to ihe economy, but changing pi tonnes poses problems as well Under present circumstances.catting con. sumption growth pfobably would noi solve Soviet economic problem! although additional funds mighl be freed for investment and defense. Without positiveowever, worker morale could plunge even farther, and growih ia labor paoduciiviiy could tiag-naieoon in both ts needed

Thc regime also rccogntr.es that "social factors" arc an underlying cause of lagging productivity growih. Cheating bribery, black .market activity, and profit-eenng permeate Soviet society According to Western researchers, alcoholism, Russia! hereditary plague, has apparently risen in theears of Brerhnev's icadcrship at have the disordert associated wiihcrime, firmly breakup, increased adult male and infant mortality, absenteeism, inefficiency in the work place, and industrial accidents Ihe leadership it attempting to combat the range of social ills, but the problem! arc mostly intractable

The Regime's Course Steady as She Goes With Ihe phenomenon of widespread disaffection in Poland fresh ia their miods.eaders arc slill inclinedppease Ihe be league led conmrrvcr The Quality o( ihe diet remains the key element in this approach and is (he standard by which ihc Sovid

populace fudge* ut well-being The' tax il various strategics lo I'm.1 (odd short aget munagcablc Ai the Noverribei IMI plcnuii Bee/hnev (Icm-'ilied (he leod supplyihc central economic and political feoblcm of ihc current Year Plan. The food program announced ai lhe? plenum hopesranslate higher farm ipcrtding into rnore food on Soviei tables. Impon of foodl continue torge rot* atTn ensure lhal (ond shortage! do not piecipilalc incident! ol worker unrcti. the leadership it channeling more food directlyBduurtal rnierpritct. bui ihit ha> lefi food tuppltct ia retail outlet! Strained

The Soviei propaganda apparatus it pointing to these mcaturct at proof of ilt continuing commitment to the consumer. To courier the rcobtcarts of worker pmdoe tiv.iy. the uridcrlfing^social malaise lhal support il. and labor discipline. Ihc parly may retori to more traditional palliatives The sdeoloeseal campaign of last year, which attacked comarneriti attitudes aad the sole reliance on material incentives io incicate prod may be stepped up. Tough measure* io iacicasc discipline and decrease labor abseniecrtm

and turnover may eventually be put forward ai well Ihe leadership hat heretofore lacVed lhe political will

or contensus. on the other hand, to pursue more major

economic reforms or policy innovations that might

help resolve itt dilemma

Social Ditconteai

he Soviet pteis indicate lhat the Soviet authorities ate clearly concerned about the forcct ofec-lien in ihcir nation, not only because ihey impact advcitclyuter pioductivily bul alto because they tend to weaken the social fabric lhe crime and hooiigir.itm ihai appear lo bethe soarone raiet. and thc appaienilcohol consumption suggest therealpable seme of life going stale and soar for many in the Soviet

i rroxr.I

- H> in the USSR, there teems to he an increased readintta tu Cheat,lack marheiHag. and peddle snftu-enre. and ideological coontenneatures a"

The situation does nol immediately ihieaicn ihc 'Cgune's stability, bul over ibe lung run ii could uaakravae ibc leaders kgnsmacy.

Th* Ordeal ol Dally Life

Soviet published staitttics donoasirate lhat striking material progress hat been achieved in the USSRi. bul they do nol begin to convey theof daily life The seemingly endless In! of sea io lies, thc long shopping lines, lhe bewilderingof regulations and bureaucratic requirements and lhe indignities endured in even routine aeli*tlics add to tbe typacil Soviet otvrca't dad) physical aad menial burdens Although thc regime ton nam It launches campaigns io improve tciviee and eliminate thrjriages. the Icaderthip it almost po-erics, toibe daily grind lea awl of tit people

"Hetto* S'."in The thoprang rat

race, especially the Queues, tymbotifci the Soviet cm/en's medicamentoroviet etarcipondcAi for Liir'aiu'tayn Oa:em look off from Moscow for Kraiaodar. the capitalesort area on Ihe Slack Sea He deliberately left behind all the usual pc-'SC.ia! items .soap, rator. cologne, toothbrush thai-sag cicaan. aad so forthi to investigate reports thai such Htim were unavailable in Krasnodar iloret The correspondent tyttemaiicifly visited every tiorc in Krasnodar ia anesi IO buy ih* nuclei He managed io get only the lati package nl raroi blades in one storehild's tcotliueuth ai another (ihc toothbrush broke ih* followingowever, the CC*respondeat later reporicd finding mmt of thc items he desired on the black market .

There at numerous anecdotal reportsimilar nature fromC JoMeiveu. foreign correspond call Jand rcttdcnit of the Soviei Union asamples serve to illutirai* the general mi nation

-lhal he waned four

hoan ioglc copy lasvltiptc cornet are prohibited)ew pagesenin Ltbrar* relercace book

P"

filern cotrespoodcnl in Motco* reported ihn he could notook required by hi* child', when, hi City UOTCl. tJaCsvt foe turn aad Hi- daughter. em cnameHrare pan far bo

A Mim.ii resident noted that consumers had to "leterve" toilet tissue in iiorcs by filling out posl-cntd nrdct forms. Anoiher tea:lent said Ibul even the supply of the pcatcardi tinepleted

l.eabjiinie Mom- rtstrJcrrts reneeicd in thethat it took uiine toat.ou'tail ticket (to Ihe Black Sea retort steak Ill dayi lotganizcd groups take turns in lincl ft*ehtnee ioew book of poeiiy. and two or thrrr ycarilaceanatorium. It can accordingestern scholar, ukc two toean toity apanment

Uneaeat (lii.rv According ton in Moscow. Soviet citizensoreover, seem incieas-ip-sly aware thai the buidcn it not sharederception thai exacerbates the normal fruttraiiom atvxiaied wiih everyday Soviet life At some fact or Iti and (ovcrrtiTiepi agencies, for ciimptc crnpk>yee> may order meat and othet commodities unavailable in state siorcs High patty officials are entitled to shop al special notes closed to the general public, where stocks of imported and scarce goods arc sold at relatively Iu* prices. Housing, especially, hat become more tt ratified with favorable treat neat on ihe bain of employment, bcreaacraiic potation, personal con-necnons. and bribery According io one Western cspcrt. money andan reduce the "ailing lime forapartment Iromearjean Oi less

Ctrs aad dartui (samascr hearses) are also hagk on ihc conttmcltike other consumer adodt tn short supply, however,ew cars arc parceled out among thc well placed or well coitnecicd. leaving others who have the money with ihe option of either placing their names on long waitingyear it the mnfTmum (or less populsr makes, accord, ing1 rscwitapcrheading lor lhc used ink" fcven in Ihe used car market motual system prevails Many ears are told for relatively low puces through an "official" used-car market

where the pecking ordei and wailing lists rival ihrnc for new cats. There is competition for dachas us well, with the besl being reserved for the top leadership, followed by parly and government officials .ind pro-futtorult in turn. (

fcW am ikt Table? According to Sovici data, the availability or quality foods increased sharply in ihe Soviet UnionSut since thegricultural failures have led lo theavailability of milk, vegetables, and fmii. andsupply of meal has not grown The result it acute spot shortages across ihe entire range of Inodi'uffV The regime has attempted ioarger share of foodi directly io industrial installations io prevent worker unresi. leaving food supplies in retail outlets severely strained

The ment tcricars cectsumer food problemime when meat hat become ain the public mind of progress orliving standards, Soviet daia show lhal Ihemeal supply snd demand hascreenl1 Anip through So- rt

Central Asia that meat was of poor Quality, rationed, and cipensivc He also said lhat althoagh ihe lines weie orderly, they coniainedozen people at each counter The poor prospects for2 harvesi indicate that ihe foodhe Soviet Union wit) worsen still more

The Soviet leaders have beea esirerrsdyhe past in persuading their people to defer gtaiifica-lions, and io lake less now tn esehange for promiseselter future This fact, along with Ihe sell-evident peogrrsi for most under the system, captains ihe Russian acceptance of theauntlet, ihe long queued, lhc poor oeahty of merchandise and the Shortages of lood. consumer goods, and housing Political ptoblemt howrvei. ate rooted in Ihe pros peels for an ever .receding fulfillment of the promiseellet fuiure and. forerceived decline in iheir standard of living

< rim and Corruption

The St" in Union appears to be (acini anproblem Ten rear* ago ihe So*iei mediaihe e'rSleoct of oaknee

tonal act arms cnSWl vica^iiaj; public order aad (irerumi eleir disrespectaidun.by in nsonihcear of coo fine me tutoday. however, ihe press t* fuP of aritcW on vseueai crime For caumplc. inVaWa reported on an upsurge of ttreei ciimc in Eastern Siberia, blaming prtwccuiort. police, and ihc public for then lull v. In September and October ofl9HI, anewt pi pereries of mugging! lhat hjd taken place in the city.

Despite the protetiaiiont ot official ideology, ihit upsurge in crime hit little to do with bourgeois influence (icon the pax or swsccptibiluy to Wcucir influence Soviet crime, to lodge fiom Su-sc: com mentary. it attociaied wtih locial problems loaad generally in modernabute. lowIc'Ctt. broken hornet, and the1 study ofot cow. for ciamplc, repc-ried lhat '0 percent of those convicted ol homicide eommined iheir enmet wltjle drunk Studio of criminal behavior by the Institute foi the Study cf Crime inOtigh correlation bciwccn crime and inicrnal migraiion patterns Crime hasbc developing cities of ihc far cast and far north, where the social mfrasirue-.urr it -cake, making these aieas more uitdesirabic places to Ir-e

unei Economic enmet have probably become ihe most veiing for the regime. Iheol the economic system and ils failure to produce sufficient ouaniiiict of lood. consumci goodi and services haveurgeoning bind market economy amounting by some Wetiern esti-maiet to pcrhapi Vt percent o( thel' Legal renrielioni on private economic activity aic honored on', occasionally Illegal stXCulaliOi IpttrchasC arj icstle of goodi for proTil) is caasgaanl Thc asou common forms of eeooorote illegality include ihefi ot government rxoperty. large-scale cheating ot tattoos crs by ihe managers ot retail stores, prtrstr produc non cat inc rob. ihe unregistered privaic practice of physicians and dcntisis. and underground tnanufac-lunng

li're viewed by the Soviet public as an effective method ol solving one'g problems in thc social cnvl-ronmcnleries of interviews Conduciedf__.

J]. nearly half ofr jiorscd selected 'bribery, pull, aad connections at the "tost effective way of tolviag problem* Mure over, the prices of available consumer goods are ofren nunc distortedot reOect demand, supply, or production coin.

Drs.siti ihc pervasive nature of corruptionsociety,far al scasi hat an

attempted lo tackle it bead on. Itt rhetoric and occasionally wcD-publkited actions against coriapr ofTKialt have been largely cotc gctlurct ihai itiadr tiltlc progress in tcducing corruption within lhc elile or ihr society. Such halfhearted elforis. in theei who led the. coairan tharply with ihciaacc onkinds of criminal activity. Elitelvcmcal inhat probaMyCQMritMicd to ihc regime's lack of vigor in combating this phenomenon. Io actively alirnipt to torn ii out among ihc elite risks eonlroniu-lion The Breihrtcv regime was probably alsoof damaging the reputation, and hence legitimacy, of ihc pally by protecoting important mcmbcis fc* corrup

Thc rtgime may rceognirc in addition, that lhc "iccend economy" does satisfy demandsystem where slate industry cannot oi will noi satisfy litem In this tentc. ihc black market servesaleiy valve thai helps in keep the entire system running II Ihe black market helps io meet some demands of lhcasrvulaisor. the dissatisfaction aad cJ.seocsr.eisl that mighti lhc lack of consumer goods in ihc official economy aie to some degree dampened

Some recrnl reports of nffiCtal corruptionhe Client of thc problems facing the leader thip

<caov was icmc-rcd as head of the Office of Visas and Registration recently afic reportedly selling vitas for ii muchubleH ruble equals tl Hi

^m

ribe, arc reportedko

arhiog from admission loedical In.liiulc io leileri of recommendationpsjnm-nunit: Parly. The wifeormci pari,eorgia -ai alto reportedly involved in selling government jobs and icon* to intcrtucd buyer.

