THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES: A GLOBAL PRESENCE (GI 83-10292)

Created: 12/1/1983

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

The USSR and Itslobal Presence

The USSR and Itslobal Presence

The USSR Uslobal i'lvwnct'

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USSR and icsence Inii ol ihc woilij jn an alU-mpt to extend lltcit influencecomii.intly counter US and Western interests.present:

rominent miliiary suppliers toSyria. Iraq, Ethiopia, and the Yemen* and with combat units ma presence near major sources oi" Western oil. vita! shipping lanes, and strategic etioke points, especially Bab cl Mandcb andnail of

i;

Warsaw Pact aims supplyish Zambia. Mozambique, andwell as lhc Pact arms and Cuban troops in Angola andSoviet and allied Support of nnlional liberation move* nicciS i" Namibia and South Africace the Soviets and its allies in an area that produces niineials considered of strategic imporiancc to the West and near shrppinp. laneshs Cape of Good Hope

Tbc Soviet and (fast European miliiary and economic presence in Northarms aptccments with the Libyans and Algerians and more than Ml.OOti technicians inthe Soviets and (heir allies near another vital shipping lain: ihioiigh the Mcducriancaa. In atiaiiion. Libyan support ofhtcaicm moderate governments in lite region

- Access toaii andfaciftiics in Vietnam provides operaiional support .'or the Sov-ei naval presencethehina Sea ant! places the USSR ncai sea lanes used lo supply oil to Japan andtrategic jios.iion along China's southern border

Latin America, the USSR along wiih Cuba and other alliesresence *iih an arms supply effon io Nicaragua: arms agreements wuh Peru, and encouragement of insuii-oni activity in hi Salvador.

onC uras

Europe, ilic USSR and its Hast European allies noi only

arge nffiei.il coiiiingenl ol diplomatic.

comnd oilierut aliond in some

The USSR, without question, benefits from itiprcsence and lhc presence or iu allies in these regions. In some cases. Influence is wielded directly; in OL'ieis. the picsrnce servos moreisible reminder of Communist interest in the region and facilitates support for disinformation and other activities designed to influence public and officialoscow can reap benefits even if its presence or that of its Fastrtrf Cuban allies is minimal For example, bolh Libya and North Korea actof Moscow, butmi West activities in suppor: or leftist government and national liberation movements generally suppnri Soviet objectives. Although Moscow cannot be tied directly to icrrorist activities, it has derived marginal benefit from the actions of various iclronsi groups in Europe and the Middle East, insofar as the activities undermine modei ate covernmcnts.

f ec live (less of Communist efforts to penetrate and influencehowever, dependsumber of sociopolitical fac:ors. Thesealtitudes toward Communism, the strength and political altitudesi::ilitary. thesucnglh of local religions, the decree of stability in theand the prevailing attitudes of the country's leadership loinvolved

.

There arc limits to the amount ofoviet or alliedFor example, despite its positionajor arms supplier toIraq, .he USSR has been unsuccessful in defusing Syrian battlesPLO or in directingon the conduct of the war with Iran, Also,of ihe Soviets to exploit their position in areas nearcoi stained. Any movean

access to pel rolcum supplies or international sea lanes wouldtrong-Western iespouse, and the structure of world mineral markets is such thatipaci of Soviet-sponsored supply disruptions could be minimized by the use of stockpile materials and substitution.

I lie USSR and Iuobal Presence

Around Hi? World

The USSK and itsastern Europe andtty of methods and programs lo ineicasc their pretence ind influence aiotind lhc world (seclthough their presence haseased in every region of (lie world, this has noi always irinilited into increased influence This paperbo* ihe So<ncU and iheir allies try io use official piesencc aad mililary, economic, and training programsvertly and ccivcnly influence the policies of oiher nations, as well as Ihe constraints imposed by internal and eiternal facion

Official Pitttmee. Theresence of the USSR and ra allies abroad includes approximatelyiplomats and trade, cullutil, androm the0 fromEurope,rom Cuba. Half of Ihese represent! lives are posted in developed countries and half arc stationed in ihe Third World Overall ibere havore lhan M) pciccm increase in their cumber during the last decade In ihe Third World Ihe distribution is fairly ever, among Sub-Sihaian Africa, the Middle Easi/Norih Africa, and Asia

Militaryihe USSR and Cast etc

Europe make up the world's Ingest ctporiei of miluaiy hardware (aircraft, land armaments, ships, and missileroviding weapons to more thanDCs Since lhc beginning of the programilitary afSSI billioa have been signed wiih non-Communist Third WorldS'6 billion in the list decade. The USSR alone

n S'1r * IA',m

military sales In addition. Cuba and Noith Korea IMC become increasingly impoclani sourcet of mill 'ary suppUcv and temcet. mainly io Middle taslcra and Afman suics The maw* buyers ol Waisaw Paei arms in tccrnl years have been Libya, Sytu. Iraq, India. AlneiM. and Ethiopia

1rowth in Soviet ind East FutopciR armsa shjip increase in lhc'.ni militmy pcivtnncl nvsigncd, -

mainly io irain LDCirmed forces and mainllin Soviet weaponry. The number of Warsaw I'aciy adviscii ir. the Third World, nowashe lasiears wiih lhc majority stationed in the Middle East aad North Africa. Cub; also his0 rr.iln.trj advisers and lioops. mostly in southern Africi. Ihe Cubans ire in lhc process of augmenting theii iroop strength in Angola white reducing that in Elbiopia. In Nicaragua ihe number of Cuban military/security advisers hascontinued lo increase

Economic Programs. Waisaw Pact economicaround the world arc diverse, ranging from economic assistar.ee lo lhc LDCsiowiagpiesencc in the West. These programs have enabled Moscow and iu allies io earn hard currency,X resources, acquire Western technology, and use commercialover for covert activities

Like Ihe military aid program. Communist economic assistance is directed toward the LDCs Warsaw Pact economic and technicalsmaller in value lhan (he mililjiryreached someDCs Ofillion in credits and giants extended io lhc Third World smce lhc program began, neatly two-thuds have been provided during the last decade In0 Soviet civilian technicians work in Third World counlnct,0 Iran Europeans0 Cubans--mostly in AfntJ and the Middle Last Ten yens Igo. there were fewer0 Sonet. Cuban, and East Euiopein techniciansoned in the Thud World

tint Euiopcans have also established

a network of moteompanict in Western and IWorld countiies thai, in addition tocommercial actniiies. ptowioc covet fornflieciv serve .is conduits for covertly liansfci-ringo tympailieiic domestic oi imernalional Ifnm groups. :irul facilitate illi.iltranslcr!

Increase in Presence of Soricrs nnd.

Their .Allies.DCs

W.tiaw Pin and Cuban P< rewind in LDC*

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lie uccodni io LDC*

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if recnxaU wiuYLDC*

dtliKtiein LDC*

Include* Cuban

Treatitt. The Soviets and [heir allies also pursue opportunities to formalize their presence via treaties and agreements:

The USSRhas friendship treaties withhird World countries: eight of these have been signedost of the East European countries have signed similar treaties with these countries.

Moscow has moreivil aviation agreements in effect with Western and Third World countries, doubling AcTofloTs access in the last decade.

Maritime agreements afC jn effcel with more than JO WesternThird World countries, compared io?

Influence and Acfiritin

The expanding Communis pioencc rirbund the world has allowed Moscow and. its alhei to influence the actions of other countries, to extend tbci miliury capability. |nd to pursue economic rains

Exerting Influence. The USSR and its allies arcositioned in sever altither to overtly or covertly influence tbe internal political scene, as well as to infhieace tbt'behanor of thie countries in tbe international arena' On the overt side, training pro-Era to bare provided opportsnitiei to penetrate tbe political, miliiary. and technical estabIish.Tie.iu of Third World countries by:

Developing individuals whose future career paths may place them at the levers of power in their country.

Creatinenelwork of individuals whoommon training experience and who, in lime, may permeate Ibe elitev and power structure of Ibeii countries.

through Ihe military trainingmeans to place significant numbers of Communists inCs.

