J
V
m
Yugoslavia Thew Resin To Tell
KeyYugoslav political I'liem rnj> prove incapable of coping wilh the
it lei nat financial difficulties, docnesticbiems.
growing ethnic tension*.
*lil klrJ w^'_
We believe ihai ihe counity's collective 'cade-ship of both party and govcrnmeniey factor. Tiio created and bequeathed this system to give all Yugoslavia's ethnica say in national decisionmaking so thai none would be tempted lo break away. The mechanics of Iherotational leaderships wilh brief tenures, unclear divisions of lesponsibillly. and reliance onlhe system indecisive.
Instead of becoming the central nervous system of the largerorganism, lhe federal parly leadership in Belgrade haslo regional and other federal power centers. Nowhcic wasineptitude more in evidence than ai ihe party'sinfiist without Tiio. The parly emerged fromdeeply divided both wiihm its leadership and also betweenand [he rank and file, not only over immediate policy ni_cs.over lhe need for basic
We believe that ihe Yugoslav system is likely to receive additional shocks in theeed to reschedule itsand thai disagreements within Ihe partyncrease. The longer term risk is thai the federal parly will slip imo an irreversible process of decay and become increasingly unable hold the Yugoslav state together.
Should these trends continue, il is conceivable that Yugoslavgain Ihe backing to move their party loward moreand iheir countryore genuinelyBui, given Yugoslavia's economic problems and historycompetition among its constituent eihnonational groups, we
believe ii more likely thai the nation will revertondition of endemic instability, perhaps held together only by lhe armed forces.
stakes for the West in the Yugoslav dramah. The Soviets
would be templedake advantage of an unstableoviet success could have potentially profound consequences for Ihe Balkan* and perhaps the balance of power in Europe.
Begin To Tclll
In loeleiy. there eilil strong lend-tacit* toward disintegration Quit' and peaceful change! ate no longer fallible. In the econoniy. politics, and society troubled thangti are earning
/WilliJwm IM1
Tin's Pcl.lml Legacy
eriod YugeaJa-via has Vif dami Rises' by tbe personality of Sons Brae Tuo and ruled by ike partisan fraternity thai her the Oc'ini and Iialiant.-
Ynn iv ;o, atoratort. andriiiiiimi more-
mean After initiallyulmmtame Yugoslav Communiilii:the Soviet Blothat Stalin-
j^ilaying a
ismeformation of toetalitm In itt ttead iney developed, over lim* Iheirunique lyitcm. Ibe core tenetsrc lint, economical ly. workers man-age their own enterprise* on behalf nf society at large and ibai. politically, the Communist party provides Ihe live thai hold* the lylttm togethernot|
Thii Yugoslav system of "self-managing socialism."appropriate for giving Yugoslavia's multiple and fractious nationalities and minorityense of participation in iheir society, hai proved no panacea:
kai net guaranteed that all Yugoslav nationalities accept federal policies. The Army has twice had to rettcrc order in the Albanian minority region and once la threaten to bring Ihe Croats into line.
hit inhibited tentible federal policymaking and management in tuch key areat as international bcrro-ing, trade, investment, tad monetary and fiscal affairs. The result has been economicchronic inefficiency, and periodic crisis.
It provided no orderly mechanisms for trantferring power with ihe result that on three orcaimnt Tito fell required to purge or demote key lieutenantsattempted to challenge bins or toata-mouni potmen from which to tacceed
Daring Titos lifetime Yugoslaviaable la functionl> despite theof la* lyiiem. because lito nad the prestige to intervene at critical junctures and to impose remedial measures In hit final yeanno one acceptable in theto assume hit role, he attempted lo create and inttitu-tionaliiesystem of collective political rule that would protfudr struggles for one-man rule endthat none ofajor eiknonalional group* -ould have Caute to challenge the integrity of the Yugcala*
ystem roqvira that Use President of theopoffiot for only one year and thai ibe yab rotate among the parties of the gii republicsrovinces. The President cannot make decision* without the agreement of the otherreiidium members. Each of thete officials, in turn, is proscribed from establishing policy in his own iwnieular area of res pant ibilily withoutof the rest All Presidium memben are free to discust and make policy proposals across theimilar lylitm of collective rcsponiibilily by short-term ofTmaii in rotations' positiont kidbeen ciiibliifcrd for ihe State Preside gcj. the Pieii-tfent ofverves as head offlfr
Soon alter Tito't rlcalh inaniing ngei begin tJ appear that the collective Icaderthip Khcmc wat not woehing well, in pan because ihe Preiidium tended lo tveid tough issue* in ill weekly meetingi. An arliele in Ihe party weekly Kommunlit revealed in
gmnt
I1
h.ii. ofbeicada iaonlyeceifi attention PreWium- btfDoianc corrtpiaiitcdmi inicmfour mcctingi inI cjn mart nw
eft uniuid. fl^|
ystem Ihat nitnpcts anpfijp'iite and timelyugoslavia needed- -prob-lem rot Thni legacy to come under cfitieiim and foe nrciwrct ic begin building lo restracture Yugoslavia's
economic aad political systemsprobtemi in fact hue appeared: a- eeoriomiea eiaccr-batedTor it to deala financial cnsii ihat
o>that. *amtsill thai Tito'i clraik "than "lit la irw . hia ina pwTno era nail* Uc|ih mil tilo'l icairtiKali jjjjJjju llatl fWlll iiMjuancc.'
