NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

Created: 5/19/1989

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Iht USSR hotnitialedceaiitiign tu

improx in rrltiMni orih the imallsr iiaiuSouth, Am.tud been rclativel) tgioctdSoviet furiitnbt pen Vitas so Metro- bi the font* Mhmut) aed beads tf Hi it ef Baagladcilt. Nepal, aaai In laita may coot ia tana"Tha Scitu hn made at- prupeuli for impraied trade, lean, and dcie'opmtai pneccia. and even tame ofTtr> of grant aid. Scroti officiiate proclaimed iheir desire loetitnd IHStothctc siaici.1

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Alt'ough notcf current Soviet ithat getlUftt arc builtlient co tiecreated by icaxtne regronal men*ar tbe raoet raaeaanaa- of ihrae Imljaaa ibe tttMraaal of Sonet fcecea frera Alghimitic, couple ted ceiebruary. Tht Seatet tmttionajor obiiaese to the USSR's retauoni with (he tmiKe/1talci of Soulh Asia betauaa It demonstrated aa ipearrnt diiregard on Motcow'i pen fee the tcterejnt> of ataher neighbor i. whileetdwing Soviet grcsndl Force* direcLr into the (cgXB. Tbe oco.ptiM ofa alao bur. SOrat etToru bj anuge*rlrig the United Staica and CX-ea. liadruonal bcrvefaciort of lha arntllcr South Atari Matte. Tha decition to -undraw from Afghani tun tad the USSR'a cbicrvenot of Ihe Geneva accordi ninoiad thetc uumbli'gblocka, while prettnung Sonet diploma it in South Asia with torntlhing tat) coald cite aa proof Ihalie-ore [haa j, paW* rtfattcro

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Tbe death af Pthitual fVetidemlut Au|oit aid the tutaoiucni oeroocratiation ihat brought tkairii Bhutto to power complemented ihe Soviet -ithdrawaj

bytha* la InekiPatliuniand Sovici-Pakiiuni rcUlioni As India's longuanding foe, Pakiuan hai been viewed hiiioneally by the tmaller nate* of ibe rt|oiounter weight io lidia. and, on nuay iituct of regional unporurcc. Pakitian bat charcpuicd the caatc of int Other Soulh Allan -aii-'i

The decfenc ia US tad ta la^idcaa. Nepal, ard Sri Lank* haa cenm Bated to the peicect Idaornev/aal diuDnohed US prcatact la tbtjaahjaJJ

theprtvailirig Soulhhai the Unitedll late irttcrcti In ihe itiion as lit attention to Afghoniuan wanct In lite afiermaih of lhe Soviei troop withdrawal. |

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ung advantage of the oppori unities for imprwed rata bona will Burg. Writ. Nepal, aad Sri Lanka, ihe Sovieu' ij-rgur-dirg obuaciet B> far ihe anott larponaai cfhe IrdOSanti "ipeca!ndia it perceived at the great csurnat threiiry enter naiiio ia tht region, fear of India end ill aiptrationi to regional hegemony figure ligniltctnil) in all foreign policy comiderauont in Dhata. Kaihmtndu.and Colombo Indu'i evnunuing armtii now Heidi iBe foutih laigui mllliar) In theiu neighbor! unccmfunabli. aad it* military intervention In lhe Mi'dota and Srithough by lavttatte* -tat faded lenrtv raver Inaaea inienueae Thit aeeatiacst tt bcreatcd by ta* tretnij ireauet India hat iigaed wak each af ibett tuita. teen* af which runt la Nta Delhi tbe right to intervene ib lhe avem of initenil ut'eti Ne- DiJii mppom ition PSiiica withan each mttofll

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To tkt toinllcr South Asian countries. New Ddhi and Mctttt* ore nearly syrtca}rnoii because fll substaraii) Irdo-Savicl itsde tonnttucni ind Soviet development aid and aims tiki to India.adian collusionuple of the press it ihctc states. Suulh Atari* note Soviet tntumi for Indian actions in the Maldives and Sri Lanka and terretponellnjor the Soviii-lucked regime in Alglion ran.

India itself attempts to limit SevKthe region Ne* Delhi jealouits Kiui-nnct Soviel annitici in South am id tnime thai ihe USSR is not atlemplina to uadarminc India'i reg.onil IcaOersltp and cartaa sphcrt cf Inrliencc entire from ikat of India. The eoaaeanitvai of ibete notiatat' dntraat af tha Senieti becaaac of Ibctaint" and tha tatwaBatjacts ef lacht te tltew Moscow ta ciij tooott-ri the lortriw obttacte top-clement ia Use Sir let position.

