MHftary Fotsm and Weapons PtocBremenf
Projecting Soviet Military Forces and Weapons Procurement
I
paper dcacribes aa improved tocbn*]uc for etevelopinj projection* of future Soviel miliury forces and ihe cosls of procuring them. The motltodology begins by estimating future produciion levels for individiul weapon programs. Il iben explicitly takes inio account judgments(he uncertainties surrounding each of ibese individual projections. For moreajor militaryprobability statements are established for the existence of each program, the dale of Its initial production, and iterate aad longeviiy of its production run. Each judgment is based on ibe all-source evidence available on the projected system; the stronger (he evidence, tbe greater the certainly attached to tbe per^ictioo. In many cases, different levels of con't'.ence are attached to differeot pod iocs of the projectionarticular program. For example, there may be high confidencearticular weapon willroduction run of at least five years, but less confidence the run will continue for eight years
With these judgments in hand, we use computer simulation techniques tobeat estimate" of spcodiaz lorsc>iremeot First, we use the Set of judgments toatje number of possible force projections. The dements in each projection are randomly selectedto the odds expressed byv-li-iiLil 'judgments for each military program. Next, Ihe procurement costs arc calculated for each of the projections. The "best estimate'* of futuie procurement is (hen determined by selecting Ibe median, or middle value, of all ihe projections. The collective simulations also formoasbaegc of uncertainty lhal surrounds ibe "besthis method produces aggregate projections of procurement Ibat reflect the uncertainties associated with eachprogram
The new projections methoddoc* no:he sources ofus Use forecasts. Most notably, it does oo( lake into account passible changes in the overall csTrirOfuncnt in which military programs will be pursued.Major cbangrSun.Soviet defense policy have beer) infrequent but can lead-to significant'shifts in (lie pace of nOijiary racderiuiatibo- TheimpJicatiocs oftboeldtbcre/ore be interpreted1 in the context Ofolilical andiWtOi:ru-:H. If Ibilltould change, the Soviets might welltheir present plan In Ways our projections do not anticipate For example, we believe that the projected defense programs will be exwipeling for tesources with General Secretary
SOi" fV-JWM
rW7
gorbachev's campaign to modernize the economy. il* the campaign falters, (he sovici leadership will face tough decisions retarding priorities, and some military programs may well be slowed or canceled lo divert resources lo nm military production.
the new method is directed at forecasting aggregate force character is tics, such as naval procurement costs, rather than itean-by-jtca, yar-by-year predictions of individual weapon systems. we are oot able to foresee which one of the many possible alternatives will bt fact be realized. in some respects, our method is analogous to projecting the outcomeeries of coin losses-thereound statistical basis for saying webestof*eadsosses. wc have no basis, however, for prcdicting (be outcome of each individual toss, other than to say there is achance of heads.
the new method, we have developed projections of sovietoutlays (measured2 rubles) that show growth at anercent during the lzthtivc- year.
: levels would alwmajor advances across thew
awideof programs. tack submarines. [scant increment in
i of fundingeployment of the
uctjcaraircrafi. forces could continue lo upgrade iheir surface-to-air forces and tbe moscow bntibaublic-missilc
introducing large quantities of newweaporuy. in tbe
we have more cormdence in our new projections than wchad in oui previous estimates. our confidence is greater for major portions of the total, such as projections by military service, than for leer levels of aggregation. nonetheless, until we gain more experience in the use of ibis
method, it will be difficult to aucu iu reliability. We carriedilot study early) using an canting dau base, cruder measures, and (ewer substantive experts. This was followed by full-scale applications daring oar annual updates5be results of the first two exercises were quite similar to incite presented here. As more data became available and the first years of the early projections becaioe history, we found Ihat the early aggregate projections were confirmed. Our previous methods had repeatedly produced projections that were proved erracieous by data acquired during the following year
We now know our new method giveselter picture of the future than did past practices. We have found no indication, so far. of significant limiutiorts or biases in the work. Whileeassuring, the true reliability lest willetrospective comparison of our projectionsithbe made in lateractual procurement for that period.
