THE GUATEMALAN INSURGENCY: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS

Created: 9/1/1983

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The Guatemalan Insurgency: Near-Term Prospects J

Tbe Guatemalan Insurgency: Near-Term Prospects I

Judgments

Informatum arttlabli ataf1 -Ul tori

radical left insurgents have been set back both politically and militarily over the past year by the more effective military counterinsur-gency tactics of the recently deposed government of President Efrain Rios Montt. The trend of growing insurgent strength and activity that was evident9 to2 has been reversed, and we believe theleft will be contained and unable to improve its military position substantially over the near term. The continued factional instability under new head of state Mcjia is likely to reduce armed forces effectiveness temporarily but probably will not immediately jeopardize the counterinsur-gency gains of the past year. Indeed, we expect Mejia for political and morale reasons to step up operations against the guerrillas scon and to try to score some quick successes.

Since2 the armed forces have cut insurgent strength fromo something. They have forced the insurgentseactive and defensive posture by expanding theof small military units, forming large civilian self-defense forces, and emphasizing ps> etiological operations. The insurgents' urgent need to regroup and the low level of activity they are currently capable of supporting render them unable to take advantage of the recent coup andwithin the armed forces enough to alter the existing balance of power.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the insurgent threat can be eliminated during the next year. Wc expect, inradual increase in small-scale guerrilla activity.rmed combatants, while lacking the resources or unity toroad offensive, are capable of increased hit-and-run ambushes, economic sabotage, and urban terrorism. In our opinion, they will have some isolated successes in demoralizing the military and undermining ibe legitimacy of the government by emphasizing such operations.

We expect the insurgents to make someformidabletheir longer term goals of recruiting and training full-time cadre and rebuilding support networks in local communities. They may also make somepressure fromtowardunity among their various organizations. The existence of civilian defense forces inillages, however, will make it more difficult for the insurgents to recruit supporters, and longstanding leadershipand ideological differences will continue to binder efforts to unify.

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Therefore, we do not believe thai the guerrillas can resume iheir dramatic growth oferiod or submerge their factional and personal rivalries enough to establish an effective joint politicomilitary command.

The radical left probably will benefit from continued foreign support, particularly from Cuba, and from the unsanctioned use of Mexican and Beiizean territory. The guerrillas' access lo foreign territory--particularly the Mexican borderthe transit of arms and cadre, safehaven, and recuperation may increase in importance as the Army exerts pressure on their remaining strongholds in Guatemala.

We continue io believe thai there arc several contingencies from which the weakened insurgency could benefit. These include potential changes in nonmiliiary and external variables such as the continued politicalof the new Mcjiaenewal of indiscriminate violence by the Army or strong-arm squads, or an even deeper economic decline this year than is expected. Tn the near term, however, we believe that only the establishment of an extreme left government in HI Salvador- -which would provide Guatemalan guerrillas with staging bases, arms, andufficient catalyst io shift the momentum in Guatemala back to the guerrillas' favor.

For its part, the military may not be able to press fully its current advantage against an already weakened insurgency. While ihe armed forces under Mcjia probably will sustain their counlerinsurgency strategy in the near term, in our opinion the military will not be able to augment its programscivicsubstantialeconomic and military assistance. The deteriorating economy will impede expansion of civic action and development projects critical to securing local support, as well as blunt prospects for acquiring necessary' military equipment. The nationalistic Mejia government is trying to improve relations with the United Stales and wants to obtain US military assistance, but il is unlikely to favor any aid offers that emailsuch as those pertaining to humanit perceives asof its national sovereignty.

Contents

ill

1

The Rite and Fall of Insurgent

The insurgent Buildup

Insurgent Reversal! of

Presentuerrilla

Dimensions of the Remaining Insurgent

Manpower Problems and Combat

Equipment

Foreign

Inability To

Increasing Reliance on Foreign

Insurgent

Military

Political

Implications for the United

Government's Cownierinsurgeiscy Strategy 15

Guatemalan Fxtrcm*

Use of Foreign

iKm

Onhe recently deposed Guatemalan Government of President Rios Montt announced an "amnesty of reconciliation" andtate of siege imposed nine months earlier to underscore inthat the insurgents had been defeated. That declaration, despite the severe setbacks suffered by the insurgentsas politicallyand obviously premature. The guerrillasotent- if presentlydedicated to continued combat. With assistance from their foreign allies, tbe various radical left organizations are regrouping and coordinating their plans forthe political and military momentum they sustainedonetheless, despite theinstability under the new Mejia government, we do not expect the major counlerinsurgency gains of the pasl year to be jeopardized in Ibe near term.