Thtpc-sriy of the region dacsatti that cconomict willritical factor in any eapaaded rcUiinatbip beiween tht USSR and Ihe tmtller Southatatot. Tbli could bt ait cpporiuatly for ibe USSR to attempt to (ill ihi gip left by declining US aid to the region Tht Soviets, howeier, have indicatedeir own toaacnttc restructuring it tbtir fim priority, and Foreign Mir ,it Secvardnadtr hat called for Saricl foreign policy to be ceni-etfeeitt* Thua, at It uanikejy thai the Sonets wcuib! be willing to dnert ragnltcant fa*seal retsurott lo entica lhaaaoracnti. Dhala, Cctetr.be, aad Kathmanthi atE taat wkai they can

oBEdaatd. irt maikoda aa tenpri* ileal, and at ad asISO aaaay tir tags itiKaed Even Hi th* area of military tales, growth la anbaaly Serial weaponry and maintenance art crmtiaVrcd in I* rier to thai cf the West, and India bat often mi raged to block arm* ula to iu smaller

A commonly heard expression in Bangloitcih is'ii ramiof iht

Communist Pany al Bangladesh in Dhaka pal up Ihtir umbrellas" Thil IfHimeniately accurateimpressionht nvxaui Cemmunlu ptnltt cf iht smaller South Allan touatmi. in ihai iht USSR heavily influtacti thtir ociioai. Alln by fmtonallsm. aad this, togetherrrrasin rrpcaol cultural and rtllgtous bios against Communist toeology. limits iht popularity and infiutnct af iht Communist

7ht Cosnmuntss Party of Bangladesh is probably the largrii in tke region outsidt India. iHh a

embership wt tUltnate lo belthough pariy leaders claim0 members. In Sri Lanka, iht Communiil Paly Is a

' member of tht United Socialist Alliance formrdin. Although Us membtri probably only make upoercent of iht alliance; memberi hipot represented in the lop leadership, the Communim exercise an influence our the ollianct out af proportion lo iheir use became of ihe eiieniirr baiting thty reeelirfeom Moscow. Within ihe Sri Lankan Insurgent movement considerable llpitrviet It paid lo Marxism. Tht oirrnhtinHng motii-etion. houtier. of groupsas Iht Janatha Vimutthi Peramuna and lhe Libero/ton Tigers of Tamilmost insportani and rioUmi Sinhalese and Tamil groups,tiaiionaUim. anda nothe USSR proiides support to either group.OO-mernbtr Communist Pariy of Nepal Ii severely spin among pro-Moscow. Maoist, and Troutyiitfatilans. Probably only UOOtpalesr are mtmbers Uf thrfaction. ^BEfhW

Faelionatitai Is the dominant factor la tke Communiil potits of iheir three countries, with alntou any petty grievance or elaih of personalities likelyesult infurtktrspttntttlag. Inhe pariits hau hod increasing difficulty generating support, and membership ranks are filled almost exclusively by disaffectedyoung imillectuali Jr unrated by ihe poverty, rigid social system, aad Byiatuiar poliiki af their

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reason the Communist Pariy of Sepal has any mttnbeeihtp al all is thai,ountry when all poliikal paitus are Illegal, ihr Party's argaaiiasion and its ability to function lusi outside iht low attracts those whothteic for tknr

wtrt polllieal paintsepal, the Communist Forty- would quickly dlilntefaii.

Seite import am. iht smaller Halts'Communist paitki art gradually losing-tow influence ihey possess. As their sirtngsh wanes. Soviei influence it Iheir operations is growing. Moscow has longeady source of funding, usingargeii noi only to control proSontt factions, bul also to enticeargin factions to loin the Soviet flock. Lately, at outride contributions io ihr partltideclined. Soriet old hasrtater proportua of operating budgets. In return. Moscow probably topes ta bay Itierage wtih ihtm to support Its diplomatic efforts In ihe region, which will bt best smed If local Communiststs, confrontational stance asd build grass-roots suppv:.

witlrd into a hillo. it* rcJaivuiuhip hu iha-od. Dhaka had luufifowly tapreued diiirnt abovi Iht So" "ii If anon or AfiihaBiimn. anil ilihe -lihdrowol ofovloi ii.-mui.il wpnon lot the Communitt Pariy eg* luniudcih and ihe oppomion Awami Iwiwhii

lo'pa'UcrMU In ihe parliamentary cltciiort ina mote ihal pirated Prauden. Erthad by aidine bi tltom io build democrat) InTrade between thtem-Hie* hai been teowlind Dhaka ba*raatpon riant* toaitf.rartowr. in aiten itti-lndt* tnd anti-Soviet aa.wi.Tieai la to tooatj thailaeekd pro- ladvan or pro-Sc-ici at taaimff to pceaical death, thepataW bu protado GorbaeaaVi neautn ca* am eoni.-oi aad

.robkaiioodrtt. rarraaatireraih. and eiiendaoi pohiiial inKtbihiy dictateoreipi pedicj. Dhaka ram* coacentialc on obtaining at rand) foreign aid ai pouible tad maintaining lumcacot micmtl liability io piueni ledinn intervention, while viint Chttvrat fecndihip io bilince New Delhi*Wraiern aid io Biagiioeth make* up J4 pirceni of in toiii foraiinnd further uttiianc* invn iht Wan Ii channeled ihrough multinational organl-allona The USSR, which account! for Initrctnt of Dhaka* foicign aid. couldn coniribuiion. bul il it not Hktly to reploer Wutirn influence. When vbiilng Dhtka in May IW. Soviei Dtpuly foreign MtnlMer Rcgaehev limited ihil, dupile Ih* public fanfare

aboui incitattng aid to South

Aiu. no ir-mi would be fcanaccmang. only loam andid* Krtemtnt* Moreover, Bgngltdcth tlilamic cultureuodamenialto-ndCommuniim. tevtrely limiinia ihe popetariiy of iha CornmeuuM Pany oflaciH araouni*eiling an ihe eaiem of Dhaka'iiie.