A number or graduate* from Communist training programs have already reached influential positions, r'or example, alumniember of the rating Sandinisia Directorate and tevcral LDC cabinet ciin-

anddirectors There

are also alumni in the insurgency movements in El Salvador aod Soulh Africa, and some of theaad professions ia key LDCs have manyof Soviet nnrversities Although such graduates cannot be considered Sovietumber can beon to interpret evernro-Soviet twist

The increased presence of Communist officialshas also facilitated coved influence operations, referred lo by Moscow a* active measures. These activities aie. for the mosi part, carried out by (he KGB or similar intelligence cntiliet of alliedSame li tnercent -if the Communist official

overseas pi1ntelligence person-idarkty ofournalistic cover is

parikulaily piired by lhc KGB because ilidcr accesstomaik cove-

J fOof lhcoreign correspondents for lhc 5onel /Vfw Tiniei were KGBiLmbcr of Aerofloi employees have been implicit red in espionage and influence opcia-lions. and in ionic countiics Soviei ambassadors reportedly have KGO lies and get involved in covcri activities

Active measures, which are used byiris and iheir allieseaken opponents and advancenterests, include:

Supporting the aciivines of more Iranonruling Communis! parlies

Exploiting lies to international and local front groups.

Pcnciriting und trying to manipulate mass move-menis. leftist parties, and labor and student

or ga Mirations

Influencing foreign mccia through controlledmisleading articles, and forgeries

Operating clandestine radio stations (currentlyihe Soviat Union. Has; (icrmany, and Cuba).

Using; agents of influence to manipulate private channels of communrcation and eipJon unwitting cor-taci*

Using these programs and tncasarcs. ihe LsSR has hid some success in garnenrg support for it* posuicc in intcrnalionalo; example

On conirovii N votes such as the Sovitl mlervcnlion in Afghanistan. Moscow has been able to line up moreorcn voles from its Third World clienis.

ecent (IN vote on ibcmkalayor East-West issue, besides its haidcorcsuch as Cuba. Vicinam. and Syria -Musto" had *hc support ol several other Third World couiines includingnisi.i. Guyanaumber of Sub-Sah.il.in African countries

The use ofo influence opinion was especially extent aficr the Soviet shootdown of the KAL airliner last ijnimn In addition lo eliciting support from iheir illks. ihe Soviets used iheirin non-Cornniiiniiio bhial USof Soviei act km

official* in Peru met privatelygh-ranlm; Peruvian milrtaf* officers immediatelythe shooiduwii in torn nte them that il was the resultS provocation C

J stated that lhc Soviet* diil noi approacnovernment leaders with tlic same inioiiti.ilioi. apparently hoping (he military could influence Peru's official reactions.

To divert attention from Soviet involvement ir. the incident, (he Soviet Embaisy in Bangladcth issued press releases portraying the US Marine contingent in Lebanon as "nun kitlo" of Lebanese Mus'tms. according to

The general manager of ihe Novosii office inprovidedess guidanceishe Vcnc/uclar media as well as io members of the Communist Partv of Venezuela, according topanics anu iiunis in oilier countries also received specific guidance on how to respond io the

Although most countnei reacted negatively (othe Soviet shootdown, Mokow wai able to gain some sympathy for its position. Western sanctions imposed on Aerofloi weie somewhat nutcd because the Sovietad access to its major inicrnationalCairo. Bombav. Karachi. Svinon. Havana. And Tripoli,

In Westernonon focus of Covrirnuntst activityhas been cintottalion of lhc WcS! Earopean peace movementlhc opDosiiion to deployment ofsurope Theperceive the pc.uc iinncm-iil as the mostts .ictmn since the nul (if World Wn II and haw

attempted lo influence iu development andfit iheir needs. In addition to urging theCommunist parties to participate inihey have used IbcirGermany -and embassy and Novosti prospersonnel to provide covert assistance toprotest

The West German and West Berlin Communistparties have made lhc most significant inroads into the movemenl, committing expciienced workers, financial resouices. and priming presses. They have

Iositions on coordinating committeespeace movement and have handled themass dcrnoratrations,both the Sonets and IjsI Germans

3 identified

annually piovidc covert financial support to (he parties;2 ihe Eas; Germansillion by courierhe Weal German parly.

A rejiort

Soviet and East European effortsnfluence (he Dutch peace movement and described closebetween ibe Dutch Communis! Party and the Jntemauonal Department of the CPSU in ihe cam naign against NATO weapons

personnel of lhc N'ovosti press agency in Bern recruited, organized, and financed "peace"far rallies and meetings in Switzerland opposing US inter mediate range nuclear forceeployment, according ii

oviets capcllcd in) were linked to efforts io manipulate French public optnioo through the peace movement, the press and lhc Franco-Soviciociety.

