DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE1 -
PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES
Pursuant to the provisions off the National Secunly Ad7ecutlve. physical security standards lor sensitive corn part merged information facibtses (SCtFt) are hereby ntaMOhed.
The purpose of ihu directive isstablish minimum construction and security protection standard! required for all US Government facilities or US Governnient-iponsored contractor facilities where sensitive ouinpartmentcd information (SCI) may be stored, used, discussed, and/or processed
All SCI must be stored within accredited SCIFs. Accreditation is the formal affirmation that Ihe proposed facility meets, or exceeds, the minimum physical security standards imposed by then the physical security standards manual that supplements this directive. The DO is the accrediting authority for all SCIFs exeepl where that authority has been delegated or otherwise provided for (see
This directive is applicable to all SCIFs. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) are charged with implementation and enforcement of the provlnlom of this directive. SCIFs established in all organiuUoru outside the cognizance of Intelligence Community agencies/departments as defined in Executivere directly under the authority and oversight of the DO SCIFs are established exclusively for SCI and are intended to provide the highest level of physical security protection It is sotnetune* necessary for non SCI programs to be afforded an equal level of protection by introduction of such material into SCIFs Should this occur, the express approval of ihe accrediting authority is required, anddocumentation shall be included in the accreditation records
* Poticv
SOICs shall establish and maintain wiihin their agencies formal physical security programs to ensure that SCI ts properly protected The minimum physical security-for such protect km are contained in Physical Security Standard* for Semitic* Ompartmentcd Information Facilities, the supplement to this directive. Annexes to this manual addressing specific technical and tactical applications of standards shall be published separately and periodically updated as required.
n lerpreon
Questions concrrning the interpretation and implementation of SCIF* physical security standards shall be referred to the Community CraintcrintHhgrnn- and Security Countcrrnea suresntelligencc Community Staff (CCISOMO/ICS)
APPIDVEI fOIKLEUE DHL IIOV Jill
MANUAL FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFs)
Supplement to1
approved for release date:1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Policy
I: *
II: *
IU: Construction Policy tor SCI 5
IV: Security Alarm 9
V: Construction Criteria 11
VI: Temporary Secure Work 15
VTI: Telephone 16
ANNEXES
Telephone Security (Provided separately) Alarm Systems (Provided separately) Tactical SCIFs (Provided separately)
NOTE: This manual supersedesated1 "US Intelligence Community Physical Security Standards (or Sensitive Compartmcnted Information Facilities.
APPRDUED FOR RELEASE
POLICY STATEMENT
Physical security standards arc hereby established governing tbe construction and protection of facilities for storing and processing sensitive compartmented informationhat requires extraordinary security safeguards as prescribed in pertinent national directives. These regulations also cover electric or electronic equipment located in sensitive compartment information facilities (SCIFs) Compliance with these standards Is mandatory for all facilities established after the effective date ofncluding any renovation of existing facilities insofar as the renovation will permit reasonable and practical upgrading It is notthat existing, previously approved facilities be modified to conform to these standards Facilities that meet these standards are satisfactory Tor the storage of all SCI.
It is recogni2ed that there may be instances in which circumstanceshreat of such proportion that it can only be offset by the most stringent security arrangements Conversely, there may arise those instances In which time, location, condition of use of theor other unforeseen factors may render full compliance with these standardsor impossible. Situations such as the foregoing are lo be referred to the accreditationas far in advance as possible in order that full and timely consideration may he givenequest for deviation from tbe standards When tlwse standards are waived, the accreditation authority granting the waiver will inform the SCIF manager which elements of security protection must be strenglhened before the SCIF can meet acceptable minimum standards. For industrial contractor-operated SCIFs, waivers are valid only for the duration of the contract. The factaiver condition will be made known by the Cognizant Security Authority to other agencies/departments desiring to share use of the facility.
The physical security standards set forth in this manual are intended as minimum safeguards for protection of SCI Senior Officials of the Intelligence Comraunily (SOICs) arc authorized to impose more stringent standards for SCIFs if conditions and circumstances In certain areas constitute potential threats that justify additional protective measures.
All facilities must be accredited before SCI may be stored in them. Tlie procedures forand accreditation of SCIFs are prescribed in applicable national directives
uiedin tlmrafted ipfotfrulion concerning t* deritvd (torn intelligence sources,oaulred lo be Kindled riduflvd, withiniyitriwby the
Director of Central Intelligence
APPROwTD FOR RELEASE aRIE:HOV20DI
SECTION 1
DEFINITIONS
ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM, UNATTENDED
An electronic, electromechanical, or mechanical system designed to identify and/or admit personnel with properly authorized access to the secure area. Identification may be based on any number of factors such as the sequencingombination, special key, badge, fingerprints, signature, voice, etc. These systems are for personnel access control only and are not to be used for the protection of classified materials.
ACCREDITATION
Forma) certificationognizant security authority (CSA)pecific place (to betoCIF) that meets prescribed physical and technical security standards.
ACOUSTIC SECURITY
Those security measures designed and used to deny aural access to classified information.
ADMINISTRATIVE/SERVICE AREAS
Those identified areas within an accredited SCIF where storage, discussion, and/or processing of SCI is not allowed.
AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL
Any person who is fully cleared and Indoctrinated for SCI.alid need-to-know, and has been granted access to the SCIF.
CLOSED STORAGE
The storage of SCI material in properly secured GSA-approved security containers within an accredited SCIF when the SCIF is not occupied.
COGNIZANT SECURITY AUTHORITY (CSA)
Government agency responsible for the accreditation and general securityCIF.
CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
This condition existsacility is mannedours every day by not fewer than two appropriately indoctrinated personnel who have the continuous capability of detecting unauthorized entry Into the SCIF. Positive identification and access control mint be maintained at all entrance points not fully secured.
CONTINUOUS PERSONNEL ACCESS CONTROL
An access control system where accessacility is continuously controlledleared individual, as determined by the CSA.
CONTROLLED AREA
Any area to which entry Is sub)ect to restrictions or control for security reasons.
FOR RELEASE
DOCUMENT
Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics, including, without limitation, written in printrd matter, daU proousing cards and tapes, maps, charts, paintings, drawings, photos, engravings, sketches, working note* and papers, reproduction* of such things by any means or process, and sound,agnetic, or electronic recordings in any form
GUARD
A properly trained and equipped individual whose duties include the protectionCIF. Guards whose duties require direct accessCIF or patrolCIF must meet the clearance criteria in4 The CSA will determine if Indoctrination is required.
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
A security alarm system consisting of various typos of components (balanced magnetic switches, capacitance, infrared, ultrasonic,o deled intrusion in the area of overageacility.
MOTION DETECTION SYSTEM
An alarm sensor that detects movement or human presenceCIF.
NONDISCUSSION AREA
A clearly defined areaCIF where classified discussions are not authorized All such areas will be dearly marked
OPEN STORAGE
The maintenance of SCI materialCIF in any configuration other than within CSA*approved security containers.
SO FACILITY (SCIF)
An accredited area, room, groupoomy or Installation where SCI may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically processed
SECURE WORKING AREA
An accredited facility used for handling. dUcuwIng. and/or processing of SCI but where SCI will not be stored.
SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (SOIQ
Those senior principals and observers on the National Foreign Intelligence Board who head inteiligcnoc organizations or tntelUgrnee-producing agencies within the Intelligr-rior Community.
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTFD INFORMATION (SCI)
SO is classified infomiatioti concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes, which is required to be handled etchoivcly within formal control syiiemi established by ihe Director of Central Intelligence.
APPRDUfD FOR HELCASE DATE1
SOUND CROUPS
Voice transmission atlrnualicm groups established to satisfy the acoustical security requirements of SCIFs. Ratings measured in sound transmission class may be found in Chapterf Architectural Graphic Standard*
SOUND TRANSMISSION CLASS (STC)
The rating used in architectural considerations of sound transmission loss such as those in votving walk, ceilings, and/or Boors.
SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY
The unauthorized entryCIF or security containeranner in which evidence of such entry is not readily discernible.
TACTICAL OR COMBAT OPERATIONS
Operations that arc conducted under combat or simulated combat conditions (to include ground, airborne, and shipboard) and lhat must provideobile or nonpermanenl SCIF environment.
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) SURVEYS AND INSPECTIONS
A thorough physical electronic, and visual examination to detect technical surveillance devices, technical security hazards, and atlrrnpts al clandestine penetration of the facility for hostile technical collection of classified and sensitive information
TEMPORARY SECURE WORKING AREA (TSWA)
A temporarily accredited facility that ts used no more thanours monthly for handling, discussing, and/or processing of SCI, but where SCI will not be stored.
VAULT
A roomls) used for storing, handling, discussing, and/or processing SCI and constructed to afford maximum protection against unauthorized entry
VISUAL STXUTUTY
Those security measures designed and used lo deny unauthorized visual access to classified materials and activity
VOLUMETRIC SENSORS
An alarm sensor that detects movement or human presenceCIF.
FOR OFFJCg^MgeTSr^fllY
APPIOVII fOIIELfASI jATE
SECTION JI
GENERAL
FACILITIES
A SCIF is an accredited area. room, group of rooms, or installations where SCI may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically processed. SCIFs will be afforded personnel access control lo preclude entry by unauthorized personnel. Non-SCI-indoctrinated personnelCIF must be continuously escorted by an indoctrinated employee who is familiar with the security procedures of that SCIF. Tbe physical security protectionCIF is intended to prevent as well as detect visual, acoustical, technical, and physical access by unauthorized persons. Entrance doors to SCIFs must be limited to one. If extraordinary circumstances require more than one door, appropriate Justification must be approved by the CSA. Physical security criteria is governed by whether the SCIF Is in the United States or not. and whether it is located at, above, or below ground level according to the following conditions: closed storage, open storage, continuous operations, secure working areas, nondiscussion areas, and administrative/service areas.
