GRENADA: A FIRST LOOK AT MECHANISMS OF CONTROL AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

Created: 12/19/1983

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IMI31

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT3

GRENADA:

A FIRST LOOK AT MECHANISMS OF CONTROL AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the President. It was prepared under the auspices of the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The Assessment was coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating were the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. Information available as3 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.

CONTENTS

SCOPE NOTE

KEY JUDGMENTS

DISCUSSION

Internal Control Mechanisms

The Party

The Grenada Revolutionary Armed Forces

The Cuban Connection

The Nature of the Relationship

The Scope of Cuban Economic Assistance

Military Assistance

The Soviet Role

The Nature of the Relationship

Economic Assistance

Military

Other External Actors

The East Europeans

The Asians

The Middle East

Military Agreements and Equipment

Grenadaase for Subversion

Political Activities

Intelligence Activities

Unconventional Military Activities

Annex A: Internal Dynamics of the New Jewel Movement Annex B: Weapons Captured in Grenada

SCOPE MOTE

This Assessment reflects the initial interagency exploitation of the documents recovered from Grenada after the invasion of The judgments noted here are preliminary and result in partontinuing examination ofin contentingle sheet of paperomplete manual or box of photographs--that were catalogued before

In addition to this material, atew hundred additional linear feet of documents await collation and analysis. This latter material includes notes and records retrieved from the residences of Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard. In spite of discussions with US personnel in Grenada, we do not know howhave not yet been recovered and when more will be available for exploitation.

Because the overwhelming majority of these documents were Grenadian and reflect Grenadian viewpoints, we would not expect to find direct documentation of Soviet or Cuban strategy toward, objectives in, or perceptions of Grenada. uller appreciation of the material surveyed in this Assessment as well as an examination of additional documents will be presentedorthcoming Interagency Intelligence Memorandum.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Following an all-source assessment of available intelligence on Grenada and an analysis of that part of the documents recovered from Grenada beforee have come to the following conclusions:

o The primary focus of almost all actors on the Grenadianforeign andon consolidating the power of the New Jewel Movement and strengthening its Marxist-Leninist orientation. To achieve thiseb of relations among Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union evolved, characterized by:

Discreet associations that became more overt as the New Jewel Movement increased its internal control.

Close party-to-party relations among all three countries. Implementation of many Sovlet-Grenadian agreements through Cuba.

o Tbe New Jewel Movementery small Out highly influential part of the Grenadian populace, dedicated toarxist-Leninist society but divided by personal ambitions and conflicting views on how quickly to proceed with this task. renada had:

self-described Marxist-Leninist politicalwith Central Committee, Political Bureau, andthe revolutionary elite.

An army and militia that In size and armament far outstripped those of its neighbors or of previous Grenadian governments; both institutions helped move Grenada in the directionilitarized society and provided Important vehicles for indoctrinating youth.

An internal security apparatus that dealt harshly with overt regime opponents and was sufficiently pervasive to intimidate potential challenges to the New Jewel Movement.

A highly developed propaganda machine that relied on the government-monopolized media and party-controlled entitles throughout the government bureaucracy to disseminate the leadership's political message.

o The captured documents underscore that the Bishop regime viewed Cuba as Us principal foreign ally. Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop hadlose personal relationship.

o While Castro almost certainly knew of the competition between Bishop and Bernard Coard, he probably was unaware of the degree to which Bishop had lost support within the leadership and of the Coard faction's growing drive for dominance. The killing of Bishop was clearly unforeseen In Havana.

o The Cuban role in defending Grenada is still being examined. Thus far, we have not been able to confirm that armed Cubans defended other than their own positions or were involved inefense with Grenadian forces. Most of the Cuban resistance came from the forty-odd military advisers and an unknown number of construction workers who were trained reservists in the Cuban military. It appears, however, that the majority of the construction workers had insufficient arms and ammunition and offered little resistance. I

o The Soviet Union valued the New Jewel regime in Grenadaymbol of declining US power and expanding Marxist influence in Latin America. Moscow initially kept the Grenadians publicly at arm's length, effectively masking the growing military relationship. The captured documents show that direct Soviet influence was brought to bear on party organization, ideological training, and management of the failing

Grenadian economy.

o Both the documents and open sources show that Grenadian contacts with the USSR were handled primarily by Oeputy Prime Minister Coard, who was the most ideologically committed and the most pro-Soviet member of the leadership. There is controversy within the Intelligence Community regarding the extent of Soviet control over events in Grenada. The documents give no indication that in3 Coard discussed with Soviet officials the leadership conflicts in the New Jewel Movement. There is general agreement within the Intelligence Ccrrrnunity that such discussions might have taken place; the Defense Intelligence Agency and some analysts in CIA believe that when Coard went to Moscow he informed the Soviets of his plans to challenge Bishop and petitioned the Soviets for advice and support. DIA further believes that Coard was instructed by Moscow to take action to assume leadership. However, no documentary evidence of any kind of collaboration as described above has been found as yet.

o Although the documents provide no evidenceoviet or Cuban request to use air and naval facilities on Grenada, we believe that the Cuban role in building the Point Salines airport indicated an expectation of using it for Cuban purposes, and the USSR probably also planned use of some facilities. The documents indicate that Grenadian officials envisaged the possibility of such use.

0 The captured documents and other sources show that Grenadians had been:

Receiving training in Cuba and the USSR for both domestic and foreign intelligence work.

Conducting military training and political indoctrination of small groups of eastern Caribbean leftists.

Broadcasting Cuban- and Soviet-furnished propaganda over Radio Free Grenada.

Disseminating newsletters to Caribbean journalists and media workers.

Although few references in the captured documents support the judgment, other evidence Indicates that both Havana and Moscow viewed Grenadapringboard for:

Penetrating other countries in the area.

Distribution of propaganda and money to leftists in the region.

Military training of subversive groups.

Captured documents reveal that Grenada had secret military agreements with Cuba, the Soviet Union, North Korea, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. While the Grenadians may have believed these weapons were for their armed forces, we believe that the Soviets and their proxies probably Intended to draw on the stores of weapons on Grenada to supply frjend^^oj^jtries in the region as opportunities or need might arise.

The overall picture presented by the evidence is that by3 the USSR and Cuba had made real progress toward turning Grenadaenter for further subversion of the region. I

DISCUSSION

INTERNAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

1. The primary focus of almost all actors on the Grenadianforeign andon consolidating the power of the New Jewel Movement and strengthening its Marxist-Leninist orientation. Following the NJK's armed overthrow of the government of Eric Gairy onhe new Grenadian leaders, headed by Maurice Bishop quickly set about establishing an institutional base to consolidate their power. In so doing they relied heavily on the Cuban political model in designing their own structures. They looked to Cuban advisers for guidance In constructing mechanisms of control and sought specialized training both at home and abroad for NJM members. The training was sought predominately from Cuba but also, as time passed, from the USSR and other Soviet-aligned countries. Thus, byrenada had:

elf-described Marxist-Leninist political party-complete with Central Comnlttee, Political Bureau, andthe revolutionary elIte.

n army and militia that in size and armament far outstripped those of its island neighbors or of previous Grenadian governments; both institutions helped move Grenada In the directionilitarized society and provided an important vehicle for indoctrinating youth.

An internal security apparatus that dealt harshly with overt regime opponents and was sufficiently pervasive to intimidate potential challenges to the NJM.

A highly developed propaganda machine that relied on the government-monopolized media and party-controlled entities throughout the government bureaucracy to dissiminate the leadership's political message.

An array of mass organizations assigned to rally support for the regime in all sectors of the society. I

The Party

2. The NJMmall but highly influential sector of the Grenadian populace, dedicated toarxist-Leninist society but divided by personal ambitions and conflicting views on how quickly to proceed with this task.* As ofhe NJMotal membershipembers, according to one of the captured documents. Of these, onlyere full party members, whileere candidate membersere applicant members. The party's eight-member Political Bureau aparently was formed some three years before the NJM seized power, but the Central Committee withr

*uller description of the internal dynamics of the NJM appears in annex

embers, was regarded as the Movement's highest authority itln thi.

ecisions were made once tne leadSihTp crlsibeganTo unfold in Subsidiary to the Central CommitteeuS of

a the.Wor,fer5 Committee, then-rOrgrz!uon the rtlnz,and the parish coordinating bodies that were' responsible for building support for the party among key groups at thethatsimpleLn'ted'and to lotn^,I Jhe reg ?e' party cellsroups" were established in workplaces. Amy units, educational institutions, and ministries. aeg^^

3. Reflecting the importance that NJM leaders gave to strenqthenino thP

SSMS'.biH, andesser extent In Eastern Europe. For example, the NJM signed

Cd!baa9ornennrti, PartyCubare ad ans to

Cuba on party business, including nine to be trained in propaqanda-related

o spend aPyeS9It the clbS

Communisto Lopez School. The Cubans also agreed to send eiqht

political SdSStii?fS were se,ectei1 too the USSR for ninp; trV0ctobephat six Grenadians had begun a

Grena*?an? tzn the USSR- The

ranriin^pf jo fleaders were seeking

ie^iJ lSrS<?BSy BuTg5ria* ^shadowing problems that were later to

r0uPasl German party organizers in lr ad?ed ef year of the general disorganization they

dnd tbe ,ac*ogical fervor among Grenadian

nd

The Grenada Revolutionary Armed Forces

5. The NJM set out from the beginning toarge-for the easterntanT? Jhat,wuldi"st any external threat and Prilpon,e" Toparty leadership, '!auricetbe portfolios for the Ministries of

he Grenada omposed of the People's Revolutionary Army sMilitiahe Grenada Police Service *oastPrison Service, Fire Service, and Cadet Corps.r,erid ofwas Commander of the Armed finn lljl] Coim,ander of the Army. By3 the PRA had grown to about whPn rHp zviPT'ded the off icer corps and leadership cadre for the PRM wnen the entire armed force was mobilized.

withRA enj*oyed Cuban ^visory support andfivweekTKinstructiO" of senior officers, which-arne to.POwer- "brigade commanders"

nof intensive training in Cuba inhetSriSlJ fnmtreined, well-equipped, andthat would form the nucleus of the Grenadian Army.

7. According to captured documents, the USSR also provided specialistor/elected high-ranking officers. Amy Chief of Staff Einstein Louisonix-month course in the USSR, and Grenada's two Deputy Ministers of Defense, Liam James and Ewart Layne, attended shorter courses. All three Soviet-Grenadian military agreements called for Grenadian servicemen to be trained In the USSR In the use of the promised Soviet equipment. The treaty signed in2 also stipulated that Soviet specialists would be sent to Grenada, but we cannot confirm that the Soviets ever complied.

roved to be ineffectiveariety of reasons. Budqetary limitationshronic inability to retain trained personnel kept thecadre small and inexperienced. Most Grenadians were unwillingquiredilitary career and many did not agree with the Marxist-Leninist ideology propounded by the NJK. Ultimately, the PRA iffiV leadership crisis, with the majority of the force afignng with Deputy Prime Minister 8ernardfaffaaal

k ineneraI Austin characterized the PRA as an ineffectivee disciP,ine.and training problems. He acknowledged that military norms and standards that would approximate international standards had not been established. Apparently the PRA was mainly engaged in enforcing NJM policy, with the concomitant effect of

hUSce much disliked D*

2?; eclswn toeople's Revolutionary Militia was announced soon after Bishop took power, but the PRM was initially given low priority as the regime concentrated on building the Army. The assassination attempt against Grenadian Government leaders in0 seems to have spurred interest in the militia, however, and its mission began to crystalize:

To assist the Army in defending the country.

To perform neighborhood control duties.

To serveehicle for Inculcating youth with the regime's revolutionary dogma.

orkP'aces. This was followed by weekly two hour sessio. which political education classes were featured prominently. As popul, enthusiasm for the New Jewel Movement began to dwindle, the regime sou. overcome resistance to militia recruitment by making such service a

Reflecting these goals, militia members typically were given two months of Dasic infantry training at army camps or other sites near militia members' Jhis was snowed by weekly two hour sessions in

)pular sought to

f nt hvnn ciirh cartiIra

prerequisite for government employment.

cnm^hl;e"ilh.the Bishop government's priorities, the Cubans were somewhat slow in focusing attention on the militia. The visit to Grenada in April lytic1 by Cuban General Ochoa appears to haveurning point In Cuba Accordih9aptured document, Ochoa was concerned with the prospect of an eventual foreign-based attack on Grenada, and he promised to

sen^ubanofncers to assist in developing the militia.

^reports that about two weeksVenadianselected from units all over the island, were sent to Cuba fortraining,

the recipient of the largest share of support furnished by Havana to radicalhe eastern Caribbean. While Cuba's long-term goals in supporting the NJM have never been spelled out either in public statements or in intelligence reporting, it is safe to assume that, once the immediate goal--the NJM's seizure ofbeen achieved, the Castro regime expected toual role: helping the NJM consolidate its grip on power by assistinq in the replacement of all political, economic, and social institutions with revolutionary institutions subordinate to the NJM leadership; and using revolutionary Grenadateppingstone for the spread of Cuban influence throughout the region as well as in international forums.

16. The main vehicle Cuba used to influence the NJM-both before and after the coup against Eric Gairy--was the party's America Department headed by Manuel Pineiro, the chief architect of Cuban subversion in Latin America. Fidel Castro apparently hadarm personal relationship with Bishop well before the coup and decided that prime responsibility for Cuba's relationship with the NJM should rest with the activist America Department rather than the bureaucratic Foreign Ministry, in addition to Castro's own direct contacts with the NJMBishop-Cuba's liaison with the NJM was conducted mainly by the America Department, whose senior representative in Grenada was Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo.

