GORBACHEV AND THE PROBLEM OF WESTERN RADIOBROADCASTING INTO THE

Created: 11/1/1987

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Gorbachev and the Problem of Western Radiobroadcasting Into the USSRff

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Gorbachev and the Problem of Western Radiobroadcasting Into the USSRW

Hoard

Summary

several decades Western radiobroadcasting into ibe USSR hasey role in weakening ihe regime's monopoly of mass comajor Communiil instrument ot social mobilization and political control. By providing large numbers of Soviet citizens with an alternative source of in farms (ion and ideas, the Western radios have made it impossible (or the regime lo determine delusively bow mucb and what son ol news reaches ihe Soviet population. Weslern radiobroadcast in* thus makes it more difficult far the regime to censor opposing points of view while propagating official value^ndideology, and, in this way, shape popular altitude, and bchaviorflBH

Several factors have gradually expanded the influence of Western broadcasting.

aod the spread of educationbroadened tbe horizons of many people, malting ibem more interested in the outside world, especially in things Western.

Fear :hat listening could lead to reprisals has inereaiiogly diminished. With the renunciation of Statutist terror, the regime lost its ability to reflate closely the Uvea of its citizens, and. as it retreated from the effort to do so, many people gradually began to take advantage of (he de facto expansion of freedom.

stale offerings of Soviet propaganda and culture in the Brezhnev yean caused many dliaou to tunc out the official media and turn tosources of enlesuin ment and news outside tbe regime's

Stye*

Western governments0 have modernised Ihe radios' broadcast-ing facilitiescpand their territorial coverage and teach more listeners, white improvements in (he standard of living for selected groups enabled more Soviet citizens to purchaseadiobecause the USSR relics eijensively on shortwave radio (or lis own domestic communications jbbb

Today atomercent of the adultillionat leasteek to foreign radio, usually Radio Free Eurooe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RLJ. Deutsche Wellehe Britttn Broadcasting Corporationr Voice of America (VOAJ. Listening is especially common among officials, the intelligentsia, andwhose political reliability is critical to the future stability and cohesion of the Soviel system. Rates of listening arc also high among non-Russian nationalities in the Western borderlands and among religious believers, dements of thc population whoscvulnerabilijy lo Western influences has long concerned the regime m

It is impossible to measure precisely the client to wbich Western broadcasting has affected Soviet public opinion. Western surveys of lie attitudes of Soviet citizens, however, havetrong correlation between listening to Western radios and tbe holding of unorthodox views on particular political aad social issues. Moreover, reporting from Soviet sourcesumulative, if indirect, impact on tbe overall orientation of those whoskepticism aboutiet official pronounce-mcr.tsiminishing sense that the capitalist world is alien and hostile.

Speeches of top Soviet leaden in-thc several years before and after Gorbachev's accession have expressed considerable apprehension that the United Stales and its Western allies arc using radiobroadcasting as one ofnumber of weapons designed to publicist and exploit Soviet internal problems in an effort to undermine tbe Soviet regime froai within. Gorbachev's own remarks, although not as sharp as those ofsomc of bis Politburo colleagues, indicate that be shares this concernH|

Scent.

CCW TRaCI

^jen^a;

Instead of Hying to seal off the population (torn outside newt Gorbachev's main strategy is to improve the credibility of Soviet media andnhance the attractiveness of Soviet cultureolicy ofhe ttasnoit policy servw map- purposes,ajor impetus has been theto compete more effectively with foreign media for the Soviet domestic audience. Past Soviet leaders have argued that exposing social problems, criticizing official abuses, and more openly discussing politically sensitive aspects of party history would provide grist for foreign radios. But Gorbachev maintains that it is precisely Ihe suppression of information about domestic problems that opens the door to foreign propaganda. Thus, supporters of glasnosi argue that it is in the regime's interest to preempt foreign radios by moving rapidly to provide early coverage of important evenitjrtd to interpret them in ways that put tbe regime in the best light.

Gorbachev also has made organizational and personnel changes in the propaganda apparatus and is working to upgrade the technical capabilities of Soviet media:

He has merged two Central Committee departments in an effort to achieve better coordination of foreign and domestic propaganda.

He baa carriedajor purge of Brezhnev holdovers in key positions in the editorial and propaganda bureaucracies.

R*iaaV

thes extending the reach and variety of Soviet television

A more dramatic change has been tbe cessation of jamming of BBCalthough jamming of RFE/RL aod DW coatiaue*.realized tbat jamming had bceo only partially effective;more Soviet citizens listened to Western radios5 thanjamming resumedonsidering this,calculated that the benefit of jamming (limiting butpopular exposure to Western newt) was outweighed byThese advene cor-*ec.uences included feeding popularGorbachev's much-touted commitment lo glejnott andin effect that the regime bad sooiciiiinc to hide and fearedtbe West in ihr world of ideas. Moreover. Gorbachevthat jamming damaged tbeeputation abroad, andeven have surmised, as have some other Soviet officials, thatstimulated inicrcii in the foreignecause of the lure. .

Gorbachev hat alio uted more standard methods of countering the Western radios:

Not surprisingly, the end of jamrrJ.'g has been accompanied byattacks on Western radios. These onslaughts olten include deuiled rebuttals of the arguments made by the radios rather than thead hmintm attacks previously relied on. Press attacks have also become both more strident, aa illustrated especially by the campaign to Sold the radios responsible for fomcaiicg the mass demonstrations in tbe Baltic republics that took puce in

Moscow has uicdthreats andtry to rein in the foreign nations. In an effort to legitimize blocking those stations that arc stilt jammed. Moscow has attempted to mobilize the support of various Third World countriesNew World Information Order" that would sanction jammingpropaganda ofcountries

Gorbachev hasounterpropaganda campaign launched9 Tbeo turn lac tables on Wcsterr. critics, putting them on the

t> btghligbuag alleged human rights violations to the Weft.

Several mlerrelated oootidcrauoaj probably will coo Untie to influence Soviet policy toward Western stations in the future.

assessment of the public'i mood will continue to be moat important in decisions about whether to jam the radios. Moscow has been particularly inclined to citend sarnming during pcrioda when the USSR wasexternal acioni that it feared would be viewed negatively by the Sovietmount was citended at the time of8 Soviet invmsion ofand again shortly after0 declaration of martial lav in Poland.ew cnus in Eastern Europe, especially oac that led to the use of Soviet military force, would be most likely to cause the reimpouiwn of comprehensive jamming

valuation of each station's message and its impact on the Soviet population is an important consideration. The Soviets continue toreater desire to jam kfE/RL because iturrogate homesta-lion that they see asreatening. Thus. Moscow has jammed RFE/RL continuously since ii went on the airhereas jamming of other stations has been intermittent.

There hastrong correlation between the level of East-West tension and decisions about jamming. Thus, Moscow stopped jamming mast major Western stations after the SALT agreement was signedhe rcceni decision to cease jamming VOA and BBC was probably influencedesire to improve the atmosphere for arms control negotiations.

Cost and energy considerations may loom fairly targe. Although hard to estimate, the expense of jamming is probably high enough tooncernet iod of resource constraints in the USSR. Some reporting suggests the leas of electricalthe Chernobyl' accident affected Soviet jamming decision!

olitical crisis in the Sovietajor downturn in East-West relations,reakdown of political and social order in Eastern Europe, tbe regime is most likely toourse of continuing or refining the current policy toward tbr radios:

Soviets may decide to stop jamming DW to bolster their reputation for openness. They detest and probably fear RFE/RL, however, and probably believe tbey can persuade many foreigners as wdl as Soviet diixcni that gtatiwi docs not require allowing what they portray as "anti-Soviet" propaganda to flow unchecked into the country.

f

Ai proem, options for moving toward greater repression are also limited by the Tact that the Soviets still rely on shortwave radio for many domestic broadcasts.ecade or so. however, the regime may be able to eliminate this reliance. It ia wntinuing to hard-wire the country so tbat signals travel by cable rather than through the atmosphere. But even If the Soviets stop domestic production of shortwave receivers, the large exisiin; steel; would give many citizens access to foreignfor years to comer

For the foreseeable future,ubstantial minority of Ihe Soviet public probably will be able to receive Western news and analysis via shortwave radio The cessation of jamming will resultradual growth in the Soviet audience. The ease with which programs can be picked up will more than offset the loss of the thrill of listening to the stations in defiance ofeffort* to block them. There is, however, an apward limit to the growth in audience size for Western broadcasting Listening is already widespread among the urban, educated classes: peasants aad less educated city dwellers have much less interest in listening.

Gttunast is not likely to diminish the appetite for news from Western stations. Greater candor in Soviet domestic media cannot completely close the credibility gap between official propaganda and the population's desire to bear another point of view. Since Gorbachev is not likely to remove all onnsirainu oe pobuc disouuoo of sensitive poliiical issues, such as the legitimacy of toe Cocairioaist Party'shere will con tin we to be an interest in Western repotting aad analysis. In fact, by increasing public attention to political issues, rfunoir is likely to stimulate greater interest ia both domestic and forcigD media. In Eastern Europe, where the media generally have been more open than in the USSR, the audiences for Western broa<kuuag remain large

The penetration of the USSR by Western broadcasting is partreadtechnological unprovcracois in communications, urban-iaation. education, and growing global economicit breaking down the isolation of the Soviet population. In combination with these other developments. Western broadcasting is enlarging the size of Che cm really thinking public diminishing suspicion of tbe outside world, and placing pressure ontheregime to lake into account the desires of its people in making policy bb

rtucr-

Con tenU

Summary

Nole

he Western Radios and Who Liiieai 10

Stations Broaocsii to Ihe USSfl?

of Ihe Audience

lite - udience?

factors Limmnempact on Audience *f

Impact of Listening " i

Anfnfinrri Pnhl> I

o! ihe Radios

on Ability To Verify Inforoiatioo 7

on Makeup of Audience 9

oo Individual Slation

for Concern

of Concern

About Particularly Vulnerable Audiences

)8

Nationalities

bcheven jg

Armed Forces

To Restrict Radio LaKcnint

33

___ _ Ulil SanOKmi

Ci>cFif urooaaanda

Eaierg caccew Type of

rprppanda

Oraaoiutton* and Personnel

. Uptraduu Technical Capabiliticiot riming

Secret./

GKtOS

Counterprojaf .nc* Themes

the Cr^dibtluy of theegi.

he Move Toward Open new

Purpose* of Clamosi

Risks of Claiwt

Impact of GIojkoji

Dipfomatk Initiatives

Multilateral Diplomacy

on Particular Countries

Ahead: Factors Influencing Future Policy Toward tbe Radios

of the Public's Mood

of the Station's Content

Policy Considerations

and Energy Constraints

Ava.iabk to Gorbachev

All Jamming

Corner. alive Option

Refinements in the Current Course

and Outlook

Scope Note

"rid the I'roblcm of Western ft Hdi inroad casting. Into Ibr : 'i-fll

In focusing on radiobroadcasting, this study concentrates on whstw the main conduit of Weston influence sod the most evident intrusion of thc information revolution on the Soviet Ueioa. Subsequent "oik in this field "ill cumine the impact cf other inform*con technologies that areascent stage of ce-e'oorr.eot in thendeocassetic recording, the ttaasmnuuoe of TV signals by satellite diiectly to tbe Soviet population, and the possible use of computersisscmiaa tt_l'uhorired" nfor rr.aiK)'. imorig members of :he Soviet pub!icf"jpA

This study evaluates Gorbachev's policy of "openness" tjlostou) only insofar as it applies to the Western radios. DI Rescaicb PaperSecret NF NCherin'OoegnprfaanJ Cultureroader treatment of Ihe genesis of flainoit

Wttutn Radio Stationshe USSR

four ma/or Western Italians: Voice of America

Radio Liberty. United Siaiei (broadcast from

Munich. Weilritish Broadcasting Corporation. Grtal Britain Deutsche WeUcV'Germo*olor*.

West Germany

Japan IBRA Radio, Holla /BRA Radio. Portutal Radio RSA, South Afrlta Radio Seeder. fiuernallonal Jwiit Radio International Volet of Turkey

minor Western stations: Radio Australia Austrian Radio {ORF] Belgian Radio (RTBFI Radio Canada International Radio Finland Radionternational Creek Radiooice of Iteael Italian Radio (RAI]

Religious radio stations Adventlti World RadioR) KNLS {'New Lifelaska Radio Monte Carlo. Monaco Radio Vaiiton Trans World Radio. Monaco Voice Of Ihe Andes, Ecuador

Other

United Nations Radio

I-OtO

V

USSR,t,

nmtawi (fat iiamplt.Komi

a" tarftidSSR iiuMfr lAwr.

*bvrty;th* ttttfi ligmtiiwHt

, TV HiWbM

Corbacbet and tht Problem of Western Rntjiobroadcastina: Into the USSH0B

Seffnninehe years ol detente. Soviet cit liens have (lined greater access to informaiion fromsource* than ever before. The moat Important channel hu been foreign radiobroadcasts, which reached, -lib varying decrees of audibility, much of tbe Sovietduring the period of heavy jamming0 tohen theregime stooped jamming many major Western radio stations. Ho- to respond to foreign broadcastsontinuing dilemma for the regime. Renewing Mmming of all foreign broadcasts would feed popular cynicism about Gorbachev's mucb-touted commitment to Ihe free now of ideas andore point in relations with Westernespecially the United Slain. But refrainmg from jamming some stations runs the risk of further ineieasiog Soviel citizens" eiposure toabout living standards and civjj liberties outside theenables them to evaluate the regime's pronnanda more

I

The Four Major Stations: Hours to the USSR

Western Radios >ad Who ListensVni

Wfckb Station Broaoout to tbe USSR? Closeestetn mimi broadcast to the USSR in Russian, in one of the Soviet minority nationalr in their own {Westera| Uniuage (seeI About an equal number ol* less developed countries, as well as some rjandesiiac radio stations, also broadcast to Soviet territory. la large parinsou >uiions can be heard only in small pans of tbe country or for short periods of the day. tbe maia impact on the Soviet public comesandful the more powerful Western tut*

;

BaaaLh Lain*.

m an averageouo-ed by Voice ofo ai tbe British Brcockaiting Corporationnd ibe West German station Dcatiscbc Welle (Germanenuaohe station is (terrinaf-ter abbreviated DW,|seeB

oatertr RrE/RL

rt

thai *orjuawiiki

umh rmoL-iift mm

terraprogram houn. the leading uicrnal bnuocaiie* lo the USSR rs Radio freeadio Ubeny tRFE/RLk on tbe air some SOO hours

Al ihelime.lean during period of heavy jamming of major Weaicrn naiioni, tonw ofnproporuwnnu H

u' Judging

a'act* ofden. RaCio France, andanada Irucrnaiieaail all have fairly suablepresumably because none of these iianonteen mbjectedamming la 'oCeni yean. Radio Vaiiean. alio unjamnved. hai an cnensivc schedule of religious programing lo the USSR, broadcasting daily in Armenian, Ruiiian, Ukrainian. Utnuaaian. Beloruislan, and laivisn.

Some non-WesternIraniana sizable following in Soviet Central Asia, largely because of programing about Islamic affairs of interest lo Soviet Muslims. US Embassy officers traveling in Central Asian republics have been told (hat Iramanand Afghan radu, stations arc easy to

up

Slu at*Audience

Ealimalcs by RFE/RtVi audience research uaiiIhai aboutercent of Ihe adultSO miUWnlisten lo for -t- beoadeaits ai leas)OA bal long bad ibe meal lUieaeri in the Soviet Union. faUowod by RFE/RU BBC. and DW. Tbe most recent aud.-enee survey indicates ihai aboutillion Sovietoercent of those overl tune in to VOA at leasteek. For RL and tbe Bailie services of RFE. ibe comparable figure iiullionban II piroai of tbok over tit forulliou HO pcreeail aad foranDuooV uxal alw all ihe major Weneraot tbe auea of all these figures, hewever,eof coniidCra Sfc audience duplication fane

'akin ikiiloans >umlau oaaei

ra.

fiWwi

i i

'-if iidirasi r-urni oT !hxi xl.n, -mutailearionaiaart rv

i ib"iii klffl

moscti (nnumi fmm uwnana a* rkc

MtaiirUt iht SiuAuJitmt of iht Mtjr Wr*>tra Shin'ami

Aiteiiont'L/RL ifo'fally tailed "Se*iti Artail."lo-/ lauvejrf lo dtlt'miit iktrE'R! BC. treat-it of iht cloud nalwt of Soidti socitry lAe'e i/ nodueeilyilt, aad survey 'fitorch esilmaits an rtauUtd. SAAOH in* Hrm'rwi tiiliensimp ratling auislde ihe USSR ataj tmlg'ti andimulano* lo eilrapola't iht flilnafng brhatigt of ihtapulationkol* i

TArrriide'0blt duplication among ihtof ihtradios fot txamplt.oft4gt -ttkly audititc*lo ti Itoii out of ihtee aaa/evVOA BBC. and DW. Bttauit mnsiliht majo* broadeaiit'i weIlsititfsystarchrdforn$nalj*remMany Uiitvs

Olio llsltn ia mart

usmt nai-an. Fat tiamt't.L Imtitts/'on*aoeas'oitspandtd6aid iht, In It ltd ia iht Crevgrai. Amttmaa. ot Ann strvtct. and Id pr'tens said ihtyo RLot. H

Tbr regime itself estunaieaigb abare(uses in to Western radio stations. Duongon the East-Weil ideological struggle given(Kaooladgel Sooay iu

otHaal lactaiur Matedoviet audieawe thatapproaimaiclyercent of ibe So*acttprauciabi) adulul liiieued io one orHe etaiosed tbit tbe growth of iheio tbeVae llgawi aretaaa Western

Tee lape-'ccording of broadeasti (calledhe passing of tapes among Soviet ciuieiu also caltoi tin audience for Wastarn radio stations. Ac corouig u;.illion tape reordersproduced in (he USSRp fromi Iandotionrticles in tbe Soviet ores*uiguud that many of these in a< bancs areto'A prcgrar-s. Inorarty newspaper in tbe aoaib Caacatas admitted thateople listen to tapes of foreign broadcasts,urvet conductediaonei sociWotat in tbe Kiragaida oblsst revealed that tape recorders art used to ieu>id religious foreign broadcaiti for further disseminationape recorder can be hevxed upimer, listeners can record beoaoruia late at night or in ibe earlr morning, when audibility often is betIci|

The upe-ieeoiding of Western radiobroadcasts could become mote widespread in the future. The Soviet press has indicated that the regime plans to male aodiocasselte tecorders more readilyur-tbcrmoie. In recent years, Soviet factories have begun tranufacturint combined radio receivers-casaetieEra