RULE
atter of policy, SCIFs should be staffed with sufficient people to deter unauthorized copying or illegal removal of SCI. Communication centers, document control areas, and likethat handle or store Quantities of SCI must be manned while in operation by at least two appropriately indoctrinated persons in such proximity to one another as to provide mutual support in maintaining the integrity of the facility and lite material stored therein. The granting of exceptions lo thb policy will beatter of record by the CSA and shouldconsideration of the proven reliability and maturity of the persons involved; the volume, variety, and sensitivity of the holdings in the facility: and whether or not the persons involved are subject to periodic polygraph examinationsondition of access. Exceptions for communication centers, document control areas, and the like, should be granted in only extraordinary circumstances. Classified workone individual in any SCIF is to be avoided. Contractors will provide two-person occupancy in all SCIFs not specifically excepted by the CSA.
C SOUND ATTENUATION
All SCIFs must meet the sound attenuation requirements as set forth in ChapterfGraphic Standards.
Agencies desiring toCIF should accept the accreditation of the facility asby the CSA.o thb policy arc valid only when significant deviations from1 standards exist or when the co-utilUting agency requires security enhancements at the facility in connection with an especially sensitive program. All proposed security enhancements must be fully coordinated with the CSA prior to implementation.
A SCIF inspection every two years by the CSA or designated representative Is required to certify continued compliance withowever, an annual SCIF inspection Is strongly recommended.
APPROVED FOR0
III l
SECTION III
CONSTRUCTION POLICY FOR SCI FACILITIES
Physical security criteria is governed by whether the SCIF is In the United States or not. and whether it is located at, above, or below ground level according to the following conditions: closed storage, open storage, continuous operations, and secure working areas
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES AT GROUND LEVEL
Storage
SCIF must meet the specifications as listed inr meet openSCIFs within fenced, guarded military compounds, or equivalent maydescribed in.
SCIF must be alarmed in accordance with Section IV.
material must be stored in GSA-approved security containers.
Storage
Storage of SCI material will be avoided. When open storage it necessary,must meet either:
he construction specifications for vaulls set forth innd must be alarmed in accordance with Section IV; or
he construction specifications for SCIFs set forth Innd must be alarmed in accordance with Section IV and be locateduilding that has all of the following:
continuous personnel access control,
hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within five minutes,
and
reserve guard force available to assist tbe responding guard in
within fenced, guarded military compounds or equivalent may useinnd musl be alarmed in accordance with Section IV and bea building that has all the requirements cited byb) above.
Operations
SCIF must meet the construction specifications as identified Inan alert system as staled in Section IV if visual security observation of the SCIFother potential points of entryindows and ducts) Ls not feasible.
adequate security/guard force must be available to respond to the SCIF withinin an emergency.
APPRDUED FOR RELEASE DATE MOV70DQ
c. Provision should be made lor storage of SCI tn lockablc containers. If the configuration of the material precludes this, there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate, or destroy the material in event of emergency or natural disaster
ecure Working Areas
SCIF must meet the specifications let forth in.
SCIF must be alarmed in accordance with Section IV.
C SCI FACILITIES LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES ABOVE OR COMPLETELY BELOW GROUND LEVEL
Storage
a. The SCIF must meet the specifications specified inr meet open storage requirements.
b The SCIF must be alarmed in accordance with Seel Kin IV
must be stored in CSA-appro vid security containers
Storage
Open storage of SCI will be avoided When open storage is necessary, the SCIF must meet either:
construction specifications for vaults set forth innd mustin accordance with Section IV; or
const ruction specifications for SCIFs as set forth innd mustin accordance with Section IV and be locateduilding that has all of
continuous personnel access control.
hour guard force capable, of responding to an alarm within fivend
eserve guard force available lo assist the responding guard in an emergency.
ontinuous Operation
a. The SCIF must meet the construction ipeeiftcalions identified innd have an alert system as stated in Section IV if visual security observation of the SCIF doorfs) and other potential points of entrywindows and ducts) is not feasible.
b An adequate security force must be available lo respond to the SCIF within five minutes in an emergency.
c Provision should be made for storage of SCI in lockablc containers If the configuration of the material precludes this, there must he an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate, or destroy the material in the event of emergency or natural disaster
ecure Working Areas
a The SCIF must meet the speciBeations itlpulaled in
b The SCIF must be alarmed in accordanrc with Section IV
6
APPROVED (OR RELEASE DRTE:
D. SO FACILITIES LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
The criteria lot SCIF* outside Ihe US are the same as those for SCIFs within the US except as follows:
Storage
a The SCIF must meet tbe construction specifications for SCIFs as set forth in. SCIFs within fenced, guarded military compounds, or equivalent of "friendly" host countries, having armed, immediate response forces may use specifications Indicated in. with prior approval of the SOIC
SCI-controlled material will be stored in GSA-approved security containersrating for both forced and surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that afforded by Class
SCIF must be alarmed in accordance with Section IV.
Storage
waiver will be granted for the construction requirementJ of afor open storage.
storage of SCI will be permitted only for material that isizethat precludes its being stored In Ihe largest CSA-approved securityAll other SCI must be storedSA-approved security container having aboth forced and surreptitious enlry equal to or exceeding that afforded bv Class
SCIF must be alarmed in accordance wilh Section IV
Operations
SCIF must meet the construction specifications indicated inan alert system as stated in Section IV if visual security of the SCIF dooris) and otherpoints of entryindows and ducts) Is not feasible.
must exist for storage of all SCI in GSA-approved security containers, ormust have an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate, or destroy the material inof emergency or natural disaster.
located on controlled military reservations or equivalent in "friendly"having armed, immediate response forces, may use secure areaas listed in, with prior approval of the SOIC
7
APPROVED FOR HELEASE
'OR IIf 1
SECTION IV
SECURITY ALARM REQUIREMENTS
xcept those in continuous operation, must be ilunW Continuouswill have an alert system if visual security of the SCIF aoorls) and otherof entryindows and ducts) it not feasible.
located within ihe United States may use comrnercial monitoring facilities forIf approved by the CSA. Response to an alarm should not exceedlnulea.commercial central station IsL-rated,equired. (Thisdoes not apply lo open storage or continuous operations requirements thatmilr less.)
Clrd outside the United States must have alarm systems monitored by SCI-cleared personnel or US citizens.
D. Alarm installation and maintenance should be accomplished by US citizens. Use of foreign nationals for this purpose must have prior CSA approval, and all work must be done under close supervision of SCI cleared personnel or US citizens
E In SCIFs where Ihe alarm transmission signal leaves the facility and traverses an uncontrolled area.ine supervision will be usedne supervisionire-transmitted. nonrepeaUble. or encrypted signal, meeting Ihe requirement, of federal
F In SCIFs where Ihe alarm transmission signal does notontrolled area containing the SCIF.rine supervision may be usedine supervisione-pcatable or unencrypted signal, wire transmitted.
SCIF alarm systems will include ihe following:
Alarm wmnc-nenls. when not specified by CSA, will be UL-approved
All areas of the SCIF between the floor and ceiling will be protected by volumetric sensors.
a SCIFalse celling or floor thatoans lor surreptitious entry, one of Ihe following methods must be used to protect that area:
eparate alarm zone in secure mode al all times covering ihe area between the false and true ceiling or luUc and true floor.
h Constructionhysical barrier that replaces the false ceiling or floor equal to the SCIF wall construction as set forth in Section V,
Perimeter doors will be protected by balanced or biased magnetic switches
All windows will be protected by an alarm system, either independently or by the volumetric tensors in the room, as determined by the CSA
Emergency exits aad secondary doors will be on separate zones from the motion detecting and main entrance sensors within the same SCIF.
very SCIF -ill beeparate svstem
9
APPROVID fOltlELCASE OAIf HOVTODI
il min
CIF consists of more than six rooms, or morequare feet, il will beby two or more alarm zones as determined by the CSA.
ll alarm control units will be located within the SCIF.
All alarm sensors will be tested monthly.oors opened and volumetric sensors walk-tested. Test procedures will be prepared and recorded by (he SCIF security officer or as directed by the CSA-
All components will be installedanner to prevent access or removalocation external to the protected zone.
All alarm systems will be capable of operating from commercial AC power. In the event of commercial power failure, provisions will be made for automatic switchover to emergency power, and back to commercial power without causing anignal will be presented to the monitor location indicating when the system has lost all power. When batteries are used for emergency power, they will be maintained at full charge by automatic charging circuits. Emergency power must be capable of operating the systeminimum of six hours.
Volumetric sensors employed in the alarm system must be placed so that the most likely paths of an intruder are detected.
U. All sensors and control units will be equipped with tamper detection.
concerning classes of electronic line supervision, equipment type, specificapplication and response/service requirements will be addressed in (heattached or furnished by the CSA.
alert system will consist of balanced magnetic switches orsensors on all entrances and passages or other areas where undetectedoccur. These sensors will be connectedignaling devicelosed loop torelay. Neither the signaling device, relay, nor the wire connecting the witchesthe SCIF
ONSTRUCTION
A. SPECIFICATIONS
Construction Criteria
Concrete Construction. Walls, Boor, and ceiling will be aof eight inches ot reinforced concrete. The concrete mixture will have astrength rating of atsi Reinforcing will be accomplished with steela minimumnches in diameter, positioned centralized in (be concrete pourhorizontally and vertically six inches on center: rods will be tied or welded at (heThe reinforcing is to be anchoredhe ceiling and floorinimum depththe thickness of the adjoining member.
vaults meeting UL standards may be used in lieu of La above.
