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Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition
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and Cuban Supporthilean Opposition
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In the regime of Augusto Pinochet have encouraged Moscow to actively promote rcvolutioa in Chile. An economic downturn) (pawned widespread discontent and an ami-Pinochet opposition thai has continued lo grow. Pari of Pinochet'* response bas been repression The demise of iiejghboeing military regimes and lhc formation of democratic govornmenis in several key Soulh American countries bave Increased regional antipathy toward Pinochet's regime
Both tbc USSR and Cuba consider ibe Chilean Communist Party (IKor many yearstln American Communist party closest to Moscow, to be Ihc mosi important Chilean leftist opposition party. They are sexking to position the party io emerge aa the dominant group within the successor government. Notwithstanding, both Moscow and Havana, but particularly Havana,ariety of leftopposition parlies so as to maximize resistance to Pinochet and achieve their goal of turning Chileommunis! state. Both have supported violenceegitimate means toiwchet.
The USSR, Cuba, and their allies have together or individually provided guidance, funding, training, and other assistance not only to the PCCh but also variously to ihe PCCh's terrorist ally, the Manuel Rodriguez Pitriotk Front; the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIRfc and tbe Atnseyda faction of tbc Chilean Socialist Party. Probablyesult of such assistance, the exposition Io Pinochet has become moreeli-organficd attempt by tbe Patriotic Front to assassinate hlm.
Sovlcl and Cuban approaches to revolution in Chile vary. Moscow's most iinporunt objective is to guarantee thai the PCCh will someday governthe imrnediale successor to ftnochet. if possible *-
J the Sovicu do not want to jeopardize the
kng-tenn prospecu of tbe partyremature or Ill-conceived attemptverthrow Pinochet. They arc content for nowave the PCCh work with otber groups, although they do not support the others enough lo enable ihem to challenge the Coenmonrst leadership of the leftistSoviet academic literature makes clear that Moscow is, is fact, hostile to Ihe radical MIR for pursuing policies Ihatalvador
do not support this movement directly. While supporting violence and terrorist activities, the Soviets caution ihat the potential poliiical imoact of each action must be thoroughly esamincd before it is carried oui
Havana, by contrast, is primarily concerned (hat Pinochet be driven out of office and worksange of parties to achieve this objective..
J Castro Is less concerned with long-term strategy or with which group leads tbe revolution; his support to the PCCh is asecognition the party's strengtheflection of preference. The Cubans apparently assume that the PCCh will emerge as the dominant group in the successor government, but they do little to guarantee that outcome by, for instance, reining in potential rivals such as Ihe pro-Cuban MIR. Havana's supporthe MIR indicates that the Cubans are more broadly committed to the use of violence in Chile than the Soviets.
If Moscow forces the issue, the Cubans are likely, even if reluctantly, to follow the Soviet lead in determining their future support to the Chilean opposition, but old controversies between Moscow and Havana concerning when and bow to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America may be resurfacing. Moscow basreater desire than Havana to ingratiate itself with the governments of several Central American states where it had previously supported antiregimc insurgents. Castro appeared unabashed by the discovery last year of over Jof Cuban-supplied arms cached by the PCCh and iu allied Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. The Soviets haveery low profile on the incident
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Same evidence suggests that negative public reactions both in Chile and the region to leftist-instigated violence and tlte caching of arms in6 have induced more caution in Moscow in supporting the violence C
.oscow may be prompting the PCCh leadership to reestablish tight party control over when and how PCCh and Front members carry out terrorist acts. If an intransigent Pinochet retains the presidency after his term endsoscow will probably encourage the PCCh to step up its violent tactics in the hope of promoting an all-out insurrection. If Pinochet leaves office peacefullyivilian government wilb broad popular support is established, Moscow will probably press ibe Communists to return to nonviolent tactics to obtain legal status
Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition
Om overthrow of Ckik'i Sociabsi Pieutkni Salvador All cadeiolet* coopyean ago. Ibc USSR aod most oiber Coroomtuit stales have had ne diplomatic leUlions with Santiago and have officially eppoaed Augusio Pinoehei'i reglnu L
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Allcnde'i deleal and by Ibc PitMChev governmentlevcrsal of Ailendc'i leftist policies, believedleftist resargeace was years ofl aod advisedCornmcioii PartyLatinCommunist party dotal lo Moscow--lothrough participation In nonviolent
Tbe triumph of the Sandinistas overAnastasM SceaoiaMoscow's thinking about ibe prospectsla latin America.
indicates (hat Moscow bad not anticipated ibcSandi-ii invictory, bul Ihe event quickly focused Soviet attention on tbe region. In numerous public aiiMles Soviet political theorists concluded lhal tbe Cuban model foe politicalstruggle aadwelfare could be translatedormula for creating political-military groups ihai couldchallenge some incumbent regimes. Support for armed struggle in Latin Americahift In tactia for the Soviets as wellm, change in Soviet thought. In faef, ioavana's intransigent backing of armed straggle hadoviet-Cuban rift.
