Instability and Change in Soviet-Dominated Eastern Europe
Instability and Change in Soviet-Dominated Eastern Europe
Scopfan aitcmpice before ihe policy and intelligence communities provocative
analyse, by carcHcnccdhe Directorate of Intelligenceublish uncoordinated essays of particular merii on important subjects. This is such an essay and the future of Eastern Europe isubject. The inicrpn'lnlions and conclusions arc ihc author's own.
Thc essay examines ihe complei and troubled relationship between lhc USSREastern Europe in Ibe recent (postwar) past, studies Ihe evolving nature of thatin thc present, and assays the likelihood of instability and change, osei the longer term While it cannot predict ihe precise course of events in an area so potentially volatile, it doesrolonged period of Sturm und Orangini the persistence or ihc struggle between the East European countries, seeking an enlarged sovereignty, and lhc Soviet Union, striving to deny it.
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Instability nnd Change in Sovict-Dominaied Eastern Europe-"
Keyold notion thai thc Soviei Union is gearing "hole societies in Eastern
lo iis own purposes has in reccm years given wayew truth-
,hc Soyie'* mui'1 'hcmsclves and their purposes increasingly to East Europeaneconornic weaknesses, deeply rooteddiscontent, rccuircni political disruptions, spreading, ideological decay,ervasive, oficn ami-Soviet nationalism. Il now seems unlikely, in faci. lhal the empire can be held together over the long term without some significant alterations in the way il tit run. Al Ihc very leasl. ihc persistence of dpersily. disarray, and discord in Eastern Europe will confront lhe Sovietpreoccupied wiih domestic problems and perhaps troubled by ihe BrcrJinevheavy pressures forchange.
Thc history of Soviet relations wiih Eastern Europe since World War II. and particularly since ihe death of Sialins rich in turbulence andfrom riots and attempted coups to revolutions and outright national defections. And the highest levels of unrest and political turmoil were reached during tseriods of succession crisis in lhe USSR when, as in lheand the, lhe Soviei leadership was rent by political infighting and disputes over policy.
Specifically, ihe turmoil in the Communisi Party of lhe Soviei Union during ihc Stalinontributed significamly lo lhe demoralization of most Easi European leaderships, the development of serious parly factionalism, lhe re*mergcnce of long-repressed popular disaffection, and the vigorous expression of this disaffection in the political arena. Demands for improved living sundards. the democratization of the system, and ihc end of Soviet controls were particularly strong in Poland and Hungary and led ultimatelyaiionalUi revivals, new leaderships,romised about-face in policy in lhe former and the collapse of the parlyevolution in lhe latter.
The succession to Khrushchev, which persisted4 until the, was much less Iraumatic. bur. disagreements and indecision in the oligarchy did add in major ways to instability in Eastern Europe. Romania's ongoing experimeni withbecamebusive; ihe Easl German regime of Walter Ulbricht began to speak with iis own peculiarly condescending voice: the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria had to contend with an attempted coup by mililary officers and former
parii.sans. vvlm aprKirenily I'ch that Moscow lacked ibc will lo interfere: .itul ihc iun. in I'rauue si,incd io come arnrl as bemusedegan io battleel> active rcfitrniliberals.
Thc crisisnosed ihe musl .crimis lltrc.it ininterests inr.ipc since the Hungarian revolution, hereear* Inter, wa.cries, ofich centered on lhcisMie.csiieion and relations wiih live USSR. ;ind here againfell the inipavl ol disagreement* among the Kremlino lum boi to damp down the si nut ion and io avoid the secession nf afrom lhc Suvicl empire.
Gdansk excepted,ere fairly tranquil in Kastcrn lluropc. though (he irend toward diversity and autonomy persisted. Hut toward the end of thc decade, the Last Huropcan economics began to sag. and the unwritten contract between peoples and regimes- more cooperation for moreendangered and. indeed, in Poland, destroyed. Thc era of relative Iranquiht) is probably now drawinglose, nol jusl in Poland, but also in moM of the oihcr fcasi European countnes. Indeed, two of the piiiruiry preconditions for serious, disruptions there succession crises in one or another HToc capital and severe economic distress arc likcls in some slates soon lo conjoin.
The USSR of course holds ihe ultimate irump card, overwhelming military powerthe will io use it. Ii altoonsiderable variety of other, less dramatic tools of persuasion and power. But military intervention has its drawback* and the Soviets are reluctant to use it. and ihe olhcr iiwiruments of control and inllucnce by no meansystem of absolute authority. Thc Hast Europeanr faci. arc able leort of conditional sovereignty which, if ii poses few real threats to Sovici hegemony, certainly constrains it. And. while attempted defections from ihc Bloc do noi now seem likely, resistance lo Soviet dominion will surcls persist.
Thc new Soviet leader. Yuriy Andropov, will, of course, have to contend with ihis. among many others, bui his ability io do so more effectively thnn his predecessors is open lo question. He may bring more self-assurance io the task, and probably will approach issuesore iirmlie way. but there is no quick and easy cure for whai ails Eastern
limine and relations within the Hlne. Moreover..ippsii ently dominant in thc arealorcignnt likch *otni in achieve clear supremacy in the leadership andlm* probabit find himself encumbered by debase* anuine Ins I'oliihnrnleague* and resistance I'rnni ii,Huenlijl element* in Hienj in ihe btirca
Perhapsealcst problem the Soviet leaders will face incrn lurnrv i* Uie stale nt thenrlous in *ome countries and nowhere nourishing Stagnating oi declining living standard* areangerous because thes damage pruduelisiij and stimulate unrest And none of these regimes enjoy* positive popular support. Rather, eachorm of popular sufferance, arising I'iihii buth hopeener life and fear of harassment and arrest Now that prospect* nl* the former are fast fading, so is the public's sijVe in slabiliiy. Some regimese* suit, place more reliance on fear, which ma> not work and is in am case economically debilitating: others may cveniually succumb to growinc pressure* for greater freedom and/or radical economic reform.
Troubled b> scriuu* and long-ncglccicd economic problem* nf it*n. thc Andropov leadership may display little patienceis those ofurope. It may be inclined to urge retrenchment economic austcnts. tougher official crackdowns oness reliance on Sovieircatcr integration via CKMA. and. in general, moreoviei policies and interests, (iiven Andropov's apparent approval of cconomie reform in Hungary, the Soviet regime may ai thc same time pressasindarist direction. But if. in fact. Moscow srsjn*ors change eiiher or both retrench mem and reform umber ofasi European regimes can bc expectedinimum to drag their feet.
Though lhc Andropov regime may bc able io surviveime without facing large crises intope. lis successors arc less liVctj to be spared. Younger leaders, drawn from thc post-Stalin generation. ma> bc much mure innovative than iheir predecessors.might, tor example (I)rogram of systemic economic reform mure ambitious and far reaching than the model provided by Kadar'scously or alternatively provide greater substancethe ciinecPtSoeialisi CuntmrimteaIth" in which each pany-siate would haveboul overall Bloc policies and doctrines but would remain (Mimd in ihe
4
USSR;iant Ihe various countries real independence,ath likely to lead lo the Finlandizaiion of Easternchances of litis seem very remote.
Butold program could not score quick successes, arid pressure* arising out of the Easi European quest for prosperity and national dignity unde much more likely io grow than to subside over the neti several years. Indeed, over thc course o( ihe rvcxi deca.de there will almost certainly be further outbreaks of serious political strife in Eastern Europe, and they will bc direcied. at least in part and implicitly, against the Sovici Union, ir such sirifc seems to jeopardize Communisi power and/or Soviet hegemony. Moscow will almost certainly imervene. with military force if necessary.ecade, however, forecasts become much murkier. The resolution ihrough force of recurreni imperial problems thai have deep political, economic, and social roots cannot be endlessly appealing in Moscow. Radical changes in the way thc Soviets maintain their empire, lhc local regimes preserve their power, and these regimes conduct their economic affairs do not now seem at all likely, but time, succession struggles, political crises, and economic adversity may whet the appetite for systemic change, even in the Kremlin. And an estimate that part or al! of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe will one day find its way to freedom would bc consonant with boih the lessons of thc pasi and tlic trends of thc present.
^unliaimiat
Com en is
Pat*
Scope
Key
The Coarse ol
I
bulalioni of
The Umpire Toiierv Poland ind
A Khrushchevian Approachomanian
The Khrushchev
Thc Chtllente from
An in of (Relative!
Reenter
ISS 20
Lessons lor theHegemony in EasternandTools of ihc ImperialEast EwopcanEuropean Influence on the USSR
Successions and Their
The
1 lieGeneration of Soviet
Pressing Policy
The Impaci on Eastern
Succession in Eastern
The future in EasternI
Forces at
A Modesi New Sonet
The
A RacMal
The Lethal Option. Soviet Military
Thehe
HaMic
-I
Instability and Change in Soviet-Dominated Eastern Furonc""
Thc ultimate dissolution ors. like death ami taxes, inevitable But to the citircn o( Athens in.earing the yoke of Kofltc. orthe? resident of PragueH. throwing nonetovici lank, ihisruth thai euuid provide scam comfort. Thc auestion foro suffer theof Soviet ovcrlordship wdiisteihrr the Soviet empire is destined to collapse -or esplodcor disintegrate or simply melt but ratherni way and when;
Seen in the conventional vV'esicrn perspective of ihcnd the earlyO*onolithic whole, lhc empire began to fall ipaM long ago. Three of its major pieces (Yugoslavia, Cnina. and North Korea v. part of another (Domanial und one ehiplAlbantal have long since been lost, andiiretricvably so.
All ihc remaining European pieces save onehave tried lo escape. To bc sure, none has succeeded, but each of ihc attempts has revealed the seriousness and persistence of general popularwidespread disenchantmenttrong urge for national independence.
Economically ihe empire is floundering and the East Euiopcan states nowuestionable asset for Ihc USSR. Politically and ideologically, theeryas ii is on the Soviets' willingness to use brute forcereserve their hegemony and doctrinalto belie Motlaims of benevolence and common socialist interests. And militarily, though on paper, important contributors to thc USSR's overall strength, thcEuropean meinlxisof thePact provide only niggardly support lo thcii defense programs (compared to the Soviet per capita effort) nnd could in any ease field armed forces of only uncertain prowess and dubious reliability
In view of all Ihis. one is permit lednder whs t'u Soviets ihink that then presence in the area is su-eili thc effort and thet mil true.hai
. . -or ipetik id ihr nu-ammtu'Ofr in ihr hoihink leftirsso aaaarr rami oftmih trainbfrrh al nil ikmn alrvatr
tra'rd lo Ihr nur/miri and tndtihr Sonet iriirwi
t still thc ease lhal
r ii preritrlx ihr nn rriLtnEastern Europe io ihe VSSH, ihe etnttnUunrvalutianary notelem whirb gfvei apnnrrm uihtiomr lo ihe roininiinitl flam itfait nflhe future,'
For even aside 'rom the fact lhalny barrels of oil and bushels of grain now flowescue direction. Irom cast to west, the noi-or. thai the Easi European stales are being geared io Soviet purposes u.ost,alf-truthrowingact, the Soviets mast now gear themscKcs and their perposo to last Earopcaaweak ncss. politicrl turbulence, idcetoa-cal and poiiiical polyeent'iim. evciall divcmtv Aod their ultimate goal, whether the eventual eMabiishmeniyjoeial-ist Commonwealth" or ihc absorption of all these states inio ibe USSR proper, must seem incrir3sin"jl> remote
vv MaVInWwiinUliia aw INn Vwk.I. i> 'I*I1.
1 he Communist "live .rf Ihc futurelic -Jim lime.e bicakmc on ihc shmis ul ccunnmic distress and ihc reef*ai European disenntent andIl dues tn. morrow. In fall sjghi nol nnl> of ibc world ai large bui aho of the non-Bhsehich name and wonder or. mureat inhose to flee the Sonet
oly. of course, that Ihc Soviet 1sue iheir problems in this bIiorciIici baleful hghi. Indeed, mc view of Eastern Furope Irom Ihe Kremlin's cloudy windows these days. If not ciactly cheering, may not seem all that bad. Poland is now reassuringly subiect to strict martial law;has apparentlyawrvetate ofa ullage. Eastine GDRl andremainaeile; Hungary cipeiinvents but very carefully and even tropMcsornc Ronwnu hit so many problemsome thai il scarcely seems likelyir up new ones with the Soviet Union.
It may be thit the Soviet leaders have deluded themselves inlo feeling that, given lhe nature of scnici-flominsicrlillion, an area reaching from ihc Baltichc Black Sea.asiin pride andhave done about is well is couldmy ocAnd the prime mistikes of Ihestifling hand.risky innervationsnu. after all. of their own making
Bui if Moscow's prevailing mood were one of self-csculpaiory optimism, il would follow ihii ihe Sciei leaders could not br wbuily aware of the cmcni and probable durability of ihcir problems in EasternThey are. in fact, neither slupid nor blind; Ihey can add ind subtract, count thc number ofon the bead ofpin. and recognise adversityultiplicity of forms Buts alio true thai incvdeeply tinted ideological Winders, were laised in ichools of power, not perception; and feast on and assert ideas ind awnmom of awesome banality
They thus do nol seemf ihey understand, ccilainty ciinnnithai iheencountered by theirand llic Fast European
economies ire systemic not merely manifestation* of temporary snags, bureaucratic thortcummgs. and bud weather. Tbey do not comprehend that last European nations Kim isforce of such whelmingnd compkiity that it may itselfave of tbe future and lhat ihc Sonet empire cannot be held together indefinitely is in economic, ideological, and sccunts entity without tome major change in ihe way it fa run ind.orcJiiry. tome shift* in drtiinaiions as "dl Ii hardly needs saying that if these men in fact do mn understand ihesc ihings and will not in the future then they will not be ible to formulate cffcciivc policies and implement lasting solutions.
Ii Is i'ue. of course, lhat Soviei interest andin Eastern Europe hive been foreordained b> centuries of ethnic, economic, and gcopolilieal tics, uil now reinforced byears of Mariisi-Lcninisi myih. Accordingly, whatever its level of understanding, and independenily of its abilityuttue sophisticated policies, neither the Andropov regime nor Ihe neai Soviet leadership is likely lo find itself presiding ewer ihe wjluntary dismemberment of empire. But. should he stumble badly. Andropov may. and his successors almost certainly will, confront enormous pressureschange, possiblynung during, or even becausetruggle for power wiihin the USSR or one or another of the East European countries or. indeed, both. Andrief, is the subtcei of ihtt paper the nature and outlook (or change in Eastern Europe and in Soviei policies ihere. especially daring periods of politics' succession
< OWM of Empire
ock falh on an tgg. alas tor ihc efX. When an rrgack, alas fur ihr egg
OU Halkan Saying
Found it lonj
The Red Army won thc Soviet empire in Eastern Europe on in way to victors in Germany. Thi*o accident."the Soviets say. noryproduct of gcogfaphy and the fortunes of war. On thc contrary, at least in Stalin's, view, thc acquisition of ihc area was necessary for Soviet security, it served lhe li mi*-honored conceptuffer roneand was desirable for the advancement nf Soviet policies and doctrines elsewhere inwouldpringboard Ipr Soviet eapansion. Bul whether, beyond lhe achicvcineni of ihesc two goals. Stalin had thought very much about how iu govern his new empire, what he wanted il to look like, and where he wanted ii to go is not at all elcar.