This paper renews the strengths and weaknesses of the guerrillas after their repeated setbacks of the last year. It analyzes the prospects for renewed growth in the insurgent ranks and for improved unity among the various guerrilla factions. The paper highlights the potential for insurgentmiliury andthe nest year in view of tbe revolutionaries' near-term strategy and present capabilities Finally, the implications for the United States of the probable course of the insurgency are considered.|

Tbe Rise and Fall of Insurgent Strength

The Insurgent Buildup

year-old Marxist insurgency in Guatemala steadily intensified9 to2 as tbe guerrillas increased their ranks of full-limefrom lesseak of approximately

ided by tbe military's resort torepression during those years,igidstructure that essentially ignored the country's large impoverished Indian population, the insurgents were having increasing success recruiting supporters. They also benefited from an increasing commitment of financial and material assistance from Cuba, which bad been encouraged byictory in Nicaragua and tbe gains of the insurgents in EI Salvador^

The momentum of the guerrilla war was shifting, in our opinion, to the insurgents' favor by

years of

prodding by Havana, the four insurgent organizations announced in Cuba in2 that they hadnity front to representteady growth of guerrilla attacks culminated that same montharge insurgent force, supported by the local villagers, virtuallymall Army garri-

Se/rM

Insurgent Rnersat*2

The growing lots of legitimacy of the government because of tbe violence and the fear among many officers that the military was kiting the war were partly responsibleoup led by junior officers inhich installed President Rios Monti in power. Tbe armed forces cut insurgent strength to somethingnd forced the insurgentseactive and defensive position by shifting almost immediatelyore multifaceted counter insurgencyhe antiguerrillaincorporated both military operations and civic action; its three major components were an expanded deployment of small military units, the formation of large civilian paramilitary forces, and heavy emphasis on psychological operations. |

ere forced to flee irom territory tat nao formed their strongholds just one year before. Abandoning many camps in the face of Army operations, the guerrillas lost substantial amounts of supplies and arms. Moreover, many villages that previously were sympathetic to the insurgents and supported them with supplies and safehaven were co-opted by the government through the civilian defense program

Present Rasa* of Gtwrrlua Activity In our judgment, the insurgents are less prepared now for decisive confrontations with the military than they wereonths ago. The destruction of their support networks and the capture of substantial amounts of their equipment have worsened their supply andproblems, thus hindering their capability for major military initiatives. During the fust three monthshey were able to maintaininimal level of military operations, while concentrat-ing on regrouping and plotting strategy. |

Fighting remains sporadic, and engagementsare of short duration. We know of no sizable attacks involving morensurgents during

Although fighting is still light and infrequent com-pared with1 and

lions that, for the first lime, in one area two insurgent groups are effectively combining forces andattacks. An attack in mid-Mayilitary zone headquarters also suggests that the guerrillas may be ready to step up the number and boldness of their assaults. PJJJJ

Dimensions of the Remaining Insurgent Threat

Despite their setbacks, the insurgent factions have assets that make it unlikely that they can bein the short

; continue to wield control over some remote areas, particularly along theborder. They also benefiteep distrust and fear of the military still existing in some communities.

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J armtd GutrrtUa Aimy af Ik* Poor umii In lypkal flvqttt ltrrain ofortlfnVt Hlghlandi. Bag

believe ibe military'* estimate ofuerrilla regular* killed during the last nine months2 to be only slightly inflated. Moreover, wc believe combat losses3 and defections during the April-May amnesty period have further depictedranks J

The guerrilla organizations are being weakenedby tbethrough combat orof substantial numbers of part-time militia and support personnel. The military use* local civilian defense forces, numbering closeembers according to official Guatemalan military documents, to patrol the immediate environs of their villages, thus reducing tbe ability of insurgent sympathizers to assist the guerrillas. Moreover, the increased military presence in remote hamlets, decreased repression, benefits from civic action programs and amnesty periods all provide incentives for guerrilla supporters who arc not ideologically committed to change their allegiance. |

The guerrillas initially sought to counter the threat posed by the civilian militias to iheir support base by attempting to intimidate the peasants with direct attacks. This, however, only served to strengthen the rapport between the poorly armed civilian unit* and the military. The guerrillas, with the exception of one group, now are trying to avoid clashes with the civilian patrols. Another insurgent reaction io growing loss of local support is the evacuation of sympathizers, at times entire villages, to remote areas.I

Recruitment of new combatants probably will be more difficult than in the past. Tbe guerrillas still meet indifference and even hostility in manyeven though they have been proselytizing insome areas forears or more.1

inillages makes it even more difficult for the insurgents to approach potential recruits.