By training Soviet youth to operate ibortwavttbe regime iueJfole ia expanding ihe audience for foreign radrCOroadcasuag Radio tccn-octlocy classes arc pan ofev eiarj ftudesta. and many SoncU have learned is improve tbort-avt rneaptioa for ibairnd eeser people's receiversheir yiTof.emeal ia oftkiiiJ-apiarrnree! but radio dabs Lack rear rXSAAFfUkc All-Unio* Vcsantary Soeaefy fee AtauUDce to the Army. Air Force, aod Natyienata number of radio operatnrs in ibeo ll age troop (or Use arcaol t aBoV

* WnU, at Vain' . ranrafn

am mauaanltl<.Vna

ii'aTafaVal

Thediminished social itigma anil dar.gc* associated with listeninghe stations alio einandi ihe radios' audience Unlike Sialin'i lime, thtcning to loieiftu broeHiasts Is n* agnnsi Ihe !iw,L'acV Khrushchev, people be|an listening wilh *cai fear, bul atillnd with detenioihe weed beganel around that IIu(<BH

Many Soviet citiicni inmil sensed

some danie' shornrom

Overall.ueh freer atmosphere bad devel' Oped even beforeccession, h'anyr in particular, listen blatantly j he situation as follows

On i'i moln It'rtt /of on obleii rtiitr/mm Uokv.ki renll It-eVfi-ujvening inevery mo; lAe'co cotuiooil,ransitu" so his and every

is cotuiaily lu-eJ to ihr Votct' or sottt oihn HVilr'n uou'om onJ Is sure lo it

OKI *I

ln elfact. with the rcaunciaiion of terror aa an initrunx/ii of social ooniroi. ibe regime leal ill ability lo ragulaie cleaely ihe Iivq of mdiigaaaad retreat-cd from lb*to do i-

Basse chaagea a* Ibe character of Soncsa ibe decades sinceeath bat increased ibelaiercai ia news froea tbe outsideUfbaaiesiioo amd eananded cdwcatM broadinol ibe lionrona of many people, and essentially uajnJormcd at of ibeassive and inert

manes ublic oTOtirem with divrrac inter-ciU aad individualThn fundamenial

change "as evident in the trend towardthat became particularlybcfs of Soviet citiicns-ilh fnvaie and Individualistthan the "civic duties" to which theto channel public activity. Merc peoplewitb me stale offerings of officialand disenchanted with Sovietincrease in aud-ence sue for theoccurred h. Aa IVOaato tune out the oaVialnd turnsources of ejJjtuWnent aad

fccim fjvirlagmparlu4ir*ct

Snt- Toe regime atsemptcd0 until0 rotriei radio reeip-im bi jamming, but jamming was neve: compMtelf effective. Tor technical icasons related to the propagation of radio waves (see, reception is usually faitly good at night despite Jamming Moreover, jamming ia markedly las elective in tbe couniryiidc thin in eiliea. Even in cities, it cannot completely cover the entire area and leaves local "holes" of audibility, fuiihcimore. the public was able to overcome jamming in icveral -jv;

Members of ihe intelligentsia often tooklor,pa to their dachas (country cottages).

Some people tape-recorded prsgrami at locabooiaaclibiliiy csai in the countryside or in tboae urban locutiont *bere samming istbey oould tutenaicr time People in tre oounirysidf taped programs foe their /roads in tbe ones

Man> Sonetsto nations thatnot Homed at all or were subjectelatively little jamming

Some Soviets took advaauge of the fact that radio-broadcaiu in language) not andd* ipokrn in the USSR were no* lammed. For euBiptc. it was possible to listenerman programing and

RFtVt Polish service. Similarly. Iht regime some-nrr.esanguage onlyere il it ibe meat commonkrainian living inmight have bean able to1in hit native tongue, lor caample. even though tbe tameiev.

Many people alio ihiried lo higher redtofrrquencics on whichaa effective. Although mot receiversn the USSR do not contain tbe higber saortwav* handi. maay littenert BOT* cia.ee! fcacigp-raaclc ten or had thej radiosto receive these frtoireiKici br free-aic*gtiers" who are eiprdefiedelectronic ecu ipmen;

of LJitroim

Some former Scmet ci litem report they overcame jamming by putchasini the highlit obtainableof receiver or by installing dcicra to improve reception. Among the latter devices ate simple directional antennas that can be mbucst home from wiresoodrn ftsjM or more sophisticated frequency filler t(

new. events lhal are hinted at in the official media. This function has become more important in recent decades with the emergenceetterhat it leuto accept ai face >atae -hat they read in tbexeuj

Tbe radios' function uf enabling Soviets in (beck on motorsmportance during momcntouior domestic events such a> ihe nuclear accident al Chernobyr (seeFF/RL'tresearchWestern radio italiona enjoy larger audiences during such periods

Many Soviet ciiitensui about iheSoviet invasion of Afghanistan from WesternWhile Soviet media initially acknowledged only that Sooei troops had been "in-itcd" so Sight the cou nte rtevolu lion aad avoided at* men job of direct combat, thoseuned in to Western stations learned that Soviet troop* were encounter-iag armed opposition and engaging in battle.

During0olish critii. many Sonet ctti-vni kept abreast of event* by following Western radiobtoadcaiti

ingle tenter stating that Soviet Presidcni Podgoroiy had "resigned at bis own request.'* VOA'i assessment of thc oustera large audience, accordingestern

SOpBSnjOTi

addilioa to broadcasting factual information not supplied by Soviet media, the radios introduce in ten-ersifferent frame of reference that may cause them to look al informationerspective unlike thai prrapagatod by the regime By providing theource of news and ideasof tbe slate, radiobroadcasting hasarote in encouraging tbe emergence of autono-moc: public opinioo in the USSR

A Better lafor-ned

Western radio isfTcctivr to helping tbe nubbe check ibe veracity of romors and 6nd out tnore about cryptic or itscoraplete accounts of important

Chernobyl'and ike Wenern (WW)

Impel iIke PapulaCe

njAt

S3

Wetter* radiotgnifiiani roll in ihe Soviet public ebon: ihe Chernobyl' nutlet-plam accident of April /Md. both by providing eO'lr reporting on ihe dtsaner and by prodding Ihe USSRrovide information ihrnuth III own medio Ac cording lo on RFEJRL survey token ikat June. II percent of INSoviet ittiiens iem-porarily traveling futside theWestern radio asrimary source for learning about ihe disaster in the first three weeks, compared to il percent who died Soviel television, the second la'geit source Then high figures suggest thai tomeof ihe public who normally do not linenestern radio did so in the face of the initial Information vacuum about Chernobyl'in ihemedia Among individual stations. VQA *ai mentioned as the primary formation source (by Ii percent of theollowed byadio Swedenad BBC ISt befits ill functionsurrogate homefE/RL tailored tit programing to contain prottiiol advtee such as kam to wash veeviablri that might be eontamtnated wih radiation. VOA and BBC.ther kand. focused more on ike accident IS,

In ihe Western areas of ike Ukraine and ihe Balili nates, where Polish radio Is audible. Warsaw's rela-lively franker treatment of ihe dlsaner and Ike announcement thai ike Poush Government was un-deriaklng health and safety pretauitons for the p, probablyignificant effect on ihe populace,

< ypteet at ite comn.oinii iomeieticence were those f'om Russian engineer

So>ic( Irlcvwon clearly tried .'Revise events inut we all understood that It wis sellout. From Westerneal-lied that the Soviet media -ere forced by Sweden's insistence lo captain the high levels of radiation. I'm convinced we would have found Out nothing and would have died like Dies if tba radiation hadn't raised an outcry in Europe.

Ino. an old womannanire lecture asked the doctor at the lecternlaim the had heard on VOA thai ihe Chernobyl' accidentcause more coses ofin the US SI

The mroodcosnng of on erroneous UPIatalliles. however, probably had some negative effect an Ihe radio's credibility One respondent to Ihe RfE/RL surveyirst heard of the accident from VOA and RL wtlch. os olwayi.poke of iheusandijulted BBall

rMSaaffift^HfiiKI^^BBSBf "

radiof high caiueluei at firn alarmed many

| aV

ordinary Rvsitani (ivtng in Yalta: when they learned that some of these reponi were inaccurate, they reportedly riprt. indignation that -Western gov-emmehrough the news medio, had "slo ihe USSR and unnecessarily alarmed people

Stytf

utt typical response In the -orJi of another riigondenlhr KFEJKL lur+ey.

At. didn't fuiow what loboughi ihat ITihcfe -ai no officialthen nothing terrible hadtOMibtc tbat some of ihe firstt-pom we'ccisggera'ed.oubt itpurpose Anyway, those repotti were proSablr etejejip the irmh than TASS'l itupid reditu

The Rrtim' t

f rtgime did not atkntfledge thai a* accident hod tokenn Chernobyl' until heightened let's of rodiction in Sweden alerted the Wenroblem and ensuredtsiern media would publicise tht incident abroad and InsideSR itself. Earl/ statements fromontained progreisirely grta:er amounts of detail, indicating that the regime felt Increasingly pressured to respond iow reaching listeners oyer short-ave radio

At hiosco- reccntred from ill Irailal bungling qf public relations, it took the affenstt to attack Weii-em eomrragt of iht otxideni Ogieial slolcmeait ottuttd RL. VOA.f tryinganic among tht population and "spill ihe socialist eommu-ally by kindlinghese aitaeki rtprtttnicd an alltmpt by the regime lo capitalize on tht leno-phooia common to many pant of the Russianand tat defied rub'atientlan

tVOaaSUfJ by blaming ihr Well forup the

Chernobyl itoryfor tht political purpose of defaming ihe USSR

w^kffiHj-2aS3B

Sprit

Impact ofttitudes: Fear Call Staditl

udienrr evaluation unit of RFE/RL ISAAORI conducts periodic interviews to gaugepublic attitudes in the USSRide range of sub/etit. These polh invariablyignificant dlffe'ence in attitudii toward current political Issues between those who listen to Weilern radios and those who do fo>'lowing four case studies are illustrative

The Right To Strike According1 survey, listeners to foreign radio stations, particularly RL. are much more inclined to approve ihe right ^Soviet workers lo strike than nonlisteners. Similarly, half of ihe nonlisteaeri opposed this right, but only aboul iwofifths of all listeners did. Altitudes toward the right lo strike are summarised in the following tabulation:

freer:: utercent of nonltsienert.ift (ae responses lo this question were responses io another amnion on whether the sample agretd with Soviet policy. Attitudes toward the KAl. thooldown are presented In the following tabulation:

1

rfe/rl audita

tauteh dtu.

1 SAAORample tonstil-ing ofespondents lo determine popular altitude! aboul the war In Afghanistan. Listeners to Welter* radio dltepp'oved of the USSR'sthereate nearly three times as great as thet of nonJisleners. Inversely, nonlisteners dtiplayet three timet more approval of atf.ciai policy than Hiteners Altitudes toward ihe USSR's proipeeti for success in Afghanistan are shown in iht following tabulation

The KAL ImeidtaLespondentsuestion about Ike credibility of the Soviet version vcrmi the Western version of) downing of the South Korean let. TP percent of nonllllenen believed the -sonet account compared toereens of listeners. The Western version was believed by H

ecu ran

snin nam

rrc/tu

racarea 4au

FfE/RL cond*tttd tnoihtr tuner6 thai yifldtd similar results Ditapprtivat of tht war In-creased among both listeners and nonlliltnersI9S*iht 'ait of approval /oti ihret lints hlghtr than among llsltntrs lapproilmaitlytrctnl comparedt'tttui. Conversely, about JJ pttctnt of iht listeners disapproved of Soviet goUc^ompared 10

onlyt'ttnl of nonllilrnt'i

Nacltar Thital.J SAAOR .Ondueild 'tita'ch on public olllludtt concerning iht dangtr of nuclear war bastdan-.pi* afndividuals. Boi* lisifitti and njninztne's ag'ttd thai tht ihrtet hadiht idcesicat raitt'ttnlthted varied tonsidtrabip. Onlyt'ttnl af Ihe Westtrn radio lisseneri believed Wtslt'n agftisitntssiht rtaionforf nuclear war. compartd toercent af nonliutnt'S. ai shown in the following tabulation

In general, broadcasts lie trvosi credible whento circumstances about which tbe listener*moatknowledge.rcttdcasishortage*be relative ly easy (oan eaplieaiiojjof^he American iwo-pany

Depends an Makeup af Aaditace. The credibility of the vsiivi* station* varies according to the aocial class and oolitical orientation of the listening audience For many Soviet ciiiicrucurious about the West and for intellectuals who desire political liberalirs-lion, the stations' association withmeats probably enhances their crcdibilityH

For many other Soviets -especially workers, rural dwellers, the elderly, and the poorlys'rong sense of patiiotisra. luspkion of things foreign, and bab>ts of poliiicai oanfaeanity reduce tbe appeal of tbe Western staixses Forestern press report on bow So>Kt onscaa icacied to the South Korean airliner incident'll fouad that miry blue cellar "Oflers acceptedovernment's nuo nale fee(be plane and rejected ibe view) put forth by VOA. BBC. and other Western nations.

in-

ill!

iirrru.hMj KntfO* le Ml T >'

tFE/tlL tutu

This istgjeiij ihai analysts of iMtrnolsonal seceriiy issues provided by Western radio had some effect in countrting Soviet media altemaispjsirriaamong the Soviet population and tnabled listeners lo Western radio toorr nuanetdof international affalrs^^a

In some oases, tbe radios lose credibility because ihey diicuu Wesiero political concept! (or which (bepublicrame of reference. AceansLngarious commcsia by Soviet emigre* and indcpcnde.itof RFE/BL prograrniog. snroosten aonaejinaea employ icrris that are cither oulnde the batearn* realm of capericacc or have not beats ad* auaiclyas 'parluutseoury democri ey" or "Repo.b' canor aoase SowMi no teas, uae and linguistic quality may detract'i lion's credibility For eaarople, ccneials from the US OniuUtc in Wr -i who viaited Riga. Latvia, in7 "ere told that VOA'i Lima*tend to be pre-World War II emigre, wbo use

mpact of Litteaing anResults from the Sarin Interview Project

from the Sonet Interviewndividual! who imityated from the USSR92 wereluppori ihe hypoihesls that listeners lo Western nationshole hold views more divergent than nonlttieners from mainstream official Soviel posl-tions- SIP data indicate thai RC listenersnd that those who do not lilten to any Western station hold theor example.ercent of nOnlis'.cnC'i taid they ever attended an unofficial art ihow while living in the USSR, comparedS percent of listeners: and only II percent of nonlisteners agreed wilh the statement that, of oil Soviet militarynone or hardly any were honest, compared tof those who listened to any foreign station.

-fr'.-j* asii a/rreui'w ittiit"tet teniae tint 'ifffinattJmtiiire tturt la ikrwi ed>a> USSR

"-i' SIPAr ri"er-

iW to til mlrewii. IStr id" teiqtHrttiiwtnlfj alga! lAr Vmi (ijulm H

I'fc'J tendency, however, is mwe pronounced for some

issues than others Iseehe cleavage of views according to rodin listening habits seems to beIn areas relating specifically to Cltliens' contacts with state Ouiho'U; than in areas that affect 'eipvt-dents lest tangibly. For example, the ottliudinal difference! among ihoie who. In RL, VQA. or no Station are quite apparent for queitions measuring:

Participation in protest activity.

Respect for key Soviet Institutions such as the police. KGB. military, and trade unions.

Domestic spending priorities {For example, does the USSR Spend too much or loo little on agriculture, reducing crime, tr^proiing keelih and education?/.

Attitudes toward Sli

The differences in altitudes ore less apparent, however, in the womenjfamlly cluster of issues, some Of theand in attitudes toward foreign policy {See table 2)

ted phraseology. These announcers* erophstis on ihe earliest possible return of Latina* independence also made many Lan-ani uncomfortable, according lo Ibis source]

Dtpeidi am taditidaal Station. Eice-pt for dissident* and West erainidlectunli. the general public in the USSR evidently trusts RL less than other Western stations.oubtless in part because Soviet media attacks on RL. which are harsocr aod more frequent than on other siatieaK. have raised ma ofiin the business of sabver* tiofi rather than ncars reporting. RL's focus on CTiucal coTragr of Soviet internal affairs reinforoes these

i. Martrencr. many ordinary citiicns lack the1nd vophislicat'on needed to understand many of RL's philosoohical and poJiticall) orieiimi prognco

as Mtediiic unfortunate irony that peasants, tbe class least able to comprehend RL broadcasts. Inejr* tht eountryiidcreception of

RLcQreport

ed in6 thai, amiwii rciiaCnii of ienioxwcL RL is era lens popcJar than Sortie radio because the public has become innoved with RL's constant

SovtCI propaiin-ji.

rigor* i

Western Radio Listening, b] AttitudtoaJ Typ*

ini hikiuh ofu.i

arwntonic- alo>or1 lupin anuniik'l Bi srt'rl from ittaunieioniihh alr> utile!

sort of information reaches tbe Soviet population, to propagate official values and ideology, aad to censor opposing points of view. Tbe regime's control of ihe information flow has thusowerful instrument for shaping popular perceptions, attitudes, and

be hi-! jefcoam

Listeningbebowr-rer, docs not necessarily erode tbe regime's credibility in tbe eyes of Soviet diirens. To the degree Gorbachev now ia trying to up popular desiresddieu problctni that emerged in prior -rears, the forma lion or reinforcement ofttitudes may actually be in tbe rcgtrne'1 interests

nations informucas about ibend thc much better conditions in the West, thusern to sussrort programs thatbring about tome irrujrovcmcnis]

oat the Radios Reasons for

Tbe regime's monopoly ol" mass communications io-sack the USSR has traditionally servedajor prop lo tbe Soviet system. Control of the media has enbe regime to determine how much and wbat

n recentumber of factorsombined to weaken the regime's ability to insulate citizens from enternsl sources of information. Aa ihe Sovietdeveloped, for example, interaction with the world economy became more desirable from tbe regime's point of view. Detente policies ined to greater Western tourism in the USSR, cultural and scientific cichaogci, and increases in trade with Westernmore Soviet dliiens to things Western and irxreasing humaa contacts.a iron of Jews, Armenians, and ethnic Germans opened another narrow channel of csiemaltbrovgh letters emigres sent back tc tbe USSR^RJJJ

g has been tbe main conduit of Western influence. Duringbe Sovielresn-iroed more iaouicd from the outside world ttnn ciliiens of any indastriaJiaed country, but West-era broadcastingeal io the regime'sarmor.reatWestern broadcasting bis come io compete wiib Soviet media for the

Sea-fet

The Impact ofRadiobroadcasts on

Defections

somecnlng tod-eatitonditioning factor In the decision to leore the USSR. Public occeii lo Wettern lourcei of Information devaluespropaganda obouimllllariim. unemployment, and exploitation of workeri. ihuiotentialear that economic insecurity would be hii lo: andpirchalogieaLbarrler' toifeIhe USSk.

enire service's account. The Italians thus inform interested segments of the public eboui tome defections, few of which ere reported by the domestic media. The redios also conduct Inter-

wtth somenot rpeeOM.-tfr

he topic of their defections or the methods they

uitd to defei- By referring In nr quoting thoic who

hare difeeled. Western radio may Inspire confidence for others who ore considering defecting^

Seyfti

-

Soviet authnritits have made known ihelr conctrn about the radios' influence on potential drfectors among youth. Ini. an ariiele in an Estonian youth paper/retted that Western broadcasts aimed at youth tranimil music and/eatures about the young interspersed with explanations on how to flee tht USSR and seek political asylumt admitted that "such broadcasts ncline someunstable people iuhjo return to the Motherlandrip abroad

A malar /actor influencing the regime's deeisirn about publiclyarticular defection has been the extent of Western radio coverage of the case. Defectors with In/ormotton of inttllittvc value to the West almost never are acknowledged by the domtltic media unless the case has been so widely publicised on/oreign radio that the regimeeed lo counter Western accounts reaching Soviet citiiens. After Viktor Belenkoflew his MIC aircraft to Japan. TASStatemenS providingversion of the defection. preiumaSly because many people alreadybout il from foreign broadcasts. Similarly, afteretk of heavy Western publicity, all major Soviet newspapersa rwo-senlenee statement portrayingefection8 as tht resultestern provocation. When Soviet officials have to respond to Western reportsefection, they try lo reap some odvantoge from it by attacking the stations for using false and rosy portravals of the Wtst to lust unsophisticated

. ictt media became leu and !eji It-el- and informative during ibesd earl--he potNlann" feacled by tunine it obi arc laraog mcrcaaiegfjr to Wester* radio B

There ii abundant evidence tbatinctcaicd concern snlbm Ihe Sennabout thevulnerability to Weatcin Beeuurc* aad is.'Many Sovici ohViali beforeaceeuionelie/ tbai cipanded cor.tacb -nth Ibe weal Junng C'enie ineciim effeel on nor*"'" altitude* and n.

Virtually all Soviet leaden who have been influential In the area of ideological controls expressed concern about ihe threat from the West.5 speech. "Second'* Secretary Yea or Ligachc-Soviet propagandists for failingounter Western influence* effectively. Andropov stated) ankle that "our society is developing not in hothouseoi in isolation from hostileul in conditions of "psychological war unleashed by5 Horn, munist article by KGB chief Chcbrikov charged the

* Aanli from" ik- facton IMia the. Biihnot conoia TV man AirqniM owi acre iba aaidmbip'i fear otlri-'rrf<^rt

an Swoi uaanru One bha>ud by UK US *rsi* cmbaria rmsuacd

UK iriHncchno-strV, ibe US

bbi shkIiiwnl> lr So-at

OaVoak. the mu Ui Poland ia IV outr tWOs; and Jar nrTVia Afibaattun aai aeraiiai eiiiauUi (br -wravt(tUataham in it*anal aiali IV USSR'arealm.

ationHUmponjth*no* of owkinf people'

ad ioMTCi!fim of "bringing about mien*!

aura radios are partly bene "male-oleni"

Tbe leadership believe* Iha! W,lame for helping lo spread Wciiem influence*

auumce!rut significanceesult of increased Wcalcra propaiaada. chiefly that "reaching a* bye frelteil thaiUrge iha re of ibe Sen-ieiistens toe abo noted tbai Ibe Central Commiiice bad recently analysed ibetbe. surrey iincc ibe east roenuoaied in Ibad found that manyerv*inelinfluencedne degree or another by tbe itationi.

Trammitti mg Weiter* Radio Si fall

r* Remote Areai of the USSR

Radio coverage of nan-Ruesian nationality region* and rrmrne parti of ihe RSfSR such ai Siberia and the Far tail dtptndi. of tew'i' c* ihe location of broadcasting transmitters and ihe iirtngth of ihtir signall.ignali ton be picked up ai'felly uphon distance from the actual pointiles -o. deptndine on the signal power and time of day. Since virtually all listeners live well beyond the fansmlllers' direct range, they pick up ugnals afiir ihey bounce off the ionotphere to Earth. Although the itrongtst are so-called one-hop signals, high-frequency signals can still be audible after theyo orjjspre times between tht Earth and the ionospherel

owerful one-hop tignal to the European part of the USSR but- or three-hop signals to Central Asia. Siberia, and the Far East VOa. on ike other hand, can send one-hop signals to the Asian trpubl.ei of ihe SevUi Union became is operates from transmitters In the Phihp-ptnei The US Cax'nmrri tondoeltng talks wish South 'area end ha, signed on agreement wth Israel for additionalations, +hteh would boon coverage of Soviet Asia Both VOA and RFE/RL would have use of the Israeli statmn. The Unittd States is actively eiplorlng wtih friendly government tinAna the p'otpecu fen obtaining. rs

i tees tbe radroa aa panly mpocub'e for fueling seemingly insatiable aspiration* for rnor* and bcilcr consumer goods,n Armenian party oeTxia) -arnod againil the impact or* Wcalcrahat republic by anying-

foreign twrtpagonda on

Sonne iatavalwavur of Iht repuhite is there far mil

ret teeesire lo imnale iheof lift i* Ihe Wen. their apolitical asnsude and focal pdaaraif ana* the mmmfetinno- ofe-uri aa

Depee of Camtrra

AJtboogb concern about ibe threat fromiiai been apparent ut arTtCialfor al least th-ee decades,since< focused moreibe problem than ever before During all of theCoenmuoui Pan,addreaaed tb* atau* of Western

radioeaoaccasu. ban tbe tos* of catacera became progresarrvei,ach

Sofvee

increased le>el of concern is undoubtedly duela i: .or.!the major Western

stationsreaction laam-jii.igO ihef .'nfa>tti-lies, theof old ones,iiva in tbe nunber of iiarumiiiing hours and frequenciesVashiagion tin devoted coni-dnibf resourcesuiMing and upgrading old ones (callow VO' -nd RFE/RL loicnrS more Inuacn iaother renvoi' altai of the USSR

ik

The atmosphere within (be Soviet leadership during (lie transition periodie(heha* been grappling wiih domestic problems loai mounted during Brcihnev'i tailibo been eonducivc to concern ihai (he Reaganrying to use VVcatun broadcasting to undermine Loce;-in'rirst deputy chairman of the KGB wrote;

The US Covcrnmcni ana* ill all.it aremeasures lo-further expandand anttcommunliopagandauSowr IJ billiontptntott'iwiraie/ propagandainIdoVul/ron -ojThe US Congress hoi million for ihe UbciyFtetradio corporation. aproportion ofet asideeauipmenl RfE/RLJ Is ihefor tu [Win -

USSR and European socialist eouMrttS

U an important censer for political iatelli-avacr sgtuaur raw CS5>f

Earlier thainmntye ICKturtr trying to prouagaivtla locturealo bethattruggle istbemoving atJsanneJnnother Znantyeclaimedall on (bethat toe electronic encdia are oar of thetbeaiegoat of.

denabiliairrg tbe internal mot mm in wciibii oduq-Uaea. He deer red th* fact that ipriroiiinateJlercent of the fxi-taium Irnrroi la one izs.ian iohnngi

In (he ipringi.ioi Cbetiriaov, the head of (he kgb. strongly denounced foreign heCatdcaiiing ai anof subversion

slander, and appealstrutl's against the irsiem chosenur people ere brought

intvptay.

lalned Sly (A*pecial ir-.tr: plop an important role In- 1 Thus we ore dealinginterference tn our Internal affairs and wish bresen notation, of theoflaw and Soviet legislation Quilt under, standoily. ihe measures provided for In our legislation are applied and will be appliedIn the struggle against such hostileBut ihe interests of ihlialso require increased 'tgilanct by Communists and

av

Siicitarty. Cbcracnto. daring tb*arty pkaum oa idcotagy. -iraed

Tht class enemy It practicing rentable banditry on the air. We face aiitmpn toull-scale information and propaganda imasioa and to turn radio and TV artworks Into tools of tubvenion.

Watuaes* about the stationso tbe aery top of the current leadership.ecretary LJgachcv baj made .'rogue nl comments about the pcioicioui impact of foreign orcadcssts. Foe cumpic,e told employees of the central television center:ocesaary to unmask tee machinaiionsof mcnc'icaout bourgeois propaganda.bat dooted coeuuderabie resources lo undermining tbe Soviet peeaple's faith in the crxrecuea* of the Coeununist Party's course andorbachev baa ovade similar statemeats (see

About ParocatLaxty Vadaacrabk AadVmca

Thespeoady eoneerned aboot the impact of htteniog by elites and intellectueb. young pcoc>lc. triistority uatiotralitki, religious believers, andof the armed forces. I

iTwtWJfTtit Threat From Wetter*

K**

'*orbachevonference of ideological workers meeting In

Imperialism has adoptedpolicy ofdetent*.confrontationcialiim. steppingerace, andbe ideologicaleu of tbe oonctpolisirC bourgeoisie baa risen sharply in recent years. Tbe eeemy huuge propaganda machine for ideological coe-ftict. and employs sophisticated technicaland diversionary and psycbc40gicalIn iu intensity, substance, and riwbods. the psychological warfare unleashedpecial type of aggression, which flouts the sovereignty of other countries.Considering the acuteness aod eompleiity of the current ideological struggle, the Juneplenum put forth the task of improving couoter-propaganda, both within thc country and among the foreign audience. Tbe party committees and moss media must extend still further the content of this work.

In the summerorbachev told reildenti ofin the Soviet Far East:

Gorbachev. Did you bear my speech inyesterday?

Voices: We heard!

Gorbachev: Let them justify their poiicy. No one will bring us to our knees. We are not tbe people to do ibis. No* is saber rant ing Our poliry. Butin strengthen our defenseIhe mainup tne eeamomy to -hat the people fed good and conlideni. You know, all kinds of radio voices, and not just they, arc trying to discredit our plans and oar policy andlash between the people aod the leadership. They would like to split our

In On address to pony workers In Khabarovsk Inorbachev said:

Certain people in thelie in wait for something that wouldeviation from socialism, that we would go cap in band to Capitalism and would borrow ita methods. We aie receiving much sxalled advice from abroad as to bow and wbcic we are to go further. There arc provocative programs of various kinds beieg bro*dcait. and articles arc being publishedathadow over the changes taking place io our country Such uoseecnly attempts are dcorned to fadurc.

Officii, and Intellectuals. Members of tbe Sewiet professional cusses and trnipsoyea of bureaucratic institution! listen to tbe radios in large4 atudy try tbe United Stale* Information Agency (USIAL based on interviewsroupsurrogates" [selected Atayericans and Westwho had cattAsive contacts with Soviet elitesl found that elites io the ana and other aenckmk folds

istener* have political interests. Tbeytothe Soviet rraodia ha* not told them about development* at ho roend (hey. art quite Inteiealod in comparison) bei-teo what happen*li; Soviet Union and Western Europe. Amongntertainment itself isjreason for listening Mute ibat caaaot be beard in the USSR, howeveras thai of Sbeaiaig-ich at tatespecially when listener* receive aa eapsanaiic- of wsj* the enuarc waa banned. Elite listeners are also said to brl. ir-.te.-eaied inonet history J

The urban intelligentsia, at well ai manyinen to Western radio stations for broaden in of literary and political writings by Soviet and emigre authors, and interviews with them. Each day. RL braaitcasu JO minutes of somlidat and JO minute* of tomisdai writings (works by emigre or Sovietpublished outa.de ihe USSR) la eOoei, Ibe station* represent as alternative Russian cutiuisl ccoie* that many belto oducatcdrecently, atrrsorev^gom* and appealing (haa oft-Oal So-iel cutiurcfl

> All the major nations draw ibdi highest ratings us theage group, but tbe percentage of Soviet youth (definedto-ivyeai. oldsl that* only slightly lower.si of

n RFE/RL survey fouod thaiercent of Se-nct yeaath balcncd lo VOA turnaeual aa well a* habiiuat haieocrs, an tali matedpercent of youiB hai been opoaed to Weaurn riOao lUlnxu. though oot necessarily the cnajor ones, during the course of aal

A Znaraye lecturer iafi eipreaaed purtie-ular concern tbat Soviet cttiiens under JO art two oi lb roe umcs more likely to listen than man ben at the

Western Radio Stations end Political Dissidents

e'lfvdin tmlioni have played ' v

M encouraging political oelivim. The primary Impost hoi been io help dlssidrni wrliers of urniuJiilarge' audience. Thii function became particularly important In thehen the regime had considirablt success it hemming ihetn-ride the USSR of unauthorised dlssidtni literature, which wetwtde'y disseminated during the

As ihr regime moved la repress distent more harshly in ihe, human rights aettvtitt became less willing to lake ihe enormous 'isks involved inand dlstriLutlng umiidJi Conitqutnitv.beganend such material to Weittrn radios, which ihen relayed Ii back Into the USSR. For example, as ofFE/RL had received and broadcastssues of ihe Chronicle of the /Ukrainian/ Catholicerialhat Is virtually unobtainable mside ike US Si

Western radloi are alto helpful to dissident! In facilitaling communication and building moralt in oihi' ways

Radio publicity of dales and placis of dttsidtni trials enabtrs sympathisers ioublic show of solidarity.

Impn toned dissidents or theirave lent personal appeals lo Western Italians detailingInJuiiKTl in Ike hope thai pmblicttlng such appeals will pressure ike So-met o retrase

i hem or at least improve: their prison conditions

1 former political prisoners hair sold ihey btllft their Imtmtnl would have been wont in tht abstnet of VOA and RL broadcast! about their easet

Prisoner, ut labor tamps often hear of brxtadcasis about them from prison personnel who regularly listenfliern radio Stoiions Thiseartens ptisontrt and tncourages sum* of ihem lo make political statements.

White txtle In Gorily. And'ty SaAkarov took daily walks carrying arasLohe could no* hearnotions In hisapanment. which was subletted

Paradoslcally. however. RL's coverage of the rtglme's repressive acts may sometimeshe "try dissidents Ii seeks locicnsisl who

6 siam thaitrvajfr events in iht Soviet Union, especially

stones about arrests, lends lo subdue rather lhan rally that* who oppose the government He believes

RL tttteaari are seen as 'masochistic

" One-

ous reports broadcast by Western stations can also hurt she morale of disiidtnti. In

leal prisoner

was tagta when healse report on Weturn radio thai he had been released |

There are also circumstances where Jit admit btlttt ihal foreign radio publieit, of regime aclion against them can be

( relaxrves and closeel'tiussian Or-.hodox pnest sentenced so initrnal in' inemlumed RL mst to publicise ihe scniencr because ihey feared this would mia kls chances of being stni lo ihe Siberianhere his wife had been ruled I

Official Views on Howadio Subverts Soviet Yoalh

of Soviet ciliztni Indicate "tme tignificant generational differences In listening preferences. Old-if listeners In the USSR ate mainly Insereited In collecting, comparing, and verifying iitml of "haid" newt. Youth linenewscasts more frequen-ty than any oiher type of programing, but show greatc Inieieit in information on Western life than their parents. Al the tome lime, young people are more Interested in music and entertainment than older cittiens. Among liitenen to Radio Sweden and the more widely heard BBC and VOA. rwo-thlrdi ofyear-aids gore entertainmenteason for listening to the station. Several tourcci report that young Soviets re^larly lope rack music from the Western stations io distribute to other! and lo play at private parties!

Soviet outhoritiel cite four ways that foreign radio exerti an inimical influence on the nation 'i youth.

{Ii They claim foreign stailons directly alienateyouth from the official ideology. To this end. the Western stations allegedly use the insidious lactic of playing contemporary music to lower youths' guard and lull them Into accepting aniliociaJlii commcn-toclti" that are cleverly interspersed In the program. InS Pariiyoay* Zhiio' Kaiattiiaca.eitern mate;ine. declared thatBarbarossa Rock-'n'-Roll haiccording to the eKajakJt paper. Western Ideologists seek to use Soviel rock groups to "shake the foundations' "with their music and to 'prepare the soil for taking in the

without ike

valuet of the bourgeoisnotheranalyses the mix ofnd muiie vn Western radio as follows: "You may toy thai the news goes In one ear and out the Other. But psvehologlsf he:-shown that when the attention Is not concentrated, well-designed phrases and tnfwnatlonolitical Or Ideological nature stay in Ihe memory with listener being aware of II or wcnSing it lo.'

he authorities are anxious that foreign radios help tol'n their phrase) "deldeologiie"Soviet youth. According to several medio commentaries. Western radios allegedly hove moved away from directtoward attempts to Influence young people's eaASCioutneil moreby stokingfor Western science and technology or the "cull ofnS TASS complained:

By abameteialybe uiiercti of young boy* and j< rU io krier-ledie aad (cicnunc-uchmcal aCbJevcflKOU. tbe Voice of America, at wellotbcf mouthpiece* of ihe Icrapcrialo' propaganda art io every pottible way enaMbUng and romanti-ciiing tbe "miracu lout* ia vine miuion" of Ihe""Slat Win" program.

Innaniyc lecturer told his audience: 'Bourgeois ideologists, using legal and illegalandtourism,and technical exchanges are trying to poison the tonicousness of our youth, sow, among It seeds of

poliiieal Indifference andhisleads some youiks to think thai ihi Western filon of events ii juii ai ralld at iha domestic version inhealor seemed to blame deideoiogisation" /a> /orngnopularity

Se-ne rO-nf people, when taming in onfccin broadcast think: I've watched (Soviet' tclcvitioe. and now I'll hiten to what "they" are saying. I'll compare thc two, aad thai way I'll act an objectiveut thatiaanifestation of political naivete and imrrtaiunti

fSiestern .diotopitt art trying to convince young people in the USSR and loiiim Europe that thiy and Wtsittn youthprtial social group distinct from any rloii for party propagandisti. these are relatively safeloSovietolitical Iruiiffrrwnce betauie they ihifltheOlarnr from Internal causaoreign

Id) Authorities also are eoneerned that ihe radios lure Soviet youth into eonsumeriss ostitudts and behavior.

lupposedlyarefully selected mis of eontemr-

porary music and slantedpprppnoltl, selected muei" Is alleged to have ike aim ofInto /youthack of moralelfish eonjumer mentality, and crass materialism ".

older age groups. Soviet newspapers and journalspcanlcdidespread tendency for youngr>en youngstcn in theus* foreignco of in formation, andecent Kor-isorrsol cerigres* tb* I'll aecretary oomavainad of the aaaraSti-cal acccpiaac*aviain accuoa aff broadcaiu by hoaiole radio natrons. In March

- Znenlye lecturer indicated lb* M'lousncaa

with which tbe regime took the threat of Western broadcasting almod ai youth. Hethai more thanercent of VOA'* broadcasts to the USSRed. directly or indirectly, to Soviet youth

Realiiii'i that you'g peopie are less.fc,Bparents to measure the system's schieveencnts by compering tbcnrj lo thc bleak cirtumitancet of the prey or prewar periods. Soviet authoritiesreat incentive to insulate young citizens from information enabling them to eornpar* the Soviet standard of living with that of thelaorbachev alluded to this peoW*av:

Today, new generations of Soviet people, bam under socialist condulons. are entering active life. These are people for whom the historic gains of our system are asas the air that we breathe Soviet young people orevp and being rduiaied under constantly

imprrmng mOte-ial conditions. In onof /our deeadei of peace. Theycome accustomed to compartng our reality not with she post, but wish ihe highest criteria of lotialum And this is one of the moit impo'ianl aspect! nf the pretrnl ideological situation.

