CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE AS0
Objectives and Opiums iii Conventional Ainu Control
and Possible Gambits
of Conventional Tnlk*
and Space Talks)
ABM Trcaiy; Compliance or Conflict for .the New Administration?
Impasse Overkety Future Course
Ariai CO""ol InlcIHgtner
the early days of bk term ia office. Cor backer has made areas control talks aae al the cealerpieces of hii/orelgn policy. Like hii rrredoccssors. Gorbachev's objecllrei include redndnt the threat /ram the West, mating the arms competition lata areas more favor, able to the USSR, and boostlag Sorlet political prestlgei
Tbe INF agreement eliminated (he Pen bin* II. and Soviet START position! are designed to constrain US cruise missilee what* preferring Soviet deploy' meets of mobile missiles aad new heavy ICBWs
ForesUllinc SDI is the central aba of Soviei effort! ia tbe Defense and Space Talks.
In tbe negotiations on conventional arsis the Soviets hope to reduce wbat tbey tee as NATO advamates initerafi and naval force
Beyond these endaring objecllrei, however, lies an approaen to international trcurlty driven in large measure by domestic economic imperatives.oundering economy which he charac-icriied as havingprecrisis' stage. He has made ccunorruc rcitali/nlion his highest priority and has embraced the armt coateol praeett OS the best means af managing military competition the VS without undercutting hit etenemie agenda:
lo sharply Cut the strategic forces of both side* woeVJ reduce the future cost of rnodeimi-log the Sonet tiralegic aisetval by raRitting tbe number of systems that would havee upgraded-
An enduring tunbe deployment ot space-basedIbe Sovieu have consistently linked to reduction! in offensivesl-low iheto foi go an enormously expensive responseDI
in coflrenliortal forces would provide dirert savings and fieegly scarcefor civilian indutlrs
A strategic aims control package co tad tided within ihe nest year couM still shape defense priorities inive-Year Defense Plan, the firneunder Gorbachev's leadenhir
Gorbachev and his political supporters have cast their arms control proposals in the context of "newa framework for Soviet foreign policy thai emphasizes lite contribution that politicalas opposed to purely militarymake lo Ibe USSR's security. Gorbachev's strategy is intended to alter the "enemy image "of the USSR In the West, exacerbate tensions between the VS and Its European allies, and andeffat Wrttern public support for arms
Some In Moscow have cleaily been uneasy with what they see as Gorbachev's overly concessionary arms controlnd many lop military olflcialB are concerned not to rush into ambitious new agreement! before the implications can be fully evaluated. (Treat foreign policy conservatives, however, generallyarms controleans of obtaining aspace" from military competition wiih ihe Wesi. in order to concentrate on the indnurlal modernita-tieu needed to meet the military challenge ofnd be ran,
And raneadership changes here clearlybaeherhand inew approachhe long-term tetationsbip between East and West All escepi one of ihe bteibnev holdovers have now beenturn the Politburo While the two most powerful deltndert of ideological orthodoxyoreign policy Ligachev aridin imrortar'they have been moved io accounts that will IntQln ihem leu directly in foreign atTiiit. On INT and SI ART.hat tl.eedyar tie bold move and, lo IliC client he sees addtivnnnl opetoitunities, hr may nowore Ictiludc tt msthifpinc /iropetoll and i'r. matte initirfi<.
Arms Control IrAellipenee
Nonelhcleii, -hilt Ooihaehcano Ihe near Icrm he if part mly does moi/rrl ike meed to make dramatic unlUtrral concessions on loch core snaes a* ihe Soviet lauiauacc on the linkageTART agree meal and non withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or ibc US demand thai the KrauKiyaiik radar be dumantted:
Mcscowte* admtnistratjoo ia WaibLTgloo will build oa ibe auatcgic arms control fraiDCworl already in place.
To maintain momentum duringnsiiion. Ibe Soviet! arc moving aggrc*si*tJyiminalc out-Standing rertfrcatkxi problems.
There ii,eal prospect (tor backer trill attempt tome dramatic gesture ia Europe, suchnilateral reduction of Soviet con ventorces in Eastern
nilateral red taction of UCOpscale^would leave the overall military balance largely unchanged, but which would scxtouily compiicatcuNATO's decisionmaking on issues like force struct are and modern izalioa. At the same lime, ibc Soviets also would hope lo generate enthusiasm among West European leaden to toerre fee-ward on future conventional anas control negotiaticcs, which arc still in tbe planning stages.
Arms Control Talks
end Spate TalksAmbassador Max Kampelman
Gremp on Strategic GffctulK ArmSeek} limits on ICBMs. SLBMi,rnb-ers. and cruise missiles Ambassador Read Uanmer
Standing ConsaltatlH CommissionBilateral
Commissioner. Richard M. Ellis SCC XXXV; Springand resolveconcerns with ABM Treaty
ABM Treaty Review was conducted Ineeting of fall SCC Session pending.
on "Defense and Spaceto substitute the proposed DAS treaty for tht existing ABM Treaty2 Ambassador Henry Cooper
Conference oat DisarmamentAmbassador Max Frtidersdotf Chemical Weaponssession,8
Summertotal ban on chemical weapons
Nuclear Testing TalksAmbassador Paul Robinson Round III began onegotiateImprovements to TTBT end PNET
Conference on Security and Cooperation In Europe
Ambassador Warren Zimmerman
Fourth round; Inresume sometime in
Create confidence-building steps to reduce risk of accidental war
Mutual and Balanced Force RedactionsMultilateral
Ambassador Steven ledogar
Seeks to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact troop levels
Weapons TreatyAmbassador Max Fretdersdotf
Roundafweapons negotiations In CD
Headi af Satin Arms Control Deltflienl
ffST: Alehseyat START and SALT experience
STAJU Group: Lentlto has ban Involved since SALT.
DAS Group: Yurirouiheoji Asia ipeciallii who hot been Involved In ovms eoeitrol Issues-k
OX run, Nat or ityear veteran of CD and lit .pexdeteuofi.
Igorai extensive etyerUnce In nuclear -and disarmament Issues
W: Yuri, Nasorkln (tee above,
SCO Mat. Gen. Vladimirat IS vtaet'ooeHenee In negotiations IS ALT II. START, INF)
CSCE: Yuri,e*'* "eelallsl who has "parllclpoied In CSCE1
n otd-stvle Soviet dlolomat
SeMtA Ofcjeetlm uio.rJ Aim Coolrot
At*MCOwtoxbt, aflmterrtlated mall hi bath for fl'glni ii. Wot la rvmremtleaal arm, coatrol atgailailaai aai far redmeimt Sarin military ferttti
WarsawNATO, ability toeoalimmepeoducitt adtaaeed-
weaponand to mobilize ind rebtforce miliury forces. It is rjartieulaflyibcejl tbe eapabilrly of NATO's air forces.
Arms talks oVer Moscow auc-sW'-wn. la which ta dtmamttrau It, -pta^mf'lmtemt, ta taw Htnatlo. amaato erodepoM it Werten Ecu-ope for NATO forcerograms. Simply by engaging in theceii. ibc SovieU hope to complicate Alliance drxbionmaliing and isolate tbe US on blocs (bat arc eewtrovmial within tbe Alliance.
