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Director of Central Intelligence Number: 4
Subject: PERSONNEL SBCURITY STANDARDSecurity Effective Date: 8
DIRECTOR OP CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY TOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)
This directive supersedes Director of Central Intelligences amended
A complete copy ofow consists of the basic DCID andhrough F, as follows:
nvestigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information.
uality Control Guidelines for the Single Scope Background Investigation.
djudication Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information.
ppeals Procedures: Denial or Revocation of Access.
tandards for SCI Security Awareness Programs in the US Intelligence Community.
4 wasy the Director of Central intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Coonunity Management onocloeely align the DCID with tho nev category structure as dfifinad in. This actioo was accoav>llshed' in conjunction with the DCI approving the newly created Annex P. "Reciprocity of SCI Eligibility Detereinations".
eciprocitySCI Eligibility Determinationsas created subsequent to the creation of the DCID. The DCI approvedn)
The President approved the Adjudicative Guidelines, Temporary Eligibility Standards and Investigative Standards required by Executiven This revised DCID incorporates the President's policy documents verbatim, atnd C, to promote the use of these common and consistent standards for government-wide security background investigations. These two annexes should be read in the contextthe Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) special authorities governing access eligibility to SCI, although the actual wordingroader application to clearance actions.
The DCI exercises authority derived from statute and executive order over access eligibility to SCI and delegates this authority to Determination Authorities through Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. (See Definitions.) Nothing in this directive or its annexes shall be deemed to preclude the DCI or the DDCI under the authority of the National Security Acts amended, from taking any actions regarding an individual's SCI access.
Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Acts amended, and Executive, the following personnel security guidelines, procedures, standards, and continuing security programs are hereby established for all US Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, and other individuals who require access to SCI. Individual departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to resolve issues and/or address employment standards unique to them to ensure that effective security is maintained.
1. Definitions.
person living in awith the individual requiring SCI information.
igned determination by aof the Intelligence Community (SOIC) or his/herthe services of an individual are deemed essentialor mission accomplishment.
ritten evaluation supportingprocess, especiallyignificant exception toSecurity Standard is being considered. Thisconsist of an evaluation from security.
counterintelligence, and other technical or management experts as appropriate, and should contrast the compelling national security benefit of an individual accessed to SCI with the risk.
esigneeOICfor decisions rendered with respect to SCIor Ineligibility.
Family--The spouse, parents,and cohabitant of the individual requiring SCI access.
Community--Those USand activities identified in thes amended,, oras making upommunity.
Officials of the Intelligence Communityheads of organizations or activities within theas defined by the National Security ActSCnd.
Compartmentedconcerning or derived from intelligenceor analytical processes requiring handlingformal access control systems established by the DCI.
The purpose of this directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI through the application of personnel security standards, procedures, and continuing security programs.
The provisions of this directive will apply to all persons (other than elected officials of the US Government, to include elected State Governors as may be required on an individual basis. Federal judges, and those individuals for whom the DCIpecific exception) without regardivilian or military status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service. This directive does not apply to situations involving the duly authorized disclosure of SCI to representatives of foreign governments and international organizations.
a. The granting of access to SCI will be controlled under the strictest application of the -need-to-know" principle and in accordance with the personnel security standards and procedures set forth in this directive.
b. In accordance with "Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmentednd its supplement. 9 Security Policyhose approved for access to SCI are required toCI-authorized nondisclosure agreement thatrovision for prepublication reviewondition of access to SCI.
Security Standards.
Criteria for security approval of sn individualeed-to-know basis for access to SCI are as follows:
individual requiring access to SCI mustS
citizen.
individual's immediate family must also be
of the individual's immediate family andpersons to whom he or she is bound by affectionshould neither be subject to physical, mental, orof duressoreign power or by persons who may bebeen engaged in criminal activity, nor advocate the useor violence to overthrow the Government of the Unitedthe alteration of the form of Government of the Unitedunconstitutional means.
individual must be stable; trustworthy; reliable,-character, judgment, and discretion; and ofto the United States.
to Personnel Security Standards.
Any exception to the Personnel Security Standards willommon sense determination based on the fact that the available informationinding that the specific risk to national security is manageable in the specific case for which the exception is granted. The organization determining that an exception is warranted will document their finding in the individual's security record. Asisk assessment, normally directed by the Determination Authority, may be required to aid in the determination of the appropriateness of granting an exception to one of the Personnel Security Standards. If accomplished, this assessment shouldart of the individual's security record.
a. The DCI is the exclusive authority for granting an exception to the requirement that the SubjectS citizen.
affected SOIC or specified designee mayto the standard requiring US citizenship for theof an individual proposed for SCI access, as well asrequiring individuals to which Subject is boundor obligation be free of any form of duress.
to the US citizenship requirementto be accessed to SCI and their immediateshall require certificationompelling need. should be basedpecificertification of compelling need.
7. Investigative Requirements and Standards.
investigation conducted on an individualfor access to SCI will conform to thea Single Scope Background Investigation {SSBU as definedA, "Investigative Standards for BackgroundAccess to Classified Information." Quality Controlto investigations are defined in Annex B, Guidelines for the Single Scope Background Investigation."
conditions indicate, investigation ofmembers will be conducted to the extent necessary todetermination by the adjudicating agency that the provisions5 of this directive are met.
a previous investigation has been conductedpast five years that meets the standards of Annex A,asis for granting access approval except wheresubstantial information indicating that the employee maythe adjudicative guidelines in Annex C. If adoes not meet thetandards, if it isfive years old, or if therereak in SCI access oforurrent investigation will be required but mayto that necessary to bring the individual's filein accordance with the investigative requirementsf this directive, Themay be limited to review of applicable records,an updatednd involve reinvestigation only whenthe person may no longer satisfy standards forthis directive. Should new information be developedcurrent investigation that bears unfavorably onactivities covered by the previous investigation,inquiries will be expanded as necessary to developof this information.
will be instituted requiring the(PR) of personnel provided access to SCI. will be conducted in accordance with the procedures and
scope contained in the section ofefining the SSBI-PR. The SSBI-PR may be expanded as necessary to resolve outstanding issues.
the status of an Individual'sdepartments and agencies with policiesuse of the polygraph for personnel security purposespolygraph examinations when deemed necessary byor agency head to be in the national securitythe United states. Where they exist, such polygraphbe characterized by unified training and certificationas by coordination of scope, applicability andto promote consistency, reciprocity and due process.
those cases in which the individual has livedthe United Statesubstantial period, aof the adequacy of the investigation in termsof the investigative requirements and judiciousthe information therein must be made before an exception
8. Temporary Bligibility for Access to 8CI.
exceptional cases, including nationaland hostilities involving US personnel, the SOIC ormay determine that it is necessary or advisable in interest to authorize temporary access to SCIof the SSBI. In this situation, thein theection entitled "InvestigativeTemporary Eligibility for Access" will be complied withaccess is permitted. ersonal interview ofby trained security, investigative,personnel will be conducted whereverpracticable.