Calk I* Targeted
Following the Sandiniita victory, published Soviet and Cuban statement* and actions in support of anugrrvernment insurgents aside clear that Monow and Havana were targeting aeveral Latin American nations, including Ccatemali. El Salvador, and Chile, for violent revolution. Chile was an obvious candidate because:
anii-Pinochet opposition lhal has continued lo grow. Partly, Pinochet has responded withaimed especially ai the poorer cituet The discontent tut been fanned by highly rubtieiicd acts allegedly carried out by Pinochet, security forces. *uch at the murder of several Communist leader) and lhc immolation of two young Chileans,
Neither Moscow nor Havana had diplomatic or trade lies to Santiago, so they had little to lose. Moreover, a* Soviei academic literature ha* made dear, the Kremlin iftla-preJcdJ Pi "echo victoryleanporaryor the Chilean revolution, and ibe opportnniiy to complete lhal revolutionpecial goal.
Tbe demise of neighboring military regimes and Ihe formation of democratic governmenti In several key Soulh American countries, including Draril.and Uruguay, have made Chile's dictalortil government an anachronism and have increased regioni! antipathy toward tbe regime The vWeoee with which Pinochet came lo power aasd hi*reliance on icptcssion have also earned him disapprovalin America, making bun an am active target
in ihe Pinochet regime were tailor-made for Soviet exploitation. An3 spawned widespread discontent and an
Differing Sotiet and Cabin Petspeciiie* Although Moscow and Havana arc working toward tbe same strategic goal inestablishmentadical leftist government closely linked to bothhave long been significant differences in the way Soviei and Cuban academic writings and public statemenu analyse the potential for revolution In Latin America and in the tactics they advocate to assist the formation of Communist regimes. Moscow hat emphasised winning broad acceptance within society and creating genuine "diss consciousness.'*
Before the fall of Sornoxa. Soviei writers cannoned against the use of violence in supporteftist revolution, arguing that such tactics often alienate significant segments ofng elements of the industrial, agricultural, and middle classes. In turn thiseactionary backlash, which can lead to the destruction of the revolution and can discredit Ihe USSR. Havana has been far more opportunistic Iban Moscow, more prone to ibe use of violence, and seemingly less concerned withissues, traits evidenced by Cuban activities in support of revolution In Soulh America during
hort lime in the, however,by tbe riciory of the Sandinistas, Moscow and Havana both enthusiastically endorsed armedagainst several Latin American governments. The Soviets become convinced that, at least under tbe cabling conditions, support to leftist groups such as Ihe Sandinistasiolent drive for power could be shortcuts to the ultimate achievement of Marxist regimes in the Western Hemisphere. But as the euphoria of the Sandinlsta victory wore off and Moscow was faced with the declining fortunes of insurgencies in Guaiamala and El Salvador, the Soviets began to temper iheir enthusiasm for armed struggleenewed emphasis on the traditional tenets of Soviet revolutionary theory
The View From Mereav. Moscow's analysts of why the Alienee revolution failed reveals part ofuccessful Communist takeover. According to Soviet academiceftist revolution should have taken hold in Chile during Allende's presidency and the country should hare evolvedro-Sorici Marxist slate. Moscow concluded thai the Chilean Communist Partyarge measure of responsibility for this failure '? *
Moscow criticized ibe PCCh for not being prepared to dominate Ibc revolution and defend its Inieresu against the violent opposition of the extreme left and right. In order to achieve some support from the middle class, according to Soviet critics, the PCCh should have been prepared to politically counter tbc parties of ihe extreme left, especially the pro-Cuban Movement of the Revolotiooary Lefts they forced Allende to adopt measures, suchapid nationalization of property, that aggravated andeteriorating economic situation. Tbe Soviets also critidied the PCCh for treating the armed forcesonolithic Institution hostileeftistAccording to an ortieie in the international Soviet pu blica tion Probiems of Peace and Socaliim, tbe party should have recognized divisions, based on class differences, within tbe military and worked to turn (hem to the advantage of the revolution
Nevertheless, Moscow's initial infatuation withperceived as the ease of theictoryhas been reflectedeightenedthat revolutions can sometimes developandreater willingness to work withleftist parties. In the case of Chile,approaches have merged with the lessonsilie failed Allende revolution to formuccessful Communist takeover.nowroad political'military fromss the best means to oust the Pinochetalso has condoned violence as ato overthrow Pinochet
incumbent governmeni. Once Pinochet has been ousted, Castro appsrently trusts thai Ihe Communiits will emerge as the dominanl political pany.