Blari
Contents
Projccting Soviet Military Forces and Weapons Procurement
This paper BKiesuol Soneti-o'11eencoi bated oo deluded force prelection* lhat were faiimnicd withpiocliirc unlike lhal employed by Ihe Intelligence Community in the past. Wc picKtil Ibe meibodoloffy uied and the results of applying this technique to the force projoctlorn pec-pared by ibe Office of Soviet Analysis' Became Dieu new. particular attention is paid to: (a) bo* tigaihcaat variables ue reflected in tbe protections, (ti) bow ibe projection* might be best used,Ihc projections process mi(ht be further improved
Tbe peocedure begins with (be docloc-neol ot* pro-dociioo estiauiies foe lodirsdual programs, sack asO tar.l. ibc-MIGU Foibat, and tbe SA-IO turfacolo-aii missile (SAM) syttceti. These Mtsfliatea are then aggregated in terms of their ruble iihii Io (Bin perspective on the magnitude and trends of major categories: of procurement
Projecting ihe peociircinen4.o( Soviet nuliury bnrd-warr nor only include*what weapons will be procurod, but alao the liming, magnitude, mid rate of production for each system. In makinguevs;
The Soviets' plansextrine for their forces over the sse itean or so
Tbe savplicdfor new pecdextion based on the current cedes of battle aad ibe age of the
The probable tslcccuining oc projectedend development (RAD) prog rami.
The capacity of the dcferiM iodustry to produce laceneration weapon systems
The earabi'itT of ladusiry lo matter tbe prcdoeiioc inchrsotogie* noedod to produce new. men* eaaifka weapon systems
Source. o( UsIBIItliifJ la rro'ectlag tbe Future
The infacaccs, on peocarccneat fill into ihiee ofanacs. First, predictions of futuremust take piaec within tons' overall eooiai. Wc usually eater the process, however, wiihoui knowiag whether leadership priorities willexample, because of changes ia the balance of foeeea within the Politburo or becausehift io (he Utcsaatioaal climate Faced with this problem. Use genera] approach in forecasting is to assume that current cooditioni will continue eieept. perhaps,ew specified changes. The assumptionsew critical events are theneutopic, that there will be asp arms Urmtation agr motets in eflect ifr thai major change* in Soviet kadership policy ia (he neat year or two still resultidcourse ad hi rt meal In the five-year planivert significant reaourcea lato (be ceofoeny aadfrom defense If change* froeorehen assumed that there will be cm unstated rcactise ehaoges in cutting military, political, or economic conditions in the United Statet or Western or Eastern liuropc tuoaacni in alter Soviet actioo* ' a
Secocsd. given tbe assumr-nou made about (hewnbin which Soviet military-economic deci-sions will be made.sue faced with predicting the actions the USSR plans toreat deal of data it available on Soviet tccoocnic pitas, bat tbe plans re*en! tittle rctirOiag defease psogiarn deea-lions. ConiidrraKcLifoimatioa exists on indiridua* weaponthey are intage, in lerie* prcdiacusia, ta the active inventory, or in some uvnbsnaiion of these stages. We seldom bare march information, however, aa to Soviet usieattanapecific isrogiairi cc ejection of esrogtacu Infortna-lion it iiindciiuoie to predict with con&eknor Use
chattel lhal hove been made between competing pcocratna. Hie relative priority jiven to Ibose selected foreteveacrxneat or cleploymeet. thai punned itie. or the pace at which ibcy are to be pursued '
The third general challenge to tcueeaitjng cetitcri on ihe Implementation of ihc plan.rogram-by-procram basis, jnformaiioo ii laiaStci.au to enable hi to fcreace those eveau that force chancea in tb*ibe overall strategy for weaponsto IbeofIndrvtdaal aieapoacram. Thai ia, eveaiable environmentefined weapons procurement plan, thetUI uncertain. Tho Soviet* experience unexpected delays and cancellation) in program! as do arms nunufactuiers in tbe rest of tbe world:
rogram lhal Bow appears lo be eubog reasonable progress may eacooater dimculty,in significant delays or cancellation of the program.
of production facilities may bepoalpooJeg ihe initiation of series production
in manufacturing technologies may lead to delays or reductions in scheduled productioo. Tho lyitcm might even be aefll back to Ibe PADIn make It more producible.
delays for one or more program could result from problems with the manufacture of aa important subcomponent.
Delays of systems io Ihe near term (tbe not two tohether thenr production phase, may nceeultale tevisiool In the schedule for fellow-on programs in the longeroears).
Policy considers lions could cause changes. For ln-runee, the Defense Council may choose lo cancel programs, cipand or reduce litem, or delay or ipeed them Up based on purely military choice) oremit of pressure to adjust miliury and civilian priorvtiea.