SSBI and final evaluation will be completed atpracticable moment unless an exception is granted by Temporary eligibility for access is valid only at theit and other agencies which expressly agree to acceptacknowledge understanding of its investigativecertification to other organizations oftemporary access will include explicit notificationfact.
eligibility for access may be granted onlynecessary for the individual to perform authorizedindoctrination briefings will be modified to thenecessary to ensure protection of the SCI to whichwill be exposed, and appropriatesigned.
Requirements.
Individuals who hold SCI access have special responsibilities and obligations to report to their cognizant security officer, in writing and when feasible in advance, activities, conduct or employment that could conflict with their ability to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or counterintelligence threats- ore detailed explanationisting of an individual's responsibilities and reporting requirements are contained in Annex E. In addition, initial and updated security documents. Statement of Personal History, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, Security Clearance Application) and security records shall include details of such employment, activities, associations and/or conduct to facilitate appropriate investigation and evaluation to determine whether the circumstances create an unacceptable risk to the security of SCI or of unauthorized disclosure. Annex C, Guideline L, "Outsideummarizes the concern.
of Access Eligibility.
The evaluation of the information developed by investigation of an individual's loyalty and suitability will be accomplished by trained professional adjudicators under the cognizance of the SOIC concerned. When all other information developed on an individual is favorable,inor investigative requirement that has not boon met should notavorable access determination by an authorized adjudicative authority. In all evaluations, the protection of the national security is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI should be resolved in favor of the national security, and the access should be denied or revoked. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interest of national security will be an overall common sense determination based on all available information. The adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to SCI are contained in Annex
Procedures.
rescribes common appeals procedures to be followed when an Individual's SCI access has been denied or revoked.
Security Programs.
a. To facilitate attainment of appropriate standards of personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigative requirements established by this directive, member departments and agencies shall institute
continuing security programs based on risk management principles for all individuals having access to SCI. In addition to security indoctrinations (see Annex E, "Standards for SCI Security Awareness Programs in the US Intelligencehese programs will be tailored to create mutually supporting procedures to identify and resolve issues which bring into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggest the possibility of his or her being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. These programs should include the capacity for member departments and agencies to monitor the individual's performanceailored program against the eligibility criteria and adjudicative standards when unresolved concerns are present. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive work requiring access to SCI, the SOIC for the department, agency, or government program to which the individual is assigned will assume security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his or her assignment.
b. The continuing security programs will include the following:
Individuals are required to inform the department or agency that grants their SCI access about any personal problem or situation that mayossible bearing on their eligibility for continued access to SCI and to seek appropriate guidance and assistance. Security guidance should be provided by an official who understands both the eligibility issues involved, and the unique sensitivities of the specific SCI program being supported. Ab appropriate, tailored monitoring programs should be established to ensure that individuals actively resolve problems which have led to concern about their continued eligibility for access. An individual participatingonitoring programarticular department or agency does not meet the criteria for automatic reciprocal acceptance of SCI eligibility as established by Executive. In these situations, each organization should make their own determination of eligibility.
SCI security education programs of the member departments and agencies will be established and maintained pursuant to the requirements off this directive.
Security awareness programs for supervisory peroonnel will be established and maintained to ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility to safeguard SCI, including the need to assess continued eligibility for SCI access. These programs will provide practical guidance on indicators that may signal matters of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures will be disseminated to enable the appropriate
authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the security of the united States as well as to provide all necessary help to the individual concerned to neutralize his or her vulnerability.
Security review programs will ensure that appropriate security authorities always receive and exchange,imely manner, all information, including lead information, bearing on the security posture of persons having access to SCI. Personal history information will be kept current. Security and related files will be kept under continuing review.
Where permitted by agency policy, security review programs may include the use of polygraph examinations conductedualified polygraph examiner.
c. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies arise that could impact on an individual's security status, appropriate investigation will be conductedimely basis. The investigation will be of sufficient scope necessary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information or inconsistency in question soetermination can be made as to whether the individual's continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent with the interest of national security.
13. Implementation.
Existing directives, regulations, agreements, and other guidance governing access to SCI as defined herein will be revised accordingly.
8
Director of Central
ANNEX A*
Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access
to Classified Information
The following investigative standards are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programsnd are to be used by government departments and agencies as the investigative basis for final clearance determinations. However, nothing in these standards prohibits an agency from using any lawful investigative procedures in addition to these requirements in order to resolve any issue Identified in the courseackground investigation or reinvestigation.
Three Standards.
There are three standardsn the Appendix summarizes when to use each one):
investigation and reinvestigation standards authorizations and for access to CONFIDENTIAL andall SECRET-level SAPs not specifically approvedinvestigative requirements by an official authorizedSAPs by! Executive Order
investigation standard foraccessfor access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET SAPs) and
reinvestigation standard for continued access tolisted in
to Periods of Coverage.
* The content of this Asnexaken verbatim froo the Preaidentially approved Investigative Standards and Temporary Eligibility Standards and should be read In the context of access eligibility to SCI. although the actual wordingroader application to clearance actions.
in
Some elements of standardseriod of coverageeven years). Where appropriate, such coverage may be shortened to the period from the Subject's eighteenth birthday to the present or to two years, whichever is longer.
Investigation*.
Investigations and reinvestigations may be expanded under the provisions of Executivend other applicable statutes and Executive orders.
Investigations that satisfy the requirementsiven standard and are current meet the investigative requirements of all levels specified for the standard. They shall be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all agencies.
in Service.
erson who requires access has been retired or separated from US Government employment for less than two years and is the Subject of an investigation that is otherwise current, the agency regranting the access will,inimum, review an updated Standard Formnd applicable records. einvestigation is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executivesee
National Agency Check.
The National Agency Check is part of all investigations and reinvestigations. It consistseview of:
and criminal history files of thea technical fingerprint search;
Security/Suitability Investigations Index;
Defense Clearance and Investigations Index; and
other national agenciesIA, INS)to the individual's background.
STANDARD A
National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit Check
(NACLC)
8. Applicability.
pplies to investigations and reinvestigations for:
to CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET (including allSAPs not specifically approved for enhancedby an official authorized to establish SAPs byof Executivend
access authorizations.
Reinvestigations: Whan to Reinvestigate.
The reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion of, but not later than ten years (fifteen years for CONFIDENTIAL) from the date of, the previous investigation or reinvestigation. eflects the specific requirements for when toeinvestigation, Including when there hasreak in service.)
Requirements.
Investigative requirements are as follows:
of forms: completion of Standard Formapplicable releases and supporting documentation.
Agency Check: completionational
Review: verification of thestatus, including credit bureau checks coveringwhere the Subject has resided, been employed,school for six months or more for the past seven years.
and Place of Birth: corroboration of dateof birthheck of appropriate documentation,completed in any previousheck of BureauStatistics records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
Agency Checks: ininnno. allinclude checks of law enforcement agencieswhere the Subject has lived, worked, and/orwithin the last five years, and if applicable, ofagency for any identified arrests.
the Investigation.
The investigation may be expanded if necessary to determine if access is clearly consistent with the national security.
STANDARD B
Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)
12. Applicability.
pplies to initial investigations for:
a. Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET SAPs) and SCI; and
b. ccess authorizations.
13. Invsstigative Requirements.
Investigative requirements are as follows:
of Forms: completion of Standard Formapplicable releases and supporting documentation.
Agency Check: completionational
Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant completionational Agency Check,cards, for the spouse or cohabitant.
and Place of Birth: corroboration of dateof birthheck of appropriate documentation; a
check of Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
for individuals born outside theverification of US citizenship directly fromregistration authority; verification of USlegal status of foreign-born immediate family membersfather, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters).
corroboration of most recent orclaimed attendance, degree, or diploma. Interviewseducational sources if educationrimarythe Subject during the most recent three years.
verification of all employments forseven years; personal interviews of sourcesor both) for each employment of six months orthrough records or sources of all periodsexceeding sixty days; verification of alland military service, including discharge type. members, all service within one branch of thewill be considered as one employment, regardless
four references, of whom at least two are
developed; to the extent practicable, all should have social knowledge of the Subject and collectively span at least the last seven years.
i. Former Spouse: an interview of any former spouse divorced within the last ten years.
j. Neighborhoods; confirmation of all residences for the last three years through appropriate interviews with neighbors and through records reviews.
k. Financial Review: verification of the Subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where Subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more for the last seven years.
1. Local Agency Checks: heck of appropriate criminal history records covering all locations where, for the last ten years, the Subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more, including current residence regardless of duration. (NOTE: If no residence, employment or education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed appropriate.)
x. Public Records: verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involvinq the Subject.
n. Subject Interview: ubject Interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the investigation, additional Subject Interviews may be conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations may be taken whenever appropriate.
o, Polygraph (only agencies with approved personnel security polygraph programs): in departments or agencies with policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the investigation mayolygraph examination, conductedualified polygraph examiner.
14. Expanding the Investigation.
The investigation may be expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professional, and law enforcement professionals may be conducted.
STANDARD C
Single-Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation
(SSBI-PR)
IS. Applicability.
pplies to reinvestigations for:
to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET SAPs)and
access authorizations.
to Reinvestigate.
The reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion of, but not later than five years from date of, the previous investigation (see
Requirements.
Rcinvestigative requiMNBtal ait as EoUoifSl
of Forms: completion of Standard Formapplicable releases and supporting documentation.
Agency Check: completionational(fingerprint cards are required only if there has not beenvalid technical check of the FBI).
Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant completionational Agency Check,cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. TheCheck for the spouse or cohabitant is not requiredcompleted in conjunctionrevious investigation
verification of all employments sinceinvestigation. Attempts toufficient number(supervisors, coworkers, or both) at all employmentsmonths or more. For military members, all service withinof the armed forces will be considered as oneof assignments.
interviews with two characterare knowledgeable of the Subject; at least one will bereference. To the extent practical, both shouldknowledge of the Subject and collectively span the entire
period ot the investigation. As appropriate, additional interviews may be conducted, including with cohabitants and relatives.
Neighborhoods: interviews of two neighbors in the vicinity of the Subject's most recent residence of six months or more. Confirmation of current residence regardless of length.
Review:
Financial Status: verification of the Subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where Subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more for the period covered by the reinvestigation;
Check of Treasury's Financial Database: Agencies may request the Department of the Treasury, under terms and conditions prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to search automated databases consisting of reports of currency transactions by financial institutions, international transportation of currency or monetary instruments, foreign bank and financial accounts, and transactionshat are reported as possible money laundering violations.
Agency Checks: heck of appropriaterecords covering all locations where, during theby the reinvestigation, the Subject has resided,and/or attended school for six months or more, residence regardless of duration. (NOTE: Ifemployment, or education exceeds six months,checks should be performed as deemed appropriate.)
Spouse: an interview with any formerthe divorce took place before the date of theor reinvestigation.
j. Public Records: verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the Subject since the date of the last investigation.
k. Subject Interviews: ubject Interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the reinvestigation, additional Subject Interviews may be conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations may be taken whenever appropriate.
18. Expanding the Reinvestigation.
ICS
The reinvestigation may be expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may be conducted.
Appendix Decision Tables
TABLB 1: WHICH INVESTIGATION TO REQUEST
if the requirement is ioi
the perpon has this access
on this investigation
the
standard
SECRET; "L"
COHF.SEC.-L*
out of date NACLC Ot SSBI
SECRET, OSI; *Q"
CONF. SEC; *L"
or out of
date KACLC
Out of date SSBI
SCI; "Q"
TABLE 2: REINVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS
If the
the age
required if there
the in-
been a
in
for
of
months
mote
to 14
11
1)
yrs. Or
"L*
rs.
il
yrs. Or
SECRET,
ea.
I)
v -
5 yrs. Or
1: inimum, review an updated Std. Fm.nd applicableeinvestigation (NACLC or SSBI-PR) is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive.
Investigative Standards for Temporary Eligibility for Access
The following minimum investigative standards, implementingf Executive, "Access to Classifiedre established for all United States Government and military personnel, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information before the appropriate investigation can be completedinal determination made.
Eligibility for Access.
Basedustified need meeting the requirements off Executive, temporary eligibility for access may be granted before investigations are complete and favorably adjudicated, where official functions must be performed prior to completion of the investigation and adjudication process. The temporary eligibility will be valid until completion of the investigation and adjudication; however, the agency granting it may revoke it at any time based on unfavorable information identified in the course of the investigation.
Eligibility for Access at the CONFIDENTIALLevels and Temporary Eligibility for "L"
inimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the Standard including any applicable supporting documentation, favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, and submissionequest for an expedited National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit (NACLC).
