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Soviet Elite Concerns About Popular Discontent and Official Corruption
Aawomi
Soviet Elite Concerns About Popular Discontent and Official Corruption
Omcce/SovietAnalrsis.
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SOVA
Soviei Eltic Concerns Aboul Popular Discontent and UfUcial Corrupt lot- '
tt) -ai Blrrf In I'll "poti.
death cometime of heightened concern among Soviet elites about public moraleff mal abuic of power The dommtnl attitude appcari to be one of peaiiinitan abont the popular inood and apprehension about the implications of corruption for the future of the Soviet system Theic is alio consider sot: leniirneni among some elites for firm meaiiircs to restoic discipline and morality within the population at large and within the regime itself.
This sentiment, whieh probably accounts in pari for Andropov'a aseendan cy. may lead ihc Politburo to move toward more conservative aocial and political policies Such pot'Cin would bc compatible with lornc changcieccevomic admimstraiivn. but probably would preclude any broad introduction of marlei mcehin.imt. increase in popular participation in tbe political process at lowern cultural policy, or ev>int:on p: unofficial contacts with the Wen
X
IHt'mtfi IH J
Sotiet Elite Concerns About Popular Discontent and Official C'orruplion (u)
ihe patl severalnd ei|>ccially over thc pan severalumbri of Wciuin observers in Moiccsr hat delected in Sovici society an aii of 0encat depression and fotcbocing about the fututc. Some of theic observers believe lhal lhc mood of thc population chanted during lite lattei pan oftenuie.
some of tho judgments in ihc piper tentative Ncvei Ihelcti, "variable evidence support! ihe generalm Soviet elites have become moie concerned aboul ihe putcniial consequences of popular Uncoo-lent and official abuse of power ihan Ihey have been for lb* past Quartercatury
IWaUnrvi About Social Malaise
Sc.ic cotes ateware ihii Ir. recern icanni giving use lu popular discontent hav* worsened while ihc lOgune'i resource) for maintaining tosiil liability and motivating ihct force have diminishedarc probably in-Hconcerned aboui ihc adrcne effect of populni dtsiatlifaCllcei onducilvity. Out they ire alio wonted about the potsibillly of social disturbances tcrioui enough to produce rhal-lenges to political control.
Since Stalm's death, coercion hat diminished it an iniirarnent of political eo-tre-lvirtually dead aa anf imp-tag kryi hy to lb* regime aad high worker prod act rvrty The legime'a control alhai also tooaenccj tersc*hat Soviet cit zerii have grcatei access than on beforenfer ma-lion from abtoad and froni unofficial sources within ihr USSR bapundrd coniicis with lhc West have enabled ihe population to compile its loi wiih that of peoples -houch hlghei standard of livi.nn
i'.i- aiscaioi recent evidence on how Soviei elites themselves perceive Ihc mood of thc populationthe problem of corruption in the political' of lhc reports died apparently refer to peiccp-lioni of middle-level officials,ome of the repeats may refer more toatLtndea current among the "intelligent ua"profession Is) than lo aiiitudei of ofTieiah Where possible, the paperattitudes with parncuiar elite (roup* (for einrn-r. KGB offrtcrs. Ceniral Ccenmiticc funciionii.ci) The nnpiccisioii uf inucb of ihe reporting doca noiore lyiicinatie delineniton of differences otnong vgrioui chics. Caps in thc data betr ind thc probable buses of individual tmiiecs ncccssirily make
Moree thecclintng eeo-nomlc growih rales hive made itdiffiruli fnr ihr icgime to provide the gradual improvement in living siindnidi that the Soviet population had come to eipeci in Ihe Khrushchev ind early Brezhnev yean Breihncv abandoned Khrvihclicii ideological re-form ism and nitimpaionihi* party iutc on the basilrood "popvlin" coaienius of values. Instead, heanower legliiinacy for the regime, based more eompleiely on atienttco to ihc population'* material needs In ibe end. however, he
]