lhc Soviet* bare warned ibc PCCh thai Ideological preparation of parly man ben remain* iu raost impor-taai lark. Thii reflect" Moscow's continuiaj coovic-licm (hat, in order loiilainable retime, the PCCh MM be disciplined, saturated vrithin.i'. theory, in control of Ihe other rerolutiooary parties, and responsive to tbc ipecifics oftheCblleaa environment, and popwlelioai
TU Viewuban President Fidelon lhc other hand, has consistently been attractedevolutionary model Ihat emphasizes initiative and military action and sobordinstes political training and the feamuliiaoa of clear principles governing political leadership l.
j Cubaess oithodoj aod ideolog-ically rigor our approach to rcvolu lion, and it considers violence the principal instrument of change in Latin Aroenca. Havana also seeks influence through leas violent means, such ai trade, medical aad, andassistance
Came Plan for *- PWbst
Ob Ibc basis of Soviei acatkenic writings. f_
j, and tht activities of ihe PCCh, we believe al present inertonsensus imoeir. ifcc Soviet i. Cubans, and the PCCh on general tact Us forbrovring Piaochel. although there Is reliable evidence! Ihat soene disagreement over specific issues remains. The tsetses ipdwdc:
Carrying out activities designedncrease ibe party's popularity while maintaining increasing pressure on Pinochet
oalition wilh other leftist parties to consolidate the oppoaiuoe-
Holding mast meetings and strikes.
Winning over or neutralizing as many ckmcnii within Ihe armed forces at possible
Using terrorism to force Pinochet to respond with increasingly reactionary measurts that willacklash, creale lynipalhy for the PCCh In ihc middle classes, and swell the rsnks ol the opposition.
ihe surface, al least. Castro's activities in Chile are consistent wiih these comments. For eurnplc, the Cubans seem less concerned wilhong-term poliiical program than wilh Ihe successfulof power from Pinocheteftist governmeni
Moscow believes violent activity willolar-lied envuonrnem us which the PCCh wffl emerge as ibeiroeprncetaet*TMabietoamsy^ihe Pinochet government. The attempted assassination of Pinochetand ofn il ants who ambushed his guarded motorcade in September6 was the most striking example yetorpmitmcpt to violence. The attempt was clearly Ihe svtark of tbe Manuel Rodriguei Patriotic From but wilh some degree of coordination with tbe PCCh
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Castro is willing lo spread his resources In support of several parlies that make up tbe leftist cpposiiion. as Ihey have done with the Sandinistas, the leftist insurgents in El Salvador, and others, the Cubans have been trying to broker IcAlst unity in Chileeans to maximize ihc resistance to the
Moscow apparently expects that Increased political instability will ultimately undermine Pinochet'swithin the armed forces also byrowing distaste for their role In repressing popular dissent and defending an intransigent Pinochet. The Soviei critique of PCCh actions during tbe Allende
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The diieotcry of Jof "upon* ttcckpiltdrihern Chile clenily Indicate* thai the PCCh envi-itoncd tbal at tome point tbe oppodiioo would ihifi from Quick,run ctxii'tcot tietitwd to haiau Ihe Pinochet ecr-ernment to more broadly baaedaeiivil; f
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The Chilean Political Scene
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I For (he Un decadealf ihe Sovicu bave broadcastin Spanishhile over Radio Macallancs. which operates out of ibe Soviet Union. Moscow hasteady discourse onand domestic Chilean events and has also developed feature programs alined ai special in teres! groups in Chile. For trample, the "Voice of tbc Fatherland" Is directed spedncally al Chile's armed forces: other programs are geared to enlist theof women or university students. The MIR has nol benefited from Moscow's propaganda efforts, bul the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front bas.adio Magallanes extolled membership in the Front byetter from an exiled Chilean youth who sought advice oo whether to return to Chile and join tbe Front. Radio Magallanestbe youth to do so ,-
The Soviets alsoropaganda outlet for tbe PCCh. In the immediate aftermath of the arms discoveryor example, the PCCh wed tbe TASS office In Buenos Aires louieaicnt denouncing Pinochet's reprisals. ^
In recent years both Havana and Managua have publicly condemned the Pinochet regime aod extolled the leftlsi opposition. Moscow aod Its allies have consistently lambasted the Pinochet governmeni in international and regional forums, including theNations and the Organization of American States. Year after year in tbe UN, Ibe Soviets, Cubans, and Fast Europeans sponsor resolutions ia Ihe Social. Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee and theRights Committee that condemn human rights abuses in Chile. i j
Hemispheric Support System
The USSR and its allies have minimal rcpresentatloo in Santiago. There are iwo Soviets atucbedjnited Nations organization there, and. according to
J- Of ihe Bloc states, only Romania has diplomatic relations with Chile. In the absence of any significant Communist presence In Chile, Moscow
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warned that if the moderate opposition and the armed forces remain united in Ihdr oppo-Jio therealistic pecapect if they both feel threatened byPCCh will be unable to gainnmin power in*
Tbe Risks of Pursuing tbe Violent Ore-Throw of Pinochet
ftitki Im Chile. The political isolation of tbe PCCh that followed the disorrtery of the arms caches and the attempted assassination of Pinochet cortotulrata tbe need for tbe PCCh and the other far left parties toareful line between an escalation of violence that keept the Pinochet regime oft* balance and actions thatacklash and increaseif not for Pinocheta tredual evolutionemocratic nontcftlsi regime by. Events during the7 visit of Pope John Paul to Chile provided another example of this dilemma. At first, tbe Communist media condemned the Pope's visitIA/Vatican plot to shore up Pinochet. When the violent demonstrations of the leftegative popular response, both Moscow's Radio Magallanes and tbe PCCh quickly denied that the Communists had anything to do wilh them
Soviet academic journals have acknowledged that arbitrary violence harmed the PCChllende period. In particular, ihe journals have
Refiaaal ffiiki. In the region's other nomodalist countrio, Moscow maintains support for Communist and otber leftist groups bui does soear Intent not to jeopardize relations with tbe nationalWithin the last two years Moscow has begun an unprecedented campaign to establish closer aod more lucrative ties to the most significant political and economic powers in Latin America, notably Mexico, Argentina, and BtaaL while concurrently reducing support to local insurgents. Continued Soviet actions to dislodge Pinochet could undermine these initiatives,lear example lo the region's leaders of Moscow's capacity for subversiveio Latin American countries
Havana has been wrestling with such competing Interests as well. In the lair few yean several Latin American states, such as Brazil and Peru, have increasingly accepted Cubaember of Ibe Latin American community. Moreover. Cuba looks to Stales such as Argentina and Brazil for trade and Grands! credits to help its troubled economy. Castro's goal of overtbrowing Pinochet could put Havana's newreputation at risk
At least through the endti, Moscowapparently fell lhat InternationalPinochet wu strong enough thai regionaltolerate Soviet and Bloc support for
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Feaiiertlma Party CtNrrrW Otr Vlottmrtt Reports of dissension tn the rank* of ihc PCChManuel Rodriguez Front, as weHeoonl brief lull In terrorist arsis, suggest thai Use PCCh lead eisunder advis^nwnt from Mcncowttempting to reassert coalrrJ over when and bo* acts of terror are perpetrated by party or Front members, la the cur. rent political cthnate in Choc lhcu find thernaclvea caught between etaneats of the radical left, aminos to speed up the drive against Pinochetore liberal applies uoo of rsdeace, and the democratic opposition, which la (till rrightencd by the discovery of tbe arms caches, tbc assassinationpi, and the PCCh's recent refusal lo cooperate wilh (ho voter registration drive supported by most members of (he leftist coalition.