Although he obviously rejected the idea for the immediate postwar period. Stalin may once have envisaged the eventual incorporation of most or all of the East European stales inio Ihe multinational USSR as constituent republics, in ihe manner or Lithuania. Latvia, and Estunia. But there were no clear signs ofand the question is furtherby Stalin's willingness aficr ihe warermit genuine if conditional sovereignty in Finland, despite the fact lhat this country had been allied wiihand had once belonged to Russia Stalin, of course, wanted to grab as many tangible goods from Eastern sjEuiopc as he could, and he did. througn reparations and such devices as so-called joint stock companies established to siphon off East European production. He also knew that, nfler the period or earlyof Communist. he would not tolerate any meaningful non-Communist participation in the political affairs of these countries, though he was wary enough of local and Western reactionsretend lhal'these stales remained mdcpcndeni andeoplei*oiher than simple party dictatorships.8 and the defection ofhe was determined to crush an* real manifestations or "Tiloism" or "nationalistwithin thc individual Communist parties.
He was also careful tu keep light cisnlrol uver the nolieic* and personnel of these ponies ami slate-
isrdcrs to their leaders, mans .rfhornraised and almost allorn were Smin essentially (he same way heIhe Soviet Union, counting op ihe secretmililary. and. in general, an uinsusphcre ulkeep everyone in line. Al the same timi heeach of these countries emulate the Suvieiits economic, sociopolitical, and cultural cnii'ctv
But beyond control and Sovietiaiiun. Statin's policies remained ntuifcy. Some or them were clcnrlvpurpose. Tor example, could the quest fur ani.t'kv in each of these Mates possibljt was almost at if ihc aging dictator were indifferent In questions of future development, of politicalconomic viability. Still, all this worked. *lbciiat least so long as Stalin remained in charge. Bui multitude of problems was merely being stored for Stalin's heirs.
The Trilnilntions of Succession
dear almost immediately afterIn3 that SlalinWm withoutwnuld not *urk. It was equally clearStalin had lell his successors anhart neglected to bequeath them adequatecontiol. Thc desperate search for anto Stalin's personal rule thenoftenSoviet leadership overof the new four years, and thc effects of thisEurope were especiallye.A. extraordinarily dramaiic.
Few Qasi European leaders responded quickly to the new. post-Statin circumstances in Moscow. But.intuitively, ihc people did.ew monih-of Stalin's departure thereajor rim in Piltcn. Czechoslovakia, in May. and even moreizable workers' insurrection in Easl Germany in June.The uneasy collective leadership in Moscow, more or less dominated by Georgi Malenlnw latter thc secret policeman. Beria. had been eliminated', "as persuaded even before these outbreaks that living standards ihioughout the Bloc had to improve, and n
I
limited lhc tr* of til? Vfu Courseunibincsl
with emphasis o* the need (ur "socialistiminuiion ofessening ol ionunn< with the *c"elaxation tif demands lor lotal ennftrem:-t>tt tjtiern Europe, ihcCourse wa*
adopted t. Jl ther owever, not al lhc ore trmc. in the same manner, or to an oaualew era of diversiijiFa-stern Europe hadbegun
Struggles between Malenkov ;tnd ihe newirst Secretary. Nikiia Khrushchev, during list, and iherrgence at thc victoresulted in some policy ambivalence, ihe reassert son of -nm> old verities thai had been amended by Malcniov in-dud, ng the primacy of bean industry and ao littleonccimng. and substantial letrenehmen' of. whatprograms had been adopted inrope But Khrushchev, as aware atthai Stalinism could not be reapplied, actively sought means toew form of Soviet-Cast European cohesion, ihc establishment of moreand less unpopular regimes, and some way io restore momentum to creaking and badK unbalanced cconom-ei In the process, he found it cipcdicni to allow, within limns, ibc ruling Communwi dries to sci -iheir own pace and even to eierase primary control over their own affairs. This was deliberate policy, notragmatic adjustment lo iires-ersible trends, as. indeed. Pravda made explicit fairly early on.
Ki.ri.-uJ IMjaritmrt uf ihe Soviei Union and of ihe People isnows en asjBrjr im Ike chief fundo-menial mailer of ensuring ihr tMoryon ond nirani may br uird in diffntni countries lohe specific problems of socialist tanururtion. depending on historical ond national feaiurei '
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hile careedged andrant nl* strong stuff hi StalinistAnd if ii did not cxactlt move the East Furnncan leader* to Independent action, liVfiT encourage some of ihem III Irv io follow policies much more attuned to aciual nationalnd fucilitaW the anpearanee of incrcasingls influcniiol reform lion* tn >ariuu* parties II also paved lhc Has for the later acccssiim ro power in Poland and Hungary uf Itomcgruwnmmur.itU who hod bs.cn iiispriwned during lhc Stahnisi era and who. junifi.-oi> or not. had come io personify ihe owesi for national dtgnni and autothDorrs.
Bel even more importini lhan olfieiat Soviet loscra-lion of newastern Europe acre lhc elTects of theew approach in two other problems, both impinging on the conduct of imperial affairs, but not.asconccrved.calculuicd lo alter them The First was the rapprochement withegun by Klirushche*his, inter alia,public Soviet apologies. Soviet recognition or ihc legitimacy (or Yugoslaviathe Ttioist road lo Socialism, and, later, Ihe Quieting of Soviet condemnaiii.it of such unorthodoi and previouslyaspects of that road us worker too nei Iof indutirs.
The Easi European leadersa fir it'betrayed b> ihb All had applaudedipulsion of Yugoslavia 'rant the Cominlorm. many had won power by accusing and imprisoning or executing comrades who had allcgcdl> committed Tnoist sins, aad few had any wash to introdacc anything remotd; resemblingor own iMihwachx.*
But if these leaders felt, asobabl) did. that the USSR could mfllci nolow to their own ideas and positions lhan io come in terms with Tiio. they
' Tne himsrlf. though na saint aad this laeamcrntag tlir enutiot Fisitrades "These ascntheir
haadl mvrflnltiaod liiili.'ihr tin mat ion.
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iling ol otocctMicv.ih saw hard bargaining. While Ihi* bargaining uliiuialdv paid off for thche treated to iin hithcito unprecedented speciaelc of self-anointedpr*wedr.ipcjnthrobuwi *ueo sruvial issue* a* inocpendeni and much more dcnwKratk' road* lu S'iciahsm. the sanetii* o# the Smieind Soviet idoishivs. ami. in general, ihc degree of auinnoniv in beub>irdiiutc regime' The IcsMinctlui ihc
Mungananv
Ihc Huncanan revolution, al once heroic and iraeic. needv iv> recounting here. Somcuf il* iiitplicationk huoever.wvuiinv mular a* :hci reflect ihc art of the pw-ibfc: inIn rope andi
utiiudev andunkulurlviid* of iMliiK'ttl rraviiili
t kidcish-p. *tftl rcdunmed b* lhe pulnies ol *nvcr*-BM and divided by ttaue* of policy and purposeboth domestK and liastroblem', found itself unable tuconirnlsopewith the crisis in Hungary.
I heiil'iiin(i ihe lurmml in Hiingart encwuraaed the Hungarians totier and (urihcr ihunanvtmc had initinllveHungaiian leader. Imree*punded in the mam toeaunaiing from lhe raptdlv divrrufyiag Hungarian bodv pivliiic rathe ihnn from the Soviet Politburo
i The So* ids could *cjrccly believehat wa* happen, mg in iheirotcci>iraie the appearance among ihc peoplecchng of rn4ent botiihi* ro the Soviets and ihciretiological condi-iion one Western observer hat called ecstaticihe almost compleicf Com-munivt and Soviet inttrumcms ol power,ibli*hnscniide *arici) of now- and anii-Communisl potllic.-tl parties: ihe founding inHungary of nil independent "Tiuns-Danubian
he hanging by feelneckt, otmiiu-nisi*ecret policeiueni from HutiapcMinc unwillingness .ifungatiun military io intervene; and the announcement .if impending neutralisma Ausui-ii ,ind uiihdranal rrno- the Warsaw 1'nei.
Cniil ihit latter mow b> Nagy. the Soviets had apparently hoped thai he and lhc Communist Pi.nj would bc ableaintain essential control and thai Hungary though greatly changed inicrnally and more independentsun in:lient state. Swnc Sovieihrushrficsamong ihem. were apparently willing to ecttlc fori least until monger Sovietould be reasserted: others were no doubi opposedemporary relaxation of the iclalioiisiiip and faiured miliiary intervention early on.declaration of an impending withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact on Jl Octohcr (whileSoviet leaders. Mitotan and Suslov. were actually in Budapest to study Ihcprobably ended thc disagreement, und theattackedovember.
- While the Soviets were not directly responsible for ihc great swell ol protest in Hungary and Polandhc posl-Sialin ambiguities,nd angst of Ihc leaders in Moscow, together with their constant poliitcal maneuvering against one another, made il possible (or Ihe forces in Eastern Europe to press so vigorously and even violcnUy Tor two inicrdcpendent goals, independence and democraligation;
By exhibiting uncertainty aboul howrcat these issues and forces, by compounding ihe problem by destroying the awesome posthumous authority of Sin-lin and failing to find any replacement for it. and. finally, by severely weakening in this way the power of thc most pro-Soviet clcincnts in Ihc varioushierarchies, the Soviets had badly wounded themselves in their Own Last I'.uropeun loot. Though Moscow ultimately recovered, (he recuperation was painful andigh long-term cost: fiom now
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on. Soviei interests, while still paramount, nnuld hate tujivcrgent East European interests into more serious accouni. The Soviet leaders had diwtncrcd. inter alia, that while "their doctrine whs rich io guidelines (or coping witht offered litile for resolving conflicts and organizing relations among Communisi states.""
A Khiushcfaestan Approachomanian Response
lor seven years7n imperfect and uneasy calm prevailed between lhc USSR and its European allies (Albania, which left the Bloche Soviets, underwho had7recarious supremacy over hiseasure of diversity but their guidance was neither clear nor cormsiem. This tolerance wasegree pressed on Moscow by iwo external factors, thc exigencies of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the requirements of anactive rand demanding) policy of dctenie with ihc West. The first in essence provided ihe East European states with greater latitude to behavethe second restrained any tendency ibc Soviets may have fellrack down on such behavior.
Khrushchev, welt aware of the Intractability of thc Cast European problem in the uuke of Hungary and Poland, wanted to preserve Ihe Bloc ind the USSR's authority in Ii by relying on the good sense and self-inicreat of East European leaders who knew thai their survival could be endangered, on the one hand, by their anti-Communist constituents and. on thc other, by ihe USSR's demonstrated willingness to use force. In return for their fidcliiy, Khrushchev in effectetter deal for theseeconomic relations, some freedom tocomestic policies, and substantial politicalespecially concerning their own panics. Thus, there emerged an unwritten compact thai sanctified both Ihc autonomy Ol the hast European parties and ihe limits imposed on ihis autonomy by the greater needs of thc USSR and thc Bloc.
Khrushchev understood, however, thai io ensurehegemony, something mote was needed. Thus, he also emphasised thc development of cconomie ini.gra-lion via ihe Council of Economic Mutual Asmlnnec
"T.
rn I
inituji. integration through the Vttiri.au hart, .imi idcolog ical unity and unkidoiv. ihiouehariety of bilateral nnd multilateral omfricflcn,programs, jointoviet-dominated international Communist twurntll. TheMarxia Revlm- (published in Praguei. andon.urieiy ofowesvr. none of ihis -in .nl vcr> vrli. in fact, relationship* remained for ihe rnosi nan bilateral, as ike veemingtv rndkrufbci-een Khrushefco and lheJ-iiEuropean kidcr."nm irilingh*
. encouraged by lacil (and later explicit) supporthc Chinese, provoked by an univalent Soviei attempt lo remove Ghcorghiu-Dej fromand incensedoviet scheme to lorn Roma-nia's economycmicolonial raw maicriafilor the more advanced members of CEMA. the Romanian Workers' Party in effect publicly declared us independence.'1 Bu: Romania's move and.any number of vividof lis-including disruptions of Soviet plans forlose reialions with. China, and an undeclared-.th Tito'snotso be contagioushe Bloc. Panly asconse-guence. panly because.elief, ihes.ii party remained in firm eonirol at home, and partly because the Soviei Union could do littleuppress the heresy short of armed inierventson. ihc Soviets grudgingly learned to live with the problem.
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Rumania has noneihclets shownew form of East European sovereignty and.the Ceausescu regime i. toppled la growingro-Soviet faction (lesshculd one day come to confound Ihc post-Brcrtincv Siwiet leadership.
The Khrirshehe. Succession
KhnisJsehev was removed from power in ibc railictim of fanes*cs andil.nanticipaie thc capacity of his iittnsediite ccAeaiues In ctiospirc Jiamvspiie iheir liawous denuncw. twrts ofjylc and lm penchant for radrral solutnyns. ihc successors were Quick not onli to proclaim coniinuity in policy in -cncral bul also continuily in policy loward Eastern Europe in pariicu-lar (llic maintenance of "fraternal relations with thc Soaalisl countries" and of the "eol labor at ion of free peoplesenios eoual
Bet most of the East European leaders were shocked by Khrushchev's ouster and by lhe (understandableI failure of the plotiers to provide them with advance aoOtx Some bad tsecomc ouite close io Khrsnhebcr and probably fell they were ablenfluencedecbaons; many no doubt were concerned that thc no Soviei leadership would jeopardize lhe existingby insisting on greater Blocoscow's wishes.
[
In any ease, these leadeis-evcn the most faithful among them, including Ulbricht andno secret or iheir on happiness, expressed rescrvaiions about the coup, and conspicuously failed lo partki-pate In the recitation oflleged sins. Tnus did theEuropeans, re/usmg tn support ihe CPSU in is hour uf need, eernonsiraie anew their ability to act on their hi
J
r
Stwicl Uninnis' thmnd linaTIt. de-statercatsarancct of continuiag ftOelit' io
SK. thc specter of neutralnm and Western
mroudsey area tn* Ihc Bloc.
IfcinritW' frw( Oft'i srn.tr id'nntulIkr/mrrt iheeehu't-pakia.wtai he rlalotedean /ij/rAr riMMiurl wrrr vn/ii'iyrrd liepring tm bv far IhrnriWl eatr of revisionism ihm Ismmtm In >tmt'" hail faced ihroaghoui In. Had the Piaiut Sprint been per-miiied lo ni-.'ir. ihc Saneiiheiriu more tearful htva at ant rimeot only for iheir tailhrpenitsny. bul alio for ihrlr own Leninisttale mirni at. Ihrv Imr-ii.-
. while this rnorntous chgllenge was emerging during ihc early months8 and burst into flower in the spring and summer, ihescientificn the Susici Union may not hive been able io agree on its sire and scope and how besl io combat ii
lu be sure, byI it had become clear io the Soviets -and lo thc equally alarmed Polessi Germans that. If theii momentum continued, the
' Niir tiwn atiffirTi MHam iho IM
ii IM limei'ipartyi tmSh' ia* tnniral of
innion.woM lice itself Iron So'in
Ify. rol i'o IhtIdk |HMi .lijjr.Hi'mimhctdlmrmr im lim lnn-i'i> SnrV.t. Ttw.mourn, *mmaSmn. ifw*
iht mwi nwrMtitiimt fironawhiar Ifal: alia. ii<iihc
dominanec.net timnio rcalu mvular nroau'nSuroajtalien rt naiionil pplilHal fclr and rltco
itfot iinHvmcili oTWd
WS^,in.ill.lM
" Fmi Eitnaitri. (niMnorinnaJiw. Srruriti. and" Ckmllrntt'O^onrtn*-nsv.iBand.
N.maMwiiia.l.
i tu miciMr<u> ajnTuitt"ti invlana in Ottcaati llStlu iM alicouiot.
imritcriini xiik linoe-t.
( rrflliJf Fllfiil
I iinfim-.oi^l
in Czechoslovakia could constituteenacehc Soviet Union and ihc Blochile' Oul the cotleciivc leadership in Mo'oow wuvi all sure how best lo proceed beyond cshorting ihc eseied Czechs to calm down.