i'l led to satiify ccniuiner deiirvi Shrinking opp til nilles Tor upward lcciul mobiliis lud ihe iniOVnnij ofUnci appeared lo tontiibuieots of faiik MMOf many in their ability lo improve iheir material circumstancci through individual effoii
These ejfvetopnwni have ledeneral grmthcynicism, and dLg'anlkancnt ia Sovici(tin per<iialaise mfifctU itself .aiff .onsun plian ofncrcuingnovo, episodic strikend imarket Over the past leve-al scars,statements have recognized ihe negativethese phcnoniena on worker outputam pie. have ilroted il.at laborby worker dissatisfaction "Ml livingit economically countcrprcduetivespokesmen, including former PremierGeneral Scctctary Hrvihnev. hnvcwage incentives lose force whenwith the duality of goods and
The MVorc immediate problems ia food supply earned by four consecutive harvest ihort'alli have increased official wanness of the pnintar irond tor rsimpfc. a
last yearC armnirr letter oc food
stsortagei sircued the nerd to metallic oil resourcesgainst alarmum and pcsiarism among the
In
JkGP official! were privi'dyabout giowing unrcsiconsumer
com nullf Soviet young people, their '*heir inlcrcn in relic ion. and their desire to avoid military service. He ntso jckronl cdc.ee thai Soviet rmniigerv nowifficult lime in dealing wiih workers became workers aic offended by the privileges managers enroy.
told
J,-ihererrui deal of
unrcti in non-Russian repuhlici. The Soviethe slated, is ditguatcd, unhappy. Indlffeient, and inert.'
- Another officii'C_
/in April that Soviet societyiisli In discipline, rcflcctrd in laborii.i. ond friction bciwccn nationalities.
Thc jam*eputy minister of foreign irr.detbe Sovietwai becoming more demanding because of eipot-r- tompeaii
In Oetisticr a
headl,e'v
real" pmsibiliiy of unrcil among Ihc SovieiHe cued increasing pressure for belter fond,free nme.reater ivaiUbWny of cow lumtr goods.
'Oniiiiiic (He (aiam iinii isnln train penir toatcally (nronwwnt aah alnc unrsvn abaai tha roiiiilal lor disarocr.tyargiita.irodiica imnwn.rxtiimi lorinic byiBor rrsmveiiniy dou not inm pallidal problem! in ilit si sue of piorJ.Hing aonst
officials In dlieunioni with foreignersover thc past year have esnreitcd concernroad range of proDirnts relating to civic monk
I
epartmanihe CesKral Coaiaat lee's Ac id* my uf Social Scicsxti bad ci-prciied the ocason that th*tate of "economic, political, and ideological crisis."
The lame month. Proiufn'i Proisoranda
repressed considerable concern ever thc lack of
This antwri'l mibum'tv*lit* alilauuU. hoaani.r iiiiiadttiu In Hainanluuian iiuu, tvli In Tiarlil limo aad Ii ihfnl era. havr lurid ihit ita pupaUiian'a .mils aiiO ifctniiiaa fiom the nanhi iinsfaimrd "a* iininuiani tivoiiom of otinii Srmal "mm iiijin e>ui) ouriiiu ihraU panosl alio ce-ii titcil. afiiar. wii-raanas slaivo
ikain in paan-Hr aaal1aaiharai
Ihr swiirrrii ii.su m4 "Oiiro srtioliif Men entuiri criaasBal Oi- II" lantvrm Hliglhs lariwll alssai-Ccace Oil thi n" of Ihr ni.sus haw bwn iwmisaiaC pxwiliiallt Olfiiotirnvi Thai, the mwin of Soiial alitia Witt abaain of noruiai iiuliflcianrem.sliiprncd by tairlnt lOnilniorii. hit deep ixlorllil roou
2
livenis tn Poland over the faityean probibly aarc hog hiencd (Ixm coKCW Toe Poluh strikedid not produce in* significant i. rips thy protests in ihc Soviet Union, binfocused the aitention oJScmet otTi.iabon intcrnil Soviei conoi-lioni thai could create pioblcmi for them:
AccordingPolish situationt.iuico greai ncrvousncti in high party andcircles in Eiiomistrikes and student drrnonttraiasas toon pis re the fail0 -c eport,he iraoosi-tion of martialoiar.d. Eatoruan officials feared that unrcit in thcit on republic could rapidly act out of control, liven after Ihc declaration of martiul law. ihey remained concerned about the food situation and the circulation cf leaflets urging Estonian) to air ike
Int__
Jieporied that Polith leaderad attributed Sovietto Poland lo the Soviet leaden fun's concern over internal Sovici problems. Kama cited several unpubllcired strikes in Ihc Soviet Union related to the food situation.
ajor idrokagical confe-ence held isit Decern be. iod<*ud that ihe Potjji sitaat wat being discesscd as an ob>cct lesson for Hk Soviet Union.
that Soviet leaden fcaicd dcvelopmenu similar to those tn Poland could occur in Ihe Smict Union. Aeeordirg to this official, sporadicr food ahurtagci haC He moon ro tedhe leadership thai oa am anal threat camcd
Andropov mid senior Polish security officials last May ihai ihe economic and political situation in the USSR was not much belter than thai in Poland Kc complained that Soviet youth, in particular, awe
beco-iiing increasing', apolitical, pacifist, and inter-ested only in Ihenuelvcs. He went onament that Soviet youlh were increasingly attracted loreligion
julyj^
there was terivus concernCentraldepartments iliat industrial urtirti could gel out of ^official rcpoiledly remarked lhat senior officials were increasingly distressed about the itnc of Soviet society end diiiilutioncd about the future of ihc Soviet ayiirm
Over the past year Soviet propagandist! haveiheir efforts lo combat "antitoCMl" behavior and moral lastly. Particular attention hai been paid to Soviet youth's cynicism,nfatuation with Western tonsumer goods, and lack offor Improvements in the standaid ol living since World Wai II Al the same nme. regime actionsjefi as closing down direct-dial telephone service to and froer. Wtitern countriescrved lo curb contact!oviet dniidcnts and fore.gr.eri.
Retell spccchci and aitldes by military figureslso displayed unusual concern about pacifism among young people and about ethnir- tentiont in the armed forces Defense Minister Ustinov's Armed Forces Day speech lai i laced unusual strcia on the theme of harrnony among thci Mt tonalitieshe armed forcesamphlet publishedc. Chief of Staff Ogarto* deploredtendency tothe danger of -it. General Yejiiihcv. head of Ihe militaryain Poliiiealmtdc nmilnr remarks aboui youth's pacifismuly lecture
Cormprion and tba Campaignt
Reinforcingiens-on aboui the populir mood isappaiently growing concern among Soviet clues
aboul rihir*-'ihaVMahoul th* ivMeri On
tbe basts ol(
us inc.cased Soviet medio attention to ihe problem.