Dunnein Arerbaijan ihe pun, pr.-t. reportedendeniir caiprtion and bribery connected with gaming admission to institutionshigher learning.

Runtur, of corruption touching Urcrhncvtlifcraicdoviet tourers told Weuern correspondent, in Moscow ihai BtcrhnevaCal.na. -aa involved wiih peopk recently .mpti-eatedorruption scandal that concerned ihe tmuggl.ng of dumondt aad hardof Gilme's associatei were reportedly arrestedc.gdo.ng AnaicJiyead of Seme circuseseputy minuter of culture, aaduriyatc- rSom thegche BcJthoy Opera Ccanpaoy. Rumors also Circulated thaiirstrticr of foreign irade. wa. under investigation forof faaeJt. ,

P.mikmrmi. Soviet ciimiiuli are handled swiftly under ihc flenble provisions of the republic criminal codes Ihe Ministry of Internal Affairs enforce- the codes its militig maintains public order and arrests In-breaker, nnrl litbring and nrosecule charee-jL

_Jfilic militia itselfnvolved in stealing and eoriupnon. Ineuein newsman charaeterired the militia as the "dregs'* of society

The Ministry of Justice runs lhe eoun sysiem The criminal code gives thc procurator (ihc Sovietent of the district atioritcyl -de lai.wde inthecharge underarticular

act will be tried and pc-mm ihekSeiadeicraatra.giheseaicocc Legal punish irsenis range from pubbc censure, removal frcanolTiec.

- tma of rank, and baaisluncai or enk to aa-prriortmeat. forced labor, or oca death Accordantarchmielhccttce assessment, about half mies involve confinement, aad iwuiMWy granM

lhanscrceat involveorm of forced labor lermed -ccaieaioeul labor- in Sc-ct legal parlance

Tkt (Ma*estlmaies

ercent ol

ov.ctiliumhehe Russian acronym for the Main Administration of Corrective Labor Campt. (The Uniicd Stales0rison populationeonsiderably lessercent of theboul iu million Soviets are confined, tomerisons and thc rest in forced-labor camps (Or "colonies" as the Sovier authorities prefer)0 have been paroled bul still masi perforin Compulsory labor There are about JOG prit-ont andOO Ubor camm in the USSR 1

f he lamatei of pntoas and the harsher labor colonic!la ceils, and the iamatcs of caber ramps live ia barisck type o areinmates havelnr-.ee mat the diet in prisons snd forced labornaiJecuaie. thateal memoor, and that -orbing minionsangerous

The penal system includes three bask kinds of forced-labor camps' correctional labor, educational labor, and colony teiilemcnit Correctional labor camps vary in their harthness with ihc severity of the term Juvenile offenders are sent to educational labor campt. and most prisoners receiving only lightor who have been re-arded for good behavior are assigned to correctional labor colony settlements.

Persons eon-icted ofagainsi the state*'the harshest punishment: ihe number of people being punished for such crimes is probably0 (Man, of the offenses for wbkhrewd arc classified atscene* on distcna..

The economic contribution of forced la borers to ibc Sorsei system it ratsbabry substantial Tbeyorkde .ar.ei. of actrvHsct. pattKu larly those thai arc rabyisralls dangcrout or la nag.

including nuinufaciunnc.on. agriculture.

aad iriinini These, - bat jlibeta oidirci

in do clop i" resoorcr-iieh aicai of ihc Si.mand north. For

indicates minimum sccurny loiccoacing

. -Jm ttkccawruCtkuiof(Om^ooc nation oa the domestic gai pipeline, which parallels the capon (inline being built lot ihc uie of catWeilcrn Europe.

Justice in ihr Viiiicp Union. In addition lu lhe wide

(plead oi* uf forced labor, lhe Soneili.'

imen- differs in several other respects deanile mi ol juttiec. Low serves ihe intctctl of ihe parly and State Soviet justice it designed lo prutccl social ill properly, not prirnai Jy to protect the direr. anOlhc couiia are treated us one of many commit lo cniure implemenialion cf party and ilatc iioalvhe legal rights of Soviet ciiiieat have been substantially increased since Sislml death, many of ihc right' considered iiiiporlani in thesuch at habeas corpus (protceiion against illegal imprisonment) and

presumption ofnot eiitt The retime hit few constraints on itt ability to use lhe law against

ut people. Nikita Khrushchev* reported comment to

hit Procurator General turns up this altitude "Who*.

ihe boss we or the law* We are masteri over the law.

not the law overwe havehange the law."

Soviet justice alio emphasises,egrrr not found in the West, the role of the public in the adrninitlra-tionof josiicr and ihc use of social groups (vig!taniet| raiher than state organt lo maintain law and order The Soviert have relied on iwo voluntary organiu-nont the Comrades' Courts (ad hoc count set up in factories, apartmenii. and to forth, wuh popularly elected judgetl and the Peoples' Volunteerswho canstc estiieas solo obeying the lawi

Ufeeiitttneu of Controls. The tharp rise in juvenile crime indieatet that the regime hat fallen short of lit goal to create "ihc nc* Soviet mac Feu ciample.conversaiiont withoviet criminologist siaied lhal rwsont underrc respontiLvk for more than half the crieacs commnicd ut the Baltic regie* Furthermore, it was it.riled lhat these ynulhful offenders, alnioll evenly divided beiween inn let HIM)

fcmjlcs. arc committingiolcni crime*well as the atual properly crimes

Much of Ihc criminal activity in the USSR itto the "second" economy and involves economic corruption Soviet authorities, worried lhat public opinion will be adversely affected byave attempted to lay much of the blame oa men erimi-nah. For cu aspic. First Deputy Miaittci cf Interna! Affairt. Yurry Churbanov (Brcr.hncvs too-in-law. who reportedly hns been involved in corrupt activities himself! recently charged innterview on Radio Moscow Urn black-marketeers arc artificiallydeficits lo line iheir own pocketi.ew law adopted in1ncreased penalties for withholding goods from tsk or accepting money to procure goods snd services not normally available or in shorthe recent report by ihe Soviet press of the executioneputy minuter of fish industries for corrup"son was apparenily meant lo signal Ihc regimes concern and warn against high, level corruption. The removaligh regional party offtcut ineportedly for engaging In corruption with this deputy minister, leads to rem-force the ideatrong tignal it being given io corrupt officials The campaign,is not likely to be very effective if other higher level officiali who arc involved ia corrupt son tic allowed to remain in office. In facr. the consumer remains unimpiesied with official attempts to light corruption and end shortages As on* cynical Soviet citnen rcmaikad about the government's recent efforts. "Whenever things get really bad they Unit an anilcorrupllon drive "

louth Alienation

Soviet leaders devote considerable effort and ie- Sources io indoctrinating Soviet youth -uh Ihc old socialist f love of physical laborillingness to tacrificc one's peisonal interest for the parly and nate The industrialisation procett hat inetorablyeward system, however, thai vitiates these sdcalt Although young people are Inughl in party youth organizations to believe lhat allis honorabie. parents oltcn attempt toheiray through procurement of preferential treatment in university admissions and job* I

rrT"

Mattriathm - ile uf ih*f propaganda aimed ai clmtiag "vaall) rvotloUiKMI Sovici young people apparently remain nioicrialitlic in outlook und arc tipolilrcit! Inoll conducted by SoDialiitichrikoya imtuuiiya'eboviet youth clciily Mated iheir prefer-cnoctable caret' and material comfort Success *ai definederceni of lhc 'eipundenit as ilie "uuanlily and prestige of iheiruchew earammcr boute. aad not i- cunthe cc irvmrhnempaiauii onii gecompanicdeneral cynicism toward larger political issuesecogniiion of the tence of ir.dinduall in influencing political affairs.

Part) olTieiaU have es pressed concr'n over the lus> of ideological vigor>on thc pan of Soviei vcuih. The irries of regional Komsomol Congresses;ecent opportunity for partyddress ihiy mue Ukrainian party chief Shehe'bn skly. for ciamplc, frankly acknowlrdged lhc tack ol idrologieal real among Soviet youth He beratedpeople aol only for their ihoHrimt ihoricom.but 3Ho for iheir "social patsiviir aad relapses itun middleeningrad party leader Roma nov stressed the same theme, noting lhal foroung SbvicU. life may be geiliag loo can Party leaden Sbcrardaadrc and Griahui etn admnicd that drug abuse ind alcoholism among youth were Mgmfi canttrong indication ihai ideologicalaning

WtHtr* Tkrtai Semer leaders continue to express concern, moreover, that this interest tu material well-bring ii making people more vulnerable to Western influences anddeat The rrtost ctplicitof ibis type was voiced by Komvoniot chief Bon' Pastukhov in hit speech before Ihe All-Union Komiu mol Conc-est in2 Paitukhw itaiedhi and spiritual deeluve" can irtuli fronti accept truesteta cultural rnevacls and laihiom. Me mentioned Polish developmenlt io underteore the danger of allowing Western influences io go unchecked,hal tttttre mutt be done to protea yoaih fromaste tor ihc Western

lilcttylc.

Since the Polish crisis began, such warnings have been ftcCiucnlly repealed. Speakingn1 tdon. logical conference, lhc now deceased party tccreiary Mikhail Susie* eniphasired lhc need lo combat 'alien" influences at home. He attacked "consumer hi" atlUades aod noted "ihe catreancly daa-gcrcus" cwmeejuences of allowing consumer demands to die-inc ttatc policy.

ofTietaiv moeco-er ladircealy admit Ibaji Weti-ern propaganda has been successful in caploiiinc the maierialtsm of in youth and in itimulaiing other undesirable altitudes. An article by KGB first Orpu-i- Chairman Viktor Qtcbrikov described the goal of "tourgeeni propaganda" at nothing less than to "aab-otage.the Communis! convictions of young people and putli them into antisocial1 Fratda interview. Estonian Party first Secretary Va.no also staled lhat "bourgeois centers" are tgtai-ing no efforts lo instill in Ihe Sovici people thc "bacilli nf moral spine less ness. spiritual acquisitiveness, and national chauvinism "

Camptiint "Itlealaaiti."Soviet officials must also contend with negative attitudes toward military serv ice, revival of inicresi in religioo. and nationaliii rpressia*do un JO2 provided growing evidence of official uneasiness aboul creeping pacifism on the home front. In arcartlcle an ftlmt. USSR People's Artist Alcksandr Zarkhi reproached Soviet producert of wai films fee being heedless of the potentially demoralti>ng impact of these movies on Soviet audiences Similarly, Marshal Ogarkov. Chief of ihc General Staff,peech given at an1 ideological conference aad tn aartSck appearing in ihe party journal Kpnim until, deplored "elements of pacifism" on the domes tie scene.complained Ihai the ptesent generation of Soviet youth were under lat.ng the ihretl of war emanating (rom ihe Weil Such uamptrt of domett* pacifism may signal popular dissatisfaction with the war in Afghanistan or indicate thai ihis generation of Soviet young people is less willing lo make lhc personal sacrifice accessary toigh degree of miliiary read.net)

i sajat

pcctal problem (tie vouth Pattuthot. in his kismtomul Congress Kftccch. insect-nl that various icligiout seels were becoming nunc Mine ami called lc increated effort*ount cioaihof religion among ihc young. Central Asian ktidcr* have 'Isneir concern wiih thi' ibm. Kazakh Pari) fiiii Secretary Kanaye* rrxcntli directed ptiri> worker* to pat more oiicn'iitnihvitiic(Keler aimectn teligiou> distent, pp -VJO.l

I ink agesgrttwsrtg interest in religion aad unacceptable caprcMtont uf nationalismn made as uell. In Lithuania. Republic Patty First Secretary Criahkyanchui warned at an! plenum thai "clerical etircmisis" were utifig ichnon, to reorrtotr "tunoaaliu tentimcBii" Ccerfian kadcrs have alto been particularly worried by the emergencei notions It it trends among young people. The Georgian KcartseuTtoi chief cautioned students against "playing alnd ptcudonationalitt heroics He also expressed regret that an increasing number of young men were applying teenier the seminary, tllclrr0 section On naiionalnyp.