The uuei lata actual tniUncra of some of these kinds of problem) opcricnted over the last few yean
WDflenow ibai problems will arise wilh project: ed lyitemi, we ate unable to predict which programs will experience dllTKuliy or the corrective actions or program modification* the Soviel* wkll institute In response. Also, we often have iiuullkicat evidence to deifTtnioe the natureroblem when it does occur.
The old method of projecting miliury forces and iheir emu Ukes Ibe results of forccaits for hundreds of individual weaponbased upon the best evideit" nd rural ibein. Wc have learned, however, that merely summing ibe Individ ul weapon projections produces total projection! ihat arc loo high. Tbe reasons for thii craitatcaaent can be tea by ccotjdcriag the nature cf available evidence. We arc able loather complete list of tbe program* lhal could be under way in the projection period. All of Ihe program) lhalajoi impact on proctireitirui nnd will be in serif* production during the neat five laean are technically complex icd have long gestation periods. They arc uiciOy visible well in advance of Ihe initiation of production, Ii has been rareew system to be "dnwvered" upon hs enlry into operational service. On the other hand, wc bate no evidence on fultire cir.ccllii: mis, puitronenieaU. stretchouts, and other delays in individual programs. Thus. Use old method overrules procurement cent by the amount of these canceled and delayed program).
Tbe New Method
The new method improves upon Ihe old method by taking the analysis ooe step further. It explicitly Ukes into account ihe uncertainties la the projections of each system and uses lUtistical trxbakgura to develop projection! of total forces likely to be produced, based oa those uncertainties. This process provides prayce iku of overall weapons prcdnction and total peoexro-meot cmtlayi jo which wc have considerable cooS-ceoce. While ihut method gives ni good projectiorii in ihc aggregate, it does not for coil the outcome of individual wcj|on pr04rams in detail. 11 1arc loo many unccruintlo la Ihc projections of ilteseto do Ihii
project iooi. The romprakion of achetermined by randomly selecting ibe individual weapon systems cm tie bans ot (bear carenai-.i.
stent rncnlt0 aeU ofrc lioiulalcd in ihii duddii lo ensurestable dittiibu-lioa of alternative rwojetaloeubeen ooulnod. Tbe "beatf future procurement Is found by Inktni the median of tbe procurement value* of each set of force projections. Confidence iotemli about Iheruinate" are formed by picking aaitable perotniilea of theseact. For ciajcpk, the 5thh percentile* of theto vaJoeaytxtro^
e interval around tbe "best estimate'
Uoeet tnk.tr
Pour catcrxie* of uncertainty are sued IncUng the uncertaintyhe categoric* arefor conveeiecee with Ihc let ten A. it. C. aod D.s for estimUct baring alroeai no socee-txioty. We are pertasaded by the evidence that pro-gnna id this ateayxy wtD, ia fact, oxar asBit* for Estimates hiving niMre
rti* strong prove to be Category C
evide
I a* apt loa noe. but about half will-be wrong Tt: tutfor those ctticmc* baaed oa only liaised evidence or iafortned ipccoLalioa. Only aboutcjuailcr of theae eauinaie* will prove correct (tee inset)
Tit r. Categories
A
Theesdltnate it deemedrecise drscript Ion ol
tht futurer'tdtinitalVt for Ihii
peotram or partrof am Thli couldyuem foe which teeiei production hot been under way for tome lime and for which we hove ipectal Information on ihe ultimate force level.
& Hits IJkellhaad
There are about three chancel out of four lhal ikU peofrom or perteotram will occur ai predicted TUs ratingtrong evidentiary bate tut ncirv-iedrti that lone uncertainty extlll
G Gate Call
Thli rating Indicate!trnlficani body ofexists to tvppoet thtfoetcc.it but thai there ii only an even chance thai thli program or partrogram will materiallte.
A Lot Likelihood
This rating allows for ihe Inclusion In the ettlmateeotram or pan af 'a peotram for which Me evidence Is tfulie limited. He do believe, however, lhat the evidence Is tu&trfenl to Indicate lhat thirt t, about one chance In four thai ihe program might
th^ cvieleaiiarytronger for one part of the program than for aisother
'A separate iwunMi nttreiag ikccUle* Qilaoi
il duC^tiaA bctSV
An "ample rstnnaterogram is presented hi ngUre I, which portrays projected outlayi and prcduc-tioncjiiantitleiypothetical new mortar. Tbe program bat bora divided in to two tegateaU. Cue segment, whkh ii ttaoculcd withroba-biliiy (nearerVet* hard evidence (hat the program baattd do'ek-^rxnt. the pfaot to prodstce it is ready,f thesM win be produced lo lEptacc an existing system in all high-ttrengthed rifle divisions. Additional(more tenuous) indicate] Out the system could also be used in replace another cyst em lo other dementi of Use Ground Force* This would roqube no
>Wct
i-icute
Projected Outlays and ProductionypotheticalSoviet1
4 be producedwc
believe there it about aa ocri cbioafrjhis will occur
thai itimeni of ibe program isrobability.