Cuba's overt caution secure Bishop's control. Arms number of surreptitious means,ide variety of sma Cuba duringhile Bishop then announced his turn inability to attract aid from involvement in Grenadian affai

a flurry of covert activity designed to and advisers were shipped to Grenadaaptured documents show that Grenada secretlyrms, automatic weapons, and ammunition from Bishop was publicly seeking Westernoward Cuba in early April, claiming an other quarters. This began the direct Cuban rs that continued until the US intervention.

documents show that Grenada received the following arms from Cuba inoviet and UShoulder-fired rocketistols and revolvers,mm mortars,um cannon,mm antiaircraft guns,illion rounds of riflealf-million rounds for the machineguns,0 rounds forortar shells, sixirni shells,ounds for the antiaircraft guns. I

influence of

i The key t0 the bur9eon'n9 relationship was the growing Fide) Castro and Ambassador Torres Rizo over Maurice Bishor

said that Cubaassigned individual advisers to the various ministries in Grenada,Bishop routinely conferred with Torres Rizo before making -cartedly added thathad little power and that even the smallest Issues had toat meetings of the full cabinet; even then, decisions usuallymade until subsequent cabinet meetings after Bishop had talkedTorres Rizo. There were, however, no indications in the capturedtne NJM Central Committee and Political Bureau that the Cuban Ambassador

ever present. I

'concluded that Torreslose relationship with

almost certainly knew of the competition between BishopPrime Minister Coard. The scant intelligence available tosuggests Castro may well have been unaware of the degree tohad lost support within the leadership and of Coard faction'sfor dominance. The killing of Bishop was clearly unforeseen According to

failed to detect what was going on Decause ot "ishop, believing him to be firmly in power.

22. This Judgment is supported by observable Cuban behavior during the

crisis which was sparked by the NJM Central Committee meeting onctober.

According to captured documents, the Central Committee decided to Inform Cuba

and the USSR of Bishop's arrest, and the Ambassadors of the two countries were

apparently in contact with the Central Committee the sane day. opy of a

letter sent by Fidel Castro to the NJM Central Committee onctober shows

he time of the Amerlean Intervent ion. Cuban advisers had been assignedumber of ministries.

that Havana promised not to intervene in what it described as an internal matter.

The Scope of Cuban Economic Assistance

24. Cuban economic-technical assistance to Grenada was concentrated in the fields of public health, fisheries, education, construction, sports, and transportation/communications. The first assistance to materializeeam of medical personnel who arrived on9ne-year tour. This medical mission remained in Grenada until repatriated in Its size fluctuated modestly, but it usually consisted ofozen doctors, dentists, and medical technicians. ew were based on Carriacou. the only Cubans In Grenada not stationed on the main island.

25. mall Cuban fisheries advisory team was sent to Grenada inut, LfsfsfsfsfsfHLHLaa^kliaaaaaaaaal

team of seven advisers was quickly reduced to five by sickness; the first fishing boat donated by Cuba was temporarily lost by careless Grenadian students; and the Grenadians in the program sufferedack of motivation, preferring to prolong their training in order to continue to get free meals. Although several additional boats were delivered, the program appears to have had little economic impact.

assistance consisted ofuban literacy experttranslator to Grenada and accepting Grenadian students in Cuban schools. As

ofor example,renadians were enrolled in Cubanstudying agriculture, dentistry, medicine, andotal ofy October

social and cultural differences as wellack of qualifed Grenadian candidates caused problems in taking advantage of the Cuban scholarships that offered. |

reached an agreement with Grenada in9 to build ain the Point Salines area of southern Grenada and before the montha pilot team ofuban construction workers had arrived to begin The following March, the Cuban merchant ship Playa Larga arrivedwith heavy construction equipmentontingentand by0 the total involved in building the The total wast the time of the US action

inhen the airport was nearing completion.

aid in the field of communications focused on upgradingbroadcasting facilities. Havanakilowatt transmitterexpand Radio Free Grenada's range (it had been using only abuilt the edifice to house it, and putewantenna. Cuba also provided continuing technical assistance and

raining for Radian radio and television

forms of Cuban support included sports instructors (theof two arr ved inix-man technical team that stayed

ir conditioning equipment in St. Georgesew agricultural experts,mall groupozen or so involvedariety

CiaI Cuba" roster-by Castro on 8onstruction workers;edical personnel;ducation workers; six agricultural specialists; six advisers from the transportation sector (this probably included the two Cuban pilotswin-engine executive aircraft that Castro gaveive fishinq advisers; three basic industries experts; three cultural affairs personnel: three commercial advisers; one sports official; one adviser from Cuba's Central Planning Board; one communications technician; and six people from the State Committee for Economic Cooperation who apparently provided the overall management for the Cuban civilian assistance program In Grenada. |

Military Assistance

first few Cuban military advisers arrived in Grenada in Aprilafter Prime Minister Bishop asked for assistance. The numberspersonnel apparently increased later that year. CapturedreferMilitaryhich was created by latelater, apparently in either1 orecret military protocol. The agreement establishes the

size of the mission. Military Unit Numbertilitary personnel, with others assigneduarterly basis for speciallaimed thatuban military personnel were on Grenada onut the available documentsange ofoersonnel on currently irreconcilableg

The mission of the group was to provide training and assistance to the various branches of the PRA and PRM. The Cuban advisers would travel to the various PRA and militia camps to provide the training with the assistance of translators. The mi 1itary miss Ion was also Involved in processing the training requests and arms that the Grenadians were to receive In accordance with the Soviet-Grenadian treaties,aaaaaaaaaaaaaaal

There wasmall group of seven to nine Cuban Ministry of interior personnel assigned to Grenada. These Individuals were advising various branches of the internal security aparatus. We know of no agreement or protocol establishing their responsibilities.

The Cuban role in defending Grenada is still being examined. Thus far, we have not been able to confirm that Cubans were active in defending other

than their own positions or in coordinating Grenadian defenses, nor does it appear that the Cuban military mission was under the direct tactical control of Havana or the Cuban embassy,

Pedro Tortolo Comas commanded the military missionhen he was replaced by Colonel Rafael Mendes Rodrigues.