Although the penetration byfcrlrt televisionourfecallsid and officii muck smelter ports of iht countrynurrt radio, iht Impact of television aa tht population ii In lamt ways greater. ThJi Is because televisionrophic:haiewen to dirtcily verify iht lub/tct material. While radio annovntt'i may ba dlimlntd ai bio ltd. televisioncannot easily deny vlsl-bit e'idence of higher standards of living in the We it or evidence she regime would prefer lo cove' up or distort taforrnarionaboutSovietactivities in the

Foreign television signals reach several parti of the USSR, but the main impact is In Estonia. Thanhs to the proximity of the southern coast of Finland. Finnish television can be received in much of Estonia: Tallinn- is onlyiles from ihe Finnish capital of Hilnnht. According to an interview Estonian parly chief Karl Yayno gavelnmsh radio Inuarter of ihe republic'speople living la Tallinn and northernFinnish TV. The fact thai Estonians con easily understandister language. Increases the import of Finnish broadcastl of Western account of

Broadcasting managtti in Helsinki ofttnrograms wkasv political consent wouldobleciionable lo Moscow, buthasof tuck lemtilve

ointi as Solidarity activities In Poland and thtof tht South Korean Jetliner.the Swediih andivme commercial advm.tliZngio obtaining Wnurn points of viewanj commentary, the Estonian publicmessages about Western lifestyles fromas well as from popular AmericanDynasty"The Cosbyccording to official! from thein Leningrad, iheie particular showspopular In Tallin as ofwo4 described inspect td

rtanish TV til

Vooon Finnisb tcie-uionate foil of prcoutii. meal and other ihinn. If you iwiicb the channel, you can bear onhannel bo*aie enough of everything. But when you io to ibe ihooa there is nothing. Tbercfote, thee*been recoil ccTicial comment! to ihe effect thai ibeia. in fact, oaily

Soviet offtetolt have espressed considerable concern about ihe Impact of Finnish and SwedUh teltvislon. which can also be received in tome pari! of the Baltic republics In1 Estonian patty boi! Veyno said that filmi broadcast on Flnruth television are disturbing the Estonian way of life He panleulbrly Criticized "TJ$ or other foreign shows whichmurder and vtoltnce and portray rich people ai glamorous-shows like Dollar (although Voynet Finnish interviewers iiatcd thai the Eeianlan leader hod aiturrdeasures would be taken lo

rairtcl ileal", j

CJianiye cdlktM said In

IS

Tht Impact a/

'Wr ;Aoj prnblems In ihtiy ihttctption of Finnish aad Swtd'.sh ittetttlo* Ht alto laid loot residents of Murmansk aod iht western bordtt 'ttio* of iht Karelian repub-Uc. In additionstonians, tarn ret ft Finnish television. Substantialbt'i of Sonets livin; in Karxiia speak Finnish

Qiht' pans of tint country along iht Western bO'dtr-load can tteett Eon European television. While iht Standard!!anon ef Itleviilon wavelengths throughout ail of Easitrn Europe (eictpi for East Gtrmanyt and ihe USSR alfirit may ittm lotiumphfor Moscow, il isauit for Sovttl concern- For example, during ihe Chernobyl' accident Polish television made tame Ukrainian. Lithuanian, and Belowssian Hewers llnng fust acrasl the border aware cf tht meaturel ihe Warsaw regime took la protect tht public from radiation. Acceding to pecii reporting, when Poltih letrriilon gate extensivelo the Pope 'l visitrogrameri In eastern Poland were rtautred lo cut backvoid exposing the Soviet audienceooose of Poliih notional!im and religious fervor. Tht time allotted on Poliih ito debates aboutcaused even more alarm, as Illustrated* article by the party frit tterttary of the Brxit oblost in Belorusila:

As .at Qiuauoo is ft'tjUad] cbanged.car* taiaot anslyoag snd csplaiaiagauses af lite siiusuon end cits.ii the slanderous faboeaucan ol Western radio centers timed at Wand aod oat country Many inbaf Brai Oblailood rciauonithe drjaeos' PtilTbe (aaooudcj-ibic pan of the ablaut inhabitants oa

programs cannot be ig-

nored. Before martial law aii Introduced in thai country, programs of an antieommunilt nature weic sometimes bioadcasl. Tliesc programs par-alytcd (be will of the Polestruggle for ihe ideals of the wontingnd directedehs at our country.

Jthc elhnJe Uy in iht Western Ukraine Istaking advantage of Gorbochtv'i glaieosi policy flj "almost everyone" litltnl to Poliih TV OS well OS Western radio. |

Reception of Romanian natlonol television Is good in Moldavia btcouse af Ihe republic's location adlactiUht Romanian border. Although the message of Romanian TV is not irredentist or anil-Soviet. Its highly nationalistic content probably fortifies ethnic feelings among Moldavians, tht moforliy of whom art ethnic Romanian. Tht pollllcal Impact ofTV is aultt timittd. however, by the harthnell of ike Romanian regime, ihe vnpataiobllliy of lisand tht fact that li Is on tht air onlyhours peraH

eside nil along ihe USSR's southern border can receive television from Turkey and Iran. Innaniyt lecturer acknowledged thai many people in tht republics along the southern border wajch Turkish or Iranian TV. Residents af

Yerevan, the capiial of Armenia, told US Embassy Vinton that Turkish TV -as easy tojlck up and that many residents watched 'Arm,

to establish c

tem to be quite-are of tbe factor! that make bixtEcr areas especially vu Ice table to Westernfficial) have commented on (he relatively tood reception for Wmternn areaa directly adiacent to the VVotern border aad the ability of many ciliicas in these area) to pick up East Eoropean television atteehe retimelso aware of the treat interest people living in tbe Westernds in hearincfrom the West. Many people there have otenslve historical tics and cultural affinities to Europe that encourage them to listen to Western broadcastiDt and make them interested in programs about life in Western countries as well as in the USSR. Party leaders also eipress concern that emigre troup* use foreign broadcasts in an effort to promote cultural and political autonomy for their former homelands and to estaJdiii. contact with their tonals in the

The regime is especially concerned about thethe Baltic states, particularly because of tbeFinnish televiaion. In recent years, the partyin Estonia has devoted unusual attentionspeeches to warning the Estonian peculationseductive power of Westernalft broadside.published aa arocJe that uecifieaJjbroadcasts to tbe Soviet Baltic rcnabcics.tbe station of broadcasting "aialpciousAmerkan tpimoe. saccorungcriminals, and esliog Soviet rearo<xtoUlcnt sbout eases of eaaitres returning toThe Seariets also issued aunvroers press"gainst VOAEZ RL's alleged roletbe7 occrroxtstratjon* InBaltic stales on tbe annrveraary ofbe USS

The regime is anxious thai the encdernirationen* VOA and RFE/Rl is uses-easing theof tbe populationSoviet CcntraJ Asia to foreign inCiaerroesime wbeo ibe regime is

bogged downar in neighboringattempting to sumof rcJigious

iam among Soviet Muslims. Thus, the fusttnan of thc KGB complained ia6

" beutt ihe taenia* ofin /au-gwawi of th*e'.'i of th* USSRirenathensnt1 nationaltci drilrned for ipeeific tef-ons of the country Thete officii orientedJ cand-eilng subvciive activities In various 'efiant al the SownQ

Authorities have devoted special attention in cOmuat-ing the "unprecedentedf Westernto subvert Soviet Muslims. For eiampte:

6 Irreltlro attacked Westernof the rices in Alms AU. claiming thai the AVw York foil had emkrcwierad tbe storyuntrue details it bad aaHaiaasd from RI_

- la7 Ute'iiumara Cateto claimed thatercent efibea-lajigtiag* service isio Islam, and attacked tbe nation's "distortions" in peeacoiiaf (bis topk Tbe article alleged that9 Washiogtonlan to bcxri in tbe USSR from the south with natesostile 'i-1aod toMuslimsing RL broadcast! ia Urhel and other Ceatral Asian languages Tbe journal also alleied that VOA tries to prepare young Sones lasuoers lo reject theof Comenuaoan by aasatriag them thai Islam is compatible With cnodera progress

nin.ua OiaubJ IMSaa awnal Dan laaanfuaalwa ona

kear earSaw wm oaaaSwl -laan aar'mil(Salavwalil

Ttai luuaa ataaaaaa' "it

> wwaVaain soa uh. iHtun AlaUaa* umi i aWian Inai:

edditnm to ibe standard charge thai CIA funds RFE/RL. highls- spacinc macksappeared

dinti iiuJi- !< iif RL'i Central Allan servicesscathinget-lei" loi membemf RL'l Turkmen service appeared in an Ashkhabad paper.

5 ancibcr Turkmen paper ridiculed ibrec specific RI. stone*ie ted Ihai ihe constructionanal in the republic -ould lead to unemployment; another tiled damage lo aoi'kSoi irrigation systems caused by the pumping el ay located near tbe Cinvaa Sea: aad the third diieuited the impact oa TarUneniataa of the lack ofe mall antb higher education degrees.

- Inaihkcnt ne-ipapr attacked RL foe calling the Batmachia "freedomnd for "ipreading the norucate that Communist* drive Muslims from tbe me* t ^jrgaaw

ftefrgiaui tUlierart. In roceoi year, religious believers evidentlyeguo to listen lo Wraiernin largtr numbers This increase in interest may be due primarily to major programing changes.5 the Western unions began to devoteroore air time to Ruia'an-la*. rtlnMus prog riming

iavestigatcd theross section of attendees of local churches io Karaganda oblast in northern Katakhstan. Tbe survey found that Evangelicaland Mennooites were more likely to listen to foreignie broadcasts than were Russian Orthodoi Christians.aaS

Some Russian Orthodoi believe ibal foreignis directed primarily at other religious groups and ibst many broadcaata treatsorc important reason for relatively low titlerung ratesrtaodoimay be the significance UMy assuja to the physical peesesce of the ehureh. tht vuual isrvevediacy of the nceils, and the isipact on the teases of ioeerte and rassie- By contrast, th* faith of Protestant believers ia nourobed br bearing tcmcea. aia foreign radio oe

A! the same time soerit Russian

laity do listen to Western radiobroadcasting -

religiousnembers of tbe Russianaith appear to listen to Western religious programing leas than members of other faiths Twooaeductod in late West and one in toethis conclusaoa The int5 RFE/RL surveyroupoviet cm tens traveling abroad, found that Soon earjboaJ-sties not associated with RussianJews. Alerts, Libels, aadtu religious programingigher rale than aational-iiies proTon-ona of Onbodoi be-Sc-tli -including Ruasians andbe aeeoad survey, conductedoviet aocsologeita.

The Jtremiin's tlrvdcald* attacks Ittesl to its nroeg concern aboui the impact of religious btuadcastiog. Idaaalyr lecture: claimed ihai that Luied Scales atone apend*ear oa rcargioua propagandi directed toward ibe USSR, lase paper itaun-runiit Arto-uisn ooted the varietytions that allegedly stoicaaauusm and aati-Soviet sentiment. In add-'lion lo itatnm tartly devoud lo religiousVatican, Radio Moote Carlo (MonaooL and Vo.ce of lb* Andes I

f-cat seal o* mwtm la rwujDciia fiinrgn.duaa>-vlt)imaUbai l tag.ini.rre iswvUnri

m

SpfteC

V<>

.ar in. f.

Programs Hear* b;o Seteeled Lutok Smku of RFT/RI.

Am ft*

m

SR

Ana'raa

tn

I

rltSu

and Tecaaolotr

l

a*Sanmammal iraiMa

at iv'at

bv

"mMm

article roeniioctd religious tegmenta broaden VOA, BBC Radio Canada. DW, and

Judging from ike eetnieni of iheae atiacks,primarily concerned aboul (be airing at"services. WesltruihaiSoviet .itiorns' rtiigioui (iriockasu. andt reiigaow -oval us ibe USSRariack addressing all tbme of tbtaeia .'ri-rUiU. Plpiata ia UlcFitbortraons and reiigvooa coraouail* en BBC. uanuried io refute 'tbe tsytJuen! ptnecajtjon mfferod bysertou and bcucvns ia ourad if

arguedlo reports from "all bndi of voice*'eocntrynot eincricncinj anin religious reeling. The article denied thai the youni asd middle aged till churcoc* to capacity, aod ciliated that ibe crowds that appear during major religious re merely curious poople who nm lot an archaic ccrco>ooy thai is unusual ia our day.

Ketigam* prograa-Jog eo(Oy> considerable popularity aruscg the large number* of Catholics in Ijihaania aad the tiraioe Jbba Paul Miinter cat in Use

hcig

dcasts QisB

lie pan. the regime haa lakaaan lo rebut charfc* of Western rad'Oa. especially Radio Vaiican, of regime rcprcaaion of Catholic believers and clergy inhere religion is intertwined wiih ami-Russian nationalism.oviet Lithuanian paper in1 denounced tomeions foe criticizing the imprisonment of certain Lithuanian religious nguici. claiming they had been prosecuted not for religious activity but for "reactionary political activity artjfojmssJiig (abrications igainn our socieir ggjS

Some evidencerowing audience forbroadcasting among the Muslim populationAsia andc inset)f the Turkmen parly Dcparimeni ofand Agitation asserted ths' most of thelistened to religious broadcasts 'ro*nin Iraa and tbat tape recordings ofhad beea made by mullahs and itgroups of Muslims throughout theaudiocasaciita are made frombroadcasts asaccording to aMuslim religiousat tbeteiie Koran transmitted by Tehran andone mullah reced that "you can hardlythe radio without bearing the

Such broadcasts hare considerable impaci on the Central Asian public According lo iafortivation|

iaccsoJosjniini'i!iiconcluded that Iranian radio-broadcasu in indigenous Turtx languagesajor rote in siimulaiinc religious activity ia Central Asia. Interest in foeciganlly acts lo ranforce ibef solidarity Soviet Muslims feel for their cesrcligionnia ia other oounute* When asked whether they use the radios to follow events in Iran aod Afghanistan. Muslimagestan"Of OBurte (be) are our Muslim brwbers."

Official concernthe link ben-can rtdlobroad-cat tint; and Sovietent en around tbe emigration iuuc. Regime propaganda indicate* considerablethatroadcasts providingabout ooiiti'c aspects of life in the West wilt encourage emigration. Soviet newspapers carryarticles describing in narrowing detail problem Jcwiih emigres face in finding employment, obtaining affordable hovilflg, and adjusting to life in capitalist

riei jjjjgs^fl

The Armed Fartet. There ire indications the Kremlin worries thai Western radiobroadcasting could weaien military morale and combat reddlnes* Inaval captain lecturing at the Central Officers Club in Leningradroup of militarythat many soldiers listen to Western broadcasts andecent Central Committee analysis bad 'Vnjnd thai the stations influence many miLiaryto some degreeoviet cipcrt oa miliary indooron wrote

Tarnd theiieek portievsychological warfare against ihe army personnel In ihe loetaiisiRFEIRL'il broadcasiing lime is de-

voted lo those -ho -ear Ihe army uniform

The eodlO saboteurs In Munich leek SOeed of doubt In ihe minds of Soviet soldiers. io shake ihelrnd political re-vWr/loiiJ

One of the main focuses of ctMnierpropagandamilitary Is on the threat of Western brcu deansaid thai ipeoal councils ti

Use battalion level and below are suppcitcd toieJy So* of information about foreign aod domestic ckrOoyments that can help agiiprop worLrrs ft but the fcs-eiga station* by informing them "what current Iks Westcra radio staucan are eayokiagorsser

acme* Itcatfnanl in th* Soviel Ground Fcrccr* i

the wwd Ittfji reported thatansicau in the Soviet armed forcea anaryvad Weal em military press and media thai could have aa tSeet on the morale of Soviet troops, payingaiicniion 10

S

Howammlat Works

Jamming It forced out by broadcasting Intentionallyr-tsttng noise or anotheras anotherthe lame frequency as the Incoming transmission. In the early days. Soviet Jamming wet] carried out by mechanically produceds thlrpt. squeals, and gull cries. "While noise" Is now used erttnslvely because itide range of the Oudin inectrum and can be produced electronically. The Soviet stationeacon} fnils In thea competing program Isee Inter,

There are two basic methods of jamming:

"Croundwave" or local Jamming Is ihe primary method. It is accomplishedetwork of irons-miners lei up In the larger rone,arge metropolitan area. Groundwavc Jamming It very effective but limited In range to Ii toiles.

ammers are powerful iraniminrrshundredi or thousands of miles fromarea Their signals bounce off ihean eagle calculated to return ihehe lame area as thewvng usually rovers aarea than groundwaveor rural areas tontat*

man, smallleSI

Flfiire 4

Lbiealef Trends for the four Major

*>

'lL't-mieiima, iia-tli"!

cu,in vanw*

i-iit aumbo-no.a v>ao-iaa in

aac <- ja.-i. at

i. iti.a.

Soviel oiikiiai of Western broudcaiu inio Afiian-iun is probably motivated by concern aboui Ihe iinpaci taey have on Sewiel trraops as -iD at em the Afghan pce>ula(too. Another target (roup thateives major attention in Soviet ceasoleaT>rops*ao*tf includes sailors tod merchant Dtarise teamen, wbo arc csposed to Western broadcatUBi and forojo iafluences generally raore frequeotJy and directly than mosi caber elements of Soviet socseiy,

ftjCR QUALITY PMS

1

the Imaiet of JaOr* AirflhiUtT

.4

jammug c'p+Atti'fc* rmctitet

ssf? has an rnarmovt capabflltv ny

a4to prOt'Cfnj

4

4

1

It*

9sl

c*il;cuO. in iQll M4 tJl-So Idtcncd to iterfrom trie USSR. Sctttf-t- ihecf 1

hj*e

So-rockv For IttlM MS.lta Atj^feittir ef Major *rV'at*'r* ^kttt*.

tiforij To Rntrlct Rjdio LoCaura

t**mmimg. Utiiit reC-;Ot.y.roopal coumt^raraiurcr>eu ej-iptoyed apiaii West-

z::ri_ni1 m!