"SPCTH'
believe manyan lhal cexiuplion Ii eroding IbcimrrKfc'inim, public rcipcil for U" and order, aad il(miiiii!iin[ Ibc partyapacity lo get ibc country moving again
Corruption, ofrcteol io varying dcgiccs in moil 'ocklks and batrromirteru femur* of Soviet lifciince Ibc IvJOi Ncvcnheieli. although il ii impoitilae to measureClient of corruption pre-eoelj. there are ladiciiioot ibat online the pan mini yeari bribery, cmbciikmroi. and other abate! of rower among Soviet clitet hate bceornc ao preva-kntto blatantigniftcsni lowering of ncccplecl nor mi of'
Moil member! of the polnlcal elite teemaveaitc ocntalily and appear strongly rncatlvateelesire tondheirspecially foe thcM children. Short'y before Brcrhnev't death, lor eaample. tome report In'
r
i in Motco" ouyiiti and tr!linr. goods on the black market tc rumbling to mvicinancial inicreina Kip-iicwhange of fewer at the top
Nepolitm and ilkul activity- lo advance private end* arc reportedly common at lhe liighcit levels. The effotn ol Leningrad parly bot<oluburo member, to feather hit net! are rvatorioui Hrcihne* himself, by assiduoatly promoting tbe career inteiettt of both hyon-in-law and hit ten detente th* reported involvement of bb children in corrupt aclniiiit,rime offcodct
Curieni economic ttrirvrrncict may have iharprnrat competition amongclitet for pcmmniet and
heigi leeied retenlmcnt among nonparty cltiti of ibe
' Anivahiauaninl nl iwiwiinanHiaeOxhioicd4 anhe uie 0 tuilair fimi anat-vinailly theItWn ilm -enrmai Ifdertmrlelative tent* ai ihr uie e'rvuiilan arie faeiairenatlhal vtnUie aicur'a* narraaorvl. mere leauariaen nawlain* iaataxaa a* "hi aahte -euliouicr foi aaOueamn mlwtnaei. we hausaailna h< assails, I'rIs-reeIron ir* Moilri Ihuan in "
ccess party offictsb bate to cboiee con turner
i>>oa< report
1*1enior Soviet n officiali enjoying privilegedfncilitici could no longer obtain what.eponcd that
latiitb internal
problem! ttach t food situationfficer requested ihc ctubllthmcni ofit*ha oincen working ouiiidcdid not-aiy accctt ia Ih* ttor* 1 He ivggctied thai thehe one used by party tilfaciali. This rcejaeitof mote general discontent
wiihin Ibt
Curruption and ihe compcutran fvr friilrgerc regarded at tymptomt of lhe Ion of toeial put pot* among clueut tlrcy arcause of elite dlttaiiifaciion
Ji
ihiougtont th*atycalentral ConirrMitcc ktici read atof parlyKcccntindicate! that clitet
i) ai-tuluiioni arc incrcaiingty
out agairMt party abutai of power
t""'toa>e
vuiviiuny hatll ideological benringt. and many yoBag jure rrtraeni oiave lotl conft-deuce ia thebility to dealcrmeal
ciOivii-ie cobienv
Nci-griinc aUiul evemi in tht Clucatian icpubliCtyean mdicaltl lhat ibc KGB iltclf it bylatmtia* to corrupt-on
for ciarniM. inai uiuiiy hue
inhave routinely accepted
""huih" money from private entrepreneur! involved in catcntive illegal economic icuviiyhaheup of thc KGB io Arancnta reportedly took place parir.eloowi on rackeiccring
esire IO restore innniegnty it eipcuaiiy itrong among KGBany of whom reportedly believe Ibnl the patty it mote conceroed wiih presefvitig iw ptivilejc* nndhan
with I nced.C
ie uandirds bjiii r
of not hiringemployees who had rchilivcs n'rcidv working foi ttic organiralion. |
The official campaignr rupi ion. which be gait tail icar. should be viewed tnhctc concern) on ihc pan of KGB and ether elites Thc campaign may snve iccral purposes. On one Jc>el. il ii In Our view (mended locumbaibcb.iv-ici on the part oli rem and to persuade the population at largehe regime'a determination to root nut malfeasance within the party The campaign mil nl so be intended to provide ctcutct and scape-goait for shortages of consumer goods and other economic dislocations By cipoung corruptionie pari of lower level (unetionariei and prosecutingof 'he in. bkgbcr affroab may hop* so deflect criticism from laetmcrves
