AX-
SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE AS0
The Nature of Soviet Military Doctrine
Itc Nature of Sonet Military Doctrine
Ttic Soviet approach to national security planning has never been static. Changes in the leadership's perceptions and its general approach to national security, nevertheless, seem to be occurring at an unusual pace. Lengthy and. at times, bitter discussions over the "correct" approaches have taken place, mostly in public forums. Western analysts have offered dramatically different interpretations of these debates and theirfor Soviet military forces and their potential use.
Throughout this paper we note indications of change and characterize its nature. The aim of tbe paper is not, however, to set forth another set ofSoviet force structures and policies. Its purpose is to explain the rote of Soviet military doctrine in the process and context of Soviet national security policy making. Such fundamentals arc almost certainly going to remain in one form or another, no matter how radical Gorbachev's "new thinking" appears. Therefore, our judgment of the import and, indeed, the uniqueness of Gorbachev's initiatives must be placed in this broader context.
The Soviet Union has proposed that NATO and Warsaw Pact military
arms control negotiations. As part of this report, therefore, we have included in an appendix an unclassified discussion of how the Soviets may approach such an exchange of views.
This study makes use of public statements and writings by Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pactp) sourcesC
The Nature of Soviet Military DoclrirH
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Soviet* view military doctrine as the coretate's national security policy. Military doorine. according to them, contains twosociopolitical and military-technical. The state's political leadership is responsive for formulating the sociopolitical dimension, whkh concerns core issues of the slate's security such as:
Which countries arc likely allies and opponents of the USSR?
How probable is war. and should the political leadership shift resources from the general economy toilitary buildup?
How can war be prevented?
What would be the likely natureuture war; in particular, would it escalate to nuclear use?
What would be the political goalsar?
The military-technical dimension of doctrine is largely the preserve of the professional militarySoviet General SiafT actingentral coordinating body for the Soviet armed forces and Ministry of Defense. This dimension focuses on the structuring of the armed forces, their technical equipping and training, and planning for the conduct of war '
The Soviets have long claimed that the political and military leaderships are deeply interconnected and that therenity of leadership in the USSR. Nevertheless, responsibilities traditionally have been more sharply divided between political and military authorities in the USSR than is the case in the NATO countries. In the Soviet Union, the party has formulated generalinput from the military and possibly otherthe military has implemented and interpreted that guidance with limited explicit direction from political authorities.
Soviet military doctrine has beenate of ferment during the last decade. Recent developments, including announcements of cuts in defense and procurement spending and unilateral force reductions, as well as the public dialogue by top parly and military authorities on the concept of "reasonableuggest major changes in Soviet military doctrine may be under way.a jo. break with post practice, civilian experts have been brought into the debate over Soviet national security policy-apparent-ly under the sponsorship of the lop party authorities. Issues being discussed by political and military leaders include the utility or nuclear weapons; the likely effects of new. high-technology weapon systems; and the increasing difficulties of mounting andheater offensive against NATO. Changes in how the Sovicu view these core issues will affect their willingness to devote scarce economic resources to defense efforts, as well as their interest in significant arm* control negotiations
Content*
Pitface
Sum niary
How ihc Soviets Define Military Doctrine
The Sociopolitical Definitionefensive Outlook
The Military-Technical Dimension Defines (he Best Defense as a
Good Offense
The Hierarchical Character of Soviet Military Doctrine
Relationship Between Soviet and NSWP Military Doctrines
How Soviet Military Docuine Evolves
MarUit-Leninist Framework
The Impact of the Political-Military Environment
Chance Within the Military-Technical Dimension
Turmoil in the Sociopolitical Dimension
Outlook for Soviet Military Doctrine
Gorbachev's "New Thinking" and Soviet Mil jury Doctrine
The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Nature of a
Nuclear War
The Potential Impact of New,
The FadiDt Lusterarsaw Pact Theater
Offensive
Political-fcooomic Constraints
-Views on the Causes of
Soviet" Approachast-West Discussion* of Military Doctrine IS
The Nalurc of Soviet MiliUty Doctrine
IbeSorieti Define MiliUty Doctrine
Military doctrine, at it is described by authoritative Sovietbe state's officii! national security policy. It takes into account the state's sociopolitical and economic system, the level of development of its economy, the technical equipping of its armed forces, and its geoOTphie location in relation to hs expected allies and probable opponents.
According to Marshal Ogarkov in2 pamphlet Always In Readiness To Defend ihe Homeland(he military doctrine of any nation must answer the following fundamental questions:
armed forces, their equipment and training, and planning for the conduct ofilitary'technical doctrine takes into account tbe conclusions of military theory and practice and is largely the preserve of the professional military leadership
Because of the character of their concerns and the division of responsibilities within the Soviet system, political and military authorities look at (he same issue from different angles, and on occasion derive what sppear to be contradictory conclusions. An example of such an apparent contradiction Is Ihe traditional characteriiation of Soviet militaryas botb defensive and offensive.
is tbe probabilityuture war, and who are the likely adversaries T
What Is the likely nature or characteruture wart
What armed forcesountry possess to achieve its goals?
What goals and tasks can be assigned to tbe armed forces in anticipationuture war?
How should the military be structured or organized, and bow should tbe array and country prepare for war?
ar breaks out, how should it be fought?
Military doctrine, according to the Soviets, contains twoandThe sociopolitical dimension, which derives from the class natureociety, constitutes the basic frameworklate's national security policy and is formulated by the political leadership. The military -technical dimension is formulated within theframework. It focuses on the structure of the
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Tbe Soelopolilleal Definitiontfcasht Outlook
The Soviets have long stated thai ihelrU inherently defensive. No socialistfind cause toir, according tobecause socialism will inevitablycapitalism without war. Tbe Soviets havehowever, that war could be forced upon (hemand politically troubled capitalistwritiags have held thai ruling capitalistundertake aggression io prevent the loss ofpositions and the inevitable declineof "imperiilist" states built uponprinciples Soviet political theoristsconditions that might lead their ideologicalto undertake desperate acts and whathostile intentions coulda tbe
The MaHary-Trehakil Diaxanlo* Defuses the Best Defenseoed Offaaat
The Soviets also assert, however, (hat, iforced upon the socialist states, their armies should fight it In
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roost effective manner allowed by availableK authorized by the political leadership, the Soviet military would attempt to seize the strategic initiative as early as possible, carry the war to the opponents' territory, and destroy the military and political coalition thst brought about the war.
This offensive military orientation is driven by the Soviet belief that only the strategic offensive offers the possibility of decisively defeating the opponent; it reflects Russian historical experienceong series of devastating invasions, and in this century the Russian Civil War and World Warnd the desire to avoid destruction of Soviet territory. Furthermore, only offensive operations cold prevent the mobitiration of additional forces by the capitalist states
The Hierarchical Character of Soviet Military Doctrine
The primacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in (be political, economic, and social life of the USSR applies equally to the arena of national security. Decisions, statements, andmade by the party provide the basis for devctop-ing and formulating Soviet military doctrine. The political leadership assesses these core issues:
FPhfcA countrlei are likely atllet and opponent* of the USSR? The answers to this question, which change with lime and circumstances, provide the focus of Soviet foreignactions, diplomacy, and economicwell as military planning and preparation:
- What are ihe voipKU tor war? The parly's pexcep-lioci drives the distribution of rcsouices between Ihc general economy and military forces.
How can war be prevented? This las*elatively recent addition to dcclataiory Soviet militaryIi is related to the new emphasis General Secretary Gorbachev and the leadership have placed on political measures for promoting national security.
What would be iht political goahar? While (he military will attempt to provide iisdf with the forces and training required for any conflict, senior military officers readily acknowledge that their political superiors will determine what they would beaccomplish.
What would be ihe likely natureuture war? The party appears to dominate the assessment ofthe stale of current technology, economics, andfuture war wouldto nuclear use. and whai ibe generalof that use would be tor the USSR. There is evidence ihat the military attempts to play an influential role in delertmning the likely natureuturewhen it believes the political leadership is relatively weak or malleabk
Soviet political authorities have traditionally focused their attention on these higher orderIn which the military's role is supposed to behave appeared to give the military largely free rein within its areas ofcal assessments of potential opponents' capabilities and plans. Soviet force programing, disposition of forces, and military science (see inset.he Soviets have tons; claimed that the political and military leaderships are deeplyNevertheless, interests and responsibilities have generally been more sharply divided between political and military authorities than is the ease with NATO countries. Moreover, national security issaes have not been debaied. decided, or implementedluralistic manner, and participation in the process has traditionally been very restricted.
An example of the division of responsibilities betwceo parly and military authorities is ihc way the Soviets address the likely origin of -at
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3.
3 poiili-
ca7 conclusions atwuiar may break out provide theor ho- the military analyzes
tag. PrcTTf*
Top fWtfel
Military Science
According to authoritative Soviet military writings. military science concerns Iht laws and nature of armed conflict and the military preparations by the country and armed forces for war. It It based on Marxist 'Leninist teachings and methodology and takes Into account the findings from other sciences that influence she military sphere. Military art is the most Important component of military science and is composed of:
Strategy. The planning and conduct of war. the training of the armed forces, and the support of cirmbal operations.
Operational art. The planning and conduct ofby large
Tactics. The preparation for and conductattle
Military scientific work Includes ihe synthesis of research and experience and the Introduction of new principles Into regulations; the development ofmodels of operations and battles and the use of these In forecasting the results of combat; the preparation of military science publications: and the conduce of military science conferences
the likelihood of war. (The appendix describes how Soviet political authorities view (he causes orilitary authorities takeiven political dictateswhich countries may begin hostilities and under what political and socioeconomic conditions war is most likely to occui. Military warning indicatois arc founded On political premises. The Soviet experience in) demonstrates bow guidance from political leaders canegree of rigidity in military pin lis and preparation* that can contribute to disasters when events do not unfold as expected. Before the Nori invasion. Stalin changed Soviet military plannincimposing his belief thai the main attack would come south of the Pripel marshes. Because of this change. Soviet fofces were poorly disposedto meet the German attack. In the weeks just beforetalin refuted to allow (he military to lake prudent preparatory defensive
measures for fear of provoking the Germans. The lack of Soviet ixcpa redness led to massive losses and initial Uiategic defeats
Helationship Between Soviet and NSWP Military Doctrines
Soviet military doctrine dominates the nationalplanning of individual NSWP countries and the Warsaw Pact as an alliance. The individual national militarythe Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine announced in Mayessentially copies of Soviet military doctrine. The Pact allies are required to accept the tenets of Soviet militaryas their own 'EZ-
J any attempt by an NSWP country toilitary doctrine not in keeping with the Soviets' would not be tolerated by Moscow.
tests mat toe military aspects of the Czechoslovak reform movement iaincludedational militaryhaveactor In the Soviet decision to invade that year.
In conjunction with Soviet political, military, and economic might. Soviet military doctrine provides the keystoneact-wide defense, in place of individual national defenses. NSWP field-grade officers are brought to Moscow for senior command and statT training courses. Soviet field manuals and regulations serve as guides for derivative NSWP manuals and regulations. Directives and war plans are crafted by the Soviet General Staff, and only strictly limited portions arc provided to each NSWP national general staff. The Sovietsaken political and militaryirom Warsaw Paci treatyo the creation of high commands of forces C
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How Seik< Military Doctitoe Evolves
Manto-Utunttt Framework
Soviet doctrinal precepts arc shaped b> Marxist-Leninist philosophy andIt hough they aic also influenced by the legacies of Russian military history. Marxism-Leninism defines not only thecontent of Soviet sociopolitical doctrine, but also the methodology to be used In reasoning and argument. For example. dhvWssions of the likely natureuture war center on statements about the Impact of technology, economics, and politics.of each of these factors is determined by theiristorical, and class bases, equallyMarxism-Leninism explicates the hierarchy of rule in the Soviet system, legitimizing the CPStl's unique political authority.
Marxism-Leninism his traditionally provided answerseveral of the fundamental questions Sovietauthorities must answer. Likely allies, neutrals, and opponents have been defined In terms of their socioeconomic and political structure. In the simplest of terms, capitalist countries arc potential enemies, socialiai states potential allies. As discussed in appendix A, the conditions under which war might arise have been analyzed by Soviet theoristsarxist-Leninist framework. Furthermore. Soviet military theorists regularly argue points of military science in terms of dialectics, historical materialism, and other Marxist analytical and rhetoricalThus, military writers addressing offensive and defensive operations discuss them in dialecticout historical shifts in their relative superiority caused by actions, reactions, and results.
The impact of the Political-Military Environment
Soviet military doctrine is also shaped by underlying perceptions of the fluid political and militaryin which the Soviet Union exists Changes in both the sociopolitical and miliiafy-technicalof military doctrine result from changes in the percept sons of Soviet leaders Chances in ihcdimension of doctrine do not occur ollen. but. when they do. Ihey echo throughout Soviet natsonal security planning. Khrushchev and the top military
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leadership, for example, keyed Soviet nationalplanning to the concept that any future war with the West would involve the massive use of nuclear weapons. The implications for resource allocations in military programs included the creation of theRocket Forces. Nonetheless, the actualof change within the sociopolitical dlmertsioo of doctrine has never been fully revealed. Traditionally, debate appears to have been confinedery small ip of party authorities. [Z.
J] that the preparation of opinion papers may be farmed outider group, C
JUnder Gorbachev, however, we ve seen discussions of such issues in open writings
(sec inset.ublic Debate on Fundamenul Issues").
Change Within the Military-Technical Dimewioa Weood understanding of how changes occur within the military-technical dimension of doctrine. The Sovietentralbody for the Soviet armed forces and Ministry ofdetermines the content of the military-technical realm and hasighly structured system for reviewing and revising it whenhe means through which changes areand implemented include
Five-year military science plans for the armed forces, which serve as the basis for five-year plans of each branch of the armed forces, militarygroups of forces, military districts, andwell as for the five-year plan for the Warsaw Pact.
- Military exercises, which test the validity of current doctrine and are used to experiment with new concepts or weapon systems
Putlie Debate on Fundamental Issues
Since Gorbachev's accession to power, open-source writings In the USSR have taken on the appearancea debate about fundamental national security Issues. Forecent article by V. V. Zhurklneputy director of Ihe Institute of the USA and. A. Karaganov. and A. V. Kortuno* In the authoritative patty Journal Koaimuaist statesthai NATO does nothreat to the Soviet Union and Us non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies: There is no canflicl inrelations today which could give rise to the temptation to resort to warolution.Most other articles by military writers, ho*vever, continue to make the case thai NATOery real threat and that the USSR must continue to devote considerable resources lo countering that threat.
The participants In the debate do not split clearly along civilian and military lines. Neither are stands based upon reductionist arguments, such as civilian or military control of defense policy. Rather, the Issues include basic assessments of "how much is enough "for defense and the proper methods of reachlngsueh conclusions.
The nature of the public debate and the participants Indicate that, under Gorbachev, the party hasits control over all aspects of Soviet military policy and brought In people from outside theto consider various aspects of military policy and doctrine. The evidence suggests that the debate is continuing, and it Is still too early for us to determine with any degree of certainty what the outtome wilt
PC*
Military rtifulalHirii. which Codify ciikling military-technical doctrine and constitutebody of laws governing the employment ofie Vanches of ili-jnurd force* in waillinc.
In addition to this stiucturcd procedure. Soviet and NSWP military officers hove several forums in which to discuss and debate potential changes in the military-(ethnical dimension of militarymoat notable being journals such as Military Thought.
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J Becauseaic published in open-source journals (suchMilitary Historyrguments arein historical teims or ascribed to foreignissues discussed, however, are no less serioushistorical or foreign veneer
have in fact canfirmd that bit tonal military worksspecifically indaded in tbe Soviet military's five-year research pba. Than, for example, the basic outlines of0 mrgaairaiiea of the Soviet Air Forces (SAP) and Air Defenseaspect of the military-tecsrucaI dimension of doctrine were adiocatcd by tbe future cimnundcr of Ihe SAFeries of articles in the unclassified journal Aviation and Cosmonautics in tbe
Twe had on6 reorganization of Soviet air defense appearederies of articles in Military History Journal in the.
A recent publication byen. M. A. Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, sums Up tbe process of change ajid the role of the military-technical dimension of doctrine:
question is frequently raisedhy. along with scientific knowledge /teachings about war and the army and militaryhere it also military doctrine. The problem Is that inscience various views CO" and should exist on the methods of carrying Out one Or another
rait.cience this Is completelyas the clash of opinions encourages Its development. Butertain stage, doctrine takes the most effect If views and reinforces them In official documents and regulations as obligatory guiding concepts forithout unified doctrinal views it is Impassible toeffective organlxaiional development and preparation of the Armed Force* and the strengthening of the country's defensehole.1
Tcnuotl in the Sociopolitical Dimension
Potentially mayor chances in Soviet leadershipof* the political, economic, and militarymay be under way. Indications ofquestioning hitherto firm assumptionsregularly.civilian party leadership under Gorbachevthe country's standing in world aHairs andits authority, the sociopolitical dimension ofdoctrine could undergo vast changes
In an important sense, Gorbacheveturn to an active role for the civilian political leadership in Soviet national security. Unlike Brezhnev in hit latermuch more likehas asserted the dominance of the sociopolitical over the military-technical dimension. He seems to follow more nearly the traditional pattern of decisionmaking in Soviet national security than that of generalInnd first half of. At the same time, unlike earlier parly authorities. Gorbachev ha* encouraged the participation of outside experts to stimulate thinking and public rumination on national security issues
Outlook for So-let Military Doctrine
Significant changes in the Icadciship's perceptions will almost certainly redirect tbc way the Sovietsuture conflict and prepare to light it. It is too early-
'ColCra M. A. Otxy'.ome/awtuiuio'y Semite. Njwi lo tell whether the announced unilateral reductions in forces and defense spending reflect enduringdecisions in the sociopolitical dimension of Soviet military doctrine. We can identify the Issues and trends ttat apparently continue to dominate the discussion, however. '
Gorbachev! "New ilnaking" and Soviet Military Doctrine
Gorbachev's initiatives related to "new politicalmost important in the military realm is "reasonableappear to callew basis Tor establishing bow much is coough for defense. Moves to implement Gorbachev's initiatives have concentratedreater drive for efficiency and .accountability throughout the military and military-industrial sector as well as on arms control. Although the Soviets have announced dramatic unilateral cuts in forces and in resources to be devoted to the defense sector, ibey may not yet have formally determined the specific meaning of not derived implications ofsufficiency for many aspects of the miliury-technical dimension ofthe core issues of discussion are apparent.
Furthermore, the traditional division of issues into sociopolitical and military-technical dimensions may be breaking down. The deep interconnections between party and military authorities that the Soviets have long proclaimed are coming to pass and, in fact, are expanding with, for example, civilians commenting in detail on highly technical issues. Moreover, miliury authors are commenting at length on the effects of technical changes on political issues. For this reason,cannot separate the following lopics Into dear political and military spheres
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that (be Soviets are well aware of their poor economic standing visa-vis the West, f*
n the, the Soviets assessed their relativea number of categories that included technology, general economic health, andonlyercent of that of the United States."
Evidence- including publico idu^ drltme and procurementis mounting that authorities haveajor shift of economic resources from the defense sector to help revit/iire other sectors of the Soviet economy. In addition, they could go further than Ihe current evidence of decisions
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(ores Mrs and structure indicate* and order specific doctrinal changes at theai the aeVopttonruly defensive doctrine that denies the pouitnliiy of large-scale caTcasirvca. If left to their own choices. Soviet military leaden alrocnt certainly would attempt to preserve an offensive capability, however reduced, in the face of politically matidated cuts in forces.'
The current mixture of continuities andin the Soviet national security cakwius results in considerable ferment in military doctrine. We maynajor divergence on some fajuca suet at the aiiljty and desirability of planning for aconventional attackuture war. Today's convergence on otherin the realm of strategic nuclear policy mi|ht dissolve in the face of maror breakthrough! In the US Strategic Defense Initiative program. Perhaps the mostlong-term development is the emergence of crvil-iara in the analysis of issues that have traditionally been the preserve of the miliury. The degiee and nature of the ctViltaas' influence could introduce volatility and divisiveness hitherto unseen in Soviet national security planning.
I"--
Appendix A
Sorict Views on the Causes of War
view* of Soviet political and military authorities on the causes of war are laid out in Harsist-ltninist Teaching an War and the Army, edited by 1Gen. D. A.ormer deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army andhe authoritative character of this source is suggested by its authors, the reviews of it in Soviet periodicals, and its frequent citation in other military-political writings.
lalysis fc4-^
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urnc structure laid out in Volkoconov's
FumUmental Cooes
The^oviett divide the historical causes of war into three levels. The most basic level consists of the predominant general or rooturopean war. according to the Marxist-Leninist view, would be the result of profound socioeconomic processes occurring within ihe opposing capitalist states. The Soviets reject what they describe as inaccurate and falselycauses of war enumerated by "bourgeois" theo-risls. Soviet writers thus explicitly deny that wars may result from purely psychological or sociological drives; social Darwinist imperatives; or racial. neo-Matlho-sian, or scientific-technical determinants
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In his adaptation of Clauscwiu. Lenin staled that "wareflection of that domestic policy which the given country pursues prior toccording to Soviet doctrine, capitalist or "imperialist" states are groundedystem of economic exploitation. As capitalistic systems yield more arrS more to their internal contradictions, inefficiencies, andthe ruling classes may try to augment their system's poor economic performances byotber stales' economic assets. According to this theory, capitalist states are by nature predatoryihe sriiure of territory or raw materialsthem with an alternative means of production. Thus the "imperialism" that eharacterixe* thepolicies of the rating classes in capitalist states, the Soviets claim, is rooted in the tame system at their domestic policies- The relative inefficiency of the Soviet economy in thehin comparison with Westerncause the current Soviet leadership to question this theory of the root cause of wai
Speclfie or Special Cause*
A second level of the historical causes of war at viewed by the Soviets links the erp'ioilaiivc drive of capitalist stales to specific historical conditions and socialexample, to the effects ofethnic, racial, or rcStgiout affiliations and antagonisms and the crises that emerge from them. The following arc tone of the spccirWin authoritative Soviet sources
National Ambition*
Actions undertaken by key stales may succeed in dragging alliances inlo war or so upsetting the world oxidation of forces that war agaiml the "socialist alliance" becomes feasible. Ihe following arc examples
that appear with regularity C
Jand probably reflect. to some degree, actual concerns:
The United States, according to the Soviets, is striving to retain its leadership over the West and to influence the distribution of global tasks andAlleged US actions that could lead to local wars include attempts to preserve, expand, or secure "monopolistic, neocoloniar positions in theworld. An example ci'cd in several sources asserts that the United States seeks to gain access to and control over sources of critkat rawell as markets for manufactured goods. In caseuropean war. Soviet writers argue, the Untied Slates would probably play the major role inonsensus for aggressive action to roll back ihcEuropean frontiers of socialism.
West German revanchism is often depicted by Soviet and NSWP writers as endemic (seehe Soviets believe German revanchism coulditself in demandseunited Germany and restorationhe growing Weal German influence within NATO is described by some Pact writersondition that could be exploited by-revanchist German elements to drag NATO into aggressive adventures in the fuiure.
Chinese "hegemonisilc" tendencies and hostility toward the USSR have been described in severalfrom thehrough the earlynothreat tj regional peace in Asia, butey element in the calculations of Western powers. The threat China poses to Soviet military power is characterized at essential to allow the West toavorable correlation of forces.
Spread of War
The available evidence strongly suggests that, in the Sovieturopean war is different fromany other eonfliel and would probably result from conditions that originate in Europe. Although socialist theoreticians since Engeb have stated that oon-Euro-pcaa wars may detonate one in Europe, thefor this detonation is generally left unstated. SomeC J2 sources have theorized thai thecould be drawn into direct conflict through their support for regional allies, especially the use of their own forces.
foiled the possibility of the Soviet Union and the United States being draw. Into conflict over support for separate Yugoslav republics after Tito's death, or postiWyiddlehat threatened an Israeli takeover of Persian Gul reel fields. OtherCources imply that the West would, in some rircurasunces, intentionally shift the conflict from remote areashe European theater.
Internal Crises and Threats Pact svriier* argue that periods of severe internal tensions in capitalist countries may reach critical poiou in which they are transformedestern decision to prepare for war. Pact writers proclaim that capitaliil States' inherent internal flaws andwill Inevitably produce Indaiion.economic stagnation, and shortages ofgoods. Class conflict culminating in disturbances, strikes, and riots it describedikely result.
Although Pact writers do not elaborate on Lenin's writings about why capitalist countries would allow internal crises to push themecision for war. Pact writings and statements imply thatecision would be motivatedesire to distract the people from lite real causes ol their problems.
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Arms Race
An aims race would not. in and of itself,uropean war, in the SovietThe exiftencearge, expanding pool of modern combat arms is.ine qui non for aggressive capitalist
To Sov*ct ea^s. Ine first veise of Ihe Wool Gormen national anthem,scrmorty "Do ul sell land. Ooutachland Oberoundsevanchist call to war. Docauso ol its association with the Naii Third Roich, Wast Germany substituted Ihe third verso as the official wordseoenOy,he first verso has begun beingest German schools in the slato of Baden
Goto Mann (son ol author Thomas Manneading figura on the center-loft ot West GormanCompetedho French. British, and US anthems, the German niece fa /efstrver/ harmless and unm3Hari&tic'
fill tlicioften diini (lull (he
Wesi will attemptnduce iniubility in ihe socialist countries through severe economic pressure prior lo undertakingmilitary actions. An arms race is one tactic (he West might employ, according to theseoviet writers have Identified three reasons why tbe West would foster an arms race
To apply economic, political, and military pressure oa Use socialist states.
To advance capitalist preparations for war.
To support arms manufacturer* in capitalist
Recent
erception that the Strategic Defense Initiative was Uusvched by tbe United States both to challenge the Soviet Union economically and lo alter the strategic balance
Creation and Exploitation of Temporary Advantages Socialist writers assert that it Is possible for the West to gain temporary military-technical advantages over (be "socialist commonwealth" because of the large amounts of resources devoted to preparing for war by the capitalist slates. Temporary political advantages could be gained by inducing disarray in theexample, by encouraging counterrevolutionarySuch advantages could be exploited by the West to encourage the withdrawal of one or more members of the Bloc, whi-.li could result in an increased threat of war.
Singular or Particular Cause* of War
According to Soviet theorists, no individualor random element will prove dominantinar, but suchin the Soviet"impart ato this process."assert thai the
actions of political leaders or ruling groups sic merelyi festal ions of toot or specific- in, actions of aggressive, rcvancbist elements in West Get many and their contribution inward crisis and war would reflect endemic nationalistthe personal motivations of individuals.
The playing down of (be roles of individuals in the origin of warsogical derivative of Soviet theory. (Individual actions are notoriously unpredictable, thus hardly susceptible to Marxbt-Lcniuist scientificMarxism-Leninism is predicated upon the role and importance of diss motivations and actions. Soviet doctrine, therefore, requires lhat majorevents be rationalized in terms of class conflict, not the whim and error of individuals and small groups. One demonstrable manifestation of this doctrinal constraint is the difficulty the Soviets have had In reconciling tbe historical record concerning Stalin's role in the months and weeks before the Nazi Invasion
The Unstated Final Catalyst for War
Soviet writings lay
out in detail bow the sociopolitical factors described above should be applied lo analyze specific conditions at any given time I-
lecurily dtpeadt on prtstrviHi 'A* poiiwa' itaiui quo Inhole. We Intel from this ihst, in assessing the likelihood of war breaking out inUse Soviets would pay particular attention lo Ihe general corrclalioa of force* on tbe Continent andreact moat vitorausly to perceived cti-.jea in it
Ao example cited
likely reaction of Ihe SovWi kadenhip if Sweden. Austria, or Yugoslavia were lo join NATO. lo itself,hance would only nurgiiilly iflrci (be mil,in) balance in Fur ope but the Soviets vould probably interpret such bebi'ioi as indicativeore fundamental, adversehe general corrC' Lilian of force* I
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Soviet theorists staleQui Malory does not repeat iuelf and (hat Ihe iaierplay ot* historical and social elements in any situation is rich, unique, and difficult lo foresee. Although they believe that war is subordinated to laws fejvcrsuas its oulbrrak, course, and outcome, ihe presence and influence of random factors meanshe laws of war arc not simple, rigidly opera ting laws, such as the laws ofather, they operate as probabilities and according to trends, as do all social laws. There fore, Soviet planners have not postulated specific scenarios thai represent the culmination of (heir forecasts. They probably do not believe ilsat they canct of aU-encompassing conditions necessary for (be outbreak of war in Eauopc
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Although Marsisl-Leninist theory underpins Soviet fears about (he threat of war sad (here have been several periods of heightened apprehension. Soviet political and military leaden generally appear to regard the threat of war as distant. Soviet spokesmen hire snaintainod io recent years that the USSR's achievement of strong militaryparity in nuclearfrusvtraied US scheming to use force against it.t the potential lou of Soriot superiority in conventional weaponry and, more likely, of parity in strategic nuclear weaponry, largely through tecaawaogieal ravo-lutioa, that appears lo ledoec serious concern in the Soviet leadership.
The Sonet Approachast-West Discussions of Military Doctrine
in tbe Soviet pressthe Soviets are interested la multilateral discussions about national and alliance rntlltaiynd what their likely approach would be In such talks. The Soviets believe that the West hai been successful in poet raying the Warsaw Pactilitary threat. Moreover, the Soviets appear genuinely concerned that Western leaders view the Pact as an actual military threat. The Soviets see these Westernas the underlying rcaaon fur NATO's willingnessnvest heavily in military means to offset the Pact's military capabilities. The Soviets would like tothe West that the Pact's miliury doctrine is basically defensive aadational basis exists foe serious arms controlncluding largein Western military forces.allbackeans of appealing to NATO publics, the Soviets would depict the Pact,ata nee. as determve and desirous of arms control white NATO fumblesonsensus and fends off Soviet accusations ofan offensive military doctrine.
The Specific points on which Ihe Soviet case would be built would probably be those that have previously appeared in one forum or another They can be grouped under three topics NATO's doctrine; the Warsaw pact's doctrine; and the imperatives derived from the current military balance
The Sovitt Cat* AgahM NATO'S Dwciriae The Soviets might argue that NATO's eapowsed military doctrine is inherently offensive, deatabilitiag. and costly to implement Spokesmen would detail technical characteristic! of NATO's military' strategy, tactics, forces, and deployments, claiming that these indicate nothing leu than the West's intention to launch offensive oration*ar. Specifkwould probably include.Flexible response assumes the first use of nuclearcapons by NATOar ami ihc explicit resection of the denuclcarIralionrope.regional nuclear-wearoavfree tones.
Forward defense is but an excuse for theof substantial NATO forces along the East German and Czechoslovak borders, ready to launch an attack into Pact territory with little warning.
Follow-on forces attack and the employment of offensive airpower "aimed at depriving the Pact of the ability to repulse NATOequire surprise attack by NATO to work as planned.
Large field training exercises by NATO increase the risk of war because of the increasing difficulty of distinguishing between exercises and actuals for hostilities.
Nuclear deterrenceawed concept because It attemptsssure one state'a (or alliance's) security at the cost of another's through intimidation.
TV Soviet Case for Its Own Military Doctrine The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee's Statement issued at Berlin on7 briefly lays out the Soviet case. The Soviets argue that:
Their military doctrine focuses foremost on the prevention of anyorand the resolution of alt international problems through peaceful means.
Their military doctrine is strictly defensive. Military| never be initiated by the Pact in an attempt to resolve international political problems. Furthermore, Pact members will never initiateaction against any state or alliance unless they are themselves the target of an armed attack.
They will never be ihe first to employ nuclear weapons.
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arc committed to maintaining armed forces and armamentstate of readiness strictly sufficient for defense and for repelling any possible aggression.
The Soviet Case fee Isnptrntives Derived fro*.Current MlliUrj Biiance
The Soviet! state thai ibe nalurc of correalrelations and the slate of technology make resolution of international dispalcs by military means unacceptable. The colossal destructive poienllal of nuclear weapons, in particular, has escalated ihe risks and costs cf war lo the point that war can no longer be viewedational calension of politics by other means. Specifically. Ibe Soviets argue that:
conventional weapons threaten toar in Europe vastly more destructive than previous wars, especially given the existence of nuclear power plants and chemical plants that could be hit with conventional weapons
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rough miUtary-strategkin specificbetween NATO and the Pact. Mutual arms reductions win not upset the balance, but instead will reduce the financial and societal burden of arms and lower the riskspiraling arms race and conflict. Specificshould be nth ted by reductions as necessary.
The prohibition and elimination of certain types ofall nuclear anddesirable because of their massivedeatrucdverscas. Nuclear-wea pons-free and chemical-weapons-free zonese precursors to the worldwide elimination of these classes of weapons.
Conventional forces on both tides can be structured to eliminate tbe possibility of surprise attack and offensive operations. Such measures wouldan element of predietabiUty. hence stability, ensuring that no aggressor could countocal blitzkrieg."
Weaknesses la tbe likely Sovietumeols Misstatements and contradict iocs in theumber of points for exploitation In discussions. We divide these into two categories: misrepresentation of NATO military doctrine and misrepresentation of Soviet military doctrine. First, we outline tbe Soviet definition of military doctrine.
According to ihe Soviets, all statesilitary doctrine derived from tbe nature of tbeecent article stated that "tbe main post allies of military doctrine are stipulated by the sociopolitical andsystem, ihe level of production, the state of the means of waging war, and the geographic position of ihe country and that of tbe probable enemy, and stem from the domestic and foreign policy of the state."
The Soviets define two aspects or dimensions of militaryociopoiitical and miu'iary-techni-caL The sociopolitical aspect is tbe bedrocktale's national security policy. Subject to the strict control of slate fin Ihe Soviet case. Communist party) dviliao authorities, it defines likely enemies, national objectives, and the gross allocationstate'sto defense- The miliury-iachiucal aspect of doctrine is largely ihe domain of military authorities. It deals with force structure, armaments, and methods of waging war.
In general terms, the Soviets describe iheir military doorine as whollyboth its srxiopoliiical and military-technical aspects. Western "imperialist" nations, on the other band, must by definition have aggressive military doctrines resulting from theirexpansionist political course" The Soviets thus describe NATO's doctrine as wholly offensive, concentrating on what they describe as NATO's intention and capability to wage offensive operations.
MisrepreuHiatlaa ofNATO Military Doctrine. Tbe Soviet nulUary's descriptions of NATO's military doctrineingle Alliance-wide doctrine rather thanational doctrines, neglect the political aspects or NATO member-slate doctrines, and falsify the mithaty-tcchnical character of NATO planning. To some degree, such misrepresenuiions may result from the Soviets' mirror-imaging their own dominance over tbe Warsaw Pact.
Contrary to Soviet declarations. NATO it not an alliance like ihe Warsaw Pact, controlledingle dominant stale. Each tute in NATO determines its
own national miliury doctrine. Certain defensive contingency puns and commandnarrow slice of whal the Soviets define as thetechnscnI aspect of miliuryfor collective defense. Within the Pact, only the USSR possesses nuclear and chemical weapons; in NATO. France, the United Kingdom, and the United Sutes all possess independent nuclear forces and (to varying degrees) independent nuclear doctrines.referencesingle NATO-wide military doctrine are thus demonstiaWy false.
Because the Soviet Union and NATO states do not share common definitions of doctrine, they often ulk past each other. NATO members generally look upon their national military doctrines as encompassing strategy and tactics, but not tbe grander issues of national sccuri'ydimension of military doctrine tbe Soviets refer to as sociopolitical. Thus, commonly held Alliance views ol tliose grander issues arc seldom formally identified or enunciated instatements. NATO sutes do, however,et of common views and objectives that parallel the Soviet's sociopolitical aspect of military doctrine,the following:
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existence of unrxrsvocative miliury forces can contribute to tbe prevention of aggressive war through deterrence. Deterrence has both an aspect of denial (the prevention of successful aggression)unitive aspect (ensuring that the potential aggressor could be punished through miliury action so that the costs of warould-be aggressor would outweigh any possible gains).
A belief in collective security against externalis manifested in the concept that an attack on any one sute is, and should be treated as. an attack ob all.
Military force win be used only for defensiveincluding the defense of allies andmissions.
Nuclear and chemical weapons would be used only for defensive purposes.
As individual states and as pan of the Alliance, NATO members maintain forces, procureand develop plans to rebuff any aggressor or imposc on any aggressor unacceptable damage. NATO's miliury strategy of flexiblen keeping with these defensive political and miliury aims. Forward defense is necessiutcd by NATO's limited geographic depth. Ihe political desire tothe Alliance's territorial integrity, and the aim of limiting damage to NATO members' populations and resources.
Mitttprestatetto* of Pact Military Poctrlat, The Pact's Berlin statement is the first to claim an Alii-auce-wide military doctrine for its member slates. The claim that one doctrine can address the rational security demands of seven countries is founded upon what the Soviets describeoincidence of political and socioeconomic systems and views. The claim, nevertheless, overlooks each Pact sutc's uniqueposition, population, cccetomics, andsituation, as well as otheraccording to tbe formal Sovieta state's miliury doctrine.