Military Activity. Theo! (Iir Cmnmunist military program liasumber of Tliiid World countries dependeni on ihe East for mililary support In some cases, thisas provided the Soviets wiih access tn imUurv and naval facilities iaC regiorvs

Sovkis arc mm- the dominant supplier of milu.m nlmil WarH countries. Iwkc (hi: nnmbriecide agoI ihcve are

in the Middle East; al key locations in Sub-Saharan Africa: or represent polilically important clients, such as India. Tbe rapid growth in Soviet arms sales.especially of more advanced weapon systems, ii ho has necessitated a_ similar increase in the number of military advisers and lecJimcians nbioad

Although Ihe Soviet Navy minimizes its dependence on overseas facilities by relying heavily on auxiliary ships, access to port facilities or shelteredaluable peacetime convenience. The Soviet Navy has'access to some military or commercial facilities ia moreorenCuba',-Ethiopia; Guinea. Libya, Mozambique, Soulh Yemen. Sri Lanka. Syria. Tunisia. Greece, Yugoslavia, andoccasionally con-docts pons of callumber of Other coualru such at Seychelles. Mauritius, India. Algeria,Nigeria. Kampuchea, and Benin

Soviei naval rcconnaisuincea decade ago operated only out of Cuba, Egypt, and Somalia now routinely fly out ot* Cuba, Vietnam. Angola. Ethiopia. South Yemen, and occasionally out of Syria and Libya.

Soviet military transport aircraft arc currently based in seven Third World countries covering four regions Angola. Mozambique, and Madagascar in Africa: South Yemen and Syria in the Middle Fast. Afghamiian in South Asia, aod Vietnam in Eail Asia. The aircraft in Syria are configured for electronic! counterrneasuics (ECM) Ten years ago transports were based onlypi and Syria.

I he military supply relationship is considcicd to be ol" primaiy importance in establishing influence.because il not only creates dependence but also provides direct accessC powerecent rase of theA f

l-igurc )

.Scxicl Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by

(rigiHc d

Distant Deployment* of Soviei Natal

3

The increased access lo miluaiy and naval facilities around Ihe woild has enabled Moscow io be more responsive io lhc needs of clients oi potential clients and to increase its oHt-of-arci nav-il presence Tor

example, accessir and tiav.il facilities in South

the deployment of Cuban iroopsii as military equipment Access to ship repair and Supportyria has facilitated Mediicrra-fc.ii-

deiiluyniciit uf KtaiMuatfiawrr mil oilier aiioufibisei in.lhcnl and Africa as well al Vkirum and Cub) tut iti- So-ie'i with aa improved capaUlily lo inoaiiC" US naval and ihiininj activity in Ley RjfjaM of ibc world. Tor eaamplc, US naval nnd shipping activities in (lie Arabian Sea and southern Red Sea nrc rouiiiiely Jiifliiiiorol by Soviet naval reconnaissance flights oui ol Ethiopia and South Yemen, in other areas, lie SovictS'bave lienili caatly increased theac tise-uioeinc eanabilitau ia tbe North Atlantic (from Cului and in tbe South China Sea (from Vieinaiii) They also Lave repeatedly Ined to regain access for rccon mi stance flights fromwhich would furtlicf eatend (heir capability to monitor US Uiflic in Ihc Atlantic from Africa

Support lod Tetto'itit. In addition to

government to-govcrnment rmhtaryhe USSK and its allies provide eHemivc support to revolutionary movements The Sovicu. Bast Germans, and Bulgarians provide amis, training, and advisers to groups, such as ibe South-Wat Afnca People's Orgi-niuuoo (SWaPOL ibe African National Congress (ANCJ. and ibc Palcitiae Libei ation Or(anui>ooibya has provided money, arms, and trainingariety of Palestinianthe more radicallias worked lo subvert moderate regimes in tbe tegion Cuba has trained

itiooarics fioca Africa and IJiia Aaxrica andajor force betuad ibc Salradotan and Guatemalan insurgents. It cot only provides uaininc. financing, and direction to the Salvadoians bui ii tbe chief source of weapons 2nd oilier important supplies Libya. Vietnam, North Korea, and the PLO have alio provided direct or ir.direet supporte Central Arnchea/Ca'fibbean region

The Soviets. East Europeans, and Cubans lendvoid dticcierrotut opcfations bui nevertheless provide haven, training,ri to revolutionary g'ouin ihM use violent lactic*

> Arms produced ecaaniccaku. Po Und, and Hungary have turned upainoaig terror

in Europe and ilie Middle IjsiwcaiKIMS

KINTIZX purchases nrntt limn internationalls and resells litem for hard currency.

