Director of Central Intelligence
Soviet Forces and Capabilities for
Strategic Nuclear Conflict
Through ther
July IW 43
this estimate is issued by the director of central intelligence.
the national foreign intelligence board concurs.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:
The Central Irrte&gence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, ihe Notional Security Agency, ond the intelligence organixolion ol the Deportments ol Slate and Energy.
Aho Participating;
The Deputy Chief of Stofl lor Intelligence, Departmeni of the A'my The Director of Naval InteKgence, Department of iha Navy Th* Assistant Chief of Start, Intelligence, Deportment ol the Air Force Ihe Director of Intelligence, HeeKSquo/ters, Marine Ccpt
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soviet forces and capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict through the| |
key judgments
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key judgments
Strategic Offensive Forces. evidence and analysis over (lie past year have reaffirmed our judgment that all elemenls of soviet strategic offensive forces will be extensively modernized between now and ihc, and will be more capable, diverse, and generally more survivable. an increasing proportion of soviet intercontinental attack warheads will be deployed on submarines and mobile intercominenia] ballistic missilesmaller bul still substantial proportion in fixed silos. the major changes in the force will include:
ICBMs. preparations are underway to deploy8ew, silo-based heavy icbm with an improved capability to destroy hardened targets. icbms of thelasswarhead system) will be deployed iniloshe new silo-based deployments will be more vulnerable as us counlersilo capabilities improve, but will enhance the soviets' already formidable capabilities for prompt attack on hard and soft targets.lass icbms will also be deployedail-mobile mode this year. these rail-mobile deployments,deployments of the road-mobilea single-warheadnd expected improvements and follow-ons lo both missiles, will significantly improve soviet force survivability.
SLBMs. the proportion of survivable soviet weapons also will grow ihrough the deployment of much better nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (ssbns) and new submarine-launched ballistic missileshe new submarines are quieter and are capable of operating from deep under theand carry long-range missiles. we expect ihe soviets toolal of eight typhoons and up tooelta-!vs. and judge they willew ssbn.ew slbm, in the. soviet slbms are likely to have sufficient yield and accuracy by theo allack current us icbm silos with grealer conedence. but slbms during the nextears will not be nearly as effective for this role as soviel silo-based icbms.
Bombers and Cruise Mlssdes. ongoing modernization will give tlte heavy bomberomewhat greater role inallack, with more weapons and greater force diversity.
While production of the Bear II, which carries theong-range air-launched cruise missileeems lo be winding down, the new swingwing Blackjack, which will carry ALCMs and short-range attack missiles, will be operalionalhe Soviets appear torogram for developmenttealth fightertealth bomber;!
ould"
The earliest we would expect the tighter would be the
; the Stealth bomber could be operational by thebut more likely not untilheand-attack, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is inof being deployed, includingedicatedup toLCMs. Theong-range,cruise missile could begin deployment innd SLCM and ALCM versionsarge,cruise missile arc likely lo become operational
Strategic Defensive Forces. The Soviets continue to invest about as heavily in active and passive strategic defenses as they do in offensive forces, and their capabilities will improve in all areas.
Air Defense. Soviel capabilities againsl low-flying bombers and cruise missiles are increasing because of continuing deployments of thell-altitude surfacc-lo-air missile and threelypes of new lookdown/shooldown aircraft These will be supported by the Mainstay airborne warning and control syslem (AWACS) aircrafl, which should be deployed7
Ballistic Missile Defense. The new Moscow antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses,nterceptors, should be89 and will provide an improved intercept capability against small-scale attacks on key targets around Moscow. The Soviets have developed all ihe requiredfor an ABM system that could be used for widespread deployments that would exceed Treaty limits. There are differing views about the likelihood that the Soviets would make such deploymcnls, and wc have major uncertainties about the degree of protection such deployments would afford
thesome new ABM compo-
nents may be under development and might begin testing in the ncxl year or two; ifew ABM system could be ready for deployment as soon as the. Also, improving technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and ABM systems.
Hardened Protection for the Leadership. We have identifiedSoviet command posts for military and political leaders,tunnels, secret subway lines, and otherCosting the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars, theyear program to provide deep-underground shelters for the leaders is designed to enable them touclear war, and to direct the war effort, reconstitution, and postwar recovery.