L tAi been iiiiixnajuinjent oaii. thebroufb lie end of

0 perccAl of theriv*i' btwdcxfU of til mtjor WcrtCfAo ibe Soviet {jmotxbeen umfrcd.0 tbe ICixcUiafull jf^minfLbc cvtior Wencrn

c declarAtiM inf rrjmil U* ia Po^od. Io Addiiioo,icuiri-ta^Uflfft br^dciCU ofOA.

ftAd toX)1 ofuhfo

according to tome rtportst tht sonttj usuallylattt ptat*iVnM thtyfferiSt**. q*tro+cfja4,

j to bt htatd

to block roc-tpooo of itvoc tvo^d* cut] by rubootJ mjnonUc* aca/ tbe afglxta borde/ iodbe cwribiUnu toudc

Tip*jjxo bcffvui inj" *borx*terniAlUbcny rcpotx UMCtJ1 il^wt Uai ,be rciudip<too of

.'.ing Citizens for Offenses Related ia Radio Listening

UI lien the, the regime hat nnd Soviet law to intimidate tttleneri in th'ee ways.

Ill Soviet eitisenj how/been penalised forinformation broadcast Over the rod.si that is

Judged to beet Sirih dissemination tenumber of forms Listening to foreign rodroublir place Is one possibility In ItKA. Ukrainian dissidentdatur was accused of latchingadious stop and listening> minuteseoodtosl by an unidentified nation that noted Scnrlei troops were responsible for atrocities inHe received tlx years in iirUt-regime camps and fiveule for ami-Sonet agiio-lionnother dissident. Vladimir Roshdesrvou. was put en trial7 for listening to VOA. DW.L broadcasu and talking to friends about them. He was committed to ahospital for "disseminating knowingly falsediSeredUtng ihe Soviet poltileat and social

The possession of iccordtngi of Weitem broadcasts has been enough toerson in the dock,because il Indicates an tnsentton to pen ihe recorded material to others In April Itil. two residents of Sverdlovsk received five years In strict-regime camps for bvitd.ngope library ofnd VOA prvaymmstry ad cans amassenesi In another ease, authorities reportedly canfiscaitd Id lope recorders and TOO usees with rvligvovsfrom Russian Ortkadox acliMsl Cemodty Lapkm. who waj arm led ineptember

' ""

diindens was sentencederm of three years lor variout <iimts. one of which was the possession of cassettes of H'rsttrn rcdiobtoadcosis. Dissident poet-

liin) (Villi-Inlo" ,m

ijail,'or potttuir; tapes of RZ broadcasts

o break the will ef ihose wilting to past Western radio stations information describing the persecitton of dissidents. Soviet legal authorities have taken legal action against those who pass the information. For example. Mikhailetorustien wii. er triedas Indicted for writing andto the Wen two umiioai articles "used by hostile radio stations in their subversive activities against the SovietKukobaka alio wasof recording ihe lexis of the Westernand lisienlng to them in the presence of othersj An Estonian disiideni. legit Peeek, was sentenced1 io six years- tamp and throe years Internal exile for patting ia ihe West materials thatUSSR, these letter, were used by VOA. RFE. and publications produced by Estonian emigre organisations ia ihe Unjjed States. Canada.

Wen and^erden

krainian dundent alreadyriion term, received an additionalears in labor camp plus fire years in internal exile inJ for orally expressing anti-Soviet propaganda to fellow labor-camp inmates end

for having hit verses sent to foreign radio nations. Is-onid ( ormer Hebrew teacher,also received ihree yearsabor camp3

for transmitting 'slanderousthe

Sec/

Sty^f

perstCulion of Sonet Jews. The court took note uf iht foci thai RL end iht Voice Of Israel both broadtail iriformollon he had written. Some dissidents have been punished mtiely for being ihe subjectroadcast.harkov court fudged Anaiolti Koryagin. one of iht foundersroup thaiSoviet psychiatric abuses, responsible forabout hint thai ihe Russian services of BSC. VOA. and RL aired

rosecutors frequently use the fort that alistens lo foreign radio, or evenriend of his worksoreign station, toejotive picture of his general character. The fattefendant listens to Weitern radio can be mentioned in witnesses' testimony, court pleadings, official legal documents, and court Judgments. For example, ihe charge of listeningOA, BBC. DW. and RL as well as abstracting political commentaries put out by ihe first three stations, was Included In thcponudgment eealnst titkolal pavtou. convtsted1 foramphlet discrediting Politburo member Andrey Klriltnka The Inclusion of such dciaitiharacter appraisal can resultarsher sentence since Soviel law obliges Judges lo lake Into account "the personality of the guilty person" when determining the punishment. Quite often, listening Is used to explain how ihe actuitd come to 'embarkriminaln other oases, the fact thai an emigre friendefendant works for RL can be usedegoimt lira. This woi ike case withsciensist from Tomsk charged with eireulaling sanutCal andLeningrad resident who belonfcd to ihe fixe livdt-aamon mo-rmenl 5UOT BH

jamming decreased thc audibility of the stations,ajor decline in regularity of listening, and reduced the amount of time spent listening. Theseegan to reverse themaclvea.RFE/RL surveys indicate thai5 listener-ship had again reached or surpassed prcjamming levels forVOA. RL. and tbe BBC (seend tabic jg

The increase in audience siteIS can be captained in part by the modci.ira'.ioo of the stations' transmitters that improved range and audibility. In addition, as noted earlier, the public continued taking several measures to try to Iwteoto Western broadcast-ing despite the jamming.HEM

In6 the Soviets began to let upon jammingonsiderable degree. In October. Moscow stopped jamming radio programing from Beijing Albania, and South Korea. Io7 the Soviets stopped jamming BBC's Russian serviceoqucsi maderitish official visiting Moscow. In7 jamming of all VOA'* language service* ceased.

Legal Sanctions. At previously mentioned, the act of listening to foreign broadcasu i* not. strictly sneaking, illegal. In responseoreign Uttcrier's question io9 on whether Soviet peoplefree to listen to these broadcasu. Radio Moscow's World Service answered.

Yes. they are. In fact, moist Soviet-made radio sets hove shortwave bands and the only thing to do Is io push the button and line intation you. People usually take theirradios (along with them when they go out of towneekend} and. of COurte. everyone linns to what heor one listen to

the BBC and the Voice ofnor

lways agree with ihe views that are aired by those tiationi.m absolutely free to linen to foreign radio stations j

Al the same time at least until recently, theuaasbed aocoe listeners for cither listening or paisini oo what they have beard in loo btataoi a

"llano"!

itat: and

Sanctions against listener!een iclcctivctylince Gorbachev's acccstioa. but ihe regime my now be movingfrom luch lactam. At the time tieac that authoritiestoppedthere arc saws thatrepared to scino-ledfe rnore openly theegit ngaa to (men in incoming breaidcaits TNui.Ved ta Marone re-andtable Chsciisatnl laid "Scene tLines people (ia the| toot the tibcriy of listening to Western'Xi By all ancaa cweasc ii it's not banned in Our country, after altatter for you and yourto to irwl

Tbe USSR has Several inter related objective* ia running intelligence Operations against RFE/RL. Perhaps thc primary one is lo undermine West Gcr. man willingness to host ihe station. Moscow attempts in various ways lo increase pressure on tbe Bono gencrnmerit to kick RFE/RL off West German

Sejanft

Kremlin hopes to decrease RFE/RLsby Tinning eliding ethnic hostilities among the broadcasters and eelitois. sometimes by activatingoreign staff includes three* of emigres: Ihose -ho came West at (be end of World War I!S (mainly Russians ando-called third-wave emigreslewish|to emigrate in,ore recent grtxofemigres. Differences in political orientation and ethnic identity of lbc stall members create an ideal setting for KGB provocations designed lo foment and ciaggcraic cibt ences among thetaff

Coonterproptgsndt and Propaginda

t aT,aa of Caaauiptomataada. In Ihe last decade, the Sovsei leadership hasn-jcrled effort to improve official propagandaan erosion of retime credibility and legitimecy in (be eyes of the Soviet population. Became one of Ihe ley factors contributing to ihe regime's credibility problems has been the ci pension of foreign views entering the eounrry,f ihe effort topropaganda is directed against the foreign radios and the information they purvey. Increasingly, the regime has seen it* primary task in the field of propaganda ihe refutation of foreign views rather than theof Soviet

Beginning in the, the Soviet regime toot tbe first sieps toward rebutting the increase in the level of foreign information entering the country. An9 Central Committee resolution accused imperialist propaganda, in conjunction with 'Beijingfierce offensive against Soviet people's minds, seeking with the aid of the most subtle methods and modern technical means to poison their awareness by slander against Soviethe resolution calledestructuring of the party's ideological work aod requited party workers to help the pubb'c appreciate the falseness of slanderous propaganda. Specifically, it Culled forbettereducation system: more effective atttpeoc ioareas and workplaces (including improving lbc quality of propagandists involved In this *wkk aod changes in the mass media.9 touted the bcGioningerious effort to build an effective domestic couolerpropaganda system and to develop the concept of countcrpropagandigainst foreign penetrati

92criiablc (Vxd of plenums,and nscevings on the subject. Thistwo confercoees for vdeorogicaj workers1 Central Contnuncc resolution thai announced "stippletncniao measures" lo create more effective counicrprppagaatla against (hediversionsicrtalism

Tbe plenum was punctuated -iih tough talk about the need to repulse Western ideology, with Konstanlin Chemenko calling, large-scale assault against "ihow: pe.-to. consciously or unconsciously, echo foreign voices, so to speak, andies and rumors

East European ideologists are labeling Moscow's new human rights offensive the "Yakovlevfter the party secretary In charge of tbe Ideology and props-gaoda leeiort. At the7 meeting inof Bloc ideological secretaries, Ysargued thai Weston prooepts of democracy had tignibcanUy affected lbc outlook of Soviet and Eosiitem, ami that the BlQC had lo counter this trend.

lVVai^ffiffiiljiaVFjfliTjl

cceeosunun^ue tha; stressed Ihe need to

present more COsrvincirigly tbe socialist countries'in Lbc Odd of bjmc rights ami freedomsV^RSt

ii; Orgaaitaiiou aaaf fatoaael. Siooe tbe, Use resrinve has cecerimcnicd with organi-

uitona) changespgrade Use propaginds apparatus:

peech by Brezhnev eritieuiag Soviet propaganda's poor cralibllilywdiencei, an Intcnuuronalsublnbed to the Central Cotomitlce io

) Central Commiiloe plenum, ubich focused oa ideology,aicsbcdthat pushed the counierpropagervda campaign to ihe fore

underling! no- beadt tbe Propagandabe retains overall reaponaibility for VKcad of Iht Central.kill Department baa alao beta an mod andthe Stale Coataalltit fa*and Radiobroadcasting, and thecommiitet tan all been gitxr.bairoad purge ofreplacing cmcf editors of IJ

UfiiadiKi TteAaieal CaaatUiiUi aad Piat'a-ilat.

The regime in recent yean baa continued to build up the physical infrastructure of tbe domestic media. By making television and radio more available, Soviet authceil.es hope to lessen lbc. Western broadcasting. The regime has modernited the eiten-sivcradio system that remains an important source of information for millions of citizens. Accord' sngJ Soviet publication, there2 million -tied radio outsets,illion arc Ibice-channcl.hree-channel systemto lecei'eoscow channelshitdprograms of regionalnint Central Cocnmiiiee/Council of Minister* retolu-ttoo bad the stated goal of completing within the neitears "tbe setting op of three-channelayoo centers andand the active introduction of this system in rumlne Western eipert predicts thai Int-pfovemcais to the wired systerr. will allow someillicei far^itles to receive ibe three radio channels.

A* ia the West, television has become ther medium, by nsost accounts displacing newspapers aod maguncs. With tbe rapidof leJevtsMo ownership, local and all-Ueion programs hat become forarudaole Cooypclitorsestern radiobroadcasting. Moscow TV now reaches nine out ofoviet dlitem, enhaoclng the regime's ability to gel its rocsaagehe populauou rapidly. Soviet tsfiscsah dearly are committed lo expanding the reach of television to all putt of tbend satellite

Syfit

< >

JSaff

technology makesuch in expansion,fora Central Asia. Siberia, and the Far Eail. If the USSR fulfil)l fivc-fesr plan forJiiialiofii tatcll'tcs. by IOUO ire whole mtr.iry -ill bo injherajige of both programs beamed from Moscow,

Increasing the number wf channel! available itkey element In Moscj-': strategy Large cilie; in the USSR have four TVnd almost all Soviets have acects lo television and radio receiverj that nick upil timultaneoutly broadcaitBycitizens alight entertainment in addiLoo to more icrioui fare like Cultural aod public affairsregime hopes to create more of aa intent ire u> listen to tbe domestic media andampen public demand for Westernimilarly. Radioaadio station that went on tbe air inSoviet listeners more varietyaster paced news coverage |tce inset).

B some innovative current affairsto appear on Soviet television Twoa novelhe World Today"eatured roundtablctipens. in lb* past, set speeches bybad been the aorm Tbe new. relativelyformat be'ps transmit the regime'smorebyreater senseand spontaneity. Live reports from cummer,in world Captlais also began appearing topresentation One or* thc commentator*I JniitiuJ that an importanttires* changes was tbe need

Western station* tike VOA aad BBCJ

Since (lirorbaebev has come lo power, iber* has been aa inereaaed cmphatit on timel< icreviwwi wxcacs. with tbe Miirodiactata of newa it evenngshows. "Vjemjw"improved tbe lieneltneu of mreporting and now indwSea

o.w

awikii IV" an aua,

ail

Ttfiavi jt it*n ant"w^va.ga Man a?

ayak

Radioameslic nation intendedirst lint ij defense oaainst foreign radlo.il Is

a

'ed lo compete with the Westcn rr?rlal it rrler ioontent attractive enough to draw So-iei listeners away from Western radio sta-

ihe air just five weeks4 resolution a/ the Central Cc.vtmir-rr* on the USSR's radio system. The resolution required that Mayak "contain prompt information {not lest than twice pern both Internal'i.;' Q

The tesultt of an audience poll published In an}ofcaiyvayei Moskva. Mr Woito- 'mfio and television guide, revealed thai aimottercent of ihe sample tuned in to Radio Mayak ai tome time during tke day. mainly lo listen SO the newt Accordingublication, themetn eud.emee itraid to be

especiallyan ba heard around ihe clock and more frequently than In other Soviet media The station alio tries so lure younge' llsteneri ty providing tntrnainment and mimicking thr programing format of WesternIt Intersperses frcoutnl newscasts with ihori ilemsjd'muile. Interviews, end humorous anecdotes

In ihe early years of its e'isience. Radio Mayak purposely transmitted tit signal on the sameas tome of the Western stations. Mayak uted to broadcast on freauenciet above theeierprecisely those used bySoviet internal br-jodcasts normally are not transmit

'Z

So-let Znaniye IK no* ledge Jman organliotton subordinate to the Centrolropagandaprimary responsibility [or disseminating official views through lectureIt also izreet publications tha: are meant to parry questions and dispel doubts ensing in ihe minds of listeners to Western radiobroodcOSIl. The most iniporiantweekly tailedatty {Arguments andappearedhis eight-pate tabloid, published in an editionTOO.OOO copies. Is directed at lecturers, propagandists, and teachers: It is not for sale to the general public. The newspaper claims thai its average readerember of "thai detachment which is actively carrying on the struggle against all possible Westerndoily flood the"According to Its editor, ti cornel articles that generalise on questions Soviet citliens osk ot Znaniye telliOns and in otheride range of inieriusilonal and domestic topitt are covered.sub/ecu Include Soviet disarmamenthuman rights violations. Western propaganda attacks on socialist societies, the portrayal of the

USSR in Weitem countries, and Scientific andprogrcis in Ihe USSR. Although these topics are discussed elsewhere in the Soviet press, th.itinaktyreat deal of detailinimum of ideoloptal hype becauseesigned to help party ideology workers

respond to whatSavtetcltttens have heard from the Western tod* 'i

Other publications using on objective, factualhave been issued. For exampte. the almanac Argumenty wasQerJ^,tes Out annually in an editionopies.age volumes focus on religion and rellgloui-nalion-altty linkages and have explicitly responded tocarried on foreigneries of pamphlets hove been published at both the republic and All-Union levels with names such as "On That Side"and -Imperialism Withoutypical pamphlet In one of these series critiqued ihe argumens. made In one of RL's Russian-language broadcasu. that Stoly-pln't reforms. If carried through, could have made ihtl9tt Revolution unnecessary If not Impossible.

lireynecuiie effort also is being made io Kind more viewtn particularly youngto titne slot* before sad slier thit rteos rjrograen. For iaiisaoe. recent films, risijor sponiei events, end popbeae evening (lots,oolrwerual newcalledrTcjor" warn freoucody uacomfcr-jbJc goverrimeel otlkiali arc grilledoainful audience. Id fact. Sennet ptTfrarncrt are (Tyingola! block of attractivehai viB no fromO hc-ars. (be Isie oi|bi bours "ben tbe Weal ontraditionallyarge portion of tbe Soviet audience. Idinor* TiJcvnuon began to expand in prTajratniog to meet ibe demand! of factory shift worker* The morning new* program carrac on tbe air0 insteadnd evening new* andran until about rmdrugbt

Reoeat Cnumierprepagenda Tirmi Covoierpropa-ganda ia inlcodcd toroad array ofto rebut negative iafocmaiion about tbe Soviet

Ses>fer

ffom various Western sources, of whichit ihe moil impoeiant. The countercTotl o> carried cut in the media snd by oralthe 'alter "vie undernniy (Knowledge!c : JJ

The Kremlin pitches iu cootucpeop*gaoda al differ, ent audiences with different degrees ot* sophiiiicalion and levels of education,eople from all elan Inletestern radio. Thus, while refined ich-niques and argumentation ate used in materialsfor tpocialiieil professional audiences, counter-propaganda appearing in large-Circulation mass-media publications seems to be directedather unsophisticated audience. Such offerings often arc aggressive and crude, io the mainlag ablasts against the many social and political sins "endemic" to the West and countcrattacits that do not grant Western points any shred of validity. Recent Soviet counter propaganda apparently directly toward the less educated parts of ihe population has revolved around certain set themes:

- The domestic media often portray Westerners,Americans, in the USSR as engaging in lubvertive activities. During the jailing of Nicholas Daniloff on spy charges, the Soviet media carried several articles on the CIA's alleged use of Western journalists for purposes of cover and dissemination of information."

