CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Soviet Policy in the Middle East and South Asia Under Andropov
Special National intelligence Estimate
J
3
SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA UNDER ANDROPOV
ItJoctiuiloortcoiryuin the pKMtalfoaof
Slit: i'cct-jscbaca approvedi-cdcaso througa thS HISTORIC^ iZS'lZilM Ct the Central ir-tailigence Acc^cy.
Date
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN; INTELLIGENCE BOARDXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of Hie Estimate;
The Centred Intelligence Aoency. the Delerue Intelligence Aoency, the National Security Agency, ond the inlcOigeoee orgemirolton ol the Department ot Stat*.
Also Participating:
The Aiiiitont Chiel of Stoff for InteTioeiKe, Oeportmenl of (he Army The Director oi Naval InteUigenee. Deportment ol the Navy Ihe Aiiiltoni Chief of Staff for Imeaiaence. Department of Ihe Air Force lhe Director of Inielligence, Heoacrtrorteei. Mo/ine Corel
SCOPE NOTE
The recenl deployment ol thend additional air defense equipment to Syria is consistent with traditional Soviet strategy in the Middle East and South Asia. It may represent the only way for Moscow to strengthen its position in the region and challenge US Middle East policy. At the same time, it-mayualitative change in Soviet strategy andrecursorolder more adventurous policy in the region.
This Special National Intelligence Estimate examines Moscow's rcccni behavior in the Middle East and attempts to determine whether itew Soviet asscrti veness in ihe region. Likely short-range reactions to activities in Syria are examined, as are longer term Soviet strategies.
SfJRcT
KEY JUDGMENTS
Moscow's recent improvements lo air defenses in Syria. indudTng the introduction of theas reversed its declining position in Syria and is likely to enhance its credibility in thc region. If the Israelis either do not altack the sites or do so at considerable cost, tbc Soviets svill- be credited with having restored the integrity of Syria's air defense system and will try to transfer their success to the political arena.
During the next few months, the Soviets will continue to build up air defenses in Syria; their military presence has already doubled toen and probably includes elements of air defense units to man theites. They may introduce other missile systems, including thehich would enhance defenses against low-flying, high-speed aircraft and would further complicate Israeli military planning. We believe the Soviets will not deploy to Lebanon any of the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) recently delivered to Syria. Moscow could also use ils own pilots to man fighter squadrons init did in Egypt in the.
We believe that the Soviets will be responsible for the command and control of thend critical elements associated with them. According to one view, the Soviets insisted on taking operational control not only of the SA-Ss but of the entire Syrian air defense system and would not have begun deployment without Syrian acquiescence. This would not preclude ostensible Syrian political control of the air defense network or Syrian manning of certain elements of the air defense system, such as SAM sites defending thc Golanll other agencies believe that the Soviets would not have insisted on control of the entire air defense network and that the Syrians would have refused to granl it in any event. Thc Syrians will have de facto as well as de jure control over the central air defense network command as well as those parts of the system they man. All agencies believe that, without complete Soviet control, the system will be more vulnerable lo Israeli cou nte rmea su res.
' TheAntilom Chiel ol Stall lor litieV<Fr-nre. Oepciinmi cj ihr aii four.mWlWp'iVXU be Introduced tm lhe near fvtnrr.
' Thefv are the Olierto: Deflate tnletlltmer Arentv. and ihe AuUlani Chief of Staff foe tMetiteente. Department of ihe Arif.
Israeli leaders arc divided over lhe necessity or wisdomreemptive strike againsi theites Some Israelis may favor quick action, but most Israeli leaders probably are reluctant to getilitary confrontation with the Soviets and the Syrians. Whether or not the Israelis strikeerception on tlveir partignificantly heightened threat or recurrent crises could lead to arr Israeli attack in the next year.
Any Israeli strike that destroyed thc sites with few Israeliwhether preemptive or resulting from previousbe another acute embarrassment for the Soviets. But it would also under-mine the Lebanese and Arab-Israeli negotiations, at least temporarily, and could also damage US-Arab relations. To preserve their credibility, the Soviets would have to rebuild the complexes and reinforce their defenses still further. While the Sovicls would want lo respondthey have little incentive and few practical options for taking the war into Israel proper. Over time, the Israelis would have to weigh the costs of gettingar of attrition with lhc Soviets or taking thc war Into Syria. Faced with these options, Israel may accommodate itselfore pervasive Soviet military presence in Syria and to greater Soviet' political influence in the region.
