EGYPT AND THE ARAB STATES: REINTEGRATION PROSPECTS (DELETED)

Created: 6/1/1986

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EgypI and thecintegralion Prospects

Key Juprospects (or Egypt's format reintegration into the Arab League

tpoor. Cairo's continued isolation will sharply limit President Mubarak's

lo pursue indcperrdent or pro-Arab policies that conflict wilh US

and Israeli interests. In the unlikelyormal reintegration were to occur, it would probably make Cairo less receptive to US influence end would have tbe potential to undermine US-Egyptian militsry cooperation. On the other hind, the United States could benefit to the extent reintegration of Egypt helped strengthen the moderate Arab camp and positioned Cairo to broker future Arab-Israeli coo tacts.

Syrian inuarmgeoce will be the major stumbling block to reintegrationas Damascus remains outside the Middle East peace process.Mubarak almost certainly will not bow to radical Arab demandsrepudiate the Camp David accords and its relations with Israelprice of rcadmittance. Recent setbacks in the peacethe demise of tbe Egyptian -supported Jordanian-PLOrobbed Cairo at least temporarilyole that would allowburnish its Arab credentials and help end its isolation. AlthoughArab readers aneear

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east ina general iBpprKncm wnh Egypt they are unlikely to follow Jordan's cample of oreo with the Arab consensus end unaaterally renewingxcept in

broke relations with

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s relaiions with most Arab states arc handled through large interest sections that function as embassies in all but name. Egypt hashe radical stales, including Libya and Syria.

Despite the lack of formal ties. Egypt will continue to make progress in its internal relations with other Arab states.9 the pace of its bilateral contacts with cherabs has qusefceoed rJrroughol high-level visits aad cooperation in trade and regional security issues. Egypt also has been readmitted Bo the Islamic Development Bank aad tbe Islamic Coesfeeeoce Oiganiration

A return lo the Arabeven renewed bilateral relations with another Arabbe highly popular with most Egyptians and would remforee Mubarak's political position as he tacklt

domestjc -oa. including intractable economic problems aod reduced pubbe confidence in hit feadcrihip. Mubarak, however. will continue lo insist that the Arab states uke tbo initiative. For reasons of national pride and prcsuge, ao Egyptian diplomaiic offensive for restored ties is highry

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Overcoming liolation: Ties That Bind

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Egypt and tbe Arab Reintegration Prospects

The Arab league iuib reacted bjnhlr to Egypt's KptriU peace wnh Israel ia9 byeriet oi* punitive measure* against (he Egyptians Ihcse

of dipkouttir rektico*.

Isapcsi(kn) of an economic boycott.

Termination of financial asiiitaace from the Gulf states.

of Egypt's membership in tbe Arab League and affiliated orgaaiiations. d

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Those sesttMns wen usmlccnenied by all League mcmbeea ciccpt Sudan, Somalia, andnever brokeled to drastically curtailed official aad.easer Client, informal contacts between Egypt and (be Arab world. President Sadat reacted with angry defiance, publicly lambattlng (bei'iI eftsT Arabs for (hdr rejection of hat pesos offarta. Sodai steadfastly refused to workeaio-

fration of Cairo's Arab tie* at tbe expeoac of Israel snd the peace agreement flH

Since assuming power iaresident Hosni Mubarak hasore conciliatory approach (haa Ida predecessor, tse has worked craarsly to end Cain's nolo tun by eertphasiring Egypt'ssupport and sacrlBcea for Arab causes particularly Palestinian righu and the Iraqi war effort agaiaot IrasUrsdi acuom Inand on the West Bank. Al the same time b* hasdhcrcacc at the Camp Dsnd soaords aad the peace treaty with Israel a* key ek merits of LgypUanUcy fj^iB

eonged strategy has paid dmdeada. In1 Egypt wasSaudi acquiescence and oven support from aoine Gulfa UN Security Council peat, aad tha following Fabrawry Cairo wai raiosaajad in the le Conference Org* aim Don. Sincea* lavhed to rejoin (be lalamic Development Bankew lesser onsnjurani such as the Arab Sports UsaoaS> The

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catc User resent their political isoUiioo and believe it denies them tbe formal Mains they are da*.public orickaun of the Arab League's recent failure to agreeodn contains aaelement of war tripes, bat il alsoimplies that Egyptian leadership is indispensable for achiev-isg Arab umty-fl|H|