To warn Soviet dtiiens ooi to associate within tbe country, the mediaoint of mcealiaog about those cases where Soviet dtirros lei themselves be led astray. Ia addition to nubltcu-ingelective basis actual defections or recruit-menu of Soviet dtiaens by Western iatelligcoce services, regime propaganda highlights lost*noes when Soviet dtiiens sorvaoent of any inictu io betray tbeir country became instruments of foreign ami-Sovietreading and patting to friends

literature entering the country By way of foreign tourists, for eaample

The. io ciplain the social pathologies that have become increasingly evident in Scnicl society- such as drujs. prostitution, violent crime, andconnecting Ihcm to perverse social and seiual influences from the West. For eiamnle. Menhas portrayed AIDS in ihe USSR as the resullern contamination, alleging thai virtually the only AIDS victims in ihe USSR are foreigners.

The regime constantly snacks the moral degeneracy of the West and the pernicious influence of rampant Western consumerism. Al its most eitreme.ounter propaganda portrays the United Slatesorrupt society torn by radsl tension, controlled by ruthless capitalists, ind governed by subordination of tbe public Interest to private greed. Forcathing documentary called "The Man From Fifthhown on Soviet television in. looked at tbe underside of New Yorkevictions of tenants, homeless people surrounded by piles of garbage, cocaine addicts, prostitutes looking foe customers in midn Manhattan, scenesd Street, repletepeep tbo-t. and the contrast bei-een abandoned city blocks in Harlem and ibe affluence along Fifth Avenue.

*om piemen! lo these attacks, lbc media and official spokesmen describe interms the social, cultural, economic, and spiritual superiority of the socialist system and tbe Soviet motherland. For cjseipic, ibe carefully arranged returnmigres in the early morula'. mostly from tbe Untied States, -as widely bailedign of the USSR's superior social welfarewhich is said to free Soviet people from dailyeflection of tbe Wat's materialism and spiritual vacuity.

us innnul11 uO 'i*ml> wradsl SB

-dmaiae" iMm IVi wtie lewbe>>acB S cot-nrriOfau if

Wr'.

, m r. I"

Sonet propagandists, believing that the best defensea rood offense, iry io lorn ihe tables on Western

Seortt

Thtmti in Soviet Ceunttrprepagaada Against the Western Stations Under Gorbachev

recent years, iht Soviet, have continued to push several Ihtmts in their attacks against the Weiternen embellishing tech one withnattons hsbs

Sponsortkipofihe Radios

An important element ofpeis:r. opsins! ihe radios Is the allegation that RFE/RL and VOA are "CIA stations" Assertions that these notions receive their funding and tasking directly from "Lanoley" are Standard fare. The Kremlin uses lo itsadv-niage the reveietions made during thehai CIA funded RFE/RL It has notto ns public that this relationship changedJ when ihe two notions were put under the supervision of the *ewl^reeled Board for Inlerna-lional Brood*.. tfeg

The Kremlin label, VOA as Washington's offclal mouthpiece, misrepresenting its status OS annews station that also broadcasts editorials 'tfltcilnt US Go-ernmem policy. The station'ssupport for President Reagan's "crusade against Communism'and lis editorials in favor of Ihe defense modernisation programond SOI are targeted for special condemnattc

Other Western stations aUo are portrayed as tools of their6 Utettluroaji faEcUBC. for example, claimed that its programs are "apprxsved by the British Foreign Office fffifrj

Purpose* They Serve

Moscow allege! that the Wat. rrali-lne that the ^iel regime cannot be broughty military means, tries toopular revolt by alienating the Soviet public from lis leadership. According to ihe Sennets, tkenify spirt who have been uncovered endurneoaii and criminal's who Aw* tcr- deiervedly sentenced by Sovietfustic* Bff5tt

Moscow alio links the radios'defense cf human

rights activist, with their goal Of iubvertion.Snvitt

medio denounce the tie, the radios suppastdly meln-toin with antl-Sovltt rtliglou, groups end organic-Hons of "reactionary" emigres and nationalists,in the Baltic Ukrainian diaspora. The publicity thai VOA and RFE/RL extend to "Captivetclerailons-onnuol US Governmentof solidarity with the Baltic slates endspecial

several EostSiirgrran

RFE/RL't alleged role In passingpponents of socialist retimes Outside the USSR is pari of ihe same paitern ofhe Soviet! charge thai ihe stations tave tactical adviceitChoslovok activist, in IW and tiage-rnanated Solidarity activities in Polandincluding sending coded mestagti to ihtimilarly, according to ihe Kremlin, the "dotent" of Western ttationi that broadcast lo Afghanliton "give direct Instructions to the bandit, for carrying out lubversivt and terroristo<v. fj@x

Radio Ferwmnet

Soviet propaganda frequently defames with iteong personal enact, those who work for the nations, particularly RFE/RL They are accused of being "turncoats andemigrant rabble,estern spies, and Individuals of weak character generally. Inovcuta-jt Rouiyipccllic RL siajj member as en Inveterate alcoholic who quit his fob ax ain Moscow, left /or Israel, and began drinking so much that he needed to AndUS militarismfor the money. |m

Teckaignts Employed

So*<rt propaganda geared to ordinary citliensfrrq-urnt aiserUom that the radios engage in outright lying. Moscow accuse. Western radioof using the same Big Lie"technique thai Goebbctt perfected far iheto convince

accuse (tool by loclirtf at these con nl ties ibe umc chelae* made icsJiui (be USSR. In tbe fieldjbu. for example,rgues thaibetheegrcrrouilylea human rights

acknowledge what appear to be majorin Western societies or criticize secondary aspects of Washington's policies to create anof Impartiality before launching Into attacks of the socialist system.

They carefully mix short newsithmusic lo pervade unsuspecting listeners lo accept Western points of view. lAlternativcly. VOA has been accused of "cramming" its audience wish newt loputh its antl-Communlst line.)

They broadcast ihe viewt of numerousand "Krern'mologists" whose authoritative manner helps lo hypnotise 'isttners into accepting disinformation about ihe Soviet system.

Attacks oft ihe Weslcrn radios specificallyiapic in ihisocally hostile cam-pejf.it sgauut the nations bis ippca/cd in all media, including popular films. Several such uories oflea appear in tbe COuraeee insethile tbe USSR generally baj lumped VOA. RFE, RL. and DW tocctber aa iastigatory sodnsciil-ters, it has directed most of its venom at RFE/RL. Tbe interna ly of these attacks rose sharply in tbe late

la coeoectioa uitb these attacks, Soviet media hive atronity rtcae-JBCed the United States loforniauon Arraey fUSIAl and made personal attack* against Chute* Wick, its director. Cha/saeruirtg USlAropuancu,oscow ponrays

openly appeal to iherejudices through the use af popular sitrmtsgiei

RecentlatnostMedia

hx- pro/tuned ,hrotl in the media In afar more systematic end far-reaching fashion than any of hi, predecessors For examplr

- Official statisticssto by iht Cent-el Statistical Administration liu.lt.drd figure, on ihe grain harvest for iht first time In IJ veers.

There ore mony nevrs stories abnut corrupt officials tontaining extensive details of their malfeasance and the punishments meted out to them.

The medio ore providing more discussion of Soviet troop activity In Afghanistan.

Ihe repine hnsrets and television blitx on the horror, of drug abuse inside the USSR.

In6 the Soviet regime eultklythe tiutbrcok of riming in Aim: Ate sparked by the replacement of an ethnic Kasakh -iih an eihnU Russianepublics first secretary.

Historical personalities and periods haveuch more straightforward manner. Favorable references to Lenin's tVew Economic Policy (NEP) have oppeered prominently in the press, the evil, of Stalintim hove been denounced more openly, and nonpersons such as Khrushchev have received matier-of-foci treatment.

the Cherr-oyT disaster, the media have become more informative with respect to internal disasters and industrial occidtnls. For example, ihey reported on ihe linkingoviet submarine in iheoal-mining attidcnt within ihe Donbass region, the attempted hijacking Of on Aeroffol planeemote City in theatal bridge collapse inerious fire with casualties at the Russian Orthodox seminary at Zagorsk, and deadly snowslidcs In Georgia.

A more sophlssicaied approach has been evident on the Jc-ish emigration guesilon. For example, in6 Moscow television aired on uncutdocumentary film concerning Jewishfrom the USSR in Brooklyn, The Russians Ate Here, which depleted positive as wellive features of life In ihe United

i

cj paction and rpoderoiuu'on of ibe US-baled radioi (not only lo ibe USSR but also to Latin America. Western Europe,bani*iaai aod USlA't WorWnet program [tht beaming of USLA-producod televised public aJTain programs io Other countries)roduct of American cultural- '-

Un EataaSl

bacitnUag ibe ClwdtbUry of Ike Official Media Tut Maw Toward Opeaness. Even before Gorbachev's dramatic initiatives to tela*cekscosut nt building within ibe leadership about theof injecting more candor into Soviet media;'*

eaampte, be told tbe Iolb Party Cortgrcsa that propaganda ihould act avoid prkUy or diBrcuUew change* in the media actually too* place,

Uoder Arsclropov. ihe leadership began the practice of pubtieuing Politburo tneeticigt and provided the populationrata level of detail about ihe warbaoisun.

Cbemcnho erged greater efforts lo increase the credibility oftju. but failed lo take much concrete aaunfiSiwI

Brezhnev, inward the end of his lift, beganipscrvioe to Ibe corroept of openness,or

Sot**,

efforts lo open up ihe domestic mediaqn IfllJ.ear. Gorbachevmajor campaignasaorr fopennetsa. andtwgan townh

s in Soviet society and themore candidof enme.alcoholi'-a. drvi abuse, inefficiencieseconomy, natural disasters. ardj.M- inI'll jppeared Ikctoday <icto respect (he tenets of Mirsijt/Leoinihey car now eapieaa opinien* that doofficial viewj, and rditori are"iresponsible (or "hat they print arilhoulfrom external centoring oeganiuiiontfor tuchthe Sciei military

and ipaee progrtaiJ^h

Gorbachevs openncii poeacy aho hat heralded the appearance in the media of r: art subtle ooontcrpropa-ganda More and more. Sovtel television prog rami and the printed media are acknowledging pointi made by foreign criticiact, toene limes, letting ihem ipcak directly to the Jomein aodicnec) befora launchingoonieraiiack (teakkaaadr Yeko-tev. theccKiary in charge ofpropaganda, and culture, appearsave taken lbc lead in arguing that the regime gains In credibility by allowing Western foreign policylatform in the Soviet media, accompanied by pcaai-by-poiat re-butials Rather than issuing Cassandra-hit stale-meats about thehreal from the-.ite those of Chebriko* andYakenlev hat conccniritcd on directingtcrict of itnprcwc-mcnts in tbe Sovrtl media to help tbe regime ilrithe challenge from Wealcrn

pressure therr. lo gel on board, andleaitimiie thaconomic reforms.

A sigmncaato gfarnoir. however, has been ihe fear among Soviet kaJcrsie uomesiie media "tre beginniiigose ihe ccopetiiionforeignations, at least among an important and influential nan nf the populaiion Theudience for the ftai-oni apparcnily convinced the regime that itslie--entcrteiaf-tat -ere becoming unappealingo irrelevantsupporters of greater openness erguc that the regime can only gain in toe public's eyes if il preempts foreign radios by being the first to provide newt and inlcrpmaiions of important events, bracing Soviet citilf as -lib arguments to counterc counts they hear over foreign radio. That, gfajnoji is seenay of reengaging criitca] tic menu of the populstion back to ihe regime's information and value systems:

1 During tbe) Central Committee plenum oa ideology. Caersvtoko said. "Ifsatain one event o- another Mptrtcially. ori> later eat have to reassure pce-pic. -hieh is farcull than muring them in tht first place."

la Decemberorbtchev told participants of aa ideological conference lhatmust provideand substantive answers tot is irsadsuaaible foe Ihe enemyreempt as on tbe acne qacsiaosss of rsantenaooraryda?vesoi> at-onf. tacts-drag our deveSqcsnteat. andit inter-

pruaiioa aad aaaeaaeoeai. psleiuig off recipes for

their 'soJuUon.'"

arsety of

for the rnime. many of whith<

aoshmgo with casnotrn about Western radioa For csample, Corbacbev aod bit supporters hope thai more cam-Sue Da ibe aaadia and ia tulural peaacyb.-ghligbt SOCmI i'i (such at pobik Ctuckeancts aad drugto rally public tappon for remedial action, put the spotlight on abuics ofwho are nor behind Corrsaehev's program and

Boris Yd"ibe chief of ihe Moscow party orga-nisaubo. afterdiscussionseciing of the city's gorkorn in6 of sueb iradiuottally uboo

Inhe official mediai-posed ihepublicarge number of Weitern foreign polity official, and etp"ii. many In thes control area. alhr'< accompanying Ihe prtlentalion of Western* point Sotil rebuttal,

6 Sonet trtciiion earned foot ete of US official, palling forth their new, on com rat r-

tnue,own meeting"outtlde Riga. Latvia

tame month, ihe TV program "International Panorama"pedol edition featuringof.}German roundlablt on arm, control ana the Reykjavik meeting between Gorbachev end Prrtldent Reagan. The programVtit Germanefenseargument that SDI re it arch it Juiljled under the ABM Treaty, defease of SDIeans of maintaining strangle liability, and itasement that

NAf preventand peeteeve

nobility

Also Inarmer US Arnbasiodor to Afghani it an participatediscuition of the Afghan problem on "Studio 9Soviet TV, major nvrld affair, program. He called the situation onnd dwell on the difficultiti ofelilemenl thai would permit tht mum of the refugeej-numaenagthird of the population

cwrvensty livingife of miseryhe

io-ietaarked regime, he sold, kod been installed in *ubml by adim acismre of powerilitary coup thai did not have ihe ettcnatvt lappori of Ihe peoale" and no erne will ruereed inntern on them because the Afghani are 'a notion of proud people."

' Insvtattyaetter, from the UKAmbtuiador inhe Sritish cose for thonging Stria witk tvpoornng ttrrortim

* Inriilih Minilttr of

Remoa. in on appearance ontfr^erAO poi'.-ei on nuclear deterrence enlteised thtjar makingeclarative

retryouclear-free world,gradual er mlthrough itnovitntlaied Moicow's refusal to observe US nuclear tnti at the Ncvade lite, edvoeeted freedom of trevtl acrossndproiitd President Rtaganfar returning confidence to Americans.

Inew feature column. Fnim Differentnih ani-cles by Stealer Robert Dole and aon ike tueitian of observing SALT II llmtii Senator Dale argued thai SALT II it dead and ihould be lefi io rett in peace.

Alio that month. Pri*di publtthed an article by Kenneth Adelman. Director of ihe US Armsand Disarmament Agency, accusing Moscow of using chemical weapons in Afghanlilon andthem to Vietnam end claiming that US tlock-ptitt of chemical weapons were imall and outdated.

Inriilih Prime Mtniiter Thankee.

harp and combative interview on Soviet

leleviaiaa. iirengly defended the Weitern doctrine of nudear deterrence: attacked Moscow Iover tha Wen In ICBMi end warheads:NATOtfeetttve alliance, criticited ihe Saveii far iiotkplling chemical weapons: andthe tutxtss of the market system withntotally ccystem,

Inamel TVengthy interview

vntk Setreiery of State Georg. S* ulir who emeu-Inied US vU-w% on arms control, deplored therr-ajiem of Afghaidnoa. and mused the ofS Embassy in Moirtrw

ai (he city's motility rate and the incidencecitoul crime, opliincd. "People mutt be aware j' ill ter rroblemt andhe meesu-cs taken to overcome Iticm. and ourthrough rumor) and gossip, not from BBC bruad-Cam. but from the party propag andists"

. So'tukoya Roniyaetter stating; "This fall two Latin American nates suffered terrible naturaln every frtmya program, central television transmittedfrom the scene. But onctober therearge car irto.ua l-he Tajik SSR Apart from the words 'there have beeno details ware reported. There wasingle shot on centra] television. Is Tajikistan farther from Mos-cow than Latinur media must summon tbe courage to instruct citiaens even on unci peeled or negative events, so thato not have to learn of tbcm from foreign voices having in anti-Soviet accent. Tbe ideological losses fromthai is Inrampjcieor not reported ia good time are too great-'

Some proponents of r'oinori actuallyirtue in public nag Western arguments. Along these lines, an article in Soverrkoyo Roiiiya argued in

Rtaderi want /he fallen posiible knowledge about ihefacli connectedurj viewpoint to eu to be well armed with inlarmaiion in Ike debate with him.They do not warn of primitive picture ol lift in ikeicture of the world Urn oner black as rug-ai oil in the other "all II well, alliiwetl.l

Soviet television

mm

Some evidence suggests that the airing of Westernoth in the Soviet media and via -thertwate broadcasts, alienates some of the more conservative elements of the population and strengthens their confidene: in 'he official media. Inember of the Central Committee urged aof pony propagandists to encourage more open debate of foreign policy issues, claiming that Centralpollsigh degree of unity and patriotism among Soviets. He said that propagandists would have more credibility now that the media weremore information on Western positions and views. In most eases, be said. Western positions on the USSR were so extreme as to be self-defeating. As an cum pie. be noted that at first Soviet officials bad been nervous about airing the6 Rigameeting" of US and Soviet officials on Soviet lelevitiin, but- when US speakers took what heonfrontaiiOBal and heavy banded approach, the ciiigeory reacted -ttb shock to US attacks on Soviet oauouaJestern cisnesprntdeni claimed in7 that thereising public backlash against Westerners appearing on tbe Sovietas wrJI as disgruatlcmcct over Western broadcasts. He reportedoviet TV official recentlyournalbu' coogxji that letters demanding increased iatujinri have beent the rate of WO

The Ritis alMany of the perceived risks of rlesnoK. like the advantages, do not relate to Weatero beoadesniog Many cooser-aiivc elites fear that ci-

Bonn, pc&ikal observer for Itvcalya.ihe same moaib thai "convincing criticsain seta out the adi-ersnry's arguments asi is essential

t>uw a*u-wi tow

r

t, VOA. HfMlKX. ten DW fa tterwrtslain- made

rfcd.- rvCCI ti.VrtlxVIrtt^tMMi in lb WI7TI4IA ui^uy

oaucUra ireretw-i) It' quoad

qat atari suave

panding lit* limiis of permissible discussion of regime shorioomingi and societalould undermine popu-

BfA for lhaather ibea inhitf public

supoort.nra-eimg ofalboriiy. and lead lo ruaa-ay erilicttuv Tbe' party plcnua >ai ibe occasion of but debate over huw far ihe press shoutd be allowedo in exposing donvmiicndrei G'omyko re-ponedly objectedarryingar onoiled "linen lion of "hooesl Communists" was damaging ihe public) confidence