Although the altitudes among Soviet youth areproblem for the regime, there is notheyhreai to regime controlSoviet (xofetaaotial commented

3at long at th* tyiiern presents the opponu-niiy (or advancement, no miner how iltghi. people will continue to wortihe tysiem No east really cares aboui how bad condition* are ihroughoul the country, as long as one Can see hope for improving oae'l ownt the same lime, the regimeaitempt to itolate materialitmmall number of young peorak has clearly (ailed Massive improve-ments in education resulting in an overabundance of highly trained young people have only caacerbaied the problemt now ntore difficult to satisfy the youth by pioviding elements of the good life Current ideological rfforis directed It/ward ihc problem of youth alienation, rathei lhan cnct-uiaging <elf sacrifice,nly lo increase cynicism Thc gap bet wan ihc kadcrihin and jlaarijBI youth latter-fort, rcmaint and cvuld giow

Thc new decree no prislublv rclaltif Iti gnu' ing rccognitmn ufn health carer. deni

in '

tome* at ccon runic planner' hwnr tanked tucapanilon and efficient! in help thehealth care impuos directlytheefficiency of thc work force Ao.iud.ng iuthe USSR,e the only nationower life, ripcciancv noweath rata rose lignifieaniis for everybetween the mid- I'fcOi andIVbyetccnl from it* low pointerceatlOOIBin ihcir forties were hardestitSfor lhe averngr Soviet male fatting.cani> to ihc preicm figureaiet. moreover, are high, may. and reflect *harp dilfeienocscare between ihc European and nooo! the country Pete* health care in ruralrites of alcoholismburiion in urbaninfluencaand env.ic-intentji

pollution arc contributing factors

Oij/ni'ilal Tnatmt'l. Although the Sovietsystem ithysicians perwith0he I'rated Sunavailable io everyone free of charge the qualityii uneven The gcncial pubhe it served byof hospitals and cniipuncAi policlinicsrelatrvelv how standard of care Accordingobscrvriare diffscull io

findand diriy andt family mil ofiea bring food Itcan home: irtbe hospitalrural areas

are particularly inadcquaic. largely because Qualified personnel find work in outlpng regions unatiraCtivc lalosed (ystoa of heoaaiah ehmci. and diipravarKt with topcrioi facuuics isby ihe Miniurycalih's fourth Mam Ad miration for ranking party, government and rsuhee officials Some naaislr>es anaiaism theirhealth scmcc tytiemt that presumably *sl(*bene care anal serve as an incentive in Mitiaci worker.

' i. .

iB-cal tmmu<m

uia.

kattSHtl III. I. .Si

Symmil Probltmi. Because of ihc di.parily in health services, some Soviets arc opening ihcir pocbcibook> io buy better, more pcrtonihredhaa ihe aajag ridea ihem dee of charge The lew legalervice clinics nrc apparently heavily used, and under the table payments to modiejl personnel are' c-s. feu (um* may be necessary io casareatrcnt getssurgeonaverage skill Beyondc availabitny. the system faces oi her challenge*inititutranal goals, lack of preventive care poor naming, aad technical bottlenecks These arc no- being lackled bul wh.iher ivtccts'ulls tore mams lo he seen To keep hospiia' dcaih siaiisne*forcsiern ohyticiln who haitudy oa Soviei medicine reported that So*>ci author.have cncoarigcd hopeless* paiieais to cheek out and return home At ihc same lime, hospital start arc prolonged, providing employment for mans ihruugh medicalbai ihi< contribute*igher ineiekaec erf scno-tai irdueed laleetam

A mayor difltcultv is Ihai ihr Soviei sstteni has focused an curing illness rather lhan preventingonet uatiiiical daia show ihji diseases that are easily controlled in otlie<un rampant in ihc Soviet Union Influenza foi onmplr kills lenttif ihous.in.ls of So'-ei babte* an.sualls. and rieksi.

ne ol childhood's scourges. Whereasercent of eetvieal cancer cases initcd Sine*idcir.ilied in iheir early, potentially trrulnblc siagcs.creenl ot* Soviet Cases art not recognized ynul they arc leimirsl.

Co lar. the So-tei Union's economic plan hasriorityloping and productipnseni ihai Wrtieta drvctors associate wiih modem medicineublished iludyS doctor, lhc USSR operniesew do/en kidneynd ill lew hundred available pacemakers arc import-ed. Disposableneedles, tubing, andin short supply. Thc less priority given loer consumer-oriented tec tort results in additional shortages. When output goals in other lectori are not met. thc supply to the medical sector of Such nonntcdical goods as automobiles, buildingab. and icitilct becomes erratic. Sctaatc of find shortages, for csample. only JO percent of ihr gai tCQuircmrnil lor emergency vehicles air being met

allmttt. TheSoviet health care lysient will be facing growing demands in ihe coming decade. The age distribution of the population has changedin ihe pastears, with the share of thoseears and over incrcfsingeicent toercent of the population, Ai Ihc share of the elderly enemies, disease pallet at alter Heahh planners witt have io decide whether toarger than ol medical rcsourcci io ibe elderly.hoigher incidence of serious illness, or continue io toctit health fcsourcci on thc economically active population

An} decree is ihc latestcries ofttempting lo Cope with problems in the health tecioe.ecree banned women Iromyob categories involving heavy and hazardous1 decree aimed ai stimulating ihc berth raie peonies far one year of partuliy paid esaicraaty leave.couraging motbert to stay at home to care for Ihetr babies, lhc decree could reduce ihe ink of ctposu'c io disease n ? resolution calls for the ripunsiun of sanatorium! and health rcsorty to be sponsored hy lhc hade union*

lhc regime hit pui more pressure un tltc managers sif thc health care sysiem by dramatically airing the failures of Ihe Ministry of Health at ihc? meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Theway criiici'cd for neglect of ouipatient polyclinics and emergency care at well as the intensitivc and uncaring aiuiudc shown by health service personnel Ihe presso ettensrvefy publics red ihe shut-comings of medical Care in rural areas and thc need for greater responsiveness to the population's requests and complaints regarding health services Regardless of ibese resolutions and decrees, unlesc the regime spends more monev on health services, there i* lililc likelihood for significant improvement in the future.

ad Ihe Role of Women Lenta hoped Soviet rule would significantly improve the vat as of women in ihe USSR. In reality there hat been much progress in achieving greater rajtiality between the seiei and of social advancement of stoincn under Ihe Soviei system. Vet. Soviet women cannot be taid lo bchc Western tense. Moreover the Soviet family as an institution l> alto in trouble The high divorce rate, part of the price of increasing industrialisation and urban natron, showj no lignt of falling Ii is especially high in urban regions Soviet tocicJogitil ccotmuc to lament the personal coin ol mini j' breakups in Iheir writings Ihe teaderihip. whore prime jaierctt het tn Ihc locccis of Ihe economy rs chiefly dnmaved by the adverse effect tfi the birth rate and. consequently, on thcabor resources.

orkplatt. Thc call of early Mai nils for women lo enier the laborot actuallyadical break wiih the Tsansi pan7 women commutedercent of factors em ryiryvees in Russia what changed of course, was the spread of an ideology supportive of women working outside ihe home Work was portrayed not onlyeant of contributing to lhc national economy but alsoource ol personal dcvetoprneni and evenicrcouitncoman to icrve at an appropriate role nudd foi her children Eipanding educational opftiriii-facitiiatetl tsomen's employmcni proi-pceis

fhu work ideology (it -ell .iti. (he leadership! goal of rapid economic development, the result being lhat -omen's labor today represents the backbone of ibc Soviei economy According to published data, the Soviei Ijnion hai the highest female labor foree participation rates of any industrial socieij; overerceni of all worker* arc women The nueiiionable work elhic among Soviet males has ledey jobs in industry and construction being filled moie and mnre by women

Despite the imporrani economic role -omen play io the economy, ho-ever. Soviei data md'eaic ihji -om en have not mo-ed up the Caicer ladderar wild men

Salaries for -omen are onlyo 'i pceetni ihosc of men.

Women wcdominate in lo-ayingincluding service industry -prk andal positions

Womenisproport'onaielv lo- shrnc of ihi more preitigioui and powerful pos'iions in St-ni locieiy

Altltough -omen constituteperceni of all sueitcr -Oilers, onlyf those holding iheiiileacademician are lemale In the polit.Cal arena, no women are on the Politburo, inderccnl of Comal rn.nm.tw members (full nndr

Beyond ihc professional restriciiOm Soviei sspmen face. Ihey continue to bear most of the burden tor running Soviet households. Sot-icl men show- lil tie inclination lo share household duliet. thusighly unequal division of domestic labor. According to Soviet daia. although men and -omen devote eoual lime to paid emrtloyment. -omen devote an cur*eek to housework compared witho. men. Child-care faeiliiies. moreover, remain inadequate, forcing women to lake additional unpaid malernily leave despite the Inss ofob opportunities involved."

Efforts by women to improve their quality of life have eentered mainly on limiting family sire, wiih aborison representing <he primary method of binh cnntrol. Western demographers eitimai? that, on average each So-iei -oman has sii abortions in herlmes the US figure. Even (his estimate may iindciesnmaie ihe aclual figure in the European sections of the eouniry. because Muslim women have fewer abortions lhan Ihcir European compatriots Discontent among Soviet women takes moreforms as well female alcoholism and drug abuse aie one. according to Soviet studies discusted1 psychiatric conference in Moscow Reccni press articles have warned about tbe adverse effecti of alcohol -nd drugs on thc health of both -omen and infants

7Ac Family. The Soviet family is also coming under Stress The Soviet divorce5opula iiOneiccedcd only by ihai of the United Stales Accordingumber of Soviet sociologists, ihrhrinking, dissolving, andooi |Ob of dealing ihe "ne- Sovietn muck in Liii-'o-Ui'naya ya/elo lums op these shortcomings in ihe four major roles attributed lo the family

binhin ihc mammy of Soviei familiesharply wuh thc average family sirebetween Oneehildren

- The home lakes ioo much eneigy. requiring some (nllion bouts ofear and an atmy1O million Service worker!