In the short term, the Soviet deployments and commitments have bolstered thc Assad regime's confidence in its ability to withstand anassault on Syria and probably have increased Israel's determination toigher price from the United Statesithdrawal fromtrengthened Syria would beetter political posilion to negotiate withdrawal from Lebanon.
This effort by the USSR to bolster its poliUcal stature through an "increased military commitment to Syria complements the principal lines of current Soviet policies in (he region, which are designed to appeal to the majority of Arabs. In the next six to nine months, wethe Soviets:
Will continue efforts to underscore the similarity ol thc Soviet and Fez peace proposals and to obstruct tjie US initiative. To do so. they will try to persuade both Jordan's King Hussein and PLO chief Arafat not to cooperate in US-backed negotiations, and they will pursue closer relations with moderate Arab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia
Will maintain improved relations with Iraq, begun last spring. This policy reflects Moscow's assessment lhat better relations
with Itan are unlikely in (lie nearesire lo prevent the further spread of Iranian-style fundamentalism intoeed for hard currency from arms sales
Will attempt to bolster factions in (he Khomeini government (hat are less hostile to thc USSR, while urging Syria. Libya, and South Yemen lo broker improved Soviet-Iranian relations.
Will conlinuc to convey the impression of flexibility with respectoUtical settlement in Afghanistan. Theywill seek to consolidate their position in Afghanistan and may increase their troop strength and their use of terror against the Afghan populace.
There is little indicationate that Moscow's current policies are finding greater receptivity in Arab capitals. Nonetheless, the Soviets certainly hope lhat their military presence in Syria, combined with their ongoing political activities, will enhance their influence in the region. How successful the Soviets will be depends on many factors, including Soviet steadfastness and acuity and US policies. The Soviets haye few if any natural allies in the region, and (hey are starting from what hasow point of influence. If Moscow can build on its new military presence in Syria, over time il mayactor that cannot be ignored, as it has been in recent years, by Israel and the majority of stales in the region.
Although theecision was made before Brezhnev's death. Andropov has implemented it. This strongly reaffirms the Soviet commitmenl both to Syria and to pursuitajor roie in the region. There is no indication that this initiativerecursor of other, more aggressive, military policies elsewhere in the region. But thement is evidence that the Sovieis will take bold action to protect andtheirthey have for the paslears.
Should the Andropov leadership decide to alter course andore aggressive military policy in the region, wc would expeel lo see some clear indicators;
Ah effort to put pressure on Iran or Pakistan would be demonstratedignificani strengthening of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan and the southern border regions of lhc USSR.
A policy decision to try to crush the insurgents in Afglianistan would be reflected in the introductionassive military
DISCUSSION
Soviet influenceho Middle: East hu been on the decline for the post decade. Therincipal problems have been iu inability lo deal wiih both tides in the Arab-Israeli dispule and its reluctance to corn-rait itself militarily lo lhe defense of its clients. The humiliation of Syria in Lebanon highlighted Moscow's inability lo influence Arab-Israeli developments and damaged Soviet political and military credibility throughout the area, tlse where in lhe region, thcbeen consistently rebuffed by the Khomeini regime in Iran and unable tothe course of lhe Iran-Iraq war. Their forces in Afghanistan seem no closer lo defeating Ihe Insurgents than they were ihree years igo.
Recent Soviet Actions and Motives
the .debaclebanon last summer,have undertaken various initiatives designedtbeir Influence in the region:
They have placednd otber advanced air defense systems in Syria; these are manned by Soviet personnel, dieteby increasing both tbe Soviet commitment to Syria and the risk of an Israeli atiack against Soviet-manned iitstalUtiocis.
Tbey have repackaged their previous proposab for an international conference on the Arab-Israeli issue in which they wouldajor
role/-
Tbey have become more supportive of Iraq, both politically and militarily. In its struggle with Iran.
They have tried lo create an impression of terability inolitical settlement of the Afghan situation.
Inoviet naval vessels andaircralt conducted their first combined eiercise with labyao forces .
date,bjectives and policies inEast and South Asia appear to bethose established under Urerhnev. The decision lo
deploylo Syria was made last summer before Brerhnev'i death. By actively pursuing such actions, however. Andropov has reaffirmed Moscow'slo advancing the Soviet posilion in the region and gaining leverage and Status equal to that of the United States.
Soviets recognize that their policies InEast oould have an impact on other aspectsforeign policy. Any Soviet concern thatofnd other systems to Syriaconsidered provocative by the United StatesEurope is offset by lhe Soviet claim thatare defensive systems and not lo be usedattacks Syria. The Soviets may believesympathy for Israel bas eroded in lhe wakeand would be even weaker If IsraelSvria. Moscow may believe, in addition,lo buttress Us Syrian ally would weakenposition.