If Ibe Soviets couM ,klft lartetmeat/ram th, defemi, ta ihe drillam leaor by reducing miliiary procurement aod coostroctioc, Gorbachev's fong-tenn ccooomic rxc*raras would beoefil. Gorbachev would better be able to protect bis arms control policies from domestic critics and (bus further his economic alms if be could darwcMratc ibal Pact coo.enbooa!Western per cepiionaUaiiaisbieg Sovietaged NATO's cit-deroiraben
IVopotahnQj> Caablu Af mam he,garem, pmitle diplomacy 'empalta am eaaremltoaeJreiaaiea, since tbe War saw Pact blued6 Budapest Appeal, wbkh called for mutual NATO-Pact rcdooloni of 5CO.0CO men and Iheli associated cquipmeoL The rempalfitmie, ihe ihrec-.lage outline presented by Gorbachev al Ihe Moscow Summit; idenlify and eliminate aiymmctrlei. Implement farjr ma'"ldettlaai andiefentr C
Otuggests, however, that the Pad had noi rorniulnted tho detaib ofby ihe springther more recent infection, indudlni the lUat's performance inandate for new con.entlonal arms lal*.the continued Ucketailed propoaal
We be!-eve ibc Pat* mill mat merry, the NATO prapmtal aaxurcatly bring discussed because Ibc Western Alluscc wants lo call, in cflect/r* maiiin Ptti cli If, retmrmfar mlmor NA TO emu Neither ihe US Government nor NATO has finaLied ita positionumber of biuss relatedATO proposal. Ibe outline of NATO's proposal,ikelynclude massive Pact reductions in lanls, artillery and possibly iofaairy 6gbling vehicle) lo bring Pact forces slightly below current NATO leveb. NATO would take only marginal reductions in ibe initial phase. For ciampJe, the Pact would remove0 of iueturneduction ofATO tanks. As yet urupecified residual ceiliegi would be applied to selected types efwn. ardetiree can formco,arsoeitored storage most likely -ill be uschaded Someeing given toposal that would rxotoa NATO'i war reserves and rue pcaiuooed oeru-peneat and lo other negotiating proposals designed lo capture Soviel forces, while allowing NATO to retain as much SeiJbilily as posiible
The SovieU are likely to view such propoaab by NATO as failing to meet any of (heir fundament ul TOocerni Mouow has admitted thai lomt aamerleal mijmmcuici la Europe faro* the Pact, bul has argued thaias ibe quality of NATO'i ait power-tompcjUefcclitrjlet adroalate. They probablyseek to acMresa ibese -qoaliuine" NATO adnnugei ia tbe nctr-tiitwoieopo.nl doigoed to:
(be remonl of socoe Arnerienn forcea from Gaiopc.
Ditaifuib ibe ab&iy of (be West German Bundev wehr lo toobilirc-
NATO's ailiutie ocgotUtaoeu by arguing lhal Ihe Pad's advantage in Uaksic- ilum olTiel by NATO'i superior air power
Thr Soriei, and (heir allies probablyrefer to artotltu, moi*alforte rrdmaieai because il li mill Urily tcniiblc to "irade" inductions. They
tome benefit merely from being engaged Innegexla lions, but tbey tea lire that tbeNATO on coenentiooal meet could makeforat cm Alliance io reach anon conventional reductions in the thort term.result,aallmrralgmarr
a*aVe to teemre tame tyre af reciprocal Weitten rtiMoaot or to racomragr call or fretiei oa Wttttrm mejtuse tarWiagetter* aaijaj aliatomtemmi af tpeedlat aexatlailoai. Q_
he Sorted have con-liclercd at least one unilateralremoval of the four Soviet divisions aUtiotted ia Hungary.could altonilateral gesture on short-range nuclear forces.ambit would appeal strongly lo West Germany
Sea tars of Oacriestk-aa) Tafti
CurretUy there are fro tea af formal artatiatioai
related to conventional arms control under way in Vienna:
Tbe Mulnal and Bala need Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which cover reduction*entral zone of Europe, beganJ. Several NATO Kates do not participate and Francasonparticv panl) wanU MBFR codeel before (be new nogolia-tiotts ooeo.
Tbe Confetenoa on Security and CocoeratiOQ in Europe (CSCE)S-oalioe review oescended from the original Helsinki. In addition to discussing performance on human rights aad eccevMiic coOperatioat.ollow-on lo ibe Stccthctlm Conlereoce oa Disarmament in. which prodnccd the Stockholm Agreement6 oa exeaSdeoce tntiJdiDg treasureshe US has maintained that oeilber now arma reduction talks nor new CBM negotiations can open until tbe CSCE review it crarngaetc The West has lets is led that tbe East show some progress on human rights before (he CSCE review coodudt*.
In addition, iaforaal talks taaadaee fee fml art megMlatiaai aa cormailaaal refaetloai began
In7 and include all NATO and Pact gutea. Although the mandate could be completed before tbe end of this year, several unreaolted tstoct itHl remain coeteotKHU withta NATO or between NATO and the Pact, tad tiding:
geographic rone lo be covered by tbe aew talks, particularly wbal poniotu of Turkey and (be
' cm USSR at: betuded.
scope of tbe aegoeiationt, that is,deal* capable systems arc included.