Should/the
rrterte Or mertlx llr-ttn KniUnakia if limit, htm- ihomld ihe limln mt defined} What toetici shouldbe employed utinfowie Sa-rirt well* Whilr It remnaxm ml yet int-ponitdeocument ihem. differencesthe Poiiiouro must certainly now
arisen over ihrie auettiontWfi. fur
ovietonvoluted ande termed subtle. It was al once elmntty and indecisiit."
In hindsight ii seem* reasonable to assume thai at Icasi until the summer, tome Soviet leader- ipchapt Brezhnev and ihe ideologitl Susiov amongven while no doubt afflicted with gloom, stillay oul, and still hoped that an invasion would not prove necessary The Czechoslovak pany leader. Alesander Lzubcck. Ihey thought, could be forced intocould be made to conirol his own parly, and could be eoereed to take Ihe necessary siepn to reassert tbe party's dictatorship
Other leaders "ere probably less prone toion and less reluctant to use force, sensing at the Czechoslovakangerous model for all Eastern Europe (Both Ihc East German and Polish
la Ota camel: cm cancan mt tin Wni attrgMafOt bpli.amr bc'vicn C* f, So, 1ill* Itunw,-
-iHj-ii.to .tl. iiitltc
Bvi mom at iScifuncd liecwailorcrixnoaWtttoirial
gHpaaaiat, did ant srerinurit)rasa
deletion Hi Sonet in'cuwi I* ranaiuUi. iat(ill llal
Ihe CrceMded Nagi'i nmiiha iwUtidiival fiom ihr Wlriiw Phi and io rwth, and Ihii the Savktt hid oat-cd vo tn Irani Sialiaiun and van inn Initialled In ihr iiialnirniMcvleeirnit to le-jmt. iwn-I'mhi to* iiaia j
Sar Dra^nBO Itiivww. TtrKltriflHlkprrnarth.J
regimes adhered lo this view: ihc Rumanians and Yugosbvs vigorously opposedndecision anda ledorm of collective rule in which Brezhnev was usually dominant but nothave been responsible for the actual shape of Soviet policy: that is. the peculiarof correct party-to-party relations wiih thc Dub cekian heretics, warnings of severe political and ceo-nomic countermcasuTcs (few if any of which were actually implementedhe maneuvers and cntr< into Chechoslovakia in June of the Soviet military, Ms subsequent (lemporaryl withdrawal, and the peculiar meetings between Sovici and Czech leaders at Braii. slava and Cierna in July and August.
As in Hungary du'-ng the brief period6 when thc Sovici military disengaged and partly withdrew and then attacked. Ihe anomalies in all this could have reflectedraduated response oroutright duplicity, to gain time for the latct massive blow. But thc case for this is not persuasive, especially in view of signs (and reports) of Soviet floundering during both crises Indeed, even thehandling of DubccL after the invasion in Augusikidnaping and forced trip to thc USSR, his subsequent release, and then, bcwildcringly, hisinmore suggestive of confusiondisagreement lhanarefully crafted plot.
An Era of (Retatlie) Tranquillity Withal,8 lhc Soviets began toore knowing and more sophisticated approach to their problems in Eastern Europe. Surprisingly Brezh-ncv, who thereafter was able more and moretiume control in Ihe Potilboro. seems not io have concluded from his Czech opciicnce thai allof individualistic behavior in Eastern Europe had to bc eliminated al the outset. This wasO.ccfinlorakia itself, where lhc stifling of dissent and the removal of the liberals were carried out only over time and did not resultevival of Stalinist terror. Similarly, threats of military intervention inprominent during the fallere played
'
nd Ihcn calinguished; ihcereundle tbe Itnliic dateQ und Gomulku's subseviueni removal without interference: the puliitml retirement of ihc troublesomebrichi liomelm in IUu Germany wis ictornplit'ied with juici Unll jnd Ihc innovative reformiiroceed
thc vjhk time, tnough irrtcg ration under' IMA
-a* rnivhcd even harder, the East Tuiupcnm were oruxutugednd by Soviei cample In increase economic tic* with ihc West. (The volume ill1 trade tviwrrn ihc Weil and the East European states virtually tripled0learly.
earful nf growing Wesft^r.n thc area. Hreyhnev and Co. urtder stood not onl> ihai
tanem Europe, bke the USSR, needed Western rnudi.nd credits, but alio believed that -ibengibening of Eastern Euiopc cnuld helpnhance domestic pofiltcal stability in lhe area; inighi relieve the USSR ol certain economicnd could leadrowing East Euiopc-ano the process of economic ad-vanccmcni in thc USSR
Siflnificanily. Soviei restraintis Caxerntook, place in thc comeii of an active and forward Soviet policy of detente in Western Europe. This, in turn, rested on ihe Sonets" growingin their ability to maintain hegemony in ihevr tphete lufier denwistrating their dctcimination to do to in Orehoslovaku) and increasing optimism about their prospects in Western Europe (where the reaction lo the invasion of Czechoslovak ia had been soon lived and overtaken by tbe momentum of Wesi Germany's Otipotilik) For much ofn fact. Eastern Europe appeared to be irinauil andrope seemed io be luiecptible Any iemptii-on in Moaco-ion wayward trends in tac empireconstrainedtrong Soviet ietare to eiptttil Ihc West Europeans' wcaiiness with thc Cold War. their anaieiy for peace,expanded economic relations wiih thc East-.Iheir capccutiont of profit
Reenier Poland
The Solidarity rnovemcni in Poland in li.'ii-Ki may have posed thc most serious nonviolent indigenous threat to Soviet inieresis and influence jet mounted in Eastern Europe. The Hungarian freedom fighters6 and thedcmocra'ic rcvi.ionistsoi I'/eJj could be overwhelmed b> militaiy force, and ihe threat of Polish national Communismn cuuld be restrained and ultimately dissolved by adroitBui lhe rite of thc Polish working-slaw movementosition of power at least CoitiMrab't
of the Polish party itself represented aof challenge lo Communist legitimacy andIthallenge, moreover, ihai mightdifficult foi ihe SovietsucII wilhwMhout. in ihe process, entailing ihe risk ofif shoit, war with Poland.
Tangible signs of severe worker unrest tn Poland go back moreuarterentury iq lhe riots in Poinan in ihe summer6 and include the ncar-rcvoluiion of the workers on thc Baltic coasl0 These events, though tripped by economic complaints, were also political since lhe workers were ciprcsung profound resentment over their own lack of power and in each instance vented iheir wrath against theCommunisi authorities, both regional and national.
The accession to lop leadetihip of Edward Gierck0 was made possible by Gortiulka's inability to cope with ihc workers' insistence on higher standards of livinghare in thc formulation of economic policies. Gierek promised io raise living standards and to heed thc workers' complaints and. for several years thereafter, governed with their implicit sufferance. But ihe economy began to sag in ihc, partlyonsequence of Gierel's profligateand his standing wiih lhe workers declined apace. Finally0 Gierek lost his job. and his successors faced an ever-growing list of popularincluding legal recognition of the right of ihe workers to strike and to oiganiie free trade unions. As
out, tlx new leaders' willingness io deal wiih
irrrttlT 1
Jit i.. t , a,*
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aervuwvt lad i'lHjfmi. nut r. >j. rj.4iu:,J
lime* by .'.! ipc, '
icliM<*i> -ulhin the fsariy aaal tarn-t
iiihpra*Vlari<il" mie-n- iiwl ii.
it mux appear.vrvsilic pnieiiiiii .ind il.llingnevs io di*rcpi ihcOMit-mx
TheroitCd Unj IVIc. by analarmed Siimo. I.. n(hat jpft'in**hitherto antried in ihe*nd. aa. at hii tumid gut tbecaax ilar' jprv..iii uapivvcdcMcd
l.rwurti (tir Ih* Soi-tl.
lhc Ctl-is in Poland mi* in the end coniaiiicdanner satisfactory to Muxuh. lhc Soviet* It.nc link' reason hi tungraiijLateOn ill.ran, the aginf. leadership in thc Kremlin simpl* not able to respond ooietl) and cffei ik.Ii andbe hard pat lu pet>aadc oen in matt devoted
- cr* thai it had handled or roolicd us
ol.nd Iastern Kuropr in an*enial, lamna
Once again, the Soviet* densonti rated in Polandeyi elace up loowing) ofy mid-Sepiemberftermonth* ol lienrvcd eonicntion oci-een Polish norhcr. andt hod become dear thai the latterin fetical. Bai hasihcn too laic for the So-ieu so iBirtl thai the pantirect political awjuil on SuliCarand loo late lo count on thc unity and strength of lhat pally to preserve its own prrfition in
' DM hI"i'al ihtiuirn iiittn ifcai. in ranto in iIh niiffciu*ifia* Muiwl ISdiibtir>-
mii Bon lu deal "llll mt Pidnh iim* in fU'n-aliiiIn inoiliauhim laitncnia* ili'i |W
r-<t< CSw KWiSHdlM
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I
ihv powerH> ih< beginningl teas' oven torn latethe tituatiuoiu fartxaby Solidarity timply by threatening ihcofiin
Vbc Smid hid divCo-ered inthat ihcirijlin grunt of aulonomv lo the Polo piccludcd live simple romance of orders to acquiesce ni suboidinaico Hut user thenput') iticy were eeiiaml) aware of ihc hcKiilll) of ihe Polish people, ihey muy have convinced themselves lhal thc congruence of Soviet and Polishheir fraternal rcUlioni wuh both Ciomulka and (itcrefc. ihcir relative itoniuieiference in I'oltih affairs, and theirconcc ra for Polish welfare in general had restored their prestige and auihoriiv in Warsawhe point, at lea*i. Where Pidith leader* in need of aid wouldeek and respond io theirnm necessarily llic"uctions
Il did nol work uut lhat way Dunne muM of lhehe Polish leadership, though weakened by internal divrvions and the confrontation withnonetheless actedurprriiAgly indcpcrid-ent entity, negotiating with Mosco* rather ihaa capitulatingven at the end. il is noi at alt clear that Jarurelski, as some Westerners maintain,to the Soviets: rather, as others atacit. he may well have moved primarily because he fearedand its threat lo lhe established ordci. and he wished tohreatened Soviet invasion
The distinction may seem academic Poland is uudct martial law whatever ihe motives behind it. and undemibly. this was the course urged and welcomed by Moscow. But it was the last course available to ihe Soviets short of invasion, and itove implied in the main by deipernlion. If Jnrurrlski believesthat he ailed for his own reasons and evencrvc Polishnd he is surrounded by like-minded men in and oui of the Polish military, then Poland haseasure of sovereignly which could one day ictwrn to plague the Soviet Unaon anc>
Beyond this, there was much in the PcJrsh emitnspire fcai and loathing in Moscow The laigisi and perhaps clotcst of all the USSR'* allien in Eastern
I urope had come perilously close lis al IcasJ-panial secession from thc empire.eign ofhc Communisi regime governed by men prc-*um-iWy skilled in Ihe arl uf polities and supptcsiton and backed by thc power of the USSR, had all bul fallen apart. It had almost succumbed to forces lhat were unarmed, unsophisticated, and tfcialivelyl unor-Ciinijcd. And these forces were not countcrrevolulion-arics or fascists or Western agents bul the workers in whose very name thc regime professedule.
Even iT. us seems probable, the Soviets did not see matters precisely in this light, ihey could not haveainful feeling ofnd rekindled apprehensions about lhe future. Except in propaganda utterances thai must ring hollow evenheir authors, recurrent outbreaks of anti>Communism and anti-Soviciism can no longer be explained away byto class enemies. Western imperialism, and ibe like. Some leading figures in Ibe Soviet Union, even if ihey do not Question thc needaintain the empire, musi be dismayed by iheir paucity of influence at key junctures, thc fragility nf thc Communist party's holdheoretically subjugated society, and theirdependence on brute forceatnlain their positionemblancehey must wonder if pari of the problem does not lie in their system, at least cs it is applied in Eastern Europe, and if thai tystcm should not be changed accordingly*.
1
t 'nitrMnalial
Soviet llegcmont in Eastern hut op*
The rrrmi of rccenl yean *mr mademmnniit camp it neither hintwar. mitmdiiUc.
Zbitatr* Brzeilntkl
Dnrrslly and Disorder
Eastern Europe isabel of convenienceeference to homogeneity. Thc Republic ofin Yugoslavialiltlr roei'i&anec pct'ireflls. eeorvomicatly. culturally, or geographically ux say. Bohemia in Ctxchcaiovakta or the province of Butty-sink in northeastern Poland.izarre and backward state, was for manylient of China bui Ii now an independent and isolationist Balkan icdoXt Eay. Germany,vember of the USSR* Easi European Bloc, is not even isnd so on. thc point being lhal diversity tn ihe area, and in the Bloc, isccent or superficial phenomenon The uniformity imposed by Stalin and maintainedcsier degree by his successors (caccpt overowever, isense both It is a* if the Sovseti had covered loose staleshin fabric which conceals much of the varied, mountainous topography beneath hut docs noi flatten il or. as we have already seen, eliminate the cceasionally active vesica no
Within the specific conical of how ihc SovietiIhcit fabric, especially in thosehere it is rent or worn, and how ihose beneath nthey content to remain in iu shadow or do ihey seekobserver is faced wiih problems of perception and measure mem and e'en definition:
- The Soviets possesi substantial power in Sofia but rarely seem to need toh* Bulgarian leaders not only act swiftlyonform to Moscow's espreascd withes, they are also adept al anticipating ihem. dancing to their superior's tunc even before il is played."
" fva aawAvaraukvt**KHmappeail IB sot wrfa vo tar Su-WitwiMil) na thati bataUlilalfiKiinnil rrcriving in Hintahui iclreiliaat>ily I'Htll nUlumlllp" I' I.peil.
The Soviets wield comparable power in Prague, but here ihc situation it much more com pi. <den* Soviet atieniion. frequent iniervenia<n> aad some willingness to heed ihc op-niom of ihe Crccho-slovak leadership
The East German leaders accept Soviet authority but. thori oo humility and long em pride of aeon-plishment. they oo not refle-rveh bow to Soviet wisdom, nor do ihc; sh> Iron* proffering advice of their own.
The Soviei position in Poland rests on uncertain foundations. Instructions arc received but mat bc resisted, partly because lhc miliury regime is noteature of the Soviets, partly because circumstances--popular opposition, the power of ihc Church, lormake compliance difficult On balance, if ihc Soviets' ultimate hegemony is noi challenged, aspects of iheir operational authority probably atc.
In Budapest ibc relationship is ambiguous On the one hand. Ihc Hungarians move on Iheir own to reassure nnd placate, and they seem never tothe Sovieis directly. On the other, they feel free to innovate atBig Broihrr reasonably well-informed bui not always seeking bis advancesometimes to behave as|noi simple sstraps! abroad. Thus, to para-phtase the old saw. the Hungarians may be content to enter the revolving door behind the Sovieis, but they caerl every cffon to leave it ahead of them.
- There remainsountry that has raised thc level of national Communisi politics to an an. Party and state leader Ceautcscu has aucecssfully redefined lhc roleember of the Bloc,ties that are mostly formal and confining Soviei influence almosl ennrdy io thc negative. Ccatrtescu accepts certain limits on hit couaiiy'* sovereignty but. within these, he accepts neither advice not inspiration.
Ihc Tool* a' Hit Imperial Craft
ittsl Kuiopcan Bloc Mate* thu> no longer deserve the demeaning appellation "snicltili'." ltcy remain in orbit they do sourther remote ituch more eccentric ellipse. This does noi mean, of esiurse. that the center ol this system hns losi il-Uiuvilalionat pull or simply given up its means of inllucnec and aim rial Cm thc contrary, ihe USSR hasonsiderable variety of instrument* of pcrMiasion and puv*cr. both tangible and intangible.them.
