Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition
n Intelligence Assessment
Declassified and Approved for Release0
Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition
Judgments
Information tnailabli as7 "as used ia this riport.
in the regime of Augusto Pinochet have encouraged Moscow to actively promote revolution in Chile. An economic downturn3 spawned widespread discontent and an uti-Pinochet opposition thai has continued to grow. Part of Pinochet'$ response has been repression. The demise of neighboring military regimes and the formation of democratic governments in several key South American countries have increased regional antipathy toward Pinochet's
Both the USSR and Cuba consider the Chilean Communist Parlyor many years Ihe Latin American Communist, party closest to Moscow, to be the most important Chilean leftist opposition party. They are seeking to position the party to emerge as the dominant group within the successor government. Notwithstanding, both Moscow and Havana, but particularly Havana,ariety of left-leaning opposition parties so as to maximize resistance to Pinochet and achieve their goal of turning Chileommunisthhavc supported violenceegitimate means to oust Pinochet.B
The USSR, Cuba, and their allies have together or individually provided guidance, funding, training, and other assistance not only to the PCCh but also variously to the PCCb's terrorist ally, the Manuel Rodrigucx Patriotic Front; the Movement of the Revolutionary Leftnd the Almeyda faction of the Chilean Socialist Party. Probablyesult of such assistance, tbe opposition to Pinochet has become morerganized attempt by the Patriotic From to assassinate him.
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Soviet and Cuban approaches to revolution in Chile vary. Moscow's most important objective is to guarantee that the PCCh will somedaythe immediate successor to Pinochet, if possible.
Jthe Soviets do not want
long-term prospects of the partyremature or ill-conceived attempt to overthrow Pinochet. They are content for now to have the PCCh work with other groups, although they do not support the others enough to enable them to challenge the Communist leadership of the leftistSoviet academic literature makes clear that Moscow is, in fact, hostile to tbe radical MIR for pursuing policies that undermined Salvador
andthe
do not support this
terrorist activities, llieaution thai ihe potential political impact of each action must be thoroughly examined before it is carried out.I
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Havana, by contrast, is primarily concerned that Pinochet be driven out of office and worksange of parties to achieve this objective.
istro is less concerneo wii with which group leads the revolution; his support to the PCCh is asecognition of the party's strengtheflection of preference. The Cubans apparently assume that the PCCh will emerge as the dominant group in the successor government, but they do little to guarantee that outcome by, for instance, reining in potential rivals such as the pro-Cuban MIR. Havana's support to the MIR indicates that the Cubans are more broadly committed to the use of violence in Chile than the Sovieis.
If Moscow forces the issue, the Cubans are likely, even if reluctantly, io follow the Soviet lead in determining their future support to the Chilean opposition, but old controversies between Moscow and Havana concerning when and how to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America may be resurfacing. Moscow hasreater desire lhan Havana to ingratiate itself with the governments of several Central American states where it had previously supported anutcgimc insurgents. Castro appeared unabashed by the discovery last year of over I lal Cuban-supplied arms cached by the PCCh and its allied MamicWouriguez Patriotic Front. The Soviets haveery low profile on the incident.
Some evidence suggests that negative public reactions both in Chile and the region to leftist-instigated violence and the caching of arms in6 have induced more caution in Moscow in supporting the violence.
IMoscow may be prompting tr reestablish tight party control over when and how PCCh and Front members carry out terrorist acts. If an intransigent Pinochet retains the presidency after his term endsoscow will probably encourage the PCCh to step up its violent tactics in ihe hope of promoting an all-out insurrection. If Pinochet leaves office peacefullyivilian government with broad popular support is established. Moscow will probably press the Communists to return to nonviolent tactics to obtain legal status.!
Contents
Past
Scope Note
Judgments
Is Targeted
Soviet and Cuban Perspectives
View From Moscow
View From Havana
Plan for Overthrowing Pinochet
1?
Risks of Pursuing the Violent Overthrow of Pinochet
in Chile
Risks
Party Control Over Violence?
Scenarios
One: Pinochet Slays After Term Ends
Two: Pinochet Leaves Office Peacefully
Three: Pinochet Is Assassinated
soviet and cubano chilean opposiiionh
Introduction
Since the overthrow of Chile'i Socialist President Salvador Allcndeidem coupears ago. the USSR and rrtost other Communist sutes have had no diplomatic relations with Santiago and haveugustoPinochei/treE^
re's dcTeaTaricro^ncrm^ governments easy reversal of Allende's leftist policies, believedeftist resurgence was yean off and advised the Chilean Communist PartyLatin Ameri-"can Communist party closest toseeksjh participation in nonviolent leftist fronts I
triumph of the Sandinistas ewer Nicaraguin President Anastasio Sotnouowever, changed Moscow's thinking about the prospects fot revolutioa in Latinariety of reporting indicates that Moscow had not anticipated the Sandi-nisia victory, but the event Quickly focused Soviet attention on the region. In numerous public ankles Soviet political theorists concluded that the Cuban model for politicalstruggle andbe translatedormula for creating political-military groups that couldchallenge some incumbent regimes. Support for armed struggle in Latin Americahift in tactics for the Soviets as wellajor change in Soviet thought. In fact, inavana's intransigent backing of aimed struggle hadoviet-Cuban nf! |
Chile Is Targeted
Following the Sandinisia victory, published Soviet and Cuban statements and actions in support of antigovernment insurgents made clear that Moscow and Havana were targeting several Latin American natrons, including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Chile, for violent revolution. Chile was an obvious candidate because:
anti-Pinochet opposition that has continued to grow. Pirtty, Pinochet has responded withaimed especially at the poorer classes. The discontent hat been fanned by highly publiciied acts allegedly carried out by Pinochetecurity forces, such as the murder of several Communist leaders and the immolation of two young Chileans.
Neither Moscow nor Havana had diplomatic or trade tiesantiago, so they had little to lose. Moreover, at Soviet academic literature has made clear, the Kremlin interpreted3 Pinochet victorytemporary defeat" for the Chilean revolution, and the opportunity to complete that revolutionpecial goal.
The demise of neighboring military regimes and the formation of democratic governments in several key South American countries, including Brazil,and Uruguay, have made Chile's dictatorial government an anachronism and have increased regional antipathy toward the regime. The violence with which Pinochet came io power and hisreliance on repression have also earned him disapproval outside Latin America, making him an attractive :jigci|
Vulnerabilities in the Pinochet regime were tailor-made for Soviet exploitation. An3 spawned widespread discontent and an
Differing Soiiel and Cuban Perspectives Although Moscow and Havana arc working toward the same strategic goal inesubtishmentadical leftist government closely linked to bothhave long been significant differences in the way Soviet and Cuban academic writings and public statements analyze the potential for revolution in Latin America and in the tactics they advocate to assist ihc formation of Communist regimes. Moscow has emphasized winning broad acceptance within society and creating genuine "class consciousness."
against the ute of violence in supporteftist revolution, arguing lhat such tactics often alienate significant segments ofelements of ihc industrial, agricultural, and middle classes. In turn ibiseactionary backlash, which can lead io the destruction of the revolution and can discredit ibe USSR. Havana has been far more opportunistic than Moscow, more pronehe use of violence, and seemingly less concerned with idcoiogi-cal issues, iraits evidenced by Cuban activities in support of revolution in South America during the
hort lime in the, however,by ihe victory of the Sandinistas. Moscow and Havana bolh enthusiastically endorsed armedagainst several Latin American governments. The Sovieti became convinced that, at least under the existing conditions. Support to leftist groups such as the Sandinistasiolent drive for power could be shortcuts to ihc ultimate achievemeni of Marxist regimes in ihe Wesiern Hemisphere. But as Ihe euphoria of ihc Sandinisia victory wore olTand Moscow was faced with the declining fortunes of insurgencies in Guaiamala and El Salvador, the Sovieis began to temper their enthusiasm for armed struggleenewed emphasis on the traditional tenets of Soviet revolutionary '. fie ot v|
The View From Moteow. Moscow's analysis of why Ihe Allende revolution failed reveals pari ofuccessful Communist takeover. According io Soviel academiceftist revolution should have taken bold in Chile duringresidency and ihe country should have evolvedro-Soviet Marxist state. Moscow concluded ihai the Chilean Communist Parlyarge measure of responsibility for this failure
Moscow criticized ihe PCCh for not being preparedominate the revolution and defend its interests against the violent opposition of the extreme left and right. In order to achieve some support from thess. according to Soviet critics, the PCCh should have been prepared to politically counter the parlies of ihe extreme left, especially Ihc pro-Cuban Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIRL as they forced Allende to adopt measures, suchapid nationalization of property, that aggravated andeteriorating economic situation The Sovieis also criticized Ihc PCCh for treating ihe armed forcesonolithic insiilution hostileeftistAccording io sn article in the international Soviet publication Problems af Peace and Socatism, the party should have recognized divisions, based on class differences, within the military and worked io turn them to the advantage of the revolution.
Nevertheless,nitial infatuation with what il perceived as the ease of the Sandinisia victory in Nicaragua has been reflectedeightenedthat revolutions can sometimes developandreater willingness lo work wiih non-Communist leftist parties. In the case of Chile, these new approaches have merged wiih tbe lessons learned from ihe failed Allende revolution to form ihe current strategyuccessful Cornmunist ukeover.nowroad political-military front in Chile at ihe best means io oust the Pinochet regime. Moscow also has condoned violenceegitimate means lo overthrow Pinochet.!
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The Soviets have warned ihe PCCh ihat ptepacation of parly members remains iu mosttask. This reflects Moscow's continuingihat, in order toustainable regime, the PCCh must be disciplined, saturated with Marxist-Leninist theory, in control of the other revolutionary parties, and responsive to the specifics of the Chilean environment and population |
Ta* Hiewreas. Cuban President Fidelon the other hand, has consistently been attractedevolutionary model that cmphasirea initiative and military action and subordinates political training and the formulation of clear principles governtn political leadership.
| Cuba has orthodox and icaily rigorous approach to revolution, and it considers violence the principal instrument of change in Latin America. Havana alio seeks influence through less violent means, such as trade, medical aid, andassistance.
On the surface, at least, Castro's activities in Chile are consistent with these comments. For example, the Cubans seem less concerned withong-term political program than with the successfulof power from Pinocheteftist government.
illing to spread tm resources tn
support of several parties that make up the leftist opposition. As they have done with the Sandinistas, the leftist insurgents in El Salvador, and others, tbe Cubans have been trying to broker leftist unity in Chileeans to maximize the resistance to the
incumbent government. Once Pinochet has been ousted. Castro apparently trusts that the Communists will emerge as the dominant political party.
Came Plan for Overthrowing Pinochet
On the basis of Soviet academic writings,!
nd ihc activities I PCCh. we believe at present thereonsensus among the Soviets, Cubans, and the PCCh on general tactics forPinochet, although there is reliable evidence that some disagreement over specific issues remains. The tactics include:
Carrying out activities designed lo increase the party's popularity while maintaining increasing pressure on Pinochet.
oalition with other leftist parties to cor.se..date the opposition.
Holding mass meetings snd strikes.
Winning over or neutralizing at many elements within the armed forces as possible.
terrorism io force Pinochet to respond with increasingly reactionary measures ihat willacklash, create sympathy for the PCCh in the middle classes, and swell ihc ranks of the opposition.
oscow ccucves ized environment in which the PCCh will emerge as tbe group most acceptableajority of Chileans io succeed Ihc Pinochet government. Tbe attempted assassination cf Pinochetand of well-drilled assailants who ambushed bis guarded motorcade in September6 was the most striking example yetommitment to violence. The attempt was clearly (he work of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front but with some degree of coordination with the PCCh.
Moscow apparently expects that increased political instability will ultimately undermine Pinochet'swithin the armed forces also byrowing distaste for their role in repressing popular dissent and defending an intransigent Pinochet. The Soviet critique of PCCh actions during the Allende
years makes clear Moscow's belief lhal members of ihe armed forces must be encouragedespond lo ihis deteriorating polilical environment as members of ihe dissatisfied middle or lower-middle classes, loyal to the nation of Chile, rather lhan as officers sworn to protect Pinochet.!
Icrct
The discovery of over |of weapons stockpiled in northern Chile clearly indicates ihat the PCCh envj. sioned thai at some point Ihe opposition would shift from quick, hit-and-run operations designed to harass the Pinochet government to more broadly based mili-
Pinit*
Greupi
political parlies became technically illegal in Chile when the military government came io pov.ereveral dozen moderate parties and factions continued to umction more or less openly. After the emergenceass opposition movemenlhe government became somewhat more tolerant of the activities of moderate opposition groups-although not of Marxist parties, The moderate parties have formed several alliances orhe past few years, as have the parties of the far left. Pinochet has joined the bandwagon by creating his own political party, the National Advance Party.