figure alsothowt an assessment ofthe uocerlaio-iy surrounding oar estimates of "beat series prodca wottd begin. Sioiilar asscssasents were nude fot every program with production slining inr later to allow tbe analyst, wbero tbo evidenceit was appropriates lo range startup dales. This atepaeloded because cur pilot study iadkaud that ia earlter. siagle-valsK esstiaates, the forecani clearly wear biased towardoo early dale for Ihe in it eduction of new programs. We believe thatalest the range of possibilities for the loitlalkniystem belpt to eliminate lhal bit*.
Tbe ra ngc of possibilities for production of this usottar includes, al one oncost, the uviaimum possiblewith prodtieiioa beginning at the earliesthis would result In cams la live outlays0 sanrtaia produced) ihrougbwhole program ii moved forward wslh ihe earlier startup date. Al the other ulretrsehift to the latest datetette*nd the inetuaioa in the estimate of only lhal ponies of the production wc gave the highest level of ccetlidente. Tha would result .ncmtliys ofoclrillioo0 snorUrs pecduotif) by ihe end
Uimviati ilwitraduiUv*.uMi aw-ItU.
'Ikiii tt**lr aau-ltf*.
tan atantplc ttho*aStiMd la tvainUoi ari.ii.it Tha rail tarsmclmii that ai lunOaupoaiinline, tartaul afl*CO Th*tin Ma-Maaa Ojim aai
I .VM -ir.i
uf Oxlla aim Sal* or IM7 (hailililwu ol aaa-iUinir -Sua p oi mi.in tat ol hartOUS aa. MSIalU la* (iwih'MiOka wwhi taiOhtf saw<of IMS) aa ai awri un ta Oke--i. pon'tni la DM lalaal Hltl?e al IT)
Statistical AnnlytUof tbt Projection* Data All the unceruiwy judgment* associated wllh Ihe initial program estimate* are lira ironed usingulattos Tba major ttepa of Iha[vooiai are
Calculating tbe annual cost* of each programcitiroatc. The cost* are then allocated to one oe more of the A. B. C. andthe basis of the uncertainty judgments made for each prog ram or iu pan*
rial protection fay randomly telcctiiig Irom the cost line* according to the protuhllille) assigned to each category. Each selected line Is then
assignedstarting year according lo Dieerelopod for Iht date ofseries peoduajea.
arge Dumber of loch trial project torn. For each projection, aoene statistic eJ initial ii calculated (for example, growth rate oe cumulati'esing thii statistic, the data arcnted from hJ(bcat lo lowest. The median (mid-point) of (be ranked data ii (he "bestnd (ho Slh and 9Sth percentilespceotoi
Iband. EipcrimcnUtioo has shownrial projection! lie icquired to obtaincatenates of this cocMeaee band
The Crsi major itcp is accomplished unni ibecoaling techniques that are applied in estimating pail procurement- The other two itepi arelxcd below. *
iitJhe following process it applied to each weapon program, and the combined resultsinglc trial. Bach program will re lines oaf cost data ueomding onuire ranked intitdfj of eettainty (forA would bOategory Athere are additional cost linesew-ram. they lie telectfd tccenhn; in the nineaadom number drawn] probability diiifibaiieio. Tbe probability criteria for the line*ercent to categoryP. SOndercente gory D.aabtlllleaine cannot beine of higher probability it timur cut ti notTherefore,ine of higher probability ti Klecird,ithe'c<)tidlllonal probabilityine is lelectedli greater than iu marginal probability (see ufc4el)
At (bit itagc, tbe lines selectedrogram provide an cipendilurc paitem over time wilh respect to the beat ei lima to of production atari time. The actualtime for each trial is chosen byandom comboriangulart-bulaon. Tbe beat eatlmatc of ttart time i) ibe mode, or higlieai probability point, of the diilribution, and (lie
Table I
Ctireory
Conditional Probabilities ofategory Line VVneaLAO lines of Higherare Beeni Scieefecl *
Men
54
t aa carat wOca* emrrcaca la aaeiaiaiK tbea wacaa
mi umi UHOamaO uka iiaaavluce1r.iiae/ at aaaaaaH.i
UOHiHinOH
. jntehuta Uwt Oar eaoit It aam rt-aaactti1 IWSilat probaMny UValaid It cccair1M!ii i
ibao,Uowhaath l> aaaaat
rvOl
oSnlaaa (haN tibia.