/'ere ofbe USSRhc application of armed force or the threat to useforce. The ihreai by itself has failed on occasion, as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, fcul seemed parili lo work in Poland, and no doubt helped to head off crises elsewhere. Whatever, the existence of Moscow'shelming military capability, tagciher with itswillingness louse it und to justify ilvia thc Brerhnev Doctrine,ervasive instrument of ultimate control, the most potent deterrent to East European defectionnce employed, uf course, il is brulaUv effective, at leastime. Thererawback, however- the Soviets do not want to use il hce- -among other things, il incurs political costs abroad and is tantamountonfession of policy failure. This reluctance, inoicovci. is by now gcnetally reetvgniied in Eastern Europe. where the lesson of past Soviet interventions and noninterventions has been twofold: Moscow- will move militarily if need be. but it willrice to avoid lhe necessity. Thisin tut n. provides the Easl Europeans wiih some real, though circumscribed, leverage of their own (for example. Romania)
"rim (tmaidlii rnumiticO Sin P'ovda.tpK-mBf'it* Brcrhnc Uocuinc saacnt (hat. (hough the people* and ru'lm
each Sccliliu eeunirjtwve IreeOvwfcicrsvinc ihco
inmi'i nalh oT Ce>(lnemeMny decnHa ol Ihtiriulivn in their wn ciwnlrythe fundamental
iriicretu of the mhei raoitivt ecwur; norler't
rge, nminunul Pany
otAy lo litrorte bui alt* in all vieiiliii coumiici and lo ihc
ommiiiil mavrmnlhcnl inflme.ji
tocialiti counnii* canQa be iiionierpiudlit Wicoii of
and ihiiiu-hit-m') mnvniCM."
Inttitutional Tin. While perhaps not-a*he Soviets would like toreat variety ofean* are available- diplomatic relations:membership in Blc-ewidc bodiesA. ihe Warsaw Pact, various councils andl Itothi: official pa riy-io-party contacts; international Communal conferences, scientific congresses:cultural, and academic exchanges: and nuta-Wy. sccrci police lie* iThe KGB must seem almost as omniprcseni in most of Eastern Furnpc os in the LSSR: while its influence is turcty lew- -in part Isceause largelynonethelessaior pari in ihe preservaiion of Soviet influence, and Andropov wilt surely seek to keep it thathi* panoply of persistent relations hips forms aweb designed and used by the Soviets to exercise nominancc. curb disaffection, and. not so incidentally, to keep informed. Still, though generally effective, institutional strings are much too diffuse and too remotely controlled toingle instrument of control: moreover, some of Ihc most important Strands, for example. CEMA. arc vulnerable ia East European expressions ofnd recalcitrance.
Helotinns Among Ltaitn. Thisital aspect of the relationship which is al once tangible and intangible. Meetings between Soviet and East European leaders (usually bilateral, except during internationalconclaves, including party congressesi provide the former anlunity lo deliver lectures, provide counsel, apply pressure, and occasionally demand accommodation Most East European leadersfind themselves listening to their Soviet mentor* attentively, though the days of bowing and temping arc mostly over. And oncehile, lhe visitor may decide to give as good as he gets.
C ongmtai interna. While ihey often operate at crass-purposes with Moscow's designs, some purely national bast Europeaninteresi* nol common lo the Bloc as aalso be an important element in Moscow's arsenal of influence. Poland's iind Czechoslovakia'* fear of German revon-ehitm and Ihc last German regime's fenr and hatred
of Woi Germany areptfsM So loo
h Bulganil hostility toward Yugoelatia. Greece, and Turkey Lett obvioot. tail powauulK significant, arc ihc Quarrel! among lhc Bloc states themselves which.things, pretl) much preclude rasl Euro-peon unity viva-vis lhc Soviets. Thc LSSR ordinarily represses but on occasion canloiit suchor instance. Ihe Romanian.Hungarian dispute Transytvania and ill will between tbe Creel, lands and Slovakia.
There are. inundle nl"common io ooe degreethe
regimes of the Blochole Suchomicrcsti-include the docinrsal disapproval pfcai-uhsmand "Oegenetate" Western society in gcnei-al: joini luspicion of Wesiern intention* in Eastern Europe and the world ai large, and. abovehared apprehension thai ihey and theirsimply couM not sajrvive if Sonet suppon mt withdrawn
Ideology. As China and Yugoslavia base repeatedly nuderesumably rom mot ideology canas -ell as unite Indeed,hcdoiy Is defined and imposed by some higher authority,differences within thc family become almost inevitable over lime. Still, as the principal teat of Maiiui-Leninisi thought and as thcrtdt founding sute. th* USSRertain ideological prestige and preeminence ithough hardly as much at itasi Europeans who would contend with ihe USSR therefore mustharge of heresy as well as thc usual secular forms of pressure While this may not prove decisive,t least discouraging More important, ihc CPSU*credentials provide ihe Blocommon means of communication, giveretest for an endless series of pronounce men is aboul mailers that otherwise would seem io impinge on the inicrnal affairs of lhc East European (and other! slates, lend authecily toconcepti of intra Bloc affairs, and define the limns of the jumoi panncn relations with the infidels in the outside world. More subtly,provides thc same rationale to all Ihc panics of thc Sloe for their very ciistencc: whyhurch without beliefs' This means, ia tura. ihai ihese panicseluctance to tamper with drxtruse. it;and then survivalput at risk.
teonomir Ilex. Thc sheer ssiTumcofuropean economic intercourse assuresSRowerful Instrument uf influence. Though graduztU diminishing over the years, lhc percentage of last European trade with the Sown Lnign remains high enough (imports ranging1ow ofercent in ihe case ol Reiminia tor Bulgaria, eiports conforming iosimilar patierni toubstantial degree of economic dependenceo since an obsaoui alterrcidy eipandcd iradc with thc VVcst.notracticalnei available to Ihc Eastiiher now (in the wake of Poland's near financial collr in ihc foreseeable fuiurc. Thc Soviei* .dsn appear lo be Ihe primary source of badl* nrrded cconomie aid over ihe next few years, even though the level of such aidalmost certainly decline -and East European economics sufferonsequence as lhc USSRown economic problems grow.
But while the USSR's economic tie*astern Europe are certainly usefulariety ofhey create tangible means of contact. can bc employed a* political weapons, and generally .nhthri Easi Europe-an movet towarddocees* sarily serveattery of heavy artillery when there are tertous strainselationship. Thus Soviet threats of economic retaliation and economic warfare hav* not always proved effective (for eumnlc. against Romania and Oechoslomkn in Ihe IveOsi When ihey were actually carried out -against China0 and against Yugoslavia, virtually scaled off from economic relations with the entire Blochey failed to produce either an economic collapseavorable change in political behavior In any event the East European regimes retain some smallc leverage of their own. and they can argue thai Soviet failure to provide adequate levels of assistance mighlomestic tranquillity and their own authority.
Tar Miliiary Coeaeenem Nothing tuts testified io the efficacy of Sonet military powerricctof control quite yn eloquently as Ihcuenccs of its removal fiom Yugoslavia. Rumania.
tfilllidiilll.l
after il Uina dclat. Czechoslovakiaokc of withdrawal r. mil likely to be repeated in ihc foreseeable future
In addition to uting occupying forceseant ut inlimxUlkoa andrcnwnder of Soviei migM lhe USSR hji mtiuednainuining etUte oveiuf h> of Bloc force* ihc Warsaw Pact and indircctl> commit many of iheir activities Ihrough mcwiun assignment!training exercises. (Romaniapartialhe purpose is fourfold: n> forrttall Ihc uie of Fail Eutopean armies in ways inimicablc lo Soviei interests; to augment Soviet force' in Ihc evcni of war:adre of pro-Soviet officcri and aof pio-Sovici power which can be used nm only against Ihe population at largealsocliiieally restraining force in the evemocal regime has embarkedayward course;iirrmis. as recently dcmonsiiateei lor tbe first time in Poland. So stake polilKal use of tbese forces when the earning regime rs falicrmg or disloyal
But here again, there vie drawbacks and risks.for example, lhe armed forces(crime's dtive for independence: clemenls ofarmy did ihe samendave tided wiih the Sovieit; and theto havc proved ns loyally to its
own high command and ibe Jarurcltki regime bul given no sign that it tojM help the Soviets mcontest between The iwo
fmiiil Co'iseti Very little is known about the ouility and extent of thc private, personal relatma-ship* between Soviet and East Euior-enn leaders and Other politicians and prominent administrated.they exitt; sometimes signs of ihis are reflected in public statements, as wheiwGomutka, Radar.
Novoiny. nnd others seemed to register some degree or personal dismay at the ouster o> Khrushchev in
ut how much imparlance thou Id be placed on specific attachments can only be conjectural
ower level, however, iberc is some firsthand testimony which tvgfcsU lhat personal contact*East European party ewa-aiihikl and cahcr bunaucrats with their Soviei opposite numbers arc very widespread and nrobabli of greni imi-oiiance to iheontinuing, low-key means
influcrwe Simpk prudence appareniU dictates ihai the East European offtctal *tay abtcasi of Soviet atlitudet relevant IO hr> own profcsiioAal trwcrcilv MT.iUrly. concern over the securiiy ol hi* own position ind eagerness lev advancement would encourage thai official to pay serious attention io Soviet advice, particularly if he suspects, ss he should, thai similar concerns prompt comparable behavior hi higher level' wiihin his own organization While nil this does not automatically ensure fas! European .on for mi ty and fidelity. and ntny al times help the fcusi Europeaf" to exercise sortie influence oa the Soviet* it must in general foster Easl European caution not an un known prodn bureaucracies anyhow the atendance of disagreement. andon of miasmic susceptibility to Soviei guidance
1inally.he weapon-of influence in ihe Soviet armory is something even more amorphous lhan personal contacts, the foci ihai lhe Soviets ate simply butastern Europe. To be sure, the effects of this. rriTscipally psychological, are negative at well as positive. "Russki Goould adorn full; half the available walls of Eastern Europe were ihr south of these countiio. as gives a their Western compatriots (and cans of Soto; paini eouallvAnd the collective sighs of relief In Yugoslavia. Romania, and China in the wake of massiveof Soviet military or "advisory" pertonncl were clearly audible throughout the world Bul cls*-where ihe continuing Soviet pretence can enough it not always does)ind of ennui andfeeling offight city hall*in the face of such awesome odds.
TViii Response While clearly effective as ways to influence East European development and constrain Easl European sovereignty, thc instruments of persuasion, control, and intimidation outlined above by no meansa system of absolute authority On ihe contrary, as history has dcinorisiraied. ihc pattern lhal has emerged over lhe yean siscc Stalin's death has done so in rneeemeal fashion rather lhan as thc reautt of some grand design, emphasises in the main bilateral
rather thin empire-tideandomment,set ed rule* and standaidi throughnconduct car. bc filleted and against which East Futopean behavior can bc indeed. Thc synrm. then, hay many faulli und it. in rddiiion. relatively inchoate.
Thc fm European Hates have had com idem Ok eipericncc in operaiinf within imperialrneni have enjeryed national independence only briefly in the modern era. There are lirnilariliet in the wnys ihe individual retime* have dcali with the Soviets and ihe way! their non.Communin predceestor* dealt with the lUpsburgs. Hohenrollcrns. and Ottomans Their behavior ksi been and hi esscmuii> opponanii-tie. runntni the gamut from bargaining over legalities to out rig hi defiance.
Low-Vcy resistance to Innovation and to "general crvkia" isn iliv iitont frccjuent and telling Idem of negative Eail European response. Il is eaaier and safer, for rumple, to drag one's feet than to flatly oppose, it is also easier to find collegia! suppori for delaying tactics than for clear refusals, the former demsndintlhc latter courage.
> Even the most adamant aid heroic among tan European Communistanddid not initially seek to sever themselves and then countries from their Soviet association, and Dubeek never did. In ihe cate of Nagy and Dubork, boih men earnestlyompromise, noi conflict, bui both ulllmatcly found themselves propelled by irre-siitible forces at work within their own societies
Even the meat obeisaat of East Earopeaa satraps arc capable of occasional obduracy Thus Polish leaden in the, apparently fcanngrebellion, failed lo collectivize agriculture on lhc scale demanded by Stalin: conscrvalive icgimcs in Chechoslovakia and Bulgaria only pretended lo go along with Mciscow's callNew Course" in the: and Ulbricht made known hn severeabout Soiet policy toward Wenin lhc.
In Hurgary the Kadar leadership has chmcn to follow an innovative cimrsc of ii<uccl and rclaied arvoach to dumestie affairs without great regard forhe Bloc Assurcd of Kudu's basic loyally, reassured by his regime's public devotion io Soviet foreign policies, and surely not animus to risk renewed turbulenceation thai hav historicallyeluctant clteai. the Soviets hate apparently gone along >nh ihe ripertment. though aiith0 aanbe*}.
Particularly risky, of course, has been ihc pcculia' 'independent in" Romanian way of Ghcorghiu-Dci and Ceauictcu This has involved lhc previously' mentioned "Declarationof Independence"nprecedented public references lo unredeemedterritory in the USSR, frank appeals to nationalist vennmcnu among thc people al large, an informal (undeclared) political alliance withpotentially directed against the Sovici Union, and "vetoes" of Soviet initiatives concerning both CEMA and ibe Warsaw Pact. Il has nlso involved criticism of Soviet ideological precepts designedeinforce Soviet claims to hegemony and support of implicitly inn Sovin "rclyeer-iriii" themes prc-poonded by the Yugoslavs and Eurocommunism AH these moves and positions hav* been iwallowcd by ihe post.Stalin Soviet leaderships, which somciime. seem less tolerant than simply outplayed
Clearly however, there arc limits to th* game thai both parties understand First and mosthc Ceausescu regime's pledge not to abandon ih* Communist system ai homeot something lhat icgim* would *ish to do in any easel and not formally and completely lo abandon ihe Soviet Bloc system abroad (which, though less clearly SO. is also an event ihe regime would rather not undertake, even were it fenublel For its pari, the Soviet leadership hai notit has certainly not foresworn thefor roughlyears ha< it sought actively io overthrow thegang in Bmhircsi Presumably. Mrsscow'iisnown thorn in the side is belier than
I VNIIJnilial
the unknowns und costsImuirds of seeking lv remove tu paiticulart) if that thorn happens tn be.l is. the poorest, most isolated geographically,rguably the least important strategically of all the Bloc states.
Tbe "final" options open lo the East Europeanrebellion andless likely inra of thc Brerhnev Doctrine land -hatthan inrecisely because the invasion threat is credible enough to make ihem seemt the same time, however, because these options remain possible, the threat of cither Oi both continues to concern the USSR and gives the
East European regimes some room for ma-icuvcr.
>
Aside from these forms ofoviet control, the East European stalesind of reverse influence on thc Soviei Union that is hardly dramatic bui that may help at least indirectly to curb Soviet hegemony.
East European Influence on Ihe USSR When the stakes are very high, most East European leaders are probably preparedsteri their own interests with vigor and conviction. Indeed, theof all the East European states, even including those of lhc fiefdom of Bulgaria and of that cutious contrivance of the Cold War, Easi Germany, sec themselves as representBtives of national entities with peculiar national interests. Eachapable of seeing problems in its own light, relatively free ol Ihc shadow ofSoviei policy and doctrine. Thus it was that the dean of the faithful. Walter Ulbricht.hreat to lhc national eiistenee of thc OUR. actively and effectively resisted trends in Soviet policy toward Wesl Germany in thend; thus it would be in Sofia. Tor roughly the same kinds of reasons, if the Soviets should ever side withon thc question or Mac)edonia.