Itccjiisr to many higher official" are themselvesre r> bli tocliarcci of corruption,ampaign against corruption ai loner loelt runs Ihe risk olut of control Allhoigh pecbablv intended initially as pcopaginda foropulace and iceond-arllyroteinic device for top leaders, the antisorruption campaign hosehicle of political struggle within the Politburo. Thc factumber of fairly high ievcl cfficiali have BCtualli been netted dui'itg the eccie of I'n carseaign tanravda indicated lhat one USSR denniy minUiarcutcd| suggest! thai some kaderi have exploited am-corrupt ion sentiment to uitati political opponenti
Andropov, in ponicalir. evidently bat used the anli-corrupiion ittue to further hn political ambitionsormer KGB chief he posscttcs derogatorynbout his fellow Politburo members. Andropov it cxmtCQucnilyosition either directly to blackmailho fear capenure si their iilcxitrntateor to use th* derogatory information moreselectively leaking It in order to damage an Opponent's reputation, oi by prosecuting- cot ruptton cases at lower leiela aggrctsocly to as toolitical climate thai cither leaders find threatening Andropov evidently has emedoyed thisGBrues tig a' ion ofpt ion cases
reportedly implicating Urerhnev'i chdikcn eoninbui-
cd io the erouon ct Bir/harvV peaiiieal rutiivaa ia ibe
roonthi prior ir in death According loC
nay alio have
a rumored aeanoal involving Kirilcoko's son to
force Kltllcnko's removal from the leadership i
The anlieotruption issue nity hare faeilnaledriteorelam way. According loscane reporting C
3 Andropovcnoaalbeinghat reputation pouiblyopular one among broader segmentspolitical elite. Accordingvnioi SovietAndropov received an unusual
standing ovation ai the May meeting of ihc Central Committee thai proasutcd aim in the KCiclanat Whether or not tup leadenhe prefer eners of lower level officisls. they arc teniittvc in them, and suppori for Andropov within thc eliteit whole may haveactor in ihc Politburo's lekctlon of him as thc weceiior.
Many ofl-.uli protected by Hrcibnc'ipersonnelhich treated corrupt andpartyndulgently, may fca'concerted drive tu purify the parly Severalinhave picked up rumott that Cheritenko attempted to cipusiire on tfcit fear. Chcrnenco's fivocibrr and pointed reference io Brce baev't pcncotflis tp**eh to the Central Committee Reeling ihai installed Andropov could be interpreted ai evidence io support of thctc rutnoii. One reason for Chernenko'i failure in- have been that the concern of the elitehole about ihc lang-ierm coriosivc effects of corruption carried greater political weight thin the apprehension of the most calpabtc part] dffrciali about ih* coucasicnvciurge
Yearningtrong lander Perceptions of an erouon of discipline within ihc populition ind the party hue evidently led many cdTsciili to long forret ma lo the cede* of Stake's day Although few in th* Soviet Uniee woulda full-iealc rehabilitation of the Slalinitl terror
many officials sec "Stnlin"ositive symbol for ilieof ioue'i leadership liter bciietc is needed lotl.'j
In MnreiVC
itonIc-level government omtiai in Mot-eon- ei pressed llic vie" lhalciation was movingco-Sialiniu or ten-la lion.
In Juno, athat senior ami middle-level pany official) were nowlicard arguing thai in Order lo generate economic growth and preserve polllicol liability, (be Soviet Union would haveighten political com rod at home and cut back on social, cultural, and political contacts with the West (Not tunc was said about economicith thc Wen.)
Ineniorold
thai hen the tent* that he believed that for the USSR to survive and to improve itreat dcil uf toeial disciplinetrong leader of lhe Stalin lype. which Brezhnev was not.