Syria
A Soviel evaluation of the humiliating defeat ol Syria and the PLO in Lebanon noted the Importance of Israeli AWACS. reconnaissance, lamming, andcounter measures aircraft and emphasised the need to Improve Syria's air defenses and to catend Us air defense gone forward. Militarily, the systems are designed toetter talegyated ait defense system While thev have not created an impenetrable Syrian aii defense shield, they will exact losses in tbe event ofh airstrikes. Most important, theircomplicates Israeli planning, particularly became Ihese missiles can attack aircraft over bract, Lebanon, and the Mediterranean.
The Soviet commitment to Syria is designed to restore the USSR's credibilityajor actor in Middle East affairs and to build Arab and Third World confidence in Soviet weaponry. The Soviets also wan! lo hinder the US-sponsored Lebanese and Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and loole in Middle East peacemajor goal since tricar eaclusion Item ihe political process began after tbe
war. Theype Insti increased military presence in Syria will provide Ihemgreater leverage wiih Syria and other Arab countries They alto may lee Ibis pieseneeesponse lo the US miliiary presence in Lebanon and the Sinai, which Moscow views as "brdgcneads' (or intervention in ibe regJoo. For all Ihese reasons, Soviet leaders have apparently concluded lhat these obiectives required an increased military commitment to Syria, their most Important Arab client.
Arob-hrocli Negotiations
most recent Soviet initiative on Middlenegotiations was made by Brerhnev inhallowing President (teagan's proposalArab League peace plan The Soviets have triedthe convergence between lhe ArabInitiatives and to undermine tbe ReaganTheir criticism has emphasized tbe USto provide (or an independent Palestinian state
recent months, Ihe Soviets have triedXing Hussein and PLO chiefto pursue tbe US plan's call (or Jordan toPalestinians at the peace talVs. Privately,o coordinate his policies withopposes any Jordanian-Palestinian
koq ond Iron
has been opposed lo tbe Iran-IraqIts inception, and its responses to bothbeen determined largely by the situation onSoviet-Iraqi relations have unprovedoviet weapons deliveriesteady pace, and there ii good evidencetwo counlries signed an arms dealillion inpossiblyagreement in December. Most significant,forces crossed into Iraq in July, thein private and Inbeen moreof Iraqi proposals (or ending the war.
lie Improvement in relations has stemmed In part from an apparent Soviet conclusion last spring that prospects for better ties with Iran were slim as long as Ayatollah Khomeini remained in power. Iran's success at Khorramshahr in June and its preparationsrive intoo strengthened Soviet concern about the possible spread ol Iranian-style blamlc (uridamcntalitm into Iraq.
Afghani si on
II. Since Andropov's accession lo power, Soviet spokesmen have suggested lhat he is serious and double inolitical solution iu Afghanistan This approach is designed to recapture Ihr propaganda initiative, lo dissuade Pakistan's President Zia Iron moving closer to the United States, and to-imcourage Zla lo deal directly with Kabul. Little has emerged to lend substance to tbe early reports of (leiibilily. When it became apparent lhat reports of possible Soviel concessions could undermine the position ofBabrak Karmal, the Soviets moved to dampen speculation
tibyo
li Soviet-Libyan military cooperation has In-created in thc past yearalf. In October the Soviets conducted their first combined training eier-else with tbe libyans. Soviet naval combatants and reconnaissance aircraft have paid visits to Libya sincend Soviet naval aircraft Iiave engaged in operations flying from Libyan airfields over theLibyan leader Qadhafi wants the iraining and demonstration of Soviet backing as deterrents to the perceived threat from tlse United States, including possible US operations In the Culf of Sldra. The Soviets, seeking greater access to Libya's air and naval facilities, see such cooperaiioneans ofQadhafi's reliance on them. This support also -emphasiies the Soviet commitment to those Arab states claiming to be threatened by the United States.
Prospects lor the Future Syria
uring ibe next lew months, the SovieU will continue to build up air defenses in Syria. Thb could Include additional and more advaiscedndaunchers and missiles and moreircraft It also may include the SA-I1 (follow-on to tbend Ihebe deployment cf theould enhance defenses againsthigh-speed aircraft and would furtherIsraeli miliiary planning. The USSR's military presence In Syria will continue to grow and abeady has increased (romen to at.