The point is. not only do East European interests someiimes conflict with Soviet and sometimes eause trouble: ihe eiistenee and expression of these interests atso influences Soviet policy, helps to shape it. even putsl. Indeed, this is one way the empire fights back.
The East Europeans, in addition offouhe-Sovietpolitic, not to mention itsariety nfcultural, and economic which of course is one reason why the Row of East European ideas to thc USSR is so severely restricted by the Sovici authorities. The East European leaders can also provide direct political support or opposition to one or another Soviet leader framing policies or seeking allies, though ihe East European role secrm not to have been large durng past periods of Soviet succession. And finally. Eastern Europe, as an area ol potential turbulence, can help indirectlyhape Soviei politics and policies by remaining calm and acquiescent, or. conversely by becoming agitated and/or blowing up.
In Ihc long run as ihe empire malures. the direct influence of the Easi Eutopean stales on Soviet behavior and policy seems likelyncrease. The Hungarian economic experiment was tolerated under Breihnev and now seems likely to receiveeniion and approbation under Andropov All the Easi European states have benefited from Romania's insistence on (and the USSR's recognition ofi the right of members lo assert Independent views in Bloc councils. Moscow has demonstrated some willingness lo give thesereater voice inthis is asragmatic adjustment to economic realities as itapitulation to politicaland has paid at least some lipservice to the notion thai they shouldarger decisionmaking role wjihin ihe Warsaw Pact at well. Thc Soviets have atsoisposition to enhance thc status of some East European leaders (Gomulka was the primeoflmost as if they wereofficio members of the Soviet elite.
While the Soviets may wish to view such adjustmentsign of growing imperialEast European members of the dub are simply being given aend result could or course be quite different if one or another East European leader inierpicts ihem as an accommodation of his own growing autonomy.
Suecessions and Tncii Impaci
apfiathi't lueeetslonIke -War* t'munj.ike/neif end mill* -dimiib/ Ma/*eventuallya trpluermeni in ihr MM Iradeiihi/iihe central e'lobli'hmcniale much grroi-ee lhan ihc last iwn luttrtiiant and wilt be tiimhlnetlun inereaseil yrneraiinnal inrmner of the Sown mdiiical elite. This . hat nu perrrdrni la Stand hiunry. Il wiltoltiital inrnrui rd term dweilon and tlynifirnnce
Srveryn Biolec
TW Andtofl'
Signsati-Hrejhno Struggle 'c leadership -undci way in ihc Kremlin were visible in boib ihc
i political arena and in the area uf Soviei economic policy long before Brcrhisev himself hadis final hcan attach. Maneuvering among ihe possible hein beganaiacst in2ey power broke. Mikhail Suslov. died and upset ihe c* in ing balance" Signs of this were Quickly reflected inpearanccs andom invents, and debotcsover longstanding issues of economic consequence, sixh as declining labor pro-ductiviiy. managerialand technulog.-eal stagnation, soon ihereadcr surfaced in thc Soviet press *
truggle for Brezhnev'* mantle, if at all protracted and deep, wouldrofound impact in Fallen Europe, and invhobihiy on letaiiems between Eastern Europe and the Soviei Union at well, seems as dose to in iron law of empire as one is likely to get. But there is no law. apparently, which decrees either Ihe duration or inicosily of vuccessionwithin thc USSR II took Khrushchev four turbu-leni years lo succeed Stalin, Brezhnev sli or eight yvais of subdued struggle lo succeed Khrushchev And il now seems possible, though by no means certain, that Andropov essential'accomplished thc task in just nine oronths of idatndy moderate contention.
Inl,
/ran* AuwWi
inrs M
l SMi Ifi ii" t"
Specifically, in terms ofhcwa. far kes* ditrnptnr andthe *uCrcisioa to Slaltf* Thi* was partlyvoid krft by Stalin's Scaihhe one opened up byThoughhrushchev'swere fir Less damaging and posthumouslythan Stalin's and roatorcd.
amendments land no potentially crptOM-esecrethc general mood* was calmer nnd much lesslhan lhe prevailing mood in WSJ (whenfeared for their skinti Further.
ecessors. unlike Stalm't. did not fall outr the Question of powei. and thet assured thcii constituencies thatcessea ol style, his penchant for reorganisations and assigning economic priorities lo ret induttrict. and hi. iimpc'ingi with the parly machinery would cease once and for all
lhe collective lhal succeeded Khrushchev and the Brezhnev regime thai, in turn, succeeded thethified policy emphases and instituted new pr> gran* nvei litne bul in generalattern of Veadcrsbip thaireturn to nor oaky" and the "pursuit of polidcs of institutional continuity. gradualism, accommodation, and reassurance of the elite, in short of
And all this teemed lo argue "for thef the Soviet polity to achieve the |ncit] transfer of there?-leadership posiUtrn without mayor drama, wiihout undue
The apparent success of Yuri AndropoveontoUlai-ing hHoboously his authorityforeignliourt of Brerhncv'i death onovember did. in fact, suggest an order') iiansfcr of power. Andropov's success can probablt be ailrib-utcd to ibc licklusler character of hiso
gWw.Snmentan n.I I<
p
lussuperior talent* and tfivunl resourcefulness, and lo his ability lo line up impressive support Iron collogues in Sic Polilboro und within key interest groups (surely including ihc KGB und pnbabty Ihc military)
Brezhnev's long illness may also have eoniribulcd indirectly io ihe ovcrily decorous succession process. There was time to make various politicaland alliancet. time Tor al (cast lhc temporary resolution of some issues, and time for the various interest groups in Soviet societye heard and to bring their Influence to bear. And all this- could lake place while Brezhnev was still able to provide cominu-jiy and national leadership and the appearance of stability ai the top.
This it noiay. however, that "it's all over but thcndropov seemsave won dominance very quickly and efficiently andinimum oi political disruption. But this may in part merely have reflected Ihc unanimous desire in Ihc Polilboro to avoid open signs of disunity in the leadership. And unless he has somehow already gained completeover ihc Politburo and the Secretariat (somethinghc Soviet leadership willto function in part as an oligarchy. This means, inter alia, lhat disagreements over policy and resist-anccndropov's rule, though perhaps they will not be expressed dramatically, are likelyersist.-"
In ihe area of policy, especially economic policy, Andropov has clearly indicated his desire for changedcnibiiewinimizing contention wiihin the Politburo aod uneasiness within thchas alsoillingnessroceed with eaulion. Thus concerning (in his words) "ihc need to extend Ihcf various economic enterprises, his declaration ofovemberase in point: "It isndropov told the Central Commiiiee. "to conduct experiments if need bc.ake appraisals, and to lake account ol thc
GreyKuthat, oilKhtvsSehrvlir arif b( tl liiione.man ink aad coUrnivc lodcrihin vvrr
balk iii-tUa-mtih pen oT Suncl politicaltcdiHil hli
noitf tfcii one ibouM diiorewst bcixcn "iraimmt in tW
riKUticii inJ noliucicT ihr iaciiinbriuand(or hitllvlncir "Sikidou CiinliagcwinSc-icl Until*.'XXIV iMn.h.
i..
experience of frrtcrnal countries" This is intcrcoinp. even modestly liiillating. butousing callaction
Beyond Andropov, who is AK. thereood chance of far greater change. "This is the first time in Soviet history that an entire generation of leaders |not just thc top leadership positionl is departing history's stage more or less logethcr. Accordingly, precedentsmc fragile and the uncertainties
Further, quoting Scweryn Bui,-:
The departure -if'he Great Purge genera-lion of lenders t$ In litelf on Important turning-point in Soviet political hiittiry
'he circumstance, roinetding as itanother turning-paint in Soviethittorx.imeond opening'for change
The Soviet svtlem inasa high le*el cf staMity.morgmolity of change. It is mythatay hein the coiningUnion tatay he/different from the Soviet (Von ofOfnt not at allmajor changes will take place.do projectignificant increasefee clanger'
The New Generation of Soviet Leaders Over time, perhaps in the middle or later years of thisew contender tor power in the CPSU will be cast up.oungerepresentative of the post-Stalin genera lion, more vigorous and less commuted lo Ihe mores and mylhs of the past. At the same lime, there willomparable generational turnover in all Ibc Soviet political elites. Oneknowledgeable observer. Scweryn Bialer again, has studied this new generation and interviewed 3
' Rtaici. onrii. p.
22
variety ol iU members und has prodded aglimpse of what it may look like:
One of in crucialformalistoo* place daring ihcfermem andshock ofanti-Stalina campaign that auciiioned authority and established truths and thereby stimulated critical thought.
The new generation ismUt generation ia ill lypieul and pershtrnt adherencehe call of the uaie. Ills menJurs are eommilied io! lhe banc forms af Soviei politicalthel belief ihai ihe system is right andBuiJ ihey lend lo exhibit linlr of iheir predecessors' xenophobia and much lest of iheir fear and deeply rooted suspicion of lhe utililde uorld.
One most striking trait of this group is its skepticism about ihe grander claims of Soviei propaganda concerning themerits. Its members displayell-developed awareness of lhe system's functionaland/of/i backwardness and provinciality inThey do not disguise their dislike and lack of eespeci for ihe oldThis generation Is olsojand/ is characterized by nigh-ly developed careernd ellilim.
i
Iteneration lhat perceives lheof lhe Brezhnev administration lo layirection for Sovieihat Is less likely to accept actualpotential International achievements as substitutes for internal development hai, may be willing to'tghrr price in terms of political and social change if persundrd thatrice would assure substaniial improvement in ihe growih ond efficiencyhe productive ond dit-trihulive prticei id. "
In short, nd Biulcr sect il. lhe pectt-Stalin generation ol ihe politically elite it essentially pragma lie and lor-tvaid looking, no let* patriotic than lis predecessors but certainly more realistic about the faults ol ihc system and thus, in tbe Soviet contest, basically reform minded. This does not mean, however that Ihc bulk of its members is likely loreformsruly liberal or democratica Dubcek. or to seek to emulate ihc barnstorming, highlyapppr-wch of Khrushchev. Nur. a> Dialer notes, need il be "easier to deal with in the internationaln the contrary, it might be "lest cautious, more prone to lake risks" because it lacks firsthand experience with "the cosi of building Soviet mighi" and is accustomed to the USSR's great power status
One might add to this analysis the notion thai ihere nonetheless is at leasi one characteristic ihc new age group shares with older generations, the naturaltendency to react against the excesses andof the preceding regime. Malenkov and Khrushchev sought to overcome the suffocating effects of years of Stalinist tyranny. Brezhnev and bis associalej in turn strove to elimnstc the unsettling consequences of Khrushchev', llamboyani style and controversialAndropov will cry to get lhe USSR moving again, though without entirely casting off thc caution of his predecessors. The neat generation of leaders is likely io be reactive loo. may discard the hardline wariness of Andropov, try to expand the number of permissible means to confront problems, and seek to enlarge and make more realistic the vision of what Soviet society should ultimately become."
Pressing Policy Problems
Most authorities would probably agree lhat. given the seriousness and compleiiiy of .he problemsthe new Soviet leadership, debates over policy are likely to beuch debates will surely involve
' Thi maoidualiM careerf ihe member* cf tb< rotiSitlin (enmueo.tmiaiWetj by Blaler't
a bmltr* Hitmk tibe Ruuian firtl pravinoal Mcniawl. aboit conwrvalrn oxrall atmreach. becameot
e ofre btuer coaciicu. aic wchaccrtit ai -ell ai anyanitrnit/.pioSoonnaniljmt-nrctumably in nan because o< ihd. lakws tut riwn ojtileoacm potiiiorn.
t*wi
.luc'siions concerning Soviet relation* wiihilled Slates. China, and Eastern Europe, but the sharpest disagreements will probably focus on thc USSR's economichere can bc link doubt, in fuel, lhat ii is in this urea thai ihc Andropov leader--hip and its successors will face their most demandV: copingariety of awesome problems lhal have fnr some lime been neglectedrezhnev regime disposed to compromise.rulify man> it hough not alii conipcting imcrcst groups, and in general to muddle through, probkma thai cannot bc solved, or even partially solved, by placebos anj traditional methods.
Pail /tcMkutiidproblems were coneenifah ril eiiher on one areaime and/or were responsiveass mohlliroiion effort. SOoy.he strategyammer hlinv. The approaching problems of the IVKOs are spread across ihe hoo'd to many vital areas andhe strategy of the scalpel."
Most pressing, of course, will bc Questions of resource allocation and the appropriate adminwmy lo deal with them. Nearof the growth ofooming energy crisis, impending labor shortages, persisting agriculturalossible decline in livingeneral social malaise, the continuing growth ofin the miliiary sector, and declining invest-mentthese problems and more arc coming together to demand major, systemic changes imposed from above. They are doing so. moreover,eriod of political stress andime when it is becoming increasingly apparent that ideology and ciisting doctrines not only fail touide lo prosperity but positively inhibit or even preclude progress toward that goal. Economic circumstances thus cry out for radical change, and Biuler. for one. suggests that, if Andropov does not or cannot respond effectively, thc younger leaders probably will.
Bialer docs noi believe, however,conomic problems will carry with ii ihc seeds
adical changehe poliiic.il system, lie ihinlis ihc regime will effectively guard against "dangerous fractures and ruptures" and that thc system isstrong and stable to survive fundamental alteration* in economic policy- '* And yet. to beew economic program will have to deal with difficulties likely to reach crisis proportions by ihe middle of the decade and effect truly fundamental reforms. Further, anything this ambitious and far reaching would almost inevitably provoke high-level disagreements over thc allocation of resources, even were resources in more plentiful supply than they will be. But Bialer seem' is* minimize ihc likelihooderious political struggle at the top
Other ripens, most notably Myron Rush, disagree in part. Rush, for example, foicsees serious political contention overeel ion of the economy; doubts ihit even radical reform. iT agreed upon, would solve thc economic problem;ossible weakening of the USSR's security positiononsequence;that changes sufficient to turn the economy around would, in fact, endanger ihc systemhole; and implies that because of this thc effort ia not likely to be made."
Nevertheless. Rush believesundamentalis attempted, it i* likely to be associatedhange in leadership. "Radical reform is mostnot simply byut ratheruccession consequent upon the manifest failureadership and it* policies."
Both Rush and Biakr agree lhat ihe need lorchange exists now and will probably become particularly acute later in this decade. Further. Rush docs noi seem lo dispute Bialer's characterization of Ihe post-Stalin elile as. essentially, more open minded and activist than its predecessors. To lhc extent ihai these two observers disagree, then, ihe argument may eventually be settled if ihe new generation of Soviet leaders proceedsadical way to refashion the
Ibid. p. hl-ag.
>Rmh.a'OKi Milriin Build-Up anil ihr Cvmiitf
nrwnwinwl SmuttyU pp. 1ftU.la">
" Bvih.unOr tiVihrul*
imfMl'MITI*
believingthat In -he process no damage need bc done ihc political super*"ueture And in this way. ihc future leaders of the USSR could unwillingly become Ihc architects of their own fall Irom power.
The Impact on Eastern Europe
The nature or the attack on domestic problems in the USSR bye (fine- leaderships will have major implications for Easternadical change itt the administration of lhc Sovici economy, for exam-pic. would inspire motion toward similar reforms in oiher Bloc slates. OutcoriKs would vary according to thcBcgrce of autonomy exercised by eachhe preferred policies of lhc individual leaderships, and ihc character and force of Soviet guidance. As during the New Course of thc, however. Ihe issue itself would become important simply because the USSR had raised it.
There ore, in addition, rather more indirect forms of fallout from changes in Soviethift in investment patterns, for example, might affect the composition of Soviet trade with Easternurn toward more provocative acts abroad might curtail East European trade with Western countries and further limit the availability of Western credits. And so on.