Antisubmarine Warfare. The Soviels still lack effective means lo locate US SSBNs at sea. While we expect (he Soviets to continue to pursue vigorously all ASW technologies, we judge they will not be able to deploy in, and probably not until wellonacoustic ASW detection system that could reliably monitor US SSBNs patrolling in the open ocean. However, the Soviets may be able toSW remote detection systems by5 that, under certain conditions, would have some effectiveness against US attack submarines approaching Soviet SSBN bastions.
Laser Weapons. Tlicrc is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to develop high-energy lasers for air defense, antisatellitend ballistic missile defense (RMD) applications.'"
H about how far the Soviets haveand the status and goals of any weapon development programs. Wc expect the Soviets to deploy mobile tactical air defense lasers by the, followed by more powerful strategic and naval systems. The Soviets arc developing ground-based, airborne, and space-based high energy laser weapons for ASAT. While there are differing views on dates of operation, limited capability prototypes in some cases could be available by the. If ground-based BMD lasers prove feasible and practical, werototype would be tested in the, although an operational system probably would noi be deployed until after thehe Soviets also appear to be considering space-based lasers for BMD. We think they may be able toeasibility demonstrator as early as the, bul we do not expect them to deploy an operational system until after the
Advanced Technologies. The Soviets arc also engagedresearch on other technologies that can be appliedand BMD
Projected Forces. This year, we have projected four alternative Soviet strategic forces to illustrate possible force postures under various assumptions of the strategic environment the Soviets will perceive over the nextears. The number of deployed intercontinental nuclear warheads, currentlyill increase bys new systems are deployed that carry more warheads than the systems they replace. Two of the projected forces are premisedoviet belief that relations with the United States are generally satisfactory and arms control prospects look Rood, if the Soviets decide nol to exceed the quantitative sublimits of SALT II,5 deployed warheads would probably number0erlmps as low0 if modernization and growth were more limited. In ihe absence of an arms control process the Soviets would not necessarily expand their intercontinental attack forces beyond these figures, but they clearly have the capability for significant further expansion. In an environment where the Soviets see relations with the United States as generally poor and arms control prospects bleak, the number of deployed warlieads on Soviet intercontinental attack forces could grow to050n all of these cases, the introduction ofsystems will resultecline in the number of launchers. [ |
We alsorojection for an SDI "response" force thatarger offensive force expansion (up0 warheadshe projection is basedear-lerm Soviet judgment that the
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United Stales will deploy land-based ABM interceptors and space-based SDI assets beginning in the. The projection depicts Soviet measures aimed primarily at overwhelming US defenses through sheer numbers of warheads, and does not reflect such possible responses as increased ASAT efforts, Soviet BMD deployments, or advanced penetration aids. While increasing the sheer size of their offensive forces would be the most viable near-term Soviet response, advanced lechnical countermeasures would be critical to dealing with SDI in the long term. The size of the force could be several thousand warheads lower than theepending on the timing of the introduction of technological countermeasures. Given the uncertain nature of the US program and the potential disruption of their elTorls, we judge that the Soviets have noi yet committed to deploy offensive force modifications specifically to respond to SDI. Thus, in the absencerash effort, such modifications would be unlikely to be deployed in significant numbers until0 or beyond. [
Implications of Gorbachev's Declaratory Policy. Weihe potential impact of Gorbachevs declaratory policyan apparently more benign approach to issues of nuclear warhave typically characterized in previous years in thisdiffer about the impact ihis policy may have, if any, onprocurement and operational planning. On the basis of allevidence, which we present in this Estimale, we do notsignificant reduclion in the priority the Soviets have givenforces or any serious revision of their operational priorities
At the same time, the Gorbachev leadership haspecial emphasis on revitalizing the Soviet economy and has made arms control proposals calling for deep cuts in strategic forces. Economic faclors might affect somewhat the rate and levels at which some strategic systems are deployed. However, the large sunk costs in production for new strategic weapons and the fact thai such production facilities cannot readily be converted to civilian uses mean tlialndustrial modernization goals almost certainly will not have major effects on strategic weapons deployments through the. We judge ihat strategic forces will continue to command the highest resource priorities, and therefore would be affected less by economic problems than other elements of the military.[ |
Arms* ControL We believe the Soviets arc willing to reach arms control agreements calling for deep cuts in intercontinental offensive forces, contingent upon the curtailmenl of ihe US SDI. Greater
S
flexibility with respect to arms control, however, would notvigorous modernization of all aspects of SovietMoreover, we judge that in negotiating agreements, theaim,inimum, to preserve the net strategic capabilitiesforces to serve the gamut of Soviet security
Soviet Force Goals and Cat-abilities. Although Agenciesdiffered on the interpretation of Soviet military doctrinalis reasonably close agreement on the trends in Sovietand on their employment in war. Soviet strategicmany vital functions for the political leadership.forces provide the most effective means to deal withlhat global nuclear war could actually occur, and givethe superpower status that is critical to the maintenanceof its foreign policy influence. Moreover, the Sovietsthe more traditional military view that forces prepareda vvar are also better able to deter war, they have neverWestern concepts, such as Mutual Assured Destruction, thatdistinctions between the strategic force requirements fora nuclear war and those for fighting one.