The eUrUMnt Chief of Sull for touUteerux. Department of ihr Air Force. Mlevc. tloil be tolroaW t"
(tie near future.
xpect the more advanced surface loair missile systems to bey Soviet umoond Soviet command tnd control functions already have increased with (he introduction ol thend othet new systems. We believe thai tlve Soviets will be responsible (or lhe command and eonliol of lliend critical elements associated with ihem. According to one view, ibe Soviets insisted on taking operational control not only ol theut of the entile Syriandefense system and would not have begunwithout Syrian acquiescence This would not preclude ostensible Syrian political control of the air defense network or Syrian manning of certainof the air defense system, such as SAM sites defending the Colinll other agencies believe that lhc Soviets would not have insisted on control of the entire air defense network and lhat the Syrians would have refused to grant it in any,The Syrians will have de facto as well as de hire control over the central air defense network command as well as (hose parts of Ihe system thev man. All agencies believe thai, without complete Soviet control, the system will be more vulnerable to Israeli countermeasures '
IS. Soviet actions In Syria resemble those In Egypturing thc "War ofuggesting lhat the Soviets could decide toontingent of their own fighter aircrafl to Syria to support air defense operations. Soviet pilots have been3 Flogger aircrafl delivered to Syria last August; It is unclear whether this is In preparation for transfer to Syrian units or evidenceoviet-mannedunit. If Soviet pilots should engage Israeli aircraft, Moscow almost certainly would attempt to limit Ihcir role to-Syrian, ai is pace. But beca uie lhe dislanccs are so short, this wouldif ficull policy lo maintainajor war between Syria and Iirael
IsroeG Attitudes
ili. In their public statements Ihc Israelis continue to give low-key treatment to thessue, but tbey are privately concerned Some Israeli leaders are probably pressingreemptive strike They fear lhat the new weaponry will give Syrian President Assadconfidence In confronting Israelbanon and will degrade Israeli military capability. The brae-
riw haUtrt ofvan* ax the Oi. Del fat InraOirewekt AMItnt Chuj of UtHntMrmce. Depart men'iht
lis are also troubled bv thc poliiical implications of thehey believe thai lhe missile deployment will toughen the Syrian posilion on withdrawal fromMoreover, they see the deployment as |hc first signough new Soviet altitude designed lo restore Mryicow's position in the Middle East and aimed intimately at constraining Israel's military options.
Most in the Israeli cabinet seem loath loan attack. They sec little popular support for the kind of all-out conflict with Syria thai might followove, and are leeryonfrontation with tbe Soviets. Prime Minister Begin may abo be reluctant to provoke another confrontation with the-United States over this issue while bilateral strains remain over Lebanon and the peace process.
Por the moment Td Aviv is publicly dismissing lhe missiles* significance and suggesting thai Israel has effective counterinea tores. We believe that theof Ihc Soviet-mannedlong with other Soviet efforts to strengthen Syrian air defenses, will have an Impact on thc Israelis' perception of their freedom lo deploy and use tlieir military forces in Lebanon and in Israel itself. Once the SA-Ss arc operational, some Israeli reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures. and battle management aircraft (key elements of past Israeli successes) will be vulnerableay tltey have not been heretofore. The Israelis will either have lo live wtth this vulnerability, attack the SA-Ss In order to return lo the military status quo ante, or change ibeir miliiary operations Even if the Israelis come lo the conclusion that they can, or must, live with the Increased vulnerabilities, il will have the effect of increasing tbeir felt security needs and making them mote obdurate In their approach to negotiations' Whether or not lhe Israelis strikei perception on their pariignificantly heightened threat to tbeir air superiority or recurrent crises could leadtrike during tbe next year.
' Thr Autiuni Chlel ol Slaff lei Inrafngmer. JVwnmml ol Ike All Force, and iht AhUIuhI Chlel of Staff foi InieUlttmor. Dtoarlment of ike Amu. heller* lhat. white lhe lirarlti artfl lale the SAS aad othet an aeffut uinwwnricMisinurWri.
umdtnlomit lhe nHvutla JtmuarkMi aad apCB netIr le
I.ll apnatmi oott labanoo aid Iirael. onlru lirad uma .rare of high tenrtonopen fuultflHr. vlth Syria. Simaus-iy. iheu ani ihemieloti. -harden luaell aevoaihei lo megotlallaat. Tht Urartu' mmi over ike awtn* wdnan, failure mdt ka lha ktta thr- atvoach loerd ihey da not Hn tW'ii irrlowrV iKetlrnrint thrir comma ndlng millrcrv
lupertortlv.
An Israeli Strike
The Soviets undoubtedly hope that Israel will be deterredreemptive attack by the Soviet' military prcsertce. the potential militaiy and political costs, and US pressure not to attack. At (be same time, they must have assumed tbe risk of preemption or attack deriving from Israeli-Syrian clashes in Lebanon, and made contingency plans.
If the Israelis were to strike thc units and either fall to destroy them or sustain substantial leases,and Damascus would haveajor victory. Tlse SovieU presumably would take credit for having restored the Integrity of Syrian air defense and would try to transfer this success to the political arena, claiming increased status and demanding inclusion In the peace process.
A strike tbat destroyed the units with few Israeli losses would be anotlter acute embarrassment for thc Soviets, although the SovieU probably believe it could also discredit tbe United States In Arab eyes and undermine the Lebanese and Arab-Israeli negotiationsleast temporarily. But, to preserve their credibility, the SovieU would have to replace the lost weaponry and reinforce their defenses. This might include the dispatching ofa nncd interceptor aircraft if they were not already present or more if they were Although such an augmented presence would not be sufficient lo prevent determined Israeli airstrikes, the Soviets would hope Israel would comeease-fire as it did0 afterumber of aircraft lo Soviet-augmented Egyptian air defenses.
Moscow rccotmizes Israel's continuing military superiority In the region and does not want toa possible US-Soviet confrontation. Nonetheless, the Soviets and'Syrians have undoubtedly considered contingency military responses to an Israeli strike on Soviet uniU in Syria. They might consider that simply rebuilding and adding new equipment to tbe sites and sending in some of tlseir own piloU would be an Inadequate responseuccessful Israeli attack:
The SovieU might consider sending ground forces, most likely one or two airborne units, into Syria (none are there now)ymbolic gesture lo deter an Israeli ground attack into Syria, but these would be of little help to live Syrians in coping with It.
An option the Syrians might consider would be to launch Scud missiles al Israeli targets. Tbe Scuds are manned, operated, and controlled by Syrians.
This would have tbe advantage ol beingby the Israelis after being launchedotally Syrian action for which tbe Soviets could 'disclaim respotisibility While tbe Israelis would be certain to retaliate massively,emotely possible that thc Syrians might calculate lhat tlie political coniequerrce of an attack- on Israelias it affects publicIn llie Araboutweigh the substantial military losses that would follow from such an attack.'
On balance, while Ihe SovieU and Syrians would want to respond vigorously to an Israeli attack, thev have few practical or meaningful options for taking the war into lu ie! proper.
Operotionol Guidelines and Potential Friction
ll seems likelyrerequbite for theol Soviet air defense systems and personnel is greater Soviet involvement at lhe hlglsest leveb of lhc Syrian miliiary estaUbhment. Civen the oflen-reported Soviet disdain for Syrian military leadership, it is highly unlikely that the SovieU would risk their own personnel and prestige on unilateral Syrianor operations
Differences between tbe SovieU and Syriansrise in the near term over the use lo which the air defense systems may be pot. Thc SovieU have Indicated publicly that there lo be used only in defense of Syrian territory For theo be used witheffect llie Soviets would have to engage Israeli aircraft over Lebanon or northern Israel Thc Soviets therefore would have to decide at what point Israeli ait activity over Lebanonhreat to Syria
ubstantial risks rernain no matter whatthe Soviets receive and no matter what their role In Syrian deciuonrruking. If Syria becomes Involvedajor clash with Israel, lhe SovieU would be pressed lo use Ihrr risk losing lhe credibility they have tried to establish Should the SovieU decide lo Include
' The Director. Bureau of InteU(eence aid rteteareA.of Slow. Wieeeremployment of Scud mlrrife. oytheit own eoktlon Unpta<
aarrf ovate lhal Irreerl rettfttHon teould he IruMril aad deouuo Ing. it Uoalu nva/ftiulfy leu ImpleuttbU that theSuriant onMbe induced lo fUe the Setidiai Sootet urging. ISR belleoeif (lei* that Monro io would, tn fact, exert raak prouuie, however, heeaute lhe Sooteii ere eeuaile cognltant of lneeTi retaliatory wpiMWus.
Lebanon in Ibeir air delcnse umbrella and lire on Israeli aircraft over lhat oounlif or over lirael, they will be inviting an Uraeli attack on (he corn pie res in Syria wllh (he attendant risks of low. In any event, tbe SovieU will defend Syrian airspace and. if the Israelis attack Soviet manned del coses in Syria. Soviet SAMs would be directed at Israeli combat aircraft wherever thev fly. We strongly doubt the SovieU will deploy the advanced systems in lebanon because of (be certainty of an Uraeli attack, and because they would be more vulnerable.
will iry to extract concessionsIn return for (he new equipment and tlserepayment terms offered. Tbe SovieUwanted greater access lo onshore Syrianand regular use of Syrian airbases forIncreased access lo navalprovide only marginal assistance to Sovietsubmarines, but use of Syrian airfieldsimprove the USSR's navalIn the Mediterranean and modestlyantisubmarine warfare capability.