Al! of which might suggest thai,uccession period in thc USSR inevitably involves Questions of policy of interest to thc East Europeans, il would behoove ihe leaders of these stales to make their feelings known or. if less cautious, io actually ity to involve themselves on one or another side of an issue orolitical struggle."
As important as thc precise nature of Sovici policies arising out of succession politics, and Ihe degree of Bloc involvement, arc thc consequences in Eastern
" Wbcikern hifoeaed ia ibery lantmuntKr cinoaenl ol rrfaaat. Rit-al saint "tl ihe then inertKhiuthchcv -iinmdrici. mli li mriobee? Quite KUtotc undo thr circumtiaitocs. but iihard to doramnL the initiittve tor the tlist Kuropci**'
bruited (nml-eirnfc eotntay U) Ml*aul ihoe n. in in)' in oWhiojrorea* leader tajt)tJ uiriricm uiiu'rhit iimr li< enter himwlfinw iln Smitt rotuiiil Uut :lm need not tukiMovcalmt byvi<
Europe or disarray in the top Soviei leadership Stability in the Soviet-East European relationship seems to bc enhanced during periods of strong leader, ship or dictatorship in the Kremlin and weakened during periods ol collective rule. The failureovici oligarchy to agreerogram, lo pfo*toc dcar and consistent direction, and to project un auia of certainly and unity had obvious, direct, and even dramatic effects in Eastern Europe during the brnu-haha attending the Stalin succession. Though less apparent and direct, ihe Impact of the succession to Khrushchev wa* almost equally dramatic, at least inSee thc accompanying chart.i
To be sure, some ofroubles in Eastern Europe have arisen fiom its own deliberate decisions to diminish lhc worst forms of oppression and to allow greater autonomy, all in the name ofore effective hegemony. But ihis more enlightenedsometimes had unintended results. Sovicito interfere in thc domestic squabbles of the East European parties, for example,nly exacerbated factionalism, weakened the existingand encouraged other elements in society toolitical role. And many Soviet decisions affecting Eastern Europe were not clearly explained, consistently applied, or adequately backed up. partly
" Ihii dillMCIWnpevsdi of ollcarihic rule and one-man
dicutorihiiiiefulcriltt accurate one but can be maleadeat. All political eorJIiet dee* noi disappear 'mm ihc Sen In sctnr siaajty becameunite kadinc flame becomes doraniaat. Khfuthtbcv faced one decree or another ai tevHtince ihitAilw^tcareer at ihe rep. aod the men who wrroaadrdthere (epiomiect inniviiomal and poliikal/rcemeank intertill lhat werei"met bonik to KhraOehev'ihe tm*true of Brciharv. ihoatb. beeanie he wit ten lnno>alive andmore
inclined lohan cewibat them. h(
hid aa easier timeotiiTtdlir.otted pfedcccwi. Stall, major cVvtiloni and disatrccencnuthe Politburo do mnto be ibc neo> durinc rerMCH of retinail1 became one man can artmnie dispato and demind eonlarmii) onii dreiilon hav been rude Tail ii oat ibe ease duriaca lucmifcnhere is to fi*il rciooe. rcrhipt no une vnh crouch rowed in-ei to clamp item on diucai onesdnvuin hsi been made. and. tadecct.t rone powibility in tome Imunvc* thit ao dreliioa ran bc made the difference* teixcn ihr im>ihuiBy nomeaas mrreti academic. <nrt in
leans' taeif ianmei.in Eaitern Luropc. Ibey may be mu>*
mac important thin their limilsriiic*
A Chronologyeot* in (be VSSR and Eastern
l
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ucmtai ilruuk biii.i'.
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KrtiHtl
n
Fa-cr. 1'sr.T*
iuf.*vjM kadtr. unuiikdb. Kluv-hrtcV.
Alimwud
Bulgaria
igiinc.
Major (Idii la Poland Hill),
(iomvlla ouilcd.
do mil Mxrfcre.
Eia of rrlmWr tta nquillny. eonueiWcoRomania 'llll dim pi nr.
PcludttuSoUariiv.
of Ihe uncertainly.and division which dominated the deliberations of the Politburo for jo long.
Andropov, described by his supportersan well equipped to deal with problems intelligently, iseager to avoid any display of Politburo indecision and confusion tind. indeed, to dale has hcIcJ very much as the nun iu charge. And if Ihe
Andropov regime is now able, in fact, to provide Ihe East European leaderships with clear, firm, andguidance, tome of thc tribulationsof the past succession periods can no doubt bc avoided. Andropov, lor example, unlike Khrushchevis Rakosi and HungaryS. will probably
< (CTioVniiJT
drill himselfhc pceilioa of fjiiwingo fcuropein contender form of hiineeds ano policy pnulHunt wiihir ihr So*k( Poliibuio. And. unlikeo could neither support nor denounce Novotny minndropov does not seem the tori of manwould rttk eathiical disruption* fur the sakeaiiinc neutralism lor simply because he was anabic to make up his mlndl
Slid, many of the banc problem' uioueccstfully faced by Khinhchev and Breihoo continue to cmii. and. as Andropov will loor fine oui. vsmc arc becoming more acute and the potential burdens all the larger Specifically in the economic area" "Thc Soviei Union it running out of incentives for enticing rather than compelling, allegiance from ill Eatt Eoropean allied elites This allegiance is undermined by mourning evidence of the lack of Soviei economic muscle and ihe growing certainly lhat Ihc Soviei Union is no hanger able to make good on its economic cone nev-
On lhe Olher hand while ihe level of Soviet aid will probably level off or decline, overallconomic reliance on the Soviet Unionrading partner may not.in pan on the policies of ibceven increase,in lhe vital area of energy imports. Soviet economic leverage is thus likely at leaste maintained, and under Andropov perhaps increased,ougher Soviet bargaining stance, greater emphasis on Bloc integration ihrough CEMA. and diminished Sense! generosity in general ire not likely to win much Easl European good will
A mayor decline of Soviet economic support would in any event leave the East European leaders with four options, all of which involve uncertainties, colli, and dangers: (I) an effort to muddleoalcriiy. coupledore dracoman domestic politicalhoroughgoing economic overhaul dc signed to bolster productrviiy and utaonalirc manage-ment ihroughturn loward markei soctalruii or ihrough administrative dcvoluiion: oi HIlurlhei shift toward the West for aid and nadc The fust woakj only noupnne ihe day of reckoning, ihc second
,ii iP
would risk strong popular discontent, strikes, ihe formation of nonparty power blocs, and So forth: the third would be ideologically eoniroversial. probably breed party factionalism, and beime bu'eau-craticaily and economicallynd the luurih. if feasible ai all. would bring wuh i| such harard> a> the unscllling growih of political and cultural lies wiih. and possible economic dependence on. ihe Wesi and might in addition inenr SosiCI wrath.
Should it pen-it. indecision or eicessive caution on tbe part of Ihc Soviets about lhe direction of their own troubled economy would no doubt be accompanied by indecision concerning Easl Europenn economicand policies as well In ibis case the East European leaders would find themselves pretty much on iheir own.
These leaden must be better Krcmlmotogitit lhan lhe Western practitioners of thcable io decipher thc esoteric communications of political combatant! in ibe Sovieitbey surely have, in addition, far richer sources of bardthan even ihe nsosi enterprising of Western observers Thus, if Andropov largely succeeds in imposing hit will and hit policies on ihe Soviet Poliibuio. Ihc Easl Europeans would be among lhe first lo kno* and lo react Bul if Andropov it nol able to assert or <atialn clear dominance or supremacy, lhe prudent Eatt European leader would try to hunker down and avoid decisions. Me would be subject, however,trong pressures from wiihin his own constituencies and face discrete problems within hit own society, and he could ill afford to remain inactive for very long While he might not actively seek greater autonomy, he might in effect be forced lo oercise ii At Ihc same timeets prudent neighbor mighi provide an unsettling example by coveting more independence and moving quickly to exploit lhe general confusion in Moscow.
True, even if not effectively dominatedat. the immediate pott-Brcihnev leadership could survive withoui faring crises in Eastern Euiopc comparable to those of Iheut if to. ihey will only past problems on lo ihfir tucccttors who. if thev arc lhe
MM! ol men Biatrr deseriPcv will bi much more likcli ui confront (hem head on. perhapsart of the larger question of what lo do aboul Soviet problem* in general. But whatever general course of action they adopt, hardline or soft, there can be no guarantee ul peace and quiet in an area so inherently volatile a* Eastern Europe.
Succession in Fatter* Eataaw
Mi but one of lhe top Cnmmuniti leaden in tbe BkK -tne* of Eastern Europeit into iheir mties aad most of them are in or approaching their seventies. Chances arc good, therefore, that the eomrnuiiein of one or more of ihetc regimes will turn over in thc fairly ncai future Since none of the curient'East European leaders has designated an heir, and since, as in the CPSU. none of these patties hasar-cui means of succession, the maneuvering and infighting characteristic of at lean past Soviet periods of succession may sooner or later be duplicatedin tbe Bloc
The bevel of stabilityastern So rope don.ig, and still generally maintainor; inicepi in Poland, couk) thut come to an end. Years of frustration and discontent could percolate to Ihc surface, to be addressed by cor.lenders-to-pmer who would seek to supplest il or, alternatively, try to turn itheir own political advantage
Succession problems may be particularly acute in Hungary and Romania, though for quite different reasons. The former has for some time been in the vanguard of reform. Thia meant, among other things, that disgruntled elements in the party will likely see Kadaremise as an cesportunMy to re gam power and alter polk- Hardline contcrvalivesprobably not be able toomeback, bul moderatethose who favot retienchmeni rathereo-Sialieittstill influeniial and are well aware thatort of national consensus based on compromise, hit yet to be institutionalized. They will be bitterly opposed, however, by reformist components of Ihe body politic, ind If the struggle is at all prolonged, alto bv elcmenlt of ihc population at large, many of whichirnng slake in Ihe
survival of Kadar'i "progressive" policies. The latter development would especially alarm the Soviets, who would in any case be concerned about thc possibilityost-KacUr "revisionist" drift in Hungarian robcies
Ceaiiscscu in Fantanla wai the designated hctr of but Medcccstor. Cheorge Obcorgiu Ocj. who was< ioiiially responsibleihe country'singular road to independence within the Bloc Ceauscscu hat maintained this aspect of Cbcorgiu Dcj's course, which is overwhelmingly supported by the Romanian people, but has otherwise lost populai support because of his insistence on his own absolute authority, his refusal to significantly moderaie old-fashioned, semi-Stalinist economic policies (which cm-phaaiie heavy mduiliy al the eipcnsc of agriculture and tbe consumer) and. in general, hit harsh and arbitrary style of leadeiihip. compleic wiih his own "cult ofot far away, surely, it the point where the political capital accumulated by Ceauscscu through hi Itfense of independence and his baiting of the Sovtcit it eahautied by his opprcs-tivc disregard of public welfare
Whether he is removed by hit colleaguesalace coup or diesffice. Ceauscscu'1 political demise may sethain of rcaciioiu comparable in intensity, if not scope.he one In the USSR lhat followed the deathan he resemblesmall way, Stalin: thatharp struggle within the party over both succession and policy. Fictions might fight over the most effective ways to appease Ihc population at large, and one or another clement might seek Soviet suppori. especially promises of sorely needed economic aid.
trongoscow wining to intervene ihe Soviei roletruggle to succeed Todoc Zbtvktr* ia Bulgaria would probably beBut if the Sovieit do nott by no means inconceivable thai Bulgaria too could undergomayor succession crisis in tliee ofeath The placidity of the current scene in
Sofia, imposed land iM'titniiU-lliL'Jltkm. no ialkan sieualtitude* und aspirations. Indeed, fromol ihe MM until thehena clear awendanc* os-eriiat*.gbli 1leu'jiu- u'
nd thereumber ol force* and (aoor*rk beneath ike swrfao. today that sagfcu the rccmereeucc of political tariff in ihe pott-Zhiikov peiiud.
Hon. diiceied In lhe main UDainsi YuipwlanaGreece butann-Soviel In (he oast, is one of thoset has manifested itself dr.imat.-irall> in the nasi (nformailcdilitaryinil Zhrvkos in Iand is uobk-today in ihe regime'* jingoistic altitude* towanl ihc Macedonian questionialed desirehoroughgoing mod cr rural ion and reform of Bulgarianbyslrrn observere character ircd by its dependence on wood-burninganother ingredient, one "ilh *trong political overtones Ihai could bccinie quite visible andvern the nosi-Zhivkov era final!', and related to this. Zhivkov has brougnt mm position* of influence in ihc party androup ol' young, well-trained leaders whoeenlor the kmited reform program,o date; these men will *mhey for pemtmn in any pent-Zhirio* rcgianc andard and againsi stalwart conservative eaprwoiun for lunhcr. more bask changes in the administration andof Ihe economy
Also of possible future consequence arc Bulgaria's relative gcogiaphicit is the only Bloc state (save East Germany) that does noiorder wuh thend. in common wiih Romania its unique good foitunc in avcadaag permanent Soviet mililary occupation. These eircumsiance*ma k. any Soviet anvasaon especially difficult tu nsount and sustain, parity because Ihe only land bridge fiom ibc
Se.xci.fnci>"li|Snn( ij4
ii.ii-jie ihca in chirrc. miu>1I>
raniilgaria in HMiwetirmn Slnn.SoaKi rilaiMi.ilrca.lille
Soctet Union lo llvlgarij .row*iinum, and lhc> might encourage ihc Bulgarian, an)rcvaluu of nconW* toortpoic wuh lone
lor ihc nsosi nan.oplv olnot. I* appear toetreated miu iigrtihells, iccking ihrough ihcof pcrsuoa! desare* sosnc recompenw for ihc namstfcji ande relief from ihef lifet'cacrj1 iiirthcr. mewl lormerubcckoiti haie been csilcd or fixced into mental labor and arc in no poo lion toi nuhdl lo challenge thc evi*line regime.
Still. faciiuTialKm within ihc depleted partystrong and. concerninge healing up. Hu.uk'* role a* acontesting laetmns. reinforced o'er thecS*i= tr= nu kmger *eem< quitepo-fcap.f nobiwal andgenaratcd in nan bs ihc[aking place in Meweow befuredeath Indeed, ugr* in Prague ofewerdt ol economic minimal or mooeraic inayom ihe vartou. contendersin Mo-enw Should disputes withinspitebable ef-
forts by Andropovurtailnd perhaps eventually cosl ttu*jk hi* tufa, the struggle to replace him (and hi* cauiious policies) could become quite intense
The two remaining Bloc ttaiet. the GDR and Poland, seem somewhat less liked to >uffer disruptive *ucec*-saon (iruggkes lhan then *ouihcrn neighbors. Ihe
*- mii*v
PCx iiui tiialiiiuml itw rwper. ITtaag 1
i*mSalfc-hrf mm-
nn* mmi 4
Waumi SuSmh AlbiiHi 1S1 mm aUiiiii Met ipili <mk.WJiadal "Nwifc Kmc f Inch lubeiirtiaiulOl.tHi. ilwili ihi amii* nl lan-lawr pa'" IcaUet Innn ia-elf wijmlliil rolll-tal *hosl>
party in liaii (icimany it old and smug; in Poland ii is old. discredited, cynical, and, in effect, cnil ofnhct. lhc Soviets sveic heavily involved in naming ihc leaders of both stales,trong poliiicalmiliury presence in each, and are generally more concerned aboui Stability in this vilal area than lo the south. The leaden ofates, mc* cover.ot been int long as ibeir confreres cite where.