East German* continue!ftyvide support loterronst groups, laxluding permissionfrom iu leffiftMy

ic-

J

'uba providesmajority of which iscooducted in Cuba by the Cuban intclligcRcetbc Popular Front foi the Liberation of Palestine (PPLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberaiion of Palatine (DFI.P) In addition, the PPLP reportedly has traininc agreements with the USSR and East Germany and other arrangements wiib Bulgaria and North Korea that includeainuic

Several of Moscow't more ladeoerdeniNortb Korea. Libya. Syria, and Iraq- -havedirectly involved in lerroroi activities. Nortb Korean icrTorucn hat been aimed mainly against Soulh Korea. Libya's participation in planning and executing terrorist operations bat. ebbed and flowed, although rarely hat il ceased cult tell. Qadhafi's most recent phase of terrorist activism look placeyria uses terrorism not onlyool against Israel but alsoevice to strengthen Syrian influence io the Middle East. Exploiting dissension in tbc Palestinian movement. Syria bas supported radical elements in conducting terrorist opeiaiaons against moderate Palestinians and neigh* boring Arab states Iraq, on tbc other band, bas recently taken stepseduce support of radical Pa!citinian grou;n

Although tbe USSK cannot be lied directly loactivitici Caindacted or supported by allies, it has done virtually nothingiscourage revolutionary or social violence, unless it hat emanated from (he right.

i iii ! i' i

thai servesndermine Western interests or ihr. siabiliiy of established regimes

Economic Activity. Moscow considers economicseful loo! for expanding influence in Hie Third Woild, And its highly focused economic program has been influential. The USSR accounts fo: less thanerceni of international aid flows to non-Communist LDCs. and only about SI billion of all SovietassKiancc. totaling some Mi billion foreriod, has been gramof that going to Marxist clients, such as Afghanistan and Ethiopia.

ssi* niii.ilhi.:i> ir.ln Egypt. India. Syria,umber of other countries through its economic program, and ihese lies endure even when other relationships wither. For example, in Egypt, although political relations have been cooloviet trade has recovered0ear, and moreechnicians are working on economic protects. In Morocco the USSR pledged S2redits to exploit new phosphate deposits, and in Nigeria the USSR broke into the Western-dominated equipment market wiih SI.2in creditsew <ieclovic: technical force of moteQO personnel is now working on the construction of the mill.

Mosco* apparently pursues political goals in some of its trade practices as well, lor example, although the majority of Soviei sugar deals are transacted in normal commercial fashion, reflecting primarilynd-demand conditions of ihe sugar market, some seem to exhibit astute political liming by Moscowonvergence of political and economic interests.the past nine years, Soviet Sugar purchases from Peru occurred only5wo years in which therea change in Peru's government. The

'i. ..

Sov'ct arms sales to Peru. Zimbabwe is another case inonly recent Soviet sugarhe first year of independence. Having backed the losing faction in the civil war, Moscow apparently fell lhc need tooodwill gesture toward the Mugabe regime by trying to improve iradet only Soviet lugar purchase fiom Guy ana'lli. ihe same year ihai Moscow's

first icsidciii diplomatic mission arrived ine Soviels first puicliascdsugarust after the current leftist regime came lo power

Recently, Moscow has passed for broad, long-term cooperation agreements with all of its major LDC clients ioirmer economic base for long-term planning by client countries, while increasing the USSR's assurancetable flow of rawjueh as crude oil from Iran and Syiia. natural gas from Afghanistan, bauxite from Guinea, and alumina from Turkey. 1

lor the USSR and Eastern Europe the technical servjeo progium has another advantage; il is one of iheir most profitable undertakings in LDCs. About iwo-ihirds cf the technical personnel work in Arab and other countries that pay hard currency for services. Cuba has also expanded its technicalin the Third Worlduick and profitable way io increase its influence abroad. Cuba now hascontingents in overDCs and has substantially increased its presence in Algeria and Libya, which pay premium prices for Cuban services

Commercial Activities.ommercialestablished by the Soviets and East Europeans in the West and the LDCs during ihe past decade have proved valuable in providing the Communists access to markets and to Western technology Many of those firms were commissioned to study local marketsell equipmeni, and service productsnow not only provide exclusive marketing services to Communist enterprises but also:

Inform parent enterprises of compciiiivc developments.

