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Soviet Battlefield Lasers: Emerging Threat of Blinding and Antisensor WcaponslJ
A Technical Intelligence Report
This paperprepared by pH Office of Scientific andomments and Queries are welcome and may be addressed to theaaaaaaWa. ' I
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So.iei Battlefield Users: Emcrptns Threat of Blinding and Antiscnsor WeaponspjJJ
Judgments
IW7
hoi uied1 rtporl
and Warsaw Pact low-energy laser rangefinders and laser target designatorsignificant Windingto several hundredUS and NATO soldiers. Several tens of thousands of such systems are deployed. The most serious danger of blinding is to the soldier or pilot using magnifying optics, such as binoculars or those optics found in tank, antitank guidcd-missile launchers, or helicopter fire-control systems. Low-energy laser rangefinders. although not intended for blinding, can have their energy magnified through these optical systems and cause
In addition to this existing threat, we believe with high confidence that the Soviets will also field dedicated laser blinding and amisensor weapons. Because we lack sufficient information about their design specifications, we remain uncertain when these weaponsJ
Western soldiers in combat, if left unprotected against these laser blinding weapons, probably willignificant number of eye casualties. Such injuries could range from temporary incapacitating flashblindncss to total blindness in both eyes. Furthermore, sensitive electro-optic systems, if not incorporated with protective filters, probably will be damaged and their performance severely degraded. Comparedaser rangcfindei or targetedicated laser weapon wouldignificantly greater threai. with the ability to produce severe eye injury out lo several kilometers. It would be designed lo acquire high-speed targets more rapidly, to track them more accurately, and to attack them with greaterat long ranges.fB
conclude that Ihe Soviets are developing and probablj dedicated blinding and anlisensor weapons.J
Ihe Soviets have used low-power laser leviccs on several occasions sinceo irradiate Western .on reconnaissance.
Warsaw Pact writingsthe
developmentew tactical dosiTme^aTJe^'opiO^Tcctronico use lasers against Western visual and electro-optical sensors.
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QR1
The Soviet military has funded research for overears on laser-induced eye damage In supportaser blinding weapons development
Soviet military officials have as tactical weapons in the near fu-
Soviets are developing tactical laser bunding weapons
that should reach initial opcraiional capability (IOC) no later than the.
Soviet laser technology probably has been sufficiently mature forecade to support the developmentaser blinding weapon. Sufficient production capability exists within the laser and electro-optical production facilities of the Soviet military-industrial ministries to meet the series-product ion requirementaser blinding weapon!
If the Soviets have already fielded or will soon field an antisensor laser weapon, wc believe it would:
Be basically an "upgrade" of existing military laser systems.
esign that emphasizes minimal technologicalis. one based on proven laser technology available to the Soviets in the.
ignificant tactical capability, probablyisible or near-infrared beamew tens-of-watts average power.
On the other fund, the Soviets maymay already havetoore capable laser blinding weapon, one whose complexityedicated vehicle. We believeoviet laser blinding and antisensor weapon incorporatededicated vehicle would be much more powerful. It probably wouldignificantly greater lecbno-logical risk than one based on proven "off-the-shelP" technology for which such key issues such as scries producibiliiy and system reliability are
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ili-iil-.
key
Sovici Intentions To Lie Lasers for
Soviet Use of Lasers in Combat To Blind in* Enemy _ ^
Sino-Soviet Border
Soviet Use of Lasers Against Western
Reconnaissance Assets
Sovici "Opto-Electronicn Evolving
Rescarcti applicableaser Blir.dinc Weapon
Resource
Techno log?
Laser Inducer: Eye Damage
roduction
Later Weapons Programs: Technology
Wcapoa De^loprnetK. or Both'
Threat 11
A Lo- Rutear-Term Possibility ll
AaHy "jT|OC tr'.>
Tablr.
Poienlial of Sovici Laser KangchndcniDesignators Versus Likely First-Gcneiation
Laser Blinding Weapons
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Lasersotential for Use ator Antisensor Weapons
Soviet Battlefield Lasers: FmeraioE Threat of Blinding and Antisensor YVeaponsHH
The next war will be wan by ihe tide which best exploits the etecl'omagnetle spectrum.