An official retarn to Arab good graces would offer both Egjpt tad MubarakBurnbe* of advantages,

indudingr. B

Weeturn to the Arab camp ar even renewed diafcmatk rota lion* with one or awrcArab ataita would he highly popular with tnoat Egyptians aad would boost Mubarak's confidence andpon as be ladies dociesuc ecorxxnu:ke chsriama of Nastr aad theof Sadat. Mubarak would benefit signifkanl-lyiplomatic triumph that would boost bis political forraoes snd betp erase ths stigma of incom-peteoce iten-.maui from bis inept handbageries of recent crises.*mmm

A strcag boost both for Egypt* prestige sad Mubarak's statueader. .

Enhanced opportunity to influence wests ia tho Arab world andeadership rote

The possibility of additional Income in the form of jocreased trade, Investments, sad aid.

Reduced vulnerability to regional crises aad schsnv big by radical Arab state*

A public vindication of Cairo! commitment to Middle East peace negotiations consistent with aad baaed on in treaty with Israel fj

mot,^ ^ Fcenal

ns wBwctaiiy wnff received ansong formal rail

1 into the Arab Leaguef Use membership at on Arab.

those groups most critical at* Mubarak. The largast recftlre the.maauuiraaia si aa Arab oppositionMuslim Brotherhood aad other summit raaenag. but near-term peoapecta forslamic find.HVicnutm groups on the right and the at he tsddbsSnwdi

iews

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5k by leeking so beal oner Arab strains. The highly canrtiows Saudis, bowcm, arc unlikely to convene a

summit meetingong ai they believe widening

conflicts In the region and hardlineoccrasfcl ouU'-^Ttf anBaBBBaaaBBBBBBB| ^

citraordtnaiy summit meeting acidii ci la Morocco accomplished little because ofofeycalled In early

6 after tbe US attack; oa Libya never even convened for lack of sn agreedaaVHaaaap1

Evenummit meeting were convened this year, we believe that tbe custom of consensus decisionmaking would allow (be Syrian-led hardliners to veto any action on Egypt's reintegration that was backed by the moderate majority of Arab states. Trees liveby Jordan and other moderate states to change the consensus requirement and adopt majority rule in the Arab League arc unlikely to bear fruil. Consensus remairv. popular because it offers protection for Ihc weak igsinit pressure and threats of reuliaiion by the powerful We believe the saaaUer states view the need for such protcsrtion os especially great when divisions within the reason run deep and there is no strong lute or combination of states that canominantypt Lt beat suited to build stucb sg alliance, but it needs to be read salted tW (ji^A

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We believe Egypt's return to the Arab fold would be anathema to the Syrian sod Libyan hardliner*.President Assad haa rtaimcd that SyriaEgypt's mctcjTatioa. we bebcec he was go to erjajderahle lengths to keep Cairoytrraagth-cried moderate coalition led by Egypt would cbaBeesre Syria's dnlm to leadership In the Arab world and further isolate it along with Libya. Of all the Arab slates, Syria felt the roost betrayed by Egypt's peace with Israel la our view. Damascus rrastinaua aa believe that Cairo's peace aaovc left Syria alone us Use war against Israel and amounted to the desertionf__

President Assad Improved ties toarak cannotssad will dorst

Wc believe the moderate- fear the: cocci of aa unstable Egypt and might codorre rraatesxstion IT they saw it as essential toMubarak's bold on power. Evidence of Ibisemerged In Cbe roqairira Mubarak received from nervous Arabthe Iraqis and the

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tbe local situation folk-wing (be police rices In February. Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affair*ie visited Cairo in early March toubarak of Baghdad's continued support^

he Saudis for the tint time

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< ess torn of support far Egypt, however, bare not been matched by public efforts in Cairo's behalf. Although Ihe moderates universally favor Egypt's returnonsensus vole in tbe Arab

none is willing to risk trouble with other Arabs byraising this issue publicly. Nor are Egypt'* efforts Io prod mode rale regimes into unilaterally renewing ties to Cairo Bkaiy to bear frnrt. Steadfast Eayptna baelrjag of Arab causes and cateniire economic and military lie* to the moderate Arabs have helped reinforce Cairo's Arab credentials and rrdocc its isolation. This support is mcreaalagly being taken for granted by Ihe moderates, especially Iraq, who see little more to bemuch to bebreaking, with tbe coeaensus and amlatcraQ)Egypt tasHB

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asarchrrsg far way* to ssatkrscore its nupooalaad to suingibes caistlasj ties Is hopes of Laying the groundwork tor an eventual Arab reintegration effort. We nhso eapeci Cairo to continue looking for shut* that demonstrate tgyra's "indlspenssbility"otsarr of the Arab world SinceEgypt La.sarabrr ofbilateral eoursomic aad toenmercial relations and securityrediKc its isolation.