ratacMl Bnpu7 (Behi) fclf bar probaUKr Hoc la fat cato/nr B.
ii" an. Ike Dltaecaa oaty accne Ifino ocean, ul it*
r aot efna baa as rffart en tbe UliES) ml atke favbatalitr Hal bath ban w& eccar.m Ba-ataaaKrr afea aanrrtae. ffD,S <rfe an.
riBT^rT
eatlleit and latest poaiiblc Mart timea are ihe miaunum and maximum possible values of ihe distribution.
feelingProjittti Palate Al outlined above, the beat estimate (and confidence range) of any particular lUlliUcal meaiurt la ilctciiniiied by ranking0 trials on (hai lUtiitrcaod selecting thepoints. No farthereeded forIc slatirtka such aa ihe average anneal growth rate. The multiplerie> auch as thai ihown in flgurochosen as described In ihe unci
Applying the Methodology
The newevelopedilot study early5 and relied upon in producing our
Figu it 2
Soviet MiUUry
Technical ProcedurefarSelecting Multlple+'alao Setia _
Hep It to Independently telect ihe 3th, JOiknd 9Sih percentiles for each projection year; for example,iven year0 Mai totals are ranked, and the Indicated three values are recorded. The resulting values represent the best estimate andpercent bandiven year, but they may not correspond to any feasible collection cf production programs across time. The feasible scries ore then found by ideating from0 trials the three trials that minimise, respectively, the squared errori when compared udlh the three values chosen for the Individual years. For example, the best eitl-maie Is that trial which minimises the turn cf squared errors when Its values are compared with the median values for each of the years. For theIn this paper, the resulting feasible estimates were allercent of the Independent estimate foe any given year
Thecompare toutlor
by FITThtnainiijieia UUVf; for uir pmtoui FIT SHlSM.
projections since then. This section presents the ro-lull* obtnir.cd when we applied ibe metbedoloey inbe rejections ire presented for various aggregates oftoeistorical
Total Prociiretneai
Tbe Soiiel force* projected. Ibe period of ibe current live-vcar planmply that tbe very high outlay! of the recent past for military hardwire will riseercente have
calculatedbestbaaededian case)anee within which we areercent confident tbe actual value will lie That it, we believe there are onlyhat the actual value will lie above the range and (be saaic prutebtll-ty ihat il will Ue below the range. In this cob teat we believe cumulative outlays for military hardware will beil lion and 2SS bilCon ruble* daring the currentbe best estimate Imevel of outlays ofillion rubles, slightly higher than that of Ihc. Such an amount would be (be highest cumulative level of outlay* for any FYP period since "World War IT (see figure 2)
Our projections indicate (bat (be massive force rood' eroiralioa programs panned by the Soviets tioec then coctinue The introduction of new
re cirraw!1 picaIneljl- cn'Iiti for
prneuroncnl of miliury wlpafnlUul Is aOted Iht ulntat iiwcafay; theylacS.de* capiul kx-M" "
Ihi dale forre coroatued protectionsey were
presmied dmIht0 ox benefit front ibe bUtoiol review acermjoj Cilj fi-prnsu yesn
Hiitorical Per sped Ire
From ikthrough ikt, melt
Outlays /or Soviel ml III 'ty IfaWf procurement
(la comricr i) 'an overateercent per year. The growr* rau slowed only briefly im ike. when out tan dipped slightly between Ihe completion of one feneration etf missile programs aaJ ihe Inftiaiion af the next. During this entire period ike Soviets expanded and modtnditd ihttr defense foret* across ihe board. Since ikehis growth has essentially ceased, but procurement has remained very high
We can put these program* In per if relive bpthem wilh those of ihe United States, because we alio value ihe Soviel defense program In0 ihe estimated dollar value af Sovietef weapons exceeded USor weapons procurement for the first lime, and by ihehey were double ihe US outlays. Even wtih the rapid growth In US programs ikat beta* In tht. Ihe dollar crisis of Soviet programs remained above those etf Ihe United States
c
improved strategic misiuc programs ted atnodetaixatieia program for crar-enuoml groundrc the event uavperuat program ia rcacaucc term, lot tberraioci. foBo-ed b7 [nocui eroent of naval it: pa and robourum
All of the weapon prog rami projected art' cottildcrcd to be feasible In lertni of defenxe induitiy cupacliy. Major investment! over tbe last decade haveable' eipaniion and upgrading ol facilities. Indeed, virtually all lie weapon-programs proiocted over iho next live or more years are hfcdy lo be enanufaefared la existing facilities. Il ia cleat,thai Ibe rcaoaroes recused for iheie programi lannVndc some for wtucb the coanpetitioa wil beularly intense if Gorbachev'*program i* pursued vigorously, lo the event the modern! rat
program encounter! scnoui diflicully.-might decidedjust tome defensecither by delaying Iheirback Ihe lire of Ibe program, or reducing anaual productionecausecciiion wai not included in our general context for making the projection!,expect it_ would catuc spending to drop below that rejected.
