Southern Europe: Socialists In Government,
Southern Europe: Socialists in Government
l' f.ll ffaf i JliniTt
ap i. 1VH waaiiu|i< - r, m
Soctaliit rWramarx* Empfcaali oa CoaliDail*
Of yXllIm rOTOnttaXV
U ilk Chaaca
Wita Socialism Jl -
Tona Pmpactiraa or tha Uartad Sum 13
Southern la Government
A tcnc* of *oasIiti cscctioa victories fat theu transformed tbe political map of Western Europe. While ceoter-righi parUea raw in mm of northersSoclaliiu traditionally have beenmuch of toutbern Europe toclalUl parties have come to power for tbe first time ia
Hay IMI. tbs Preach Social at Party won iu drat oaiional ejection tinea th* Fifth Republic was founded is mi.
The Psnhelkaie Soctalbt Movementonservative government in Athene in1 to become Greece's first tocUUii niaiitri
la December IW, the Spanish Sooslsst Workers' Partyovernment for tbe first Urn* tiaca.
Inuly's first rsattwar Socialist Party prims ministeroalition government with tbe Chrismn DcrrtocraU and three small lay parties.
th the more conae
thei.j: Party, wfcica wis la office6ormedwith the morsocial Democrats
Tbe performance of these governmenu hu reversed lha poles of European socialism. Until the, acadetntc Uudiss contrasted las pragmatism of aortb-cm Europcua socialist snd (coal democratic parties with the ceihcdoay of Iht aewthem Socialists. At present, however, the French. Italian, Portuguese, and Spaaiih parties are sir easing moderation at home and abroad, while their British. Swcdba, and Westcounterparts are proposing more radicalia defense, foreignad sens* sco-nosmchisws tn part to th* fact thai meet northern parties are oat of power while ihoas ia the south now muit cope wiih lhagoverning. Rut it alsorises from baric changes ia the internal bslanc* of power in these parties thst have made kftiil factions ptceewwMBi ia the forth and placed modcratsa alm ia ih* southj
For Um mm pan. th* tsoBota tfacsslbtn Earopcaage-ernnscnu differ aacdeatry freaa ihoa* of iheir notertdeccsaon,a the economic realm. Only lb* French Social jiia radical economicof which ihey *ub*equenily Bbandoncd. Only lh* Crack* haws Ukcaoogmaticleanforeiga sffsirsJ
spsr analyze* lh* prcsnise and perform*oca of the governing aocialsil parties la toutbern Europe. It eianinct their ideology and aocial bass, their social, economic, snd foreign pui,oca. and laser ourraolia public egkiniesi Finally, lb* papere implies uor* of sorauit rale for tbeuture and for US iaiertsu
Ip general, ibc sects) and economic programs of ibc four Latin parlica have evolved similarly lof iheir northern Etiroptan counterparts, la Ik* tarfy postwar period, northern Etiropcaa socialism wistlitani wcebog-ctssi movement stressing naiionaInslion and central economic pUnnJng. By ifie, however, tocialiii panic* tuca a* ihe Weal German SPD beianmphasise socialization of consumption rather than production. Incomeand Kcyniian economic management, they concluded, could mitigate the "evils" of privateTo achieve power, they also becameased catchall parties, appealing eapeessfly to the new middl* clsu of white-collar cinesoyees. The French and lulian panicsimilar evolution in, while the Portuguese andSocialists followed suit in the.
In foreign policy, Socialists bare long stressed peace, international solidarity, and the danger* of the arm* race. At the ume time, most of the parties contain itrong nationalistic. anli-Communi*t. and anti-Soviet elements.esult, the parties are often lharply divided over policies toward the Soviet Uniortand cooperation with domestic Communists.
Southern European parties continueace some longstanding internal tension* on both domestic and foreign policy despite theire cases because of it:
Sooahsi economic pcateies have increased use urt and power of Ihe tunc Sirong cur reals within ihe paruo. howmw. favor *snoe* forma of economic decenta ikon and self-management. In addition, greater state control of the economy at teas!ihr cut em ihe individual right* longby Socialists.
Tbs gradual brcademag of neat parties' aorta! base has rrinforotd their more pragsnatic sad moderate approach. It also will male it dilTicttlt for them to change course and adopt more radical policies.ibs French snd Italian panics were alliances of union tied worker* aad Martni urteslsetaaiato "boargtsotlike their aonhcrn Europeanrench snd Itahaa Socialisu generally were weak among ihe middle snduws. women, and Rosnaaboir csUa appeal dimiaisbsd iand II as proapcritydais divisions and right -gamed aasoag ihea reatsosaa, they incrcaaintly deemphattred Maraaaat. ttrcascd common iniercsu of manual worker* aad while-collar employees, and successfully appcakd to Christian* and women Tbe Spanish and ronugucac panics, which had beenouping* of largely rmddle-ctas* (nigra daring lha lubontsrua regimes,broadened iheir popular appeal in Ibchile retaining working-claia lapporl. The Greek
partyollection of primarily young, middle-dan fcftisU but hai increasingly attracted farmers and industrial yocfccq by stressing nalional-iim1 change!
