INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT3
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA
OUTLINE
I. Key Judgments and Exploitation Considerations
II. III.
Estimates of Cuban Personnel V. Cuban Intentions VI. Soviet Intentions
Annexes
7 to3 G. Chronology of Soviet Statements and Actions in9 to3
Ihc Director of Cenbal tmcIHgcncc
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT3
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CUBAN ANO SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA
I. Key Judgments and Exploitation Considerations
possible invasion, it is reasonable to believe that the captured arms stocks inventoried to date were Intended to ensure internal security and to defend Grenada against attackparticularly in view of apparent plans to expand thi size of the Grenadian armed forces.
)me or tne arms may nave oeenusetockpile from which arms could be transshipped to revolutionary governments elsewherehe eastern Caribbean. Similarly, some arms could have been prepositioned for contingency use by Cuban forces,
KCON
The use of identifiable Soviet arms to support guerrilla movements would be uncharacteristic. For example, insurgents in El Salvador are not supplied with Soviet-made weaponry. Moreover, we doubt that the weapons found In Grenada were stockpiled for use In an Invasion of neighboring island states because Cuba and Grenada would be deterred by anticipated US responses.
If it turns out, however, that the quantities of weapons are considerably in excess of those enumerated in the bilateral military assistance agreements with the USSR and North Korea, then we must consider that some of theanns stocks in Grenada were intended for use elsewhere in the region. pJ^pj^H
Recent events in Grenada suggest several conclusions regarding our assessment of the situation in Central America, and especially in Nicaragua:
SECR NOFORN/N
SECRET*/!
Despite their domestic economic problems, the Soviets, Cubans, and other Soviet allies are prepared to ommitment to provide military equipment and training to defend their investments in client states such as Grenada and Nicaragua. In the wake of recent developments in Grenada, the commitment of additional military personnel, weapons, and equipment tor2j* 1et would not be unexpected, but the introduction of high performance jet aircraft to Nicaragua is considered unlikely.
V. Cuban Intentions
Since Maurice Bishop and his followers overthrew the regime of Eric Gairy inrenada has servedocal point for efforts by the Cubans to expand their influence in the eastern Caribbean. Havana had taken the lead in trying to make thehowcase of Cuban-aided development policy.
a chronology of Cuban3 see TAB F.
statements and actions in Grenadao
Castro was personally close to Maurice Bishop and strongly supported his regime. Havana probably was aware of the frictions between Bishop and Coard before Bishop's trip to Eastern Europe, but seems to have expected that such differences could be smoothed over. The event which apparently precipitated Coard's power play was Bishop's rejection of Coard's proposal to assume the senior party post, with Bishop becoming the head of state. The Cubans would have preferred that Bishop remain in full control, but probably would have acquiescedower-sharing arrangementircumstances so dictated. Havana, in fact, may have been planning toelegation to St. Georges to helpuitable compromise after Bishop was placed under house arrest, but the mission probably was aborted by the news of Bishop's execution.
Havana's public reaction to the news of 8ishop's execution and their cautious treatment of the new government in subsequent days.
Castro almost certainly Interpreted the US decision toaval task force to Grenadaign an Invasion was seriously being contemplated, if not underway. He apparently responded by dispatching Colonel Tortola Comas to Grenada on Monday,ctober, to organize the resistance.
also have unnerved the sandinista regime whichepending on Havana to help defend it from external attack. Ineek surrender would have badly damaged Castro's credibilityorld revolutionary leader by giving the appearance of knuckling under to US military pressure.
VI. Soviet Intentions
for naval reconnaissance was marginal at best.
The USSR apparently wanted toarxist regime In Grenadaodelource of influence over other east Caribbean countries.
Moscow seems to haveow profile In Grenada. The purpose of this would have been to deflect criticism and avoid alarming nearby countries over Soviet involvement, instead using the regionally more acceptableead*
Nonetheless, the Soviets were aware of the extreme economic difficulties into which Grenada was falling, and they night have feared that their own unwillingness to provide significant economic aid could weaken Grenada's orientation toward the USSR and Cuba.
Both Moscow and Havana might have been concerned by Bishop's efforts to Improve relations with the United States last summer,|*
The events in Grenada, and the related expulsion of the Cuban Ambassador from Suriname, are likely to affect Soviet thinking about the Caribbean-Central American region in several ways:
-- Moscow will Intensify its efforts to build up Caribbean Communist and other far left parties by supplying funds and advice. The goal willong-term hope of Communists' benefitting from economic problems, overpopulation, and other strains with continued Soviet advice to consolidate their own parties and build solid bases of public support.
The USSR will continue and probably increase effortsto harden Cuba against possible US attack.
hronology of Soviet statements and actionsrenada9 to3 see TAB G.
Moscow will continue to enhance the ability of the Sandinistas to defend their regime, but it will seek toajor public role by, for Instance, not sending identifiable Soviet military personnel or shipping major weapons directly on Soviet ships.
The Soviets will be more careful about an armed confrontation with the United States In the regionesult of the US's willingness to use force in Grenada. The Soviets still are not likely to authorize Cuban shipments to Nicaragua of high performance jet fighters, and they will reinforce their admonitions to Cuba against undertaking actions that might leaduban confrontation with the United States.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: