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.3JECT: Response to National Security. Policy Toward the 'VrMjn Oulf
FOR: FROM:
SUBJECT:
Distribution)
ficer for the Near East and South Asia
Response to National Security. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf
Attached for your review is Ue CIA Directorate of Intelligence response to the intelligence related questions inn preparation for thearch working group westing on the subject.
JOFORN
ersian Gull
How are US political, economic, and strategic lnrertr:ttu in the Persian Cui/ affected by tfle end of ther ant! thm end cf the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? pjieaj
Heew regional order has emerged in th* Persian Gulf that will reduce the likelihood of regional hostilities over at least the next two years. The new order consists ot several elements: no Persian Gulf state can dominate Che region, internal political and economic issues willeavy call on the attention and resources of most of the states, and the states perceive that no foreign policeman is needed. This new order will serve th* key intereststhe United States by lessening the likelihood of an oil supply disruption and reducing the need for direct OS military involvement in the Persian Gulf.
Reconstruction efforts and reduced operating risks in the postwar period will allow US companies tooften at aIraq and the Guir Arflb states.
ulf States will continue to be interested in security ties to the United States, but the diminished threats to the region during peacetime will make those states less interested in expanding aecurity cooperation with Washington.
renewed prominence of contentious regional issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and differences over chemical and biological weapons proliferation, will complicate US political relations with the Persian Gulf states. H
Relationships among states in theBrTl fragile, however, and low-level tensions that currently exist could escalate, leading to conflicts that might upset the emerging regional order and jeopardize US interests.
he potential for civil strife and the ascendency of more radical forces inevidenced by the Rushdiepresent the most serious threat to the postwar order.
Territorial disputes, particularly between Iraq and Kuwait, alsoerious threat and could result in requests from the, Arab Gulf statesigher US military profile to support security guarantees.
Iraqi efforts to increase its market share in OPEC could create serious tensions with major oil producers in the and destabilize the oil market, at least temporarily.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removes an obstacle to better relations between Moscow and most of the Persian Gulf states. Moscow is likely to slowly expand Its ties to Iran and the Arab Gulf statos although Riyadh will remain wary o! Soviet intentions in the region.
Recent Soviet initiatives on the Arab-Israeli issue are likely to enhance Moscow's image in the region.
Closer Iranian-Soviet ties could increase Gulf state interest in improving relations with Moscow.
iiufimrrersian Gull
what degree of proliferation of advanceds chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons Is predicted?
Iran and Iraq will continue to devote considerable resource:;
to acquiring advanced systeas. Tehran will catching up with Iraq missiles and nuclear, wants to maintain its
conventional and unconventional weapcn ive priority to rebuilding its mili-aryhe research and development of long-range biological, and chemLcal weapons. Baghdad strategic advantage over Iran andeterrent against Israel, and will intensify its already veil-advanced weapons research and development programs.
Persian Gulf states are likely to resist international efforts to restrain weapons proliferation. The accompanying increase in the number and lethality of weapon systems will increase the potential threat. forces andbserver groups monitoring cease-fire agreements and treaties. IB^^H
Hoclear Weapons
ears if Baghdad has Terial.
may be able touclear weapon in less thanears
yissue
with extensive foreign assistance, will take at least 10
Chemical and Biological Weapons
program is the most extensive
Iran
Iraq's chemical weapons
Ballistic Missiles
Baghdad is increasing its efforts to acquire an indigencus missile production capability and will probably be able to produce short-range ballistic missilesears. Iraq may alsoew missile system if Baghdad has problems with its program.
Tehran lags far behind Baghdad in missile
3
Do we believe that Ira/ and Iraq will be able topeace agreement? uhat relationship do webetween the Two? uhat ere the prospects rotin the region? uhat would be the consequences forir.es?
The deep mistrust between Iran and Iraq and their sharp'y divergent objectives in the peace talks make the achievement,ull peace agreement unlikely. He expect the two countries to coexist for the next several yearstate of "cold peace" markedeacetime arms race and competition for influencehe region.
Iraqomprehensive peaceguarantees of non-aggression and non-interference in each other'sforces Iranian recognition of the Ba'thist regime's legitimacy. Iran willomprehensive agreement and gives highest priority to the provisions of DMalling for withdrawal of troops from occupied territory, the naming of the agqreasor in the war, and payment of warof which Tehran believes will work to Its advantage.
The peace talks, in recess until /ApriL/ probably will over Iraq's refusal to^irtfhdraw its troopsagrees to dredging of the Shatt al-Arab waterway andfreedom of navigation for Iraqi ships InGulf. Iran insists on adhering to thefor the withdrawal of troops before the two sidec tryother isaues.
We believe both countries are war weary and are unlikely to resume hostilities in the coming year.
If either side were to resume fighting, however, Iraq would be more likely or able to do so because of its military superiority and Baghdad might feel pushed in that direction if it.believes political pressure will not eventually produce concessions from Iran. Even then, Iraq probably would op-.first for limited military action such as air attacks.
he issue of freedom of navigation in the Cuifotential flashpoint for renewed clashes between the two cides. irag has indicated that it would retaliate if. Iran inspected or seized an Iraqi ship in the Persian Gulf.
A major resumption of hostilities between Iran and Iraq would adversely affect OS interests ln the region. evelopment would benefit radical factions in Tehran andenewed threat to Iraq's Gulf Arab allies.
n the face of major Iraqi attacks Iran might be tejtpted to strike at Gulf states' Gulf oilpress them to restrain Baghdad. BBBBBBBBBBBbI
ersian QuH
'heis trie
What are Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf* what ii the next phase of Soviet policy likely towirrj the tttJiV
as
The USSR's primary interest in the Gulf Is toreestablishment of US influence in Iran. Thepe neither Iran nor Iraq becomes predominant in the iJuif, hut clear that the Kremlin seesundergreater "prize*.