THE SOVIET ROLE

The Nature of the Relationship

Soviet Union seemed to value the New Jewel regime in Grenada asof declining US power and expanding Marxist influence In Intelligence reports show that Moscow began to useit

has other toeholds In the Thirdspreading Communistpropaganda and the distribution of money to leftist groups In We believe that the island's location could have madethere of future value to the USSR, and it might also havefor Intelligence gathering and for training andin the region. However, the Soviets appeared wary ofinvolved with Bishop's regime, probably because of doubts aboutand dedication to Communism as well as concern about potential The overall picture presented by captured documents andis that by3 the USSR had hardly begun to

the Cubans covertly rushed to help Bishop after thearchthemust have known what the Cubans were doing,ole inslowly. Moscow did notnd did notesident embassyuntil This arm's-length treatment might haveto mask the military relationship that developedutmore likely to Indicate that the Soviets were content to let Cuba have

the Ifjcingrenada, at leastB|fB|fBifBi

documents include extensive materials on the history,and other aspects of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) thatto Grenadians. It seems to be shelf material, prepared In English for

general distribution to Third World countries without special adaptations for local conditions. Some of this material apparently was brought home by S ,an tlUdentl nded Soviet party schools. Grenada was unable to send moreandful of students becausehortage of skilled people at home. The CPSU was advocating improved organization of the New Jewel Movement, tighter discipline, more effective ideological work. *nH qeneral improvement in the Movement's grip on the island. IL'aTaTaTflLli

39. Moscow tried to influence other eastern Caribbean countries from Grenada by providing equipment and advice for Radio Free Grenada to make propaganda broadcasts. I

the Sovietsfj/Qna^

,fall of Bishop, is not reflected in available documents.

4U. Both the documents and open sources show that Grenadian contacts with the USSR were handled primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, who was the most Ideologically committed and pro-Soviet member of the leadership. Bishop, Army Commander Hudson Austin, and lesser officials were also involved, but Bishop in particular had closer contacts with Cuba. The first major aid-seeking mission to Moscow of which we have any record was led by Coard in May^nd^une^ytiO. He returned on other visits,isit in

41. _

late3 that Coard was Soviet Ambassador Sazhenev's man and that he constantly advocated Soviet interests in his dealings with other Grenadian leaders. eport based on early document exploitation indicatedoviet codebook and other cryptographic material had been found In Coard's briefcase. This suggestionpecial link to Moscow cannot be confirmed because confusion in document collection makes it unclear whether the material DeiwigedtolCoard or whether the codebook indeed was of Soviet origin.

Ac. According to the documents, Coard visited the USSR in3 after the CPSU Central Committee agreed to receive five members of the Grenadian leadership "for rest andnd Grenadian leaders named Coard, his wife, and three children. Clandestine reporting provides the folli itifGrnatior

43. There Is controversy within the Intelligence Community regarding the extent of Soviet control over events in Grenada.* The documents give no indication that in3 Coard discussed with Soviet officials the leadership conflicts in the New Jewel Movement. There is general agreement within the Intelligence Community that such discussions might_have taken place; the Defense Intelligence Agency oel that when Coard went to Moscow he informed the Soviets of his plans to challenge Bishop and petitioned the Soviets for advice and support. urther believes that Coard was instructed by Moscow to take action to assume leadership. OIA bases this judgment on its understanding of Soviet behavior in political crises in other Tnird World countries (such as Egyptfghanistannd South Yemen8. However, no documentary evidenc^ofany kind of collaboration as described above has been yet. |

Economic Assistance

documents do not add substantially to what we already kneweconomic relationship. As elsewhere in the Third World, Moscow emergeslessenerous benefactor. The first knownof importance came from Coard's May and0 visit. 1 million worth of agricultural equipmentift. also agreedyear line of credit on terms thatin2 down from an unknown interest rate to

4 percent. Moscow provided aid piecemeal, drove hard commercial bargains, paid low prices for Grenada's basic export, nutmeg, and made few outright gifts. When Grenada asked3 that delivery of truck spare parts be speeded up, for instance, the Soviets rebuffed it by saying the pertinent contract had required that bank guarantees be madewUhlnays of the contract'sthey obviously had not been. |

The Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan)ooperation agreement to the Grenadian Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Trade that apparently was Intended to provide education and instruction on how toocialist economy. raft of the agreement is among the captured documents. We knowumber of visits were exchanged, andconomic officials visited Grenada in order to deliver lectures |

Grenada clearly had great hopes of extensive Soviet economic aid. aptured paper on preparations for Bishop's2 visit to Moscow lists numerous projects for which help was to be sought. The Soviets responded, however, with only limited promises of definite aid and more expansive commitments to study proposals. As the Grenadian economy declined, St. Georges turned Increasingly to Moscow for economic relief. Oocuments indicate that as earlyrenada, beset by "severe budetarysked tne USSR to assume responsibility for feeding, clothing, and fueling the Grenadian armed forces, which the Soviets were already arming. When the

"The examination of additionalthose from Coard'sthrow more light on this issue.

Grenadian Chief of Staff asked

salaries and generally was

t. Georges was falIing in dire financial condition.

Personal notes and other materials among the captured documents show that there was little if any expectation in Grenada by the summer3 of being bailed out financially by the USSR, while not prepared to underwrite the Grenadian economy, the Soviets did deal with the country on economic terms somewhat softer than those usually accorded Third World countries.

Assistance

48. The documents include previously secret agreements with the USSR to provide military aid to Grenada. The Soviets provided the aid free of charqe as they do for Cuba. It is unclear whether the weapons were merely transshipped through Cuba, or were Soviet-supplied Cuban weapons that had been replaced by more modern itemsart of the upgrading of the Cuban armed forces under way in recent years. |

49:

witnrogram to train six Grenadians in the USSR shortly after diplomatic relations were established, but Moscow initially counted on Havana to provide both arms and basic military training to Grenada. Coard's publicly reported trip to the USSR and Eastern Europe in May and0 to seek economic aid is shown by the documents to haveecret search for military aid. His talks then presumably helped lay the groundwork for the signing in Havana on0ecret agreement for the USSR toillion5 million) worth of military equipment. This

'.he

agreement established the pattern1 protocol addingillion5 mill ion) worth of military equipment to first agreement72 agreement forillion rubles'

illion) worth.

50. To hide Moscow's connection, the agreements provided for the USSRdeliveries to Cuba, which would arrange onward transportation. greements provided for Soviet military training of Grenadians inand2 agreement mentioned the sending of Soviet specialistsisland-by which time the Soviet involvement with Grenada wasopen. There is no mention In the documents of establishing amission there.

