PROSPECTS FOR RESUMPTION OF START: SOVIET VIEW

Created: 8/8/1984

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Piosppct* for start: Soviet View

Summary

There has been do apparent softening In Moscow's official conditions foi resuming nuclear sxaa control negotiations Mlth tba os. Tbe Soviets continue to Insist publicly sod privately that tba OS first most bait tha deployment of Ita Missiles In Suiope end take steps to remove them. They also have

incad any linkage of START and 1ST to their proposed itlng In Vienna on the demillat Ion of space. They are unlikely to reopen start ox ISP talks In any forus during tha neit half year although their Interest In finding at back to tbe tslks aay Increase after the US election.!

Therm is little direct evidence of how the Soviets envision the forest of renewed nualear eras negotiations.basic choices include reconstituting separete START end IMP forums, shifting some components of IMP into START, or combining the two sets of talksingle negotiating forum. Bach of these options hss some drswbacks, and single one sppaara ideal from the Soviet perspective.)

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As recently asuly, Soviet Prenlar Nikolsy Tikhonov stated that If the US would lecove the "obstacles" which led to tha breaking off of tha Geneva talka, the Soviet Onion 'would not be found wanting." Ha warned thatS, however, would not conduct talks while under the threat of OS nuclear nissilcs stationed In Western Europe.

The Soviet Union has denounced any linkage of START andto their proposed meeting In Vienna onof space. They have claimed thatSTART and iNr in conjunction with talks on apacesetting unacceptable preconditionsiennaspokesman Leonid Xemyatin, for example, in an IBin Llteratumaya Carets asserted that combiningand apace iaaues would result in theof the Soviet Insistence that bilateral agreement be reachedagenda prior to the opening of the talks in part Isstep the OS from formally raising START and 1ST iesues

issue of linking space end nuclear arms talka. While the Soviets ultimately may acquiasce to the US raising these Issues informally in Vienne, they ere unlikely to address them In that (oi urn.

esire to pot the OS on the polltlesl defensive appears to have determined their tactics on resumption thus far, they probablyenuine desire topolitical influence andconstraints on US programs which they believe evcntuslly could adversely affect theit strategic posture and strain their rssouicea. Should talks on limiting space weapons begin in September, and result In an Improvement in the bilateral cllmste, Moscow may find It easier to return to discussions on strstegic end intermediate renge nuclear arms. They may begin tha process by sounding out US Intentions

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regarding the formubstance of renewed negotiations, possibly by using high-level, diplomatic channels. '

Future Negotiating Formats

There la little direct evidence of how the Soviet*the format of renewed nuclear aims negotiations, diplomats and scedemics unofficially have raised themerging the START end INF talka. However, Sovietsa General Nikolay Chervov and Central CommitteeZegladln, have pablicly dismissed the Idas.

The Soviets nonetheless appear to have laid the groundwork for incorporating limitations on the Pershingnd GLCM into their current START proposal. Their proposed reduction0 strategic euclear delivery vehicles, for example, ls contingent upon no Increase in DS "forward-based" oysters, specifically the US Pershing i: andwhich the Soviet* regard as "strategic." Their proposals to bsn long-range CLCMs snd to prohibit the deployment of ballistic missiles In third countries

It would appear thst the Soviets have left themselves considerable latitude regarding the format of the future negotistions. Their basic options Include reconstituting separate !KF and STAR? forums, shifting some components ofgenda to START, or combining tba two sets of tslksingle negotiating fortm. The following highly speculative analysis, which is not based on concrete tvldence, describes poaslble Soviet approaches.

Reconstituting Separate Fotums

Clven Soviet preconditions for resuming INF tslks. It probably would be difficult for Moscow to return to the INF forum ss previously constituted absent US step* to restore thesitustion. Nonetheless, the Soviets msy calculate

thateparate inp forum, thereby avoiding tha complexity of combined talks, couldozc expeditious zouta to securing an agreement which would limit ongoing US IHF deploymenta.

Thu Soviets could change tha terns of reference of the INF talks, perhaps offering to trada oil us lrinf daploymanta and thairand insisting on their right to maintainorce Europe equivalent to French and British nuclear forces. Alternatively, they sight attempt towalk-iproposal. Bating it contingent upon US withdrawal of Pershing lis ftoo Europe. In conjunction with suco proposals the Soviets alaost certainly Mould calloratorium on US lrinf deplovaants In returnalt in their "counterdeployments."