Conitruction. Where unique structural circumstances do notconstructionault, construction will be of steel alloy-type, such as US Steelcharacteristics of high yield and tensile strength. (If alloy-type steel is not available,structural steel may be used, butinimum thicknessnch) The metal pbtesbe continuously welded to toad-bearing steel membershickness equal lo tha( ofIf ihe load-bearing steel members are being placedontinuous floor and ceilingconcrete, they must be firmly affixedepth of one-half the thickness ofand ceiling. If the floor and/or ceiling construction is less lhan six inches ofa Seel liner is to be constructed the same as the walls to form the floor and ceilingvault Seams where the steel plates meet horizontally and vertically are to betogether.
vaultt unit be equippedS Approvedault door.the Uniiedault will have only one door that serves as both entrance andthe SCIF. If (he travel distance from the most remote point in Ihe SCIF to theecond door equal to (he original door, must be installed for lifeTravel distance will be measured on the floor along the natural path ofone fool from (he most remoteurving around any corners or obstructions,at (he entrance doorway.CIF has more than one door, only one shouldfor normal business.
Criteria For Permanent Construction
Walls, floor, and ceiling will be permanently contracted and attached lo each other. To provide visual evidence of attempted entry, all construction must be doneorkmanlike manner, properly finished, and/or painted. This facility is acceptable for the following:
a. Inside the United States, ground level:
Closed storageilitary inslallation or equivalent
Open storageilitary installation nr equivalent if facility is alarmeduilding that has continuous personnel accesshour guard force, and reserve guard force.
Continuous operations
Secure working area.
b. Inside the United States, above or below ground level:
Closed storage.
Open storage if facility is alarmed and locateduilding that has continuous personnel accesshour guard force, and reserve guard force.
Continuous operations.
Secure workingutside the United States:
Continuous operationsilitary reservation or equivalent, with prior approval of the
soie
Construction Criteria For Steel Plate
Walls, ceilings, and Boors to be reinforced on the inside with steel plate not lessnch thick. The plates at all vertical Joints are to be affixed to vertical steel members of anot less than that of the plates The vertical plates will be spot welded to the verticalbynch long weld everynches; meeting of the plates in the horizontal plane will be continuously welded. Floor and ceiling reinforcements must be securely affixed lo Ihe walb with steel angles welded or bolted in place. Walls, ceiling, and floors of reinforced concrete atnches thick or of solid masonry (stone or brick) atnches thick arcExisting walls, ceilings, and Boors of hollow masonry (blocks and tiles) or lesser materials not meeting this criteria must be reinforced with steelnch thick Thisis acceptable for the following overseas applications:
a Outside the United Stales:
Closed storage.
Continuous operations, b. Inside the United States:
Not applicable.
Construction Criteria For Expanded Metal
Walls to be reinforced, slab to slab,augc expanded metal. Tlie expanded metal will be spot weldednches lo vertical and horizontal metal supports of equal or greater thickness that have been solidly and permanently attached to ibe true Door and true ceiling. Floors and ceilings that are of masonry or metal construction require no special treatment. This facility is acceptable for the following applications:
Ihe United States, ground level:
Closed storage.
Open storage if facility is alarmed and locateduilding that has conlinuous personnel accesshour guard force, and reserve guard force.
Ihe Unites States:
Closed storageilitary reservation or equivalent, with prior approval of Hie SOIC.
FOB RELEASE
The above provides minimum specificalioos. The use of materials having thickness or diameters larger than those specified is permissible. The terms "anchored to and/or embedded into the floor and ceiling" may apply to the affixing of supporting members and reinforcing to the true slab or to the most solid surfaces; however, subOoors and false ceilings are not to be used for this purpose.
Alt windows that might reasonably afford visual surveillance of activity within will be made opaque or equipped with blinds, drapes, or other coverings to preclude such visual surveillance.
Inside the United States
Windows al ground level or readily accessible from the ground normally will be equipped with metal grills or bars. SCIFs located within fenced and guarded military compounds or equivalent may eliminate thb requirement if the windows are made nonopenablc by either permanently sealing them or equipping them on the inside with deadbott locking mechanisms. For SCIFs having open storage and/or locatedigh crime or risk area, or in one that is sub-iect to civil disorders, metal grills or bars will be used. Windows above ground level and notneed only be lockablc from the inside with deadbolt lock mechanisms. In open storage conditions at ground level, consideration should be given to sealing the windows bv filling with brick/mortar or affixing lockable steel shutters to the windows.
of the United States
All windows will be protected against forced entry with steel bars, except when located within fenced and guarded military compounds or equivalent where the CSA may waive this requirement
SPECIFICATION FOB ENTRANCE, EXIT, AND ACCESS DOORS
All doors must be plumbed in their frames and the frame firmly affixed to the surrounding wall.
All SCIF entrance doors must be equippedoor closer.ombination lock, and an access control device Doors with hinges exposed must be modified with nonremovable Dins or by installation of "dog bolts" or security studs. (NOTE: The specification does not apply to the CSA-approvedault doors These doors are secure as designed, must be used as specified in this document, and are not suitable for the installation of door closers,control devices, or panic hardware)
SCIF exit doors, when required, must be the same or equal lo the entrance door. The door will be secured with "deadbolt" panic hardware on the inside and have no exterior hardware. Where life-safety codesliding "deadboll" should be installed, in addition to the panic hardware, and secured when the SCIF is unoccupied.
For entrance and exit doors, when life-safety codes dictate thai panic hardware must exbt on the door and the normally acceptedscape devke is disallowed, an additional like door without frontal hardware will be Installed lo facilitate the use of panic hardware.
l>etails of specific manufacturers and models of approved combination locks, accett control devices, and other related hardware is covered in the technical annex furnished by CSA.
FOR RELEASE
0
irrn
SCIFs inside the United Stales may be equipped withaultetal-clad fire door, minimumgaugeolid core wood door, minimumnches; or Sal-sill fire door with built-in boltworfc.
SCIFs outside tbe United States must be equippedSA-approvedault door,ocally fabricated door and frame equal to the steel reinforcement required inepending on the type of SCIF. (NOTE: Specifications for locally fabricated doors are covered in the technical annex furnished by CSA.)
F_ PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF VENTS AND DUCTS
ll vents, ducts, and similar openings in excess ofquare inches thai enter or passCIF must be blocked with either bars, grills, or commercial metal duct sound baffles that meet one of the sound attenuation classes. If bars are used, they mustnch diameter steel welded vertically andnches on center; If grills arc used, they must beauge expanded steel; if commercial sound baffles are used, the baffles or wave forms must be metal, permanently installed and no farther apartnches in one dimension.
ll vents and ducts mustooconductive sectioniece of dissimilar material unable to carry electric current) installed at the perimeter of the SCIF. An access port lo allow inspection of the protection in the vent or dud must be installed Inside the secure perimeter of the SCIF. The access port itself must be ablo to be secured by padlock or other approved device.
CIFs located inside the Untied States
An alarm may be installed in lieu of bars or grills, depending on requirements of the CSA. Sound baffles may also be required by the CSA.
4 SCIFs located outside of the Uniied Stales
Barsnch diameter steel, welded vertically andnches on center, must be used in addition to other requirements of the CSA.
FOR RELEASE
1
SECTION VI
TEMPORARY SECURE WORKING AREA (TSWA)
A temporary secure working area is definedemporarily accredited facilitysed no more thanours monthly for the handling, discussing, and/or processing of SCI. but where SCI will not be stored.
During the entire period the TSWA Is In use, the entrance will be controlled and access limited to persons having the clearance for which the area has been approved. Approval lorsuch areas must be obtained from the SOIC of the next higher level within appropriate SCI channels, setting forth roomuilding, location, purpose, and specific security measures employed during usage as well as during other periods- TSWAs should be covered bv an alarm system where possible. These areas will not be used for periods exceeding an average total ofours per month. No specialequired other than to meet soundrequirements. Ifacility must also be used for the discussion ofechnical surveillance countermeasurcs survey will be conducted periodicallyandom basis during the operation of the temporary facility.
SECTION VII
TELEPHONE SECURrTT
One of Ihe most serious technical security liabilities of the modern office environment is Ihe presence of telephones connected to uncontrolled lines. The vulnerabilities inherent in telephone equipment are repeatedly encountered. The protection of telephone systems fromudio exploitationajor element of Ihe government's technical security program Appropriate care in the selection and installation of telephone systems, and effective technical surveillance countermeasures examination procedures, must be treated as being of paramount importance for sensitive discussion areas
Specific detailed instructions explaining the telephone audio security measures that are mandatory for SCIFs. and the options available for implementing ihem. are provided in the TELEPHONE SECURITY ANNEX to this manual.
The on-hook telephone audio security requirements for SCIFs are based on applications of technical standards developed and published by the Telephone Security Croupountermeasures Subcommittee. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee TSC is Ihe primary technical and policy resource in the US Intelligence Community- for all aspects of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) program that involve telephones and/or telephone systems.
TSG technical standards are developed and updated lo extend ihe benefits obtained from ongoing studies and research programs. It is essential thai all users of the TELEPHONE SECURITY ANNEX employ only the blest Issues of applicable TSC standards. Only facilities that conform lo Ihe standards current at the lime of inslalbtion will qualify for accreditation and grandfathering. To ensure that the blest versions of the TSG standards are used, direct all inquiries to the CSA.
ANNEX A
MANUAL FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFs)
Soppleroont lo*
j. PURPOSE
This Annex specifics the requirements and procedures for systematically incorporating Telephone Security Croup (TSG> approved telephone security measures into the planning, installation, maintenance, and management of telephone service for SCIFs.
APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
a The protective security measures contained herein address only the on-hook and unattendedook telephone security requirements for sensitive discussion areas.
with these security measures is mandatory for SCIF accreditation.neither prohibits implementation of more stringent local directives norrequirements of other security programs such as Communicationsor TEMPEST.
telephone security measures of this Annex apply to the following types
Telephone instruments used with administrative telephone service.
Voice terminals that connect to telecommunications links extending to areas for which continuous physical protection cannot be assured. Secure-voice telephones isolated from unprotected links hy external encryption devices are not included.
Internal communication (intercom) units unless an approved partystem certified for secure use.
EFERENCES
Standardntroduction to Telephone Security.
StandardSC Guidelines for Computerized Telephone Systems.
Standardype-Acceptance Program for Telephones Used With theCentral Office Interface.
Standardtype-Accejifence Program for Electronic Telephones UsedTelephone Systems.
Standardn-Hook Telephone Audio Security Performance Specifications.
f TSC Standardelephone Security Group Approved Equipment.
TSC Standards arc available to all members of the United Stales Intelligence immunity from their respective Cognizant Security Authoritiesndividual standards may be released to nongovermnent personnel who need ihem to accomplish work required by the US Government. Any such release Is to he accompaniedetter ideritilying the standard as an official government document thai may nnt be disseminated further without Specific approval of the issuing agency.
The TSG Is responsible for evaluating on-hook audio security characteristicsequipment and providing guidance on utilization and audioeasu res
The CSA is responsible for ensuring compliance with TSC standards fortelephone installations. The CSA will provide assistance toOfficers (SSOs) in selection of authorized equipment. The CSA wilt maintainset of TSG standards.
c SSO- The SSO is responsible for maintaining the integrity of installed administrative systems by;
Ensuring that equipment is repaired expeditiously.
Requesting technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) inspections for new systems and reuispectiom of significant expansions or modifications made to existing systems. To facilitate TSCM inspections, the SSO willog of all maintenance actions since the last TSCM inspection.
a. Administrativeelephone intended for unclassified conversation. This designation specifically excludes secure-voice systems unless Ihey incorporate amode of operation.
Disconnectevice that has lieen accepted by the TSCeans to disconnect, for security purposes, an on-hook station or computerized telephone system (CTS) from wires exiting the protected area. The disconnerl device may be automatic orSG-approved external ringer is normally required on the Central Office side of the disconnect device. (Sec TSG
evice or assembly of devices lhat has been accepted by the TSCeans to isolate, for security purposes, an mi-hook station or CfS from wires exiting the protected area. The isolation device must operate automatically and be transparent lo the telephone and user. (Sec TSG
In this condition, the telephone's handsel is in the instrument's cradleassociated circuit is deactivated, the telephone is hung-up. In Ihe case ofequipment, it is in its normal rest stale ami is not actively being used
Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Security measures taken todetect the installation of technical surveillance devices and/or Ihesecurity vulnerabilities.
Link. Any means used for the transmission of electrical orsignals (eg, wirelines, radiofrequency, fiber-optic)
The primary technical and policy resource in the National Advisoryslructure for all aspects of the TSCM program that involves telephonessystems.
Telephones. Telephones that incoiporate security measures thatto the telephone itself. Their design and construction are known tothe on-hook security standards set by Ihe TSG for telephone security. (See TSGnd 4)
Off-hook Audio Security. Security measures intended to preventof background conversations when the user temporarily leavesoff-hook. (Sec TSG
FOR RELEASE
rOR .nrnrlnl
EQUIREMENTS
Control
All telephone wires must enter the SCIFommon opening. Each conductor mutt be accurately accounted for from the point of entry. The accountability will identify, through labeling and/or log/journal entries, the precise use of every conductor. Excess conductors will be removed. Where removal is not feasible, they will be stripped, bound together, and grounded. This ground will not be associated with any classified information processing equipment or TEMPEST security equipment.
Control
Installation and maintenance personnel will possess the appropriate security clearance (determined by thef obtaining cleared personnel adversely affects the mission, technically qualified escorts will monitor the work performed. Access to telephone equipment and wiring within the SCIF must be controlled by SCIF personnel. Cleared or uncleared maintenance personnel given access to the SCIF should be US citizens.
Audio Security
telephoneCIF must be provided approved and verifiableaudio security. There are two alternative methods authorizedthis security: type-accepted telephones or line isolation. Aordering information) of currently available type-acceptedTSG-approved security equipment is available from the CSA.
Any telephone that has been type-accepted by TSC for telephone security classes I.ay be installedCIF without further on-hook audiomeasures. TSG operates an open-ended telephone type-acceptanceNew telephones can be submitted for evaluation in accordance with TSGndnd accepted at any time.
Line isolation mayaccomplished by the use of an approved isolator or disconnect device (see TSC Standardr it may be effectedontrolled CTSlsee TSG Standard 2)
both type-accepted telephones and Isolalion/diwonnect measuresit is not necessary to use both Neither approach is regarded as beingihe other. The SCIFs specific needs will dictate the methods
Audio Security
Unattended, off-hook security will be accomplished by one of the following:
old feature lhal does not allow audio from the telephone to leave the SCIFThis can be accomplished by:
A hold feature providedontrolled CTS. (See TSC.
A hold internal lo the telephone that prevents audio from exiting the telephone when the hold feature is activated.
A hold feature thai allows the handsel to be cradled when the hold feature is
activated.
ush-to-uperate handset will be required if an appropriate hold feature is not available. (See TSG Standard 6)
Items
Speakerphoncs are designed lo pick up and transmit nearby conversation when they are in use. Therefore, speakcrphoncs are expressly prohibited from common-use office areas where sensitive conversations might be intercepted
TSC-approved telephone answering devices may be installed in SCIFs only with prior approval of the CSA.
No equipment or device may be connected to an unprotected telephone line unless it has been specifically approved by TSG for such usage.
Personally owned telecommunications equipment is not permilledCIF.
All additions of equipment or modificationsClF's approvedsystem are prohibited except for the expansions ot reconfigurations listed below:
(a} Additional telephones of the same type and under the same conditions already approved for use in the SCIF may be installed
Telephones may be removed from service.
Telephones may be relocated within the SCIF as long as Ihe new configuration does not degrade compliance with any ol the terms of
Cases
Any alternative to these telephone security requirements may be submitted through the CSA for TSC evaluation. Proposed alternatives will be evaluated for approval based on their equivalency to the requirements cited within this Annex
ANNEX B
MANUAL FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFi)
Supplement to1
(Effective
Tim annex amplifies the requirements contained in Section IV,1 supplement, Manual for Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmentcd Informationnd establishes the minimum standards for intrusion detection systems for all SCIFs throughout government and for government-sponsored contractor facilities. Compliance with these standards is mandatory for all facilities established after the effective date of thisincluding any renovation of existing facilities insofar as the renovation will permit reasonable aod practical upgrading, as determined by the cognizant security authority.
Any conflict with the security alarm requirements contained in Section IV.1 supplement, will be resolved in favor of this annex.
FOR
ANNEX B
MANUAL FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIESupplement to1 (Effective
ONCEPT
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detects an attempted or actual entry intoarea. It must:
orced entry.
ighly skilled surreptitious entry.
IDS complements other physical security measures. Iluard forceits range of supervision over protected areas. An IDS conjisls ofcomponents:
Intrusion Detection Equipment (IDE)
Security and response force personnel.
Operating proceduies.PERATION
a. IDS components operate in concertystem wilh four distinct phases:
Detection.
Rcporting-
Assessment.
Response.
U These elements are equally Important, and none can be eliminated II an IDS is toan acceptable degree of protection
Detection The detection phase begins as soonetector or sensor reacts to stimuli it is designed to detect. The sensor alarm condition Is then transmitted over cabling located within Ihe protected area, called the detection loop, to the premise control unithe PCU may service many sensors. The PCU and the sensors it servesrone."
Reporting. The PCU receives signals from all sonsorsrotecled area and incorporates Ihese signabommunications scheme. Another signal is added lo the communication for supervision to prevent compromise of the communications scheme. This supervised signal is intended to disguise the information and protect the IDS against tampering or injection of false information by an intruder. The supervised signal is sent by the PCU via Ihe transmission link to the monitor station Inside Ihe stationedicated panel or central processor monitorsfrom the PCU signals. When alarms occur, an annunciator generates an audible and visible aleit to security personnel Alarms result normally from intrusion, tampering, component failure, or system power failure
Assessment The assessment period is the Brsl phase that requires humanWhen alarm conditions occur, the operator assesses the situation and dispatches the response force.
Besponse. The response phase begins as soon as the operator assesses an alarmesponse force must immediately respond to all alarms. Additionally, it must determine the precise nature of the alarm and take all measures necessary to safeguard the SCIF.
EQUIREMENTS
areasCIF shall be protected by an IDS unless continually occupied.
of Equipment. All IDE must be UL-listed (or equivalent as defined bysecurity authority [CSAD and approved by the CSA. Vendors mayIDE requests eitherpecial Security Officer/Con tract orOfficer (SSO/CSSO) or directly to the CSA. Vendors must provide afoT installation and service.6 apply) directly tofor acceptance Government installed, maintained, or furnished systemsto approval only by the CSA.
posals- All requests for acceptance must describe the IDEinclude the results of testing by an independent laboratory. Anevaluates the manufacturer's compliance to performance specifications.for acceptance of line supervision using data encryption standard (DES)include validation from the National Institute of Standards and Technologyanother independent testing laboratory recognized by the CSA. The descriptionthe manufacturer and model of equipment and show lww the IDE meetsUL standards. Unless previously evaluated by the CSA, detailedtheory nf operation, system layout, distribution and communicationlesults of laboratory tests must be included in these requests to avoid delay inprc-cess. The manufacturer must notily the CSA before modifying IDEreceived earlier CSA acceptance and document this modification. The CSAIhe lesults of the evaluation to the authorized requester. Results ofwill remain on file with the CSA. Determination of CSA acceptanceimpart any obligation on the government to procure IDE.
Approval of IDS. The CSA willroposed IDSCIF as part of the initial SCIF construction approval process.for an IDS will be examined for the type and employment ofAn IDS proposal will be submitted as parireconstructlon
ransmission Line Security. Onlyr Class II (referred to as "Class A" and "Class B" In Section IV of Ihe1SA accepted line security shall be used When the transmission line leaves Ihe SCIF and traverses an uncontrolled area, It should be protected withine supervision. With sufficient iustilication. the CSA may approve use of Class II line supervision. When the transmission line remains within the SCIFS SECRET-controlled area contiguous to the SCIF, Class II line supervision may he used.
(a)ine security is achieved through the use of DES or an algorithm based on the cypher feedback or cypher block chaining mode of encryption. Ccrli6cation by NIST or another independent testing laboratory is required. The certificate musl be retained by the CSA for the duralinn of operation ol the SCIF.
B-2
(b) Class II Class II line supervision refer* to systems in which the lianimission is based on pseudorandom generalod lone* or digital encoding using anand response scheme throughout the entire communication, or UL Class AA line supervision. The signal shall not repeat itselfinimum sU-nionih period. Class II security shall be impervious to compromise using resistance, voltage, current, or iMnal substitution techniques.
nternal Cabling Tbe cabling between the sensors and the PCU. termed the detectkHi loop, must be dedicated to IDF and may be routed In rigid pipe (EMT or PVQ or equivalent raceways and tnusl comply lo national electric code standards. II applicable, the cabling must he installed in accordance with TEMPEST requirements. Internal cabling within the SCIF may be wire or liber-optic cable. BidH.ficqUtjncy/free space communications are prohibited within the SCIF
estriction on Integration of Access Controls Into SCIF IDSs If an access control system is integrated into an IDS. reports from the access control system will beand subordinate in priority to reports from intrusion alarm!
aintenance Mode. When an alarm rone is placed in the maintenance mode, this condition will be signaled automatically to the monitor station This signal must appeal at an alarm or maintenance message al the monitor station However, the alarm or message musl continue visibly at the monitor station throughout the period oflandard operating procedure (SOP) must be established to address appropriate actions when maintenance access is indicated al the panel. All maintenance periods will be archived In the system. Tbe CSA may require that Ihe maintenance personal identification number be established and controlled by the customer The IDE will not contain any capahihly frw remote diagnostics, mainlenance. or programming, except for an alarm remote lot feature at the monitorett-test feature will he limited lo one second per occurrence.
Annunciation of Shunting or Masking Condition. Shunting or masking of any zone or sensor must be appropriately- logged or recorded inhunted or masked tone or sensnr must he displayed as such ut the monitor station throughout ihe period the condition exists whenever thereurvey of zones or sensors
Alarms Indications. Indications of alarm status shall be revealed al the monitoring station and optionally within Ihe confines of the SCIF Where there is an operations security concern. Ihe alarm monitoring panel shall be designed to prevent observation by unauthorized persons.
Power Supplies. Primary power for alt IDE will be commercial AC or DC power In the event of commercial power failure al the protected area or monitor station, the equipment will change power sources without causing an alarm
(a) Emergency Power. Emergency power must be capable of operating the IDEinimum of six hours. Emergency power may consistombination ofand generator power When batteries arc used for emergency power, they will be maintained at full charge by automatic charging circuits Tlx- rmergencv power system will comply withnd he testedU-hour period at leastear by turning off or disconnecting the primary power systemof the tests will be maintained as required Inrocedures
(fa) Power Source and Failure Indication An Illuminated indication will exist al the PCU of the power sou ice iu use (AC orquipment at Ihe monitor station wilt indicate visibly andailure in powerhange In poweimi the location of Ihe finline or change.
Tamper Protection. All IDE wilhin the SCIF with removable coven will be equipped with tamper twitches The tamper detection will be monitoredwhether the IDS is in the access or secure mode of operation
Prohibition Against Fortuitous Conduction via IDE No IDE will be employed that allows audio and intelligence-bearing signals to pass out of the SCIF in any form.
IDE
In areas outside the US, IDE must remain solely under US control, or as otherwise authorized by the CSA.
Key variables and operational passwords will he safeguarded, disseminated, and controlled as determined by the CSA.
The line security encryption scheme must be capable of being readily changed on demand.
All IDE will be identified and labeled with the manufacturer's name, model number, and. if available, serial number. This information will be recorded and maintained by the SSO/CSSO.
f. Installation
Dedicated Equipment. All SCIFs will have dedicated intrusion detectionand zones independent from other protected sites. When many alarmed areas are protected by one monitor station, audible and visible annunciations for SCIF zones must be clearly dUtiriguishable from other annunciations. All sensorsthe SCIF will be installed within the SCIF
Multiple ZonesCIF consists of more than six rooms, or morequare feet, it will be protected by two or more alarm zones each providing separate annunciations at the monitor station. Each zone must be specifically defined by an approved perimeter, unless structurally prohibitive
Access/Secure Switch and PCU. No capability will exist lo allow changing the access status of Ihe IDSocation outside the SCIF. All PCUs must be located inside the SCIF and should be located near the SCIF entrance. SCIF personnel must Initiate all changes in access and secuie status Operation of the PCU will be restricted by useevice or procedure lhat verifies authorized use. In the secure mode, any entry Into Ihe SCIF shall cause an alarm to be transmitted immediately lo the monitor station
otion Detection Protection. All areas within the SCIF between the floor and ceiling will be protected with motion detection sensors, eg, ultrasonic, passive infrared, etc Use of dual technology transmits an alarm condition independently from the otherailed detector will cause an immediate and continuous alarm condition. Detection equipment must be installed in compliance withith the exception that the motion detector will alarm when two steps are taken wilhin the detector's protective pattern.
ccessible Areas.CIFalse ceiling or subfioor thateans lor surreptitious entry, one of the following methods must be used to protect lhat area:
A separate alarm zone, remaining in the secure mode at all times; or
Beconstruction of those portions of the SCIF perimeter io acceptable physical and acoustic standards
Protection of SCIF Perimeter Doors. Each SCIF perimeter door will be protectedalanced magnetic switch (RMS) that meets the minimum standards ofhe BMS must be installed Inanner that an alarm signal will Initiate before the nonhinged side of the door opensnch of the seated position. With the exceptionhe SCIF entrance, all SCIF door, window, and portal sensors shall remain activated and monitored and will receive response force servicehour basis. Emergency exit doors equipped with integrated life safety hardware may have the life safety alarm component integrated into the SCIF IDS as an additional detector. Emergency exit doors will beeparate rone or assigned to zones that permit quick identification and response to Ihe appropriate door when there is an alarm.
Windows. All windows will be protected by an IDS. either independently or by the motion detection sensors in the room, as determined by the CSA.
IDE Installation Criteria All IDE will be installedanner to prevent access or removalocation external to the SCIF and in compliance withor "Installation of Burglar Alarm Equipment."
(ft) IDS Requirements for Continuous OperationsCIF accredited for continuous operations may not require an IDS as determined bv Iheontinuously operational SCIF must be staffed by sufficient personnel to ensure the integrity of Ihe entire SCIF. This type of SCIF will be equipped with an alerting system if the occupants cannot observe all potential entrances into the SCIF. The system alerts occupants to an intrusion into llw SCIF. An alert system will consist of BMSs or other appropriate sensors and will be connectedignaling devicelosed loopatching relay. None of the IDE or cabling associated with ihe aleit System will extend beyond the perimeter of iheuress alarm(j) will be Installed in the continuously occupied SCIF and be in ihe active mode at all times
alse/Nuisance Alarm. Any alarm signal transmitted in the absenceetected intrusionalsealse alarmuisance alarm when the effects of environment, equipment malfunction, operator failure, animals, electrical disturbances, and known effects cause the alarm to go off. All alarms shall be investigated and the results documented. The incidence of false/nuisance alarms should not exceed more than oneeriod ofays throughout ihe entire IDS zone.
g Personnel
IDE Installation and Maintenance Personnel. Alarm installation and maintenance will be accomplished by individuals whoinimumoD SECRETclearance or who are US citizensavorable national agency check with inquiriesse ol foreign nationals or uncleared personnel for this purpose must have prior CSA approval
Monitor Station Staffing. The monitor station will be supervised continuously by individuals whoinimumoD SECRET security clearance or who are US citizensavorable NACI. Use of foreign nationals or uncleared personnel for this purpose must have prior CSA approval. The duties of the operator will be documented and will entail observing monitor panels for reports of alarms and changes in IDE status, making accurate assessments of these reports, and dispatching the response force or notifying the appropriate authorily in Ihe event of an intrusion alarm. The operator will have no duties that interfere with the primary functions of monitoring alarms and dispatching the responseocumented
. iii nun i
ill eslsl for use by security personnel during unusual situations. The operator will lie trained sufficiently in tbe operation and theory of the IDE to properly Interpret all incidents generated by the IDE This training must also include all actions to be taken on receipt of an alarm activation.