Several Soviet sources have suggestedeen toan whn can answerneed for firm leader ihip -lyffk'ir-l. for example, totd
April thai of Ihc current leaden, only Andropov fit the model of* to;no*(nroftg leaders This, put summer aSoviet C Dmd he believed thai the Soviei public would like to tee Andropov take crrcr. Ii tvai this source's opinion thai the Soviet Union needed above alleturn to "order'* and thai Andropov was viewed at the kind of man who could nchievc Ibis. In addition to piagmatrtm and laciical flexibility in dealing with dissent, Andropov hut lhe reputation oftrong ndvoc-stc of measures lo prevent Western ideological penetration and any manifestations of civil unrest cr disobedience
In recent months, severalrticles have implied ihai policies, durirBrezhnev's lenure ledrowih of pc'ri'iiiivcncs* in society. Lati November, for
csamplc. an article b> well-known conservativeAlcksnndi c; ilovsly darkly nvctrcd that.
Some comrades hare evideatty ntiiinicrprcied thc "aimosphcrc of humanism" which watby lhe October IVA4 plenum 'which removed Khrushchev aad installedhese comrades arctep with the mass of tat Soviet pectue and arc not contributing it> the building of Communitm-
. C
>
hat bit rtceai ni.'t were pan offfort taibc tcrc-i aadorreaion" in tV chmaic of relatrv* loterarHC that hat prevailed inolt*te* wnee iheHariy Congress6 Othei aii-Jrt BMeritseiaed the public* ton in the Soviet pren of iriielci thai UfccliM. |
Russian Nationalism
Thc recent emphasis on Russian nalionoliil themes in Soviet media piatnblyeightened desiee to buttress internal discipline. In the pail Russianhat been closely associated with repressive social policies. Appeals to Ruiuan nationalism may be intended lo lay Ihc groundwork fur efforts to inert greater central control over ill* mmcrily nationalities, uhica Raman leaden doubtless believe are lessandt.btr to fuccign infUcaecs lhan Ibc Rssvan porwlatioo Alurrsctt to anociau ihe rcgin*iely with irtdi'iev.al Russian Mtteav absia may abaseaiu of COUMCfrog cocsvmci di-estaueai and (affirming ihc wiiuag of ideologygitimiyirtg force tn the Russian repfcb-afclwK
There hive beenindication that Russian nationalism is gaining ttrongthurrent of thought io official circlet.
Over thc past iwoumber of articles and speeches of Politburo memthose of the now deceases! Sutloi- have been more support*f Russian nationalism than leadiitiiipearlier in Dreihaev'i tenure
A Ceniial Committee resolution earlier ilm year niirlmi lhc iinniienary of ihc formation o' ihe USSH lilted sirooglyHuman nationalism The resolution placed htniti emphasis than prcvi oli ullknil statements doling ihc Bicihocv yean on the promotion of Russian language study at an iniuunicni of integiition and on the need to proicet ihc nihil of Ruuiani li>in( in non*Russian rcpub-lici. Thealio called for greaterfrom Bon-Ruuiaan the development ol ihc KSISR's Far Eaitcia and Siberian resources and rheone of European Russia Il attributedrole to the Ruiiiun people in patl Sovietmphasised the central' ized character of ihc Soviei note, and made only polling reference to ihc ihoorcIleal Geniality of Sovici mi ion a'at in
2 speech probably coordi-naird within theo to. expanded on theie Ihtnict toigorous endorsement to Investment and cadrei policies beneficialhe Russianand lo Russian, living in other Soviei republics He advocated the migration of -ortors fromAsa to areas of the RSFSK suffering labor shnrtaget, criticised Use notion lhat valuable ipc-cnhtti ihauld remain in iheir own lepublics "hen oihcr regionsreaitr need for Ihem, and ciiipltaii'cd even moie strongly than in the pan lhat pro)ccii throughout the RSFSR had priority ove> ihose in other rcgioni He also called for greater icprai matron of ethnicari7 and stale intuialien) ini republics.
iddlc-Mvcl Soviet party official icportcd ilrona tentlmenl among senior and mlddlc-lrvelolicy of retrenchment aimed al strength-ening thelavs* rsscoce Such officiiIt reporirdly argued ihai Sonei Russia had first to protect itself from bona; laamped by Western ideas and then lo brace itself for Ibe end of Ihe century, when it would havery to maintain controlountry where Ruisiini would comprise Ion limn Half the rsopuliiioa.