- The reUttonihip of the new talk* to ihe CSCE process, wiih the US Insisting that Ibetale* of bothladependently of theSCE Hates. i
START Sutw of Talks
The US and USSR began negolJatioaa on unlet* weapon! ie Geneva in rnas-IVfm-tort ore weeklmg am Ike haii,aimi draft treaty Ita which bvceporilaSSoviet poaJiioos on ihe ipecific arms lo be reduced and on tbe raocedurei for imcJeraeotlnj lad verifying Ihe g
An" of Agreeaeemg. Tarn, far, ika two elder hare agreed lot
their eeieneUaa act lotrategic oeTcnsivedeOvery vehicles and&nrjo oaalosive charge*).
.Set nheelllmg, withinCO-weapon limit so that no morearheads will be on land-and sea-based ballistic missiles tnd no more thanarbeadi willhoary- missiles.
Counl each hear,ne airalegk nudear delivery vehicle and count each heavy bomber equipped for gravity tombs and short-range attack cussiles aa one warhead withinOO limit
Reduce tbe aggregate ikraw weight of Soviet lCBMs and SLBM* toercent below thelevel and set this Icrdoiling thai neither party will exceed for the duration of the treaty.
Adopt wrlfieailo, procedure, (hal -ill provide for an extensive exchange of data, notainlerferencc with riatsooal technical ineaxu of verlficniion (NTMsl and the nght to conduct on-site in.pect.ona
Mohllt ICBMi Tboogh the US hat not formally agreed that motile missile* should be allowedTART treaty. raV Iwa tlitt hare hat-howeffective regime far watfyimr limit, on suchl Ihe MoscowS reriflcmtlam package mat agreed ta la prlmclmle that would restrict road-mood* ICBM. to tcnall restneted area, aurroundtn, (net, garensona. .bjle pcrndLag (or liXDitod exereue and deployment rights, withoS<aiion. beyond these areas RaU-rrtobtle lCBMs would be permlued notiftrd movements out. side tbclrear Oeaeral agreement was reachedigorous regime of on-site Insrxctions of garrison facilities, and perimeter portal monitoring
of peoductlon fadlilies. would be necessary. Al the Uteai round of START talks la Geneva, the Serin, hart teMed detailed proposal, to Scab out what wis ag.eed lo in principle al the sautwava. a
XemaJalag area, of ameenaiaty ind ode tbe sire of restricted areas, the number of missiles or launcher* lim would be allowed to deploy almtOuneously. and Ihe nact production fadliliea subject lo rxrinxler porul mc-niioting. Moscow has proposed placing the reslrkted areas for ground-mobile lCBMsarger dcploytneni area, within which missiles could tnove for routineore restrictive concept of de-raoymcniW -JovicU have notS proposal for ugging mobile missiles wiih .toine* idcUfaers in order to better monitor ntisxile movemcnu and numbers
Sta-lMMeked Cruhe Mlttile,heUSSR are far apart aa Mi hue. whichcearacrerexrd a* one of the most Insporunt |nirons. Ia prit>aple,ide, luve agreeda maluslly salislactor, sdatioo lo the questioathe depioyrncal of ksag-fang.Both sides also agree that .uehbe adopted outsideCO^artead andoffensiveThe Sarin,,
. agreedprapotal, that wouldpliamed VS deployment, of hatharmed SLCM, aad wamldoa rite
face teuel, am hoe. ti4afafoole fe ijs oh^Ibe Soviets have insistedom Una lion ofiasfecliorii ,nd national technical
r-"trn- SI rkli **
Scmet arulitary vljxsuxn bdieve unrcautcied USysnent of ntadcaranrscd SLCMi would greailv complicate Soviet targeting plans, ,nd coo Id the US inceotrve i0 strike firstrisis
Air-Laameked Cruise Missiles lALCMsX The lidti
tOlmCMt lmid ALCMt
tsadn START limits hml differ emrr ike remit ikrrsk-eid tor accountable AI ('Mi aad emrr ike ttramilmg rales lora ipcofic Btaanbcr of miiulea to their rcapectirc ALCM-carrying akcrail:
' Tbeoposca that tbeapply to aixkar-aitneel ALCMa with ruga of 1JOO In Of greater; tbe Soviet.act tbe thnaJtoid
Tbe US alao prupcae* that eachheavy bomber be coueted ai carryingLCMt, while the Solicit maintain thai boenbera ibccld be counted aa carrying tbe number of ALCMl for which tbe aircraft La equipped -t> I