. Most far kft panicshe Popular Democratic Movement, which -as folded inio ihe United Left Alliance In
Thrainjirtanol itgnea i
com pithtnsivt urin ef moderate proposals tortransitionemocratic government in5 si (he instigation of ihe Caihoik Church's primate. Includesconser-iiive andkft.it panics along wiih ihe original members of ihe Alliance Quietctni in tectnt monihs.
Tht Demecratscreed grouping "of st.ee parlies from the moduaie right to the (enter kfl. foundedJ ind darnioattd by iht central Chrisiiao Demoeratie Pany. ChalrmenWip routes every sii month* among ihe Daniel.
L>(l
but gro-lng group or Christianree. CriritEiaei Democrat!
H
collection of democratic and Man.it see.al.st.
oldest pany; secular, more kfimhristian Democrat*
SkiiIIsi Parn/Nmn Largtn and moil nodrraw wciiiin faeti>
Stoat Democratic I'tnjJ Radialold-lint llbtral party
Oniitaa DtmocraUt (he Oemoeraliet mem lo Pinochet: membership runs
from ecnwr rlghs to left
r*Mwlr4 party
SeClaliU
Pan,
Urgriiarty
Rtiwaiita established in1 through fusion ofritht panics and one far right wn>
Afince
Party
own potiiical caiij
Fot ihe last decadealf ihe Soviet* have broadcast extensively in Spanish io Chile over Radioicb operates out of the Soviet Union. Mcsoow hasteady discourse onand domestic Chilean events and has alto developed feature programs aimed at special interest groups in Chile. For example, ihe "Voice of the Fatherland" is directed specifically at Chiles armed forces; other programs are geared to enlist theof women or university students. The MIR has not benefited from Moscow's propaganda effoits, but the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic From has.adio Magallanes extolled membership in the Front byetter from an exiled Chilean youth who sough: advice on whether to return to Chile and join the Front Radio Magallanesthe youth to do so. I
The Soviets alsoropaganda outlet for ihe PCCh. In the immediate aftermath of the arms discoveryor example, tbe PCCh used the TASS office in Buenos Aires totatement denouncing Pinochet's reprisals
In recent years both Havana and Managua have publicly condemned the Pinochet regime and extolled the leftist opposition. Moscow and its allies have consistently lambasted the Pinochet government in international and regional forums, including theNations and the Organization of American States. Year after year in the UN. the Soviets. Cubans, snd East Europeans sponsor resolutions in the Social. Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee and theRights Committee that condemn human rights abuses in Chile
Hemispheric Support System
The USSR and its allies have minimal representation in Santiago. There are two Soviets attachedations organization there, and, according to
loc states, only Romania has diplomatic relations with Chile. In the absence of any significant Communist presence in Chile. Moscow
Tbe Risks of Pursuing ihc Violent Overthrow of Pinochet
Risks in Chile. The political isolation of ihe PCCh that followed the discovery of the arms caches and ihe anempied assassination of Pinochet demonstrates the need for the PCCh and the other far left parties toareful line between an escalation of violence thai keeps the Pinochet regime off balance and actions thatacklash and increaseif not for Pinocheta gradual evolutionemocratic nonleftist regime by. Events during the7 visit of Pope John Paul to Chile provided another example of this dilemma. At first, the Communist media condemned the Pope's visitIA/Vatican plot to shore up Pinochet. When the violent demonstrations of the leftegative popular response, both Moscow's Radio Magallanes and the PCCh quickly denied ihat the Communists had anything to do with them.
Soviet academic journals have acknowledged that arbitrary violence harmed the PCCh during the Allende period. In particular, the journals have
warned that if the moderate opposition and the armed forces remain united in their opposition lo Iherealistic prospect if they both feel threatened byPCCh will be unable to gain and maintain power in Chile.
Regional Risks. In the region's other nonsocialist countries, Moscow maintains support for Communist and other leftist groups bul does solear intent not to jeopardize relations with the nationalWithin the last two years Moscow has begun an unprecedented campaign to establish closer and more lucrative ties to the most significant political and economic powers in Latin America, notably Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, while concurrently reducing support to local insurgents. Continued Soviet actionsislodge Pinochet could undermine these initiatives,lear examplehe region's leaders of Moscow's capacity for subversivein Latin American countries.