The Soviet Role in Arab-Isroei; Necrotiat-xn
Moscow's main objective with respect lo Arab-Israeli negotiations will be to obstruct the US Initiative, which provides no role for the USSR and which, the Soviets believe, is designed lo undermine IheirIn the short term, lhe Soviet military deployments to Syria have complicated the achievementithdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon by bobter-Ing (be Assad regimes confidence in its ability to withstand an Israeli attack. They have also increased Israel's determination toigher price from tbe Unlled Statesithdrawal from Lebanon Over the longertrengthened Syria would beetter polilical position to negotiate withdrawal from Lebanon.
Moscow will continue efforts lo persuadeKing Hussein lhat he risks isolation in the Arab world II he negotiates on lhe basis of tbc US peace plan and to argue against any PLO-Jordanian eonfed-eratioti that is not based on lhe concept of anPalestinian State.
Tbe Soviets will try to persuade Assad and Yasir Arafat to settle their differences. Presumablyabout Palestinian willingness to give (lie PLO chief nesmliating flexibility, they will encourageeleroenU in the PlrO to put pressure on Arafal not to accept ihe US initiativeasis (or rvegotiations.
the same lime. Moscow will puisue effortscloser relations with moderate ArabEgypt and Saudi Arabia. SovsetEgypt Iiave. In fad. Improved marginally inyear. The Soviets will try lo hasten lheambassadors with Cairo agreed to in principleIn an efiort to courthat tlse United States is unwilling lo
pressure Israel and that Moscow now has an ability to do so
SovieU might consider pursuingIsrael, although they would assess the(faction carefully. Israel has wanted toby Moscow after7 war.believe (he SovieU, unwilling tocredentiab with the Arabs, will continue loto deal publicly with IsrseL
ffrjgt
If the military stalemate between Iran and Iraq continues during (be nex( year,olicythe war probably will remain basically as it has since Aprilneutral, but in fact more supportive of Baghdad
Tbe limited Soviet-Iraqi rapprochementwill continuespecially i( tlse war drags on Despite iU efforts to diversify weapons supplies. Baghdad does not want lo irccardiz* lhe Soviel arms flow while lhe war continues; the bulk of its weapons are still of Soviet origin, and II needs to have accesspare parts and other supplies. Moscow wartUreserve its position in Baghdad and wants to preserve iU shaie of the lucrative Iraqi arms market and reverse Baglsdad's shift toward alternative sourees.
t thc same lime, certain factorsiamatic improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations. Pieri-dent Saddam Husayn still distrusts tlse SovieU andeep resentment of Moscow's embargo on arms deliveries during the first eight months of the war. Despite the present poor state of Soviet-Iranian relations. Moscow still considersreaterprize than Iraq and values the anti-USof Iran We believe lhc SovieU will avoidso closely identified with Baghdad lhat it undermines their prospects for future gains In Teluan.
lthough tbe SovieU supported UN resolutions2 calling (or an immediate Iran-Iraq cease-fire, they probably will not get In the (oiefront ol media-
(ion efforts. They hive little: leverage over cither couniry and. wiih the prospects (or lhe success of their mediation extremely low. probably would end up antagonizing both.
Soviets have no attractive options inof an Iranian military breakthrough thaithc viability of thc Baghdad regime. Theask Syria to urge restraint on Iran andand implicit public warnings to TehranMoscow also has the option ofits weapons deliveries to Iraq as welloff arms deliveries to Iran and threateningof Iranian imports through the USSR. Thehowever, would not decisively help thewould further anger the Iranians.urplus of weapons, and Tehran isto listen lo verbal appeals or respond toany Quarter. The Soviets might try lo backa victorious Tehran almost certainly wouldovertures as it has in the past
Iron
Soviets do not have strong assets inleft In Iran is lo disarray. Tbe small Tudehsignificant popular backing and has beenby the regime. Tbe Soviets maintain tieselements among Iran's various nationalbut noneerious threat to Tehran. Even Iranopposition group, theerious threat to the regime The Sovieisbelieve, as we do, that Tudeh andassets In Iran will be unable over theuccessful challenge to theEven if the central government in IranTudeh would be unable to scire andwithout, direct military intervention
believe it is highly unlikely lhat theIntervene militarily in Iran in the nexttheir development0 of newfor military campaigns in the Persianthere are no indications that the Sovietsany preparations on the ground for suchAlthough there have been modest increasesreadiness status and equipment inventoriescombat forces opposite Iranof activity In these forces remains routine.there would be major political andfor an invasion of Iran. In additionresistance, the Soviets would have tolhe Wesl would respond wiih force. Moreover, an
invasion would wreak havoc with Moscow's foreign policy initiatives worldwide, especially its effort to persuade West Europeans to oppose thc deployment of US intermediate-range nuclear forces In Europe and its attempt to improve relations with China.
