EXTERNAL OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Created: 1/1/1987

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

EXTERNAL OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The political leadership of the external oppositioneffectively Incapacitated for most of the periodby the Itsue of Arturo Cruxoes he stay or go? end, he went; the opposition is arguably better off The issue becaaeatter of personalityof individual wills, virtually devoidpolitical content, and it prevented, for theof the dispute, progress on developing anResistance political program, which to date hasbeyond the four-year-old Blue and White Book and19S7 agreement on objectives between UNO and BOS. t is now possible to effectively iapleaent reforas he*advocated, and we

The emergenceotential single leader, widely recognised as such. In Pedro Joaquin Chaaorro.

Suppdft throughout the Resistancerocess of change, leading to the unified resistaace,ingle aray, and broadly representative of the diversity of the opposition to the Sandinistas.

The possibility of developing action programs, particularly in the international relations field, which are not haastrung by political Infighting androad consensus within the leadership.

here are increasing Indications that Alfredo Cesar will see reason and sign on with the Resistance on aore realistic terns.

There are pitfalls renalnlng, however. Arturo Crux* departurehiaper ratherang left his rivals feeling theaselvesosition of relative strength, and there is the danger that they will exceed theaselves in their effort to obtain representation on the new Resistance Directorate.^ *

aajor threatirectorate-packing effort, in which Calero allies io the aajor political parties would effectively giveajorlty in the Directorate. While this reflectslose contacts throughout the Nicaraguan-political system, it also night become so blatant as'co pronpt other necessary elenents to refuse to play. Robelo has.;already said he would not (and froa all Indications has not intended toeaber of the new Directorate since the initiation of the "transitionesar undoubtedly would not either.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

This can be countered by working with the, individual party leaders, both in Nicaragua and in exile. Factions in the individual parties willeto power: the unspecified selection process for Directorate aeabers froa each party requires that politics of consensus be practiced.

he key to resolution of this issue Is to avoid the polarisation that would result were it allowed to becoae one in which true Nicaraguan nationalists" could unite against "foreign iaposltions".

Selection of the Indian representative to the new Directorate will beontroversial and an expensive

proposition.

onduraas have not yet been persuaded that art asseablv to select an Indian representative should be held soon; their spokesaan, Ltc. Eric Sanchez, who 1st the original source of aost Honduran viewpoints about the Indian problea, has expressed his view (technically correct) that an asseablv is not called for

oaewhat lesshird of the Indians can be considered followers of Rivera, and his control over even that portion is tenuous. Soae of his coaaanders are already negotiating directly with UNO/South.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA