Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition
n Intelligence Assessment
sea
Declassified and Approved for Release0
Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition
Judgments
Information availablr as7 "as uied in this rtport.
in the regime of Augusto Pinochet have encouraged Moscow to actively promote revolution in Chile. An economic downturn3 spawned widespread discontent and an anti-Pinochet opposition that has continued to grow. Part of Pinochet's response has been repression. The demise of neighboring military regimes and the formation of democratic governments in several key South American countries have increased regional aniiptlhy toward Pinochet's
Both the USSR and Cuba consider the Chilean Communist Parlyor many years the Latin American Communist party closest to Moscow, to be the most important Chilean leftist opposition party. They ate seeking to position the party to emerge as the dominant group within the successor government. Notwithstanding, both Moscow and Havana, but particularly Havana,ariety of left-leaning opposition parties so as to maximize resistance to Pinochet and achieve their goal of turning Chilete.^iithhavc supported violenceegitimate means to oust Pinochet.B
The USSR, Cuba, and their allies have together or individually provided guidance, funding, training, and other assistance not only to the PCCh but also variously to the PCCh's terrorist ally, the Manuel Rodcigucz Patriotic Front; the Movement of the Revolutionary Leftnd (he Almeyda faction of the Chilean Socialist Patty. Probablyesult of such assistance, (be opposition to Pinochet has become moreell-organized attempt by the Patriotic Front to assassinate him.
o jcopSltoizetnc
Soviet and Cuban approaches to revolution in Chile vary. Moscow's most important objective is to guarantee that the PCCh will somedaythe immediate successor to Pinochet, if possible.
Jthe Soviets do not want
long-term prospects of the partyremature orto overthrow Pinochet. They are content for now io have thewith other groups, although they do not supporters enoughthem to challenge the Communist leadership of the leftistSoviet academic literature makes clear that Moscow is, in fact,tbe radical MIR for pursuing policies that underminedthe
do not support (his
terroristeaution thai the potential political irnpacr nf each action must be thoroughly examined before it is carried out.I
^cret
Havana, by contrast, is primarily concerned that Pinochet be driven out of office and worksange of parties to achieve this objective.
tstro is less concerned wu with which group leads the revolution; his support to the PCCh is asecognition of the party's strengtheflection of preference. The Cubans apparently assume that the PCCh will emerge as the dominant group in the successor government, but they do little to guarantee that outcome by, for instance, reining in potential rivals such as the pro-Cuban MIR. Havana's support to the MIR indicates that the Cubans are more broadly committed to the use of violence in Chile than the Soviets.
If Moscow forces the issue, the Cubans are likely, even if reluctantly, to follow the Soviet lead in determining their future support to the Chilean opposition, but old controversies between Moscow and Havana concerning when and how to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America may be resurfacing. Moscow hasreater desire than Havana to ingratiate itself with the governments of several Central American stales where it had previously supported anittegi^ic insurgents. Castro appeared unabashed by the discovery last year of over I Kf Cuban-supplied arms cached by the PCCh and its allied ManucHffxfliguez Patriotic Front. The Soviets haveery low profile on the incident.
Some evidence suggests that negative public reactions both in Chile and the region to leftist-instigated violence and the caching of arms in6 have induced more caution in Moscow in supporting the violence.
IMoscow may be prompting tr reestablish tight parly control over when and how PCCh and Front members carry out terrorist acts. If an intransigent Pinochet retains the presidency after his term endsoscow will probably encourage the PCCh to step up its violent tactics in the hope of promoting an all-out insurrection. If Pinochet leaves office peacefullyivilian government with broad popular support is established. Moscow will probably press the Communists to return to nonviolent tactics to obtain legal status.!
Contents
Past
Scope Note
Judgments
Is Targeted
Soviet and Cuban Perspectives
View From Moscow
View From Havana
Plan for Overthrowing Pinochet
1?
Risks of Pursuing the Violent Overthrow of Pinochet
in Chile
Risks
Party Control Over Violence?
Scenarios
Otic: Pinochet Slays After Term Ends
Two: Pinochet Leaves Office Peacefully
Three: Pinochet Is Assassinated
Soviet and Cubano Chilean OpposiiionH
Introduction
Since ihe overthrow of Chile'i Socialisi President Salvador Allcndeiolent coupear* ago. ihe USSR and most other Communist states have had no diplomatic relations with Santiago and haveugustoPinochei'sreBi mc|
les acTeaTaDoT^nerinocriei governments easy reversal of Allende's leftist policies, believedeftist resurgence was yean off and advised the Chilean Communist PartyLatin Ameri-"can Communist pariy cloteil toteek changyhjggiih participation in nonviolent leftist fronts I
triumph of the Sandinistas over Nkaraguan President Anasiasio Sornozaowever, changed Moscow's thinking about the prospects Tor revolution in Latinariety of reporting indicates that Moscow had not anticipated ihe Sandi-nisia victory, but the event Quickly focused Soviet attention on ihe region. In numerous public ankles Soviet political theorists concluded thai the Cuban model for politicalstruggle andbe translatedormula for creating political-military groups tbat could lucccss-fully challenge some incumbent regimes. Support for armed struggle in Latin Americahift in tactics for the Soviets as wellajor change in Soviet thought. In fact, inavana's intransigent backing of armed struggle hadoviet-Cuban rift |
Chile Is Targeted
Following the Sand in is la victory, published Sovicl and Cuban statements and actions in support of antigovetnment insurgents made clear lhat Moscow and Havana were targeting several Latin American nations, including Guatemala. El Salvador, and Chile, for violent revolution. Chile was an obvious candidate because:
anti-Pinochet opposition that has continued to grow. Parity, Pinochet has responded withaimed especially at the poorer daises. The discontent has been fanned by highly publicized acts allegedly carried out by Pinochet's security forces, such as the murder of several Communist leaders and the immolation of two young Chileans.
Neither Mo*cow nor Havana had diplomatic or trade ties to Santiago, so they had little to lose. Moreover, at Soviet academic literature has made clear, the Kremlin interpreted] Pinochet victorytemporary defeat" for the Chilean revolution, and the opportunity to compkte that revolutionpecial goal.
The demise of neighboring military regimes and ihe formation of democratic governments In several key South American countries, including Brazil,and Uruguay, have made Chile's dictatorial government an anachronism and have increased regional antipathy toward the regime. The violence with which Pinochet came io power and bisreliance on repression have also earned him disapproval outside Latin America, making him an attractive taigciggj
Vulnerabilities in the Pinochet regime were tailor-made for Soviet exploitation. An3 spawned widespread discontent and an
Wffering Sotiet and Cuban Perspectives Although Moscow and Havana arc working toward the same strategic goal inesubtishrnentadical leftist government closely linked to bothhave long been significant differences in the way Soviet and Cuban academic writings and public statements analyze the potential for revolution in Latin America and in the tactics they advocate to assist ihc formation of Communist regimes. Moscow has emphasized winning broad acceptance within society and creating genuine "class consciousness."
against the ute of violence in supporteftist revolution, arguing that such tactics often alienate significant segments ofelements of the industrial, agricultural, and middle ctaises. In turn thiseactionary backlash, which can lead to the destruction of tbe revolution and can discredit the USSR. Havana has been far more opportunistic than Moscow, more prone to the use of violence, and seemingly less concerned withissues, traits evidenced by Cuban activities in support of revolution in South America during the
hort lime in the, however,by the victory of the Sandinistas. Moscow and Havana both enlhusiasiically endorsed armedagainst several Latin American governments. The Soicti became convinced that, at least under the existing conditions. Support to leftist groups such as the Sandinistasiolent drive for power could be shortcuts to the ultimate achievement of Marxist regimes in the Western Hemisphere. But as Ihe euphoria of the Sandinista victory wore off and Moscow was faced with the declining fortunes of insurgencies in Guatamala and El Salvador, the Sovieis began to temper their enthusiasm for armed struggleenewed emphasis on the traditional tenets of Soviet revolutionary fie or v|
The View From Moscow. Moscow's analysis of why Ihe Allende revolution failed reveals part ofuccessful Communist takeover. According to Soviet academiceftist revolution should have taken hold in Chile duringresidency and ihe country should have evolvedro-Soviet Marxist state. Moscow concluded thai ihe Chilean Communist Partyarge measure of responsibility for this failure
Moscow criticized the PCCh for not being prepared to dominate the revolution and defend its interests against the violent opposition of the extreme left and right. In order to achieve some support from the middle class, according to Soviet critics, ihc PCCh should have been prepared to politically counter the parties of the extreme left, especially the pro-Cuban Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIRk as they forced Allcr.dc to adopt measures, suchapid nationalization of properly, that aggravated andeteriorating economic situation The Soviets also criticized ihc PCCh for treating the armed forcesonolithic institution hostileeftistAccording to an article in the international Soviet publication Problems of Peace and Socatism, the party should have recognized divisions, based on class differences, within tbe military and worked to turn them to the advantage of the revolution.
Nevertheless, Moscow's initial infatuation with what it perceived as the ease of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua has been reflectedeightenedthat revolutions can sometimes developandreater willingness to work wiih non-Communist leftist parties. In the case of Chile, these new approaches have merged with tbe lessons learned from the failed Allende revolution to form the current strategyuccessful Communist ukeover.nowroad poliucal-military front in Chile as the best means to oust tbe Pinochet regime. Moscow also hat condoned violenceegitimate means lo overthrow Pinochet.!
Se^rM
The Soviets have warned ihe PCCh ihai preparation of parly members remains its mosttask. This reflects Moscow's continuingthat, in order toustainable regime, the PCCh must be disciplined, saturated with Marxist-Leninist theory, in control of the oihcr revolutionary parties, and responsive to the specifics of the Chilean environment and population j
The View Fromuban President Fidelon the other hand, has consistently been attractedevolutionary model that emphanr.es initiative and military action and subordinates political training and the formulation of clear principles governin political leadership.
| Cuba has orthodox and ically rigorous approach to revolution, and it considers violence ihc principal instrument of change in Latin America. Havana alio seeks influence through less violent means, such as trade, medical aid. andassistance.
On the surface, at least. Castro's activities in Chile are consistent with these comments. For example, (he Cubans seem less concernedong-term political program than with (he successfulof power from Pinocheteftist government.
|Castro is willing to spread his resources tn
support of several parties that make up the leftist opposition. As they have done with the Sandinistas, the lef(is( insurgents in El Salvador, and others, (be Cubans have been trying to broker leftist unity in Chileeans to maximize the resistance to the
incumbent government. Once Pinochet has been ousted. Castro apparently trusts that the Communists will emerge as the dominant political party.
Came Plan for Overthrowing Pinochet
On the basis of Soviet academic writing!,!
paj^pjand ihc ictivitiej I PCCh. we believe ai pieseni thereonsensus among the Soviets, Cubans, and the PCCh on general laciics forPinochet, although there is reliable evidence tbat some disagreement over specific issues remains. The tactics include:
Carrying out activities designed to increase the party's popularity while maintaining increasing pressure on Pinochet.
oalition with other leftist parties to consolidate the oppostlion.
Holding mats meetings and strikes.
Winning over or neutralizing at many elements within the armed forces as possible.
terrorism to force Pinochet to respond with increasingly reactionary measures that willacklash, create sympathy for the PCCh in the middle classei. and iwell the ranks of Ihe opposition.
oscow ociicves ized environment in which the PCCh will emerge as the group most acceptableajority of Chileans to succeed the Pinochet government. Tbe attempted assassination of Pinochetand of well-drilled assailants who ambushed bis guarded motorcade in September6 was the most striking example yetommitment to violence. The attempt was clearly (he work of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front but with some degree of coordination with the PCCh.
Moscow apparently expects that increased political instability will Ultimately undermine Pinochet'swithin the armed forces also byrowing distaste for their role in repressing popular dissent and defending an intransigent Pinochet. The Soviet critique of PCCh actions during the Allende
years makes clear Moscow's belief thai members of ihe armed forces must be encouraged io respond io this deteriorating political environment as members of the dissatisfied middle or lower-middle classes, loyal to ihe nation of Chile, rather ihan as officers sworn io protect Pinochet.!
Icrct
The discovery of over |of weapons stockpiled in northern Chile clearly indicates that the PCCh envj. sioned lhat at some point the opposition would shift from quick, hit-and-run operations designed to harass the Pinochet government to more broadly based miii-
Parties
Groups
political parlies became technically illegal in Chile when the military lovemmenl came lo powerevertheless, several dozen moderalc parties and factions continued to function more or less openly. After the emergenceass opposition movementhe government became somewhat more tolerani of the activities of moderate opposition groups-although not of Marxist parties. Tbe moderate parties have formed several alliances orhe past few years, as have the patties of the far left. Pinochei has joined the bandwagon by creating his own political party, the Naiional Advance Parly.