h Procedures
Testing SCIF IDS sensors will be tested semiannuallyinimum unless required mote frequently by the CSA. All levels of emergency power will be tested in accordance withmergencyecord ol IDE testing will be maintained at the SCIF that refect- testing dale, individuals who performed the test, specific equipment tested, malfunctions, and corrective actions taken Tests of the response force will be conducted semiannually The decision to test and manner of letting should be based on safety concerns and avoidance ofthe effectiveness ol the forces response lo otherecord of response force testing will be maintained that describe* the identity of persons conducting the tesl, the effectiveness of the response, and any recommended changes to response procedures
Safeguarding IDS Plansinimum, details of installed IDS will be controlled and restrictedeed-to-know basis.
perating Procedures. When the monitor station and response force are not controlled by lh* accreditedritten support agreemente eslablnhed
M Alarm Condition liesvery alarm condition will be treated initiallyetected intrusion until resolved by the response force. Response time to ao alarm will not etceed
Open Stoiage Area five minute*
Closed Stoiageminutes
The response force willie source of an alarm and will notify SCIF personnel. The response force will take appropriate steps to safeguard the SCIF and prevent iheof an intruder from the SCIF as permitted by SOP, local law nifurcement. anduntil properly relieved.
Catastrophic Failure If the IDE suffers catastrophic failure, or loses primary and emergency power, SCIF-indoctrinated individuals must provide security byoccupying the SCIF until the IDS can be made functionalan alternative, the outside SCIF perimeter may be continuously protected by appropriately cleared guards, as determined by tbe CSA.
IDS lagging The IDS willeans foristorical record ofv either automatically or through the useanual log system If the IDE hat no provision of automatic entry into archive, the operator will record the lime, source, and type ol alarm, and action taken Results of investigations by the response lorce will be maintained at the monitor station. The historical records must be routinely reviewed by the responsible security officer Records will be maintained lor two years beyond the current year.
ANNEX C
FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES
Supplement lo1
This annex pertains to specialized sensitive compartmented informationactical environment It is divided into three parts to reflect the accepted modes ofoperation:
Part IGround Operation
Part IIAirborne Operation
Part IIISeaborne Operation
FOR
ii in. iJI'Iff
Port I: Ground Operation
This Annex prescribes the procedures for the physical security requirements for the operationensitive compartmentcd information facility (SCIF) whileield or tactical configuration, including training exercises.
AND SCOPE
Recognizing that field/tactical operations, at opposed to operationsixed military installation, are of the type considered least secure, the following minimum physical security requirements will be met and maintained. Situation and time permitting, these standards will be Improved upon using the security considerations and requirements for permanent secureas an ultimate goal If available, permanent-type facilities will be used. Under field or combathour operation is mandatory. Every effort must be made to obtain the necessary support from the host commandecurity containers, vehicles, generators, fencing, weapons, etc).
SCIF will be located within the supported headquarters defensiveadjacent to the Tactical Operations Center.
SCIF will be locatedontrolled arealearly markeda physical barrieroncertina, razorband, etc.)
perimeter will be guarded by walking or fixed guards to provide observation ofcontrolled area. Guards will be armed with weapons and ammunition. Theweapons will be prescribed by the supported commander.
to the controlled area will be restrictedingle gate/entrance, whichontinuous basis.
access list will be maintained, and access will be restricted to those personnelappear on the list.
SCIF will be occupiedinimum of two SCI-clcared andat all times
destruction and evacuation plans will be kept current
b. SCI material will be stored in lockablc containers when not in use.
i. Communications will be established and maintained with the backup guard force. If possible.
SICINT SCIF
mobile SICINT SCIF will be physically located at brigade or below.
hour operation is mandatory.
SCIF will be occupiedinimum of two SCI-cleared andat all times.
physical security measures will be incorporated Into Ihe perimeterfor the immediate area within which the facility is located.
A physical barrier is not requiredrerequisite toINT SCIF.
External physical security controls will normallyunction of the personnel controlling the day-to-day operations of the facility.
will be established and maintained with backup guard forces,
destruction plans will Incorporate incendiary methods to ensureof SCI material In emergency situations.
igid side shelterortable van are two possible con figurations that may be used.
a rigid side shelter or portable van is available,ubject to therestrictions:
helter. It will be mountedehicle Inay as to provide the facility with the capability of moving on short notice.
A CSA-approved security container will be permanently affixed within the facllily. The combination to the lock will be protected to the level of security of the material stored therein.
Entrance to the facility will be controlled by SCI-indoctrinated personnel on duty within the facility. When situations occur when there are no SCI-indoctrinated personnel within theuring redeployment, classified material will be stored within the locked container and the exterior entrance to tlw facility will be secured.
Entrance to the facility will be limited to SCI-indoctrinated personnel with an established need-to-know whenever SCI material Is used within the facility.
a rigid side shelter or portableot availableacility isoperations, such as in tbe caseoft side vehicle or man-portable system, itto the following additional restrictions
Protection will consist of an opaqueeather pouch, metal storage box. or other suitable container that prevents unauthorized viewing of tbe material.
Thb container will be kept in the physical possession of an armed SCI-indoctrinated person.
The container is subject to the two-person control rule.
b. The quantity of SCI material permitted within the facility will be limited to thai which is absolutely essential to sustain the mission. Stringent security arrangements will be employed to ensure the quantity of SCI material is not allowed to accumulate more than Is absolutely necessary.
All working papers generated within the facility will be destroyed at the earliest possible time after they have served their mission support purpose to preclude accumulation of unnecessary classified material.
If equipment Is used to store or process SCI data, such equipment will meet the provisions of applicable directives for processing and destruction of classified material.
i nrrr"1
Port II: Airborne Operation
i. purpose
This Annci specifics the requirements (or the security protection of aircraft utilizing senstlive compaMrnented informationhile in the air or on the ground These are minimum standards since each situation differs.
pplicability and scope
The criteria are applicable to all US Government- or contractor owned mission aircraft transporting, using, or processing SCI material. This does not include commercial aircraft utilkied toesignated courier.
Secure Workingemporarily accredited facility that Is usedthanours monthly for handling, discussing, and/or processing SCI, butwilt not be stored.
Response Team (SRT1 Individuals responsible for responding to an alarm
A serially numbered device attached to an opening that if removed cannot bewithout showing evidence of its removal
The cognizant security authorityesponsible for ensuring compliance with these standards and providing requisite SCI accreditation of SCIFs.
5 accreditation requirements
a Parking and Patrol Requirements Aircraft will generally be parked in an established restricted areaecurity force, entry controls, and SRT support. In addition, periodic checks will be made of all hatches and seals (see security procedures below) Fjitry to the aircraft will be controlled by the air/ground crew or the aircraft commander, who must be properly cleared and indoctrinated for the level of SCI processed
Area. When there is no established restrictedemporarymust beestricted area entry controllerinute response must be provided. Owner/user personnel willover the aircraft during normal duty hours.
Procedures When aircraft are parked, all hatcl.es will be sealed to preventaccess Irom the eatenor of the aircraft Hatches that cannot be securedinside will be sealed using seriaDy numbered seals The seal number, used willlo ihe security force The security force members will make periodicteal numbers to ensure their integrity. Additionally, alarms will be InstalledAll violations will be reported as security- violations.
hen SCI aircraft are protected by an approved alarm system,controllerabove need not be posed Anul be provided aslo respond lo all alarms.
c. Entry Authority Lists. The responsible official, as designated by the CSA. provides security force personnel with an entry authority list and seal numbers before departing from the irrunediate area of theecurity force supervisor authenticates the list and makes sure it is posted.
I. Protection of SCI Material. If possible. SCI material must be removed from the aircraft on mission completion or at unscheduled landings. When removal is not possible, or when suitable storage locations are notinimum of two SCI-indoctrinated personnel must remain with the aircraft to control entry to the SCI compartment.
Requirements
An emergency action plan (EAP) that provides for the evacuation and/orof classified material and equipment must be approved by the CSA and testedesponsible official as designated by the CSA.
Destruction devices such as hammers for equipment destruction and an approved shredder for destruction of other material must be on board in case the EAP must be initiated.
Airfields. On arrival, the responsible official as designated by the CSAfor controlling the entry and maintaining surveillance over thedeparture
i Nonmilitary Airfields. The local Federal Aviation Administration Security Officer will be notified of the estimated arrival time and security protection required. On arrival, the official, as designated by the CSA, is responsible for controlling entry and maintaining surveillance over the aircraft until departure.
i Unfriendly Territory. If aircraft are forced to land in unfriendly territory, prepare SCI crypto, and collateral classified material and equipment for immediate destruction If possible, the destruction process should take place before landing. The decision to destroy is made by the Air Mission Supervisor. Cryptographic keying materials for SCI will be destroyed first, followed by all other SCI. When flights are planned over unfriendly territory during the conduct of official operations. SCI material carried on board will be carefully selected by the intelligence mission operational personnel on board to consist of the absolute minimum required for mission accomplishment. All personnel will rehearse emergency destruction before each mission.