'

Another important argument, however, relates direet-ly io Western broadcasting. Since Gorbachev! glat-noir policy ha> faincd momentum, ornciili and orrli-nary ciiiieoi havet fear thatibe regime's dirty linen only provides grist for ihecttcmal enemies because foreign radio picks up criiieiimi from the doiuesiie media, disioru them, aod repiari -been back into the USSR. Thisand the liberal response toexpressedeJe*ised roundteWe discussion in4 between Geotgi Arbaiov. head of the USA and Canada Institute, and TV commentator Valentin

on/ ietf-<rilieim of on' drfrtii hoi been and ii being voiced, and ihii nlfctticiim Il used by inrmy arociaganda IO caulttoi for open ilander agalnit

i-Jraajuu Tti.ori mi ikon-

-1 tun. they art rrldeni wnnktr arcntmzei Ii aurir/ii laid about dc/eeis.(hrnrthink ihliihai

filled our inrm.il with weriouj hopei about

i downhill, to lu iprak K

The desjroe of darner oftheik with bad ret depends oo whatrep for dianitsion Inforriution ruggesling thatr-socae in the Weal live better tbao the svertge* Soviet apparentlyar greater rcsk of influ-eneiria Srroct public altitailes than Western enlicrmu

of Moscow! foreign policy For most eiiitent. laicraa-tic-rial rtlaiioni are -cneie aad theoretical,ar "dor bousingor tbedelcrWxaung Health care lystemrii-calIn'. Ihi hcja ofleticr

3 ' aper rcccuca tellers frum people in centraliving on laUoiwd food, with itiii* or no en-Ik or steal, complaining ibat their lives art wvtae than tome ot ihejC deoicied by the Sovietas ihosc >ho appeared in "The Man From Fifthhe lower level of risk in caooting Soviet audiences lo critidsira of Mc-scow's foreign policy probably ciplaina why so many Wen Europeaa and American arms control eipernappeared in Sovietthan foreignersbo discuss coalaad consumer welfare n-

Thetasnc-st. The Soviets Claim the new openness is increasing the audience for Soviet media aod decreasing the appeal of foreign radios.articipant oo the program "The World Today" Rated thatj hamri tbe dtccljver.cn of RL's i

Dews report, the Oralis lion for domestic newpepert has lumped hy owrr thanillion io the II mouths (through March inTlthale* has been in orVc. Tbe cdttor of Pir-da claims that bn paper (Jane aiund IJ truD-OUrenders bee-uen5 and

Aprilu realty leli ttven

" Banuaananaaarana-ahfi

ail Usedu^Sccted Roman iiriclkectuaJa

ad cemusa over the year

. appurt for gfainorr. ipptaading it at oxkini the papers north reading for theiaieearsseaiure at besng able to get some actual iscws fromove had to listen tu Weal em radio for such irtfVn..

Al thelime. RFE/RL'i audiencefor the Jim few monthsl too*indience for tbeivir aif rtj.cvp-tla the regimeon openibe poai.ii of question on previouslytopics thai lbcol prfparedfully. Tho Sonet mediain! manyihan before, bul even the most liberal of

journals art hesitant to address bead-on luchpolitical premises as tbe rationale for lie ore-pony state or the ia/alutnlity of Lenut't uiieriBcej For snany Sonet btte-sert, ibe very sliratiion of foreignbat it operates under no itSt-ooog-cally imposod constraints in pursuing sucb lop-ts Oner. en interviewed by RFE/rl researchers intated.

Although Soviet medio have become more out. ipokea of late, they7 far -Aofe rruiA about our internal affairs andhe name Radio Liberty speaks forhether it ii talking about Western or Eosiem countries. RL almsys discusses both the positive and negative

There tt probably another treason tlasnosi failsihe demand fordo-

mesticrsort open lira uncut of pottucal issoea makes tbe public stare iBierestcd ia pofit-ca generally ibaaile cue ia tbe Bruhncv penod. *baa apathy about potiUcaJ tub--ecu *as uiekspiead Create/ latnreni io poiiucal topics may loocnaco foreign Woodcatlint at we* ai donna lit -ncdii In sum.bci(bicnt omte-iousneu of controversial tab-ecu that only ibe foreign radioa eon dkeuu to Uieir lof-eal (often anti-Sonet) ccaat-lateoo.

The Kremlin hasroad array of bilateral t'iJ.pivmaiie measures lu iccompl.iS several object rata.

To persuade We'lern coumr-ei icOjceadiobroadeatts ot at least moderate their content.

To fend off foreign charges againsi Soviet jamming

To create an international consensus, based oa culling Third World resentment sgainti Western ce-mnu-tieji-orj policy, that >ould legitimisebtocfaag of tboae sutiesas thai1 -arr.nxd

To prtaaurt West Cerrr.any and other countries into nor boiling RFE/RL or the other Westernons

Io broad terms, ibe Kremlin's diplomacy ia basedlaim thai the tuiiemi. particularly RFE/RL, violate the basic norms of iniernaiiontlamming is tberefore justifiedegitimate form of self-defense.

1 bepocilic legal arguments have indudod the follo-nag-

go*erriinenu bare the rght lo ctrairal thef taformalfon from atsrond; brcasdeasia in antivear-.ici.lar'. tnadcniMlltle type of iat^erenoc as tbe leetraal affa.ii of sovetetgs aatioos

Waters rsdau areinauurncnts of pay-cift-aeartt-al warfare dea.|Bcd loc-beilioehe Sonet androptao regimen

Western radios engage in aar pd'oagaoda in vsota-tioo of interns ta-aaal coni-cniioni

radios transmit uirortruiiofl thai is coo tra ry to tbe purpose of ibe Heliiokj Final Aa. "tnea is to -troovott mutual undcnianding among pec-pic]

SI

$*ft*tf

Mtliiltlertl Dittamact The Sovicu, in their East European allies, have sought to tsein Western brendciittrt byt the CSCE Re-it" CWe'eaces. 'or caemptc. rba Sovietsvigorously auer-iad tie right of soc-cnc* to defend themselve'"OnsiaBghu'* by foreignwvKcj Similarly,2 conference of ibeiccommimicalions Union held mthe Ciecbotlovak delegationco-OOUl (ubicqueniiy -ilbdrewn) that would have legal-ired jamming by giving nana tba ri|ht to cut off any comm.unica lionsmay appes* dangcrsulbe security of iht WaitContrary to ibttrpubbc Order or lo decency '

e USSR uncipccttdly r* liftedI9J6 Leafue of Nation! convention entitled "Concerning lbc Utc of Broadcasting in Ihe Cautc ofhil treaty cmllawi the - istin nciting war or other acts Incompatibleation's internal order or leeurily. or factually inentrcei information coneerninfral relation! Althougha-ly probiemi ti|naioriea from alkr>ing ehTcndiag broadcasts lis Crrned in the crwivcntion)nunerr from their lenitonea.oe* not confer ibe rjhif such br-sidentu to take eesrraclive action

suchr!iiniii|[b

Despite the fact thai the treaty doc* not unctioo

the tudden So*tct ratificationdesigneduitify jamming of "militaristic" propaganda enter-leg the USSR na Wen emroadcasts.

argued thatTimely" because "irnperialiu" propaganda, notably that of *be United States, ased ladaatsroadcasluu]the tenia irotrameal of ptycboMgical warfare aad loSersne interference io the mierrsal affairi of eaher aamsas.-Ajoursul ncnod) that Najs Germany and Italy ased ted tobrat dusts lo prepare their popu Utions forndemoralire people in the cssaairies tbey planned to invade; ihe journal added that this -form) Auilsia lo fern Germanyi (ubversrvr bcndeaiu.*

In anvercome the itroai Wcaiein eonsersus that jamming it illeial (sea insets, thehe support ol*varioustricsCs) against the sapooaod ineafcspoly of information by WeMtrnserviceahai ciorfitll) iftcvnolodsNew World Information Order-Mi Western radinbroadcastin;orm of "war prtspaganda" andtillies interna^oscowa Third Werld diplo-rnacy oa caymmacita-.tons issvea has taken advantage of Ibe desire of auttvarltarsan governments in maay LDCa to maintain control over information media as instruments for indoeiiinatini their populations andthe spread of "subversive" Westernand political influences In addition to lurtberlni Moscow's own interests in sec-ring LOC support for asmmiei. eipioi:iaC the NWIO issoe enablesiress thel.ty ofbetween tbe Sovset Bkc and the Third World andonvenient platform for pillorying Washie|ion|

Moscow promotes the NWIO at every possible forum, ciceptew issues where NWIO positionsalTect theor example, at0 UNESCO General Conference, the USSR andLDCs proposed an assortment of NWIO initiative* aod advocated ibe n'lhi of aU states to rebutot "malicious" reporting. In2 the

-1ik

bl ia

wii.li

The International Community's Condemnation ef Jamming

Gentrol Assembly explicitly condemnedinhe fit tt Internationalof 'he prcrilce. Jamming violates severe! Internationally eceepted agreements /he UNDeclaration on humanhefinalnd ihe InternationalConventionich went into force. Thc first agreement, signed end ratified by the USSR, stoles. "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this rightreedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek to receive and impart information and Ideas through any medio and regardless ofheTelecommunications Convention stales that "all. must be established and operated inanner as not to cause 'vntful Interference to she radio of Other members or of recognised private operating agencies, which carry on radio service and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the regulations, fl

Soviet Jamming was en Important Issue at4 session of thc World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of High-Frequtney Bandseetingations that was charged with planning the worldwide use of shortwave radioHF-WARC had to address jamming because is eaeigens ihe already crowded high-frequency spectrum and makes it harder to allocate the radio band to urn. In addition to blocking out reception of the largerjamming harms distant brcadeasxs transmitted on the tame freauency by third counmcs as well as broadcasts antter* estimated Oust, although Ihe amount of deliberate Interference durtng peek listening hours Is of the order of Xio 4Qptrceni of the available Spectrum, the local amount of spectrum affected at these times is of the order of0nveec gj

At4 HF-WARC. the United States tried to dernonsiruie lo other ayunlries that the problem in allocating the kisrh-frcqveney bond was Inextricably linked to lamrniag Washington, however, found Utile

iroruiemweing Jamming Or fisrring Moscow 10

erase ihe practice West European natiora also eten-livety employ hifh-frrqisrwcr broadcasting, but they

preferred to ireot fumnungechnical, not poliitcat. problem Support for the US pontlm again: jamming wet even thinner among LDCs many of "ham, thimseim as unaffected b, the practice]

ird Stmt. .'dnlu,lea calling far fotrnrntnis. working through the 1FRB. to monitor ihtxtwnre breadcasiiiew to Identifying Stationsharmful interferenceThe IFR8

COndirCted four monitoring tan-paigns. ike results of

which werr reported to the second session of the HF-WARC. held from February toht monitors detected Jcmmtng in the USSR and several East European countritl. but ihele countries made no response when prtsenlid -n* the evidence:

Meanwhile, the United Staiei and nine friendly na-itons organised enoihi- monitoring programihe ITU's. This effort involved the use ofdirealon-findlng equipment to identify specific sky-wave jamming ttensmitte/s. The date collected by these countries wet tens to the US Commercenstitute for Telecommunications Sei-enctsfor analysis, and moreistinct sky-jammers in use el more^ thanocations In the

Scrvitl Blot werf torsfirmedl

Inhe IFRB. actingS complaint filed. took ihe unprecedented attton of eoefirrrung that emUsions by the USSR. CsAC'Odovakie. and Palend are tavsing 'ntu-mful inltrfcrtnct" with US high-freeuency broadcasts. This was the first instance of ihe ITU formally rcoogtdting and registering the extent of the USSR's Jamming. The Board then otfitially notified the offending governmenii involved, and requested that

remrd.cl mearurei be taken B

rn/rCimai

nfm i '

irawmlUr lo- ntlteaint ml iwifw toAofnoverevrtm" m& ii aomOt wmrtry bWiadar trirt."newe.tfRlntlwww...

twlmftefew-nt nwtinn^U

Prttwtt air Particular Countries. By the 'allSoviel leaders apparently bad decided into stop jamming VOA. they probabli thought they might ustry to get something in return.originally broached the ideauid pro quo during theei summit with Presidentio Reykjavik. The Soviet leadereal whereby the USSRscop amnng VOA us tiot US permissionn eurr.it ting Station on or near US territory that would allow Soviet mediumwav* broadcasu to be heardhe United Sisies. Gorbachev .rgucd that ihe present niuation discriminate* against the USSR because many Sovv ctiecal to shortwave receivers and listen to shortwave broad cam (including thoae of US stations',mericans tunc io lo medium wave rather lhaa shortwave. Thus, he claimed, lb* Uaitnd Suicsmedigm-mves to "fence itself off from tbe info*-rnaifOA carried by ourn She end.rebuffed Gorbachev's proposalrading US broadtail rights 'or ending VOAoam eg would undercut ibe principlender international Uw.B

The actual ocas*lion of jamming cameeforein> to (be USSR U>7 by USIA Director Charles Wick. By liming thc cod of jamming lo iLes vrsiu the Kremlin apparentlyirying to oaeimiae Its chance* of obtaining concessions from the Uaiiedfiek caplcsred way* to aooaanitsodaic Sovct axcrcai ia gstr.iag greater ion io US awd>-gfjsaa, ineJwding iccing if any US radbo station be wiUiag so run Soviet material era the an and tichanging Soviet and US radio progracna. He cud not wordaoy anaagnneni along ihear luvo because oo US natronommercial incentive lo agree, but Soviet officials portrayed thei alion of US ill will rather than tbe commercial nature of ihe US broadcasting industry

Wben Moscow stopped jamming VOA. it began to use Cuban mediumwave transmittersroadeast Snv.n. en tilth-language programing lo US leiritory Soviet vlTicialt quietly contended thai Washington had already agreed iouid pro quoetter to Director Wick. Aleti'id' Yaki-.lev naiadirect linkage between the "nobaccking" ofad US rjdtobroadcasu burred :o ,oowniry

The USSR Costelcadio hat had talks warn Ch-bnn radio authorities. with reference to the factossibility of our broadcaslinterritory adjacent to your country was relied during myA you lot ihe Riyk loviktl* no objection! on your tort Soon, perhaps, it will be potable to arrange Sa"rt mediumwave b'oedecsit to the US from the Cuban territory. Simultaneously. Ihe jam-mine of the VOA broadcasts to the USSR will be Stopped We hope that you will dulythis step of ours ..

US oftcalt emphatically and publicly denied thai any deal had been made, and in7 Waabing-tonrotest to Moscow complaining that the CuSanbsseal biMdeatis were interfering wtiib US com tier tea I

TV fact that Woi GermanyFE/RL. the iui-xiiii eicst concerned io block. Seconals Coremarches to Booo TV USSR.u made Mkio aordemaiaig OW aodadio ia ibe Americaoaiioa rwa br US1A1 TV Kremlin ill alleged Ihat Bona, b* kmai RFE/RL beoactcasi from Won Cer-naa territory,0 Ottpalliik iteaiie* and

IA weii

Germso ipeciatisi in Eatl-Wosiritten lhal lb* USSR and Other Cut Euntpcan eouni/iei lluealened io boycott2 Munich Olympic Games unless ihe Bonn tow rmieni agreed to closeRFE and RL TV Soviets com pic meet dioto-esairc approachesiivsdia attacks mating thepoini (see miel. paid ' ' |

TVre cs also tnncknoc that Moscow has lor but pressure on Turkey aad Israd Artponod in Isauaryhat PricncOral plumed lo refute US mivcsu for aa rammer as Turkey if Pirsidcni Rcaga* broughtissueebruary I'll ooaversatMCgrounds that it would bans Ankara'sMrascerw. Waabington manhe paper

bo have applied pleasurel into refusingUS Gcr-ernmenl recyucal loMranj-nilling lUtsesrIsraeli lerriloi',KsS**af

Ittatl Appteeet US Radio Trammiiiet Deipile Fran*foko-

Throughoul mano gain apfwul from Iht litd'Ua tadio transmute1 on Israeli Itrrliary laFE/RL rcetpit'en in those pw.^USSR "here listening Isof Iht (frail DeiplttOy

some liraeh officials thai emphamed ihe political risks ofransmitter. Ttl Am agreed because

of iht peat impoeianieiiatlaiheJ to being rtspom

tire le US

ome Israeli Irodert reportedly balked at agreeing for ftor of offending the Kremlin. According to tht Jerusalem Pent. Abba Ebon, the chairman of the Knenet Foreign Affairi and Defense Committer,oppottd io iht nation betauie il eonfllded with Israel's alms of helping Sovieto emigrate and entouroging Moscow to renew diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. Some afficioli. Including theIn charge of ihe inlcgrollon of Soviet fewt in Israeli locieiy. erpreised dliagrtement with fires', dtctston io build ihe transmitter. Recogmting thai the relationship with Washington Is the tornerslone ef Israel's foreign polity, however. Tel An* con-curred and the agreement wai formal lied in August

Accordingerusalem radiobroadcast aired inarsaw submitted an uncgfuHet protest to Israel about the etpannon of the transmitter. We hot no evidence thai Uoitow tiarud any direct pressure to persuade Israel to refuse theaffer at the USSR Onenial Institute told the

comnnced lhal Tel Atlv Is not senoui about impttn-

ittg relations far two reaioni. Israel's efforts lo

exclude the USSR from the peon proteit and" evident in Us epproial of the radio

tittl

also has applied prcsaore against individual n an effort to prevent the build,ng or* Wckcth |ioc

i'be Sovietsre est to the

Western information ihe public can he trusted lo hear In ihe past, (he leadership bat judged that, when Western radios help ihe Scie: public independentlyaad analyze intemaiioaal crises wnsl-.ag the ciiemajo of So>iet militaryotentially in-fiammaiory or at lead irouWcaome siiuation isinnde the USSR. Moscow therefore rendi 'o jam Wesiem itations when it it about to undertake large-scale Jiirmil action. Ilitly to

At the lime of ihe Afghanistan invasion, lbc regimc'i fear of an adverse domestic reaction probablyan important conditioning factor that led lo ibe mump-lion of jamming. The regime apparently calculi led that "protecting" Soviet citizenslawal react-jn ot* outrage -si accessary to preveai tbcm from raiting embsmssing evestiCeis. Moscowintensive jamming inight moothi after lbc invasion, and domestic radio and television acknowtodgedst Soviei troops had beeo "invited" to help fight theot that (hey had engaged in combat. Much of the populatasa learned about Soviet combsi activity from Westcri broadcasts thai "tie left un jammed, aad, after Aagun. by listening ihrougb ihe jamming. The jamming ofari and Pa ah to-language broad-catis in2 and) probably was an attemptlose lau up among Ihe vulnerable Ceo-