From Moscow! perspective, tbe US proposaltf proportional advantage to tbe US, since US heavy boenbera can individually carry niorc ALCMt than Iheir Soviet cpaalerparti and the USarger bcenber fleet. The Sewietiskis ataaa-rr locc-peeal they bad made earlierublimitat bomber-carriedss-ratnota. ia rc-tjrn forrbaau/'ag eearrtmiltutallr erased htarj hiaak-ert taurardM limb am tmradtrie mttsdtaw aWiV-rrr ftkltlo. This il fan at Satin efforts le mat START It raastrala US teems la metttakm la Europe
<nd Suae*V S) Stain of TaX1u
CwrrcnUv ikt Defrost amialk,Tbeir ropting in iei Sovieltocaat Draft Treaty (JDT) tealekbnentea agreed language and aboalternative language whereoS<ntrU knotJ In eameepi foDTthai Ike US I, (a.UUlow, thatihe rVashlapton Sammilccording lo thatf ibe two countries abo Lrarjuaed!egataoos in Geoev. to work cast an agreementcommit the sides to obocrve the ABMsignedovietIbeioterrpreU-Joo of tbeconducting their research,hich are permitted by iheand not to withdraw from (be ABMa ipcciScd period of
prohibited by Ibe AUM Treaty, ml the eat af ihe nomwitUrmwal ptrlmi In tbe WSJS.aa mulaally agreed that each partybe free loroorte of action foilouing (be end of (be oon withdrawal period. Tbe US stale* thai (be right tooc of (beofpen lo (be pnrtie* end tbercfore can be eipUdl in theamlet, hare mot mceepiii ihi, patlriom elalmlat thai It ran, coatitr ia the ABM Treatyreaty of unlimited duration.
Sensan-Ca-Free. Tbb past year, fie USiaJlrroposal to (he Sonets (hai both aides agree la aJltm ipattkastt arntevf re km aUplayai
IrrrapteiCrt mf Iheir esmpahlllty. (The ABM Treaty prohibiti tbe derJoyisscni in space of aa ABM radaryitem capable offor an ABMbb proposal was madember of reasons f"
M Treaty far a
US StTmtetlc'Defrnu Inltl, mram piataiblc.alk* of ihc-StH pec^rtun;'
i/HXiMmertai: ibe rigbu
treaUes, foe example, the
ABM Treatyraordiauiy cents Jeopardize lis supremo tnletedtaorthena-tertal breach. Tbe US has been wdling to accepi language pledging non withdrawal 'rota tbe ABM Treaty oa ec^Uon'tbsl iu pUns lo develop aod depaoy SD1 not be jeopaH^rd tbb has not been acceptable to tbe Sole u
Right To Deploy SDI. In cichangeon-wit hdra wai clause, iht US ha, Inilitti on hariog iht right to deploy Uttncti iittuglc itfiniet. currently
" the Sarin, hat maeefinitlxt position em tht proposal
Ten Range Ints the WSJS, tbe US minted upon the. observe ibe ABM Treaty aigoedhile cooducting iheir research,and lesting aa required, which are pcauihtcd by (be ABMeans of clarifying whal It means by this phrase,S proposri thtetmexMteaxtn,la* of,he ptrmilnrA.^
scat fecra,thecorxept nvisaoets no limlu co orbital rarascUri eclumber
twiM roTMiinxai. ; h
Prtparatlaaoiat Draft TeafJDTlte al the stageoiat Draft Teareaty ,'atreemeat tt im order. TV US feat preparedocument and provided ilhe Sennet* Tlr Sortrti hare effulaJly refected theeat pm tie grotmdi liat the language It *orwith the hVSJS laaaaatt. They arfuod (hit the US tide *at attcospting to lubvcn the nseaaing ot* the WSJS by limiting the noo withdraw a! commit rr.cntccitiiv-ed eflorJ lo deploy strategicee example, "freedom to decide lu own course ofbould nol be coutiued aj an unconditional right to deploy tuate.lc defenses in the future. TAeythai theeoaftrmi the limit, mftme ABM Trtair, Im ma tray wamJJ Ike -broade actrptaHi ,
Urnksge lo START. The Soviets insist that there can bepercent reduction in strategic forces until the US agreedbide by the ADM Treaty as ngnedhe US. on the other hand, stipulates that ihere can be no Defease and Space treaty until the Soviets have agreed to andTART lrcnl>
Chemical Weapons Negotiations
Tbe Uniled Sulci hai been aa active pan idn chemical Hve/oat (CW) arms eeairel tsTeet, for moreecade,1 ibeac ctTorU tklfted te>amslam Caafereaee am DUaematmeat (CD) in Oerseva Bilateral ducuisroeu with ibe Sovieti also have been held oa Ibe margins of Ibe CDhe primary VS oh} ft Ire ia ike aegctioiicei Ii la ellml-aair cheailcal trtapaaiomprektml'r mat retiflahlr iltkol haa.