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Lilt Baagladrah, Nepal abo hot* tcrioui proBlenu of povtrly ard noteniial .niub.ni) -'hough not io the tame eiien. For Kathmindu. Ihe major faeior alTeenng Ira remionithe USSR It not aid. tui itt prccarlout po.iiion between China and Indlo Although ihe HUnaUyaicontact wiih China. snir> from India Ii rttauVtlj opan and Nepal* riitn rut from the Himalaya) into India. Geograph) hu thut eatrattd lhat nearly all of Napal't trademore throtah India. Ne* Delhi tan leitnene catily bt the kingdom tbould it thocteiik Chinauch mare difkall time urirai-guretgtk io bur BBBBBj

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i tat -ream: cittrtul theraic*as. Kit tana oda lb,IW and ia.n-ei: Itvie.td thcaef India- otpamloitttm Ihal taior Nepal. Kiiii Btendrti aoluiion to ikr* predicamrnt la* beta iu rtinlofcelh China and io promote the idea of dtciaiirujone of Peace, an propoul be trtt ir.id: In Tiefurf) Unit favor ia India, whtrc It Iin autmpi lo nkllll) the proviiiuu QfihelvlO treaty bbbbbj

recently Nepal itemed io be thethai peered the rale of Soviei polity I*am. Detpite lhe pretencefghininan and hana Ntptlrte triiirom of lhe Seam ootupaiion.ult had rtpretatd tnitrnt inee Hait'e proami ISov.li

ifor.uZcneof Ptacaor warmer rtUtamt, ind Motoo-

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In deference to India. In IWiht Soviets sccartd New Delhi's approval tn announce thai they would cooiicki ihe proposal and would encourage iht tupicei nf iheii Eail European allies. Thit gesture ledSoriei Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachtvs soil Kaihrnandu innd it seemed to clear ihc way far kng-eicettcd visits ta Moscow by the Kittf. of Nepal and ha Foreign Miitisier.

Since tht tsginratg of IW. events seem to hive halted the tluviia Sovlet-Nccalete reUtioaa. Mil wasiscover that Nepal had secretly bought arms from China, and ia March New Delhit-vid through onlio* iradc and iranilt treaties ittal to He NepaWic eecnomy to lapse. Moscow seems to have thrived Itt paint for expended tiei to Nrptl even before Indo-Ncptletc rtUtiocu had delta-rotated lo Ihli point

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Sri Lanka shartt lit disadvantages of Nepal andiniitbiiity,orriaome proventy loit hit hiisorioally maintained close nra to Ot United Stain and ihr Wealounter" eight is India Ceacnnbe receives mast of its aid from UKtadaintain Western itsuretl an Set Luka. bat that remtieeathrp can only

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grurally saajaiim of India atd lie USSR tod viouM prefer tkt Uttttd Suite ai Sri Lanta'stanrattlcal artouajh to rceaapntc thatiat etherwina. Of even greaterrwnadaia rialiraa he natdi ihc cemiinuad tapper! al tht Itdiat peace*keeping force to tenure Cnmctuc iiabltHy, and he might bt willing to explore the pniihitily of icplacing lost US aid wilh Soviet

Sri Lankasolated, too far from the USSR, too peripheral to Soviet interests, and toe central to Indian policy for the Soiittt totratianshij much distant from thai tilth New

iJ. aid front Moscow cbruptly ceised.ust before the Indian iniencuion. Soviet Fim Dtptty Foreign Mliusur Voronisov assured ibe Gandhi government lhat ii bad the Soviet Union* unconditional lupport in Sri Lanka. Throughout tbe occupation, Moscow has publicly foSowtd Niw Delhi's line and given the Impression thai it considers Sri Lanka entirely India's business.

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Dhaha, Kaihrnandu. and CctOmbo all echo Moaco-'sto Improve rettiiCAS. For this reason, torn* prog itu ii likely to be made in the future. The ire-nth inwall be litrited became Moscoa cat not aBud ionerthosend btcaust it "ill probe bi)evotConshu pi in tbitates ibat migMjeoewfrt in tuadangDelhi, la recent years, atraiaaarfaced It Iht Inda-Scrntl reJaticrnsaip, aad tht tinaJ Itr Sotslk Asian Mate* artseaigniaxarit to Moacom tojuuifyistgrtamtni that could fur (barelationahip tu intporiaai to Soviet foreign policy, Tht likely outeamc It filendlkt relations btl-ttn Moscow and thi mallei South Asian Staler, bul no major brcaki' i ffffl

Bill*

Original document.

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