Shows no sign* of improvement. *nd demandi by the Albanian ninoriiy lo be granted equal ttaj,sYugoslavia's olhc'litTes-aJB
Th* Economy: Wbal?
>'. conomic problems lie run ofhecountry's SI9hillioadebt Borden- higher perolandretailed fromependence on foreign loan)pur economic growth in. Inflation, which accelerated during the invetimeii! boom of lhal period. >om :oa recordercenthis high rate *atby lhe continuing inability of the self-maoaicmeat lysicm to sel realistic limits on wages and domestic credii. But Yugoslavia's economic crisis did not emerge asuntil Poland'! financial collapse1 sensi-Hied inieruliostal lenders to cconomc -enkaeucs throughout Eastern Furopc and iharpiy curt tiled Yugoslavia's access to hard currency credit.flflfc
In our apiriion events In other parts of taster athe added impact of shaking lhe em'-acneem the Yugoslavai I've minorbeing debated would remedyproblems In an unprecedented wave ofof the government's cuonomic policy.crorsomittt in particular argued thatntirsaf enteni systemwittcfal.impeded rational economic decision* And- directions for Ihe
far ahead of the authorities' abili-totM
The failure of Ihe Polish economy and the onset ot* the political crisis in Poland strengthened the hand of reformers in the parly hierarchy, who began immceli-atcly lo tpell oui the dangersttand-aat" ap proach. The cofl/ptcoan trndicition effort1 and prrsbiemsreviving tte syndication1 furtheren* who were content
In1 the government appointed aheaded by thenetident Kraigher and sialTcd by some ofnost rcsaccicd ccoxto-rr.itis. so prctsotc correeiivc meatures. The commit sion't upon, issued inas more general than sptvific and con iridic lory on some points. Ii called, for rumple, for more aitcnticci to tueh "ne-glecied" sectors as private agriculture, small business, andndustries, but did not suggest specific *ol>tiioas Andit urged
co-HavaC of weaker 'OS. it
warned thai inefficient factories would ha-eia be closed and investment drastically reduced.
The Central Committee endorsed lhe Kraigher report io May. andh Party Congress in June incarpo-rated the report into its program Party endo*ser-ienithisreport caused catensiveJust before the Congress, for cample. Kiroef lhe chief Central Committeeof banc change in the economiclectured in Belgrade's authoritative daily ncwipapcr Borbe thai the pa'ty must abandon idcoVsgiejil biases if itia correct defor ma lions in the eennaany. Al ibe other tiiremc. Svetoearn Old revolutionary, warrfedlhe Congresshal it profistdi i H
It has tubtoiucnlty fallen to the government to convert the irpiKt into specific measures. Seventeen differeai li-i oetwout legislative process .iselsiOei Tveaociaiiont wuh each of the eight regional capitals. None of the laws hat ytt rrsade ii through the political gauntlet.ga^k
hjUnec-o'-paymcni* problem jnd rvtimc lenderkey Ticior* given YtfiaLnu'iThe KliMO ut "agoVavu't financial petabtcmi. muchu> arMroicnirC -cakneu of tbe cvonurnic nunanciitcnl
allium. IhC fundamental Cause uf lhe drifl intocriNJ* in tholate. And. gitcn the rolu>ion I, ii,
federal fatyi* if
it muttfjn-nuus among Yugosli>ijrcpubliv'.in and pruvinoiullhal anticlire Indeed neevtxiry andi av"b
lhe tlbaalan Mina.il> Piacat*
u>al in theAaiu-aorkn,.