. Most far kft panic!he Popular Drmoccatic Movement, which -as folded into ihe United Left Alliance in
Thr .SnlMiul Atotd. Elcsen -ulniKnnitgnea i
corn prefers iv* writs cf moderate propositi fortransition to democratic government in5 si ifeeinitigaiionorihe Caihoik Church's primate. Includes two conservative sndklt.it panicsh ihe original members of the Allisnce Quiescent in lecent months.
TV Demteraoeread grouping ofpanies from the moduli? right to the (enter kft founded In IMJdommiied by the central Chrisiian Democratic Panv. Chairmanship route, every six monihs among the pities.
L>n
but growing grow o< Chriiiunhriiiisa Democrat!
Pin,I
St
collection of demevmic andee.al.si.
olden party; iteulsr. more leftisthrisiian Democrats
PfH}/Nmn Largen snd mosi modrrai*ii>
SacHl Oemorratfe Party Moderate taeiion of! Radialold-tin* liberal piny
Oniitia Ormnnik rarht>di ihe democraticto Pinochet: membership rum
(torn centereft
p.rty
Piny
arty
im" tiubhihad in7 through fusion ofright panics and one fir right pjn>
- i>
Psny
olitical party
For Ihe last decadealf ihe Soviet! have broadcast extensively in Spanish io Chile over Radio Magallanes, which operates out of the Soviet Union. Moscow hasteady discourse onand dornesiic Chilean events and has also developed feature programs aimed at special interest groups in Chile. For example, the "Voice of the Fatherland" is directed specifically at Chile's armed forces; other programs are geared to enlist theof women or university students. The MIR has not benefited from Moscow's propaganda effoits, but the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic From has.adio Magallanes extolled membership in the Front byetter from an exiled Chilean youth who sough: advice on whether to return to Chile and join the Front Radio Magallanesthe youth to do so. I
The Soviets alsoropaganda outlet for ihe PCCh. In the immediate aftermath of the arms discoveryor example, tbe PCCh used the TA-SS office in Buenos Aires totatement denouncing Pinochet's reprisals
In recent years both Havana and Managua have publicly condemned the Pinochet regime and extolled the leftist opposition. Moscow and its allies have consistently lambasted the Pinochet government in international and regional forums, including theNations and the Organization of American States. Year after year in the UN. the Soviets. Cubans, and East Europeans sponsor resolutions in the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee and tbeRights Committee that condemn human rights abuses ia Chile
Hemispheric Support System
The USSR and its allies have minimal representation in Santiago. There are two Soviets attachedations organization there, and, according to
loc states, only Romania has diplomatic relations with Chile. In the absence of any significant Communist presence in Chile. Moscow
Tbe Risks of Pursuing ihc Violent Overthrow of Pinochet
Risks in Chile. The political isolation of the PCCh that followed the discovery of the arms caches and the attempted assassination of Pinochei demonstrates the need for Ihe PCCh and Ihe other far left parties toareful line between an escalation of violence that keeps the Pinochet regime off balance and actions ihaiacklash and increaseif not for Pinocheta gradual evolutionemocratic nonleftist regime by. Events during the7 visit of Pope John Paul to Chile provided another example of this dilemma. At first, the Communist media condemned tbe Pope's visitIA/Vatican plot to shore up Pinochet. When the violent demonstrations of the leftegative popular response, both Moscow's Radio Magallanes and the PCCh quickly denied lhat the Communists had anything to do with them.
Soviet academic journals have acknowledged that arbitrary violence harmed the PCCh during the Allende period. In particular, the journals have
warned that if the moderate opposition and the armed forces remain united in their opposition lo Iherealistic prospect if they both feel threatened byPCCh will be unable to gain and maintain power in Chile.
Regional Risks. In the region's other nonsocialist countries, Moscow maintains support for Communist and other leftist groups but does tolear intent not to jeopardize relations wiih ihc nationalWithin the last two years Moscow has begun an unprecedented campaign to establish closer and more lucrative ties to the most significant political and economic powers in Latin America, notably Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, while concurrently reducing support to local insurgems. Continued Soviet actionsislodge Pinochet could undermine these initiatives,lear examplehe region's leaders of Moscow's capacity for subversivein Latin American countliei.knaanl
Havana has been wrestling with such competing nterests as well. In the last few years several Latin American states, such as Brazil and Peru, have increasingly accepted Cubaember of the Latin American community. Moreover. Cuba looks to states such as Argentina and Brazil for trade and financial credits to help its troubled economy. Castro's goal of overthrowing Pinochei could put Havana's newreputation at risk. ^
At least through the endoscow and Havana apparently felt that internaiional antipathy for Pinochei was strong enough that regional leaders would tolerate Soviet and Bloc support for subversive violence.