Havana has been wrestling with such competing nterests as well. In the last few years several Latin American states, such as Brazil and Peru, have increasingly accepted Cubaember of the Latin American community. Moreover. Cuba looks to states such as Argentina and Brazil for trade and financial credits to help its troubled economy. Castro's goal of overthrowing Pinochet could put Havana's newreputation at risk.|
At least through the endoscow and Havana apparently felt that international antipathy for Pinochet was strong enough that regional leaders would tolerate Soviet and Bloc support for subversive violence.
setvei
iteaiuriing Party Control Orer Violence? Reports of dissension in the'ranks of the PCCh and Manuel Rodriguez Front, as wellecent brief lull in terrorist sets, suggest that the PCChunder advisement fromattempting to reassert control over when and how acts of terror are perpetrated by party or Front members. In the cur* rent political climate in Chile the Communists And themselves caught between elements of the radical left, anxious to speed up (he drive against Pinochetore liberal application of violence, and the dernocratichich is still frightened by the discovery of tbe arms caches, the assassinationand the PCCh's recent refusal to cooperate with the voter registration drive supported by most members of the leftist coalition
The increased isolation of the party that followed the discovery of the cached arms and the attempted assassination of Pinochet almost certainly caused Moscow io conduct some form of damage assessment and to conclude that some terrorist acts or actions that would lead to violence, such ss the caching of weapons, would be counterproductive and would alienate groups, such as the armed forces or the moderate left, whose support is necessary if the Communists are to gain and sustain power. The Soviets appear lo have decided that the PCCh should reestablish internal party discipline and control over terror so as to bring the use of terror more into line with Moscow's views on the selective and purposeful application of -ioler.ee |
Possible Scenarios
Scenario One: Pinochet Stays After Term Ends, The high degree of popular antipathy among virtually all classes and social groups to the idea of Pinochet retaining power9 suggests that he could only do so through fraudulent elections or other extralegal means.urn of events would almost certainly cause an increased level of dissension and disruption in Chilean society. Moreover, in order to guarantee bis tenure in the face of such resistance. Pinochetwould probably prod the local police and armed forces to increase internal control and repression. This, in turn, would damage tbe reputation of the armed forces with the Chileantheir appeal
as an alternative toprobably cause fissures within the ranks olihe armed forcesThese events could easily bring about the kind Of all-out insurrection cnviiioned by Moscow and Havana as tbe sieppingitone to PCCh political control ofChile^^p
Moscow probably evaluates this as the most fertile environment for pushing its overall goals, especially if resistance to Pinochet's regime forces him to damp down even harder. Increased repression wouldustification for Moscow to remain visibly opposed to the Chilean President. Moreover, the situation could evolve in Chile as it did in Nicaragua, leaving the PCCh at the forefront of an opposition with support from various classes. In this case, Moscow would almost certainly maintain its level of support and. Quite possibly, throw its weight behind an all-out PCCh effort by increasing itsthe direct provision of.
Havana would probably supply weapons to various leftist groups, including the pro-Cuban MIR. The Soviets, however, are anxious to guarantee theof the PCCh from the start of the post-Pinochet era. and almost certainly would pressure Havana to suspend aid to competing leftists. Given the greater numbers and popularity of the PCCh, Castro might grudgingly comply with Moscow's desires, If the PCCh succeeded in seizing power, Moscow andwould, we believe,teady stream of advice and probably advisers in order to steer the PCCh toward the establishmentarxist-Leninist state. In particular, the Soviets and Cubans would probably help set up internal political controls and aid in the establishmentecret police that would begin harassment of those groups opposed to the new order. As is the case in Nicaragua, however, we believe Moscow would attempt to keep its own profile low in Chile to avoid provoking the United States.