51. In addition to military training, the USSR also provided intelligence and security trainingandful of Grenadians. As already noted (seeetter from Army Commander Austin on2 to then KGB Chairman, Andropov asked Austin's "dear comrade" to train three Grenadians for one year in counterintelligence and one In intelligence. ource of undetermined reliability said that, as earlyrenada had arranged for six policemen to be trained in "secret operations" by the Soviets, and?0oie?ed.Gren.adian off^ials said the five3 in the USSR for overseas intelligence

52. There is no indication in the agreement that the USSR had requested military use of facilities on Grenada. During Bishop's2 visit the Soviets agreed toreliminary survey to establish the suitability of brenvllleeepwater port. This agreement prompted rumors that Moscow intended toaval base there, but we have nothing to substantiate them. In fact, the survey seems to have caused the USSR to drop the port development idea becauseong reef and other geologic problems but a

captured document shows that thepossibmty ofeaport project" was still under discussion in LYflLYAiV^H

documents on the Point Salines airport show that the USSRrole In its construction, although Grenada sought financial assistanceSoviets. When Grenada was running out of money and worried about being

able to finish the airport. Bishop turned to Libya to plead forillion. His3 letter to Libya leader Qadhafi said Libya Is "the last remaining hope for providingthenecessary finance to complete the international

officials envisaged the possibility of both Soviet anduse of Point Salines. In1 the then MinisterSelwyn Strachan, announcedorker's Party ofthat the airport would be used by Cuba to transport Its forcesand by the Soviets for military purposes. An agenda itemew

Jewel Movement meeting on3 said "the airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military." ovement member who had received CPSU training in Moscow wrote In his personal notebook, apparently Inhat rumors were being spread that "the Party wanted Bishop to sign for the Airport toilitary Base and We did do

OTHER EXTERNAL ACTORS

Ihe East Europeans

Germany was the most heavily involved of the Europeanseveral kinds of aid and assistance to Grenada. Thethat East Germans were active in party, trade union, andtheast Germans on the island onctober, sixin agricultural assistance under the auspices of youth and East 8erlin also provided agricultural vehicles as wellfor security forces--uniforms, bedding, knapsacks, andhave supplied other equipment. Including gas masks. In addition.was involved in upgrading the island's telephone system; two offour East Germans in Grenada at the time of the invasionin this effort.

36. Bulgariaource of ideological and party trainingmall number ofof it provided in Bulgaria rather than inwas beginning to be involved in developing Grenadian animal husbandry. We do not know the activities of the three Bulgarians who were on the island onctober. Most Bulgarians who visited Grenada were agricultural and construction experts, although at least one was involved In propaganda work. "

Czechoslovakia servedupplier of small arms-rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition. Prague also was engaged in supporting hoq raisingrenada, and offered scholarships to eight Grenadians in science and construction.

Ihe available documents do not indicate the terms of the assistance provided to Grenada by the East Europeans. It is unlikely that any great portion of the aid was free. Put much of the payment may have been by barter for bananas and nutmeg.

The Asians

At the time of the intervention. North Korea had notignificant presence in Grenada. However, P'yongyang's approach to St.Georges was consistent with Its recent policy initiatives in Latintake advantage of emerging leftist governments to expand Its recognition and influence at the expense of Seoul. North Korea has vigorously courted Nicaragua, Guyana, Surlname, and former Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica to these ends. The available documents provide no evidence that P'yongyang was acting on behalf of either Moscow or Boijing; Instead North Korea appears to have been pursuing its own goals. Hi

Inorth Korea was about to undertake major economic and military assistance projects. On the economic side, P'yongyanq had volunteered to helpseatruit-processIng factory,

two fishing boats, and an irrigation systemive-year development program publicly announced during Prire Minister Bishop's trip to P'yongyang in Under the terms of this agreement. North Korea was to provide technical advisers and some construction materials and equipment, while Grenada would provide the bulk of the labor and materials and pay the expenses of the technicians. Theorth Koreans on the island onctober were probably conducting initial surveys on these economic projects.

More Important, Grenadian documents confirm that Bishopecret military assistance agreement during the same visit to P'yongyang. North Korea had promised to supply, at no charge, sufficient small arms, aitmunltlon, and equipment toorce ofen. This equipment, listed In the documentalueillion, was toifles,achine-guns, two coast guard patrolniforms, large amounts of ammunition, and miscellaneous other gear. eliable source reports that an elite Grenadian force was to be trained by the North Koreans, but there is no confirmation in the available documents. iJ^BBJBjmjg

we believe that the military agreement had not yet been Implemented. From Hudson Austin's report of his3 visit to P'yongyang, it appears that the North Koreans were delaying their participation, perhaps out of concern for increased US attention and surveillance. North Koreanii*ietnam-war vintage have been recovered from Grenada; we are as yet unable to determine whether these weapons were used in Southeast Asia or came directly from North Korean stocks.

63. Accordingrenadian document datedrenadian and Vietnamese representatives met in Vietnam and agreed that the Vietnamese would provide Grenadians training in weapons, tactics, chemical warfare, propaganda, and engineering. The Grenadian delegation later asked the Soviets in Moscow to provideirline ticketsne year period to transport trainees to Vietnam. Other documents indicate that the Grenadians encountered problems arranging transportation for the trainees. Among the Grenadian documents we examined were Vietnamese aircraft recognition manual6 and several inches of pictures portraying Ho Chi Minn extolling his people durlnq the Vietnam war.

The Middle East

As the Grenadian economyunravel9he Bishop regime turned to several Arab states for assistance. Captured documents show Algeria, Iraq, and Syriaaillion grant toward the completion of the Point Salines airport. Bishop also found Libya toertile ground for economicpatrons courted Grenadian favor for their own interests.

He believe Libya saw Grenadaotential transit point for arms shipments to Latin America* anaonvenient but little-used base for recruiting and funding regional radicals for paramilitary training in Libya and for Libyan representatives to spread Qadhafi's social and political

ph losophies. After Bishop's visit to Tripoliibya established jo nt ventures in agriculture and fisheries. ripoli financed three British-built coastal patrol boats for Grenada and agreed to loans of aboutillion to help defray the costs of constructinq the Point Salines airport.

eople's Bureau (embassy) in St. Georges In earlySishop's third visit to Tripoli, Inesultedurther

illion loan toward airport construction. Although there is documentary evidence to suggest Grenadian irritation with the slow disbursement of Libyan funds aptured document shows Bishop again requested financial aid-Si)before his death. I

was under the Influence of more radical domestic elementstime of its initial aid commitment to Grenada. To maintainin Caribbean affairs, its standing In the Nonaligned Movement,the dwindling but still-vocal radical element In hisBendjedid released the second half of theillion stipulatedGrenada4 and granted an additional S4 million in petroleumaid. Algeria has periodically provided buses, trucks and spare

Inibyan merchant shipSt. Georges and

transferred unidentified cargo to smallerthe harbor. This closely

followed the incident in which Libyanbound forbeen grounded in Brazil.

parts and to help support the airport project small amounts of wine fertilizer, clothing, and commerical products for Grenada to sell.l

Iraq responded to Bishop's pleas for assistance in order to build support for hosting the Honaligned Movement summit scheduled for Baghdad Inaghdad's ambitions faded as the war with Iran grew hotter; Baghdad subsequently terminated its assistance to Grenada. |

Syria's bitter rivalry with Iraq probably fueled its initialrenada. At any rate, Syrian assistance to St. George's ended

MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

Captured documents reveal that Grenada had secret military assistance agreements with at least five countries: Cuba, the Soviet Union and North Korea had set up major programs; East Germany and Czechoslovakia had provided small amounts of equipment. As previously mentioned, Cubaizable amount of small arms and other equipment to Grenada immediately following the NJM assumption of power ini^ij