Eligibility for Access at the TOP SECRET andand Temporary Eligibilityccess Authorization: who is the Subjectavorable Investigationthe investigative Standards for Access at those Levels.
inimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the Standardncluding any applicable supporting documentation, favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, and expedited submissionequestingle Scope Background Investigation (SSBI).
Eligibility for Access at the TOP SECRET andand Temporary Eligibility for "Q" Access Authorization: who is not the Subjecturrent, favorablePersonnel Security Investigation of any kind.
inimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the Standardncluding any applicable supporting documentation, favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, immediate submissionequest for an expedited SSBI, and completion and favorable review by the appropriate adjudicating authority of relevant criminal history and investigative records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of information in the Security/Suitability Investigations index (SIX) and the Defense Clearance and Investigations index (DCII) .
Requirements by Agencies.
Temporary eligibility for access must satisfy these minimum investigations standards, but agency heads may establish additional requirements based on the sensitivity of the particular, identified categories of classified information necessary to perform the lawful and authorized functions that are the basis for granting temporary eligibility for access. However, no additional requirements shall exceed the common standards for background investigations developed under) of Executive. Temporary eligibility for access is valid only at the agency granting it and at other agencies who expressly agree to accept it and acknowledge understanding of its investigative basis. It is further subject to limitations specified in)f Executive, "Access to Classified Information."
ANNEX 3
Quality Control Guidelines for the Single Scope Background investigation
In accordance with the requirements ofhis document sets out guidelines to maintain quality standards for the Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI). These guidelines assume the adjudicator's perspective because the adjudicator is the ultimate customer for the SSBI. The guidelines are divided into:
of Quality
Conduct of the Interview
Collection Requirements (coverage)
Quality Control Activities.
SOICs will ensure that investigative personnel employed by or assigned or detailed to their agencies/departments receive adequate initial and ongoing training in investigation and interrogation techniques, as well as familiarization with counterintelligence issues that may arise during investigation. Training should also incorporate findings of contemporary research in personnel security and medical disciplines and, in addition, evolving legal issues thac may impact investigation collection requirements. As much as possible, training should be conductedoint effort with other investigative entities supporting the Intelligence Community, to facilitate information sharing and to enhance reciprocity.
of Quality.
A quality investigationhorough and comprehensive collection of favorable and unfavorable informationariety of sources, past and present, that may includeredit, police, and the Subject.
The determination of eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented informationiscretionary determination using the whole person concept that such access is clearly in the interests of the national security. Accordingly, the investigation will be comprehensive and in such detail so as to affirmatively address unquestioned loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability.
discretion, and sound judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling and protection of sensitive compartmented information.
of the Interview
The quality of the investigation depends on the investigator's ability to elicit informationource knowledgeable about the Subject. This is basic to the conduct of any interview. The investigator should plan and execute each interview so as to obtain the maximum amount of informationource. Available sources should be selected from each area of coverage to ensure that pertinent information about the Subject's entire background is developed.
The investigator should conduct the interview in person anduitable location that protects privacy. Telephonic interviews are strongly discouraged; however, occasionally exigent circumstances may dictate that the interviews be conducted by telephone. elephonic interview is necessary, the report should always state why the interview was not conducted in person.
The investigator should initially advise the source of the reason/purpose for the investigation and should attempt toegree of confidence in the source(s) that willigh level of rapport and cooperation.
The investigator should also advise the source about the Privacy Actefore completing the interview, since the source needs to understand that the Subject of the investigation has the right to review information providedource and has the right toource's identity, unless the source requests conf ident iality.
Requirement (Coverage)
a. For all Sources.
Investigators should establish the duration and nature of association between the source and the Subject to assess the source's extent of knowledge. The investigator should always secure the source's full name and any other appropriate identifying data, particularly in the caseourceommon name. All derogatory or noteworthy information concerning the Subject of the investigation that is providedource should be fully explored in the interview, including elicitation of the names of any corroborating sources or record information that will substantiate any derogatory testimony provided by the source. For all sources, the report should indicate what issue
areas were covered and whether the information Drovided favorable or unfavorable.
b. For References and Neighbors.
Depending on the source's degree of association, investigators should ask each reference or neighbor relevant information regarding the Subject's:
Family, citizenship, education, employment, residence history, and military service.
Reputation, character, honesty, trustworthiness, integrity, discretion, reliability, and temperament.
Financial stability, organizational affiliations, and whether thereistory of mental, emotional, or physical health problems.
Whether the Subjectattern of excessive use of alcohol or has ever used illegal drugs or abused prescription drugs.
Activities whichack of discretion or demonstrate poorharacter riaw,ersonality disorder.
Participation in criminal activity or an altercation with law enforcement agencies.
Travels abroad for business or pleasure and degree of contact with foreign nationals.
(6) Unquestioned loyalty to the United states.
ubject has had access to classified informationource isosition to know, the investigator should ask whether the Subject properly handles classified information or has everecurity violation. Finally, the investigator should ask if the source can recommend the Subjectosition of trust and responsibility with the US Government or, in the caseontractor, can the Subject be trusted with classified information. The investigator should conclude the interview by asking the source to provide names of additional references.
c. Follow-up Questions.
ource provides noteworthy or derogatory information to questions in any of the above areas of consideration, the investigator should ask follow-up questions as necessary to elicit all available information. The investigator should report as fully as possible:
nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct.
motivation for and thethe conduct,
The frequency and recency of the conduct.
The Subject's age and maturity at the time of the
conduct.
the conduct was voluntary or whetheror exploitation leading to the conduct.
the Subject has been rehabilitated orother pertinent behavioral changes since the conduct.
If the Subject has ended the questionable conduct, the investigator should attempt to determine the motivation for positive change. The investigator should also attempt to establish whether there may be personal animosity or bias towards the Subject on the part of the The investigator should supply any available documentary evidence relating to the conduct in addition to the report of the source.
d. For Employment References.
The Investigator should identify and interview the best source Is) available. These employment references should include, but are not limited to, the Subject's immediate supervisor,nd other persons with frequent professional contact. Where appropriate, the investigator should pursue the same line of inquiry as with references and neighbors. In particular, the investigator should inquire regarding:
whether the Subject is willing to abide by company policies and regulations.
Whether the Subject appropriately safeguards the employer's proprietary/sensitive information.
Whether the Subject is financially stable.
whether the Subjectistory of substance abuse, to include alcohol, and/or prescription drugs.
the Subject has been involved inactivity.
the Subject is reliable and eligible for
re-hire.
The investigator should obtain any available documentary evidence to support the report of the
e. Por Subject Interviews.