Recent opinion survey* confirm the Sccialitu' broad electoral appeal ia all fin eoun met ScxScecceeanac eoJTereaces between socialist snd center-right electee-ataa arc often only moderate. To be lure, nsaaaal worker* are much more likely to hava toted for tbeiii than for lha canlcr-right in the last Frceefc. Portuguese, aad Spanisheasons, according to tba paau- Whita-ootlaralao leaded tothe Soculuu ia Portugal, however,rc about evenly divided among the SocialiiU aad the ccater-riiht in France and Spain. Tha gitiauer Italian party receivedinority of votes among all occupational groups, bet its urengih la virtually auaa aasoag workers, wnlte-coUar sasesdyeea, aad fc.gh-uaiua nrnfrasateials. accordingecent servey.
Tbe SocialiiU alto have broad aupport acrou other demographic catcgoriea. according to tbe polls.ingth it fairly even serosa age groupstaly, where the Socsalbua do leas well among those under JO la France. Italy. Scada. aad Portagosl. the SocialiiU polled about equally among men and women. In general, socialist aad cemrr-righi votersouBine* ara about actually likely to ba ia Use lowest third of the populatioa ta terms of iacoawigher proportion of ccater-righi voters gave high ineomes^^ociajisu are rtiorc likely to be ia tbe middle thirdj
Socialist Prooiiae: The CaB for Chaage
Socialists' major campaign theme waa the aced for potiiical. social, and economic change- Theparty'i ssogaa. for example, tvasamtbto (forhile tha Greek party's waa ntrtpiy allagifter decades of conservative or rightwlng rule, the Sodatisis offered different facesistinctive styleideal. Only the Portuguese SocnluUa suffered the disadvaaiage of having**ackluster performance on lha economy
FASOKtrong appeal acrosst and regions In1 notional election.to opinion survtyt.ercent af voters in both urban and rural districts votedSOK. and it polled virtually as well among uppt class voters as among unskilled workers]
To many voters, "changs" meant improvement of the economy. The worldwide recessionbeijor handicap, icccrfinjj to virioui polli and preas reporta. The SocU litis highlighted their prom tie to urcngthen the economy, particularly to fight un-employmcnl.|
Sociilisu advocated botdlni public tpen'dlrig coniUnt in real term* and prcwtfni technologicalhe private tector. Tbe Portuguese stressed that
economic Merifice would be necessary. -
In addition, the Socialist* prgmUed an assortment of social and political rtfonnaJ
lulian Social-1st* proposed tsvtral Institutional inncnatloni to itrengtrirn the presidency and increaae CabinetAll five partiea ladorwafl rarioua reformslaborM penal ryiuan, women's rights, aad edacaiion The prapoacd reform* rtfkctcdkftiu coacerna for eqaahty and aocialbut few were distinctively aocialittlc. lad aad, some propotab, such a* political decentr*ation in Greece and Franca, inherently conflicted with traditional loti*int objectives of reducinglipstitles and inomlng central government control of the economy.