"'" (naa9ll

Al about ibe same linethe decisionde Afghanntan. authoritiesrc ouitc conutrnrdBMential spUlove/ effect from the independent trade union Solalsrity io ibe Baliic republic* aad other tu-der areas Ceaacarn waa capocsally great abcaii prevcaueg oe-wt froan spreading lo Lnbuaata.bat bang fcstorieaJ aaka to fcCaod la fees, the reaunpiMa of rieoming in0 appearsto haveeactionvents to Poland and oal> secondarily lo the invasion of Afghanistan

-

during liic -Praguen goal was to prevent the pubtac from becoming-lib reform ideashe .'r.me-orkarxist ideology jtd io Biskc it easier lu pbii.wnchosio-akia io the Soviet population

In addition tuabout exposing Soviet citizens lo information from abroad that puts the USSRad light, tbe regime must neigh the negative impaci on Soviet public op.ri.o- of acknowlodging in efTaet that thee hai lomething io bide frompopulate and al fearful of ccexpetingthe Went in the -grid of ideas The ceuetcc of jamrsuag of some stations suggestsactev helievea thai jamming bat been one (actor widening ihe gulf between uate and nxir.in recent years and conirib-uting lopolilical alienation among important teg-menu of the po,

of tbe Surioa'i Cooteoc Moscow's evaluation of each natron'i ceMieot and tone and iti likelr impaci on vulcerable paru of lbca importer' coaaueteiaiios. Crvea thu criterion, the Sennets have much greateriea RFE/RL than any other Weaiero ruuonc.tutTtsgitc cewnettrungtr rsornesik challenge io Soviet authorities. Tbaa. ihe Scmcu have ooniiiicmly lammed RFE/RLtbe nation went on the anJ, alihougb_ toward the Other radioa hai fluctuated!

otVy CaaaUaWuHoaa

rbererong eoereiaoemthe level of laleroeuooel ictvatoaast-Weanl aad the deeaoou io yiiiiaie ar endj.

ttopped in9 duringi ili withdiaaenhowrr ta the

Urnled Stales, and it oonliaaedow level aaulmodem! of0

otcuw itoprcd jamming ra rcaune to ibeof ibe US-USSR. -Vxtioe" aad leal

ban is-rnvnii bal risatncda1

upon ihe uwaivui af C

Jammog for ihe ri.ei Weaiera nations) after theeriod -benn fallfor the CSCt Conference were under

Jamming remmed in0 after the invasion of Afghaniuan andJhej|sei of labor unreal in

Poland. (Secfrjeiim

Another foreign policys rhc USSR's bilateral reUrjsctshiproadeoiling country; Una Often captains tbe dJTereei ucaimertt lomeean receive

The Kremlin spares Radio Sweden probably out of ippetciation for Stockboim'i neutrality as well at the ponticsild content of this radio's broadcasting

The USSR begaa jamming Radio Israel al about the same time it ruptured relationsd

Motco- slopped jamming the ridio-broaicanjat Imam. Weal Germany, and Ibe United Sua ontinued to jam tbcae of Israel and China, probably because of sou bilateral relations -itn both osuntria

Tbe Soviet leadenhip trici lo nsesb jamming policy with the pursuit of diplomatic objectives. couatries. For eaampk. tbe Polilburo tradi-taooa:: taaprndi ,ir..Tni aal before or during tbe aautoreign digarlary. apparentlyaga of feed-til ca to aelp Mcaeow eebtaia etaaccaaMnt

- When Kbrvitacfw vuvtad ihe Uaated StateswtubPresidente rtsauoed

jamming tot VOA and BBCa good-iD gesture. Tars probably was mcaDIndoor Washington io agree io lUDusbebev'i prtapvaal ihai the Uniied Slates "restrain* VOA'i content in ctchangcermanent end io janimiag

Ckranalntj af Sarin Immmlmt

1

9}

t Jamming altg.ni

lam.rn.nM ofMilan Service begins

USSR extendi Jamming lo VOA ana" RFE's Eail European broadcasts. Jamming of RL begins.

Jamming sloppedihrn resumedtltciire basis.

$

I9J2

Jamming slopped for BBC and for VOA'i Armenian. Georgian. Estonian. Lalrian. Lithuanian. Russian and Ukrainian ttrrkes Jamming continues for RL and some other Stations.

Jamming begins for Albanian and Chinese broadcasts.

Jamming resumes for VOA'i Russian. Armenian. Georgian, and Ukrainian terriiti and for BBC., KaJ Ureal, and other notions. Russian broadtail! fromtden. and Canada ore left fee*.

VOAs Usbek Service fammed minutes after first broadcast begins

Jamming ceases far VOA. BBC and DW GrxtBpaM foe RL. Kol Israel.and China.

4 DW lammed to nop reading from Soitkenilsyas GulagJamming of VOA. BBC. and DW bepn,

1 Jammers in USSR. Eastnd Cltcrualcnakia Jam Polish broadcaiis of VOA and BBC

1 Jamming of VOA Dari begins.J Jamming of VOA rashto begtni.

Jamming teasel lor Radio Baling Albania, and South Koreaerases lor BBCt Russian

Jamming ceases 'or allnn rommuci lor RTEJRL

ecision lo end uiilong practice of jamming China's Russian-language broadcasts ia6 may have been limed to coincidetrtlng of !h: tfcpulv 'o'li'm nn'niiterj "hatn"aee in Beijing lhal month.

The end of jamming for BBC in7 may hare been limedorthcoming <iaii to the USSR by Prime

aTer to tad jamming for VOAhe6 high-level meetingReagar.eykjavik may haveope that the oatpouring of worldwide hopes for better US-USSR rclaiiooi would pressure the United Slates to agree to his precondition for ending ihe jamming.

The cad of VOA jamming in7 may have been limed to coincideisit lo the USSR by the director of USIA<HJ^

Other foreign policy considerations have also influ-eerccd Other Sovietvion*

Part of Ihe reason Moscow resumed jamming vVeat-era itatoen8he inwasionof Cteeboale-vstbaiaad0 tin rcaetasa to the Afghan and Polish enseal may have been lu register displeasure over ibe strong Westernibe casecaitm ttadewdlas to keep Use Soviet populace from bearing theside of the story.

looscow probably stoppedRadio Beifiag io cement lb* belter tataienJTb* tXirmlin may ahso have stoppedg the Southad Albanian nan thai sasnc noatbauten of grand faith

Case aad t*rcra*ar*

o eaircarael) costly operat'on Actual costs are not blown and arc hard to estimate, io part because of diffierultie* citimaima the relevant rublc-dolltr tiehaatT tat* and the wage leveli of jamening echniciaai Moat calculation! rang* from SIOO-IOU million per )tar. to "bicfi mult beQ mil lion iaenmr BBC engineer has put the innual cent to the Soviet teonimi at no leas

thanillion, and per flap* as high asillion. According to sceneperil, if the Urn led States raayac toJSlem. the coat would eteeed blwer twice the combined annua' coat of producing and transmitting RFE/RL. VOA. BBC. and DW broadcasts to thc Warsaw pact count run.0 technician* operating opOC ^earnersought to be empaoved oo Soviet terriiory

The impact jamming has on thc UnoR't energy balance, although even more difficult to measure, may alsoelevant factor. At meat.stimate that the total jmrnrj operation consumesercent of electricity productasn. but. in tune* of shortfalls (especially to critical limes of the year, litehai coiitd mate adifference. Accordiageries of reports appearing in the second halfhe loss of electrical power due to thc Chernobyl' ciplcaion affected. Soviet jamming demtaont Far cample, inrofcsacH of the Central Commit tec's Academy of Social Sciences told

due to th* acealeai were likely to leadovet to tgT clccirxaty by uopcang jam-mag of

vOa|

We have no confirmation that elect maty thortftllt were mpootiblc lor ibe decision to nop jamming BBC or VOA la lanuary andeapeetivdy. Hcrafver. jamming of BBC ended during aharsh winter thatthe USSR) seasonal electricity thorugn and delayed oiladhe sbonfaBt dwe to Chernobyl', ll alto camelowdown for ibe aacloat corsorac-aja prorram when thc inirodudioa of new lafety procedorea (rleaagacd la prevent another Cher-aobyr-type accidenl)hmmber of canting nuclear'|

OwrWan Available to Gca-bacaev

Fadta* Al Ja

la the spirit of Opennen and to achieve foreign policy bcocAts, ihe Soviet regime could decide to nop jamming aO Western tutions. not jutt BBC and

VOA. The mainoller foalt would belbc mofc favorable image of (heaid ro encourage Wnici gcvemnKautorccaaacci. toUSSR.arther bareish Moscow'i imageh* eraUS aod Wtai European publics who would lakebe another symboi of ihe regime's morei ion.oot with oilier actions,limateor oilier ncgont-

ptuve jjiea?

Domestic com.de."aiioii. hc-cer. pecbillv would be paramount ia an* decision lo free broaceaauaf for lac rid ot thai arc (till .atmmedDW. RFE/RL. aad Radio Iiracl. If Gorbachev ii sincere in ha effort io redefine the relationship bet-ten state and societyositive baiit of aappori rather ibanegative bam of control, he could ultimately conclude ihai Ceanni all jamming would do more lo bolatcr regime legitimacy than eon'.inaing io Work the morenations. Indeed. Soviet journalist Vladimir Posner ux3 inhai be fa-ortd aa cad io jamming and called theounterproductixHt pointed out thai jamming give* Ibe na lions more attention than they deserve, and be implied thai people arc tempted io linen preeiiely because lbc regime does not want them lo. Thereeen indications that other So*vtt ofleala have coocludcd lbai jamoueg bos become eouaterproducure and tbat ii is preferable io rely no iltfoii to coupler Wcaters pro pa fndi

If Moscow decides to stop jamming other- as well as BBC and VOA.oo Idharp increase in the amount of ao-nesiio craajterpropa-gstsda against the Rationa and the Westmcaoioc the population aad urge uttTtascd

goiiBn fecliKlive" Wesura broadcasts, le fact, lbc Soviets did appear to jack up theirof VOA Use bt tha fall of IW6 la boat the liosc of Geatascse-r't prtsptavsl lo Pteudcol ReagaaL wnh several iraodaa attacht mirodaeedncni-ras of Uhe caaetday and lieaeof late VOA brcaatscaaL Tars oauldaa that leading proiwiaade |gSjg**Jl ia lbc party wen preparing la end to VOA jomnutuj bui wereoverruled fscausnirlg in laneafler jaauniag ed VOA

thereanother notieeeb'e increase in attacks agarnst nones broadcast by ihe tuiions. pariicailarly

The Conaer-aliie Oplioa

As has happcred fnllowiflg past Mlecliae cessation* of jamming, the bo--ett could revertorepproach us dealing aitG foreign radio* Thevauvc option could consist of three elements thai could ocither singly or in comb.nation: an increase in jamming, legal prohibitions agaiiist linen-

acked up by Jodioutback us th* availability ofoeiaers available to Soviet citizens'

Reporting from about the time Gorbachev eai*power suggesu the Soviets actively censidered beefing up laauning rather than decreasiag it:

lamcorig

I beiog buill at Estonia to prevent ihe faibuc froa ttchieg Ramsh iele*ia^o_ That apparentlyeing done portaiaai to Distractions from Mcaaasw io lbc EsUeuas Commaarty io increase arseealsgicaJ(The di/tcur of tbe Euonun *iair trJciiicn lyueci publicly denied thii allegation

These rcprru cuyisiBgrsrai to rckomc jan-.tmna; at lbc fa-are if current pdicae* crane lo be atrwed by So-wa Leaders as aw pruducsjvt.faj mr pataaaoWa dire- If oprnncaa mmalaiea publicHai gets cast of band and leads to

widespread protestkcptio of glainosithe leadership would press more vigorously foe rci-noosing con tr oil. at lean with record to the radios.could argue tha*ntended to leave ihe country defenseless against ill-intended for. eign propaganda. Gorbachev himtelf clearly hat no intention of allowing /Varan-Mo go to far that it becomes dtatabilirinj^H

In fact. tome officials undoubtedly believe thai allow,Western broadcasting is especially dangerous bow that the pany linecuvrij

delect ihose who listen to Western radio and that authorities hex done so in rectal rears

_|claima last

Secret poctr pjiroi Moscow In on tha'. arc il<abac to delect radio -ttoh*glass eiert According us hearsay cached up by the source, ihe apparatus can aaalyft the vibra-

freerlass aad dciecteaiera radio program it bong aired.

Before heemigrati

special vehicles were usedonitor individual apartments to sec if the occupants weree also clahncd thai an acquaintance who altered his radio so he could listen to foreign broadcasts through the jamming was arrested and jailed.

fiom the damage io (he regime's image it home and abroad of renewing jamming, however, purely technical crsntsdcraiiona could prevent the regime from increasing jamming much beyond the levels of recent years Total jamming coverage iaeasible option Given the physical nataiu oftraot-mnsion. tbe Soviets caonoi mate lbc couniry locally impermeable to foreign brunOensuog. This iabecause ibe "iwtlighi unmaaiiy" pheooeveaon (caused by changes in the aaaoapbere after the na has act so tbe East bultill up la the Weal) matesamming ihcAcciivc last al aujhi aad before tbe aus risea. Fartberntort. use*arc located only aa urban cejiieis.lso cjcb leu eilpciivr ia lac oouairyaale tbaa in

In theory, the regime could snlicaidaU listeners tbroug ncai TotaJ ra-ublNliori of lbc ad ofwould bam to be bached by dra cowan legal nd by technical means of del

sar-eill.ai, bbUebbb!

ea king Westerner who is an amateur radiorimilar claim.oviet Central Asia where he closely observed shortwave equipment for sale ia electronics notes, he concluded that many people owned "tube-type" radioe ralber than iranaitloMypc. He states that tube-type radios, in addition to being harder to transport than transinor radico, are easier to locate by using radiated energy radio locatioo techniques. This could mean that internal security forces could verify listeningistance without entering residences physically

Whether or not massive turvcillaocc of ibis son itthe realm of technical possibility, il would aoem to be out of tbe question even oo practical grounds because il would require enormous police

A variety of isu'oma'son suggests thai the regime bos at real considered cutting back tbe supply of short-

aercertionery small pan of the Soviet public that tbe regime already can

Split

Thereindications as early4 that Soviet security officials were toying with she idea ofshortwave radio sates io the Soviet population.

Wecca no firm evidence that the Soviets have already stopped the production of shortwave receivers for the domestic meriei. At present, the Soviets probably would be loath to reduce the supply of shortwave receivers sharply because thc population in some areas still needs these receivers to pick up Soviet domestic broadcasts j

It is possible, however, tbatecade or so thc refimc wiP be able to eliminate reliance on shortwave for Soviet broadcasts by bard-wiring tbe entire USSRhat sif nail travel by cable rather than through the atmosphere. As previously mentioned,5 the refimc intends to make three-channel radiebroadcasi-Lnf available to virtually all citiecna. even those living in remote, rural pans of Use country. By mi ag ill wnir immune to "conta oiication- from outivdc broadcasters, tbe Kremlin may eventually do away with, the need for shortwave roccivers in inutconii-Dcatal easmmunieation anctoould then safdy oil off all pradoctfon o!SM

war-wi hi law (arrw Cactrat

In the abaer>ce af an nwimjlional crisis Or aaof tocial stability ca the USSR, it tecmi rttou hkety that the Soviets rillifferentiated o the radios. Thai. Mcu-Dow may continue" relatively ouM itatioai like BBC L. broadcast unimroded. vihile tireivgihenLiia saaimiag agaaflti more "orTrniive" tiawoni like RFE/RL taad peabapa OWi la fact Meaveo* hai atrcady reallocated

Seyrlrt

and Outlook

Fat thc foreaeeableJtl minority of <iie Soviet public will probably beloWestern news and analysis via shortwave rad-o:

The hard-wiring of the country for cable radio could makerastic cut In dotnestic production of shortwa.eia addition to th* earning stock of radios, resourceful citiicns would still have access to black-market radio sets, to foreign imports, and to receivers modified forby Soviet "mooolighiers."

If jamming continueselective basis,omprehensive basis, Soviet citiicns will use lime-honored way* to Overcome it partially."

Ptopaganda aiucks against all the stations and Intelligence operations against RFE/RL are unlike-ly to deter members of ibe public who are deier-mined to listen.

The cessation of jamming of meat Western| resultradual gro-th in Ihe Soviet audience for foreian broadeaira The ease wjih which programs car. bep will more than offsei the loss of the thrill of tasting -forbidden fruit" by lisienin-Meyhe nations tbe authceitie* were Irvingr-J|

Glasnosi is not likely lo diminish Ihe appetite foe new* from Western stations. Greater eacdor in So-net donsc-iC media cannot completely close thegap between officialand Ihedesire to hear another point of view. Since Gorbachev is not likely to remove all constraints on public discussion of sensitive politicalas the legitimacy of the Commuoisi Party'swill continue to be an interest in Western reportJW and analysis. In fact, by increasing public attention to political issues, ilasnaii is likely to Stimulate greater interest in both domestic and foreign media. In Eastern Europe, where thc media generally have been more open than in the USSR, thc audiences for Watern broadcasting remain large.'

Some listeners will probably continue to be ha-raised, especially for disscmituiiag "inti-Soviet propaganda- obtained from theut the regimeertainly will Cinch from ercctiag legal pertaliies such as those used to preventduring World War II: lock taw, would limp be unenforceable under present uxMUticail

Thert is an upward limit to the growth io audience site for Westernlrctdy widespread imooi Ihe urbaa. cdacticd classes. Tnosc people wbo do not listenless educated, and rural dwellers, tor eaampte are least KJdvio clesire uydepcradeot soerrccs of ittfamalico. 9

Western broadcaitinj bat bad and will continue torofound loagtangc impact on the attitudes of the Soviet population Tbe pcnciratioo of ibe USSR by Western breadcaitiag is pan ofbroad proceaa oftechnologicalin CKtrnmaoJcaUoni. urtnoitauon. odDCalion, aod growing global ccoeocarcis breaking down the isolation of the Sovietenlarging Use sia; of ihe critically thinking public, dimintsbiog (tttp-cion of ibe out aide world, and ptaaog ra-esaaire oo the regime to take ioroaccouni the desire* ol* its people io making policy.

AwrUiaiauw* aaw>bwa,I. LSI* aaea-anm ifWr*Vaww**rUmiin theolarUwi vulnia CuiiiiaaojarrirMiajwvy. xSiiikinMr lali

-tnaiwaM) rwtaora ml

I ktb Iwleven pO waScwl

Original document.

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