Se.V'i
Rtatttrilng Partyt Violence? Reports of dissension inof the PCCh and Manuel Rodriguez Front, as well asrecent brief lull in lerrorisi acts, suggest that the PCChunder advisement fromattempting to reassert control over when and how acts of terror are perpetrated by party or Front members. In the cur* rent political climate in Chile the Communists And themselves caught between elements of the radical left, anxious to speed up (he drive against Pinochetore liberal application of violence, and the democratic opposition, which is still frightened by (he discovery of tbe arms caches, the assassinationand the PCCh's recent refusal to cooperate with the voter registration drive_supported by most members of the leftist coalition
The increased isolation of the party that followed the discovery of the cached arms and the attempted assassination of Pinochet almost certainly caused Moscow to conduct some form of damage assessment and to conclude that some terrorist acts or actions that would lead to violence, such as the caching of weapons, would be counterproductive and would alienate groups, such as the armed forces or the moderate left, whose support is necessary if the Communists are to gain and sustain power. The Soviets appear lo have decided that the PCCh should reestablish internal party discipline and control over terror so as to bring the use of terror more into line with Moscow's views on the selective and purposeful application of -ioler.ee |
Possible Scenarios
Scenario One: Pinochet Stays After Term Ends, The high degree of popular antipathy among virtually all classes and social groups to the idea of Pinochet retaining power9 suggests that he could only do so through fraudulent elections or other extralegal means.urn of events would almost certainly cause an increased level of dissension and disruption in Chilean society. Moreover, in order to guarantee bis tenure in the face of such resistance, Pinochetwould probably prod the local police and armed forces to increase internal control and repression. This, in turn, would damage tbe reputation of the armed forces with the Chileantheir appeal
as an alternative toprobably cause fissures within the ranks olihe armed forcesThese events could easily bring about the kind Of all-out insurrection envisioned by Moscow and Havana as the sieppingstone io PCCh political control ofChile^^p
Moscow probably evaluates (his as the most fertile environment for pushing its overall goats, especially if resistance to Pinochet's regime forces him to damp down even harder. Increased repression wouldustification for Moscow to remain visibly opposed to the Chilean President. Moreover, the situation could evolve in Chile as it did in Nicaragua, leaving the PCCh at the forefront of an opposition with support from various classes. In this case, Moscow would almost certainly maintain its level of support and. Quite possibly, throw its weight behind an all-out PCCh effort by increasing itsthe direct provision of.
Havana would probably supply weapons to various leftist groups, including the pro-Cuban MIR. The Soviets, however, are anxious to guarantee theof the PCCh from the start of the post-Pinochet era. and almost certainly would pressure Havana io suspend aid to competing leftists. Given the greater numbers and popularity of the PCCh. Castro might grudgingly comply with Moscow's desires. If the PCCh succeeded in seizing power, Moscow andwould, we believe,teady stream of advice and probably advisers in order to steer the PCCh toward the establishmentarxist-Leninist state. In particular, the Soviets and Cubans would probably help set up internal political controls and aid in the establishmentecret police that would begin harassment of those groups opposed to the new order. As is the case in Nicaragua, however, we believe Moscow would attempt to keep its own profile low in Chile to avoid provoking the United States.
Scenario Two: Pinochei Leaves Office Peacefully. Pinochet has expressed determination to remain io power indefinitely, but ultimately the military, led by the Army, could decide it has no recourse but to confront him and insist that he step aside. Most Chileans, including those in the armed forces, are
convinced that the best outcome for Chile would be one in which the military and the nonradical political party leaders reach an agreement on an orderly transition to civilian rule. If in facteaceful transition is worked out and armed violence isMoscow and Havana would be facedilemma over how to proceed, According to various Soviet journals, Moscow believes that, inituation, the PCCh could be swept aside or destroyed if it were unable to respond effectivelyuickly changing political environmentriveeaceful political transit ion.
