ZAIRE: THE MILITARY UNDER MOBUTU

Created: 10/2/1987

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

africa review article

zaire: the military under mobutu F

comingowerilitary coupresident Mobutu hasoyal, albcii largely ineffective. Armyf

Mobutu laces no im mediairom either senior officers or ihc tank andkey units arc composed of tribesmen fiomregion. The Army, however, lackscohesion and manpower necessary toihc country's borders from attacksTbe Prcstdem almost certainlyto rely oo infusions of foreignand advisers to keep tneat the minimal levels. The spreadin the miliury will probably further erodecombat capabilities over the next

MotwlVa

Mobutu has successfully kept the 'O.COO-tnsn military out of tbe politicaJ arena j

not only is Mobutu the commander-in-

"chierorthe armed forces and Minister of Defense,officerabinet post, and regionalare subordinate to the local

loyal party members--assigncd to each unit serve as Mobutu's "eyes andnd the President regularly shuffles senior miliury positions lo prevent officers from developing an independent

base of

Tke Officers Corps. Although officers occasionally have been arrested for "couphere is no evidence of organized dissent.

]ihe last confirmed coup plot occurred in

f whom were subsequentlyto incite urban insurrection and loppk Mobulu.l-

I

last year Lieutenant Colonel Mokonzi. ofh brigade in the Kamanyota Division, wu exiled lo his home village for coup plotting, but the charge against him was based solely on rumor. Last summer. Army Chief of Staff Mukobo and four of his staff officers were discharged and exiled to iheir villages after they badifles and ammunitionisiting Belgian frigate:

The Rank and File. The enlisted ranks arewith soldiers deserting from iheir unitstheir dissent rather iban turning to

pay. poor working conditions, and long hours on duty-high desertion rate among enlisted

have spawned men;

The Special Presidential Division. Tbe one exception to the Zairean Army's generally dilapidated stale may bean Special Presidential Divisionut il too is beginning to suffer from problems generic to the other units.

al* t* iw

o*?

Semm

DSP. which is resporrsibk for Ihc President's safely, is well equipped and manned wiih personnel of above average competence In addition, most of the soldiers come frotn ihequatcur region, which is generally thought io ensure tbeir loyally lo thc_regime

i the DSP is suffrlnnt tram

discipline

fisctpline and morale, partly because of Zaire's general economic dcterioTaiion. In

DSP experienced a

ming rate oi desertion inthe first quarler of this year.

A Logistic "Nightmare."

]the military's logistic systemdisaster'

luscofmhraanagemeni. corruplion. and disinterest. Ammuniiion ts in short supply for most unils. and even brigades in the key Shaba region have only enough Slocks lo last for one week of combai.Qn addmon. many unils have poor communication links to the capital and outlying provir

]because fuelajor source of

income for soldiers, mililary vehicles are normally drained of gasoline after the completion of their daily missions and the fuel is ihcn resold on ihe black market.r"

Foreign Presence aad Assistance

Zaire's military is heavily dependent on both foreign advisers and equipment, without which it could barely fund ton, [

Although Moriuiu has used thb potpourri of assistance to prevent dependenceingle foreign source, this strategy undermines the cohesion of the Army, j

Ollen form cliques based on theirIn addition, ihe differing military tactics introduced by the variety of foreign advisers may make coordinated opera lions between some different battalions difficult. | |

problems also inhibit the capacity ofmilitary to deploy its troops quicklyregions along the Angolan andSome regiments have no trucks, whilethe spare cans to keep tmk few ve&icira

Urnicd

;.rn5icksut onlyemain operable due in large pan lo the difficult road conditions and poor vehicle maintenance. Although Zaire's Airhas three operablea limiied airlift capability, we would expect Zaire's shortage of fuel to hamper iu capability to deploy large numbers of troops io remote regions infiliraied by dissidents.

with3 percent. The mandatory AIDS testing imposed by meal Western countries for foreign military students may reduce Ihe Army's Western contacts and reduce its pro-Western leanings. Given tbe fairly high desertion rate, and the fact that many soldiers return io iheir home villages after service.The miliury is likely to help spread AIDS in rural areas, in our view.

China. The Chinesemall presence in Zaire toariety of Army units and the Navy.

post of the 43

Chinese advisers are assigned lot Brigade al Kisingani. and ihc 1st Armored Brigade, locatedilometers southwest of Kinshasa.CI

technicians at Boma

^thc CI officials.

provide all tbe maintenance for tbe country's live Shanghai-class

Chinese assistance is wcll-

received by Zairean

Tbe Impact of AIDS

The spread of AIDS in Zaire is likely io undermine the military's limited cohesion and effectiveness over theeveral years.

Outlook

Mobutu hasenerally passive militaryno immediate threat to his rule. Thishas resultedoorly disciplinedadequately to patrol Zaire's borders.almost certainly will continue lo plague iheunderstrength units, and shortages ofammunition, andMobutu will rely heavily on ihc DSPhim in power, but if ihe unit remains besetand declining morale, iu loyalty maysuspect.

In our view, the military will certainlyajor, if not decisive, roleosl-Mobuiu Zaire. Should Mobutu unexpectedly die or be assassinaled. senior

officers may step in. especially if civilian elite are

beset by squabbling and intense power struggles-1 IEluki, for

example, could probably put together the necessary political and military consensusacuum develops after Mobuiu's deaih. Evenuccessor civilian regime is cohesive enough to assert itself, we believe the military would successfullyreater share of political

new recruits suffer from

high incidence rate because of their contact wilh Ihe proslilutes in Kinshasa. | |

is ranked fourth among'

African countries in percentage of population infected

Blank

Original document.

---

---