The Soviets apparently believe that, in the present US-Soviet strategic relationship, each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Thus, the Soviets have strong incentives to avoid risking global nuclear war.| |
While the Soviets apparently do not foresee that this strategic reality will soon change, they continue to procure weapons and plan force operations intended to secure important combat advantages and goals in the event of nuclear war, including, to the extent possible, limiting damage to Soviet forces and society.avorable outcome for them inar would comprise neutralizing the capability of US intercontinental and theater forces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to defeat enemy forces in Eurasia, dominating Eurasia, and preserving the ability of the Soviet state to survive and| |
Because of the Soviets' demanding requirements for forcethey are likely to rate their capabilities as lower in some areas than we would assess them to be. They are probably apprehensive about the implications of US strategic force modernizationsignificant improvements in US command, control, andare especially concerned about the US SDI program and its potential to undercut Soviet military strategy. Although we do not have specific evidence on how the Soviets assess their prospects in a
global nuclear war, we judge ihat they would noi have highthe capability of their strategic offensive and defensive forcesall of their wartimelimitingof damage lo the Soviet
Nuclear War Initiation and Escalation. The Soviets' strategic outlook would affect their decision as lo whether or not to risk initiating global nuclear war in various circumstances. In peacetime, iheir lack of high confidence in accomplishing all of their wartime missions, and their appreciation of the destrucliveness of nuclear war, would strongly dissuade them frombolt-from-the-blue" strategic attack. The Soviets also would probably be inhibited fromirect clash wilh ihe United States and its allies that could potentially escalate to global nuclear war.
The Soviels believeajor nuclear war would be likely to arise outATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflicl that itself was precededolitical crisis. The Soviels see little likelihood ihat ihe United States wouldurprise nuclear attackormal peacetime posture. |
onventional war in which the Soviels were prevailing, they would have obvious and strong incentives to keep ihe war from escalating. Yet. Ihey continue to believe it likely that NATO, to avoid conventional defeat, would at some point resort to nuclearpotentially including US strategic strikes. The Soviets themselves are prepared to use nuclear weapons, potentially including strategic strikes on the US homeland, if they suffer serious setbacksonventional war with NATO. |
If NATO usedmall number of battlefield nuclear weapons lo try toarsaw Pact conventional offensive, thereubstantial possibility that the Soviets would respond in kind or, if their offensive was no! stymied, even refrain briefly from resorting to nuclear weapons at all. However, they would see the chances of global nuclear war increasing significantly once any nuclear weapons were usedheater war with NATO.| |
If they had convincing evidence of US intentions to launch its strategic forces (in, for example, an ongoing theater war in Europe) the Soviets would attempt to preempt. It is more difficult to judge whether they would decide to preempt in situations where ihey see inherently high risks of global nuclear war but have only ambiguous evidence of US intentions lo launch its slrategic forces. Because preempting on the basis of such evidence could initiate global nuclear war unnecessarily.
the Soviets would have to consider the probable nuclear devastation of their homeland thai would result, the reliability of their other nuclear employment options (launching their forces quickly upon warningS ICBM attack is under way and retaliating after absorbing enemynd their prospects for success on the conventional battlefield.
We cannot ultimately judge how the Soviets would actually weigh these difficult tradeoffs. Their nuclear warBghting strategy, however, does not predispose them to exercise restraint if they saw inherently high risks that global nuclear war could occur and believed restraint on their part could jeopardize their chances for effectively wagingar. The Soviets have strong incentives to preempt in order to maximize the damage to US forces and limit damage to Soviet forces and society. Moreover, their strategic programs indicate that for the period of this Estimate the Soviets' nuclear warfighting strategy will endure. | |
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