Indeed. Egypt's ties to the Arabs swerc severaevraed. Cairo Tctasns daptoesalic bnks to rnosl other Arab states through large ictcresi aections thai

Ws bcliere that the Egyptian* pin much of thetheir continued isolation oa the Saudis, whomas key players la determining whenIbe Arab

" Cairo has accused tbe Saudis of deliberately working to prevent Egypt's rssategralsda in order to preserve aa Arab lesneriaup rote foravoid -

been certy hanh and indicatesjwdh has takee steps to shore up the bilateral rrdatkocudup and to boost Mubarak's .'i.-ifjJca.c

Nonetheless, we betivre tbe Saudis trill follow-eotArab ooesensus to end Cairo's diplomatic cjtiarantlDB. Only ironclad assurances reimport fromwe rousWor highly unlikely ia the foreseeableprompt them

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function aa de facto embassies andareby professional diplomats, many of "boaa earn UK

personal rani of ambassador Ditcretti1 immediately alter the initial

atom of ami -Carap David etnotioes coded, fa

The Peace Prccess

Wa believe ibat an active and visible rale in tbj peace isccut* coupkd with ataaacb aapport tec Palestinianthe moat promising vehicle for easing Egypt 'a return to tbe Arab League- We bettere Egypt hatead* toajor role in future peace rcgoaia-tlena, no trastter bow they evolve. In our atew,also hopes that progress oa thisI csuuoaaiiasa to the Egyptian people that Casap Davidccessary pfccursor to the process andxsrite peine fgn

Mnbarak hat too much prestige invested ia th* searchiddle East peaoe to abandon the effort, but w* believe kit ability to move the process wiQ be constrained by several Cacaoes. Oo the domestic side, we eapect him to become uacressUigty preoccupied aith shoring up Egypt's falteringaad cecaag with pcettscal rhaahaagrt fram tshsawc

Jordan Renew* Tier. ffgysek Only Beeekskeeegh

have flour-mubarak and

Egypt's retmegralion effort received III mostboost when King Hussein af Jordan restored relations with Cairo Ine believe Hussein hod long been coeMnced that Egypt must be brought back Into Arab decisionmaking to strengthen the position of the Arab moderates In the peace process. He calculated that resuming diplomaticwith Egypt would Increase his leverage against Syria and enlist Mubarak's backing for his effort toordanian-Palestinian peace strategy. Foe Mubarak, the Jordanian Initiative offeredole Inew Arab majority against the rejettloalsu and an opportunity to earn reacteptance Into Arab ranks. It also helped vindicate Egypt's poller of adhering to the peaceera leeel and refusing to accept preconditions for thr restoration of' Egyptian-Arab lies.

Since the restoration, bilateral Ished.

Hussein have metozen times. In addition.

they confer frequently by telephone to exchange views

on Arab Issues aad coordinate polities toward the

peace process. These contacts are covered"

Hon aspaeinemts la pack arras as trade, eotnmvnlea-tlaxi. transasartation. and labor tschangrs. The potts-tealof these agreements,appear mere leapartemt than their substance. Trade prospects have been Inflated In pristS2S0 rntBian target setppears particularly manrsnhanfc. gfswa sheeOliom level achieved Inccimeiterctal reseslom* help identify and reinforce common

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prospects for new initiative! appear bteak. Wa bcfieM Mubarak win rax risk expea-are byeace Initiatives oa bat owe. preferi; ng instead tIn the tafer role of broker while other* lake theI Wmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm}had bopad that renewed tuea to Jordan wouldn to pbr*ole. The coDapaa ka6 of tbe JoreUiv-PLO dialogEgypt actively cbamrnoraad -appear* to haverrieua blew to Cairo* hopesreakthrough Even FJag Hussein haa becotrM skeptical that Egypt has any teal role to