aid to Tartsy, and called for the closing of US oo Grot* roil. By lha time the tabetic* waa he id.Greek Socialist* bad already moderated their denuad far CeaaaPktC witbdrswal from NATO snd tbe EC
The pBitics'tmphaai* on ideology varied widely. The Frenchwith their Cocnmunmlo "break with captullsm" and rposerstr*for the French political and eco-noraic lyitcm. The Greek Socialist*lend of SIiri.i: sad raationslituc rbetonc. la Spain, by coo-trsst. ihs Soctaluu had explicitly renounced Miruna2 rsrnrwiga. they called for realism sad nKderatka. Tbs atemsartt fsctJoat ia the liana* tadiaawiosthasuih-a* from MirUam sad irrgjd pragmatic scJictss, partktt-lariy for the ooooceay
aagatsssoa tai Oi.bdr,
la offks. th* Socialists have inmtutedaaa> mcuul change, la our opt moo. th* rsccaaioo thai bclpsd bring than lo tower ironically also prevented the stuiaaacsrt of their store radical objective* la partksslar, tbs aaod to unset btlhanatag btsdgst dstsraU baa mltd outatw spending programs, tad) tht rtctatt asedesi tcewossut; wetura has onlyurned thb coniif unt. InoJicy, FrsnOC, PcctaanL and luly have generallyroo*ry pro-NATO courts. Tat Scauuta Cantrasniat hat dropped iuorabenfaip la lhalthough it aa* froze* Spain'* osiliury inwtrritsoa lot NATO at least temporarily. Evtn tbe Greektridently anti-US rbstoricroubtesora* ssucs Btoakaaonhmmm toward NATO sad tbs United Suts*,
foreign policy, tbe parties' position* reflected national as muchideologicala general, panics ia France. Italy. Spain, and Portugal strongly cnucired Soviet mil.-tjry and etternal policy, but abo urged greater West Earopeaa inoependene* from the Lottedhe Sfttnah party ccaidcautsd Mid Mi entry into NATO sodational referendum on ihe question. The Great pany was stridently critical of ihe United Sttlt* it lhaperiod, particularly of Wsihlngton'* military
Tbe Soctaltn-ltd lialian Government bailatro-duced tevtra) austerity rneuuret, bul lhe budgetncretilng. Economic policy require* agreement irrvmj tbe five coalition parties, ind Prime Minuter Beilino Craii'i Soeaaluti have reluctantly tcotptad lha need for toMerity. Theaiarietympiementealpartial freua oa wage indexation, ind acaled bach pit nt to create publk-tector <oa% The gewrrnaaaaiii arocceing gradual ineaeatca la the retiiemaot agerackdown on tax ntaina by wall bua*-ncttca tad pre/eaakaaak. Coertprarrjaea among tba coalition partaen and with the Coenmumau. however, have watered down many of the budget-cuttiag meat-urea Inflation hai declined and moderate capoel-lad rconomn growth hai resumed lince Craxi took office, although unemployment haa ritcn tlighUy. According to the US Ran baity la Rome, ihii modctt economic upturn hai caused Craxi and mott of the coalition
Craxi has introduced several Institutionaln aa attempt to maka tba Italian politicalmore effective. Foe iutance, be hasCabinet Council" of major minium to make key decision* and hai ilreamlined parliamcu-taty proccciurci to prevent obstruction by imall minorities. The SocialiiU* minority potiiion in the Cabinet, however, hai limited their ability tomajor social reforms.
One remit, we believe,endency to play down Bait-West rivalry in lhe Thirdwhen few Weal European interest* are Involved. The socialist governmenti have condemned the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, bat ihey critlciu perceived US over reactions lo the Soviet role in areas distant from Western Europe such as Central America aad southern Africa. French Foreign Minister Cheysaon, for instance, has repeatedly attacked US aid to Nkaraguan central and rejected the linkage of Cuban withdrawal from Angola to NamlbianPari* ha* cooperated witb the Uniled Silica, however, in arena where it bas greaterand economicing Lebanon and. eatil recently, CoadJ
In East-West rerance, Italy, and Portugal have generallytrongly pro-Alii*nee si* nee. Mitterrand, for example, has been tougher than his
decetaor ia limiting high-technology exports to the Eastern Bloc, while Craxi and Soare* ahoOCOM restrictiTlhree leaders have ssxpport-ed key Western initiatives or. security;
We believe lhat foreign policy In the five southern European socialist countries reflects both ideological tensions and international comtrainlt. All five parties stress their traditional commitment to disarmament and peace, but moat alto see the need for Western countermcaturex lo the Soviet military buildup.except in Greece, strong an ll-Communist (trains coexist whh pacifist tendencies In Weaiern socialism, according to many academic studies: Socialist* sec Soviet-style Communismerversion of Marxism, and many sires* traditional Rutian expansionism. Moreover, Socialist* have experienced Sovieii against them in their often bitter rivalries with national Communist parties. Hence, socialiiiire torn even more than othersesire for detente and distrust of Sovici foreign policy. In many cases, they have sought other areas in which to demonstrate traditional socialist internationalism.