The Subject ia the best source of information about himself/herself. Hence, the investigator should explore with the Subject the same line of inquiry she/he pursueseference, neighborhood, and employment The investigator should obtain the Subject's version of the details surrounding all issues arising either in the course of the interview or in other parts of the investigation that have been completed by the time of the Subject Interview and report them completely. The investigator should inquire regarding:
what happened and why.
Where, when, how, and how often it happened.
Who else was involved.
the conduct voluntary.
Of particular value to the adjudicator is evidence that the Subject is being contradictory or dissembling. If the Subject claims to have ended the conduct, the investigator should attempt to determine the motivation for positive change. Tho investigator should report: only the facts.
5. Quality Control Activities.
Quality control activities are designed to ensureigh quality investigation and report have been provided. The following management tools can be used by investigative agencies to ensure quality investigations, and other techniques may be appropriate:
a. Case Review.
Case review consistsupervisory review of the investigative requirements and the investigation to ensure that all coverage has been met using the best available sources. Depending on the
agency, the investigative review may be conducted by the investigator's supervisor oruality assurance or assessment team.
Program.
In ride-along programs, supervisors and/or senior agents accompany the investigator, observing the investigator's performance, focusing on whether the investigator:
Uses proper/acceptable investigative techniques.
Explores all relevant issues.
emeanor that reflects positively on the investigative agency.
Recontact.
The supervisory element may selectample of an investigator's cases and contact some or all of the sources. The source is queried regarding the investigator's professionalism, line of questioning, adherence to established policies and procedures, and thoroughness. Both written and telephonic re-contact are acceptable.
These recommended monitoring activities ensure adequate training of investigators, acceptable supervisory oversight, and proper professionalism while conducting the investigation. They also ensure that the standards of investigative coverage are satisfactorily met.
ANNEX CJ
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information
1- introduction.
The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programs (SAPs) and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.
2. The Adjudicative Process.
a. The adjudicative process is an examinationufficient perioderson's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligibleecurity clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighingumber of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered inetermination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
circumstances surrounding the conduct, knowledgeable participation;
frequency and recency of the conduct;
individual's age and maturity at the timeconduct;
The voluntariness of participation;
The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
1 The content of this Annex le taken verbatim from Lhe President tally approved Adjudicative Guidelines and should be read in the context of access eligibility to SCI, although the actual wordingroader application to clearance aclions.
pertinent behavioral changes;
The motivation for the conduct;
The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
case must be judged on its own merits, andremains the responsibility of theor agency. Any doubt as to whether accessinformation is clearly consistent withwill be resolved in favor of the national security.
ultimate determination of whether the grantingof eligibilityecurity clearance iswith the interests of national security must becommon sense determination based uponof the following, each of which is to bethe context of the whole person, as explained further below:
adverse information concerning amay not be sufficient for an unfavorableindividual may be disqualified if availablea recent or recurring pattern or questionableor emotionally unstablethe whole person concept, pursuit ofmay be terminated by an appropriatein the face of reliable, significant,information.
information of security concern becomes knownindividual who is currently eligible for access tothe adjudicator should consider whether the person:
Voluntarily reported the information;
Was truthful and complete in responding to
questions;
assistance and followedwhere appropriate;
{4} Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment ,-
Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough toecommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approvalarning that the future incidentsimilar nature may result in revocation of access.
llegiance to the United States
3. The Concern.
An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the united States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.
2'1
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
in any act of sabotage, espionage,sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrowof the United States or alter the form of governmentmeans;
or sympathy with persons who arecommit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
or sympathy with persons oradvocate the overthrow of the United States Government,state or subdivision, by force or violence or bymeans;
in activities which unlawfully advocatethe commission of acts of force or violence tofrom exercising their rights under the Constitution orthe United States or of any state.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
a. The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims ofor organization and severed ties upon learninq
b* The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
in the above activities occurred for only a
short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
person has had no recent involvement orsuch activities.
GUIDELINE oreign Influence
6. The Concern.
A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other
countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
immediate family member,erson to whomhas close ties of affection or obligation, is aor resident or presentoreign country,-
living quarterserson orof their citizenship status, if the potentialforeign influence or duress exists,-
cohabitants, or associates who areany foreign government;
to report, where required, associationsnationals;
associationuspected oror employeeoreign intelligence service,-
which may make the individual vulnerableexploitation, or pressureoreign government;
that representatives or nationals fromcountry are acting to increase the vulnerability ofto possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure,-
substantial financial interestountry,any foreign owned or operated business that could makevulnerable to foreign influence.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
determination that the immediate family father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers,or associate(s) in question are not agents ofpower orosition to be exploitedoreigna way that could force the individual to choose betweenthe person(s) involved and the United States.-
with foreign citizens are the resultUnited States Government business;
and correspondence with foreign citizensand infrequent;
individual has promptly complied withrequirements regarding the reporting of contacts,threats from persons or organizationsoreign country;
financial interests are minimal andto affect the individual's security responsibilities.
oreign Preference
Concern.
When an individual acts inay as toreferenceoreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
exercise of dual citizenship;
and/or useoreign passport;
serviceillingness to bear arms forcountry;
educational, medical, or other benefits,retirement and social welfare,oreign country;
Residenceoreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
foreign citizenship to protect financialinterests in another country,-
or holding political office in the
in foreign elections; and
or attempting to perform duties, orso as to serve the interests of another governmentto the interests of the United States.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
a. Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birthoreign country;
of possible foreign preferenceservice) occurred before obtaining united
is sanctioned by the United States,-
hasillingness to renounce
exual Behavior
Concern,
Sexual behaviorecurity concern if itriminal offense,ersonality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion." Sexual orientation or preference may not be usedasis forisqualifying factor inerson's eligibilityecurity clearance.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
behaviorriminal nature, whether or nothas been prosecuted;
or addictive sexual behavior when theunable toattern of self-destruction oror that which is symptomaticersonality disorder,-
behavior that causes an individual toto coercion, exploitation, or duress;
behaviorublic nature and/or thatlack of discretion or judgment.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
behavior occurred during or prior to adolescenceis no evidence of subsequent conductimilar nature,-
behavior was not recent and there is no evidenceconductimilar nature;
4 The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining Co criminal conduct (Guideline J) and emotional, mental, and personality disorders (Guideline I) in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.
is no other evidence of questionableor emotional instability;
behavior no longer servesasis foror duress.
ersonal Conduct
Concern.
Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:
to undergo or cooperate with requiredincluding medical and psychological testing; or
to complete required security forms,provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questionssecurity officials or otherin connectionersonnel securitydetermination.
that couldecurity concern and mayalso include:
unfavorable information providedemployers, coworkers, neighbors, and
deliberate omission, concealment, orrelevant and material facts from any personnelpersonal history statement, or similar form usedinvestigations, determine employment qualifications,or status, determine security clearance eligibilityor award fiduciary responsibilities;
providing false or misleadingrelevant and material matters to anofficial, competent medical authority, or otherin connectionersonnel securitydetermination;
conduct or concealment of information that may
increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail;
pattern of dishonesty or rule violations,of any written or recorded agreement made betweenand the agency;
with persons involved in criminal Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
information was unsubstantiated or not pertinentdetermination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
falsification was an isolated incident, wasand the individual has subsequently providedvoluntarily;
individual made prompt, good-faith effortsthe fslsification before being confronted with the facts;
of material facts was caused orto by Improper or inadequate advice ofand the previously omitted information was promptlyprovided;
Individual has taken positive steps toor eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation,,-
refusal to cooperate was based on advice fromor other officials that the individual was not requiredwith security processing requirements and, upon beingof the requirement, fully and truthfully providedinformation;
with persons involved in criminalceased.
inancial Considerations
18. The Concern.
An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained
affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
history of not meeting financial obligations;
or Illegal financial practices suchemployee theft, check fraud, income taxaccount fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, andfinancial breaches of trust;
or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
affluence,-
problems that are linked to gambling,alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
behavior was not recent,-
was an isolated incident;
C. The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's controloss olusiness downturn, unexpected medical emergency,eath, divorce or separation) .-
person has received or is receiving counselingproblem and there are clear indications that the problemresolved or is under control;
affluence resultedegal source; and
individualood-faith effort tocreditors or otherwise resolve debts.
GUIDELINElcohol Consumption
21. The Concern.
Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information duo to carelessness.
UnciaaaiI led
that couldecurity concern and stayinclude:
Incidents away from work, suchwhile under the influence, fighting, child oror other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
incidents at work, such as reportingor duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, orthe Job;
redentialed medical professional clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) ofor alcohol dependence,-
of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence byclinical social worker whotaff member ofalcohol treatment program;
Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;
f. Consumption of alcohol, subsequentiagnosis of alcoholismredentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
alcohol-related incidents do notattern,-
problemumber of years ago and thereindicationecent problem.-
changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
d Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participated frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymousimilar organization, has abstained from alcohol for at leastonths, andavorable prognosisredentialed medical professionalicensed clinical social worker whotaff memberecognized alcohol treatment program.
GUIDELINErug Involvement
Concern.
or illegal involvement, with drugsregarding an individual's villingness or abilityclassified information. Drug abuse or dependencesocial or occupational functioning, increasing the riskunauthorized disclosure of classified information.
are defined as mood and behaviorand include:
materials, and other chemicaland listed in the Controlled Substances Actarijuana or cannabis, depressants,andnd
and other similar substances.
abuse is the illegal userug or use ofdruganner that deviates from approved
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
drug abuse (see above definition);
drug possession, includingmanufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
redentialed medical professional clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drugdrug dependence;
of drug abuse or drug dependence byclinical social worker whotaff member ofdrug treatment program;
to successfullyrugprescribedredentialed medical professional. involvement, especially following the granting of aor an expressed intent not to discontinue use,invariably result in an unfavorable determination.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
drug involvement was not recent;
drug involvement was an isolated or,-
demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in
completionrescribed drugincluding rehabilitation and aftercarerecurrence of abuse,avorable prognosis byT.edical profecs-.onal .
GUIDELINE I
Emotional, Mental, and Personality The Concern.
Emotional, mental, and personality disorders canignificant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they mayefect in judgment, reliability, or stability. redentialed mental health professional linical psychologist ormployed by, acceptable to or approved by. Government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.
26. Conditions that couldecurity concern and may be disqualifying includei
opinionredentialed mental healththe individualondition or treatment that maydefect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
that suggests that an Individual hasfollow appropriate medical advice relating to treatmentailure to take prescribed medication;
pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive,or emotionally unstable behavior;
that suggests that theefect in his or her judgment or reliability.
29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
is no indicationurrent problem,-
opinionredentialed mentalthat an individual's previous emotional, mental,disorder is cured, under control or in remissiona low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
c. The past emotional instabilityemporary conditionne causedeath, illness, or maritalhe situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.
riminal Conduct
30. The Concern.
A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubterson's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude)
or admissions of criminalor whether the person was formally charged;
single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
criminal behavior was not recent;
crime was an isolated incident;
person was pressured or coerced into committingpressures are no longer present in that
person did not voluntarily commit the act and/orto the violation are not likely to recur;
is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.
ecurity Violations
Concern.
Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
that couldecurity concern and mayincludei
disclosure of classified information;
that are deliberate or multiple or due
35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that:
inadvertent;
isolated or infrequent;
due to improper or inadequate training;
a positive attitude towards the dischargeresponsibilities.
utside Activities
Concern.
Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if itonflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude any service, whether compensated,employment with:
foreign country;
foreign national;
representative of any foreign interest
foreign, domestic, or international organizationengaged in analysis, discussion, or publication ofintelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or
that could mitigate security concerns include:
a. Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does notonflict with an individual's security responsibilities,-
b. The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it Is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.
isuse of Information Technology Systems
Concern.
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
or unauthorized entry into anysystem;
or unauthorized modification,or denial of access to information residing ontechnology system;
(or use) of hardware, software, or media information technology system without authorization,prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines
of hardware, software, or media intotechnology system without authorization,prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines
that could mitigate security concerns include:
misuse was not recent or significant;
conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
introduction or removal of media wased,-
misuse was an isolated event;
misuse was followedrompt, good faithcorrect the situation.
ANNEX D
Appeals Procedures: Denial or Revocation of Access
This annex establishes common appeals procedures for the denial or revocation of access to sensitive corepartmented information (SCI) by entities of the Intelligence Community after adjudication pursuant to the provisions of. This annex is promulgated pursuant to Executive, Executive, and the National Security Acts amended. For the purposes of this annex, all references tonclude the basic document and all of its annexes. Any individual who has boon considered for initial or continued access to SCI pursuant to the provisions ofhall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to appeal the denial or revocation of such access. This annex supersedes any and all other practices and procedures for the appeal of the denial or revocation of SCI access. This annex will not be construed to require the disclosure of classified information or information concerning intelligence sources and methods, nor will it be construed to afford an opportunity to appeal before the actual denial or revocation of SCI access. In addition, the provisions of, or any other document or provision of law, will not be construed toiberty or property interest of any Kind in the access of any individual to SCI.