Honerter ia tan German? hasirm hand on hn parly and his resume and does not *ccmc plagued by sertous-rjisagrecments andtestimony to bis skill and. uni'. " Easi German economic successes. mithreat to Honecker'1 position and to parly control mighl come not from within but raiher, from Without, from the USSR itself if.ew leadership, i| should one day shift toward greater accommodation of West German policies and aspirations. For East German Communistsurn would carry with it the vpectcr of reunification which, should it material rrc. would in all likelihood utinguiih ihe regime and all its works, the GDR included (for ihii and other reasons, the Sennets arc, of coarse, not likelyakeove, but muchaakow's consternation, ibey have flirted with Ihche pasi, and ihey aothe event some very large gain in Western Europe seemed attainable have kept the Option open.l
Jaruzelski in Poland faces the most sorely troubled of all East European societies', the vast majority of Ihe people arc in various states of repressed opposition.
the party it weak and faaionalited and iw longer rules; and theesperately ill. Jarurclski's troubled tenure seems likely to endure for some lime, however, because he controls the Army and there seems now to benarchy or Sonethis martial la- regime.
The USSR will of course seek to dominate ihc course of succession eventshese countries. But its ability to do SO, thoi of military intervention will bc circumscribed in rriostEastand Ctechcolovakia arc possible partial eaecp-lions- by tiie autonomy (or semiaulonomy) of the individual parlies where the struggles will lake place As Asdtopov well knows. Soviei assets certainly eiisi in these parties, but. as he shcs-ld also know, iheir depth and reliability,aring periodt of crisis, is open to serious question. So too rt Moscow's ability through political action to aircat. maeh less reverse, the coarse of parties bent on defiance, past attempts to unseal unruly leaders through Soviet-sponiored coups (in Belgrade. Tirana, andor eiamplc. have ail failed.
Csniliilamial
Tfce Futurr in Eaitern Europe
Ifa riontonomir rmrryrmir*Ihr Sotri Union and Hi empire in ihrlottlher -ttk iiWafforded hi the uApeoorh-img iv'tewont of leaderships and titles, do not yield serious effortseform ihe nadiilonal ittiemo nor know "hoi may and will.
Seweryn Bialer Forces at Wo* |
Fo> the pailear* or so. lhc *ait drvcruty ol peoede* ind cultures that hat evolved Over thc eentu. ties inropc has been iccrnerging. by His and stats, two ihrusis up. one down, butind of implacable fo/ee History, ji may be said is reasserting Hsclf. not in any predetermined orMartin way, buiill thai the Soviets, so far. have been ableheck bui not eliminate.
ven some [perhaps superr-ciall historical consistency in the kinds of regimes ihoe linespui up wiih Thus. beginning in tne south. Bulgaria's Zlarvko* reninsind of no-oonteose monarch, which rs in ihe national tradition; Ceauiescu in Romania resembles noihini so much as another fascist dictaior. and there is certainlylor lhat: Kadar in Hungary governs as abenevolenta Admiral Horthy between the wars; Huuk In Czechoslovakia is an csccption. but had the Rassiins not intervened. Dubeck (or his successors) would teday rule in ibe manner of past ccmoetiiK paesidenir. Hcneeker in ihe COR litem the kind of strong, personal authority which, if notier tan. is familiar to observeis of the German scene, and General Jarutelskt in Poland repents Ihe PiUudski pattern of eierciiing powerilitary dictator.
Thc decline of Communist ideology, bothuide to behavior and policy andommon bond.
Thc fragmentation of the Communist world and thc establishment of competitive Communist centuv <rf thought and power.
The attenuation of some Soviet instruments of inlrtenee and control.
The limned but meaningful amortean) of individual parties aad regimes.
- The cmtigenorew. post-Stalin elite. revolutionary in outlook than its predecessors
discontent with depressed living standards, with Communismolitical and economic sy-lem, and with thc USSR as the sponsor andrator of this syltem.
Recurrent disarray and factionalism in the ruling parties (and especially during periods of succession in the Soviei parly as welll
The persistent allure of the West.
The slowing down, stagnation, or decline of the vsrassst eeonomies; ihe techncaogica: backdress of theic economies; ind the gulf between these economics and those of the Wcsi.
Perhaps the greatest of these forces al ihe moment is the list, the state of the Easi European economies. pirlnus in some countries and nowhere nourishing Recent rues of growth of GNP hive been is follows;
A**tQf* awe! iQit of yravih laetttmit
Germany
*
0
lo their essentials, the broad forces atasternof which conspires in its own wiy and to one degree or another to diminish imperialbe lilted as follows;Strong nationalism throughout the area.
" Bialerremark!i. SOSlaie addreaicdproticnii.
tlirr been citended heir inio theuie
The USSRource of relief is necessary but clearly deficient, given the size of its own economic problems. The West, greatly concerned about possible defaults as dramatized by Poland, is noount ofossible, perhaps the only, long-term
^jsafi Junta'1
ihc inxnuiHwi of more or less radical rc< hn would entail shon-icrm economic burdens and longi-rin political cunts (ptincipall) associated mth ihc 'ok and power of thc party machines) and aould not hi any event carry witharanicc oittl> became of ihctc political com. ibc feat that bavK economic changes would lead to pwrd) national (vice Bkx and Socialist) lines of oeveleeirneni and pcrnapi disagreements within the leadership, theregime has in the post been loath to encourage any widespread movement toward genuine.reform in Eastern Europe.
Deepening economic stress in Eastern Europewith forces of social and political decay toelling poor in favorable omens bui rich inNone of the East European regimes enjoys positive popular support Rather each countsorm of popular softersace itself the product of (ear (ear of harassment, job loss, imprisonment--andthat, as promised by theliving standards will improve. Now that pros pects for thc latter ate wining, the public's stake in stability is loo. Thus, ihe regimes may consider placing more and more reliance on fear, which may or may not work and which is, in any case, economically debilitating, or they may eventually succumb infor radical economic reform
How, and her- well, the Soviets address these kinds of problems in the years abrad could make thebetween tension and tormoil. between the kind of Strained stability now evident in rnost of the empireevel of disarray and disorder comparable lo or even greater than that of ihe past.
A Modval New Soiiet Approach Clearly, except in iu ability to build up Ihc USSR's military power, the Breihnev regime deserved no applauie for its performance in recent years. Il was much better at postponing problems than solving tbern. and il was prwrvatjonJst in outlook rather than innovative Thus, tn Eastern Europelargely toStalinist song has ended, ihe melody lingersarring reminder of past injuiuces and present incQuiocseededtffeienl score and per haps, eventually, an entirely new composilion.
A truly new Soviet regime, heavily dominated by one man, would beetter position to innovate il. ol course, thai man -ere so disposed To be sure, some eircumsianccs (including the USSR's own economicelf-lmpc-scd limitations (including the Soviet leader's likely determination to preserve basicnd political realities in Easlcrn Europe (including the persistence of national diffcrcnccsi would constrain any rnovemeni tnwurd change. Bui. in view erf ihe siie and scope of the USSR's problemsastern Europe, ihe failure of past Sovietto deal with (hem successfully, and thc general bankruptcy of current Soviet policies and ideasis the area, thc need for something much belter will be obvious and.ew leader of Andropov's apparent mien, perhaps compelling.
A new, more flexible program designed to correct lhc shortcomings of the past might focus initially on two seemingly contradictory objectives: the enhancement of essential Soviet controls and the enrichment or Easi European autonomy. Seeling to achieve the first might involve an effort to weave the diverse elements of Soviet dominionlearly defined, moreand clastic whole: the second might seek to specify and expand the areas in which the East European leaders would be free to pursue policies of their own devising, appropriate to their own peculiar national circumstances. While ideology would at ihe same time be intended to serveommon bond andery general guide to action, its prescriptive role could be greatly relaxed so that innovations (especially economic innovations) would not automatically bc condemned as heresies.
The Wgrsa* Pact and CEMA would not be ignored in ihe process. On the contrary, each would be Strengthened, partlyeans lo ensure Soviet military and economic predominance, bol also in an attempt lo further rational ire command structure and various economic endeavors. Thc influence of lhc Easi Europeans in both organizations could nevertheless be allowed to grow without necessarily endangering thc interests of the largest and rnost senior partner.
fTrrrrra^uaaai-
(jpesijlli II'ihc Morie* aboul Andropov '*ixtensive economic reform iherc nrc true nnd some highlcvel Hungarian* hate nmnlcb saidi temporary Hungary mighi sen ori-if Imsc inisilclew Soviei approachistcrn Europe's eivdemic instability. Kadar's singular willingness iw Suspend political warfare wiih ihc bulk of lhe he lung ago revised ihc old inlagc. "heot with us is against us" into "he who is nots is wiih us- his urge lo replace anachronistic and incfficicnl economic practices'omarket force*ole, and his apparent ability to run hisarly in prelty much his own way mat nil be endorsed by Andropov becausehc* Live contributed to Ihc stability uf Hungarian society and the relatively good prospect* o' Hungarian socialism.
Keen if not prompted by Andropov, sonic nf ihe other East European regimes might be attracted by Icaiutcs of the Hungarian experiment, particularly by Kadar's apparent ability to cope reasonably well withproblems in new ways without endangeringparty power or arousing public oppositionhe process."
Hut ihcre would be no real need for Soviet inlerfcr-encerogram of this character so lone us ii did nOl threaten to gel out of hand and so long as Moscow itself did not provoke arguments o'er Ihe puiily of ideology and fidelity to thc "socialistndeed, assuming thai the parties concerned retained ultimate decisionmaking authority over national life and raised no direct challenges to the USSR's influence over Ihcir foreign policies, Soviet interests could be well served by Hungarian-style experiments Ihai promised to alleviate both economic distress and politicalprcriperous and stable client states than poor, volatile protectorate*
" Hungary* cuoeraule ill (Will mil have dimmed iiiIhib tannku Itai (hercax niiitaiint orsumaraniK (ill largeifcifiNI* ii in liragnand thusms vulnerable ikan nmo lu Ihi itfuo>e(
wortdvidr recctwn aid. bs Ike same toltn. moreoTn
(ihrMigliade) from lhe 'esiircev ill BadarKtl seen* to
aeKiraiM aad [daaacdi curieni eowumie iroatfo
beliefror4anlid itiuf tin bevn jtrfi
inlml i*
oaOiMi* and rvL-riciuiin.- trvo*fagedf regime not tnmi io raivi*l. rti.nnnnrumoa bent'iuihcoa-
It doe* not. in fact. strain crcduTi*emimiii th, eventual development of something on tin- ordei what else is likelye a* effective'* Bui. hi prncltci-moreew Soviets and 1mmind aspect* of any such new course ideologicalrepellent, burcaociaiicaiiy disruptHc. politicallynd economically uncertain. Accordingly,ro-pcan experimenters, even ifreen light b> Andropov, are likely to find the going precarious Even should majore adopted and prow reasonably successful. Ihc sources of much olsi European malaise -nationalism nnd rupuliir pnliik'alould remain beneath thc *urfiicc. ready to emerge al lhe first sign lhal the programthe regime was* faltering.
The Commonwealth
Wiih orew approach along the line-described abta-c. thcthe Andtupo* regime or itsill still have thc option of pursuing Khrushchev's conceptommonwealth of countries in which, ideally, thc USSR would be Ihc firsl-among-equals tcudci ofa harrrtoniou* association nf like-minded "socialisl" states. Though Ihc termCommonwealth ufno longer used and was never well defined, the idea is still alive and has in some ways been expressed in practice. Thc Soviets' conditional Icgitimiralion of "separate roads to socialism" and "polsecnirism" in ihcase in point. So too were the only partly successful Soviet rapprochements wiihduring the same period: Tito was in effect offered renewed mcml*cr*hlpoviet campalong commonwealth lines. Even ihe military intervention in Czechoslovakia8 could be said lo conform lo thc commonwealth Idea in thc sense thai iloint Soviet-East European undertaking against something construedommon threat.
In operaiion ibc conccpiwo-edged doctrinal sword: itorm of independence for ihc East European stales but ai the same lime sanctions direct (commonwealihi interference in Ihcir affair* when "socialism" is said to be threatened. Bul for the
Al
ihc concepi initially iiffcied more form than substance: Khrushchev, in fact, probably seeking in ihc main lo provide appropriate idcolog ical doe nine fur Soviet policy as ii hid actually evolved in thctatin year*.
All thc same the notion of independence cumdoes offer thc East European regime* an alternative on the one hand, to the perpetuation of ihcir subordinate status and. on the other, toscccssien from the Sloe. Among other things, itore meaningful form of partnership status to the Bloc slates: thateal voice in commonwealth affairs and, in effect andeansarticipate in ihe exercise of Soviet hegemony.
artnetship might appeal to East European Communists who seek more autonomy but whofear that their own parties could not survive without strong ties to thc USSR and thc Blochole. The arrangement, however, would do liillc lo appease those in the East European elites who are nationalists and who favor complete sovereignly and/ignificant liberaliiation of their own political-economic systems. Nor. for tbe same reasons, would ii be likely lo case popular discontent significantly
The Soviet leaders would also have qualms aboul granting the Eastarger voice in Bloc and, at least indirectly. Soviet affairs. How effectiveultinational Bloc board of directors be? Would each member be granted the right or veto (a* inow eould serious disagreements among members and even multtstate alignment* beAnd. finally, for Moscow, the ultimate question Is: if thc empire is ultimately transformed intoresembling an alliance, how could thc Soviets maintain the strong degree of dominance ihey believe vital to their own interests?
A Radical Alternative
But whatever their interim approach, the Soviets will find thc solutionheir problems wiih the mainlc-nance of hegemony in Eastern Europe on thc day liny cease to exercise it. Although there arc no signs ihai (he Soviet leadership under Arvdropov entertains any thoughts of surrendering or severely curtailing lhat hegemony,ourse of miion. while doubtful, is V
f
conceivable in ihe posi-Andiopov future.umber of arguments can be made 'or it.
Sooner or later it may occur to one or another Soviet leaderoneenturesome new program wiih which to advance hi> own career thai ihetc is no occcssaiy heresy inlear-cut liberal change in Soviet policy toward Easternignificant diminution of Soviet dominance; anincrease in Soviei tolerance of diverse rootes inelaxation of the standards lhal define theof lhal exalted status.
Though ideologyommitment to an ever-expanding "socialisthere is nothing in thc evolving body of Marxist-Leninist ihoughi lhatthai the USSR mutt maintain tight control of Eastern Europe. The Brezhnev Doctrine, qua(rather lhan asationale for past Soviet invasionsretext for futureocs not provide theoretical justification for Soviet over-lordship. Nor. any longer, does ihe concept of "proletarianhich is in any caseloganenin himselfinbout the union of nations in the USSR, insisted (though no doubt disingenuously) on "absolutely voluntary consent" andnion which precludes any coercion ol one nation bynd thc implications of relevant ideologicalsuch as the ultimate disappearance ofboundaries, scarcelyationale or need for Soviet hegemony.
Deviations from Soviet foreign policies, so apparent in Romanian positions, do not necessarily harm lhe USSR, except insofar as Moscow Insists thatem and total unity is essential to the cause. Even Yugoslav foreign policy, when not addressed to Bhx problems, frequently coincides, or al Icasi does nol conflict, wilh Soviet views.