If tha Soviets decided to reconstitute the IHF forum, they would have tha option of resuming START where It left off last Dacemoer, unencumbered by the problems poied by INF and third country systems. Thay could return to thtlr current draft treaty proposal calling for reductions0 SKDVs, subcaillngs on ftiavcd missile launchera and ALCK carriers, and Unite on modernlsetlon almllar to thoae in the SALT II Treaty. They prosebly would continue to oppose tbe current US bulId-down proposal and the proposed ceiling0 ballistic missile warheads, aeelng these measures as efforts to force then into restructuring their strategic forces away from ICSMs. They night be mora receptive to those measures if the build-down ratloa were less discriminatory with respect to ICBNi. They also night be amenableompromise where they wouldigure for aggregate delivery vehicles and Nashlngton wouldigure for ballistic missile warheads; similar arrangements on aggregate delivery vehicles and MlRVed missile launchera were worked out at Vladivostok Inand in Moscow in ig7B. '

Even if the Soviets were not confident of reaching an agreement In the reconaituted INF forum, keeping the talks separate inashion could enable them to pursue START negotiationa f

Shifting Components ol INF Into START

P-II and CLCri. Another approach the Soviets could take would be to shift the Pershing II and GLCH into the START negotiations, asserting thst these are "strategic" aystems. They could attempt to exclude their own "medium-range" aystems from Start under tbe rationale that they cannot reach OS territory and that they are needed to offset French and British nuclear aystems. (C)

one way the Soviets could incorporate the Pershingnd CLCM Into their START propoaal would be to raise0 ceiling on strategic nuclear deliveryS> to include US tM systems. The Soviets neve often stated that they would have to -reconsider- their 0 BIcDV Halt once US LRINP deployments began. The Soviets also could suggest sn sggregate ceiling on nuclear wetheada and boaber weapons that would include US LR1MF systems slong with central strategic oees.

This approach would build on the foundation already laid by the Soviets for including US LRINF in START and would be consistent with the Soviet contention that thas an offset to French and British nuclear forces. Furthermore, it would have the advantage of penalising the US by counting the Pershing and QLCM against the US total for strategic ayatoms while exempting therom the Soviets total.

The Soviets would realise that tbe us would reject auchas one-sided snd would demand the Inclusion ofrange" systems In the negotistions. The Soviets wouldto counter this demand by Insisting that underFrench end British nuclear systems alao wouldbe taken into account in START. Such an approachbecome stale*.ted as the sides argued over the agendahold little prospect for an expeditious agreementLPINF deployments.

ariation of thia approach, the Sovleta oould propose including the Pershing II end GLCM and some Soviet LRINP Slssllaa in START while excluding French and British nucleer forces and an

equivalent and offaattlng number of. By including some fiS-2Ca in START, Moscow oould try to counter US claims that the

Soviet approach waa one-elded.

French aad British Forces. The Sovleta alao could attempt to ahift French ana British nuclear systems to tba START sgends but leave us and Soviet LRINP systemseparata negotiating forum. ove could pave the way for the two aides to reach an INF agreement on equsl levels of LRINP miaallea In Europe. The Soviets night consider such sn spproach If they were seriously concerned about capping us LRINP deployments at the loweat possible level and were convinced oi NATO'a resolve to carry through with the deployments.

Combining stab? and :nr ingle rorur

In this option the Sovleta could place OS and Soviet central atrateglc systems, US IBS, third country systems, and all Soviet LRINF missUea and aircraft on the agendalngle negotiating forum. Numerous possibilities would exist for negotiating tradeoffs and limitations under such sn srrsngementi

Limiting tha Pershing lis, CLCns, third country systems, and Soviet LRINF nlaslles under on* cellingeparate ceiling for US and Soviet central strategic ayatema.

Limiting all atrateglc add theater ayateaaingle overall aggregate ceiling, poaslbly with subceillnge.

ncluding: Pershing lis and GLCMs under the US ceiling for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles while limiting Soviet LRINF missileseparate collateral conatraint, possibly linked to Trench and British nuclear force levels.

off "concessions" oneductions, third country systems, snd US FBS aircraft in return for withdrawal of Perahlngan or llwltation on SLCKt, strict limitations on ALCKs,elaxation of torow weight limitations.

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While perhaps offering the Soviets more fleilbility in terms of negotiatingingle negotiation treating sll these systems could becomo eatrerely complex and drawn out. Meanwhile us INF deployments presumably would be continuing. Ths Soviets tbus might be inclined toroposal for merged negotiations

contingent upon US acceptanceoratorium on its fcSlsf

daployments while negotiations were ongoing. [

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While the Sovietsumber of options for tha forast of renewed oegotlstlone, esch has soma drawbacks and no single one ls Ideal from their perspective. ey fsctor influencing Moscow's approach will be the depth of ita concern aboutS LRINF deployments at the lowest poaalble level and Its willingness to do soegotiated settlement. (

The Issue of rrench end British systems probably willocal point of the Soviet position in any future discussions with the us regarding the resumption of negotiations. Although the Sovieta ar* primarily concerned with stopping US LRltiF deployments and limiting us etrateglc programs thsn with forestslllng the future Increases in French snd British nuclear forces, they can uae the issueegotiating lever In either START oi IHF.