This annex applies to all US Government civilian and military personnel, at wall as any other individuals, including contractors and employees of contractors, who are considered for initial or continued access to SCI. This annex does not apply to decisions regarding employment and will not be construed to affact or impair public0 or the authority of any entity to effect applicant or personnel actions pursuant to Publicublic, or other applicable law.
Access Determination Authority.
Adjudications for access to SCI will be made in accordance withetermination Authority designated by the Senior Official of tha intelligence Community (SOIC) of each entity. Access to SCI shall be denied or revoked whenever it is determinederson does not meet the security standards provided for in. Any doubt about an individual's eligibility for access or continued access to SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security and access will be denied or revoked.
4. Procedures.
a. Individuals will be:
Provided as comprehensive andritten explanation of the basis for that determination as the national security interests of the United States and other applicable law permit.
Informed in this written explanation ot their right to be represented by counsel or other representative at their own expense; to request any documents, records or reports uponenial or revocation is based; and. to request the entire investigative file as permitted by the national security and other applicable law.
(31 Provided withinays, upon request and to the extent the documents would be provided if requested under the Freedom of Information Act) or the Privacy Acts applicable, any documents, records and reports uponenial or revocation is based.
Provided an opportunity to reply in writing withinays of receipt of relevant documentation toeview of the determination.
Provided written notice of and reasons for the results of the review, the identity of the deciding authority in accordance with operational requirements, and written notice of the right to appeal.
Provided an opportunity to appeal in writingigh level panel, appointed by the SOIC, which shall be comprised of at least three members, two of whom shall be selected from outside the security field. Decisions of the panel shall be in writing, and final, except when the SOIC chooses to exercise the appeal authority personally, basedecommendation from the panel, and provided to the individual.
Provided an opportunity to appear personally and to present relevant documents, materials and information at some point in the process before an adjudicative or other authority, other than the investigating entity, as determined by the SOIC. ritten summary or recording of such appearance shall be made part of the applicant's or employee's security record, unless such appearance occurs in the presence of the appeals panel described in subsectionf this section, in which case the written
decision of the panel shall be made part of the applicant's or employee's security record.
a SOIC or their principalrocedure set forth in this section cannotavailablearticular case without damaging theinterests of the United States by revealingthe particular procedure shall not be madecertification shall be conclusive.
in this annex shallOICexercising the appeal authority in paragraphbased upon recommendations from an appeals panel. Inthe decision of the SOIC shall be final.
SOIC may determine that the appealin this annex cannot be invokedanner thatwith the national security. In suchOICan individual an appeal pursuant to this annex anddelegated to the SOIC by the DCI under theActs amended. The SOIC's determinationregard shall be conclusive.
DCI or DDCI may take any actions regardingSCI access without regard to any of the provisionsor any other regulation or directive. The DCI or DDCIwith the agency head pertaining to any action to bean individual's SCI access.
annex does not create nor confer on any personany right to administrative or judicial review oftheir implementation, or decisions or actions It also does not create or confer any right,privilege, whether substantive or procedural, for accessinformation. Finally, this annex does not createany substantive or procedural right, benefit, orby any party against the United States or anyor instrumentality of the executive branch,or employees, for any other person.
ANNEX E
Standards for SCI Security Awareness Programs in the US Intelligence Community
Consistent with controls and procedures set forth inSecurity Policy for Sensitive Compartmentednd its supplement, 9 Security Policytandards are hereby established for the SCI security education programs designed to enhance the security awareness of the US Government civilian and military personnel and private contractors working in the US Intelligence Community. Compliance with these standards is required for all departments/agencies within the Intelligence Community. Existing security awareness programs will be modified to conform with these standards. Departments/agencies willocumented program to ensure that training has been presented to all personnel.
All individuals nominated for or holding SCI access approval will be notified initially and annually thereafter of their responsibility to report to their cognizant security officers any activities or conduct such as described inhat could conflict with their ability to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. Any outside employment, activities or conduct that could create real or apparent conflicts with their responsibility to protect classified information must be reported.
The security awareness requirements set forth herein are divided into three phases. oncerns the initial indoctrination of individuals, which is normally administered before access to SCI.oncerns the continuing security awareness program required to maintain an increased security awareness throughout the period of access. ets forth the final guidelines and instructions when access to SCI is terminated.
1. Initial Indoctrination.
As soon as practicable after being approved for access to SCI, personnel will receive an initial security indoctrination that will include:
a. The need for and purpose of SCI, and the adverse effect on the national security that could result from unauthorized disclosure.
b- The intelligence mission of the department/agency to include the reasons why intelligence information is sensitive.
c- The administrative, personnel, physical, and other procedural security requirements of the department/agency and those requirements peculiar to specific duty assignments, including information on who to consult to determine if particula outside employment or activity might be of concern.
classification management responsibilitiesforth in appropriate directives and regulations toguidelines and
definitions and criminal penalties forharboring or concealing persons;or losing defense information; gatheringdefense information to aid foreignand sketching defense installations;of classified information, , the Internal Security Acthe IntelligenceAct2and, when appropriate, the Atomic Energy Act
administrative sanctions for violation orsecurity procedures.
review of the techniques employed byorganizations in attempting to obtaininformation.
security responsibilities including:
The prohibition against discussing SCI in aarea,on-secure telephone, or in any other manner that permits access by unauthorized persons.
The need to determine, before disseminating SCI, that the prospective recipient has the proper security access approval, that the SCI is needed in order to perform official duties, and that the recipient can properly protect the information.
The need to exercise security in activities as members of professional, commercial, scholarly or advocacy organizations that publish or discuss information on intelligence defense or foreign affairs.
The continuing obligation to submit for review any planned articles, books, speeches or public statements that contain or purport to contain SCI or information relating to or
derived from SCI, as specified by the nondisclosure agreements thatrerequisite for access to SCI.
Obligation to report travel to or connections with countries with aggressive proactive intelligence capabilities, or contacts with foraign nationals under certain circumstances, or attempts (including blackmail, coercion and harassment) by unauthorized persons to obtain national security information, physical security deficiencies, and loss or possible compromise of SCI material.
Obligation to report to proper authorities all activities or conduct of an individual who has access to SCI which relates to guidelines described in Annex C, such as:
Involvement in activities or sympathetic association with persons which/who unlawfully practice or advocate the overthrow or alteration of the united States Government by unconstitutional means.
Foreign influence concerns/close personal association with foreign nationals.
citizenship or foreign monetary
interests.
Sexual behavior that is criminal orack of judgment or discretion.
Unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations or to cooperate with security processing.
affluence or excessive
abuse.
or improper drug use/involvement.
mental or emotionalconduct.
with security requirements.
in outside activities which could
onflict
of information technology systems.
(7) Identification of the elements in the department/agency to which matters of security interest are to be referred.
2. Periodic Awareness Enhancement.
Each department/agency willontinuing security awareness program that will provide frequent exposure of personnel to security awareness material. Implementationontinuing program may include live briefings, audiovisual presentationsideo tapes, films, and slide/taperinted material osters, memorandums, pamphlets,ombination thereof. It is essential that current information and materials be utilized. Programs should be designed to meet the particular needs of the department/agency.
basic elements for this program will include,not limited to, the following:
foreign intelligence threat (includingassociated with foreign travel and foreign associations).
The technical threat.
Administrative, personnel, physical, and procedural
security.
classification
Criminal penalties and administrative sanctions.
Individual security responsibilities.
review of other appropriate
security briefings/debriefings shouldexisting security awareness programs in the
When an individual is designatedourier.
When high risk situations are present, specifically:
(a) When an individual travels, officially or unofficially, to or through countries with aggressive/proactive intelligence capabilities or with connection(s) to terrorism or criminal activity, or:
(b) when an individual has, or anticipates contactepresentative(s) of the countries identified above.
(31 When any other situation arises for which the SOIC or designee determines that an increased level of protection is necessary.
3. Debriefing.
epartment/agency has determined that access to SCI is no longer required, final instructions and guidelines will be provided to the individual. inimum these shall include:
requirement that the individual readof Titles, and that the intentsanctions of these laws relative to espionagedisclosure be clarified.
continuing obligation, under the prepublicationprovisions of the nondisclosure agreement for SCI, neverpublish; or reveal by writing, word, conduct,to any unauthorized persons any SCI, withoutconsent of appropriate department/agency officials.
acknowledgment that the individual willdelay to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, orany attempt by an unauthorized personnational security information.
declaration that the individual no longerdocuments or material containing SCI.
reminder of the risks associated with foreignforeign association.
Mi
ANNEX Ps
Reciprocity of SCI Eligibility Determinations 1. Reciprocity Policy.
the Intelligence Community, subject toset forthavorablefor access to SCI made by one adjudicativeSOIC cognizanceavorable determination for allof eligibility determinations does not inreciprocity of need-to-know determinations. determinations are always distinct and separate decisions.
requires adjudication by trainedunder SOIC cognizanceystem forsecurity eligibility. Eligibility decisions,presence of exceptions, mustatter of recordthe Intelligence Community's access granting authorities.
ligibility determinations areand will not be readjudicated if:
They are made without exception, and
No substantial issue information exists since the most recent adjudication, and
The appropriate type of polygraph examination, if one is required, has been satisfactorily completed.
may accept or rejectwhere exceptions exist based upon theirof risk. Any agency rejecting another'seligibility where exceptions exist will notify, to theis able to do so, all adjudicative authorities havinginterest in the person of its decision. in turn, may reassess the appropriatenessto hold the person eligible with an exception.
an agency or organization has additional butrequirements, the actual granting of accessupon satisfying those requirements. Failure to meetbut not duplicative requirement mayerson's continued eligibility forwith other organizations and agencies. However, themade the original eligibility determination may use new
1as signed by the DCI ont that time, the number of4 was changedo correspond Lo an appropriate section in
information obtained by another organization to readjudicate the person's continued eligibility subject to restrictions placed on use of the information by the organization that obtained it.
person determined ineligible for SCI accessineligibleinimum of one year. However, SOICsdesignees may waive this requirement in individualon operational necessity and an assessment by theauthority that there is no unacceptablein doing so.
annex does not apply to suitability decisions
2. Definitions.
a. Exception: An adjudicative decision to grant or continue access eligibilityailure to meet adjudicative or investigative standards. Regarding SCI access eligibility, only the DCI or, as appropriate, the concerned Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) or designee will make such decisions. An exception precludes reciprocity without review of the case by the gaining organization or program. There are three types:
Condition: Access eligibility granted or continued with the proviso that one or more additional measures will be required. Such measures include additional security monitoring, restrictions on access, and restrictions on the individual's handling of classified information. Submission of periodic financial statements, admonishment regarding use of drugs or excessive use of alcohol, and satisfactory progressovernment-approved counseling program are examples of conditions.
Deviation: Access eligibility granted or continued despiteignificant gap in coverage or scope in the investigation or an out-of-date investigation. "Significant gap" for this purpose means either complete lack of coverageeriod of six months or more within the most recent five years investigated or the lack of an FBI name check or technical check or the lack of one or more relevant investigative scope componentsmployment checksubject interview for an SSBI, financial review for any investigation) in its entirety.
Waiver: Access eligibility granted or continued despite the presence of substantial issue information that would normally preclude access. The DCI, SOIC, or SOIC's designee approve waivers pursuant to their authorities outlined in, paragraphsnd b, only when the benefit of access clearly outweighs any security concern raised by the shortcoming. A
waiver may require special limitations on access, additional security monitoring and other restrictions on the person's handling of classified information beyond normal need-to-know.foverns the granting of waivers insofar as they pertain to SCI access eligibility. In the intelligence Community, waivers may be contemplated when the person under consideration for SCI access isnited States citizen, when any member of that person's immediate family iss citizen, or when any member of the immediate family or other person with whom thereond of affection or obligation is subject to duress.
information: Any information that coulda person's eligibility for access to There are two types:
Minor issue information: Information thathreshold of concern set out in "Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information" (seeout for which adjudication determines that adequate mitigation, as provided for by the Guidelines, exists. Minor issue information does not provide the basisaiver or condition.
Substantial issue information: Any information, or aggregate of information, thatignificant question about the prudence of granting access eligibility. Substantial Issue information constitutes the basis for granting access eligibility with waiver or condition, or for denying or revoking access eligibility. Granting access eligibility when substantial issue information exists la predicated upon meeting the requirements offor tailored security programs whose purpose is to resolve issues.
to know. etermination made by anof classified informationrospectiveaccess to specific classified information in orderor assistawful and authorized
Acceptance by one SOIC of an SCIdetermination made by another. It applies bothaccess when another SOIC has approved and denyinganother SOIC has denied or revoked. Reciprocity doesagency determinations of employment suitability. SOICs or their designees from exercising authorityor to deny access for reasons of operationalof another SOICs decision.
3. The Effect of the Polygraph on Reciprocity.
The Intelligence Community uses the polygraph in defined circumstances to provide additional information to the adjudicative process. Reciprocity of an SCI eligibility determinationolygraph requirement exists is conditional upon satisfactory completion of that requirement.
4. Review of Access Determinations.
All denials or revocations of access eligibility are subject to the review proceedings outlined in Annex D, above.
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