(he family Is falling 'htwt in n> role of edueaiing thc yOung

1 he family is not adequately satisfying Use nerd, .if ih< individual for love and humanism

The link of erfiable family cnvirsinnieni appears fraughtto much difficulty ikat man)re opting mil of the process altogether.iw number in lhe ten* of million! accordingectal ankle ia iVsnrvand someautbommrenc*rejection or marriage and child-bearing in favorore independent andcsiyte

In captaining ihr dcicriornilon of the family unit. Soviet caperu roiate-eiat cause* inctudiag urban nation. induiiriatiraliOn. alcohol urn. and ihe fecklrsi atiitudr of men louurd mairiagc and family. Soviet witters have only <cccriff begunccognarc ihai female liberation, using levels of female education and labor loree participation, and family stability may, riot be compatible Living conditions, pariieulariy shortages in liousing for nrwlywcdi, scarcities of daily consumables, and the deadening chore of searching and standing in line for them, arc also pinpoiated as obstacles to stable family life and having children

Helf/ot ike Family. Thc hey problem for ihcis how ie achieve an optimal balance beiween the contribution of womenhe labor force and their family roles The irreplaceable ccniribution of -omen to both production and rrpiodoomnt lea against measures lhat wouldr-.en roles in either domain The ongoisjeflected in the Soviet aeademu; Incut are. Some family socsolo gists favor the preseni balance of work and family ioles and focus on reducing thc tension between ihc Iwo by eipandirvg ibe availability of consumer goods andumber nf Soviet scholars andwho are more concerned aboul preseni demo graphic treads, including Soviei demographer V. Per-tvedenisev. advocate an all-out eflorincrease the social status and material rewards of mot hei bond For now tbe Soviet leadershiplo be leaning in this diicciion. Thc present Five-Year Plan, with us paid maternity leave provisions, if designed lo gt! Sovtei women, particularly in lhe Europeaa areas of the Soviei Union and Siberia.ave moic children

Yci. theresouitcs committed to studying and solving the (noble in remain skimpy Two yeora ago it was suggestedfamily council" nder the Academy of0 ercoui -'Age diKUSSian nl lhe ailing Soviet nuiriagc and

lamily insritulinns According to P'avtto. this plan still awans implementation. As one British sociologiu has suggesicd. Soviei scholars are caughi trying tu find Maraiil-Leninist cipJunation* for problems thai in Iheory should not ears! under soOSKsiri (iatpnicil icsearch on ihi* lopae is alio hampered by samplings (hat arc loo small and uncoordinated lo provide reliable eonclusaeos Sach tltortcisrriings suggest that the Soviets have an uphill batik to lemcdy tho problem

Alcohoh sm

Almost every cveni or ccfebenlion in Soviei hie. audiay raise,onus, r* marked by iatense drinking. The pttiins fie-nucnt complaints aboul drinking boult on paydayactory workers lhat often cadublic bra-It or domes'* disturbances.rinking causesdisruptions in work, reduces labor productivity, leads to ind all rial and trafficigh correlation with crime (including luremteontributes to family instability, and impacts negatively on Ihe health of the raejoulaiirav Although Soviet authorities have on many occasion* ei pressed ocep concern about the effect of alcohol abuse on Soviet society, the regime's vested interest in (he tale of alcoholic beverages conflict! withduce consumption. Moreover, alcoholfunctiontind of safety valve for pent-tp local ditcorlcni Such discontent would be more troublesomehe icgimc if it took different foi mi inch as demons! rat nans or strikes 1

Ihe seriousness of alcoholhe Soviet Unionmplied by the paucity of tiatisiical infoimaitoa available on the subject. SinceOt. much of the statistical dala thai had been published, including information on lhe production, consumption, and dn tribaiioa of alcohol< beverages, has disappeared from nandaid reference sources Uting Soviet technical sources and regional statistical hartdlaooks.Western scholars principally Vladiasir Ticmi. have heen ableonitiuct estimates ol alcoholpatlcrns

he principal conclusion emerging from TrcmTtislit on it*hc So" Kt

Union ii<ifiter capita eitmump.

"on of ttaic prcxluo/tl alcoholrtII*s Accord ing to reliable rinmates bated on demngiapltic duia and lo- enI rnedieioe reports, asorsuuer. deaths Irnm acute aleohoi poivmingeenc rapidly once Ihcndeath*upobiion |la ihc same scar.in in ihc Uniled Stale from aleohnl rvisnmn,'

were rr.ri.nlidtruin tu ..

akofcolicn% and Ihc madi-. idnitration io ihe problem Idcalh from akut-il poisoning Clin usually be prevented by prompton I

Suvict pics* accounts affirm thc dimension* of Hier crample, an arlicle writUurtomntKiologiil. argued thai drunkennessa ihrcal io ihc social well-being of Ihr cnlitc nation andhreat to the nil' capabilities of theecent issue ofn-imtnht. ft.i ul the Acadrmt ol the USSR Mianiis of Internal Affairs, reported lhalcreenl of the maleforce i- chronically lrunV.eoniii.jT.il with II percenthe num pal of dnnkers under thc age of It ha- alwa risen haiply.s onlyercent uf ibosc underrank, whereat ihc proportion id today'* under-age-HI drinkers etceedsercent Aktsrtolrun among women it growing asludy appearing inamo found thai0 one inkctholMi waijump from ibe raiecJcntc in Iwomen at the beginning of the renturt

Published statistics based on contumptionte-produced alcohol donoi give ihe full picture honcicr Illegal jdinrygtM (Russian tlang for rnoomhincl hatayor share of the total alcohol eontumcd in the USSR. Although the real magnitude of ikii consumption i' noi tnown becaute the Semen do not publish data on the sabreet. Treml and at least one Soviet academieun ctumaic that ihe dmly eoniumitiion of scrwdfon- increised from lestirr per urban adult in iheoiters per adult in the

social ecnicQiicnccs ol drinkingPublications lif of all eiin

report

ii

1 The are evident in Sonet put cd lhal more than1 were committed byerceni of the cases ol leporled rapes, andhe case of leenagcrt. aci edition ofPio'O were "inked io dunking

ilumplion o(ajor contributing factor lo ibc tit* in ibc divorce rale in ibc USSRind* conduced inegion of the Russian Republic! in ihc.iccni of ihc women who Tilcil for divorce cited iheirrinking a> the rainury cause for thilirailar sludy caamrJeted ia Riga iafound ihai npprcuimalcly .'0 pe'cenie coupler filirg lor divorce mentioned alcohol abuse at the main icaion for the dissolution of theirecentby Soviet demographer V. Peicedenlsc deemed lhat nearly half of all divorce* miiiated by women acre on the baits of their husbands' drunkenness

losses io ibe Soviet eeooomy caused byrc significant at well. Accoiding to Westerntotal medical andpend it ore* for alcoholicsillion rubles annually Inan. alcoholism is rctrauarsibie for loses iareduced duality of output, industrial accidents and high turnover ofoviet journal has reported that drinking on the job reduces productivity up toerceni Regarding the impact of alcohol abuse on ihr quality of output, one study in Co (ihr journal or lhe Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences) concluded thatrams of alcohol dcorker* precision of movement by caeiercent. Every fourth industrial accrdeni in the Soviet Union, moreover, is ihe result of diinklng as are approximately il percent of ill traffic fatalitiesiac east ofases of tardiness or absenteee repealed io be caused by drinking

Economic lossei also result from thc diversion of ever larger anacaiats of the countiy's agricultural out patroduce alcohol In addition to the agriculturalused by lhe state lo manufaciure alcoholiche production of idmogonignificant share of the agrNuliaial output as well Parirculaily wane lot is thc rJistillainsn of lemoto* from such ingredient* a* bread- ihe price ol which is heavily lubs'dt'cd by thc state and ihui less cuitlvcaberauavtbineri to u>

Inlnni mortality i> jnoiher serious consequenceover consumption of alcohol F. Ugkw.ull member of the USSR Academy ufaccs. has caked aiicrsiioa lo the. danger -r; alwi so ihc iclaiion ship beiween alcoholic uiiiihcrs anil it- miri.nc m

. ncome and Eiraeaditurcs on Alcoholic Beierngc* Per Person Age l< Year* and Older by

fla.irc

Alcobal on Afcohol

tn">wiri

110

ns

I 0

J

ft.*

110

1.1

110

*

gsi

USSR

n uie

UrVnusio

UrbciaiiB

Kanitiilai.

Gcvrn

lansi

s .

I ijikisui

n.'metiscmskin

Li'.iiwi

saPstiaaal

IUK?

IIf,*

I.I

(

rvneail incomr data Convened lo iniomi (x< prion IS icarsuld

Swec: vudiaiir C. Ir I'mveriily Preis

'Gitcai* li Ike only Soviei lenvbtie lorHktiof Vihr.tlndrntbe-tniri rim iw< bcaek- vi lm used hocliwjic.

Alrohol in ihr VSSH. IW. Dull

percertlnge ofreiarded children. According to the Moseo* Psychiatric Research Institute, amongwomen the frequency of miscarriages, slillbirlhs. and dcalht of babies in the fnsl iwo years of life is ihrce to five times theragc. Onc-third of all children born to alcoholic mothers are mentally maided

ffimi With ik* FreaUm. Both Western i.o*KI ripens attribute thc severity erf alcoholism in the USSRhan ita lion, indiitirialifaiiun, boredom, and thc lack of consumer goods Thc regime hat noi fought the profe-em by add rettingante Rnihcr. authorities' have relied onii tieaimcnt. and price increases Soviet olTi-toll uv, ihe media, film, and lex.uro to public ire ilicnegative effects of heavy drinking, but Midiampaigns have fallen on Oeaf cart

Although the Soviets maintain an extensive tysicin of ueatmeni faeilinei foe atcohctUcanging from sobering.up ilii-ni lo labor ticatmrrithc eficciivcncst ol these Ueatmeni tiialcgics remains, low At ihc All-Union Psychiatric Congressi was reported thai in thc Ukraine beiwceandercent of those tieated revertkoliolovici medical report issueda also revealed lhal ai least half the patients ai labor-Ireattnenl camps resort to former drinking patterns soon alter release The lack of success of the Semei medical rtitbiishmcni in treating alcoholism <tby both the absenceational program to coordinate treatment and the feci thai accordingtudyoviet0 percent of all alcoholics receiving ireatmeni have had thcr iuears before receiving initial therapy

The Soviets have alto tough! io enact stricter laws against those who are found inioateatcd ai work, iiscluding deprivation of bonuses and denial of permit slon lo use icciciikxi centers Thc rffectiveness of these laws has been minimal, however, because labor shortages often lore' ensevoyeri to covet up forworkers.

Raiher than curbing Sovici cili/ens1 intake of alcohol ihe price increases appear lo have led to more <rf lhc family budget going toward the purchase of alcohol or. in some eases, individuals switching lo (he cheaper illegally distilled romogon. How the regimeh costs of alcohol abuse in ihe USSR it adrlem-i. with important soesceconomie

wiih the monopoly on legal production and talc of alcohol, thc regime has attempted to utc pricing to control consumptton atiraised the retail price of alcohol by an average ofoercent Soviet figures indrcaic lhat. oa average, aboul every tenth luhie in the family budget is spent on alcohol ami lhal in some rural areas Pure ha set of spirits cons ante nearlyercent of family incomes (see tablen (act. the distilling industry provides the largest inccavteilO torrsvai of all siaie revenues) in ihe Sonet liCasury of am single pr<.duclmu enlerpris. hi ilie eounlry.

