ZAIRE: HOW VULNERABLE?

Created: 7/10/1987

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Shaba, Zaire's most vital economic region and the site of two major foreign-backed insurrections in the, now appears tranquil, with no dissident gioup operating effectively in the region, I-

Zairean Army units based in Shaba arc undermanned and ill-equipped to cope with al) but small and

sporadic skirmishes. Q

neighboring Angola is reactivating the long-dormani National Front for the Liberation of Zairehich may attempt to launch small-scale guerrilla operations into Shaba. Othei dissidents based in eastern Shaba and neighboring Tanzania and Zambia lack, ihe external support, manpower, and effective leadership necessary lo challenge Mobutu's grip.

Tbe Domestic Scene

producesercent of ihc country's mineralcalm, despite an economic downturn, and there is no evidence of significant aniigovernmcnt organization. The Lunda tribestraddles the border with Angola and which formed the backbone of Moisc Tshombc's separatist movement innd :he FLNC in theseems passive, and few. if any. members retain separatist sentiments. Although studcnti and faculty in Shaba's principal city. Lubumbashi. occasionally have, been rjrMcej ol the Mobutu regime, they are too disorganized to mount an organized challenge and spark prolonged unrest. Despite the absence of antigovcrnmenl activity, however. [

providesimited level of goods and services to Ihe region, and the central government's conirol is minimal in many parts.

'undas are Shaba's second-Isigcsi iribe. Tor ihe meal part. Lands* dislike Mobulu, but ibeir leaders are | freak jund ihua are politically impoicnt.J' |

The Threat From Angola

Relations between Angola and Zaire havefor moreecade. Authoritieshave long denounced ihe presence offor the National Liberation ofin Zaire, while Kinshasa believesis al least harboring, and probablyarming. Zairean j

'publicly denies il assists Angolan dissidents and.Luanda, occasionally cracks downpolitical activities.

lose friendship wilh UNl'l ASavimbi and il sympathetic to thr goals of

support almost certainly stems tiomil-Communist outlook: he has long believed ihat Zaire is surroundedred belt" of hostile or potentially hostile regimes. UNITA is politically active in Shaba, withembers andnonmiliiary personnel-

Zairean dissidents in Angola have been quiescent since their earlier altcmpis to oust the Mobutu regime

)he FLNC.

which invaded Shaba from Angola7s incapable ofajor offensivenear

FLNC'swomen and

llj

- i

ALAUliuly m?

stands al fewer. In recent years many FLNC troops may haveprobablythe Angolan Army units fighting UNITA, rather lhan operating separately against Zaire Moreover, ihc defections of key Lundaas Nguzaond, once Mobutu's main critic but now Zaire's Ambassador lo the Unitedalso damaged FLNC's credibility in the Shaba region j

jlans to start a

FLNC can probably carry out small-scale military operations inside Zaire. and| hii-and-run campaign in October.

Recently, however, there are reports lhat theis seeking to regenerate FI.NC,part to pressure Mobutu to reduce his support

malt number oipooriy ily penetrate the

trained andporous border to launch limited attacks against isolated government and military posts. V

The Angolan Army may also lake advantage of the porous border and increase its hot pursuit of UNITA guerrillas, especially if President dos Sanios concludes lhal mote pressure must be placed on Mobutu.

Angolan units have occasionally chased UNITA troops across the border and rounded up Zaireans theyelieved were Angolan guerrillas. For ils part. Kinshasa concludes that the Angolan Army could easily destabilize the Shabj reeion. i

I)fcsirk-nts: in Taniaaiambia

Tanzania harbors several small Zairean dissident groups, including the Coalition of National Unity <CUK| and the Congolese Liberation PartyUN. led by former FNLC President Mbwnba, bas some members who left FLNC and the Congolese National Movement Lamumba faction, but it has fallen into disarray in recent years. P

Capabilities

Zaire's Army, which was overwhelmed in both Shaba invasions, and required French, US, Morrocan. and Belgian assistance lo retake key parts of the region, has improved its capabilities slightly in recent years.

Army petlormcd fairly well aunng the

byuerrillas on the border town of Moband. withinours of the incursion, ihe General Staff organized andounterattack. Despite plans to expand the size of its armed forces0ver the next several years to strengthen protection of its borders.

IZaire has developed no coherent military strategy to deal with attacks along the borders. Q

its longstanding aversion to Mobutu. Tanzania is unlikely to encourage Zairean dissident

FLNC troops also are unlikely to

ignificant threat to Sbaba io the near term.

[even though Zambian

President Kaunda is critical of Mobutu's southern

African policies, and particularly bis support for

UNITA, he probably would not welcome instability in

Shaba, which could easily spill over into Zambia's

economically vital copper bclt.1-

1

GrnnmL

capital.

Zaire's Air Force could provide limited support, bul we doubl it wouldecisive role in any combat operations. The Air Force, based entirely in ihe

Outlook

While we see no evidence of any major threai to the overall security of Shaba at present. the low level of central government control in the region and the limited capabilities of the Army could allow for opposition organization and activities in the future. Even in the near term, Shaba remains Zaire's most vulnerable region andikely target for dissidents

backed by tbe Angolan government. FLNC.manpower and organization to mount asimilar to put Shaba invasions, could carryoperations and possiblywarfare. Small raids, for example,damage Zaire's already depressed economydisrupting mining production inAngolan Army, for its part, may be temptedits hot pursuit of UNITA guerrillas alongand evenewarning lo Mobutu to reduce hisUNITA. Eastern Shaba, on the otherto be fairly secure, and neither Tanzaniais likely to encourage Zairean dissidents

Srrrrl.

Original document.

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