The USfaecal with tbe dilemma ofay lolalcd objective while recognizing Ibat ikere art merert ditjitattiei la rerifyiagfaaW Of haa so aa to protect (be tenacity of tbe US aad it* Allies. Tbe negotiating ecruocoeot also it comrVscat-edrowing number ofaboutmay have acquired an offensive CWand the breakdown of the internaiionjl aorm against CW use in the Iran-Iraq war.
tliempling to solve the cooiptca issues thaiiht aegotiolioms kare laetadtd -f
to moot lor tbe cavil chemical industries lo ensure tbey are not producing chemical weapons/agents.
aad procedure* to ensure tbe destruc-lion of cbemical weapons and cbemacal produc-tioo faciliUes.
Challenge inspection rxoccdnrcs to mini mire the
risk to Mtuitive facilities.
Struciurc, rjrscrallon, staffing, and funding of an lalrraattooal bod, to implement tttai, pearltlo as.
Data tiekaage and confidence building measures.
fa ihe laltlal those of tkii dote esxko-Age, we bellere that as leostC WTpatioas hart lisaed false grate*
World posiessha ofckewlcal wrapoas eompli-caiet^ellmlaaliosr of lack weapear, (hose countries, particularly (he ivo.-rrthai have made propor-lionately large inyesimcnli in ihese weapons probably arc cc stilling tohem up and may notejilf (bey do signtreaty, many of these countries may decide to main lain their CW programs to eoettle: ene-Ttiea that might cheat oa an agreement.
particularly in ligbl of Ihe weak International response
to CW use-in the Iran'Iran, war.
Tie VS ha eaattmadef laerrastd presimre fromnon-
;r.. ru foi rati, tdmplilloareaty. The US baaeliberate a'pofoach at tbe CD" tr.
The oulcotnc of the chemical weaponsdepend, in part,olitical decision byit is in the national interestthedrafiing processW treatyinability to verify
US. Canada. United Klagdom, Auuilla.b-,Weu Germany, Ibe Netherlands, Bdgitrm. aad Japan, _
Niae lent Pealing Talks (NIT)
The bilateral Nuclear leafing Talk* under way in Geneva7 arc intended to negotiateprotocols Id two treaties that were agreed lo in theut not ratified by tbe US Senate.
ke.Uniiei Slate, and thtke Tkretkol4 Ten Baa
ing ISO kiloien,ere limited to specific designated sites, and verification was limited toTechnical Means (NTM-^edominantly lele-seismic monitoring, that is. seismic measurements madeistance greaterm) and tbe exchange of data. In preparing the TTBT the United Sutes and the Soviet Union recogniied ike rued lo ittahliik aa appropriate igteemuml la govern nnder-groma4 amelear ttplotiomt Joe meaeefal pmposeiThere is no esses (ia) dutinction between the tethnologyuclear eaplosivc device that would be usedeapon and tbe technologyociear explosive device tiedeaceful purpose) Negoti-atiotis began in the fall4 and mallei in ike Treaty on Underground Nnclrtr Explosions for Peaceful Pnrpoie, (PNET) In6
The PNET prohibits single nuclear ci'plceionsieldt, group explosions having an aggregate yieldOO kt. and any group explosion0 kt unless (he icdividual ex-idcaioru can be identified and measarcd by agreed veriricatione* agreed to tbe use of on-site bydrodynamic monitoring for verification of group expsosionsi. ia order to confirm that no individual explosiont. Tbb agreement was based on the fad tba( tcicscismic meant cannot dbilngulsh among multiple explosioni thai occur simultaneously. The Sovleu, Iwwever. have been concerned that Ihe hydrcdynamlc method could reveal informaiion beyond thai needed to verifyThe uealy limited the presence of inspectors and cuuipmcni to moniioringbavieg an aggregate yieldt.