Scenario Two: Pinochet Leares Office Peacefully. Pinochet has expressed determination to remain in power indefinitely, but ultimately the military, led by the Army, could decide it has no recourse but to confront him and insist that be step aside. Most Chileans, including those in the armed forces, are
convinced that the best outcome for Chile would be one in which the military and the nonradical political party leaders reach an agreement on an orderly transition to civilian rule. If in facteaceful transition is worked out and armed violence isMoscow and Havana would be facedilemma over how to proceed, According to various Soviet journals, Moscow believes that, inituation, the PCCh could be swept aside or destroyed if it were unable to respond effectivelyuickly changing political environmentriveeaceful political transition etnakBaas
If, io Moscow'sajority of Chileans support the new government and the PCCh'sfor taking over the government appear dim, we believe the Soviets would probably advise the PCCh to refrain from violent activities. This would almost certainly be Moscow's approach if the newpromised to legalize the PCCh. The Soviets would press ihe PCCh to assume the role ofopposition that Communist parties, like the one in Argentina, play in other countries in the region. This could lead in several years to state-to-state liesMoscow and Santiago and might eventually lead to the Communists becoming part of the legally elected government in Chile. I
It appears unlikely, however, that the PCCh will be legalized any lime soon. I
e
here is littles and the majority of civilians for this move and these sentiments will probably continue. In the wake of ihe attempted assassinationhe moderate opposition has refused to collaborate with the radical left, including the PCCh. Nevertheless, Soviet advice and actions in other revolutionary situations in Latin America indicate that, unless Moscow concludedajority of Chileans (representing the variouswere opposed to the new government, the Soviets would still advise the PCCh to refrain from violent opposition. Despite probable demoralization in party ranks, and almost certain resistance from Havana, we believe Moscow would advise the PCCh to make political legalization its goal for the time bein^M
Scenario Three: Pinochet Is Assassinated. Thesination of Pinochei would probably spark abacklash against the violentmoil likely sponsor, of tbe assassins. Of all ihe scenarios, we believe that this one would be (be rnosi damaging from Moscow's point ofvene PCCh might gain someamong students and others predisposed to forcefulridding the country of the dictator, there would undoubtedly be aversion to the violence of ihe assassination. The parties of the radical left, including the PCCh, couldignificant amouni of support as other Chileans, notably members of ihe upper and middle classes, rallied to the defense of the successor government. In fact, the new government might find in tbean excuse for an all-out crackdown on these parlies. Moscow's oven supporl forknce would brand the Soviets as advocates of terrorism and expose the dark side of their aspirations in ihe Western Hemisphere.H
Conclusiom
Whether the Soviets will continue to advocate the violent overthrow of Pinochei depends on theirof bow successful this policy is in strengthening ihc PCCh and whether il undermines their effortsaintain good relations wish other Lalin American countries. If Ihey believe Pinochei's intransigence and increased repression will set the sceneass rebellion and popular acceptance of violence, they undoubtedly will encourage ihe PCCh to use violence and probably will supply weapons and logisticIf, on the other band. Moscow concludes ihat ihe armed forces and opposition political parties are beaded towardsttMvioIeat solution to Chile's pcliit-cal sttcccssion and that other regional states arc becoming less tolerant of Soviel interference inaffairs, we believe ihe Soviets will advocate lhat ihc PCCheaceful path to
Supported aniiregime insurgents. Castro apparently retains his long-held conviction thairoad sirata of leftist forces can bring about leftist change in Latin America in ihe short term. Moreover, Castro appears unabashed by the discovery of Cuban involvement with ihe Chilean IcftJ
potentially rity. I
The Chilean example suggests broader lessons about when ihe Soviets decide toevolutionary drive.ecision is apparently often largely based on an assessment of two facers: the risks to Soviet interests and ihe impact on local Communist panics. Frequently what is good for one if good for both. For example, in Peru Moscow has counseled the Communist Parly to actoyal opposition lo President Alan Garcia rather thaneftist revolt. For Moscow, this serves the dual purpose of reassuring the Peruvian Government thai the USSR is nol irying toegree of Sovietsaving the Peruvian Communist Partyremature and disastrous challenge to established authority. |
In other cases, however, thereichotomy between ihese iwo factors ihai actsrake on Soviel supportiolent drive loward revolution, In Colombia. Moscow has only limited political and economic influence, bul it is hesitant io publicly throw its weight behind any of the armed exposition groups. They are reluctant even though thermed wing, io which Moscow has clandestinely given direction and perhaps funds, has the potential to seriously challenge ihc established government. This hesitancy probably stems from Moscow's appareni beliefcontrasi to the situation insupport io the Colombian opposition would be viewed in the region asand would adversely affect Soviet relations with other Soulh American stai
Moscow forces the issue, ihe Cubans are likely io follow Moscow's lead, even if reluctantly, intheir policy on support io ihe Chilean opposition, but some aspects of Havana's position may differ from Moscow's. Old controversies between Moscow and Havana concerning when and bow to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America could be resurfacing. Moscow hat alreadyesire to ingratiate itself wiih the governments of severalAmerican democracies where it had previously
In those countries, however, where Moscow believes ihat by underwriting violent tactics il can further iu own fortunes and increase the popularly of (he local Communisis. it will push ahead in its efforts toommunist drive for political power, Chile clearly isouniry.b
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