Soviet View of Key START licit*

ae Crulee Missiles. Early In both STABT and the lur talk! tbe Soviet*an on deployment of all long-range cruise miasiles regardless of basing rode." Later at START they modified this position by egifring to permit ALCHS|

move was not surprising because they hud already agreed1 toin the SALT II Treaty.

Throughout START the Soviets heve claimed that the US proposal would allow Washington toLCMs. They derived this figure byombers (the US-proposed celling) bytha US-proposed limit for ALCMs perhey nave criticised the US reductions proposal by addingotel for ALCMs toelling on missile warheads and claiming waahington really Intends to build up its forces0 nuclear weapons. Although exaggerating US deployment plans, toe Sovleta sees to be genuinely concerned about the prospectroliferating ALCK threat during.

The Soviets might be willing toradeoff ofHalt US cruise missile programs. However, we do notcompromise along these lines they might suggest orMoscow to.hi to any aignlflcant seduction in Itait probably would wantinimum to see SLCms sndALCHa sharply limited, and some amelioration ofUS threat to the remaining soviet 1CBM force. requirement could include restrictions on the PershingPeacekeeper (MX) ICBM, andLBM. Even with theie,that the Soviets would still be hesitsnt toreductions in their ICBM force.

heavy leans end Throw Wight. 3 several Soviet officials in Geneva and elsewhere hinted that the BS-ll hesvy

Perhaps equally worrisome to the Soviets are US plans for SLCM deployments. Suspicious of Kaahlngton's intention*, they noticed htt SLCHs were not mentioned in the Seowcroft Commission report i

ICBM would eventually be retired, partly because It waa based on oldechnology. Soviet Ambassador Rarpov, however, made it clear in July that Moscow had no intention of "dooming the heavy ICBM ton laying out the subcellings in their START proposal, the Soviets made no eiplicit commitment to reduce their current forceS-ies. Theyillingness to discuss this issue, but only on the condition that Washington accept the Soviet negotiatingr*.

It is difficult to Judge the extent of Soviet flexibilityICBM snd thiowwelght. Soviet flexibility on this issuelargely on whether the SS-lS's ailltarytargets--car, tc aisurad effectively By other

f verification in START. The Soviets realize that the Adnlniatration has declared an Improved verification regime essential to negotiating arma control agreements. 1 interview with Dm Spiegel, General Secretary Brezhnev stated that some foriris of verification Besides the prlmsry method of national technical mesns might be worked out given confidence between tha two sides. Bven before the Brezhnev statement, Soviet negotiators at the Comprehensive Test Bsn talka had agreed in principle to challenge on-site inspection procedures and the use of aelemic sensors to monitor compliance with test ban restrictions. Since1 Moscow has displayed greater flexibility onon the Inspectiontbe HSrR negotiations and in international forums that have considered cnemcal weapons and civilian nuclear reactors.

The Soviets have been more circumspect, however, In addressing verification In START. They have Insisted that verification provlalona should be worked out only sfter the final shape of an agreement la clear. They have reacted negatively to US statements that aone on-site inspection msaures might be necessary. Nevertheless, they haveillingness to consider cooperetlve aaaaures, pointing to thoae negotiated in the SALT II Treaty as asaaplea.

The Soviets clearly anticipate START will have to deal with major verification iasues such aa monitoring SLCKs and reobile ICSMs snd telemetry encryption. Th* Soviets haveillingness to discus* measures (or SLCHs, but they maintain that

a ban on deployment would be the bastof solving the

verification profiles.

The Soviets have not been responsive to US concerns regarding telemetry encryption either in START or in discussions at the Standing Consultstlve Commission. ave argued that the United States shouldiat of parameters whose encryption in telemetry channels on Soviet missile flight tests he*, in tne US view, impeded verlflcstlon. They know that

Washington is reluctant to do bo because it must protect

intelligencend

The Soviets may view thair hint of improved verification provisionsargaining chip in the negotlationa. Thia view appeered to be more evident inalks than in START.|'

Moscow's apparent willingness to go further on verification in Start than they war* in the salt II negotiations mayelief that aome movement on thia issue I* necessary in order to reach an agreement. They probably are ready to exchange more detailed data than they did9 and perhaps to accept counting rules snd some limited cooperative measures snd collsteial constraints. Although they will still insist that natlonol technical means are paranount, they may be open to ideas

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