Aw* trtallet -ere imkmliiei io ike US Senate lot advice andatification iahe Carter admirir.rmoti subsequently asked that
no action be taken on ihc treaties pending elforli loomprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Tkeoi seek ratification oa ikt gionaiiere Imaicaeale muantother cam pi timet milk theie agrromttnli
Rcccwt NrgwdaUag History
ikt Umiiei Stale, ami ike Sovietlomclear Testing Tali^tTOT)ievelopiat mart prrelit menu lo monitorwith tkt TTBT ami tke PNET. (Round III ofbegan on8xpected tolime In) Tie Unitedthaieald have ike rlgki lo me amettarrmeat mrikod (carreally CORRTEX)both tbe TTBT and the
PNET. Tkt Soviet Union, while not rejecting byrJro-dynamic measurement, holds tkat thenenliet enn he effectltely monitored my leleseumie muaimrement meant alone Soviet insistence on tbef lelescbouc measurcmenl stems in putesire lo csubfash thai such means axe adequate toomprehensive ban on all ondeaiofdeclared arms control priorities. The US position ii that (eirseumic means arc not adequater.ither treaty
PNET. During Round III ellnaei htm been decidedrm rtrifuaiion protocol ta ikt PNET. Agreement io principle has been reached on the right toydrodynamlc yield measurement method for anyeapleaion'A exceedingt, oa the right to carry out oo-tite inspection of the test area for any capiosio*lanned yieldt. and cat tbe right lo make local seismic raeasaro-menU for an> group eiploaie-lancedyieldt
lelniperimett ani TTBT. During Roundf Ihe NTT lalfu, the too martin agreed la eonintlJointrimunt (tVE) la-rolrlng the 4rtee,tieoaclttt icrlct by tack country ani tke eetlretion of yield metuareaaruti hp keek eomnrriei tu tie ilte Of lack tot. On. the Uoiied Sutes explcded iu device at the Nevada Teal Sue. oneptember, (he Soviet Union cood acted in test at the Seeoipelatmsk nuclear leal
siteinducted hydrodynamtc and tele-seism Ic yield mcaiumocnu of both eiplejakma. Dur-ir; tbeweek in October, expert* from both countries met to discuss the remit* of the hydrody-nxmie rncasorcrncet* made by both coat tries at tbe site of each 'VP. tent The Serlea tetoeily homed ikeould diiertdit ike hjdiodjaamie method. baring coeuUtcattly elaurned thatver ly Intrusive, too complex, impractical, aad excessively expensive and thai the idcsdsnilc method of nveaivrerneDl it adequate lo verify IqbTTBT. The Sovieti im admit-ltd Mike etreru meeting, howewer, thai ike muffs of ike JVE teat iemte+taete "mdwmtummtt mmd ilieinr-ragr, "lot both meikodj
TTBT. Al [hough US and Soviet draftscw verifies two protocol of the TTBT were prepared and exchanged during Round II. disenssionj wereuntil tbe result* of the JVE (eats were obtained.