Ihr?llloe

nationalitygranting ofto lonvc eilctil, culturalstandard ofl".

and mine police

force whenbeen Largely luccosful.there ii no -ideiptcid, potfiaeaUy duruptirc proicii or dissent among Iheiajor nationality croups. Recent socUI ind economic trends lhat are not readily responsive to policy, however, provide the basis for development of natloiuliiy discontent in theiling national cryt^cdsaess among the many ethnic groups. demographic chtr.eeroblems, and Ihe erosion of (he supranational Communist Ideologyegltirnatlng force.nationality discontentatent (hough potent vulnerability of the Soviet regime

Sources olConfllel

Some aspects or Soviet nationality policy createbciwccn ihc regime and its minority peoples. Efforts lo promoteof Russianecond, ifirst,created tome resenimcnt, and recent demographic policy has seemedavor Slavs. Ethnic issues have, moreover, become interconnected with lhc pari/'s effortslkxtic ictrce loiourcai gironiaglorml claimants

Rstaalficarlost

Language pohcycnikive iisue ia lhc USSR. Soviet authorities have ConsciMsly loagfcl to nuke Russian the lingua ft onto of the Soviet Union both to facilitate eorr^unicalioa and. rnost importantly, lo inicgriic. it noi animilaie, many diverseommon culture. Such linguistic Rustication his been partially succesiful.9 census shows that use of Russianecond language is increasing (ice table li. bui complete linguistic lulmilalion is far in the future.ercent of the non-Ruuian popu-niton uie Runtanm lin|uig&Soviet efforti to nuih u. moreover, haveacklnh of tcscrii-meni Wcticrn correspondentreponed thai in Georgia, for cttmplc. there were proicni8 againil dropping Georgian ai Ihe

state language of |he republicovernment .backedchoTirtb)i: appeal foe the icttaiioe of the native Urvguigc ia academic life, and Western observers reported that ia1 moreeorgiansublic demonstration to express their concern about language policy. In tbe here have been similar protests over Soviet language policies,(bought lo be Rusiians by Georgians andoften been treated with hostccording to accounts from lilliitia. ,

fefoogr.aWe Poiley

r>ernogriphic trends are also Pkdy to iacrcasetensions and compiicaic Soviet deciiioni on resource allocations. According lopublilhcd Soviet data, the Russians arc losing their majority alaiui. and ihe Slavic and European areas of Ihe USSR are short of labor Although thc regime hasiffer en: it led demographic policy designed lo spur population growth fun in the Far Eaiiern, Sbcriio, and Eoropcaa regions of the Semel Uaioo gad then ia Central Asia and the Caucasus, this effort can have in impact only in ihe long run. The policy, moreover, will noi allow the legimc io avoid ihe Impoiiani economic, social, and political choices thai will cul BCtosi nationality eoncerm during Ihii dau.li

Ctulriliialioa Versus Decrairallialloa Eeoaomic idmiatitratioa tnd decisionmaking are also nudeiffseah because of the naluaational charade o( ihc Soviei stale. The need for littler economic effectiveness gencraici pressures for deeen-tralitaiion. which in turn could diminish lhc party's political control Khrushchev's decision to dccential-iic economic minigemeal under Soina'khoiyeconomic councils) "is quickly reversed in the. ai least partly because it appeared to cacoLrige aoealiu lenckrscics- Oeceniraliration, non; tbcless. suit has >ts proponents, with Georgian leader Sbevardnariic among Ihe meal vocal. The issue is especially contentious now as aspccii of Ihe new

4a-

I-Hl!"

Table i

uguagc Affiniti and Knowledge o( Runian AlSecond Language

II.I

/

,

4

1

t

j

L,

?a)

F

J

1

food programft beingproponent*ol*i. control of agriculturejddi vxft Moscow baud pcaaoocrtts ofed conirol

Rcsouiccs

AI local to* of resource.among conocaint admin-lira-Ux aadifficult in ihc bni ol ilii.hi* mur ha* become particularlyni decade andundoubtedlyighly eonl en ilout ittue in* (esouicei become inerejt ing I. tcarcc Put tiatcdy. Ibe Sovicti do not have ihc retoureet lo invcti huge lum* equally and nmulla ncouily in ihc ipanciy populated but resource nth area* o* Sibcna. ihc older industrial area*ropc-aa Ruma and ihc Ukraine, and the USSR'* rapidly graving, but iindc'developed.rea* 'he regional iBvctimcni muc conKibuicd ia pantadciilnii puigc in ihe Ukraine in ihr

Problem* on the Periphery

Nationalism ha* not toil it* political or cmotuMaal force in ihr USSR Tbe mam forces of <ntegiatioa. moderniration, and induit'iatitation have ihemielvet contributed lo Ihc growth ol ditercic ethnic feelings Several arcaiAsia, the Dallies lhend ihc Ukraine--have population* ibat ni-.Ni r f cihaic telfi thai coald crver thc very long i'*m. lead to rthnic unrest and naiionaliti lurmoil

Tb<rraaaaics

long-term rHmographnc. economic, and uae.al irendi in ihe Baltic iem Ctieana andgradual assimilation of iheie genupt

Tab-It *

Comparison of Russian and Raliic Papulation9

Nli-ntm nlliivi> Kiiwilitilltuaidiiail Pdiciillf* tncrtaw

OliWniia.

t.rivu*s

ok

the dominant Russian mold The pleasuresby these developments, nonetheless, have led to tcoradic violence and dissident acliviiy and will make Moscow's relationship with the Baltics rxoplesfor some time to come. Moscow appears to believe that these problems are manageable andits local prefects some leeway in appealing to local concerns. Thc Soviet leadership, however, hat done little to alter polie.es lhat endanger the iderttiiy and native languages of the Baltic republics, and continued social Strife over this issue is likely.

Population Trends in the Baltiit.ignificant threat toistinctive national identity among Estonians and Latvians (tecoth groups have very low binh and marriage rales, and high divorce andrales. The favorable economic conditions in thesecomparatively high standard ofood technical base.and relatively higheranrower shortage have,attracted hugr numbers of RussianAsa result, both native groups are likely to become minorities in Iheir own republics by the end of the century. Ethnic Latvians compute only St percent of iheir republic's population, and Estonians represent less thanereenl of theirs In both republics, moreover. Russians enjoy majority siaius in major cities including the capitals of Riga and Tallinn

protesting various industrial projects andand mining enterprises. In ihe. even parly officials in Latvia opposed cioansion of heavy industry in Ihe republic on the grounds thai it would require lhe importation of Russian workers and leadurther dilution of Latvians. This nationalist opposition led Moscow to puree ihe native Latvian parly leadership

fsh.

icecnt economic slowdown and the subsequentin food supplies have alsoouring effeci on relations between the Balls and thc Russians. Thc Baltic republics have traditionallyelatively plentiful supply of meat and dairy products and blame lhe Russians for the reversal in the situation, dating from lhe. In6 meat virtually disappeared from Latvian markets. Resident! of the republic were convinced that locally producedwere being ci ported contrary lo republicath ol violent incidents. including lhe sabotaging of trains headed for the Russian Republic and the selling of fires al meal warehouses, suggested widespread resentment.9 public disccntent had also reached iciiout leveh in Estonia Western visitors to the capita! were struck by the bitter public mood, and there were persistent rumors that assassinationn made againsi party first secretary Vjyno

Hostility. Latvians and Esioniani recognize the link between industrial! rat ion. Russian immigration, and Ruisifscalion pressure Pe'ilions have circulated

t unguagc rustic) has become jn even inureThe migration of Russians into ihe lljliicsbrought uiih il increased demand for Rvix^ihschools and increased pressureuse Russian in famines* transociionv In :ii lean some arc.i* of Latvia- and Estonia. Russian has become alorood jobood cducahon. This threat to local languages has spurredvckspmetii uf anti-Russian feeling and led to civil distorts!nee. protesting the heavy promotion of Russian tu ihc cspense of native languages, v

Agiiation over the language issue reached crisisin Es-onia in the Tallccording In European press reports, several thousand siudentt Staged protests in Tallinn and other cities againsiompulsory use of Russian, ih; scarcity of Estonian language pubhealions, and ihc replacement of live Estonian Minister of Educationussian Sixly Estonian intellectuals lateretter io officials calling for the removal of reslrictions on ihe use of Estonian and for mcasutes to redress the heavy influi of Russiansheir republic.

The protests appearave had some impact.leaders seemmo'C Solicitous toward Esionian culture and language usage, and an all-unionon nationalities held in Laivia received -idc publicity.

<

Lithuania Itussifies lion pressures are much less severe in Lithuania. The pcipulaiioni rate among Catholic Liihuanians is much higher than in the oiher two Baltic republics (see tablehe republic remains predominately rural, andof Russians has been limited.esult, still make uperceni of Ihe republic's population.

Lithuani

and is directed against the Russians As is the ease with Polish nationalism, the Roman Calholic Church rs closely identified wuh Lithuanian nationalism.regime pressure on believers and reslrictions on the training of new priests, officials acknowledge thai li peicent of Lithuanians identify wiih ihc Catholic faith. Regime harassment hits, nonetheless driven much of the Church's activity underground This underground jamiy Include the iTMi.hing ,if ihc

sumudai (illegal) periodical Chronicle, the longest standing dissident publication in Lithuania.9 tlie Church eveneiiiion drive (Col0 signatures! demanding Liihuunian

r Poland.

Jdcvelopnscnlsunu appear to lp.iv amused miicd feelings in the Baltic area. On the one hand, many native residents admire the courage und initiative of Polish workers in pressing ihc regime. On the other hand, they believe thai Poland alreadsigher standard of living lhan the USSR and resent Soviei assistance that subsidircs Polish consumption There appears lo be widespread agrecmenr. moreover, lhal Sc4idarity-type movements are simpls notin Ihe USSR.

Local authorities, nonetheless, arsparently believe ihai Polish developmenis COold produce some sympathy and made some largely symbolic adjustments in policy in the first months after worker unresl in Poland infficials in Latvia andew concern for workers' rights and interests in an aitcmpi lo bead off any local agitation inspired by live Polish model. In both Latvia and Liihuania. workers were elevated to membership in each repub lie's Central Commillee Bureau, an unusual honor.

Despite the manifestations or nationalist ditcontenl. Ihe nationalist movements in thc Baltic areas appear to SurTcrack of formal leadership. Nationalist groups lack consensus on goals, and ihey have failed toroadly based membership. Most of these groups havc Quickly evaporated in Ihe face of KGB pressure. Although ihe Baltic rscoplcs tenaciously cling to iheir language and culture, politicalor independence isealistic oplion.he face of long-icrm demographic trends. Given rhis situation, the strategy of permnn some degree of religious and cultural freedom while ai the same time dealing harshly wiih political dissent should

serve to isolate nationalist pmups and undenn.ne their popular apnea.

The Ukraine

The Ukrainians arc the targcti and rnost lofloeniial national minority in the USSR. Their republic It the most populout. politically powerful, and ccorwmically important of theinorityecording to9 centut. Ukrainian, compriieercent of iheopuUlionerccnl of theof Ihe Ukrainian Republic,ared -ell launiog wjntaatial rcrfilical repreieniation tiacc Sulias death. On the weal level, the Ukrainaaahe largest regional pany orgiaiiaiioo in the USSR, aad its upperare dominated by Ukrainians

Alihough the Ukraine la relatively -ell inlet riled polurcally and lociill, Into lhe Soviei ilate, potential problem areit remain. There hn nevertrong Rviman pretence in (he wesiern pan of Ihe Ukraine, which wa, annexed by lhe So-ieii durlnt World War II. Lessercent of the rwrwliilon in moitobtain, anderceai in all of lhe western obtain are Hunan The Uniale Church, moreover.lymbol of Ukrainian ethnic ideality, is alio centered ia the waters pin of the republic Desptie the iniircl.giout prenure, co it and the periodic rcprciuoeu of the Stalin and Khratbchcvhe Church rem not loyal to Rime and main-lami tici with coreliewoiili innd, couldhe locus of nationalistthe future.