thc Islamic regime stays inmost likely course of action toward Irannexlonths will be to continue to
Bolster factions in tbe Khomeini government thatless hostile to the USSR and discredit those that are anti-Soviet
Urge Syria. Libya, and South Yemen to broker improved Soviet-Iranian relations.
Increase Soviet-Iranian economic and military trade.
Encourage Iranian hostility toward the Uniled States.
Cultivate Soviet darsdestlne assets inside thc country.
Thc Kremlin probably has no illusions that it can make rapid headway. Rithcr. It appears to be taking thc long view and attempting to preserve the littleit has for the day Khomeini departs.
Afghanistan
choices confronting Andropov inremain as unpalatable as they were forWithdrawal remains highly unlikelythe Soviet commitment to preservation of aregime in Kabul. Similarly, thc Sovietsto introduce the several hundredrequired lo sucoessfully control thebecause of thc political andinvolved. Soviet options thus are likely toto be rrvedificationsasic strategy of attrition.
the next few months, the Soviets could:
Make more tactical adjustments to increase tlie effectiveness of their forces.
Make personnel changes in the Afghan Government.
Continue to terrorize thc Afghan populace with more bombing and. possibly, the greater use of chemical warfare.
Iroop levels (possibly an00 troops).
[
ccessncreasing amounU ol weapons fiom Pakistan. China, and possibly lean is crucial to thr insurgency. The Soviets may undertake new. cross-border raids to stop Insurgent infiltration, but "they do not currently have the capability in place to undertake major moves across borders
hatever iti military dorse within Afghanistan in the months ahead, Moscow almost certainly wilt continue lo claim an interestoliiical settlement By so doing. It hopes lot
Win Pakistani acceptance of the Kabul regime and reduce foreign support for the resistance.
onciliatory image to tbe United Stales. Weatern Europe, and the Islamic world.
Mute criticism of Moscow at the Nonaligned summit in New Delhi in March.
Respond lo Indirappealote conciliatory Soviet posilion with regard lo Afghanistan.
As Indicated by Ihe hardline ftavda editorial in mid-December, however, it is unlikely that tbe Sc-rteU will be willing to make the concessions necessary to lend much credibility to llieir political efforts.
rotracted stalemate is the most likely prospect for the Soviets in Afghanistan for the rest of the year. The USSR is unable to destroy the resistance with Ihe level of force it now has. and lhe insurgents are too weak and disorganized to defeat major Soviel units Moscow's overall strategy, therefore, will be designed to consolidate its Isold in Afgharustan, loakistani dialogue, with Kabul, and to reduce the international costs of the occupation
Libya
be increased Soviet-Ubyan cooperation of the past year is likely to continue In coming months, as Qadhafi's fears of US intentions remain high He probably will seek further demonstrations of Soviet military support, seeing thisounter lo US military moves. While lhe Soviets have takenof US-Libyan tensions, to advance their position in Libya, they have refused to extend any commlliuent to come to Libya's defense. Soviet reluctance to makeommitment probably has increased Qadhafi's sniiely and could make him more willing to grant
increased Soviet access to Libyan facilities in return for stronger Soviel backing.
oviet influence over Oadhafi remains limited. In spite of tbe closer military relalionship. Eastdispute over lagging Libyan payments for Soviet arms increased Qadhafi's basic distrust-of Moscow; al lhat lime, lhe Soviets insisted on continued cash payments even though this placed new strains on the relit lonrliip
he Soviets benefit from Libya's destabilizing activities In Africa and. through their supply ofequipment to Qadhafi. contribute to these efforts. They have remained publicly detached from these activities, however, for several reasons. The Libyans almost certainly are not interested In coordinating their policy with the USSR. And the SovieU prefer to remain uncommitted to and untarnished by Qadhafi's unpredictable actions. Moscow was disappointed by the collapse of lhe pro-Libyan government In Chad Inut there is no evidence that overthrowing the Habre regime is an important Soviet obyective.