l*ro>tn>C.I, to*curafivr
Tito'tdeaih.t ingenuous'} thatre surprised incident of popular retiivcno had jf-rend} been evidentito titii ihere inV-ispatched -pevialndm> meiki to rettaie order. Although man] of the- unita haveied, dcflvuottraiiontag.un last si-ing; Ss'bun reudcnit anduic tlill beingscd and oceationull) killed: .ind ntt> of economic tu butane are regularly reported in the pro*
f Albanian rctiivcncvt iithe perception ofr> AEbanijiii that, a* non-bluve in an ovcruhclm-inglyxcne. ihe> me at lhe boitum of the
economic and sociopolitical heap. Despite the Tactmore prosperous northern republics have/ decades betn contributing fundihe economic tJcelpp-rient of the area. Kosovo will hai iheita-idard of living and thehigbcu unemployment rale of all Yugoslav rcgi
Tbe Ocirdcr
enunciated.
to enjoy
broad lupport ii thai (he regions tutus be elevated from thai of an autonomous province of the Serbian Republicull republic. The Albanian! apparenl aiaumplion ii tbat many of Iheir problrmi would be bciier addressed if more of the decisions afFcchni Koao-omade by Albanians and if ibe region badif bi in Federal council The larger import of the Albaniani' demandat one ofa/orisbe cfcuribaitiOA of power beaaaaatfced by TuoJH
Tbe I'i'ii in Koaovoet<
in Serbia Out il
baeklaib. pnrn. rer.ub.ici of Monienegro and Macedonia, -hiCh have tubstaniii Albanian minorities. One can hear in Serbia, whose medieval kingdom mm centered in Ihil area now peopled primarily by Albaniani. tbe ilogarv "Koiovo ii to Serbia whato theeinforcing the backlash ii the fear Ihat republican itatui for Kosovo would be but aunion on ihe road lo un-anith Albar.ia. Aad demographicsole, with tbe highest birthrate in Earope. tne Aibani. asu arc ninriKelly gradually cwcrwhclmuag their aeighbon. who in turn arc ereigraiiag fromecaaie of the hoitile earn
at the Congress in June and ii ihared bi Stane Doianc. his successor at Ibe ministry. There ha* been no movement,loward accommodaiion. We believe this is became some other pany leaderi. primarily from Serbia, remain determined to crush all forms of Albanian romance and areasing the rivalry it lo itrengthcn their
such leader ii the Serbian-ho hai insteadCttmrtaM ofc /arever Knovoand the Vojvodina Aaionornoiit-here tbe bulk ofsmalt Huagarian minority resides
party leadership hai thus far proved inflaiible on
reject-on of Je ii mil eon.
nrrl
presiarrsthe regime to* roncesseini io toKr tbe Kosoao pree-
lira raised by ee-Mauiier of the Telenor fiayobefore his prensotioe lo lac party Presidium
ihe Root Ca The federal authorities' tardiness in addressingi economic problems and their continuingon the Albanian minority muc reflect in no imall meaiure the fact thai Yugoslavia hasonfederation o'eight republican and provincialcenters. Federal officiati may be charged with making policy for all. but then primary loyalties Ik with ihei* various home rrgions And those federal
policies that arc enunciated can fie foully ignored by republican or provincial governments if they see no tclf-inlcrett in honoring tl M%
Regional bureaucratic resiilsact to centralot. ofnenorneaae teen only ia Yuiwl -ia. Dai io asoti otheraiet tie party
arallel institutionar and doesto enforce central authority on local officii It who are In moil cntes alto party mem ben Inlhe federal party doe* not wield comparable po-eis: in Central Committee doet not have an active secretarial no* doet the federal part) rottest aappointment clearanceaattrc lhal key posiiiana throughout the isilrm are uaffed by pcrsoni acceptable to the fetter. al parly's leadership |
The federal party is further emasculatedontrol mechanum by its very' natureanroughly one of every seven adulucmbci. It alto suffers fromsubstantial general io- sap Whileercent of parly members are uadcr JO. someercent of Ibe Centra!embers are Wartd. War II veieraos ia iheir fifties and beyond, at are if ol iht Piesidtamsmbm. Athecurring complatai >ai rtpeated in the
i abouto. thai the seme lenior officials appear lo move endlessly among key republic and federal potliloni tMh
In Yugoslavia's permissive environment, regional power centers have seen primarily lo tbeir owninterests. In lhe eeoaomie sphere, for etsmplc. rrefineries have beeneven ibough other
local airtines have been established in -with ihe federal airline. Even as the fcdc-at.on ha. approached the postibilityebt rescheduling or default, financial authorities in lhe more prosperous northern republics ha-e. according to reliable sources, fought hard to maintain control over foreign exchange earned o> their republics lest these funds be drained
off idut banal and tnicrpnso c'scsbt'C
