IRAQ: THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUE
ave no evidence
that iraq has passed controlled Western dual-use equipaent to the Soviets or hasequipment to non-authorized domestic users. The Soviets either already have acquired or can get the equipaent Involved in tne pending cases without using Iraqource
fro- the US, they al.ost certainly will be able tonta number of Western suppliers.
Iraq's high technology base therefore has not oviet target for high technology acquisitions. Iraq only became seriously Interestednhancing Its technology base in thehen It began receiving increased revenues from higher oil prices. Indeed the Items presently underpproved--would be among the most advanced US equipment sold to Iraq thus far.
Cases Under Review
0 computer withloating Point Array Processors
Iraq hopes to upgrade Its technology through joint ventures or outright ownership of new production facilitiesilar to the Soviet phi 1osophy--fears,being dependent on foreign
sources for critical products. '
Irfltl has plans lant to assemble mi cro-compund wants to install advanced data processing and communications systems throughout the country.
As best we can tell, the Iraqis have legitimate needs for the high technology equipment they have ordered from the United States, particularly for selsmological exploration and scientific research. Reflecting their oil reserves, theyell developed energy exploration sector. For moreecade, Iraq has placed considerable emphasis on education, and its engineers and architects have acquired good regional reputations. For example, Iraq has established the Council for Scientific Research and the Space Research Centers to conduct basic research at all Iraqi universities and colleges.
into unauthorized and technology 1f
equipment from falling would protect control 1ed equipment so.
evidence of Internal Diversion
has Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
has little Incentive to divert equipment purchased under false pretenses or to attempt elaborate black or grey market procurement schemes for such equipment
Potential for Diversions
toSy clean record to date on diversions to the Sov ets, we cannot rule out the possibility in the future
incr aslrh.VT1 vailableq The USSR, Iraq's principal arms supplier, mightequipment previously denied Baghdad to Baghdad may be even more agreeable If the^ace'e^o" ^ ornot easily
MJhedo not necessarily need Iraq to gain accessUS equipment beingto
The Soviets have focused their acquisition efforts on acquiring IBM and DEC equipment.
Theesk top calculator in all probability could be acquired legally from the US. mm"
The large Soviet presence, however, gives Moscowfor
*nJfrnal diversions and
that the odds of this happening are higher than
technology transfers to Moscoi
Similar and in some cases better equipment is available in other Western countries. rance soldillion worth of computers to Iraq; Japanillion. Both
er t0 Sel1 and almost certainly wm.ththe US failed to make the
.k believe that the>-e Utile risk that Iraq will us computers to Moscow. While the risk is somewhatalso believe that internal diversions to Iraq's nuclear weapons programs are unlikel
The Iraqis probably would agree to special conditions attached to the sale of the iterns--such as post shipment checks and visitetions--provided the terms are not perceived as an affront to their sovereignty. The Iraqis, owing to past domination by the British, are extremely sensitive to superpower interference in their internal affairs. __
the Council of Scientific Research has submit to
more clandesti ne
visits. The Iraqis havePH access to their research centers. The Iraqis are likely to find controls acceptableouched In terms ofg the items from diversion by the Soviets.Original document.