Soulh Yemen
oscow will continue to exploit lis firmlyposition in South Yemen to expand its presence and influence In the region In an effort to attract assistance from the West and South Yemen's Persian Culf neighbors. President Ilaiani is moderatingoreign policy, curtailing support to the insurgents in North Yemen, and locking reconciliation with his neighbors We doubt however, that he wants to move lignifieantly away from tbe Soviet Union
he Soviets probably have encouraged Hasani lo court the Culf states, both lo persuade them to nocmaliie relations wiih the USSR and lo ease South Yemen's economic problems. At the same time, thc SovieU most likely are encouraging the South Yemenis lo maintain the option lo use liberation movements to destabilize moderate Gulf states if attempts torelations should prove unsuccessful Moscowis worried, however, that South Yemen could move too dose to the conservative Arabs Tlie Soviets recently have also expressed their opposition to Western oil exploration in South Yemen
hould the SovieU conclude dial Uasani'sthreaten their posilion in Aden, thev would try to organize opposition lo him; tbey may. In fact, have tacitly approved lasl summer's abortive coup plotting.
They vill certainly continue to use the levciage available toon Aden's dependence on Sovietdvisers, and snare parts as well as on their strong influence in South Yemen's ruling party, defense, and internal securitykeep South Yemenourse tliey deem acceptable.
An Acjo/essive Soviet Policy
we see no supportive evidenceit unlikely, the Andropov regime couldto alter course andorepolicy in the region. If so, we would eipectcleat Indicators
A Soviet decision to put pleasure onpossibly in tbe contest of the war with Iraq at well as the Afghanbe seenignificant ttrcngt lien ing of Soviet military forces in lhc Trans-caucasui or in western Afghanistan. Moscow might combineuildup with lhe issuance of verbal warnings io Tehran These indicators would alsoIf the Soviets wereilitaryin Iran lo overthrow lhe Islamic regime, ft might also consider sending increased numbers of Soviet advisers and technicians lo Iraq to support the Iraqi war efforts
A decision lo try to crush the insurgents in Afghanistan would be reflected in tbc preparations forof at least several hundred thousand additional Soviet troops. Soviet lorces might altomajor cross-border attacks in Pakistan, and possibly Iran, to cut off Insurgent access. An attempt to crush the insurgency might also require tbe grcady intensified use of snticavilian tactics, including the expanded oie of chem Leal warfare
A generally more aggressive Soviet poslure in the Middle East might also be reflected in intensified demands for more frequent use of naval air facilities In the Mediterranean (Libya and Syiia] and theof more advanced aircraft into lhe Indian Ocean area {South Yemen sndbe Soviets could combine an Increased presence withto its clients to become mote aggressive. Should they want to strengthen both then tactical andpositions, they might even deploy Badgers, as llsey did in Egypt in the, or other advanced combat aircraft lo these areas. Such deployments would Increase the threat to Israel's security and negatively affect (he US position in the area. Tbe
SovieU might urge Libya to move more strongly in Chad, to seek more actively to undermine President Nimeiii in Sudan, and to try lo destabdiie iberegime in Egypt They could encouiage South Yemen to renew lis strong support of the National Democratic Front in North Yemen and to resume the operations of lhe Popular Front (oe tbe Liberation of Oman
Moscow could abandon its attempt lo court lhe moderate Arabs and loin forcei with radical Arabs lo try to undermine negotiations. We might see tbe issuance of strong warnings to the Uniied States with respect lo Its support for Israel and brief's continued presence In Lebanon. And we might see Sovietof an aggressive Syrian policy in Lebanon and on the Golan, designed lo Increase tensions and poJarire the situation still further.
On Ihe ether band, there are options open lb the Sovietsolitical and diplomatic nature tbat are equally unlikely. They could elect to solve their problems in Afghanistan by withdrawing. They could decide lo abandon Iraq and side with ban. offering assistance lo Iran In thc hope of ultimatelyajor breakthrough In leUtions there
Most of the fores^nng actions are unrealistic given Arab atUludes. Many would proveor would undermine Soviet policies in West-era Europe or elsewhere Nonetheless, adoption of any or tome of these options wouldewby Moscow to try to alter the situation in the region diamatically lo Its own advantage.
Country
Aleena. Tu.
Libya...
ordan. Iraq
Estimated Soviet Military and Economic Pretence io the Middle East and South Asia
Military Personnel
Personnel
S.OM li-
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u.d. tnlt u>ir*do not have diplomatic relations with the USSR. Thereno Soviet military or eeoeoente rrrnnntl In Lebanon
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