Both ike VS aad Sovietell fee ihe ate of ike kteUadramatie method foe at lean twoear. Whatotare ike eamdiiiami made* which kydrodjammte autkodi will he mtedL The United States is ptoprxtiag that each tide have the right to use tbe hydrodyraamic method of measurement for each nuclear test with an expected yield greater thant oj, If there are no testa planned for yield* greater (haa SO kt, tbe right to use tbe method for two tost* with the highest planned yield in each calender year. The Soviet Union ll propnrng tbe use of the hydrodyn*method for lwo nuclear tests wish aa expected yield greatert Al issue also i* the Soviet proposal calling for tbe use of joint acisink verifies-(ion using tW utaonal tcleaciimic stations eta* each party for auesTar teats with expected yield* greater (ban
TW ABM Treaty:ortltiet
Tor tW Near Adei.iilMrat.oeT
Moum't immediate goal in strategic armsoirm US oocnnutmcai to an encoded nc* withdrawal period frocn tbe ABMtt ligned inHep that they vie- aa key to curtailing ihe US Strategic Defense InitiativeW Sovieti hive made it clear (hat theyS commitmenthe treaty (hat places t llc limits on SDItercqiiisite for any agreement to effect deep cuts In offensive systems under START
CaarresatOver CirapBaact Therretel art ihe Krasaeyanhaterial wreath hai complicated Soviet effeett la peeterve the ABM Treaty and move towardTART accord:
The Krasnoyarsk Issue has been on the agenda of the Standing Consultative Commiuion (SCC)hen US National Technical Means oferiH cation first identified ike facility at an illegally sited early watning radar under coeutructioo. Since that time rar VS hat demanded she complete aad- -ttitioaal ditmaatlemeai of the radar as the Palp mramt of eorrretlag the-
ke8 ABM Treaty Review Cew-fcreate la Genera, the US Goveramtat formally reiterated the tkreat, made earlier in tbe year. rAar ir woald raaAdtr hoik declaring Kraineyank taaterial breach of the treaty aad tahiai tpprapri-ate aad prapartlaaete letyoatet unless Moscow agreed to unconditional dismantlement of the radar.
Im September, Gorbachev treat pmbllc with ma offer ta place Ihe radar mater lateraaiioaal control as
portenter for the peaceful use of outer spaceove apparently intended to mat thai enough domestic and International pressure on Washington to forestall tW threatened US dcclaratioo.
late September, the Soviets have erpressed interest in discussing ways in which tW radaronverted that would alleviate US concerns about its early warninghile pa -serving tW facility for space research
Ihrouth the end af the Reagan administration, ibe Sovieu are likely to pursue simultaneously three approaches designed to cope with tbe range of actions thai they perceive to be openashington:
Mateo* trill eewalmste ta petit ihe Umlted Stoles taomptomitc total torn to the Krasnoyarsk issue that involves less than complete physicalof the radar andrjecific US commitment lo (be ABM Treaty.
Moscow, by continuing to project an image of interest in reasonable corn promise and by offering proposals for wWt it describes at "mutuallyWe" solutions to coenpliaoce issues tinderwill mitempt te create met atmosphere thai will
may US decision taormal detlmra-tiom of material trench
will lay out publicly Soviet argumentation about ita compliance record, at well aa allegations of US noncompliance, in aa attempt to head off nary formal US eeanaeiatioa of the ABM Treaty should
Washington proceed with use dcclaratiooaterial
likely future Coot-te
Gorbachev probably believes ibat the chances for additional progress on core arms control Issues are siigbt with the Reagan administration,lmost cenmlmlyoatiaaettlom of ike megotiallng protest as the best eomrte of action lo lay tbeforh Ihe ceil administration.almost certainly will coo liaise to play out his offer to iatcrtsabona)tie and convert the Krasnoyarskadge. however, that he weald prefer to delay aay dramatic mew gestmre mntil the mete con Id be portrayedfgaiAcauer tomeenlom tm solidify hit oenoaal relatlemihlp with the next pretldtat.
Goebache* clearly ricrimew aimlnlstratiom as offnint afresh oppoetamlty la break ikr impasse reackeJ over compliance itsae* nailer tke ABM Treat* ry and the ccoclusiooTART agieeoientt
He secka'an exlcnitoa ef (be treatyuarantee agalmt being draggedull-scate technological com petition witb tbe US in SDI. ,
He believes that an extension of the ABM Treaty, together with the reductions codifiedTART treaty, would free hit band to pursue hit highest priority ecce^omic goal, the rocdceoiiatioo of tbo Soviet
Wakei^laaytGatb^ mmU iHnwtUy agree to Ike completefsiU-KrtsraProrsk fa-ciUty-os, FellABM:compliaiicetiterfc* reformof
too much itti ihe'lNFpoliti-
cal] rlt^auMtheT appaJeijt captationuitable USOriginal document.