If, io Moscow'sajority of Chileans support ihe new government and the PCCh'sfor taking over the government appear dim, we believe ihe Soviets would probably advise the PCCh to refrain from violent activities. This would almost certainly be Moscow's approach if the newpromised to legalize the PCCh. The Soviets would press ihe PCCh to assume the role ofopposition that Communist parties, like the one in Argentina, play in other countries in the region. This could lead in several years to state-to-state liesMoscow and Santiago and might eventually lead to the Communists becoming part of the legally elected government in Chile. I
It appears unlikely, however, that the PCCh will be legalized any lime soon. I
e
here is little supportamonpnc^riiieanarriTxcT^ ts and the majority of civilians for this move and these sentiments will probably continue. In the wake of the attempted assassinationhe moderate opposition has refused to collaborate with the radical left, including the PCCh. Nevertheless. Soviet advice and actions in other revolutionary situations in Latin America indicate that, unless Moscow concludedajority of Chileans (representing the variouswere opposed to the new government, the Soviets would still advise the PCCh to refrain from violent opposition. Despite probable demoralization in party ranks, and almost certain resistance from Havana, we believe Moscow would advise the PCCh to make political legalization its goal for the time beingH
Scenario Three: Pinochet Is Assassinated. Thesination of Pinochei would probably spark abacklash against the violentmoil likely sponsor, of the assassins. Of all ihe scenarios,believe that (his one would be (be mosi damaging from Moscow's point of view. Evene PCCh might gain someamong students and others predisposed to forcefulridding the country of the dictator, there would undoubtedly be aversion to the violence of the assassination. The parties of the radical left, including the PCCh, couldignificant amount of support as other Chileans, notably members of the upper and middle classes, rallied to the defense of (he successor government. In fact, the newmight find in thean excuse for an all-out crackdown on these parties. Moscow's overt support forknce would brand the Soviets as advocates of terrorism and expose the dark side of their aspirations in the Western Hemisphere.H
Conclusions
Whether the Soviets will continue lo advocate the violent overthrow of Pinochet depends on theirof bow successful (his policy is in strengthening the PCCh and whether il undermines their effortsaintain good relations wish other Lalin American countries. If they believe Pinochet's intransigence and increased repression will set the sceneass rebellion and popular acceptance of violence, they undoubtedly will encourage the PCCh to use violence and probably will supply weapons and logisticIf, on the other band. Moscow concludes that ihe armed forces and opposition political parlies are beaded towardnonviolent solution io Chile'ssuccession and thai other regional stales arc becoming less tolerant of Soviet interference inaffairs, we believe the Soviets will advocate that ihe PCCheaceful path to
Supported aniiregime insurgents. Castro apparently retains his long-held conviction thatroad strata of leftist forces can bring about leftist change in Latin America in the short term. Moreover, Castro appears unabashed by the discovery of Cuban involvement with ihe Chilean left!
potentially riry.
The Chilean example suggests broader lessons about when ihe Soviets decide ioevoiuiionary drive.ecision is apparently often largely based on an assessment of two factors: ibe risks to Soviet interests and ihe impact on local Communist parties. Frequently what is good for one is good for boih. For example, in Peru Moscow has counseled ihe Communist Parly to actoyal opposition lo President Alan Garcia rather ihaneftist revolt. For Moscow, this serves the dual purpose of reassuring the Peruvian Government thai the USSR is not irying toegree of Sovietsaving the Peruvian Communist Panyremature and disastrous challenge io established authority. |
In other cases, however, thereichotomy between these two factors that actsrake on Soviet supportiolem drive toward revolution, In Colombia. Moscow has only limited political and economic influence, but it is hesitantublicly throw its weight behind any of :he armed opposition groups. They are reluctant even though the ColombianParty's armed wing, to which Moscow has clandestinely given direction and perhaps funds, has the potential to seriously challenge ihe established government. This hesitancy probably siemi from Moscow's apparent beliefcontrasthe situation insupport io the Colombian opposition would be viewed in the region asand would adversely affect Soviet relations with other South American stai
Moscow forces the issue, the Cubans arc likely to follow Moscow's lead, even if reluctantly, in delermin-ing their policy on support io ihe Chilean opposition, but some aspects of Havana's position may differ from Moscow's. Ok) controversies between Moscow and Havana concerning when and bow to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America could be resurfacing. Moscow has alreadyesire io ingratiate itself wiih the governments of severs!American democracies where it had previously
In those countries, however, where Moscow believes thai by underwriting violent tactics il can further its own fortunes and increase the popularity of the local Communists, it will push ahead in its efforts toommunist drive for political power, Chile clearly isountry.B
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