Even so,ull-timeorrnidabje force capable ofhit-and-run raids, economic sabotage, and urban terrorism designed to demoralize the military and undermine rovernmeni legitimacy. Dunn* suchthey are occasionally augmented by part-time militia members, although support from theseforces is more often confined to supplies, safe-haven, and information on the military's operations. We believe the current scale of activity and tbe guerrillas' decision to retrench are consistent with the firmly held view of their Cuban-trained insurgent leaders that they arcprotracted popularhe long-term strategy underlying such abehind the ambush and sabotage guerrilla tactics -is slowly to bleed the strength and will of the government forces. |

Insurgent activity

last winter, accordinguerrilla press release, was specifically designed lo capture weapons, and action plans over the coming months arc predicated on capturing additional weaponry. These shortagesthat externalporadic and internal distribution uneven. J

In addition, ihe military is having greater success disrupting guerrilla internal support networks.

JThese weapons, dIUIIg Willi lilt additional benefits of terrain and element of surprise, often give these elite guerrilla units the upper hand in engagements of their choos-

ing.

Foreign Support

The guerrillas' most advanced weaponry is provided by their foreign allies, particularly Cuba. Nicaragua, and Vietnam. Their inventory consistsariety of US-made equipment, including some captured in Vietnam by Communist

malao military, However, is tbe Israeli-made Galil: thevn (be lacrrilla inventory are clearly not captured in haltie.

the regular guerrilla combatants arc well trained and well equipped. I

The Cubans are also heavily involved in training Guatemalan insurgents."

lavana is pressuring the guerrillas for even more trainees this year; the orthodox Communisthas not formally adopted the armedparticular is being prodded to step up its military training, andembersissident faction of the Party have already completed training in Cuba this ycar.l

Tbe Soviet Union, its allies, and other radicalalso assist the extreme left with arms, training, and money.

effect sign.ficani politick or miliilry coooen.iL .

coseNaL

Revolutionary Unionn

[ns-rgrw Strategy

mT,/n ndorce .nsurgem leaden to focus mor.

on political work and reorganization of their forces lhan on military- acwn.fmmaaaaaaa^mma%aamma%ma

caught off guard last year by the military's rapid shift from indiscriminate violence and repressionore multifaoetcd countcrinsurgency program, theare preparing to adjust their strategy accordingly.

Both groups, but particularly ORPA, have carried out severalambushes in recent months against small Army patrols. I

lions are designed to stretch the Army's already thin manpower and logistic capacity, to exact largeof government casualties while minimizing their own. and to demoralize troops by demonstrating the military's inability to respond quickly withOver time, attacks on small patrols and patrol buses, as well as stepped-up urban terrorism, probably are intended to force the Army to abandon itssmall-unit tactics in favor of moving troops back, into the larger garnsons and employing large-force sweep operations. The guerrillas, in our opinion, will continue avoiding conventional confrontations with Army units that would further deplete their ranks.

the military is using, at least temporarily, large-unit sweep operations in the southwest where ORPAentrenched. These minimize Army casualties and succeed in destroying insurgent camps andsupply lines, but they are easily avoided by the insurgents themselves

The radicals have already begun terrorist activity in the city of Guatemal

wring

May ihe radicallikely the orthodoxcredit for the assassinations of three businessmen.!

| Leaden of

mesc two organizations believe, However, that attacks on civilian defense forces are counterproductive.ihey interd to target Army uniu stationed,lages that also have civilian defense uniu tothat Ihc Army is their enemy, not Ihc people, and that the villagers cannot rely on military

Their

tbility to accomplish these goals will depend on the degree of success they have in breaking down tbe growing cooperation between the peasantry and the government. These plans indicate insurgent leaders recognize that, over the longer term, the Army's psychological operations, civic action* and formation of civilian defense forces threaten the guerrillasas much as their military losses.

