Report to the Congress on Verification of Treaties Limiting Chemical and Bio'ogical Weapons (CBW)
This report was prepared In response to the Quayle Amendmenthe "Quayle Amendment" toS DOD Authorization Bill states that It Is the sense of the Congress that the Presidenteport identifying and evaluating the following:
xisting and planned programs to support verification requirements
necessary to determine compliance with2 Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventionhemical weapons-ban.
V The budget resources necessary to support verification
requirements necessary to determine compliance with2iological and Toxin Weapons Conventionhemical weapons ban.
For completeness,5 Geneva Protocol has been added to the list of treaties that were considered. Annexes that describe in greater detail the basis for the conclusions of this report are submitted separately, because of classification. The Annexes describe:
A. CBW Analysis and Resources
hemical and Biological Weapons Intelligence Collection and Resources
,* . Additional Proposed Studies,and Analyses Related toand| .
There are three broad issues with which. is dealinghe general area of chemical weapons arms control: compliance with existing constraints, negotiationomprehensive ban on chemical weaponsnd development of an International barrier against the proliferation of chemical warfare capability. elated_Lssue Is modernization of an. chemical weapons stockpile. | [
The United States is party to two existing international arms control agreements affecting biological, toxin and chemical weapons:
-- eapons Convention (BWC)
o prohibits the development, production, acquisition or retention of bio'ogical agents orf types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Obligation applies also to weapons, equipment or means of delivery to use such agents for hostile purposes or armed conflict.
o prohibits transfer of agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery.
o obliges each Party to take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, weapons, equipment and means of delivery, (u)
-'- 5 Geneva
o The Protocol prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquid, material ort also prolLLbJts "the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.-
The Iraqi's use of chemical weapons against Iran and the use of toxin and chemical weapons by the Soviets and their allies were violations of these constraints and associated rules of customary International
The. objective with respect to chemical weapons is to ensure that such weapons are not used. To this end,.eeking to:
-- bring an end to the current use of toxin and chemical weapons;
:*- omplete and effective ban on chemical weapons; .
-- redible CW deterrent/retallatory capability until the objective of an effective agreement is reached;
develop international barriers against the proliferation of chemical warfare capability.T
Onice President Bush presented. draft chemical weapons treaty which would obligate each party not to:
o develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer chemical weapons to anyone;
o conduct other activitiesreparation for use of chemical weapons;
o use chemical weapons in any armed conflict; or
o assist, encourage, or induce, directly or indirectly, anyone to engagectivities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.
Verification refers to the process of assessing the degree to which an arms control agreement is verifiable, and assessing compliance with the provisions contained In arms control treaties and agreements.
A nation's armaments are an important guarantor of Its security, and governments have always sought to deny to potential adversaries precise Information regarding the numbers, quality, and disposition of their weapons and armed forces. While in open societies such asnformation on military forces Is more readily available, closed societies are capable of denying much of this information to Its. treaty.partners. Moreover, any arms program'that Is deliberatelyiolation of arms control agreement IsJlkeTy topecial* effort to conceal the fact or at least the extent of the violation. The scope'of concealment and deception activities continue to increase, even with regard to areas not subject to arms control agreements. Concealment activities focused on denying evidence of violations should be expected to be carried out on an extensive and rigorous basis. Intensive efforts are required to support verification of arms limitation agreemnts because the information required to ascertain compliance will probably not be readily available.
Compliance by one partyreaty in the face of circumvention or violation by other partiesantamount to unilateral arms control. ation cannot afford to base its security on trust alone. On the other hand, perfect verificationyth, and for 1rremedlal technical reasons and realistic fiscal ones, ts likely to remain so. I I
The verification of arms control agreements has three distinct purposes:
First, verificatlonvefforts serve to delect violations of an agreement*-by evaluating pertinent evidence that violation of an agreement may have occurred, thereby furnishing, as far as is possible, timely warninghreat to the nation's security arisingreaty regime.
Second, by Increasing the risk of detection and complicating any scheme of evasion, verification may help to deter violations of an agreement. This deterrent function presupposes knowledge that detectioniolation will involve some concrete response to counter the illegal activity. The deterrent value of verification also dependsonsiderable extentotential violator's uncertainty as to the exact capability of the Intelligence techniques used to monitor his compliance with anact which helps to explain the importance of secrecy regarding many of these techniques.
Third, effective verification is essential to ensure domestic and international confidence in the viabilityarticular arms control
agreement and in the integrity of the entire arms contro1 process. It provides an important sa*eguard against .the pursuit of advantage throughobservance of treaty provisions. | |
The process of assessing the effectiveness of verification of an agreement has two phases:
The first phaseechnical and analytical process, which weights present and. collection, processing, analysis, and reporting capabilities against the activities to be limited, taking Into account the standard of evidence that has been required within. Government In order toecision that noncompliance has occurred. Such an assessment must assume for purposes of analysis that attempted violations would be accompanied by concealment and deception, and take account of alterations in Soviet standard practices that couldetermination of noncompliance. This phase provides an assessment of;,the degree to which compliance with an agreement, Including the agreeraent'SftObJect'andan be verified by identifying those evasion scenarios that.are the easiest to implement should the Soviets attempt to evade the Treaty.
The second phaseroader assessment by the national leadership of whether verification is effective. This assessment must take into account not only potential evasion scenarios but other factors including:
The degree to which an agreement and its provisions can be verified (results of the first phase);
The costs and risks of evasion;
he degree to which Soviet noncomp*lance wouldisk to US national security, and the extent to which we could compensate for it;
f* he impact of potentially unresolvable compliance concerns on therms control environmentSoviet relations In general;
The specific Incentivesarty might have to violate an agreement, and the past compliance recordarty and
he ease and speed with whichould be possible for. to deny the benefits gained from noncompliance; and the likely Soviet perceptions about the extent to which. would be willing and able to deny any benefits gained from noncompliance. | |
Of particular importance In determining the effectiveness of verification is the degree of risk to those parties that abide by their political and legal commitments to arms control posed by possible violations. At the time of the signing of the Biological and Toxin Weaponst was widely believed that such weapons held little military promise and thatparticularly nuclear powers--therefore had few incentives to develop them.
The use of toxins by the Soviet Union and several of its allies in recent years has shown that this assessment was incorrect. |
A firm and continuing commitment by the United States to negotiate limitations on armamentshared confidence on the part of the concerned branches of government and the public at large that arms control measures are compatibleIndeed an integral partsecurity of our nation. Such confidence will itself depend In substantial part on our assurance that reciprocal limitations continue to be observed by others. Verification and enforcement of compliance with agreements are essential if we are to have that assurance andrecondition for further progressrms control generally. I I
Current Areas of Concern
The present report dea's almost entirely with areas-of concern with. -regard to the first jjhas* of assessing the effectiveness of verification' and of assessing coraplhat phase isechnical and analytics process In which intelligence capablllties^are weighed against activities that are, or are to be, limited by treaty. I_
Specific areas of concern in monitoring the chemical weapons treaty include the following:
Determining whether all existing chemical weapons stocks and productionbeen declared, and whether new ones have been built subsequently.
Identification of undeclared stockpiles and production facilities.
-- Determining the nature of activity at suspect storage and production sites.
undeclared chemical weapons facilities from legitimate
commercial plants and government facilities.
-- Distinguishing chemical munitions from conventional munitions.
-- Determining whether *ghemiMJ*fmunitions are loaded with agents for riot control purposes or with chemical agents.
Determining whether portions of comnerical plants are being used for production of prohibited chemicals or for the production of commercially-useful chemicals In quantities in excess of those required for legitimate commercial use.
Distinguishing undeclared chemical weapons storage sites from legitimate military and commercial storage sites.
Detecting and identifying-clandestine sites, or sites being used by treaty signatorieshird countries or countriesnot party to the
Detecting overt and covert movement of stocks.
Detecting whether facilities conducting research on toxic agents are making themuantities in excess of permitted quantities.
Detecting the development of new chemical agents and delivery systems and identifying the new agents and systems.
Detecting Illicit use of chemical weapons and Identifying the weapons used and their source.
Detecting preparations for use of chemical weapons, including specific testing and training for use.
. -- Confirm accuracy and completeness of.stockplle and
the transfer of specified legitimate chemicals to ensureare not diverted for chemical weapons use.
Summary of Monitoring Capabilities
Many of these concerns arise from the nature of CBW programshave no Identifiable solution; other are amenable to at leastthrough augmentation of resources. This section summarizesand analysis capabilities and notes areas for
CBW Analysis and Resources
dditional all-source analysts to monitor Third World CBW production,storage and logistics would provide substantial Improvements in ourf existing capabilities and potential proliferation and1 would-be essential forlobal CW treaty. |
The trend toward CW proliferation and the potential requirements forW treaty that prohibits transfers of CW agents, technology or materials between nations requires additional resources. At present, the Intelligence Community hasimited capability to monitor these activities particularlyorldwide basis. ystematic program to Improve this situation has been initiated. This effort has Included formationull-time five person team of analysts to work the CW proliferation problem. ignificantly expanded collection effort also will
problems because of their complexity And classified nature of seme of these activities.
be required to enhance our capabilities to detect transfers of chemical^agents and munitions between countries. Even with additional resources these are
' because of the highly
in that and the rather than
Increased analytical resources could usefully be devoted to assessing the potential BW threatlobal basis. If the Soviets and other nations are able to weaponizegents, our problemsonitoring become extremely difficult and probably would not be solved by additional analytic resources. Such activity would be even easier to conceal than traditional BW agents. Thisue, in part, to the nature of the production facilities normally are engaged In producing materials for civilian use probability that some BW agents would be produced when needed stockpiled.