* Undertake ambitious advertising and promotional campaigns, such ai hiringew York firm io P'ornote Acrollot service io the United States.

turbines, gesKratnrs, eao&lrkal ciinipiiwiii. ami shins

Modify inappiopii.ticl* styled or finished Soviet equipment or consumer dm.ibks foi mure demand ing Wesierne IIc1.hui agriculiuial and automotive cnmprtniev ir Canadanri".it and automotive distributorssuch asVn'.-elgium modify oinipment for Western use

Soviet and East European parent or tan rationsthese enterprises both bv direct capital contrihu-lion and supplier ciedits

While these companies operate as commercial enter-piisea. they have frequently also been used for covert activities'

Employees uf Soviet firms in the NciIiciIbiuIscapcllcd from the country mcases, and in Nonvay

Soviet firms iMiticuUirly Koiietsin

I lieiample of illenil'oir.munist firmolish comiMny in the Uniied Stairsubsidiaryolish Covermncnt (Oijrti.iuon -is incorporatedf nhcjii'iiutc enterprise of trade in machine loo'.s.dl publicued case, POLAMCOiltocommercial cover for Polish intellicenee officers in the Uniied States. Marianolish intelligence officer under coverice president of POI.AMCO,adar ipccialii; lor the Hughes Aircrafthree-year period. passed more lhanlassified icpofis oi advanced US weapon systems to Zachaiski enhance (or nore

An Assessment

Increased Communisi presence and actinly work to Moscow's adv.iriacc in key world rectum In the Middle East Soviet icaupply of Syria following its defeat by Israel inspecia'ly the delivery of Soviet-sunnedcrface-lo-airand SS-Z1 sur-facc-ro-swrfacc nuiiki. has helped io njmiim Soviet political influcacc in the area In Sub-Saharan Africa rcsupply now uidct *a> ir. Angola by the USSR and Cuba may help shore up Communist mllucncc in that country and signal Moscow's steadfastness to other regional elknisim America, especially inAmerica and the Caribbean, Cuba and.essci eiteat. the USSR and Eastern Europe have influence over the SancWisia govc-naieal in Nicaragua and over tbe insotgenis in EI Salvador and Onaiemala through their steady supply of arms, (raining, aod advice. In Wralernthey have not prevented ihe deployment of US INTCommunists have inllitcnced lhc direction of the peace movement in iheir favoi, at times complicating relations bci*crn the United Slates and iis European allies While ibe Scwrcts and Cast Eu'opcans avok!. - in terrorist activities, iheyserven of uiiden'ur.ing democratic societies, suchwevrr. mint lie weighed against lliedammr irnl iciiiIkcm charges of Soviei cniiiij<)iciiy in 'ciKin-.m

I attic 2

l omniums Presence iu SinKcs-ic Area*

Middle Kill

Phtnd.hip

Tieiiy

Major Armi Suppliei

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Assisia.ice

Ai eti io Military/

Commercial

IntueH

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Yemen

lo Bib el Mandebcboke WW

Yemen

Iu Bab cl Mandifc choke perm

xnirce of Western oil

Africa

Mediicrranean Sea

shipping lane* through Ihe Mid iter linear

shipping lane* through ihe Mediterranean

to Snail of Gibraltar

snipping lares Ihrnuab ihe

Vi-.li crc-Mn

thippine linesegic

ni

ungo

shipping lane* and iir.eaK

dippingfie' Sea choke poim

snipping tares in

,

Ocean shinxnn lines

a andeg* minerals

Ocean shlppim lane

rani a

i

Ocean

ictnam

China Sci (hipping >.