The active promotion of ihe Russian language hai been bitterly resented by Ukrainian dissidents ai -ell. Khruihehcv'i proposil in Iheiking Ukrainian an elective (rather thin required) language in Ruiiian schooli in thc republic icnenied consider-able local opposition. Samiidai (illegal) publications have conimaed lo protest iheandlini of Ukrainian language and culture

Re^cm rc pom rig indicatei that language attimiUtioo pressures have no; abated Hum- remain, ihe pec-daminant language in hiihernlyercent of Iceturei at universities in the republic were offered inignificant portion of liiciary and scientific py Mm lion, ia ihe Ukraine, moreover, are only offered in Russian

Ukrainian dissent has evolved away from the irmcd anll-Sorlei resistanceorld War II and ihc imme-dine posiwtr tearsatlonillim lhal is avowedly Miriilt in conteni and appeab to Ukrainianle. Ilonehar. for example,lc,elof lhe Ruu.iTe.two process .Wk gjjg^potitwn a. head of Ihe Ukralaiaaon. The Ukrnman pany leadership (under former pany leader Pyoer Sheleit) hasevcaased (AninunsanipuUlrrc toolhe meat from Mcacow -hike fcateriat relative tcacrationerfluch seauJnvni at home. Shelest protected some Ukrainian aationalim inhile he championed economic decn-tnliuiion and pushed lo get the roost for lhe Ukninc'i coil sector, while publicly complaining thit his republic -ai not receiving iu fab share of resource allocations Inh ihe Tyumen oilfields. Sheleit evenbtory of lhe Ukrainian people lhaty from hereiofore traditional Soviei imerpreiailons of Ukrainian nationalism. Such ae-twn, made Sheleit vulnerable to chargestional.sm ird led in pan lo fab removal isany leader1 iei dbmbsal from the

pinburo him

Rrg.aw rntrtaW Although thererre tense of Ukrainian ethnic ideittriy and pride in Ukrainian Impute hisiory. and collure. luitonaliiy. bised icparatbmere talent lhan actual threat now- The aulliorlllei hive been very iticcciiful In controllini all kinds of dissent in the Ukraine bythe dlsienicn. Vladimir Sheherbiukiy. the current parly hcid. moreover, ha. moved effectively lo rein in lhe nitionaliil minifestalions toteciicdredecessor through esiensive personnel ehinget among adminitiraiori of cultural affairs.

tW The Ukraine, like lhe Baltics,to East European talTtseaee. Theha. hiitorieai tbs with coastrict ofand Ukraiaiaas arc cat both tides of theAt with thc Crechotlovak crisis inUkrainian, have show, .merest infoi-

nti in Poland b, liileoinj; io Polbh television and radiobroadcast* and by reading underground

Table 5

Comparison ol Russian and Central Asian Population9

iWMct Kazakh*

1>M>

Tarkfflcm

Kiijlii-

i

epori receivedtl indicate! that Polish aeii-it.lt, were trying to influence labor actions in the Ukraine by sending in leaflets und pamphleil and directing broadcam lo inhabitants of the western porlion of the republic. The result ol tuch activity is hard to gauge. Although events in Poland, prior loaw. may have raised Ibc vague Itope for eventual change in ihe Ukraine. Ihe regime has soughi to counter thc impaci by stepped-upefforts.

Central Asia

This area remain* culturally and socially resistant to Soviet assimilation. Islam, despite tcgimcontinues to haveinfluence on the way of life in Muslim areas and serves totrong sense of national tdeniiiy This distinctiveness IWSoviei demographic policy, resource allocation decttions. and military conscription. Il doe* not seem likely, however, to produce significant violentio the regime in thc near future.

emographic ci plosion is occurring in Ceniialee table Jl Birth rales in the Muslim republics are from IJimes those in predominantly Slavic republics. By ihehese republics will contain somecreenl of the Soviet population, up (rom some IS percent uiMoreover, by the end of ihe centuryperceni of all Soviet childrc* ndet ageill come fmist Muslim areas

Census daia9 indicate that Muslims are monjly inclined lo Concentrate in their native areas, hor Ihe major Muslim ethnic groups, al leastercent and as many asercent reside in their own republics. This stay-at-home ittitude has complicated ihc regime's effortsse cicess Central Asian labor in European Russia and Siberis. The Kremlinwill not be able to use this surplus labor pool effectively without making significant culturaland providing more material incentives or using coercion.

Alloration Demaatfi. The growing population inAna is already increasing pressure on lhc regime to increase allocations for industrial development and for services loecline in the standard of living and employment. Soviei planners have recently ao kmr-lodged ihai such demographic considerations shouldreater rede in ceniralosplsn deputy department chief even argued that al) new industries should bc located in regions with high population growth. Central Asian leaders (Kunayev. Rashldov. andoreover, lobbied hard for more funds for water diversion projects ath Pany Congress. Yet, Ihe Soviet economy is already overburdened by defense eipcnditurcs. ihe need io moderniie increasingly obsolete industrial plants ond raiuip.Ttcni in Ihe European USSR, and ihe desire to ciploil the resources of lhc Par East and Siberia. In Tashkent inrcr.hnev. in fact, wesit out

i(unit* and Russian chauvinism Ditinni in

officers: Ar.n K'watrm inrsrifcj0 appeared aimed aiter imina ton practices suffered by enlisted men and officer* of minoriiy origin. Defcnie Minister Ustinov's Armed Forces Daritt teheed ihitsung lhe needncrease non-Slavicin ibc officer corps

Eailyew conscription law rurniul'v eliminated educaiional dcfermenti. Thii nop-Eap meaiurc will havearginal efTeci an Ibe "yellowing" of ib< Sonet military. however.lio will add to lhe Soviets' dilT>culiy in providing an educated civilian labor force. *

The Afghan eipenenee. against ihc bioider "asekdrop ol social and ethnic friction between Rusiiani and non-Slavs, tuggetts alto thai the Soviet General Staff may become less confident aboul Ihc hryalty Or obedi-ente of unitt in the event of potentially unpopular future mililary interventions. The invasion,ia its early stages, appeals to have aroused tome resentment arnong Ccnlral Aliins. Riotsashkent induction center, and spaniancout demonstrations against thc intervention alto occurred al thc military commiiiariait in Issyh and Chilik. Kazakhstan Muslim leierviMt in Afghanistan,may have refuted to fire on iheir Mutlim brother* ia Afghsaisian and in some cases reportedly deserted io the other side. The lipid replacement of Central Asian reservists in Afghanistan by regular and mostly Slavic troops suggeili in any cjvc iMi they were not effective in dealing wiih thc situation the Sovieit encountered there

lilimie frntJamemialiim. Moscow has always viewed religionompetitor for Ihe loyally of ihc Soviet people and hat dealt directly with this threat in Muslim areas The regime has beea fairly soeccstful in controllingam test StiOai of Islam by limiting lhe number of mosouet. supervising lheof the faith through police and governmemal administration, and itttrKtiujg ihc number ofio til theological seminariesukhara and Tashkcni ,

ttlam.hetcii.trong grip oa ihc culture of lhe Central Asian peoples and hinders the neaiionniform national culture. According io Soviei tociologbts and Western newsmen, viriitally all Kernel Musiimi continue lo marry within the faith, circumcise Ihcir tons, bury their dead in their own cemeteries, andost ofustom* lhal the regime hat struggled for years to eradicate To nidge by articles in the press and leadership speeches, local officiali are troubled, moreover, by ihc number of "unofficial mosques" and (he continued ciounce of Sufitcmiiecret religious are*pal. which caste, formed the backbone of thc itson militant anti-Soviet movement in the Caucasus. The scniilivjty to Sufi Influence was indicatedecent articlearty journaluslim party leader who invetghed against "the acts of religious fanatics and self-appointed mullahs

Thc revolution ta Iran and lhe Sonet intervention in Afghanistan, moreover, have made Islamica curreni issue for lhe leadership, and their events play on ihe psychological (cats of the Moacow.based leadership Numerous publicdemonstrate official amiety on this score In C' 0 C

J then Aierbaijan Party First Secretary Gey-dar Ahyev emphaiKed lhe need for lighter security measures on ihe Soviei-Iranian borderpeechough statement by lhe republic KGU head warning thai American intelligencewould attempt to use thc situation* in Iran and Afghanistan lo influence Soviet Mutlimt. The regime hat alto responded to thc potentially desubiliiing el fee tt of Itlamic fundamentalism with an upswingas propaganda specifically aimed ai Central Asia

n ike Soviet Ualoo

Tbe range of poiiocjl, reitgicus. and cultural ditcoo-lem thai it eiprcued la Ihe. Soviet dissident rnove-ineni doct not now teriouily challenge Ihcolitical control, btil Ihe retime dcah with It atif it does. The KGB hai wrd against "antiMcialiiiith considerable teal- and many dissidentctiviai*been arretted and hirissed

AI though the government hat lucceeded in itolailntptiuideni activity (tec tablearsh reaction almost assures thai the dissi-dent probiem will continue. Theactioru. moreover, reflcci iu own psychological insccurhy and iu un-illingness lo allow any him of challenge tobe party, aware of in own evolutionmall contpiratorial grenp enjoying fitlk popular support topowerful body in control of theprocess, feelt it can take no chances. The leadershipo well aware lhal popularr isauet involving living ill nethousing, and consumer Iin lime form the bairt for new, and potentially mote challenging, dissident movement i

Aside from official rcceeaalon. the dissident mewement has been hampered by lis own internal divisions: it has been fragmented, with various group* appealing lo diverit.lniefrial audiences The human right* move-nut, forhn becB unable lo broader Hi appeal to include workers. Religious and national minor)lies, moreover, have tended to define their goals narrowly, fillingelate them to Ihe broaderfor civil liberties. The movement has alsoharismatic leader who mighl through force of per-tonality rally the disparate religious, naiaoailitl. and human rights group*ohesive whole

R HI gloat Dltaenl

Soviet Martinshaiou id have ao rotgociiliit irate. Thc Soviet Communistn lurn, has been unwilling to tolerate any rival claim on ihe loyalty and behavior ol Soviet cliiiens. and ii hat tried sincest decree on religion1 to tuppreit religious activity aad belief. Although ihe constitution provides for freedom of religious worship

ii provides no proceduiit guari meet for cicrciilng (hit right. The constituiioo also endorses the righi ofpropaganda1 to combatbeliefs AH former churchwned by the in tr. and stale pcrmuiioa It required to use it for religious purposes. Religious orgiitiiaiioni wishing lo hold services must register with thc Council for Religious Affairs, ihe watchdog organ of Ihc Council of Miniitcn.

According

particularly Ihe Knsstaa Ovttiodotclosely monitored and even penetrated by thc KGB. Religious groups thai are not sulTrcicntly compliant are not registered hy ihe regime, -ffeeiively denying ihem legal status. Members of such unregistered groups arc lubjcci to lUrsssmcnt. and their leaden risk arrest sod iraprtscmmcni. According tot1

J various religious dissenters (especially Pen-lecottals, whose sects are not officially reeogmied by ihc stale) haveetted in large numbers. Jewish emigration hasprobably hairowth of the "refusenik" (one who has been refused permission to emigrate)the small npnoaitton group operating within (he Reman Or tho dot Church hat beea decimated by arrests

Religious belief, noneiheku. remains alive inUnion. Although no firm count eslsls.have admitted that as much as IJ iooJ lhc population are believers. Accordingparty chief Aadrocov is

concerned, moreover, lhal young people are being increasingly attracted to religious teachings. Thehasigorous ami religion campaign to counteract ihis trend.

Protest

In some Sonet republics the traditional rchgiovt faith it reinforced by minority oationalisrn. The local church often actsatalyst for nationality move-menu and as the guardianultural tradition that remit assimilation into the Sovkt mainstream. The

r

"1

Table 6

r

Catholic church and ihe Ukrainian Uni-ate ehurch. for ciamplc. have played central role, jn nattonalily struggles in their respective republic, (sec)

Government policieseprcti and control religion activity have generated romance is well. Althoufbcreation ofoo nc ill has allowed thc retime to keep light rein on officially unctioned rcli|ious activity, it hat driven many religious groups (lor (ii'Jiiun evangelists) urvdci|round. Baptiiu and Other* have soii|ht the ri|hl lo call With new fcu'giout councili free from governmentand they have petitioned internationalo gaini attenilon to improve the toi of iheir impritoned eoreligionitti

More recently, recogniiing thai any change in regime policy waj unlikely, many evangelical Christians have ptciiurcd the government for permission to emigrate. The Vithchrnko family, residing in the US Embassy in Mckcjow (or four years while teckieg to leave the Sovici Union, is perhaps the best cumptc of such discontent. Moreover, according lo US Embassytomeentecosials and Baptists have applied for can vrtas, withew families being granted approval

Althosgh the Hessian Orthodot Church has longrivileged positron in the Soviei stale, iu obsequioui submission to slate intercut and police

juntroluHwidCM acirviiy amongol the

Church Tlllhlul. Sortie observers fcpwi ihai unofficial study groups and religious icminiii organircd hy activtsis and functioning entirely outside lhchurch structure,ucceeded in ii-jVemri* intcr-esi in (he Orthodot faith among young people So cloar hat beea the Church's cooperation with Soviet zolheeitica that small grovpl of CVthodo believers have charged the Patriarch Oca Oct) with neglcetirg pastoraland re*ponsibililies The Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers Rights, for caamplc. founded by Father Cleb Ynaumn in IhePs. indicted thc Church hiciarchy lor at-tempting to serve two masters. Cod and IheIhcisiie siulr. Ina leilcr toChutch official! Father Dmitri) Oudku. another activist priest, also attacked, thc Church lor accepting officially imposed limiia-lions on us growih. lacking "independent bishops and not recraiuag sufficient clergy 'Oodio was sub-seaacntly forced io withdraw bis crslicrsam

Thc coniciniinrH of Sovsci Jen rose duringCH, and many of them began to concentrate their efforts onnew goal, emigration. The Soviet Govern, ment allowed increasing numbers to emigrate to win Iradc concessions with the United States, in response to lobbying from the outside, and also became ii hoped lo defute Jewish dissidence at home without resorting to internal rcpresa-w. ThcS-Sovietspecially after the invasion ofhat apparently roreimiied Sovstl ccaacern over outside optnaoalews were permitted to leave the Soviet Union, bui the number declined1 (sec figure) Local Jewish activistsumber of cities including Moscow reported recently that emigration officials had stopped accepting applications altogether If ihc trend of -itas issued to lewi through1 continuci. the number of Jews permitted io leave7 will be

Accordingthe regime has

rcupcasded to roigioui prorest by arrests ofby use of the media io discredit retigron. aad by ihc imposition of overt legal controls on the activities of believer! The arren of Faiher Vakontn and ihe public rcranioiion of lather Dudko are typical of the kind of (Vesture Ihai both the official church leader, thip and the state ctcn to keeplergy and the

u -* tu

religious membership under si net discipline. Viktor Bclikh. bishop of an unregistered Pentecostalin the Ukraine, wat rr.poricdtC ' o have been lummoncd to KGBin7 and mimed that somef his colleagues' throughout the Soviet Union faced arrest unless they complied with registration requirements Nikolay Gore toy. another Pentecostal bo hop- was sentenced to seven yearsabor camp and five years of internal caik for helping his perisharsncrs io emigrate According to remridur the Western press.

* number ol prsesii and nuns

active an the underground church in Lithuania arc under arrest, and three priestsbeen murucredheir deaths, in the on'ivon of many believers, officially condoned

Thc ami religious theme has been prominent in the press as well. Much or Ihc recent media aiiack has Stressed lite linkage of growing religious interest and

nascent pacifist tendencies among Soviet youngReligion it aho dcpiclcd ai ato the military strength of the USSR.Icctu'es nnd ivopagandu hate picked up' !thaf

Rchgtoat interest amont yocih i* not compatible with sccv.-iiy rcoui rente nit.

Encouragement lotnci front "Wnicrn tour icon circlci."

- Religionorm of mythological warfare irngurcd

by Ihe Vatican and the CIA. Soviet tourcct report that the CPSUecrct decree recently on albeitik cduejt'Ki aimed al the Mutlim and Catholic pcpula -tioni. Thc regime hat alto encouraged the use of trI ii riiualt including formal wedding ceremoniei in ihculture to replace the cenrrtonial aspect! of religion

The revival of religion it nol tolelr spiritual in content but tprntgiesire to redecover national ideality and escape from the barrennett of official ideology, ft it. Ihus. likely to continue Thc teeurily orgam and parly apparatus appear confident thai they can control religiout ditto*teni. but any inc> in repression could engender even more frcQuent conflict and dttiurbanc.es.

latrliectual Ih*tent

Like ihe Soviet religiout aciivius. many Soviei iniel-Ite lulls have risked harassment, imprisonment, psj. chiauie dtif niton, and forced rule to ciorest iheir views about political, economic, and social conditions in ihe USSR Their pertpeciives are diverte. ranging from the Westward looking ioierr.il ions turn of Andrey Sakbatot to Ihe imrospetlive Slavophilism of Aleksandr Solrheniltyn Theitand pcliiront. public dcmonttrationt. and itimiidtu peWi cattoas- have also been varied Regardless, thchas been flexible and sophiilicated in bringingctivity under control Although dittulence em barrasses the regime and captures inter naiiooal mmoet not threaten, at present. Soviet control

The DUsideait

Thc Soviet dissident aaoverrtcot got its real Mart ia the poti-Stalin political thaw Stalm't successors pernovelists, poeti. and hlstorliins to. viewt and.imited way.riticirc past *tate pot'ty Khnrshehcv even uied sooeeirlt- noiablyhis campaign tu dis-credit

Although ihe domesticem became more hostile to such activity under Brerhnev. internminnal conditions have provided dissidents with more npnor-lunny to disteminaic their viewside, aadiencc. and imtially with tome ptetceiion against reprisals Sakharov particularly has used his vlsibilil) in the West and his prestige wiihin the USSR to good advantage. He hai spoken can against Soviet foreign and domestic policy.criticired ihe Soviet human rights record, anduman2 heunger strike that forced Ibc rcg-rac lo allow an stepson's wife Id emigrate I

Although Sakharov it ihc moat visible aymbol of intellectual discontent in ihc USSR, others have joinedissent by uting the human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords The fin! such group was established in Moscow6 by physicist Yuny Orlov. Branches quickly followed io the Ukraine. Lithuania. Armenia, and Georgia. OrVov'i group established eaienttve con'.acts with othergroups, and it was especially supportive of various ethaneerncubrly lews aad ethnic Germans in thru effont toghi guaranteed by lhe accords. (

Ass offihoot of this Helsinki Corcmiitce. theAbuse Working Group, headed by Alcksandr Podrahtnek, researched psychiatric abuse* in the USSR Ii collected and publiciicd information about tbe otea of pysehiatry for polnical purposes and the confinement ofental hospital*oem of punishment. The resulting5 page dossier entitled Punitive Medicine wa* subsequently published in ihc West by Amnesty laseraational li detailedases of forced confinement and the

uie of drugs io "cure" iheic patients (for

."Hirue gel themecant ihrii newt) Ihn book

L.1Tier.1sl tn bringing condemnation of Soviet psychiatric practices it in internalioniI psychiatric conference held in Honolulu1

M V the ll'vi-l glow tnvinlri-rO pll-

maul, nn human nghii itiues and generally ignored the economic grievance* of the populace, ivm organi-ration! -erehco protect the tighti erfand lo address iir. previoutlv neglected comutuency Thc Free Trade Unrrm found ed by Vladimir Klebanov7 attempted io offer blue-collar uorkera lome protection agiiittt the poor working coaditioni found in the Don bat region| SMOT |Fteg iMcr-Prrafcumnal Association of vVoiKert) -as inner! by Vladimir tsoeisuv to defend worker microtis and io protect rinployeei Irom aebi-ttary disnsmal^ad otherncataKes The orgimiatmni were himpered hy the lackpecif* political program ind by the failure toufficient number of workers Shortly before hitmuvotod Ku>atin. ihe Motcer- head ed SMOT noted lhat thead mimtv iracted .ntellectualt. not rank and file workti-

Reaction and Suppression

Thc regime hat not hesitated lo move quickly again,!

oppoviion group* to ensure Iheir iiolaiton from rttte another and Iromai.or at Urge. Alikmgh tenniive lo Wetiern criticism in the past, ihc down turn in relations wiih the West and particularly with the United Stales has terioutly ehmxtnhed the timnrd foreign leverage cm the regime tn the human righit area

In iheir efforts to prohibit unsanctioned political acirviiy. the Soviet aathoriiics are great" ivdedlegal restrictions on freedom ofudrctal lyilctn Ihai doet not recognize fundamentalof the accused,ompliant medical ettiblohmeat lhal it willing to label disndenit at trxiOpstchopathi Although the Soviet constitution guarantees freedom of speech, picti. assembly, and densonilr attorn. Arli-ckf the RSFSR criminal code qualifies these fieecloms by prohibiting both "fibrkaisoesh defame lhc Soviet sutc and social syitem' and "propaganda Carried on for thc purpose of weakening the Soviet regimeThis irncle is supplemented byhkh fdrbtds the circulation ia oral or written form of fabrications that defame the Soviet tlate and social system. Conviction under these art clet can entail imprisonment for up lo teven years, wtth an additional lerm of internal enk ruaniog from two io five yean

These ankles have been interpretedroadly lhal atrnosi any siaieineai or action can be ccanudcrcd illegal. Daring Sulm'i tenure, even the ckfacingaiue or the tellingolitical lole eou'd be ntoscciiicd underosi-Siahn regimct have generally insliiuted kgal proceedings onlyan retort, ptcfc'ting to use kiter proa hies and frcctueaiby the KCB to make ihe pom thai anal's aciiviiici could have unhealthy consequences. If warnings are not heeded, sanctions can betightened Irom searches of apartrrtcnti by leerel prsi.ee.oti of tot. to arrcsisd-be emigrants are fired from then jobs upon applying <oi cut vital, denied olher work in the field for whvCh

they no named, and threatened with punishment underjiiiHiiijjm- illegal failure In -orl or be employed I

Once ditscei has reached Ihe point where legalihc regime hat teaeral ma legto

choose Pioniineiilile Anatoli) Shcharins kiy and Oilov may be tentriel-regime, labor camp. Under the ambiguous provisions of the eorrre-nonal labor code, these individuals arc routinely denied visits from relatives, medical treatment, and proper diet. The regime may choose to avoid trial publicityit did with militant civil rights leader Gen Petr Grigorcnto and manytending dissident! directly lo psychiatricIn those establishment! adminitiered directly by ihe Miniitry of Internal Affairs rather than the Ministry of Health, political activists arc treated lo the full array ofncluding drugs and shock treatment, as if tbey were truly insane Upon oampk-Ison of prison terms, the dissidents arc frequently cailed. Some unofficial Weaiern estimates of "politi cal" prisonersharacteriraiion not reeogni.n Soviet law) range as highrominent political distideniigure half as large Most imprisoned dissidents sic in Vladimir Prisonilometers west of Moscow) or in slrtct and special-regime correctional labor ctuoeies in Pot an or Perns Political garsoarrt are icponedly acpt alsychiatricn the Sovietere arerdinary psychiatric hospitalt in Ihe USSR and somepecial psycluainc hospiials o* piisoni run by the Ministry of Interna! Affairs).