Aa caaaa rut lion of the outlay* fot weaponsy tbe different icivkei provides additional
: legardiDg Ibe projection period. Although Ibe dala arc presented as lingle values (for cue of
Ihey ihould be consideredaloes lying withinrange of uncertainty
Wc arc reasonably coolYdrnlour ability to identify the military service subordination of each of the historical aad projected progt imi We have much tea* confidence, of course, la the projections ofprogrami. Nonetheless, in tbe dueiLUJeia that fuunn. wc identify tbe individual programi or diesesrogrami thai heavily InHococc our projcriiccti ofprocurement. While Ibeac programs may change ia icope or liming, ibe evidencei our judgment lhal ihey will be therogrami io resource term* through the end of thej decade.
The estimated and projected outlays by service* and their- iof the total am preacnicd innd i. The annual levels ind ihares fluctuate leenewbai, bat when outlay* for the entirere accumulated, the Ground and Air Forces and (be Navy each account for about onc-hflh of total pre carrrrv-ni. TheRocket Foreea (SRFX Air Defeeae Forces, tappeart teincei. ud the ipaee program -each account for roughly ono-teoth.'
Ground for cel. Tbe luiulncd growth bi outlay* for ground forces hardwire over Ibe laitears reflects Iho long-term priority aitooldeit wilh Ibe massive
1flim nilautri, liiiin* utbe rmrtar fer tbemciMthe kwIw*br mUitc" ol Um
Icptv-tul' '
Table 2
USSR: MlliUtyl by
Far mm af raaipiriiaa,Baranaaaica" are mtam-w. TWeent mMiull (rvaaawv nhiMr UM^mMm at
luiK Of TT-lfuc. IlaullliaikUlm (iw iarMaa aailaarr In WWII bar naarilan (or UK:
aeeeoe rftajit ttor nfent farua Uctadas blaMU) ei Dilenc inKon aaaa rear neriaaa.
and modem (ration program earned out by ihc USSR. The increment In resource* projected foe (he Ground Forces daring the current FYP. trend. We foresee very large program* to upgrade the: major emphatii on atnHrigh ratea of production lotO ii wellajor progrim to modern ire leveral thousand cider lanka artn addition, we forevx exTeflsrve produclicje of (benfantry corabat vehicle, ptocureroeiit of aeverai ave" artillery and tactical air defenaend the introductionear medd tank.rawli of tbcae program, arclight incrcue in tbe Ground i'oiwl ibare of total procurement outlay*
Air Feteti. Since Ihehe Air Foreea have received nearly one-fifth of total weapon*These resource* have been uteri to ctpand aad
upgrade Ihe Intercontinental and peripheral attack, tactical aviation, and military tranjpoet miraioui. The ptoctiroment of bomber and fighter aircraft make up the bulk of tbcae outlay*
The lyitcm* projected for (bene force* during Ihe current FYP would require the continuation of the very high outlay* that have occurred rirtcc. The mUoduCtioo of the Blackjack intercontinental bomber and coaliniied production of the Backfire would be very expemivc. Meanwhile, protected tacJi-cal aircraft prograins,belanker, aad therogfootcontinue to cluimlargo iharc of air force procurementldiiion, Soviel airlift capability Is projected lo improve
Nary. Naval procurement reacbod iu highestrine, when additions lo submarine* Uuocbed ballistic rnisiUc (SLBM) forcfl veto in full twlflt.ln the first half ofaval procurc-rOeaitUrge part because of reduced outlayi'for SLBM protrams. 1
Substantial growth ts forecast for naval proccrccnent during, theYP. Su boil lines are again likely to leadHoWever, we relieve that additions to tlieaUla'cKasi^^
.ajorrc-QUird resource*nearlyequal lo these for procurement df lalllitic missile iuhntarirtes-^willrihe Typhoon likcijltrvleaJ.thtway. Tbr Soviet* will continue to upara'doceemtaUnt fleet'as wdU Two new carriers are projected lo enter the fleet, along with other ships suchodified version of the guided-missile destroyer Sovretnennyy. We expect procurement for naval air programs to also rise
Strategic Rocket forcer. Procurement for Ihc SRF Is driven by the acquisition of 1CBM systems, causing sharp decline* and speeding fluctuations as each generatiou ofs is introduced. Tbe projected fotces eifCalperiod of high cxpcndiluret with the contiouing depioj-mcnt of ihc road-nvobilo ICBM, thend theod set of one or rjiore new missiles.argo increase it projected in SRF procurement over that ofseriod.