Th* Jeth Partyebruarynvnev atcd ptonaialisi policies to be implemented First in Slavic regions, which haw much loner blrthriics than moil areas of the country. ,
Tbe increased official ami nun to Russian_notionatist tlscmcs and thc heightened emphasis on discipline have, however,cietion from advocates of rnorcTiberaF"domettac potiors Some strong aitachi on corncrvaiivc Raman naiionaiist writers, for cut. pie. have appeared in the pren in recent months Moit notnbk In this regard wcte. articles by Professor Kulcshov Inlast February and by literary critic Suroviscv in the literary soutnaln March (
Moreover, speeches of tome kidcrc. especially secre ury Chernenko and Georgian paity boss Shcvord-nsdie. have paid less attention to ihc nee' forand discipline thanhe need for partyublie opinion Chcrnvnko's ipcech-Co, for essmplc. have tended tu attribute th* crisis In Poland mure to the Gicrck regime'sol contact.th th* mosses thanhe Polith party's loss ol iti ideological bcae.rChcrneiho has alsoeuputist" image or prwmatrsg conomiti-cau lo study public opinion, calling for miripa'tyamiuigmng fee grcolcr attention toers from ciiiteni, reportedly opposing eiprcstions of ciiramc BLilian chauvinism in liieiaturc. and explicitly enii-ciitng Stalin's repression. His advocacy of stepser than represa dug'unilcd clemculi of soc>cty suggests thai th* proper mil of conci'iatcry and ceertivc see salive rssue among Soviet cliitf, (
s Ion 1
Savin elite concerns about popular morale may bo tempered by cognitanee lhat th* regime posieitei itill powerful insirumenti ofndelief
n ceniii "negaioc" fralurea of COOtssrrvpP -ry
Sovietai religion, th* black marker,ceas escape valves for popular frus traiioni. Soviet elite* probaNy also believe lhat many ciuof ihc elder generation igh degree of attachment to dominant values of the political culture. According lo (.
ost Soviet cinrens seem
proud ol ihe Sonet fiobi! loir andigh premium on personal security and public orderame souiccs indicate that fea Soviet Citiicna know much about Western dcniocracy or regard it aa an
attractive model, and th-il time feat capitalism as much ct thcrcnvr it. Dissent it fragmented, andrganized labor movenseni tie national( could servenifying center for disgruntled elements of ihe population.
Nes-crlhclcss. slrtee ilsc mid-lVTOs ihe mood of Soviet society> In-ve shifted. Altlwugh holiiis of submission to authority remain stronger iir the Soviet Union than among mosi pecples in Eastern Qmope, thc Soviet nunuljiion his apparently become more demanding, nioie skeptical, and less pliable. As cited earlier in the paper. Soviei officials are asvntc itsm many non-Hutslans rejcei core values of the system and that many sou nr. people doubt thai ihe system any longer nor values or ideals. The -el fur*-or ten led features of th* Soviei system have always been llmsc iliai evoked: Ihc tncsi positive responses from ihc population, bat the regime') pcifoimancc in rcccni sears has increased doubts among consumers about the party's commit mini nnd ability to providefor iheir material wcl!-boins< t
Theseoviei society have gi'Cn Soviei elites causeu citron the efficacy of cuireni policies for cniuring high labor productivity and regimeThc impaci of low public morale on worker oulpul is probably Ihe most immediate Concert of Officials. Bui Soviei elites alsoBrezhnev reminded ilicrn on more than oneihe problem of satisfying the material needs of the population is "not only an economic, but aUopolitical matter "by vigilance and Amicocruption campaign* of recent years, as well as by reportingide vatIciy of sources. Soviet elites today probably feel less secure about popular Quiescence iban atne since Ihc dc-Stalinizuiion period of, t
Reporting about pervasive corruption it all kvels of the Soviet system also suggests ihai Soviet officials todayower commitment to serving ihe party or the country, as opposed to their bureaucratic and especially iheir private interests, lhan ever before.