Adm. Sergey
Commander in Chief. Soviet Nay
This report assesses Soviet intention, lo develop and use lasers as blinding and aniitciisot weapons These lasers are not laser rangefinders and targetThey are designed specifically lo blind enemy soldiers and pilot* and lo damage or disrupt elecuo-opltcal sensors. This paper also assesses iheSoviet research, development, testing, and(RDTAEi effort directed at developing such laserfor use on the battlefield
Lasers could caul) be tued at blindingyes and electro-optical sensors can be saturated orvery easily when illuminatedery-bright-light source For eaarnpk.isible laser irradiates an eye forillionthecond and delivers onlyillionth*ioule of energy, it can produce catastrophic eye injury resulting inblindness. Byater would have to deliver several million limes as muchhe aluminum or titanium skinishier aircrafl.sssBBBBal
it Soviets have deployednergy lasers as adjuncts lo tanks, aircraft, and other weapon systems. They will be used, at least, in target rangefinding. target designation, and decoying US laser-guided munitions away from their targets. Soviet tank laser rangefinders emit approximate!}
three lime* more energy per pulse than Western tank laser range tinders. This is enough energy to degrade significantly an enemyr pilot's ability to maintain precise fire contiol of his weapon systems Also, this level could produce severe eye damage at tactically significant ranges. Target designators are more hazardous than later rangelinden. Theyemit0ulses perone of which is needed to cause severe eyeare aimed and fired at Uracil Tor periods up to several lens of
Soviet weapons designed specifically to blind people or damage sensors woulduch moreihreat than currently fielded laser rangefinders and laser target designators.ompares the blinding potential of currently fielded Soviet laser rangefinders and target designators versus alaser blinding weapon. I
Soviet Intentions To Use Lasers for Blinding
he Soviets have used lasers against enemy soldiers and pilots. We believe thisontinuing Soviet interest in tbe utility of lasers for blinding personnel and disrupting electro-opticalaciivity:
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Table 1
Blinding Potential of Sotiet Laser Rangefinders and Target Designatorsikely First-Genera lion Laser Blinding Weapons
Probability ofEye Imury
KlJIBHCd
Liing
Bimiotj'.
Not Urine
threat lyit
ijxr ranwiinder IT-'?
30
0.
ii.
ii:
later urcct drtijmtiy Ifor cu triple. KLENr
J.i
laser bhndin. weapon
fXi
blind inson leanir.editsltd vehicle'
00
00
CO
procubibi) attuno injury ioUo-iniloot* Ijitr suite under eirl> mamaa or early eveninc UMi it.Aeyeetractl tf en*hith retiej! dgirj <laui<rrdare aeaoaoieiil deaafel oenr Inmaf-ikT* fofevirf ttpinarcnc. ecomttaii IA Graoc II um ocean tipownwoi^h) Mtoi iUrOK iBaa thetiermnn. bar loci orhhonch "heitr ol lb* ocular pathology ifuteciedauun in pe((otmoner o( imp* taut taiki thai roauire (owl usual acuity (lor rumple, piccliaontrol or ibe pilotinguilt-M'fornumx aircraft) can octw at inMrt low ripeviir letti iUji*henr only minimal ucalar iiir-iv ocean.
T-'lf 'antrnnileo arc atiumtd top-rte
I> ruacaecoadi ui oat-kal' anlnafiIdi borne later urfti to^rtawrt areaa bate tbe loltyBiKf thaiaciimiicilcrit)hIKromcit.-i. puaeilli|oukt(O imanonli. duik repet'tic*
J the Soviets
ars3v> blinding
are continuing to use Users to harass Western military liaison missions andasseti.
0 hetit. and beamicroraaiani Became n' ilw hifhei nubt lerjetltiun rata, it it probabletdtrr or puotapvtednert thin anarcs<iit,prnouPittit ibjiInBthiniteiimc-hrsi illntrn .e
en art mil -nam>
Thenoo oraaeraMa Uht thaitSSSSSI laaaa ova tbe
,tin.,
owrjuon -naaoacowi.enend bejmiitioiadtaBi-'Thr laxiblindine oeaponedicated >ehiclr is iiiumM toOtVujit. npctiirrcl) puliednmm bin, nwunttd in anTj-ijw tared -ehiile
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optica] and dectro-optical sensors of Westernequipment and precnion-guideciSoiets call ihis practicea formo( radioclectromc combat iREdPact writings
| discuss the lessons learned from caercaes and describe REC for motorized rifle and tank divisions Lasers and noncoherent infraredare mentioned'.he conieti
Soviet Rrsearcb Applicableaser Blinding Weapon Proa-ran
The Soviets haveigh prionty on military related laser research since the Invention of ihe laser0 Good evidence exists thai they have studied and arc continuingtudy tbe use of lasers to blind enemy soldiers and lo degrade optical and electro-optical sensors. This evidence can be conveniently divided inio ihe following lines of thought;
The Sovietsignificant commitment ofmanpower, equipment, anddevelop laser technology and to design systems
Soviet laser and associated electro-optical techno! of htv are sufficiently mature to design and build laser Minding and anuseasor weapons
The Swvki military has funded for overesearch program lo study laser-induced eye
The Soviet miliury'industrial optical produciion plants have sufficient production capacityeriesaciical laser weapon.
Resource Commitovrnt
The Soviet military maintains an extensive RDTdcE mfrasirwciure for User lechjokajy oVvekapment and laser systems designrge pan of this effort is for research in supcort of strategicifur example, amisatcllttc [ASATJ and ballistic miiMlc defense) We believe, however, lhal aportion exists for research in support of tactical applications. |
Technology Maturity
One of ihe key issues concerning the use of lasers for blinding and sensor damage is ibe maturity of User and related lechncJogies (for ea*mple. optics, power supply, and pointing and trickingi Although the Soviets arouW begin the preUrrucary designser weapon system after the key iwhriewag.es have peoveci feasible, they will not enter into fall-scale system engineering Ccs:gn work until the ke> technologies arc considered mature. The Soviets considerivenis mature when il has achieved pilot produciion.
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'ilhou: exception, studies have shown irial Soviet laser technology and the appropriate supporting technologies have been sufficiently mature since approximately iheo begin engineering development of tactical laser weapons.1
We believe thai several Soviet laser technologies were sulficienily mature by theorand antisensor weaponry applications Visible lasers, which emil io the visible and near-infrared (ncar-IR) portion of the spectrum, would be appropri-aie for use against direct-view optics, human eyes, and image intensifiers. Neodymtum lasersrobably the most mature technology in this class. Oihcr mature visible or neai-lR technologies include ruby, argon, dye, copper vapor, and alexandrite.dioxide lasers* which emit in the far-IR portion of the spectrum6 micromeiers, would be most appropriate for degrading or even damaging forward-looking infrared (FLIRl systems and for burning Ihc cornea of ihc eyeoldier's skin. FLIR systems operate inoicromeiers (thermal) portion of the spectrum (sec
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v Producn Ca pa bi Ii>
A necewary
HaWor ihe full-scaleovnKn^>T^
new weapon is ihe existenceroduction capability
The Ministry of Defense Industry (MOP) has the primary responsibility for design and production of Soviet electro-optical and laser systems and armor systems As such, it would be the defense-industrial ministry responsible for the design, testing,obile (that is. vehicle-mounted) laser blinding wear
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^]we believe Jlhai the Soviets eventually Viilledicated laser blinding and antisensorWe are uncertain, however, wheneapon will tK fielded
A NMI m rovtltHUty
If the Sovieis hast already fielded or "ill soonlinding or antisensor laser weapon, we believeuldesign thai cmphastzca low tecb-iscwogicalis. technology roughly equivalent to thai available in tbet would probabh be (he small, man-portable or inpod-mount-ec weapon or adianct weapon referred lo above It wouldimited though significant ucticalprobablyepetitively pubed. visible, or Dear-infrared beam upt- lem-of-witu average powerlinding range probably oui
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of kilometers against (he unaided eye. Even when deployed, the presence of suchweapon in the hands of tbe troops would probably be extremely diScui: for us to detect. |
A High-Risk Drsitat: Probably aai IOC la the Larly-to-
On the other hand, the Soviets may decide, or have alreadyaild tbe much more capable weapon system. Ihe one involving greaterrrsk referred lo above. This weapon, compared with the low-risk design, would have much higher average power and belter point ing-and-target-track-ing capability. Tbe key to an accurate projection of this type of system lies, us we noted above, in interpreting correctly Soviet User RDTAE activity: namely, determining when the Soviets transitioned or will transition from NIR lo OKR. We believe thai Soviet laser technologies relevantigher risk antisensor or blinding weapon reached sufficientprobably by ihco support the beginning of an OKR program. Ifare correct in assessing when tbe relevant laser technology reached sufficient maturity, then it is possible that an OKR weapons design program could have begun as early as the- More probably, the program began in tbessuming Ihat the OKR program proceeds on schedule and requires eight toears, then:
If the OKR start date was the latewe seeowerproject the Soviets could be close to an IOC for the weapon at Ihe present time, that is. theGt.
If the OKR sunn the latewe see as Ibe lowestprotect that tbe Soviets will achieve an IOC foe the weapon in theeapon program begun in (he late
ayunableuiubie laser would emu User radiation at any of several wavelengths, severely complicating US efforts to incorporate eye and sensor
Ii is possible, though we believe unlikely, that the deploymentoviet laser Minding weapon is imminent (that is. in then the other hand, we believe thai it it highly probable that the Soviets will eventuallybsct blindingincorporatededicatedmost likely in the early-to-middle H
the OKR start date is in the earlywe believe to be the most probable startproject the Soviets will achieve an IOC for the weapon in the.
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