C-ll-2
I Ml Mil lilBI IHUFOR RElfASf
DATE.1
I I iii IIIII
Part III: Seaborne Operation
purpose
This Anno specifies the requirements for tbe construction and security protection of shipboard sensitive compartmented Information facilitiest Is not intended that existing, previously approved facilities be modified to conform with these standards.
AND SCOPE
a. Tbe criteria are applicable to al) new construction surface ships of tbe United States Navy, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The application of these criteria to submarines will be as specified by the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command (COMNAV1NTCOM).
b There may be instances in which circumstanceshreat of such proportion that they can only be offset by stringent security arrangements over and above those prescribed herein. Conversely, there may be instances in which time, location, mission, condition of use of the material, or other unforeseen factors may make full compliance with these standards unreasonable or Impossible. These situations arc to be referred to the cognizant security authority (CSA)
MilitaryInstallation Criteria for Shipboard Secure Electrical Information Processing Systems) in conjunction with this Annex constilule the minimum physical security criteria applicableCIFs.s published by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
S/SCIF An area used for handling, processing, and/or storage ofa clearly defined physical perimeter barrier requiring "full-time"protection. The area may contain one or more contiguous spaces requiringThis type of facility is routinely utilized during both deploymentsin port.
S/SCIF. An area used for handling, processing, and/or storage ofa clearly defined physical perimeter barrier requiring "temporary"protection during deployments only. The area may contain one orspaces requiring SCI accreditation This type of facility isby at least two appropriately indoctrinated personnel whenever thereor SCI material present within the space. Prior to or at the completionmission, normally not to exceed one year, the facility will be deactivatedfor disestablishment
Secure Working Area. An area used for handling, processing,storage of SCIlearly defined physical perimeter barrier onor "part-time" basis not toaximum average totalonth. This type ofanned continuously by al least twopersonnel wheneverryptographic or SCI material withinPrior to or at the completion of the mission, normally not to exceed one year,will be deactivated and reported for drsestabluhment.
C-lll-1
CIF ACCREDITATION
Ships requiring permanent accreditation will be processed for interim accreditation on completionhysical security inspection and submissionhipboard inspection checklist, which certifies its compliance with the following criteria. Final accreditation will be processed on favorable review of all SCI physical, administrative. ADP. and TEMPEST security requirements, if applicable.
a. Physical Perimeter Barrier. The physical perimeter barrier will be constructed or fabricated, or both, of aluminum or steel platehickness not lessnch. Nonoperabte elements of the physical perimeter barrier will be fully braced and welded in place. (Note: Where several SCI spaces are contiguous to each other or non-SCI spaces in one complex, the entire complex may be enclosedingle physical perimeter barrier conforming to thb paragraph Access to the complex will beingle normal access door conforming to paragraph fib; each compartment within the complex mayeparate access door from within the common physical perimeter barrier that need not be In compliance with paragraph fib. Access from such an SCI spaceontiguous SCI space may beoor not in conformance with paragraph 5b; however, access from such an SCI spaceontiguous non-SCl space will not be
installed.)
b. Normal Access Door. The normal access door willhipboard vault-type door (in accordance with NAVSEA)etal Joiner door with honeycomb core (in accordance with NAVSEA) and will be fitted as specified below. Where the normal accessulkhead that is part of anperimeter, the airtight integrity may be maintained by colocating the airtight door with the vault door or byestibule.
The manipulation, radiographic, and thermal resistant three-position tumbler combination lock will be equippedop reading dial, internal manual escape mechanism, and dial dust cover and be reinforcedrill-resistant steel plate.
In addition to the normal locking device, it will be equippedush-button, cipher-type electric or manual combination lock to be usedatch and for access control only while theanned.
The door will be equippedull-lentjth astragal on the latching side to effectively protect the latch bolt from an unauthorized entry attempt.
The door will be constructedanner that will preclude unauthorized removal of. and preferably hamper access to. hinge pins and anchor bolts as well as obstruct access to locking bolts between the door and frame.
c Emergency Exit. The emergency exit door will be fabricated of steel or aluminum plate in consonance with the physical perimeter barrier as specified in. and mountedrame braced and welded in placeanner commensurate with the structural characteristics of the bulkhead, deck, or overhead in whichituated.
d. Restriction on Damage Control Fittings and Cables. Because of the security restrictions imposed in gaining access to these spaces, no essential damage control fittings or cables will be located within or pass through an SCI space.
c- Removable Hatchet and Deck Plate* Hatches and deck plates less thanquare feet that are secured by exposed nuts and bolts (external to the SCI space) will be secured with externally attached, high-security padlocks (unless their weight or siie makes removalhe padlock keys will be stowedecurity container locatedpace under appropriate security control.
f. Vent and Duct Barriers. Vents, ducts, or other physical perimeter barrier openingsress-sectional dimension greater thanquare inches will be protected at the perimeterxed man-proof barrier or security grille. The grille will be fabricated of steel or aluminum grating or barshickness in consonance with the physical perimeter barrier (see paragraphrating is used, bridge center-to-center measurements will not2 Inchesnches. Barrier* will be mountednch centers The grating or bars will be welded in place. This requirement is notto through ducts that have no opening into the space
g Acoustical Isolation. The physical perimeter barrier of all SCI spaces will be sealed or insulated with nonhardening caulking materia) to prevent Inadvertent disclosure of SCI discussions or briefings from within the space, taking into account the normal ambient noise level to persons located in adjacent passageways and/or compartments. In cases where the perimeter material installation does not sufficiently attenuate voices or sounds of activities originating SCI information, the ambient noise level will be raised by the use of sound masking or audio countermeasures devices, controllable sound-generating sources, or additional perimeter material installation- Air handling units and ducts will be equipped with silencers or sound countermeasures devices unless continuous duty blowersractical, effective level of security masking (blower noise) in each air path. An effective level of security may be determined by placingpersonnel inside and outside the space to determine if SCI information can be overheard outside the space.
Isolation. Doors, scuttles, vents, louvers, or other openings in thebarrier through which the interior may be viewed will be screened
Detection Systemhe normal access door and emergency exitbe protectedisual and audible alarm system. This system will complyandeans of warning the space supervisor when adoor or emergencypened. The installation will consist of visual andlocated at the supervisor's position and connected to sensors at eachnormal access door alarm mayisconnect feature. Emergency exits willto the alarm system at all times and will notisconnect featureThe IDS will be connectedemote alarm monitor station that isother remote IDS* orpaceontinuously manned by personnelresponding to an alarm at the protecled space. Additionally, primary power ofwill be connected to an emergency lighting panel within the space. (Note; Thismay not apply to SCI spaces under continuous manning by at least twoindoctrinated personnel who have the capability of detecting forcedentry.)
j. Passing Scuttles and Windows. Passing scuttles and windows/ports will not be installed between SCI spaces and any other space on the ship.
k. Location of Cryptographic Equipment. Online and offline cryptographic equipment and terminal equipment processing SCI information will be located within the SCI space.
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L Secure Storage Containers. SCI material will be Sored only in GSA-approved security containers or equal. Containers will be welded in place or otherwise securedoundation for safety and to prevent rapid removal.
m. Rotary or Tone Dial Telephones. Rotary or tone dial telephones, except theTC-l, will be equippedush-to-operate featureanual line disconnect device such as the WECOndr equal. Shipboard telephone systems meeting the above criteria may be connected to shore telephone lines under the following conditions:
AU shipboard telephones access the portsidc central office (CO) lines via an intermediate switch (switchboard, computer-driven private branch exchange, or mechanical switches).
Telephone lines between the intermediate switch and the dockside connecting device will be under the control of and maintained by the ship's company. SCI space line will be terminated (brought to common ground) within the space housing the lirtermcdiate switch
The intermediate switch may serve shipboard spaces other than the SCI space, provided the wire run between the switch and the SCI space Is in electronic metallic tubing (EMT) (or via controlled space).
All computer-driven switches will be of US design and manufacture.
The compartment housing the intermediate switch will be establishedLimited Accesshen not occupied, the space will be securedamper-proof hasp and combination padlock conforming to.
(Note; Rotary or tone dial telephone circuits installed within the electrical perimeter barrier of an accredited secure processing center will have their lines filtered in accordance with
n. Sound-Powered Telephones. Sound-powered telephones will be eliminated from SCI spaces Insofar as possible. When required, those instruments thai connect to locations oulside of SCI spacejs) will be in compliance with Ihe following installation criteria:
The telephone cable will not break out to iackboxes or switchboards or to telephone sets other than at the designated stations. The telephone cable will not be shared with any other circuit call or signal systems associated with this circuit.
Sound-powered telephones will be equippedelector switch, located at the controlling station, capable of:
disconnecting all stations,
selecting any one station and disconnecting the remaining stations.
a paralleled connection to all stations.
Other stations that are accredited as SCI space not equipped with the selector switch in paragraphillositive disconnect device in the telephone line.
Sound-powered telephone sets colocstcdpace with this system, and not used for passing SCI information, willign posted that these telephone sets are not for passing classified information.
A call or signal system will be provided. Call signal station type IC/D, when used for circuit EM will be modified toisconnect in the line tooudspeaker from functioningicrophone
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o. SCI Intercommunication Announcing System. An intercommunication-typesystem processing SCI iniormation, which connects to ot passes through areas outside the SCI space, will be used inC system and be installed in accordance withhe switch matrix panel will be located within one of the SCI spaces. Primary AC power will be providedital or emergency lighting circuit.
p. Supporting Intercommunication Announcing Systems. Inter communication-typesystems installed within an SCI space, which do not process SCI Information, will be designed or modified to provide the following physical or electrical security safeguards:
Operational mode of the unit installed within the SCI space will limit operation to push-to-talk mode only.