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ith Mubarak'* apt*rent snabH-Uy to paihty hi* tuunch support of Arafat into leverage over tbe wily PLOflknVaay

silr KeUrtoen

Active eceeawuc cents as have helped blunt the ef-fwcts of9 saactioos aaauSM Egypt- Ahthaugh Arab aid tobar lemaincd fuseeaded. trade leveh and rjomrrirjcial contact* have tnursatcd, ac-

0g> enmwl cue major US academic (tudy. bt addition to Jordan. Egypt has signed economic and technical agreements with Iraq. Trade officials travel frequently between the two countries, and belatoal oaopersttdn has bc-eoen* substantial ia such areas aa tabor, youth, and culturalnor cample, Osro and

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major source of the Arab states.

Despite ibe increased economic contacts, Egypt's ability to itrcststhen econosMic tics to its Arab acigb-bors will be boused, re our view, becatua the Arab states are not aatural tradkng partners. Ia addition, Egypt's apatrtaw- wutaera probably sviO return won to titereeaing numestr* as the oil states run short of fundi to pay thcrxutSS^gstVgS^

elieve the economic downturn in tbe Guff OH econnaan has already began to affectunsings Saudi Arabia isiag so est its expatriate wtxik force to boost oVanntic employment.

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We believe Eow'ieiernbe Arab feedong way off and anticipate Utile movement on ibe issue in ihe coming months. We expect Increasing polarisation between Arab aaoderatct and radicals oa regional tssuet'to coaiioueinder ibe consensus rscccssary simplyummit meeting, let alone pioduce agreement to set on Egypt'i behalf. As long as lbs peace process remains 'tailed. Cairo will be deprived of its most orcein og tnecbanisen forreakthrough.ijfj

Prespects for bilateralboa of Egypt byArab states appear somewhat brighter, but fears of breaking ibe Arab consensus will continue to discourage such initiatives. Any bandwagon effect almost certainly woulduirt nod fromd i. which we consider uidikcly. Still, we expect Cairoontinue efforts aimed at forging newand security lies to the Arabrend that we eapect wtS further ludaec Egyptian

Egypt reaan do Btthi to hasten tha rcsats-gratloa pracuss. io our judgment Msibnrak's shaky leadenhip position and increasing preoccupation with domestic issues will rein fore* his tccdnaey toward nation. Is oar view, he wfl cossturwr the main hues of hb regionalmini miring reintesp-etson prospects while staunchly backing Palestinian rights sad quietly exploiting opportunities to cementbe sees no workable altematrrq thai do not carry an uriaacepMble nsk ofafBB

Altaswochw Scenario.

Our ana lysis of King Fahdx rtscxtnt odoptsoa of bold positions on oil production levels and the Iron-Iraq warbe rnay ba embarkingore aaapes-iive foreign policy coarse. If ha aasasessaars no sagescV cant raree believe histo grapple

may locroase In the months ahead. Although dramatic Saudinlikely. Fnbd may ctjcIottc Egypt* tetsrn to the Arab League if be csuailates that Syrian acquits, cencccnobef "

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On the Wheteintegration undertaken an Arabe withoutrenundaiion of Camp David would benefit Washington bybe mod-cratt Arab* and possibly prariionipg EgyptrokerArab-Israeli contacts. Ma bank'i political for-isinea would receive aaluou* boost that couldoth positive and negativeoraure political position could permit him to be more flexible la attempts to normalize rctations with liracL

ealthy working relationship withclose Ilea to the United Slates are likely loof Egyptian foreign policy whether oroccurs. Mubarak has statedEgypt wil adhere to the Camp Pan!thai there at no alternative to peace with lma trowing and-Israeli mood amonghi, peace la popular, even within the military

Although Mubarak, under pressure from fellowand domestic erflka. la eager to radac* ha depsadsncc on the Cakede haao go for the vastba&on lastnecessary to knap the Egyptian eoouemy aQoaL We believe that prospects (or aaoraaaad Arab" hi event of i

sdattsweogical outgrowth of resiorcd bos.4rab atalts4 bilbou taad UJ bBasaaiurj srd lo Ia:yTX- Ai present, however,l/ Arabs are In the midst of their own fraantJal crista because of falling oiln ourhey remain preencupted with more unossdaate iitwm In particular Iraq'a struggle againstarc neither sbkaro-tde the adrtirasal asd Egypt will

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