We believe the large numbers of weapons seized In Grenada were intended primarily for use by Grenadians in their ownin anticipation of

an Invasion by counterrevolutionary pro-Gairy forces, later in reaction to US Navy exercises in the Caribbean, The NJM planned an expansion of its People's Revolutionary Armed Forcesegular and militia personnel in response to its perception of the external threat. The Grenadians and their suppliers also were aware that If the Island was attacked, there would be few If any opportunities for resupply. While the Grenadians may have believed all of these weapons were for their armed forces, we believe that the Soviets and their proxies probably intended to draw on the stores of weapons on Grenada to supplyries in the region as opportunities or need might

As of3 moreons of military and military relatedat leastehicles and pieces of construction equipment-had been confiscated in Grenada, The overwhelming majority of the weapons were of Soviet or East European origin, with minor amounts from the United States, the United Kingdom, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. The largest single concentration of weapons was at Frequente, which probably was the "central store room" referred to In many documents. There were six warehouses at that site: one each for arms and ammunition and four dedicated to quartermaster items, spare parts, and vehicles. Military arms have also been recovered from the Cuban construction camp, Fort Rupert, Fort Frederick, Richmond Hill, and many smaller caches. The lack of proper documentation by US personnel makes the exact location of weaponry at the- tiaie of its capture difficult if not impossible to determine.

It appears that most of these weapons were under direct Grenadian Army control. Documents reviewed to date confirm that the "central store room" was the primary control point for arms, ammunition, quartermaster Items, and some explosives. From this point, Grenadians controlled the distribution of

equipment to mi 1itary regions, camps, individuals, internalew Cubans. The military regions also controlled the further issue of weapons to the subordinate units and individuals.

74. It should be noted that it is standard military practice to have large stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. We believe that some of the weapons from the stockpile in Grenada, however, could be shipped to other countries in the region, but there is no known documentary support of this.

GRENADAASE FOR SUBVERSION

Political Activities

75. There is no question that both Havana and Moscow viewed Grenadapringboard for penetrating other countries In the area. At the time of the US intervention, however, little had been accomplished. Bishop understood and accepted the concept of revolutionary Internationalism and the need to carry the fight to areas beyond national borders. In lauding the changes of government in Dominica and St.ew months after his own coup in Grenada, heuban news magazine in9 "we think our revolution contributes to the acceleration of the process of decolonization in our area, where there are still enclaves under British, French,the case of Puertodomination, and that our revolution is part, together with the Sandinista triumph In Nicaragua, of the revolutionary advances in Latin America. The revolution in Grenada is ready to offer all the solidarity that is required by the peoplethat struggle for their national liberation and against imperialism.

7b. 3 "Cooperation and Exchange Plan between the Communist Party of Cuba and the New Jewel Movement ofof the documents seized following the UScalls for Cuban-Grenadian cooperation in support of foreign revolutionaries as well as against US interests. The plan states: "The Cuban Communist Party and the New Jewel Movement of Grenada will exchange information of mutual interest, both in the field of development of the two revolutions and their experiences, as well as on the International situation and, fundamentally, that of the Caribbean In its struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism, racism, and Zionism. Likewise, they will exchange information on the liberation movements as well as coordinate actions and positions of mutual interest to be adopted at events, conferences, and other party activities of an International character, with special emphasis on tie problems In the Caribbean."

77. 3 work plan for the NJM's Propaganda Department, also captured by US forces, listed as one of its objectives to "deepen the internationalist spirit and socialist consciousness of the Grenadian masses." In dealing with international Issues, the work plan called for the local media to "highlight activities of progressive and revolutionary parties in thedentify and promote all the revolutionary heroes of theexplain the birth and growth of progressive parties of the region" as well as to focus on "burningpeace, US aggression" and on the "history of Socialist

78. The bilateral cooperation plan's call for solidarity with the 'International Revolutionary Movement" presumably resulted in the meetinq of Caribbean leftist and Communist parties that, according to seized documents was held in Grenada in Although no details are available on the discussions or results of the meeting, the following groups were listed as having attended: the Communist Party of Martinique, the Dominica Liberation Movement, the United People's Movement of St. Vincent, the Barbados Movement for National Liberation, the People's Popular Movement of Trinidad and Tobago, theh Movement of Trinidad and Tobago, the Jamaican Worker's Party, the Working People's Alliance of Guyana, the People's Progressive Party (Communist) of Guyana, and the Worker's Revo 1utionary Movement of St. Lucia.

d?,CT^meeting, held in August, that was attended by the NJM, theh Movement of Trinidad and Tobago, and

other unspecified participants. Cuba's contact with such groups throughin Grenada dates back at '

A former member of the Grenadian Government's international relations committee told US officials during his interrogation that Grenada's foreign policy was coordinated with Soviet front organizations and that most of the program support he sought from abroad was arranged through contacts with the World Peace Council and the US-Grenadian Friendship Society. emorandum from the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow in2 stated that the World Peace Council expected its Grenadian affiliate to take the lead in mobilizing peace groups throughout the eastern Caribbean. Toward that end the Grenadian Minister Counselor in Moscow recommended that Grenadaeeting of Caribbean Peace Movements in The NJM's range of contacts with Soviet-aligned groups Is reflectedrenadian Army officers notebook that contains addresses for such groups as Friendship House in Moscow, East Germany's Solidarity Committee, the KoreanSolidarity, and the Conmunist Party of Colombia.

The captured documents showsecret regional caucus" of -progressive parties" met in Managua in3 to discuss how to influence the Socialist International (SI). The attendees were SI representatives from the Salvadoran National Revolutionary Movement (which belongs to the political arm of the guerrillahe Jamaican People's National Party, Grenada's NJM, and the Radical Party of Chile. Also present were representatives of the Cuban Communist Party and the Sandinistas organization in Nicaragua, neither of which is an SI member. The presence of non-Si members at this caucus was particularly embarrassing to West European

parties, accordingGuyana's Working

People's Alliance and St. Luc ia'sT'rogres^iTe^Labori'arT^iad recently gained observer status in the SI, and the NJM was asslqned as the caucus liaison to them. '

teener.

Activities

tavail able to date indicates that the thrusty Grenada focused on developlno aintelligence service.

viewed by NJM leadersikely center for US espionaqe activltv andivlf he enad! ansto In Ho

one of these advisers oversaw the intelliopnrp coverage of students at the US medical school. The school had loVgbeen

Military Activities

revolutionary forces in the region is particularly evident in the Suriname. At Cuba's behest, Grenadian internal security chief Li several trips to Suriname beginning2 to advise Daysi 8oute

Surinamese officials on security matters.

f0rtS..totandem with Grenada to strengthen

am James made erse and other

case of

the People's Revolutionary Army, described |as an ineffective combat force with severe training problems.

n9ne New Jewel Movement provided trainingew members of leftist groups in the English-speaking Caribbean. The traininq was

Tlieollp t0 receive training consisted of someollowersOdium, the then Deputy Prime Minister of St. Luciaember ofLabor aa*aaaaammmmmmaaammmmmm^

Propaganda

and Moscow also saw Grenadaey site for disseminationin the region. They both participated in the upgrading ofGrenada, and Havana provided scholarships in Cuban institutions forwho were to operate and maintain the new station, whichon Presumably to support Radio FreeHavana Inaugurated Prensa Latina press transmissions in Englisheastern Caribbean. For news costs and for broadcasts in the fieldsthe sciences, and music and other cultural activities, the CubanTelevision Institute provided Radio Free Grenada with programing as part

ooperation and exchange agreement signed In In0 officials of the Grenadian Ministry of Information reportedly wereheir efforts to have journalists in other Caribbean countries publish locally various articles supplied by Radio Freelear indication that the station's broadcasts were expected to have an impact far beyondwn territory. Tbe extent of Cuban support for Radio Free Grenada suggests that Havana, in addition to using the station to consolidate Bishop's revolution looked upon ituban propaganda surrogate In the eastern Caribbean helping to counter powerful other international broadcastersished broadcasting stations in the region over the past decade.

Captured documents indicate that the Soviet-front International Organization of Journalists was planning to use Grenada as an important regional propaganda dissemination point. At an IOJ meeting in Angola in January andhe IOJ agreed to give Bishop's information chief, Don0 to set up an IOJ Caribbean regional office in St. George's byith an additional stipend0 per month to subsidize the expenses of running the office. Rojas was also promised three four-year scholarships In journalism beginning in3 at the University of Bucharest, Rumania; three five-year journalism scholarships beginning in3 at the University of Moscow; and one or two placeswo-month course for senior journalists of developing countries In East Germany beginning inaj

Once established, the IOJ regional office was toonthly newsletter for and about Caribbean journalists and media workers. In July, Rojas, acting as IOJ regional secretary, was to tour Jamaica, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, Barbados, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago, and Surlname, speaking on the IOJ and its history, principles, achievements, and objectives. The IOJ was to cover all expenses for the tour. In August, the IOJ regional office was towo-week course in Grenada on the principles and practices of "democratic journalism." In September, similar one-week courses were to be conducted in Suriname and St. Vincent. The IOJ regional office was also to prepare monthly monitoring and analysis reports on the Caribbean media and send them to the IOJ Secretariat General in Prague for

inclusion In Its world press computer databank, and to the IOJ Commission for Studies and Documentation in Moscow.mfi

89. Beginning in August, the office was to solicit articles from "progressive" journalists throughout the region for publication In the lOJ's monthly journal, Democratic Journalist. The office was to begin preparations in December for the holding of the Second Conference of Caribbean Journalists and for Operationeam of West European journalists chosen by the IOJ to write stories on Grenada. Both the conference and Operation Truth were to coincide with the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Bishop coup In On his way to Angola, according to the captured documents, Rojas stopped in Cuba to meet with officials of Cuba's Casa de lasajor source of Cubancoordinated plansuture conference ofor the receipt of Cuban propaganda materials In Grenada.

ANNEX A

Internal Dynamics of the New Jewel Movement Background to the Leadership Struggle

The factors that led to the disintegration of the New Jewel Movement are rooted in the history of the party and especially in the interplay between its two major leaders, Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard. The rivalry between the two men preceded the movement's rise to power, and, while this dynamic had long been evident, the extent of their differences over policy questions, the intensity of Coard's personal ambitions, and the painstaking efforts he had taken to develop an independent powerparty within aonly beginning to be fully understood in retrospect. |

The origins of the New Jewel Movement are embedded in the personal histories and ideological formationmall group of young, mainly middle-class Grenadians politicized by foreign study during the turbulent. Bishop and his childhood friend, Kenrick Radix, returned to Grenada0 after obtaining their law degrees in the United Kingdom. Together they founded the Movement for Assemblies to the People2 to try to rally popular support against the entrenched and increasingly heavyhanded regime of Eric Gairy In March of the following year their party aligned with Unison Whiteman's Joint Endeavor for welfare. Education, and Liberation (JEWEL) to form the New Jewel Movement, and the movement quickly began toargely youth-and-labor based constituency.

Meanwhile, the avowedly Marxist-Leninist Bernard Coard had mobilized his own political following, organized around the shadowy Organization for Revolutionary Education and Liberation (OREL). Although he and Bishopoose allianceREL apparently did not formally merge with the New Jewel Movement until By thenby the Gairy regime's killing of his father, contemptuous of the democratic processesult of being fraudulently deprived of electoral victorynd already havingersonal relationship with Fidelincreasingly amenable to radical solutions. |

After the New Jewel Movement took over, Coardommitted Leninist recognized the importance of controlling the party machinery and worked

t0 use ICl* Through his connection with OREL he had already done important spadework by contributing to the ideological formation of young Grenadian militants. Building on the OREL experience, Coard took advantage of his role as party theoretician to continue to provide Ideological instruction to party members and to Army personnel.ost as head of the party's Organizing Committee, where he served untilave him responsibility for party organization and enabled mm to assign loyalists to strategic positions throughout the party, mass organizations, and government ministries.

most important group upon whom Coard had an impactliqueofficers who had assumed senior positions In the Army. including most notably Liam James, Ewart Layne, and Leon

all of whom became Central Committeeere to play kev roles In the leadership crisis from3 onward; first by calling for Bishop to share power with Coard then by putting Bishop under house arrest when he reneged on

!?Leadership agreement, and finally by assuming effective control after Bishop was assassinated. The captured documents make emphatically clear that these three men, each in his late twenties, shared Coard's preference for orthodox Communism, his determination to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, and his desire to accelerate the pace of the revolution. horoughly unsavory and hardbitten group, the three had well-earned reputations for using violence against opponents and all have been accused of personally participating in the torture of detainees.

a J extent to which the Army radicals were subordinate to Coard as opposed to merely ideological soulmates with similar goals remains uncertain. Many of the officers were from humble backgroundseep sense of class hatred and resentment of elitist privilege characterized their world view. Consequently, some officers-especially among the second echelon-were as critical of Coard for his bourgeois lifestyle as of Bishop. Direct evidence regarding communicat ions between the Army radicals and Coard durlnq the leadership crisis remains an Important gap in our Information base. Thi weight of available information now, however, points compellinglyonclusion that by mid-July the Army radicals and Coard hadymbiotic relationship and that this alliance held firm through the arrival of US troops. The fact that US forces found Coard and LI am James hiding out together after the invasion reinforces this

The Power Struggle Intensifies

disillusionment with Bishop's leadership led him to resignparty's Central Committee and Political Bureau in Septemberuthis ambitions in check until last summer. Bishop's trip to thein3 appears to haveatalytic effect on Coard. have reported that the decision to go to Washingtonwithin the party, and Coard took pains publicly to condemnStates on the day that Bishop returned. There is no indication indocuments reviewed so far that Coard was concerned that Bishop's

visit reflected an intention to moderate his policies in order to appease Washington. Instead, Coard seemed to fear that the trip and Bishop's

In the party. I

1 Coard was particularlyan james wassa^ohivehg^Ljw..by Bishop'shjndlinqtrip. Coard may have begun to fear that his

support in tne orncer corps was beginning to slip.

after Bishop returned from the United States, Castroword to the Grenadian leadership that he planned to attendof the airfield at Point Salines in Coardthisajor opportunity for Bishop to bolsterprestige and enhance his domestic appeal. At this pointmay have boiled over as hean whom he viewed asand relatively untutored in Marxist-Leninist doctrineprosper. Meanwhile his own ambitions must have been fed by his wife.