roalian aulhorit ripcnd great energy to keep the Catholic Church on ihe defentive. while in Bosnia an Islamic revival is under way with the bleating of local officials It ii poaaibie in Sloveniarivate fannerwn three times as maeb land, and an official so serve i- cc as longffice. as bis couatcfpen in mosi other republics And political and iniclieciualfoe Ctample. youth demonstrations in support of Poland's Solidarityregularly permit ird in Slovenia but routinely disallowed in Serbia
In lum. the peoples of Yugoslavia have been diverging in ihe handling of their own particular affairs, which in tarn makes it all lhe harderoatcntvt about -hat should be done al lhe federal level toolemi of commonhouthe federal party without Tito at its head does nor have ihe clout to impose solutions which serve federalsi fM
Critics of the System
Judging from ifieir vigorous defense of parochial interests, regional encepi for iheby and large satisfied with tbe current
distribution of authority in the Yugoslav system Other impottint forces in Yugoslav society, however, arc noi. The Media, for instance, since Titos deaih
the
"newive or sii major dailies and as many weekly news and light entertainment magazine! have earned considerable popular respect by openlyeconomic and political problems. Editorial boardi. although frequently under fire from various officials for contrnversial articles, are staunchlythe public'sL i:
No brief description of the daring of the press can do it justice. To give but oneecent issue of the federal newsweeklyontained stories on such sensitive issues as:
Talented economic managers who refute to apply for lop posts because of the problems posed by Ihe self-management syttem.
"Where Socialism Wentn interview inrofessor of economic* asserts Ihat neither the economic plan nor matket forces are working.
The pariy't financial resource! aad expenditures, claiming for the first time that the party used0 million in public lax funds8
The exclusive use of Brioni. Pretideni Tito's island vacation home, by federal functionaries)
Key among the media's critical themes have been the corruption and influence peddling that pervadesociety. Such practices are, of course, typically Balkan. The Yugoslav Party hat made much over ihe years of the scandal* of the predecessor royalbut ihe clan or the extended family, which looks after its own economically and politically,ey societal unit in much of the country. The party's reputation suffers because, in building its legitimacy parity on ihe new^'toeialisil has in fact fallen prey to traditional "spoilt lysiem" practie
While the Yugoslav Parly hasastparticularly in ihe past decade, it has been deeply infected by Ihe spoilt tysiem. Many of ihose whoushed to join the partyone toariy card connotet both moral aadfitness and in practice permits the establishment
of connections etsenilal to achieve the good life. As one letter lo Ihe editor of the newsweekly lianas recently complained:
The eed Iparty) membership boulilet ii used as an entry into ihe society of those who are select
and eertifird. 'I alualtyetter Job.
although not more knowledge. It oftenore secure material life and often evenorse farm, and so forth. It thuseparate stratum of rich j
who have their own view of the world. I
With Yugoslavia's autterity programs now taking their toll on lower income groups, popular anger hat been growing over tbe privileged statu! of thewhich is. at the tame time, held rctpOnsiblc lot the declining economy. Il hat not escaped notice in ihe media that ofugoslavs who have officially reported to job-placement centers,0 have been party members. And ibe press feeds theeady diet of catei of cmbeulcmcnL misuse of authority, influence peddling, aadWe suspect that, in the absence of punishment cf Ihe riigb-kvel nffieiali assumed by many Yugoslavs to be responsible, the ciposurct cause only increased frustration
Wrjfcrt and dramatitit. too. have highlightedy party members, in some easesore tcrrOut way by suggesting that lop party leaden have been guilty of abuses since the beginning. Several books have been published, for example, about theand tortures inflicted on party members who opposed Tito's break with Sialindplay capitalizing on the theme hat played to packedEven Tito's one-time official biogriphcr.Dcdijcr. hasew book which tuggctit Titoerict of political and military blunders during the mar andlawedexample, hit pretentiousness as demonstrated by hit love nf fancy uniforms
An lillAr,Sccral speakers called for regular reviews of the Central Committee'sinofin ,he economy. Another calledpecial congress nets year lo reassess ihe leadership's reeord. Still another argued thathe eeonomi eom.nued to decline, one-thlrd of ibe Central Comm.necesiga
hallenge, ,0
lhe prjci.ee ofjI Iiii of eandi-da.es for electron by .cetarr.at.bn camehe form o* proposal, forht to otueetame, on the
Official list, for multiple candidacies foe all top party
posts, and for secret ballon.