Ir
improve their regional influence. They probablythere good chance for such improvement in the near future, but appear concerned that over the long term both Iran and Iraq will turn to the West to rebuild their economies,
The reduction of US military presence in the Gulf in also an important objective for Moscow.
The Soviets will continue to stress to the Gulf states tha; the Iran-Iraq cease-fire lessens the needoreign military presence in the region, and will probably float proposalsulf collective security arrangemt-nt callingeduction in foreign military deployments.
Iran,bymoving to improve tiei which declined in the.
Khomeini's recent message to and revive economic links
In Iraq, the Soviets' major chore will be to soothe Baghdad's suspicions as they try to improve ties to Tehran. They are likely to rely heavily on their role as Baghdad's primary arms supplier, and will almost certainly continue to sell Iraq advanced weaponas theFencer)may be flexible in renegotiating Baghdad's military debt.
Elsewhere in the Gulf, Moscow will portrayitseifoderating force in the region in an attempt to cement buddlna relationships with the smaller GulfOman, and theobtain full diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia ando deflect attention from its growing ties with Iran, Moscow will play up its efforts to broker an Arab-Israeli settlement.
what are the prospects for stability in Iran, bvth under the current leadership and alter tha death of Agatollah Khonelnl? who is the most likely successor? Do werolonged struggle for power? Hhatic and foreign policy orientation do we anticipate will emerge?
'till final^/tilted until las:ssembly Speaker Rafnanjan
because of weakness.
rd
ed byRaf Ran jani*temper the revolution. Since then Khomeini has ourse. as demonstrated by the Rushdie affair in
which
Hhomein toward wants t
changed cou r
he sided explicitly with radicals who favor continued revolutionary ferment at hone and confrontation abroad.
Khomeini, however, almost certainly will prevent the radicals from completely wiping out the Rafsanjani coalition. Although the radicals now dominate policy, th* two factions command roughly equal political resources.
The Rafsanjani coalition will try to use its still considerable clerical and popular support to survive while probing toe opportunities toome-back,
esult, we believe the most likely trend inrolonged power struggle with neither side easilyotal victory. Tehran is unlikely to haveovernment capable of implementing coherent and authoritative policies.
We cannot rule out the possibility that events may deterioratehowdown this year. The most potentially polarizing events would be assassinations of key figures or public unrest over economic-conditions.
The radicals probably will have the advantage If the
infighting turns violent. They control mere guns, and rhey are better .prepared to take to tbe streets.
Such infighting would intensify if Khomeini were to die and could not set limits. Khomeini's death will boslter the radicals because they willtronger claim that their policies and not Rafsanjani's remain true to Khomeini's legacy.
reiac
will go smoothly .lv d
lieve th
ions with the West
the rcle.
with AyatoLlah Montazeri, Khomeini' s
will continue its ne radicals
What behavior do we anticipate from Iraq in thewar with Iran?
Iraq's emergence from the Gulf war with the best-equipoed largest armed forces in the^Arab world and enormousconomic clout from its/vast>oil reserves has revived President Saddam Husayn's asplratbonsTto leadership of the Arab world. Saddam is promoting his leadership goals through generally moderat. means, representative of the majority of the Arab states he seeks to lead.
His new alliance with Jordan, Egypt, and North Yemen in the Arab Cooperation Council typifies this approach.
aghdad has also been dishing out equipment from itsof captured Iranian weapons to gain influenceArab states.
Iraq retains some radical tendencies, however, and will collide on occasion with regional rivals. .
Baghdad win work hard to punish Syria for its support of Iran during the war. Iraq will concentrate its efforts in Lebanon, where it is already supplying arms and money to the anti-Syrian forces.
The Iraqis continue to sponsor Ba'th Parties in other Arao states to promote Iraqi interests.
Baghdad is not likely to abandon the use of terrorism against its opponents, either foreign or domestic.
Iraq will Jritensely press Kuwait for control of the strateqic Kuwaiti islands ofTubiyan and Warbah, possession of which would provide better protection for Iraq's ports at Umm Qasr and Khaw Az Zubayr.
uwait is strongly resisting Iraqi pressure and probably will turn to Saudi Arabia and its other GCC allies, the United States,.and the USSR for political and military assistance if Iraq threatens to take the islands by force.
Saddam has emerged from the war in firm control dt Iraq, but his effective security services will face continuing challenges to his unpopular, repressive rule.
he cease-fire has reduced fears of the Iranian threat that Saddam used to rally the Iraqi public and the Army behind him.
conomic rehabilitation is seen by the regimeecessary ingredientuiescent population.
Assassinationilitary coup by disgruntled officersmam threat to him.
to National Security
U-S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf
External
Richard Haass. Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs National Security CouncilE06
Paul Hare. Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Department of State2 New State
Edward H. Gnehe. Jr.
DASD/ISA (Attn: Frederick C. Smith)
Roomentagon
VADM Jonathan T. Howe Assistant to the Chairman, JCS Roomentagon
David B. Haller
Asst. Sec. for International Affairs and
Energy Emergencies RmOC
Linda Lau OIAC
Bolllrtg AFB. Site H
NSA
Rm.QS.
Hayne White
Garyietrich, INR
STATE
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Original document.
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