Receive elements will be equippedocal amplifierbuffer" to prevent loudspeakers or earphones from functioning as microphones.
Radio transmission capability for plain language radio telephones (excluding secure voice) will not be connected. Cable conductors assigned to the transmission of plain language radio telephones will be connectedround at each end of the cable
Equipment modified will have an appropriate field change label affiled Io ihe unit lhat indicates the restriction Additionally, the front panel willign warning the user that the system is not for passing classified informatlon.
q. Commercial Intercommunication Equipment. Commercial Intercommunicationthat does not have NAVSEA approval will not be installed in an SCI space.
r. General Announcing Systems General announcing system loudspeakers will have an audio amplifier in the signal line to the loudspeaker to servehe amplifier and the output signal lines will be installed within ihe SCI space
s. Pneumatic Tube Systems. Pneumolic tube systems for passing SCI information will not be installed. Pneumatic tube systems previously installed will have the following characteristics:
Locked cover at both ends.
Capability to maintain ihe pressure or vacuum and lock il in the secure position at the initialing end.
Direct voice Intercommunication link between both ends (for example, telephone)
Special color for the cartridges
Prseumaiic tubes lhat run through passageways and are capable of being visually checked along their entire length.
t. Destruction Equipment An effective and approved secure means of destruction of SCI materia) will be provided each SCI space or contiguous SCI spaces-
u. Emergency Power. An SCI space will have emergency power sufficient to operate destruction equipment, alarm systems, and access control devices and provide emergency lighting.
v. SCI Processing Systems. An SCI space that processes SCI electronically/dectrkally will beisual TEMPEST inspection before activation.
CIP ACCREDITATION
Ships requiring temporary accreditation status will be processed for accreditation on completionhysical security inspection and certification of compliance with ihe following
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DAIEHOV20B8
physical securitybesed to process SCI InformaHon electrically, it will beisual TEMPEST inspection before activation and must comply with the full TEMPEST-related configuration control criteria of.
physical perimeter barrier will consist of standard structural, structuralor metal joiner bulkheads welded or riveted in place.
will be at feast metal joiner doors equipped with door closers and capablesecured from the inside. Dutch doors are nol acceptable. Ifis installed or stored within the space, and the space will be temporarilywhile cryptographic key material and/or SCI material are storeddoor will be equippedamper-proof hasp and combinationto the requirements of
scuttles, vents, louvers, or other openings in the perimeter that permit auralpenetration of the internal space will be screened, curtained, or blocked.
effective and approved secure means of destruction of SCI material will bein the space or nearby in general service spaces
e Cryptographic equipment processing SCI InformaHon will be located in the SCI space, or, if locatedecure processing center other than that accredited for SCI, will be electrically configured so as not to be compatible with the secure processing system of that secure processor
filing cabinet will be used for storage of SCI material
or dial type telephones will be as specified inbove.
telephone installations will be as specified tobove.
S, TEMPORARY SECURE WORK1NC AREA iTSWA) ACCREDITATION
Ships requiring TSWA accreditation for "contingency" or "part-time" usage will be processed for accreditation on completionhysical security impaction and certification of compliance with the following physical security requirements:
physical perimeter barrier requires no special construction, provided itvbual and aural access during all periods of SCI operation
will be capable of being secured from the inside
vrill be made foremporary sign that readsPERSONNEL ONLY "
SCI materia] Is to be stored in theecure storageill be provided. Security storage containers will be weldedor otherwise secured to the foundation for safety and to prevent rapid removal.
electrical security requirementsSWA space will be specified bya selective basis.
MBARKED PORTABLE SHIPBOARDVANS (PSCV$)
Ships requiring accreditation of embarked PSCVs may be activated on certification to GSA of compliance with the following physical security requirements. PSCVs are vans that are temporarily placed aboard the ship and are not part of the permanent structure.
a The exterior surface of the van will be of solid construction and capable of showingof physical penetration (except for Intended passages for antenna cables, pc-wcrtines, etc.|
-.F for release
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h The access door will fit securely and be equippedubstantial locking device to secure the door from tbe inside in order to prevenl forcible entry without tools.
C- Adequate rneasures "iH be established to preclude viewing ol classified material by uncleared personnel.
provisions will be established to control Ihe approach of unclearedthe vicinity of the van These measures will consist of instructions,the station (ashore and afloat) in which the van it embarked, prohibiting loiteringimmediate vicinity of the van. and will include periodic visual security checksindoctrinated personnel.
destruction equipment will be available and effective proceduresensure rapid and complete destruction of classified material in emergency situations.
SCI material will be stored wilhin the van and continuously manned by at leastIndoctrinated personnel when activated for SCI support If SCIto be stored outside tbe van. the space must be accredited by tbe CSA and be inwilh this Armea
electrical tecurity requirementsSCV will he specified by N'AVSEA
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i. Upon cessation of hostilities, all classified material will be returned lo the parent element of the facility for reconciliation of records and destruction of obsolete material
A TEMPORARY FIELD/TACTICAL SCIF
Frequently, tactical units will elect to set up non permanent SCIFs for processing SCI in support of ongoing field/tactical requirements. SCIFs established under these conditions will be secured in accordance with paragraphs 2a.. above. The Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of the military department (MILDEP) having SCI security responsibility over the activity is authorized to temporarily accredit such configurations, including point-to-point SCI communications circuits using low-power-level equipment, and may delegate that authority to the cognizant service special security office. Temporary facilities established in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph will not be authorized for operations to exceedays. If ihe temporary SCIF contains communications equipment thai has direct access to AUTOVON, or ADP equipment used for processing SCI material. TEMPEST security requirements also apply.
A TEMPORARY TACTICAL SCIF IN AN EXISTING
a Occupied Building. Accreditationemporary tactical SCIF in an existing permanent building occupied by other personnel shall be granted in accordance with paragraphelow.
b. Unoccupied Building. Accreditationemporary SCIF in an existing unoccupied permanent building will be granted in accordance with paragraphbove
TEMPORARY RELOCATION OF PERMANENT FACILITIES
Permanently accredited SCIFs may be relocatedield configuration as specified hereinormal accreditation of the temporary SCIF. The SIO of the MILDEP or his designated representative, having SCI security responsibility over the activity, will be informed of all such relocations, to include the anticipated duration of the relocation and the physicalmeasures that will be In effect.
EMIPERMANENT SCIFs
used as tactical SCIFs may be used in nontactical situations ifeed for more SCIF area and time and/or funds are notconstruct orermanent SCIF. These types of SCIFs areSCIFs (SPSCIFs).
SPSCIF will be accredited and operated in the same mannerermanentfor TEMPEST and ADP accreditation apply.
SPSCIF must be of rigid construction similaran, trailer, or transportableThe building material must be of such composition to show visible evidenceentry. Vents and air ducts must be constructed to prevent surreptitiousdoors must be of solid construction and plumbed so the door forms aseal. If installed, emergency exits/escape hatches must be constructed soonly be opened from ihe interior of tlte SPSCIF.
SPSCIF must be placedenced compoundilitary installationas determined by the cognizant security authorityhe fenceor exceed tbe standards describedoot chain linkhe fence must be at leasteet from tbe SPSCIF andbuildings and equipment. The distance from the fence to the SPSCIF may haw
^ for reifase
O
to be greater to provide acoustical security or to meet COMSEC or TEMPEST requirements. Access control to tbe fenced compound must be continuous. Red cabling between SCIFs and SPSCIFs must be installed in accordance with COMSEC and TEMPEST requirements.
SPSCIFs must have one of the following locks on the main entrance door:
Built-in three position combination Croupock.
0 High Security Drop bolt with body guard plate assembly orl series deadbolt
ombination padlock
Medeco Protectoradlock.
Medeco Protectoradlock.
CSA-approved equivalent lock to any of the above locks.
(NOTE: The keys to the padlocks and built-in key locks must be under two-person control al all times This is due to expense of replacing locks with compromised keys.)
do not need any additional security measures if one of the following exists.
Continuous operations. Continuous operations exist when the SPSCIF Is occupied by two SCI-indoctrlnated personsay. When there are multiple vehicles/sheltersenced compound, only those occupied by two or more SCI-indoctrinated people qualify as continuous operation facilities
Dedicated guard force cleared to at least the SECRET level. The dedicated guard force must be present whenever the SPSCIF is not occupied and must have continuous surveillance of the SPSCIF entrances. The guard force must check the perimeter of the SPSCIF at least twice an hour al random intervals. Cuard response time will be five minutes or less.
not storing classified material and not meeting one of the requirements inparagraph must have an intrusion detection systems (IDS) as prescribedfacilities.
for Storage:
SCI material will not be storedPSCIF except when removal is notomputer hard disk.
Storage in the United States and Outside Ihe United States. If the facility does not have continuous operationsedicated guard force at thehree-position Croupombination lock and an IDS for the SPSCIF interior and the SPSCIFequired. The interior SPSCIF IDS must be as prescribed for permanent SCIFs. The SPSCIF compound IDS must meet the same standards of the interior SPSCIF IDS. except Ihe sensors may be ground sensors, motion detection CCTV, or other exterior perimeter or area sensors approved by the CSA.
The policy and procedures for establbhing SCIFs are outlined in1 or in this1 supplemental manual.
The Cognizant Security Authority is responsible for ensuring compliance with these standards and providing requisite SCI accreditation Theesponsibleemporary field or tactical SCIF is used in support of field training exercises
Original document.
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