Korea

.pping tines near lapanIB Korea

America

the US and Pmama Canal

Panama Canil

shipping lanes aod sirategii minerals

IU

UnvielIt.'ti'me Mix-'l.'i; tclb-icLk ini I*ci-wai' imt jica

' i.iiiHi in ley icgtoiii iluiilei nl.iv' Mincwri. il it litenefit io to it tin tic illiloitiiir. local Icnsiont contributesontinued imlabilily in Specific regions, met cm nr. Hie lufcnual lineal lo Western intci ests In tan regard, Movco- succeeds iaey aspectt, foreignccpingnterests unccitaw ami subject to disiuptinn

Al; bough the Soviets ind then allies have incieascd their presence ia strategically important areas, their potential to exploit such positioas is limited

Any move to disrupt pclroleum supplies or towiih-tea lanes would invitecoordinated response fiom the Wev

- Given lhc structuic of ilic world mineral market, any short-term supply disrupiions would have little impact because of reduced world demand icsuliirtg from the world economic slowdown, the svailabtli:y

of stocarpiledand ibe ability to substitute

other materials

Despite pi ogress in acquiring the use of naval and military facilities abroad. Moscow's ability iopower to distant aicas is constrained by lhc lacietwork of bases comparable to thai of ibe United States. Except in Communist couniiies. the Soviets ham not yet secured any pcimancnt basing rights

la addition, internal poliiical constraints ia most LDCs limit Moscow's ability io translate presence into influence. The elfecliveness of Communist efforts to penetrate andountry dependsumber of sociopolitical laclors including localtoward Communism, the strength and poiti-:a! attitudes of tbe military, often ibe major subduing force in developing couniiies. ilic strength uf local religions (such ashe Middle bast and Catholicism in Latin America, both of which arche degree of stability in the society, aed :he prevailing attitudes ol ilie country'so laie ihe Sovietsmctcawdndearly all regions of ifcc

lhc Middleand Siili-Ji.ili.nannn ihci: jiains inve iii.iinly retailed limn exploit-nag local rivalries .mil aarcuiM ret:diii.ibwV<vl

A

hcsi. Syria and Iraq arc two of Moscow's laiccii amhiary chcniv. but both continuepcralc largely independently uf Soviet interests Syua. in its bailies wild lhc PLO ami iis policies toward Israel, is influenced fiisi by 1'iiicArabtsl tendencies and second by Moscow's desires Iraq, in iis war wilh Iran, is demanding more Soviet wcap onry while not adhciing toisheslhc conduei of ihe war In Libyaalso one of the largest iceiptcats of Sonet armsMoscow has little conlrol over Qadhafi's Islamic policies.

Sub-Sah.ii.in Africa, lhc Soviets, wuh Die help of Cuba, have csiibtishcd strong footholds in Angola and Ethiopia and have become predominantsuppliers to Moumbiqac and Zambia In Aagola. Moumbtque. and Ethiopia, however, rebel activity conlinuet to thicalcn the stability of ihc regimes, while Zambia follows independent foreign policies.

- In South Asia, although Soviet-Indian relations have much improved. New Delhi stillcint of festratning the number of in-country SovietIn the Indian Ocean, recent attempts by the Soviets to increase their influence in Mauritius have been unsuccessful.

Central America, Moscow is reluctant to openly support the Sandinistas in Nicaragua with weapors for fear of agitating ihc United States Cuba and Bulgaria have been more directly involved in the military resupnly effort, political proselytizing, and developmentommunist infiaslructure. TheS invasion of Grenada will oiobably lempei Soviet and Cuban support of oilier revolutionary movements in the region, at least in ihe short term

Indeed, the conhijiot insurgency in Afghanistan aad .node.its such as the shooting down of ihc KAL airliner last so inaveumber of leaders, parncjlarly in thr flnrd World, increasingly wary of Soviet motives am! icluctanif lies to Ihc

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Middle- East and North Africa (continued)

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BLANK PAGE

A

The Soviet Union and Itslobal Presence

Combal iroops fiom the Soviol Union, other Warsaw Pact member, Cuba. Vietnam, oro-ca present; one or more of these countries isominanl supplier ol miliiary equipmeni

Soviet Union, other Wa-saw Pact member, Cuba. Vietnam, or North Ko'ea dominanl supplier o' military equipmeni

-

4

reaty of Friendship and Cooperation or Defense Treaty with Soviet Union

Insurgent group receiving support (weapons, aupplies, money, advisors, training, or tatehavon) (J) From tho Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact member J| From Cuba, Vietnam. North Korea, Libya. Syria. Afghanistan or South

Overseas facilities used by Soviets:

Soviet military transport aircraft based in country Port o' call A Ship repair/support 3 Airfield used by Soviet naval aircraft

Pf|f^ Operating area ol Soviet naval aircraft stationed abroad

CZ^Critical choke point

5>t) Major strategic mjnoral Major petroleum producer

Nofth Pacific Ocean

Original document.

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