Tbe Increased Isolation of (be party Ihat followed the discovery of ihc cached arms and (he attempted assassins lion of Pinochet almost certainly caused Moscowonduct some form of damage assessment and lo eeesclude (hat some tenons! acts or actions that woe id leadiolence, sack as the cacaung of weapons, would be counter-prod active and wouldoups, such at the armed forces or the moderate led. whose support Is necessary if too Communists are to gain and sustain power. The Soviets appear to have decided ihat Ihe PCCh should reestablish internal party discipline and control over terror to as to bring Ibe use of terror more into line with Masoowl riewt oa tbe selective aod parposefol application of violence *
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Oaer Ftmodui Slays After Term Eadi. The high degree of popular antipathy among virtually all classes and social groups to Ihe idea of Pinochet retaining power9 suggests that be could only do to through fraudulent elections or other extralegal meant.arn of events would almost certainly cause aa increased level of disscasaoa and disruption in Chilean society. Moreover, in order to guarantee his tenure bt the face of such resistance. Pinochet would probably prod tbe local police and armed forces to Irrcrease Internal control and repression. This,arn, would damage the reputation of Ihe trmed forces with the Chileanred urine their appeal
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a* in alternative topiobably cauaa nature* within Ibe raaka of ihe aimed force, ihem'These events could easily bring iboot Ibe kiad of alloat iasuuTtvatioa ermsioorjj by Mown aad Havana as ibe sicppi rigs lone to PCCh political control of Chile
Mcacow proba biy evaluate* this as tbe most fertile eovtrorirnent for ptuhing it* overallspecially if reuttance to Pinochet', regime forces him to damp down even harder. Increased rrprraiion wouldi ilification foe Mo*cow to remain visibly opposed to tbe Chilean PrcaJdeaL Moreover, tbe tit nation could evolve In Chile as it did ia Nicaragua, leaving tbe PCCh at tbe forefront of aa orvpraUuou with lapport from variou* classes, la ibis case. Moscow would is linos', certainly maintain its level of tuppoei and. Quite possibly, throw its weight behind an all-out PCCh effort by increasing it*the direct provision of anas.
Havana would probably supply weapons to variou* IcflUtncluding the pro-Cuban MIR. The Soviets, however, arc anxious to guarantee theof tbe PCCh froen the start of the pott-Pinochet era. aad alxnost certainly would prestere Havana to impend aidtren the .rramt numbers and popularity of the PCCh, Castro might grudgingly comply with Moscow'sf tbe PCCh succeeded la ad dog power. Moscow andwould, we believe,eady in cam of advice aad probably ad risen ia oeder to atccr tbe PCCh toward the establishmentantst-Leninist slate. In particular, the Soviets and Cubans would probably hdp set up Internal political controls and aid ia the establishmentecret police that would begin haratsrryent of those group* eppcoed to tbe new order. A* ii tbe case la Nicaragaa. however, wc bdievo Moscow would attempt to keep its own profile low In Chile lo avoid rmyvokjng tbe United State*.
Sctaeria jVo: Plmochel Umi Office Peace/ally. Pinochet has etprcased extermination to rcrnain ia power indefinitely, but ultimaidy the military, led by ibe Army, could decide it has no recourse bui to confront faim and Insist thai be *tep aside. Most Chileans. Induding those In the armed forces, arc
convinced lhai Ihe best outcome for Chile would be one ia which ihe military and tbe non radical political party leaders reach aa agreoorai on aa orderly transition to Caviltaa rule. If in facteaoefulorked out and aimed violence is mini-mittd, Moscow and Havana would be faceddilemma over how to proceed. According to various Soviet journals, Moscow believer, thai, latuuoa. tbe PCCh could be twert aaidc or destroyed if ll were una bar to rarscesdm icily changing political environmentriveeaoeful political Ir*tuition
If. la Moscow'sfsafority of Chileant rapport ibe new gtrwaructti and the PCCh'*for taking over the govern me nl appear dim, wc believe lhc Soviet* would probably idvite tbe PCCh to refrain from violent activities. Thi* would almost certainly be Moscow! appreatch if the new (overn-ment (xornited lo legalize Ibe PCCh The Soviets would press the PCCh to assume the rote of accredit. ed oppotjtion that Communal partita, like the otic In Argentina, play in other coon trie* In the region. Thii could lead ia several years to state-to-*tale tie*Moscow aad Santiago and might evcntaally lead to tbe Commonest* becoming pan of tbe legally raected government in Chile.