All of the insurgent organizations apparently view the civilian defense forces as tbe greatest obstacle to their recruitment and freedom io operate, and they are reacting in various ways.j

We believe thai (he much-heralded "politicalinitiated lastGeneral Mejia vows tois viewed by insurgent leadersong-term threat. The radical left hopes to discredit the political liberalization, while at the same time exploiting ii by expanding ties lo and control over legitimate groups.

lucrnlla leaders probably also hope tl strikes and demonstrations provoke tbe government to take repressive measures of the type that catalyzed the rapid growth of insurgent ranks9 through1

er

Prospects

We tee little chance that the government will be facednous threatadical left victory during the next year. The guerrillas are likely to experience greater difficulties in replacing manpower losses and more obstacles to gaining domestic support than ihey have in the past. Even if they obtain increased support from foreign allies, the insurgents will be hard pressed to retain their established territorial strongholds or to sustain military operations over an extended period. We believe that in the near termeftist takeoverJn Ulwould provideguerrillas with munitions, staging areas, andufficient impetus to shift the momentum in Guatemala back to the guerrillas' favor. |

Nevertheless, we believe the military is unlikely to eradicate the insurgents during the next yearprogress against the insurgency probably will be slow in the next several months as the guerrillas-after several months of regrouping andreemerge from their tactical retreat with betterund an improved strategy to counter the Army's initiatives. The Army's mobility andack of aircraft, Ihe large amount of territory it must cover, tbeability to find safehaven in neighboringand continuing support for the guerrillas in someagainst their rapid

Although we do not believe that io the near term the insurgents can reverse the balance of power and the momentum now favoring the government,ect them to be able gradually to increase the number and impact of their attacks on Army units.inimum of effort, they also can increase urban terrorism, assassinations, and sabotage ofimportant targets. The insurgents are unlikely, however, to engage in prolonged confrontations with the military or force the military to abandon its successful small-unit orientation. J

Tbe insurgent groups may be able to offset their manpower losses over the next year wiih new recruits by exploiting the declining economy and risingihe continuing fear of ihe military in some

Noumilitary Factors Affecting tht Insurgency

previously excluded sectors. The new groups will find it difficult, however, lo emerge and prosperetting where vested interests want to consent ihe status quo. Whether or not the newly mobilised groups are actually Influenced by Ihe radical left, they will be seen to be so by the uttrarightisis In Guatemalan society. The habitual response of this element Is assassination of political rivals. Renewed indiscriminate violence would quicklyoll on government legitimacy and increase ihe pool ofinsurgent recruits. MBMtMB

Economic Conditions

An important factor In the government'ssuccess has been the gradually increasing support from ihe civilian population, particularly that of the Indians in tht Western Highlands war tone Maintenance af that support, however, will be contingent on effective military protection and follow-through on promised developmental assistance and social services. This may be difficult to accomplish because worstning economic conditions have forced tht government to implement austerity measures. Contraction of ihe economy this year will raise an already high unemployment rate and jeopardize the government's ability lo direct more resources toward ihe Impoverished conflict zones Cutbacks in these programs and higher unemployment could spurdisillusionment and add to ihe ranks of potential insurgents.

Leftist Takeover in El Salvador

The course of the conflict in El Salvadorritical variable, which will affect the final outcome of the Guatemalan Insurgency. Weeftistin El Salvador would provide ihe Guatemalan guerrillas with unimpeded use of Salvodoranfor safehaven and for stagingadical left Salvodoran government probably also wouldew major source of arms and other supplies Finally. Cubauerrilla victory In Elwould not hesitate to expand their assistance to the radical left in Guatemala^]

Uniled Stale* is an unreliable ally,go it alone" attitude it prevalent among them. Otherhowever, resent former President Rios Monti's anti-US rhetoric and recogniic the potentialof tbe United States to their counterinsurccncy' campaignupplier of both military equipment and economic assistance. Mcjia is trying to improve relations with the United States by supporting US policy in Central America, and he has already-through informal channels thusof US military

is searching for economic assistance, as well asthe purchase of helicopters, spare parts for its aircraft, and rifles for tbe civilian paramilitary units. It is unlikely, however, that the Guatemalan Govern-mcot will be amenable to aid offers from international donors that entailas those on human rights- that it perceives as infringements on its national sovereignty.

gains, if any, over the next year will be determined, however, as much by the government's ability to maintain its muttifaoetcd countcrinturgency approach as by the left's own capabilities andWhile wc believe the military can sustain its couniennsLrtency programs at existing levels, tbe Army may not be able to exploit fully iu current advantage. In our opinion tbe military will not be able to upgrade iu civilian defense force and civic action programs substantially without significant foreign economic and military assistance. The Army has been able to armew of the newly formed civilian-defense force units, while the civic action program is constrainedack of materiel and the military's limited air supply capability. The Mejia government

Appendix A

The Government's Counterinsurgency Strategy!

2 (be Guatemalan armed forcci haveultifacetcd counurinsurgencyipcorporatirtf both military opcratioiu and civic action. The three major components of the strategy arc an expanded deployment of small military units, tbe formation of large civilian paramilitary forces, and heavy emphasis on psychological operation*is still used selectively, but is notandard counter ins urgency tactic.

ArtDtd Forces

The military has focused on saturating insurgent-held areas with government forces, both regular Army units and paramilitary groups. An increase inbyast summer raised the Army's strength to0 and has enabled it to expand iu effective area ofbe miliury also redeployed large units from major city garrisons and established Five task forces in the midst of strongholds

held by thensurgents. Concurrently, small Army detachmenU and patrolcompany and platoonbeen

placed in as many villages and isolated hamlets as

manpower and logistics

The armed forcesundamentalthis spring that further broadened theirnationwide. The number of military zones has been dramatically increasedachinimum of one battalion, and all security forces, including the civilian defense forces and national police, are being placed under the direct control of tbe rone commander. The changes arc likely lo improve tactical command and conirol and reaction time, as well as enhance Ihe military's ability to direct civic action projecu and control political mobilization. |

This extensive dispersement of forces is designed to overcome weaknesses in mobility stemming from the lack of aircraft and the difficult and extensive terrain to be covered (five tunes tbe area of El Salvador) It pcrmiu aggressive patrolling in areas of insurgent activity and reduces some logistic, communications, and planning problems associated with large-force sweep operations.

Tbe military's expanded presence in remote areas has political and psychological benefits In many casesrepresents foe some villages the first show of authority by the central government in months, if not years. Il serves to deny insurgent control over an area by default. In many instances the insurgents have assassinated localmiblaryand rationaldemonstrate their de facto control of the area. Thus, the pretence of troops, particularly as they become involved inbringing social services to the area, helps to restore legitimacy to the government. |

Civilian Defease Forces

Tbe organization of local civilian defense forces has been perhaps the single mott important countennsur-gency development. These militias, nowarticipants nationwide, patrol theenvirons of their villages andtandoff capability or warning function against insurgentAlthough these forces are generally poorly equipped, their presence frees the Army from the need for static defense, permitting it io seek contact

wiih insurgcnU in more nigged terrain. Tbe civil defeiue forces also provide intelligence on guerrilla movements and on the locations of insurgent arms and supply caches. H

Tbe format ion of civilian defense forces inillages is hindering ibebility to develop local support. Members of these forces are being employed in various projects to improve livingin their villages. These tangible benefits, however minimal, provide incentive for nor ideologicallyinsurgent supporters to change iheir

n.ic Action andetiological Operations

The third major component of the military's strategy is an increased emphasis on Army involvement in civic action programs. Tbe high visibility of military personnel in providing food and health care and in restoring roads, homes, and schools is enabling ihe Army gradually to change its image and gamer local support The Army helps refugees to return to their villages and uses local radio to urge the return of others who fled fearing government repression or who were forcibly evacuated by the guerrillas^1

umber of villagers have benefitedfrom government civic action, the programs thus far probably have had as muchsychological impactangible one. The growing perception that the Army is willing to protect and assist the populace, even in areas where it cannot yet do so. makes ihc local inhabitants more amenable to cooperating with ihe military. Nevertheless, expansion of civic action projects is severely constrained by Guatemala'seconomy and the military's logisticMoreover. Ibe success of tbe program inlocal support for the government has depended largely on the widely varying skill and commitment of individual area commanders.

cbo*oc>cal ukucs being employed by the Army include two amnesties for the guerrillas, the first In2 and the second fromarch through the end ofhe second, called ihe

Reprtialoa

grams or remaining in the armed opposition.