Forced ciiie abroad it another rcrtsedy that ihc regime employs, usaaly after ihe dissident has served inr example, by thc end of Ml. such dun dents as Aksenov.aniel. Ginrburg. Grigor-enko. Kopelev. Litvinov. Maktimov. Plyushch. Stn-yaviky. Solrheniisyn. and Voinovich were In etile in the

In tome caaci Soviet dissidctts are harassed without ever being charged. They lose theirheirareigher education, and ihcir propcrttconfiscated Soviet authorities on occasion have iKi't -rated dissidents for upear without bringing them so trial (Human ngbti activist ASbcharantkiy. for esample, was arrested in7 and tried in)1 toch dissident gioaps as the Ptychiairic Abuse Working Group and the Ukrainian Hebinki Monitoring Committee had been rendered inactive, the Moscow HelsinkiGroup -as forced io disband, and Ihc unofficial trade union SMOT had been driven underground {although some of itt activity may persist, accordingecent report! Audrey Sakhirov has beea etilcd ta Gorkyffectively isolated from contact with Wmicro cmretpoodcnit. and continual:by thc KGB

In ihc recent pail the regime hat been at least partially leipomive to the foreign criticism of its treatment of dissidents, but il has never relaxed internal control. In ibc, lor example, the regime lacitly moderated its reprettion of dissidents toore favorable atmosphere for reaching agreements with the West,iihcier! States, for ill owa reasons It night be willing to do so again if there appeared to be some foreign policy gain. The kaderthtp. howevet. remains insecure and overly sensitive io inicrnal discontent, and tl will never voluntarily relax its vigilant nance on dissent

Conclusion

lli'iilt amy ofSovkl SOCIjl jni!ill* it evtceni snd wdl documented, observers differiheir atititmcnt of Ihc ultimate tonsequt ace* of ihcse problems fo> ihc Sonet retime SomeColumbia Universityewrrynthat *ht regime has bee" generally tuoceiiful in keeping popular t"ons wiibin bounds and will continue to do to In tbe judgment of ihetche oMei gcne>ai*tn it itill opiimltlle aboul llic future, and. more. moti Soviet citizen* are so politically apathciir lhat (he prctsutc on ihe iciime lot utmftjoi ptl. economic, or social charge is not grem The regimes coercive powers are to mam-c. nsprtover. lhal ocnlocHivcai of eagaautsl0 Sonet po-icietbe cacccdiagly difficult Thus,ihetc obtervert believe lhe regime probably will makr tome change ai thchev do not ihink il will produce lundamentil oi radical tiamfor-maiion ol* the potilital tyttem

Some oiher analyiit. among them John DuthncU of Northwestern i . brlieve lhal totiiloming together that coulditve over the long rue for profound pelnxs' change Thn school of thought head* that thc popular perception ofci"Og'clS. upon which ihe regime'* itgiii-macy rctn to heavily, it eroding Fthe Sonci-creaied middle elatt, according to ihii view, i* becom ing mote pciiimistic and apprcheiuive about the futj'i The younger generation in BustineH'ioreover, maket ut ludgmcnt* of Soviet performance by comparing standard! of living in lhe USSR witha* Wrjt and even Eastern Eatcaptom-parrtea a* w

nth the USSRheatad lubtrv.hesuchmay influence ihe political csiablishmcm or uhimaicly evenundamentalhc political lyticm

Boih of these iitcssmcnis. of course, arc highly

speculaiivcit type ofraught with

uncertainty very incomplete information aad aidclt

iivumptioat li i* pctsiWto

acae ttttematic aad intcgraiivt look It lhe

piobtcitss i ii it's locauag partitulaily on how ibc

Soviei rrf ime viewindroblems

The Soviet leadetship. in effect, ha* formulated ii* Own atsesimrni of its societalnd thi* evaluation hai guided it* policy response. Its priorities have been set by judgments concerningnd soKablii) of the social and

economicaces Clearly, ihc regime gives priori -t) to rxcMents ihai

Arc political isiucs fditttdencci at opposed to nta.nl; toeial phenomena (crime!

Have iinrnodilte potential for producing popular discontent (consumers opposedossible longer term threat* (ethnic tentiont)

- Are tutceptible to new policies (health care) at opposed lo being largelylcohol mm

Top of Ike Agrada

Thc rhetoric and actions of the current Soviett well al other evidence from intelligence icporhng. indicate lhat the regime is most concerned now about economic problems and ihcir effect on lhe Soviet populate The leadership recoeniies that economic rjroblemi have ihe potential for creating popular OVscaalcni and poltlicaltheseesrrirms threat, particularly in light ofalsad Such problem* aho adversely afTcct pacwlar morale and worker performance, which lead io mate ecoaeamehe highly labor-iaiemive Soviet naie even poorer Economic difficulties, in addition, oacerbaie other inicrnal problems tuch at crime and corruption and make it difficult for the regime to find ihc resources lo deal with such politically let* significant issues asand health nreesult, ihe economy i* ccnlral to achievement of the regime's goals,of raopularnd control of manybtcm

The regime, io jodgt fiom its aciams. dots not new many ol ihrte social dh at poliiically imporiani Ihc leader* may alio feel that if they gel ihe economy moving, even ihr endemic social problem* could be belter eoniiullerl

I

A Probkm on Ihe MViioo

The regime hn, 'torn ill inception, beensensitivehe nationality dimention in Soviet polities and it) carrotind it-ek approach hii generally been applied rrtott effectively. Today. for ciample.o widespread, politically disruptive protest or nationalist distent amone the Sovietonal ilka. Mur-ovei. it is difficult to envliion any serious polilieail difficulty (or ihc rcfime in ihis area in thc near term. Although eenvoji iphie irendi and regime ceooomie policies couldethnic tensions in the Baltics and produce sporadic violence. Baltic grievances have little impact elsewhere in Ihe USSR, can beand. i( neccssaiy. suppressed.

Over the long term, however, the nationality problem will itiume much greater importance andotentially significant vulnerability. Demographic tictids, for ciamptc. will have the gieateai impact in iheew decades, adversely impacting on labor distribution and probably increasing eonver icgional resource allot atlhal will heighten nationality tensions Thus, the regime'sraiher successful approach toward dealing with Soviet nationalities will come under increased sirgin in thc decades ahead, and il will require more adroii handling and perhaps changes in policies

i'.Mm: Suppressed for Now

The regime treats any political challengets inter, nal authority tersouslj. Although dissent in ihe Sennet Union does nothreat to ibe regime, the icgime goes lo coniideriblc effort to make turc the dissident movement icmiiiu impotent. Thus fir the Soviet leadership has been very successful in isolating and repressing politkal. religious, and cultural dissent through widespread arrest and imprisonment of oVsn dent leaden, confinement in psychiatric hospiiils. and exile Over ihedecade or so ihe dissidenthai little prospcei forulficiently broadbase to challenge the regime In thc long term, however, dusidencr could become morebecause of dissalisfactioe. with Irvingontinuing decline in ideological commitment, and an apparent iciurgcnce of interest in religious faith

Coping With Problems:

Present Policy and Future Options

From ihe perspective of the Soviet leadership,difficulties impact on thc entire range of social pi'hlcmi lhat it must manage. Unless It canueccisful economic strategy, there is every likelihood thai economic growth will stagnate, consumergrow, ethnic tensions will intensify, and discontent will become more threatening.

The Brerhnev regime, although concerned aboui ihc economy, apparently believed lis course would bc sticcctilul over the long run and felt no need io alter ii. Although Ihe new Sovkt leadership wouldprefer to continue Brerhnev'i coursehile land hai so far signaled us intention to do ml. it is not likely to have thn lutury for very long. Reduced economicIercent for ihiswill probably compel the new leaders lo consider other options more seriously. The Politburo will have io deal more directly with whether:

must be made in resource allocationthai now favors defense and consumption over invest mem

management reform should bc undertaken that ii Mows tome decent ruination, increased uie of material ineeniivej,reater rok for market forces

More draeoniac and orthodot measures would rein-Hill discipline in society and stimulate motelabor

The regime should fill back on its Slavic base and raise Ihe banner of Russian nationalism as ih; basis for political legitimacy

These choices and other related ones areand define two broad policy direct ions future

Soviet kadcii ate likely toe (or mitt

package would probably involve:

Diversion of funds away from defense budget growth to investment and, possibly, consumption.

Movement toward greater deccntraliniion inmanagement (perhaps including greateroa market mechanitmi to move resources and tabor)

More political and "iliuial deccntialriaiion along nationality lines

No Soviet leadership ha* permitted swellpcrmivisv course. The rcEiroe eould opt. on ihcuihe; hand,ore draconian appeoich that emphanred discipline, sacrifice, aad otdet Thb paths etumv Inm would probably lead to

tio*n> (or miliiaO spending

shift in illueaiionil.-om cosvantpiniri:

Much greater discipline in the workplace.

olto -oik and rerrWrnaracc aad perhaps increased.

and idkneav

Even more cent tali ratton of po-eem UM aa

Forced migration Oi* laborureelianee on Russian nailonafism to generaiMic.it legitimacy

1 neve pulieict could also br coupleda 'elurnorm of one-man rule at *elthone -ouldomrrutmeat to ateepress the popular backlash and di*otsntcnt ih.il it -ould bc likcl} ro generate.

Both options email significant risks and unccriiiiniirv but'>unie nf the prnb tenat the retimeilt in favorthend ccrtrasmic reform, for et ample, mi^hi idd't" some iif the root causes ol the social malaise, spur higher productivity, strengthen popular >upport for the regime, and make societal ptobkms rrsorrAt the same timeourse ruvvd initially be both economicsII) and uK-all) dmvpme Eeonomk manigenlack clear and consistem guidance for their dccittnni jad worker* would be forced loreaier measure of resptin>ibiln> for iheir li-.rlihocd Thc authoritarian approach, tut the mlit. hand, would increase control andhc regime's resource ilkx.it.on preferences at the eapenseeepening socialechaiag pro dsretivity. pottibiy declining economicth and perhaps the tracer bat ion of ethnic lennons

Given Ihe political realities -altar comm-ersteither program and the difficulty learning conntome mrddkiange course insotvinr ck mems of both opticus could be adopted Various economic reform measures might br coupled and arc Consistent,ore drmind-ng altitude lo* nd work, defense spending gru-th could be Cuthe margin: andinns magi ilsiliurr

might no longer be favored tsuch imcsinteni iutsJ depended onstrong lupportl Investment to spur long lermndustrial grov-th the let to economic retrial would gelnd-

It it b> i means certain which coursemini, km .if nrlano the new leadership -ill adopt Ton linkbouireferences, perceptions nf ear* rentnd lhc impJCi that lUCCCi lualicking will have on its del ibe rat inns. To iudgv Ir.mi reporting, however mans middle-letrl trffkittl* longnrr forceful Soviet internalnd believe greater discipline and rsrsJer ateubC) sJim ia this directroo. ihus.iielt At the new leaeknhip cow->'rdaie> it>and as tosnger offkiiK cnicr the -emndar. rani* ol ihe Pol'mihould get conic clues a> In theleaders perceptions of the problem and ihethat hat ihe greatest support.!

Im plica ifor IS Polks

CS aad other Western influence at) th,a the Sovvci rasSNtcal siurt and n*joile limited The lories supportingare -cah and -ill prohibitaviur unl) in ihe vcrj long term. Moreover, despite the evident -caknesscsof Ihe stslcm.hisiuryate* thai Ihe regime can slill call upon deep patrmtic nan* It cano ccaani on continued retails, patuviit ed lhc pofailaiion rtirncuk'it to cttcnal appe.iK

Wfttern policies, noneihelett ma. be iiblc Inale continuing Soviet weaknesses. Alilsough irndc docs not determine Soviet internalt denial could force more difficultata stiaa>ct> on ihe n*>ik price in terms ol quaint uf life in continue ihc prevent nriorili. for defense or leading it to some cutback in ihe rate of milnars gin-tli Western iradc. inrobab*l> br rtsrniial in am mapir cfl.irl ai economic reform The attraction tome We<acra siiuet hold for Ihe Soviet pcorae. moretv-cr. can probebl) be marginall) eiolc-icd in increase prapuUr pressure or the regime but Ihccicimn -ould be likely io be more hnrsh repression.

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Original document.

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