There it aprachentton among chics lhal eorrupijpn is -tapping Ihc party's moral ntilhotily jnd its ability lo provide effective kodership' <
These trends in elite altitudes may have inwrfor policy change ui the pcrsi-8fe*hitev period. Initially, internal policy mayix of "au-ilinriiarian" measures (for example, increased ceniral controls over thc us* and movement of labori and "liberal" ones (such as increased txippoti for private agriculture and some privaten balance, however, it scents likely thai Andropov and nil col-leagues will increasingly Attempt lo accommodate elite concerns by bobicring Russian nationalismrop to ihe system and adopting generally more conservative social ooliciei. The regime may. for example, place gccaicr emphasis on negativeHhe lot* of one'* >a6 or reduction in salary, the lliteat of arrest) than on positive incentives (higher wages, unproved supplies of consumer goodijfor political confoimily and hard
Al ihc same lime. Andropov is likely toajor Crackdown on corruption. Thc appointment of former head of Ihc Azerbaijan party Geydar AliyCvhc posi of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of
If ilm.l* be neeed lhal Itoere relativea -al
isttui ihii sorrvptionhoiamnso*SO'tei tile, or thst
pairiulism na lenntt serves ss eae me4lvilirviiie Uhov*r. Rsihtr.hr iiOimem al iNs facer imi Se-Miss sr. less inclined than In lie nil u> subcedinsie crtoeil> it-iht puFitiliofuCKUluilniOtt-e* h. tr<lnil .umamieuin. Heut earlier periods, il nu. be isJ listlme-'t catnei-ionifherf idutim thin arrears la be ine ease ladsy.(error -as el nurse iieatetu under Lents in
Ihe Ctrl, rears ea* Soviet peati.in* th: Slalva year. Sovits
oii'tctieo itai thi. -ere pieneenew sxliu. In facl.il was precisely *vrla* the dtrVttl this of the narge. itui large nunsbrn olbonei pan. cadre* nsuSe ibe -Mr-cm
of teuilcuini tu crime* this hid not torn mine* MiIimiI
leeaitni -ere sneticed ey torture,ene*int lotBliy-to Sulin atd loth,th.
mcdivine* mm,-of th!ial defends assven
wetter KSistihshev. parli nlT-SMi -oilim en ainbilXsundofurpose tint nntabuthetai- mau-hed
Mini it en may hare beenlirii atep In tail direction,arter KCBapeciene* in cccutomic maiuicnvcni. hat been in ihcof ihc initooernpiion nmpnain.
The elevation of former Goanlan official Nikolar Ryahkov lo the iccrctiriai may alio portend the intiodnciian of more forceful coeaiurca to curb ofTVctil milfeaiancc and lo cruuit unci govern mcnl coir.plante withcilrcctivei. Ryehkov, who will be overieeing the work of minUirtes in key icctora of heavy ioduttty. hai itrctaed .r. hit puhliibcd writingi tht needente uniiln and tabor (BacanHac. Andropov'i apnech onovember lo ihe Central Committee olio eiuphaiiiid (hii tbemt
cevcy neieniaiion -omld be compatible wiih
wmi chance* in economic adminiitration. Tbcii
might include an end to ttai* lubtldlei for Item* of
baiic coniumpllon and snaier cntpbiiit on monetary
ineentivci for factory manager! to uiibaa labor more
wonld loadhe firf non pro
duetivc workcri Efforii to Mlengthen pemllcal and
ioco;troll over the ponulailon probably would
preclude, however, any brond introduclion of market
mcciianinni.opular partieHpntaan in tht
political raoceii ai io-er levcJi. thaw in Cultural
policy, or expansion of unofficial con licit with the Wen
-Sacaai^
Original document.
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