" la. ibri!it- au formal theory of tuocisiMa in theCmmunisiroletarian Interniiionallimor Srii.at
"O'K.ewral torpcratation.mpiecue.
lis t.The Wiuid Commualu
n Triita. ej. Cnmo-Maiit fHir.Vwit*li
or Trotia.I,
14
Complete international ideological huinutnt. white ilfMiiblt need nut becutif rccjulfciitcni. Ihc legitimacy ol party rule, can bc maintained without il conversely, con bc Imi even mlh m. And Moscow's tatitiencc nn ihe universal validity nf iu own dnctunal viewt Sav III notreodaccdpliu in Ihc ruwrncmlo ihe creation of rival center* of thought
Thcational self-esteemno doubt bc damagedithdrawal from in Western marches, cipccially if it appearede forced. On ihe other hand, iu internatioriaI preMige. especially
in Wetiern Europe, would surety1
j
USSR's presence in Eastern Europe it imperial in nature because it rests ultimately onlearly, ihc Soviet leaders wouldest burdensome and more effeaive arrangement, per-haps along the commonwealth lines discussed above. Bui. if they wish to establish something of this nature thai it trulythus trulymay finally realize thaigainst ihem: the number nfons more or leu voluntarily entered into in ihe past is very imall (only Swiizerland. the United Stales. Inly, and perhaps Germany come lo mindt. and lhc clcmcnU which in those few casesree amalgamation simply are not present Ia ihc case ol the USSR and Easternecognition oi inn verity, if it comes, would of course imply the need foi change, either the attempted restoration of something akin to Stalinist tenor or. conversely, an honetl Uy for something quite new, perhaps the Finlandization of Eastern Europe
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While these arguments mat. in the aggregate. maJrx_i_ conjectural caseadical change in Sovietihey are of course theoretical innd nt.i> be. Izmcniablt.eneral in nature lhat ihey defy specific application Even should one or another Sovi. Ci leader eomc IO ponder similar neoCMvii kjo> and problemi. any urge he mighi feel to reek radical solutions will encounter strong contrary pressures arising from, inter alia, the irtcriia of *h* vv.irns ihe resistance of interest groups, and the risk> of change
Inertia might prove to be ihc mightiest of these Thc old ways of doing thingsowerful appeal to party, state, and mihlaty officeholders, as KKrushchev belaicdlt discovered. Change, especially cspcrnneniat change, vunjurct up images oluncertainly. danger, and. noi least, career
There arc. in fact, Influential intercsioviet society that would seek to block any proprned grant of g'caier sovereignii to Eastern Europe Thene. would foresee andoncomitantof Soviet armed forces from Easicm Europe and thus damage to Soviet security--ihe abandon, mem of iu controls over armies ii hid helped to create, and thc dissolution of an alliance structure nhc Warsaw Pact) it has nourished and dominated from birth Also unsetiled would bc CEMA bureaucrats, workers ia foreign trade ministries. Ceniral Com ran tec ewcu-nrrhrtr and ideologists, managers of many ripon industries (who consider Easietnind of captive maikcil. managers of armaments facioricv officers of the KGB with lies to satellite services, and. indeed. Soviet (and Russian) jingoists il large
Any substaniial loosening of Soviet authority inEurope would atso incur mayor mli Bloc leader* mighi try toram of greater autonomy into an cart vrsa; elements of thene or another flkx country might take advantage ol any relaxation of domestic controls to move into open and active opposition to the regime; workers might be encouraged by economic and administrative reform to
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iland freedom from puny con-irufs:and so forth All or ihese Mats, in fuci. hiivc happened in ihe pail
The biggcttlot ihe Solicitcould be- and lhe) wouldely be aware of ihit- lhal fundamental chjngeihc relationship decreed by ihc USSR itself might create precisely thosein>ubiiiit in Eaitcrn Europe ind. in the lace of it.potenee tn thethey were intended to aind tn truth, volatile Eastern EBtope even freed of Sonet dominance would noteomert io liability
Oihei iignifiCant considerationsnCPOkpfi-cate or deter any Soviet urgehift positions. Foreignn panteulai the USSR'* detirc to cipand in influence nnd ultimairly lo ettend iu hegemony into Western Europe, might decree Ihc need for the pretervatlon of its dominant influence in "springboard" Eiilern Europe. So too might thc USSR'* longstanding concern over the Germanion and it* Tear that thit might one day be resolved without Soviet participation andoviet intcreitt Economic condnions will affect Soviethough continuing troubles in East European economies might pull the Sovieit in oopotiie directions:e facto loosening ofatting adrift occaiioncd by the USSR's reluctance or inability to provideut lance (not to mentionr toward tighter con-trots, prompted by lhe cenundt of austerity and adversity and. pet ha pi.ingering hope lhat the East Europcaa economics win tome bow recover their hearth and usee rgtoreet asset for the USSR
Thc argument!eliberate and significantof Soviet net to Eastern Europe tie not. in fact, persuasive. Hisiory does not record many instancesoluntary surrender of imperial power. Even in this century, thc British aorl French, for ciample. did nol spontaneously ind altruistic ally decree freedom for their empires: lather they were victims of their own postwar weaknesses at Home and of accelerating pressures and tints abroad
Much more likely than an enlighirncd. self-genera ted movementreakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe would be one permuted byin Moscow (thithange in the character and perspectives of the leade.ship analogous, say. lo that in Paris following de Gaulle's coming to powerSl and forced by the national aspirations and course* of policy of lhe Eail Europeans themselve* limperfectly analogous to lhe revolution in Algeria in thend early IvoOsi
Ihe Lethaltrict MlBtary later nation Whether ibe Sonets will intervene militarily in one or another East European crisis is. ultimately, theQuestion. Surprisingly, it isa question thai cannot be answered in absolute terms Past interven. tioett have demonstrated tbeillingness toilitarily bul hive also revealed tubsianiiil reluctance lo do su and apparent disagreement among the leaders on this scorewell Clearly, as wis apparem in Poland in6, the Soviei leaders ire prepared to run considerable risks in ordervoid military intervention They arc aware lhal invasion ind occupation cicate iheir own burdens, aside from effects on world (andCommuniit) opinion. Ihey harm prospecis forgrowth, damage popular morale, and endanger the efficacy of the civil conlraci in general in the country concerned. Thus it the value of the entity preserved diminished by the meant of preservation.
ody of Western ihenighl that believesinal decision by Moscow to use armed force torevolt" in Eastern Europe rests lest on the Soviets' aprxchentiont about the essential character of thit "revolt" than on iheir calculation of the odds that the intrusion of their forces would encounter determined, organired resistance from indigenous military forces andl is argued that, if the Sovieit conclude that they will hiveightarge scale, they will not invide.
' See etrmsalb Chtlnoplm O. lonit. Sauei laflmmi tn Eanrrnpand maatiifamenia review of apprnpiMW Kan evrapean "earn hitiwwt" and
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oucMionabl* in estimate ih.ii Smut armed forces would meet fie ice and possibly prolonged resistance wouldubM.mii.il effect on Soviet leeismn-mnkcti Such un estimate may indeedac*-oiinied Ittionic-hat surprising failure to actin the ease of Yugoslavia in |ua> and oaniribut-cdiereluctance io invade Kunuru in lheOl.ircwmijaces areihe Semen actually invaded only in thrneen massive opposition seemed unlikely las in Ircchosluvakia in IvoRi. nnd ihei did nol invadehen it seemed likely (as inII Bul Ihc contention lhal ihe prcrtpcci of battle i* ihr determin-ing factoi for the Soviets cerialnly cannot be proved. Other consideration* mas havearger role could the iiioblem be resolved by means other than military, ai ii was iwace in d or ssuuld the proeJemeriooa thecal to Communis rule in Ihc country concerned or to Se-iel oorruninee of Ihc Sloecac. as the Romanian challenge did not
So Ihe esse mul Question remains' will ihey or von) they? If this cannot be answered definitively, one can at Icaitairly firm estimate, and It is almost certainly the tame mosi Easi Europeans would make yes ihey will. II persuaded thatterhu live be tantamount to the lossloc wale
The Way of Ihe West
The influence of the West on ihc course of Eastern Europe and on ihc character of Sonet- ban European relations rs not easily Quantified Some <peeificactsont have had an enormous impact on EasternMirthall Plan, ihe formation of NATO, ihe creation of the federal Republic ofbut ihetc have almost always been addressed in ihe first Instancether areas and other problems (postwar rcconstruction in Europe, the Soviet threat lo fur ope. thc continued division of Germany) To be sure, some mayor Western policiesbeendirected toward Easternciampie.ofrarely to. and the lacklear policy--for instance concerning Mungaii inhas seemed ai least a> significant
I'M' imc ilie. mi Eastern Europe in different way* Because il pjovitl.il incentives for restraint in Soviet policies In Europe in general and tended to dampen
any Sovsci cnihuuasmough linei stern Europe in particular, ihc improvement ulelations inukI growth taf autonomy in severaluropean capital* and course, capanded eoniactssicrnW -crn cultures and economics. Some last European, seemed to leel lhal in the long runuld permit theil countries in move iperhaps together wilh some Weil Europeanind of non-alignment, and to Ihrs end Ihey urged the dissolution of both NATO and ihe Warsaw Pact
At tbe tame linse.tranquillity snd pruspciit* ia Eastern Europe nude thc job of the Sonet* in the area easier politically and less burdensome uonnnn-calls Awatc ofpossible drift toward Western Europe. Moscow continued to insist on the need fur continuing ideological conflict and stepped up efforts to use CEMA to slrengthen Its own hold on East European economies
It is in ike area of ecewnie relation* that the Wesi now plays its Uracil diiect role androte ihe greatestBui current Western financial caw-iton and skepticism in the face of burgeoning Easternr*nhkmt will circumscribe lelaliont for some years to come. West European nation* are in any event chary of *ecking to use economic meant for polilical purpose*hcse purposes are ralhcr grand, abstract, and re motel
The growth of independence in Eastern Europe mightthc hattg row be spurredesumption of detente and Western economic support, especially if theonditioned ihr maintenance of us good will and aid on ihe chaiacter of Soviet nolicies there. But there can be no guarantee of this Certainly prosperity alone does notn more independent or enlightened approach by any particular Easi European regime, as East German* has demonstrated for quite some lime.
It is also pnasabk that economic difTiculiic* could leadonet hcgenxwiy. Popular previare^ anting initially from economic discontent caninto an array of demand*democraliraiwm.
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vns-creignty.so foiih und local regimes can bc persuaded to comply. Bui if such demands and such compliance go loo fur loo fast, ihc Sovieis arc likely to interfere and leyeverse course
The Wet's mosi Influential role in lhc area ispassive. Ii* mere existence offers an attractive political, economic, and cultural beacon to the people* of li-sicrn Europe and an alternative source of ideas and support for thchese are not. to be sure, scry dramatic means or suasion, but they help Iwpcio survive, and it is. ultimately. Isopc that -ill provide much of the fuel for the next greal move toward change and freedom in Eastern Europe.
Elastic Deformation
Precisely where and -henove might take place is not an easy culculniion. Thc inclination of thc Poles and Hungarians to moke trouble for their own regimes and for iheir Soviet overlords should not have come as any greajshock to observers familiar wiih their history and national character. On ibcand, the willingness of Ihe Czechoslovaks iotheir systemevolutionary way and of the Romanians to defy Moscow wM indeed surprising, given the generally aequicsecni traditions of the Czechs and ihe seedily opportunisiic naiurc of most Romanian governments.
i
A lesson of the recent past may bc that, while it Is not passible to single out ihe prime candidates much in advance, all of the Easi European states of the Soviet Bloc are potentially disruptive. Indeed, as has been said of contemporary Poland, ihe structures of control are in place ihroughout the area, "but jusi[what we secrumbling facadecaffold aroundine times since the end or lhc war. facade and scaffold have threaiened lo fall or been torn down, an average of once ever, four years or so.
Thus Ihe estimate: over the course of the neat decade ibete will be further outbreaks of serious political strife in Eastern Europe, and they will be directed at least in part and implicitly against the Soviet Union At the same time if such strife seems to jeopardize Communist power and/or Soviet hegemony. Moscow will almost ceriainly intcivene with military force, if necessary.
ecade, however, forecasts become much murkier. The resolution through force of recur rem imperial problems that have deep political, economic, and social roots cannot be endlessl) appealing in Moscow, itorm ofn -soeuttisi" credentials, international prestige, economicand even, perhaps, selfisnegligible. Radical changes inyi the Soskts maintain their empire, the local regimes preserve their power, and these regimes conduct thctr economic affairs do noi now seem at all likely. Bui time, iiiceession snuggles, peaitical crises, and cconomie adversity may whet the appetite for systemic ehangc. even in ihc Kremlin. Major disruptions andof high-level discord within ihe USSR-comparable, for example,hose which followed Stalin'sdo ihchus, whileualified prediction of fundamental shifts in Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe would certainly be premature, il does seem reasonable to suggest-largely on the basis of lhc preceding estimate that Eastern Europe willource ofhat the chances othift ssill probably grow.
Many students of Ihe area, in ract, foresee major changes in Eastern Europe and in ihe Soviet position there over the nexi few decades, and most seeme at least moderately optimistic about lhc nature of those changes. Thus Zbigniew Brzezinski. focusing on thc erosion of ideology and lhc growing feeling among East European Communisi cHles that the Sen-iel-dominaied Bloc brakes thefulfillment of their socialuggests lhat thc empire and Communisi dictatorships might survive in form but not in substance."
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Ermarth. ci:ini! Ihc corrosive effectsSovici hegemony of fast European nationalism, lociocco-nomtc modcrniiaiign. andelieve* thaiegime different from that ofighi be attracted by th' opportunitiesore asset live and flexible policy" but that if this don not heip. 'oneope that ihe development ol the Soviet state and society opens the alternative of systemice adds lhat if thc Soviet system simply calcifies, "then an alternative system could artvc in which liberal principles could dominate Soviet domestic and internationalhile trends in this direction "are not inevitable or evenof good fortune and good |Western'might someday bring |lhe USSR" in be ruled by politicians who arc not, by instinct of ideology,
. Brown,uccession crisis or scries of crises in thc USSR, writes that ihc future of Soviet hegemony is very uncertain. Soviet authority inEurope, he argues, might decline; factionalism in several leaderships might become more intense and open: some leaders might orient their policies along more national lines; groupings of East European slates might form: pressure fee seeking closerwith ihc West would likelynd so on."
A theoretician and mcthodologist. political scientist Jan F. Triska. adds his own particular perspective of Ihc Bloc;
Wiih obsolete organizational structure and without an association theory uponodem, rational organization could br butii. the communisi system organizers art doomed to patching-up. temporizing, and holding operations, which in iheir sum lotal. are inadequate even for system maintenance, lei alone for ihe socialist development and system ue-felopment of ihe communist party-stales. Politically stagnating and economically inactive, Ihe system becomes increasingly vulnerable to adversaries at home and abroad"
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finally and most boldly.eh .ulr limply forecasts ihc end of empire:
{The Host European/ naiiims remain spin.ually unconauered and politicallyhe West has consistently tended lo underestimate ihe opportunities of Eastern Europeans for independentand ihti' willingness to seize ibose 'reportunities, 'there fill Av more Virni. yagys. Hoxhas. Ghforgiu-flefs. ond Dub' eeks in Eastern Europe. Tht system breeds ihem automatically- Formoreover, the Eastern Europtans have seen conaueroes conit and go: it it not unlikely lhat ihe Russians will also rtturn home one day."
What these students of thc area seem to be suggesting or assumingrocess of decline in the USSR's political, economic, and ideological ability to hold on to its empireimultaneous process ofwithin that empire which might reduce Moscow's will lo preserve ill position there militarily in thc face of nsing. perhaps accelerating, cosls.
Thus, perhaps Eastern Europe will one day in Ihis century bc seen in hindsight as having sufferedemporary change in shape, produced by an outside agent of stress (lhcrocess known to physicists as an elastic deformation. If sc. the area will have al last returned to Europe, where, as ihe East Europeans themselves know best of all. il truly belongs.
" Harry Serein?,Eurar* I* ihrf-r. iNr*
il.
Original document.
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