It appeal unlikely, huwever. tbal lhc PCCh will be legaliied any time toon
J there ts fa'ttleamong tbe Chilean errned force* and the mayarity of drill* ns (or this move and
these sentiment* will probably continue In Ihe wake of Ibe attempted assassinationho moderate Opposition has refused to collaborate with Ihe radical
left. Including tbe PCCh. Never- be leu. Soviet advice and act ions ia caber revohnwoary utualtoos ia Latin America indicate lhat, unlets Mcacow concludedajority of Chileans (representing the variousere opposed to the new government, the SovieU would still advise theefrain from violent oppotiltoo. Despite probable demonHration ia partynd almost certain real Ma not frora Havana, weMoscow would advise the PCCh lo make poiiiical legalization Its goal for Ibe time being
Scenario Three riwochel Is Attastiaaif Theof Pinochet would probably sparkm;"catil backlashthe violentmoil likely sponsor of the aisastini. Of all thee believe that thb one would be the moat damaging from Moaeow'a point of view. Even if tbc PCCh might gain lotrtcamong uudeatu and cabers predisposed to forcefulridding Ibe coualry of (ha dictator, there would undowbtodb be aversion to the violate of Use assassination. The parties of tbe radical left. Including (he PCCh, couldignificant amount of support as other Chileans, notably members of the upper and middle classes, rallied to Ibe defense of the successor government. In fact, the new government might find in thean excuse for an all-out crick down on these put its. Moscow's overt support for such violence would brand tbe Sovicu as advocate* of terrorism and expose (he dark side of their aspiraiioas In lie Wcsiern Hemisphere
Conclusions
Whether tbe Soviets will continue to advocate the violent ovenhrow of Pinochet depends on iheirof how successful thb policy It in strengthening Ibe PCCh and whether it undermines (heir effortsaintain good reUtions with other Latin American countries. If they believe Pinochet's intransigence and increased repression will set tbc sceneass rebellion and popular acceptance of violence, they undoubtedly will encourage the PCCh to use violence and probably will supply weapons and logisticIf. on ibe other hand. Moscow ctridiides Ihat tbe armed forces and opposiiion political parties ire headedooviotent solution to Chile'ssuccession and thai other regional state* are becoming lets tolerant of Soviei Interlcrencc Inaffairs, we believe tbc Soviets will advocate that the PCCheaceful path to power
If Moscow forces the issue, the Cubans are likely to follow Moscow's lead, even if reluctantly, iniheir policy on support to lhc Chilean otipratiitoe. but tome aspects of Havana's posiiion may differ from Moscow's. Old controversies between Mcacow and Havana concerning when and how to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America could be resurfacing. Moscow has alreadyesire to ingratiate itself with ihe governments of severalAmerican democracies where ii had previously
antiregime insurgents. Castro apparently reulns his long-held conviction thairoad firsts of leftist forces can bring about leftist change in Latin America in tlie short term. Moreover, Castro appears unabashed by (he discovery of Cuban involvement with (he Chilean left.
The Chilean example suggests broader lessens about when ihc Soviets decideevolutionary drive.ecision is apparently alien largely baaed on an assetsmenl of (wo factors: lhc risks to Soriei Intercau and the Impact on local Communist parties. Frequentlyood forood for both. Fot example. In Peru Moscow has counseled the Communistctoyal oppositionresident Abu Garcia rather thaneftist revolt Fo* Mcacow. thb serves the dual purpose of rrassunng ibe Peruvisa Cvcwerntncati that theot trying toegree of Sovietwhile saving ihe Peruvian Communist Partyremature and potentially disastrous challenge to csUbtished aaihoriiy
In oiber eaies. however,ichotomy between these two factors ihat actsrake oo Soviet tuppartiolent drive toward revolution. In Colombia, Moscow has only limited political and crarjaomic innuence, buiesitant to publicly throw its weight behind any of the armed opposition groups. They arc reluctant even though ibe ColombianPany't armed wing, to whkh Mcacow has dandeatinely given direction and perhaps funds, has the poteniial lo seriously challenge ihe established government. This hesitancy probably items from Moscow's apparent belief thacontrast to the situation insupportbe Colombian opposition would be viewed in (he icglon aa siutccept-abk and would adversely affect Soviet relations with other South American stales
la those countries, however, where Moscow believes that by underwriting violent ucoca it can further iu own fortunesincrease (he popularity of ilie local Communlsu, ll will push ahead in iu efforU to supponCommunlK drive for poliiical power. Chile dearly itountry
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