NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW (DELETED)

Created: 12/9/1983

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Iraq: The Crowing Influence of Military Officers From Mosul!

appointment in mid-October of an Army general from Mosulhead of Iraq's moil important security service underscores the increasing influenee of senior officiali from Mosul, apparently at Ihe expense of clansmen from President Saddam Husayn's hometown of Tikril. Although the Moslawi* are apparently loyal to Saddam, ihis grouping is no* better posiiicncd to move agaimt him If theyeterioration in Iraa's military and economic situation.

I President Saddam Husayn U

facing inc.-eaiing confidence in Army and Air Force officer* from the targe northern ciiy of Mosul. Until recently. Saddam relied heavily oo relative* ind clansmen from bis small Iwmetown of Tikrit to monitor and control tbe Ba'ih Parly, ibe miiiuty. the government, and the security smicqagfifljlgggg<:'.otU region comprise leu thaneroral ofcopulaiion, Tikritii leasercent.:

round

In rakl-October. however, Saddam removed bis Tlkriii half brothers from key poaiuona; Barzan. former director of lh< Geo. loulliaence Diroctrrateab'iwi. aootber senior Mukhabarat officer,'a

half brotben incurred Sadcam'i wmh bydaughter's eurrUgeousie of Saddainto their nephew, by directingand by rxeauming ibatdepeniltd or.

Saddam has nearlyurge of TOO Mukhabaratfrom

i-jIWIfxl BSSffiaSfflBB

mVJ^kVk^JkWfkiiiU^ The wme wurs* reports that the new chief, Gen. Hishsm Sabah al-Fakhri,

Selectedilli From Mosul Government

Taha Yailn Ramadan. First Deputy Prime Milliter, membt' of the Revolutionary Command Council and theth Parly Regional Command, ond head of the People'l Army.

Torlq Ash. Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Qaslm Ahmad Tail Vrabl. Minister of Oil.

Hlshom Hasan Tarfo. Minister of Finance.

Hassan Ta*fla al-SoJafl. Governor of the Central BankMgg

Military

Cm. Abd al-Jabbar Shanshel. Army Chief of Staff.

Gen. Jawad Thanun. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

Gen. Muhammad Fathl. Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration.

Gin Muhammad Jassim al-Jaburi, Air Force Commander.

Gen. Rashld Yunls. 1st Division Commander.

Gen. Hvsoyn Rashld Muhammad. Srd Division Commander.

Car. Riyadh Taha, 1st Republican Brigade Commander.

former commander of tbe Army's IV Corps, has appointed many officers from hi* nativeof Mosul in their pUce.l

the strength of the Mukhabarat"

Meetaofci In tat CemneamH

MoaUwla arc well represented in the government and In the miliiary. They include the powerful Fin! Deputy Prime Minislcr Taha Yatin Ramadan.

ivalSaddam, and

military officeis include ihe Army rt,cfIT and his iwodepuiiei and se.eral commanding generals.

Why Mowl?

The strong milii-'y tradition of Motul. Iraq'i second*if(ei; ei:y. hasman of its residents to join the armed fornt ^blibbssw

ry career of feci social andadvscemcni fjr tip thtej .oufc

lion

Mot law is comprised one-fourthrse-third of (he Arm) officers in iBased on the targe numbers ofs oosersed iit high piaou.betieve thai Moslawt officers comprise at leastercent of allproportion in lh< overall population Moslawi officers probablyio advance their clansmen in ihe military fXS^SSBM "7 oslawiiare

strong

Ho- , J

Reports questioning MasUwi loyally have circulated

repeatedly in the last iwo years:

prominent Sunm alliens

from Mosul had openly spjkti agatrji Saddirji_

security offieiali hid previously cornidered Sunnl leaders io Mosul to be solidly behind the regime.

rsorne

military officers believe that theirounterparts have greater loyally toother members of their clique than to the military command structure or the ruling Ba'ih Piny to which they belong

baunb)jjmbslsfllvbthiy,'k Communist Parly of Iraq (CPU draws heavily frora the Sur.ni A'lbi of the Mosul area '

the cp1 claimsebuilding cells, principally among junior officers wnhin ihc anncd

Despite these reports, we have no evidence thai senior Moslawi officers are disloyal io Saddam We believe thai seme rcporis arc based oat jcatOssiy or wishful thinking that, since ihc Motlawisbtained key positions, they must be plotting Saddam's ouster.

Implications

Weaddam is mil firmly in control in Baghdad. He maintains control of ihc government, the military, and the rating Sa'th Party apparatus and has personal and official networks of informants W< be ict Saddam "ill ciploil hit networks, whtch inclvde variossa rcgioral fact toes, to walch for signs of early coup plotting and movetechnique he has refined through frequent practice.

Popular demands are likely to mount for decisive leadership to end the war with Iran that Saddam started. We eaiimate that the Iraqis hive already lost moreo mo.0oq deathsopulation ihe sir* of the Uniteda seemingly endlesseteriorating economy and the prospect of still more import cutbacks inll necessiuie further sacrifices by ibe public, i

Meanwhile, In our judgment, the purge and ihe growing influence of the MosU*is peobablyvbave created resentmemikriiii*

'-wrasses hate

developed betweenukhabarat ofTiceriappointed Mosla-U. Moslawi militarylhai "it may be behind several"aondeou" befaftiag Mcalawjj onbetween Baihdad and ii-theae

frictions are likely to reduce the effectiveness of the Mukhabarilf -

U

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