Air Defease Fanes. Procurement for Air Defease Force* in absolute terras andhare of the total has declined tince Ihc tecond half of, when these forces were nisi mils,arge number of now systems. Srxndine atsodoted with the forcesfor the neat five years would being (hi* declinealt, however. The prbclpal programs projected arc
UK SA-IOoahoupd anditnd the upgrade of ibeaotioallUtic-mtsiiio fyt(cn.
Space Fwoeiami. Soviet irrvatroent io apace pro crams, whichprimarily rcilitary, hu (townover (he lastears. The peak expenditure Icreliill dip (entc-hal wiih the rj-iiems rejected. The priocipal one* are opect cd to be (be raflitary reennruusrance rruom.aajor aEocatioa lo (he heary-IL'i launch vcanck aad rpaee shuttle, whkhupper! many progranu
Support Form Outlay* for procurcoacoi of.appeal leavtcc*oneiioo of (ho lire ofand increased when Ibe Soviet defeasewaagrowing rapidly. Tbe growth ia-daring the lint half of the
, and (hey arc expected to show Utile irowth during tbe current FYP *
Weapon ProdteOo-
The new proicctioa method produces much improved forecasts of future weapon pros-rases in the aggrcgIK, The method also producot -medianhich leaerates the foteeaiUuojtiiies. This force could be viewed assingle-value "belt estimate" ce>mi>oacdomplete listing of the weapons and equipment tbsl arc esjieotede procured dating the csirreni FYP. Tbe iodividutl dementi, ho-ever.not be viewed or wed asbeat"The .aalyskiat which prcaeau tha bspTieatictasakes the fullest practical use of tbe data. Atd preflriously, while wo have been able to forecast the total and the service allocations within reasonable tconcU, wo cannot predict accurately all of tbe Indi. vidua! programs within those lotah
Faeb unique act of foroos reflect* (be randomprocexs withio the aUted uncertain tie* For ptuc-tscally any aggregate roeaiiire.at equally likely tel* ol force* could alto have been selected We hive presented inne of severalf selected wcapoos that Coald be produced with the spending level* dcociibed above. Thi* iliastraiiveample af pouible weapon types and productionfor the current FYP Is compared with animated
iccductioo of the last FYP to put (ho rnimber* in eoDteiL The actual mil of systems and their levelsbe different, but tbeaa programs are actuevable within tbe resource levels forecast and wouldniSeaci ittptovecneau ha Soviet military face.
resenls another view of the results obtained from the newthisorecast of Ibe procurement for all misiilcs. The lop line represent* Ihe resources roquiied to procure all the program! consideredthe end of (he decade they would amount to roughlyillionha range aa Ibe figure illustrates how the accamislation of the
csodi&e*rcegaioa ot* the fatrree. This appecacb indicate* that scene growth la eoissile procuicxacnt is eipected through thend that,utlay* will protubly be betweentllicuand IS billione believe (hat dirpUyt of ranges for the future, similar to those In this figure, in either resource or physical icrrna. could be tuefully adapted to the NaUonal Intelligence Pjtimate force pcojec-tiom
BauaaosrJaa of the Method
Wc believe tba new method described in this paperaeh improved assessf futurebul It doe* not resolve seuifactorilyof the concerns notedefinitive assessment of Ihe
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I'm- be.ween missile programs ta the early pan of ihat ekeaeVc. Even though basic change* in the eavT roomeot hare occurred infra; acnily. boweva. when oar doc* take place, iu impact can bo po-rajivc anel result la dramatic ihifU in the pace of wen pomolicyy have taken effect ia Ibe, whoa tbe rapid (rowth in caitlayi for wcarxatf prociiiemcel ceased. Farther, these chances are not eaiy lo identify, initially, we ore bicly lo perceive such cbnages only at adjustments to individual weapon programs. Accordingly, wc arc not likely lo be able lo predict them with confidence.
Other "global"*ai political and oco-noenic cooajderatioaacaa affect Ihe impiemen-Uiioatocaremeot plan. Tbe new forecasting method dee* not incorporalo Iheae influences into the individual program rati ma tea in any ligmficanl way. Wc arc committed lo improving this clement of our analtiii. however, aad have begun an effort to cum-iac ways to bring our perceptions of ihc "global" environment to bear upon our force projections.arge and amorphous problem thai Is not likely to yield easilynalysis, noi docs il lend Itself readily toSca lion. Wc behove, noecibeless, lhal wc caa Bake progress on that issue aad develop techniques thai will allow taa to apply tbe Community'sin this area directly lo our force projection effort.
suoceai of this method will take some time. Al ihiihowever. Il ii possible lo teview ibe approach and bow it oddresaes the sourcca of uncertainly that affect force rejection* "*
pproach The new melbodology doe) not take into account poaeible changes in the overall emiroaroesl in which future military programs will be pursued. The history of Soviet military programs over the lastear* or io lUggetU.lhat fundstnental changes HO noi occur frequently in tbe resources allocated to procuring miliury hardware la theoviet efforts to modetrUre miktary forcessroioaged period af growth in weapont procurement TV only deviation from that rapid growth prior tothemld-WJ*he
At Ihb stages il i* not rvactkal to reflect the projected growth of Soviet GNP or tbe evolution of Gorbachev's tndustrial oodcratration program in, forthe estimate of future produciioo of the BlackjackBuis feasible, In fact crucial, to review iho overall resource implications of our force projection* jointly with projections of overall economicThai allow* as to determine if adjustment* arc required in either or both estimates
AlUrnn lively, ihe review may Ind lea te both Ibe eoo-nomk and force projections ue .but only under restricted conditions The foroc* projet led here would add tubalto Soviet military capaUhtica by the cod of the decade We have concluded,ihat the projections, in conjunction with our
aisetitnenti of future- economic per forndicate lhal considerable ifn itore fot ibe Soviel leaderab ip Tbii siren can be relieved only ificlucia bit profited growth La OoUwl id productivity If hisa* iiKce-ufal aad ccsanyarrvic pertearssaac* faUi MbaUMiatly short of tbesituationbetWSevery loojh cbeace* will bare U> be made, and revisions ia rmbtary programs ore possible
A Better mtha "PUa" aad In lon^inUIMa
We believe the new method doe* permit aa imjrovc-meat ewer pott mcthoda in two pobicoi area* notedtha Soviet pUfi and forecaifing iuon. The ircatmeal of tbeae two sowers of uncertainty ii the goal of the new project loot methodology, and It ii here that wo belicxehat been achieved.
Our perception of the "plan" It bated on individual programnd we believe the quality of these irtdividaal estimates hai improved,etail of our more detailed analysis of theuch larger dau bate has been created and more com pleaundertaken oa the capability of thestablishment and the proficiency and rapacity of defense irsdusiriet These analyses have been integrated with the analyse* of weapons ia the Held and future militaryll these results combine to alio* at to develop projections for individual programs consist rot with the intelligence available and lo sue lhal tame evidence to develop uncertainly statements for each program Thesejudgments aboutr*tbilily lhal onprogramart of it win occur a* predicted ore tbeor our overall aucument of future force*
The uncertainty judgment* are program -specific and vary widely, parucsdaity among different classes of military hardunti. sliiprartd submarines, aircraft, missiles, and military and civilian space systems. There ore variations within aand SLBMs, forwithin arumple, different measures axe applied to individual models of tactical aircraft. Further, for each system, judgmenU are developed with respect not only to tbe likelihoodrogram occurring, but also lo tbe lime of iu introduction, iu level of development, and the pace ai which it will proven toward thai level;
All these judgntenu create tbe basis for reaching our ultimate goal, improved overall force projections. Combining Individual uncertainty measures with the help of computet: simulations allow* us toet of force projections lhal no longer assumes allrojectod. programs will materialize "on
Original document.
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