Phyllis,entral Committee member and an outspoken Bishop critic. amaican by birth, she announced soon after the New Jewel Movement took power that she had not "come to Grenada toeputy Prime Minister's wife."

of the Central Committee Plenary in3eceptive audience in the group for more radical solutions. one. Central Committee members expressed their concern thatritical stageesult of growing opposition from aboardat home. Especially noteworthy was the widespread convictionleaders that the revolution had not taken root, as reflectedin the lack of public support for the mass organizations and There were also indications that the majority of Centralhad come to believe thatleast by himself-was not thecarry the revolution forward. |

was becoming increasingly clear that Bishop, ever confident ofto the Grenadian people and his international stature, hadattention to the Inner workings of the party. Heosition of embodying the Grenadian revolution for most ofthe island who continued to sympathize with the New Jewel Movement, butsame timewindling base of support within the upper echelon

party. |

The Leadership Proposal

At an emergency session of the Central Committee onecision was made for the entire Central Committee to hold an extraordinary meeting in mid-September. Stating that the party was beginning to disintegrate, Liam James reaffirmed the need to strengthen internal party discipline "along Leninist lines* and urged an intensification of efforts to indoctrinate and mobilize the masses. To ensure full participation by Army hardliners, Leon Cornwall returned from his post in Cuba for this meeting and Ewart Layne cut short his military training course in the USSR. When the Central Committee convened oneptember, James stated that the fundamental problem was Bishop's leadership. Arguing that organization and discipline, ideological clarity, and brillance in tactics were needed to push the revolution forward, heodel of joint leadership in which Bishop would remain Prime Minister and Commander in Chief but Coard would become the de facto party chief. Only longtime Bishop loyalist George Louison spoke against the proposal, and the voteoith three abstentions including Bishop and Army Commander Hudson Austin.

Oneeting of full party members was held to vote on the joint leadership proposal, and, when 8ishop did not showelegation was sent to request his presence. The full membership also voted nearly unanimously to accept the proposal andfflHHHHBHHHHHHHHBHBishop

announced after prolonged debate his readiness to implement the decision. He and Coard embraced and the following day Bishop leftrip to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba from which he did not returnctober. After Bishop's depature, Coard apparently began to play an increasingly assertive behind-the-scenes role.

. "; lJe trip* Bishop-encouraged by George Lous ion-decidedwould not accept the joint leadership concept, and Louison arguedCentral Committee decisionalk to party members in Hungary. Wordreversal filtered back to Grenada, and the Centraldecided to signal its displeasure by ensuring that Bishopformal reception upon arrival in Greanda.

long tne captured documentsetter dated3 from .astro fcTthe Central committee of the NJM in which the Cuban leader denies that Bishopingle word" or "made the slightest allusion" to problems within the party during his tri

ctober the power struggle was threatening to spill over into To put Coard on the defensive. Bishop had spread the story that

Coard and his wife had ordered his assassination. Individual militia units loyal to Bishop began to mobilize and demand weapons to defend the Prime Minister. Within the Army, Chief of Staff Einstein Louison was seeking to rally support for Bishop. By that point Army Commander Hudson Austin, whose ties to Bishop dated to their youth in the town of St. Paul, had succumbed to pressure from Army radicals and had been successfullydevelopment that reportedly deeply affected Bishop's morale. In addition, employees in at least one government ministry werehutdown, and labor leaders loyal to Bishop spoke of going on strike.

Bishop's House Arrest

The Central Committee met onctober to confront Bishop. After discussing the escalating turmoil on the island and Bishop's failure to abide by the rules of democratic centralism, he was informed of the decision to place him under "indefinite" house arrest. James stated that the situation demands "Bolshevikdding that "Communists without belly better hop the next plane." Echoing James, Ewart Layne insisted thatinimum Bishop be expelled from the party and dismissed from every state position. The Central Committee decided to inform Cuba and the Soviet Union of Bishop's arrest, and the ambassadors of the two countries were apparently contacted the same day.

In the wake of Bishop'sump Central Committee continued to function and apparently remained the chief decisionmaking body. Onctober, Coard is reported to have stated that he was receiving assistance from the head of the militia in disarming that situation. The next day Coard

loyalists sought to rally popular support but to little avail. When Minister of National Mobilization Strachan announced that Coard was the new Prime Minister he was apparently shouted down by the crowd, and his attempts to appeal to workers also fell on deaf ears. aptured National Mobilization Ministry document indicates that local party organizers informed the Ministry soon after Bishop's arrest of strong grassroots sentiment against Coard.

the period between Bishop's house arrest onctoberdeathell as earlier In theappearsbeen slow in anticipating developments and ineffectual In influencing esire not to antagonize the Cubans, coupled withlack of popular support for the Coard-radlcal Army coalition,for the new regime's last effortompromise with Bishop. OnJames and Layneelegation to offer athat would have enabled Bishop to remain as Prime Ministerfor publicly admitting responsibility for the crisis. Bishop is said

to have promised his answer the following morning. jJjVJJpjJj

have found little information to add at this point to pressthe killing of Bishop. Our reporting confirms that, when Bishop and a

crowdew thousand Grenadians marched to Fort Rupert, the ruap Central Committee, including Coard and the Army radicals, were at Fort Frederick and that it was this group that issued the orders to kill him. That thererowing sense of vlndictiveness toward Bishop among the ruling group by the time he was placed under house arrest is clear from the captured documents. For example, an entry datedctoberotebook that belonged to Liara James states that, "Coard wants to kill Bishop." Reporting concerning the period after Bishop's demise remains sparse, but the factetter from the Army's chief of logistics datedctober was addressed to Coard indicated that he continued to hav^^lejdgr^hip role after the Revolutionryary Council took control.

ANNEX B

Weapons Captured in Grenada

1. The equipment listed here is the portion of the moreons of

7oii St0r" capluredrenada that was inventoried before to Weapon types are grouped to simplify this listing;e been rounded because the inventory is as yet incomplete.

Smallifles, machineguns, submachtneguns

(mostly Warsawplus

Crew served weapons:

m

m

ti air defense artillery

mir defense artillery

Aumunition (rounds):

m rockets

tn (Soviet and

m

rmored personnel carriersrmored reconnaissance vehicle

Original document.

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