ne delstfeateayor stir by proposinghe party reorganifc to parallel theeonoase tuaetvee rather tbaniraeture.
well-known Yugoslav
Uapccc. hadded Trom proposinghe Congress bi* publicl> slated view thai (he partydrop all references to Leniniem. including dieiaiorshrpof the prolctcample, the
rrvms can rise
to sapnor.er.edlyvonjt misgivings He -or-etheress did Stale thai there could be no solution to the country's problems untilo position) of responsibility!
The toneamber or speeches by oldci partyft4tto suVires thai, as additiontanding pat a-orming therehird torrentnoagbt. lhllanatrtbornaeuituransouti.ot unchallengeable, leader.the Country's problems and the currentelative Impotence, it would he perftap! more surprisingMfn,ngeturn to simpler time) did notWhile weeport, suggesting thai one or another leader ii being1 so position himselfid for such po-er.annot confirm
For at the dtscrr cipressed ai the Congresvse cad the leadershsp cUscr.bedongress of coniinu.iy. Programmatic vows -ere made to carry onthe basic principles of Titoism. and statements oT pnnciple recei-ed unanimous approval. The only clear reform measure adopted -ai for the secret ballot which, according to press aceoun.bass, street. immed-.tHy causedhe eltenon of theOne of Serb*', key leader,edget ike reeiuired-ate onh-elingecondigging of the results, fa suit, the leadershipable toongress tc prevent change* of thethat the party', theoretical -cckly., warned wouldmuliipany system -iihin
Pros peers
The-tinea be-fore Tna', aVais in^MC) thai Tno, rolelhe ereationasne cannot be confideni1 proveen event, since Tito's death, many Yugoslavs are no- asking lhemiel.es whether Tiiosim ihouldTito: some arc in-twenng -r. W. WtKCt ff
o thaiu Ike ihortagct ol gasoline, coffee modiciao.dcteigcaai multiply under Ys-eotimI aultrrity program* *sa awe senoat cTrt-rupeem of consumer tuppl>ciI'd iWum.it growth in itx ahead
Moiecver. shortajor bailout effort byYujoili-ii almost certainly will have toa rescheduling of II* debts rest year, if not"wiliI comeubitantialt- itilem, bosh because it would br.ic-ci of Ibe leidersbip's ineptitude indhe kideriade ng taeirattera eeatctnt. thai mli baiiaOtiiaec ia|
Where, preitscly. another major shock mi|hi lead it. ofailer of conjecture.ll major might OCCer; ihe regional power Centeri may be to strong, and their leaden to en-ireacted, thai they aril! be iblr in ihrug off the shock and oartinve to go their separate wayt in policy and practice. Yugoslavia would not be the first country, when 'iced withof tar-out importinee. lo try tn mailt in lack of IcadcrtAie and willuddle-through approach while driftingtate of chronic political and economic
Gives ihe tirength of disss tit fact ion wiih the status Quoin Yugoslavia, however, there seemi it lean an coualehancceriouswould prtcipitalr eveaitof greater significancehoes Tight gal>anitc the Yigealin into working tirm.ij together loamprthensire pro-gran ef economic recovery and to reform ibeirlystem. But, in light of the Yugoilavi' binary of working and fighting against each other, we believe theymore ^ikely fall on one mother, trading chargn of malfeasance and attempting lo prevent favored programs from being cut.esult, even if it led to personnel changes imong fcdcnl leaders, wouldariety of muddle-ihrougk bat it would add rm more intpet at lo tirain prettu'tt thai aceoward de facto, if oot de jure. eoHapte of the federal
Topreoflipsc of trve in- w* Mkr mmy Y. got tan would *oou to the military, -kae CaTwern before World War II vis conndereO ike arbiter of tall retort. Pcrhapt forctcclngurrent difficult course, Tito in one of hit litl tpcech-ct malted ihe Army at ihe "ultimate guarantor" of internal stabirlty. at well at of the bordcri. We findhe militaryolitical forte one of ike mau difTicatt ofntlilalians to evaluate in gcnerali tightly limit the aeeett of foreigners to thinking and usuallyow public profile.!