Thc militarynot totally forsworn repressionounterinsurgency tool. Although it il virtuallyto sort out reports of human righu violations, wc believe that ihe Army in tbe past used extreme force and brutality in selected areas where insurgent control and support for ihe guerrillas from the population did not initially permit tbe military toresence and institute its new programs. This tactic, apparently utilised mostly along the Mexican border, hassince last summer. Many peasants apparently recognized that the guerrillas could not protect them and lhat.they had the choice of accepting theamnesty and benefits from civic action pro-

Appendix B

The Guatemalan Extreme Left

The FAR is the oldest insurgent group, daiing2 when it initiated the armed struggle with an alliance of dissident military officers and Communist Party (PGT/O) members. It was the major guerrilla organization involved in tbe heavy fighting of theut was decimated by the counterinsurgency campaign of that period. The FAR reemerged7 and now operates principally in tbe remote expansive Peten Department in northern Guatemala. Although it focuses more on military strikes than building popular support, the minimal official government presence in much of the Peten has enabled tbe FAR to develop an excellent intelligence and supplyin the area.f

arc concentrated on the southern slopes of the Western Highlands, with its headquarters andin San Marcos Department on the Mexican border. I

the ORPA has carried out the most damaging at against Army uniu so far this year. The organization has traditionally been tbe most resistant URNG member to efforts at unification. Astunas, who would like to be the unquestioned leader of the Guatemalan revolution, now may be more willing to cooperate increasingly with the smaller Rebel Armed Forces. By doing so, be may feel that his organization can supplant the EGP. which has been weakened the most by (he military, as the preeminent insurgent organization. J

The Rebel Armed Forcereaded by Jorge Ismacl Soto Garcia,mall, but highly trained and effective combat force of. Soto, an inflexible Marxist-Leninist, has led the FAR since tbe. He is Cuban trained and enjoys good relations withtrong advocate of military action. Soto may be tbe only insurgent leader who permanently remains in Guatemala to lead bis com-

Tbe FAR has suffered leas than the EGP from the Army's offensive. The government has not yet focused iu counterinsurgency campaign against it. because FAR activities take placeparsely populated and economically unimportant area. Partly for this reason, the FAR has undertaken some successful ambushes of small military patrols this year. FAR leadershave resisted unification efforts bul. in one area, arc coordinating military actions now with the ORPA. In the past, the FAR feared domination of the guerrilla movement by the fcGP and does not have good relations with it. |

The Guatemalan Communist Party/Dissident Factioned by veteran Communist Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, is tbe newest Insurgent group and smallest member of tbe L'RNG. Cardoza broke away from the onhodox party (PGT/Ol8 to form the dissident wing when tbe party refused to adopt armed revolution. He has urisuccessfullyto provide leadership for tbe faction from Mexico City, however, i

_ robably can rely upon far fewer than that for miliary action, however, and has rarely engaged security forces in fighting. I

clieve ,nc PGT/us precarious

orgdni/aTIoniTslalus may lone it lo reunify with its mother organization or be absorbed by one or another of the other guerrilla gros,rna^'fa|assssssssssssw

The Guttmalan CoomwaUl Party (PGT/O) Tbe party, led by Ricardo Rosales Roman, is an orthodox Moscow-line Communist party that has not yet openly adopted the armed revolutioneans to obtain power and isember of the insurgent alliancelthough theay have upupporters, it probably has atctive members, mostly in the unionized labor sector.

The insurgent groups have invited theo join the URNG, apparently believing that party leaders have organizational skills and tics to legitimateand labor organizations in Guatemala that they need. Rosales Roman may accept in the belief that he can gain considerable political influence in analliance weakened by the military's continuing counterinsurgency successes. The PGT/O'sof three businessmen in early summer may signal iu readiness to take up arms Nevertheless. Rosales Roman long has opposed military action and probably views the severe guerrilla losses of tbe pas: year as vindication of his course, which emphasizes thorough political indoctrination of workers, students, and peas-anU in preparationopular uprising. In either case, tbe incorporation of tbento theumbrella organization, in our opinion, would not add significantly to the insurgents' militaryor level of activity.

Appendix C

Insurgent Use of Foreign Territory

Access lo foreign territory is essential to tbe guerrillas for safehaven. arms infiltration, resupply, and bead-quarters for their international propaganda efforts. Wc believe that the poorly patrolled border areas of Mexico, Belize, and Honduras are increasingly being utilized by the insurgents, particularly for sanctuary.

Mexico

to camp

City also serves as headquarters for three insurgent political front groups, which solicit political and financial support from international donors and issue propaganda against the Guatemalan

action 01

of the front groups canror or1 behalf of all the insurgent organizations.

Original document.

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