ruauV Views of Soctsdh* Partersaaasca
Pluralitiet of people io all Ibe couotnea except France appear to bebere (hat socialist fcwircoenu do not differ greatly from iheir center-right preeeccason in either foreign or eeotxamic policy. DiuUiuUounseot with locialirl performance ia widespread, parucekrty among awing voters who supported the wcliliu pet tiea in their countries' last national eleclkmaJ
Accordingariety of public opinion lurvcyt in luly. Portugal, and Spain, pluralities tee only alight difference* between wculitt and rwnaociaiiti
Not lurpriilngly, economic policy appear* to be tbe blfgesi cauae of dluffection. In France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, pluralllica of tbcec who voted SccialiH My economic policy la the aipect of govtriuncat performance of which ihey moat diaa^prove
Even fewer respondent* ice change In aoculiit foreign policies. In recent luliaa. Portuguese, and SpanithlBralities tay socialial foreign pnlldca are onlydifferent from tbos* of preceding nonaocialutnd only anall em non lie* ase anon tabsUntial differences,
Various polls make clear that mpondenu diiillu-rioncd with iccialum lend lo be uncooimitud ceatriai voiar* rather than dogmatic SocialiiU upset with their governmeau' moderation. They tend to criticiseramenl for fellinghsngs national policies, rsthcr thsn for chsngiag tbssn la wrong cUrscticen. la France, luly. Spain, and Portugal,re much more likely than other* io*ay gsvemmen. differ Uttkorro^ceawr*omestic policy.
may have picjed VJI,u
to their call for change, and their generally cautioui domealic and foreign policiet have alienated many erstwhilel the same time, radicalin economicalmcai certainly alienate much of the middle class, whose electoral aupport is crnciaL Wchis dilemma reflects tbe broad but fragile basis of in peon for the Socialists ia the lastccording to our analysis of opinion surveys, middle-claa* i* ing voiers opted for the Socialisia in hopes of improving ihe economy and from an often ill-denned desire fornot in order to support orthodo" socialism.
The Socialists have few opt ions for resolvingilemma. Both economic conitralnu and publiclead to rule out traditional Socialist approaches auch as massive national iia tieeii. Social isi-led govem-mcnt* will be tempted to switch to estpanaaoaary-econoeaic policiea is election* draw near, but even thi* could backfire by rekindling inflation aod/creating the impression of economic bungli
Onxlievejrncet ef tn* five gsavernntcnts are unlikely to change their basic policies over the neat year or two. The Portuguese have promised to eat* up on austerity neat year, and the French. Spanish, and Italian Governments may also somewhat loosen Fiscal and monetary policies before the next elections. At ths same time, however, the fourhave staked their reputations on structuraleforms designed to itlmulate private Investment and hold down public spending. Moreover, theseeconomic policies are beginning to showcurrent account deficits and inflation areand, except in Portugal, economic growth has picked ap. The governments still have some time for their policies to succeed because parliamentary dec-tiom arc not6 in France andn Portugal,8 ia Italy.eteriorating economy, tbe Greek Socialists arcto embrace austerity program* similar to those of ihe Latin socialists, in partational election ia dueS and may take place this year.
despite the political and economic risks. We consider it mere likely, however, that nsosi of the governments will modify their economic programs only aligbtly while sueasiag caseaper and more popular lanovauoeu in socialreater social aqta'ily;rights; aad reforms la education. Use penal system, aad the cm] service, la addition, the French and Greek Government* will probably continue to Strew their corernilmeni to reducing the national power over regional and local idruaisuntsoni
Laager Term PsrseoediM
Evea beyond tha nexthe diversity of tha socialist electorate will tend lo rule out radical cfaaa-baaed economic poiKtOL The SocialiiU' support comes increasingly from Use middle etnas, whack often favor* seen* social reforms hat orjpcees radical income rssdiaOibuiian In many cues, sraddlc-ctaaa sarapan atadsri socialist governments to reject ihe ekaaaada ofhe Seeialiat-ladla France, Italy, Spain, aad Portugal, for -example, have rejected labor union criticism of their austerity mcaaurea and industrial rcairucturing. The -Greek Govern meet bas severely United the right to links, in puMk enterprise* despiu usuoa ceft^tlOB.
If policiea do generaJj remain nMderaia. aa we capact, lha parlies could undermine, their core source* of support. The Socialists' pragma lie areasoenk man-sgecv ot. If tiscceasrul. woo id alsnoM cartainlynee their tuapeal to awiag voters, bast at tba ooat ol* blurring their dastirscuvc image aainag their hardcoreodowrag wouldbe larger, bet asao more proue to defeo to more eoaacrvative pa/tiaa aa soon aa aeoasoanic coerfiuoas svorsea. Coajaaaisi aad other leftsviag putica. ia the meantime, would probably attractrir parties' abandonment of In objective*!
To counter this electoral erosion, the Socialiit-'ed governments will be tempted to abaridon austerity efforu and adopt new spending programs. Theii Prime Minister* have embraced austerityand they or their successor* will face pressure
enhance their electoral peospects. the Socialist-led governments still must try to highlight theirm change, leftist* in lhe parties might succeed in lure ing strnngly expansionary economic policies