The rnott authoritative recent statement from tbe military came in anonuly byen Dine Carj. bead of thesn> urgiaiajiioaa newly elected member of tbe partyAsserting the military* right to tpcah out on the issues. Cuic commented. "People in the army are integral parts of our society. and we all worry atwut ihe iamchile complaining that tome of theroblem* could have been avoided hid the Civilian leaden "undertaken ritki. boW iwi.e added that "ike avorsle of the atTcer corps iibe least ihakc* by the economic situation jbecaute] the political situationuch
T
He warned, nonetheless,hey areand. if the economy becomes more troubled, one day we will not be abicio make this evaluation."
Trade With the ussr
Tbe Sa<iet Slake
The Soviets fell heir during and immediately after Work! War IIubstantial pan-Slarie reservoir of good willoal ofifoslj- aatiooalil-u. especially ihe Serbs and Montenegrin* Thisas. however, largely drained by Stalin's military threats and economic blockade against Yugotlaiia after the splithereafter, relations have blown hot and cold; sincehey have Tor theort been tepidly correct. Moscow hat shown itself willing to accept Yugoslav noaaligament and deviation from ihe Soviet norm inolicies.
bat probably On lherf condition that YegO
slavia do nothing lo offer sigsuTicani strategic gains to the West or jeoparditc continued Communist rule in Ybgo^i ib
Over the longer lerm. the USSR probably hopes thai the financial crisis will impel Yugoslavia toward eienc' economic and political relations with Ihe East. Scsidcs catensive bilateral ind* with ibe USSR. Yugoslaviapecial rcratiansnip with CEM A, and the Soviets probably nope that even closer ties can be institutionshe same time, they mult worry mat Yugoslavia's economic problcmj could threaten the collapse of the Tttoisi system, thereby shaking the foundations of Communist rule anda nuior Yugoslav shift toward Ihe Wen Realign* mem by Belgrade eilher to lh* Cast or lo the Westojld ^uve repercussionsin theftjlly in maverick Romaaj and isoSatwxwsi Alba-
1-3
Despite some aieat of coincidence between Yugoslav .ind Soviet interests andrumple, ia the Third World and on Western arms controlthere are some aspects of Yugoslav policy that Irritate the USSR. Tor eaamplc. Yusotlavoi hat been so impoetanr counterweight toe'lor is lo nsasre ibeovement iaae greater eawserthe protests againsi YugOtUa policy pusiiiom on tuch issues as Poland. Afghanistan.
'iflHt
l**tS
and Kampuchea. The Soviets also have reactedto whai they perceive at critical Yugoslav media rage, particularly of bilaieial economic relations.
Yugoslavia's leaders remain -ary of Soviet intentions The Soviets <wcr ihe past two denieseconse the dominant tupfiiaer of sophistics iffto the Yagoslav military and. Detain* ofports of raw materials and energy io Yugoslavia. Belgrade's largest trading partner. Last year Yugoslav lenders began to warn in public speeches that increasing dependence on trade with ibe USSR was not In Yugoslavia's security interests Their tcnsilivilics on ibis scoie. along with Moscow's own resource and hard currency problems and Yugsalavia't need far more hard currency trade, probably aceoant for the drop ia bilaieral tradeforrcan from recent -
.0
We believe that ihe Sovietsimited range of ooiioni in Ihe comingheir owa economic difficulties wp: prevent ihcm from moving more rap-ich tociplealctal foe economicee Attemptspply prenure through diplomacy and propaganda are extremely risky and have back-fired in ihe pail. Wc belief ihey havemall number of controlled "Soviet lympatbiztrs- in Yugo ilivu aad would be unlikelyrtk using iWm unit! confident Ihey could have some iF-tweiTie lach of promitinglong with the Kremlin's preoces-palion wiih problems elsewhere in Failcrn Europe and wiih the Soviet succession, iuhcsis that Moscowill poatponc hard decisions on Yugoslavia ai long si the party slay* in power and prevent* significant moveshe Wen dM
If the Yugoslav titualion continue! to deteriorate, ihe Sovieti probably feci compelled toore active rote. The extent and nature of their involve mem will depend on how terioui theytrie siluaiion in Yugoslavia tu be. thehich their resources arc ttruined by invotvemcnl ettewhere, the oieralt uaie of Eaii-Wcit relations, and the temper of thee- leaden at the lime for decition approac'xi (fltt
'A CIA
a"ai"i
If divitivencts appear) to threatenelieve the Soviets would begin urging through Iheir media and high-levelrontacii that ihe Yugoslav authofit'Ca take Strong aetioa to reverie the trend They would activelythose membari of the Yugoslav Icadertliip most likelye amenable in Soviel influence. They would alio more openly'. individuals and poantt of view they contidcr aangcroui and would become more open about uting Soviet tympathircrt to advocate measures they favor. The Soviets might hopeesurgence of public support in Yugoslavia for more authoritarian rule and clover alignment with ihe USSR in preferenc; to
eh paner.It. JaiMr /nd-rarr In
ill valid, eu-elviri thai.lire* ihe USSR maylate"siiiasl. cvl.tiil.ar iairllifmce ati-itu.labluO. UffuMiial aivrti.newiMl| aro-Soviel leewial trouei Inmiltiumtare arc IiMtao-to -oulOtourwilt ihe Wartawn ihcanl lali- lyiiernucevr i- >h< ooai-lnn era.
instability and uncertainly. Octpite their own cm-nomlc difficulties, ihey would be more willing lo take ttept loHelp the Yugoslav* weather Iheir financial
Cntrt ffM
While not enthuiiasiie. the Sovieti wouldreater role for ihe Yugoslav military in preference lo the lost of party control. Wc believe they would be evea more loath than in the Polish ease to riskugoslav romance and evoking Weviern re^ciierri by nagarge milKa'r ansaen ihe burden orm threatening military iaierven-lIortjHp
Wrtlrra liHeretll
particularlyeconomic, and military support after Tiio'tith Sialiu was. in our judgmem. an important ingredient in stymying Soviet power in Furopc and in hailing Yugoslavia's pur lull of iti own political and territorial ambiiioni agaaatl Italy and Greece. One can argue, ia addition, tkatubseetuciutj> ihe Sew-ict*hough without Western or Yugoslav tin iepossible only because Yugoslavia had aj ready icbicvcd independence from the USSKd^ji
The Yagotlavs. ia their attempt lo perpetuate their recovered independence, choseoaiimn aeither in the East nor theralcgy thaierham more understandable when onethai the Yugoslavs were divided between Ihe Hjpibaig and Ottoman empires for centuries and icrvrCear perpetual battlegrnund betweeneut embodimentsit ard West. Seehirg leadership irttcad among the countries of Ibe Third Woe Id, the Yugoslav* hove freeiucntly worked against US interests by supporting liberation movements and even terrorist groups, crsdorsing detente tn ai! Ill aaaccii vriekoui regard for (be strategic Salami tod working is achieve larious Third World ecoaomic goals In turn it may be arguable whether the Yugo-tlavt have been in recent decade t* bigger thorn ia the tide u' the Eatt or of Ihe Wcit^^
agotfavia has. in out opinion become moic Wei(cm than tasicrn. at demonstrated by ibe freedom of ill peopleshe openness of its press, and only selective iim of police repression. Some members of lhe Yugoslav elite, while ihey agree with their countrymen that Yugoslavia'! military andthreat lies to lhe Gait, worry thai Yugoslavia has become so VYcslcrnired politically andthat the more serious thieat lo Tiioism't long-lerm staying power it posed by the caamplc of the
As Yugoslaviaeriod of grcaler fragility in thethe West wi'ltake in discouraging the Yugoslavs from turning back lo the East, thus adversely altering the tu lance of power in Europe. But ihe West does not. in Our judgment, have lhe ability absolutely to per-vent Yugoslavia from slippingondition of chronicduring Ihe Inlcr-world war period, which featured periodic suspensions of political rights and incidents of politicallo inoculate the country against greater Soviet meddling. Farther Yugoslav movement Westward and continuedliberalization probablyair measure of domesticricky proposition when the country's peoples are under ne* pressures and appear more interested in parochial interests, than injugoslav commor.ivralth^^B
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