Practically all Soviet suternents have emphasized tbe sociopolitical dimension of the Pact miliury doctrine and have ignored and distorted its ctTemive military -technical dimension. The Pact's deployment of forces, ihe makeup of those forces,thepublic suternents suggest its intention, capability, and preparations to wage offensive operations In Ihe event of war:
Tbe Sovieu have not addressed ihe inconsistency between their very favorable conventional force sunding irt Europe and their self-describedmilitary technical doctrine Soviet miliury writings Miggest that an alucker needsdds to be confident of success. Even after >he recently announced troop cuts, Soviet and NSorces deployed in the forward region willutDumber NATO forces In aims menu,Ihosc suited for offensive operations (such as unks).
Numerous SovietPact statements call for forces incapable of wating often tire opera lions, especially tbe Berlin ilatcmeni tbai impliei ihai Pacl forcea have convened or aie convening totatus. However, recent staterncnta show clearly that no chance in operational doc nine and planning has, in fact, occurred General Gribkov, then Crnef of Stafi* of Ibe Warsaw Pacl Joint Armed Forces, statedWhile repwbiac axtreaaioa. (tbe Warsaw Pact] will alto conduct counter offensiveefense Mmn:er Yarn* noted. "Tbe defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, which is designed exclusively forilitary threat, by no meanslhal our actions win beassive nature- Forces that are configured for sustained counicroffcnsivei are not easilyfrom those dcalgssed forffensives, as Soviet sources say about NATO.
It is not apparent what would motivate the Sc-riets to mate fundamental changes in tbcir operationaland doctrine. Soviei statements about parity, reasonable sufficiency, and other, related terms arc inconsistent as to whether Pact forces and doctrine are independent of Weal err. actions or direct reactions to thorn:
Yevgeniy Primakov, director of ihe Institute ofv. and International Relations, has contended that for too long the USSR has "followed tbe United States in almoal mirror-tike fashion" and can insteadevel of defense sufficiency free of US actions
attack acaiasl us is notimilarly, Defense Minister Yann staled. we are not ibe ones who set tbe knit of sufficiency. il it the actions of ibe United Stales and NATO."
Finally, it remains unclear how the concept of reason able sa Hkseocy applies ia Ihe Sonet view toonal forces The Soviets have now indicated thai they will make substantial unilateral cult ia some conventional arms, but tbey have not detailedact "defensive defense" would look like
There are signs of doctrinal ferment ia ibe Soviei Union. Contradictions among ovilun and military Spokesmen are probably evidence of an internal Soviet debate Nevertheleas. even Ifcbitc isand If It were definitely resolved in favor of the "defensive school" of Soviei thinking, we would find ourselves in the position of L. Semeyho, writing In Itvestlyaats IJ
he men proclamation ofilitary doctrines defensive thrust Is not enough. Confirmations of 'Mr artmu of she slit of ih' armed forces and their distribution and structure, the nature at their armaments, militaryit. undertaken and. atn terms at eonstruetire actions lo reduce the level of military straiegte eauilsbrsum Hit haul this, declarations will remain declarations andsuspicions will not onlyermanent feature but will also be capable of causing themergence of ertsl! ttiuatlons.
contrast, Valentin Falln (then head of the No vosli press asency. now chief of the party'sDepartment) concluded that the Soviets would change their operational. if we have (he material guaranteeonventional
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Key Concepts In Soviet -New Tkinking-About Military Affaire
political leaden, academics based largely at Institutes such as IMEMOIlhe Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and IUSAC /the Institute of the USA andnd military leaders areew vocabulary in years to discuss changes In military affairs. Joe following concepts ore among the most prominent used by these writers and cam be npeered to appear regularly in multilateral discussions about military doctrines:
Mutual security In the nuclear age. security for the superpowers can only be mutual. On the global scale, security can only be universal and comprehens ive.
No victory nuclearThere tan be no victoruclear war. and it would be suicidal, and thus Irrational, to begin one Furthermore, nuclear war may threaten the very enlsience of mankind.
Impossibility of acbaoinf miliury superiority.ike USSR nor the Untied States canilary suparvity ovf' the other superpower. Similarly, neither the East nor Ihe West can achieve military superiority.
Insufficiency or mlllury-technical meant to secure defense. National security cannot be attained by military-technical meant alone An Increasingly important role Is played by political means, eipe dally armi cameo! anj disarmament.
Rejection of deterrence Deterrence perpetuates the arms race, increases the chance of military confron tattoos, end ti immoral
evels of panly. Parity at ever-higher levels does nut guarantee peace. It in fact threaten! peace and it inherently wasteful. The levels of nuclear weapon- held by both sides must be lowered, and eventually they must be completely eliminated.
Straleeicyitem of strong disincentives for the use of military force must be preierved during Ihe transition from the pretent situation to the nonnuclear world. In addition, the development of new weapon syitemt may contribute toby rascheting up the ermi race.
Reasonable surnctcacy The level of military strength and force ptenmng should be based On ike principle of limiting resources committed to the militaryhe lowest level consonant with national and alliance defense. In the nuclear field, forces should be enough to ensure the infliction ofdamage on the aggressor In thefield, fortes should be able to defeatbut should not be able to carry out offensive Operations.
Defensive military doctrine. Both sides should adopt defensive strategies In formulatingstrategies. Both sldet should deny themselves the means to carry out surprise attacks or offensive operations
Glasnost. In ihe military arena, excessive secrecy comribuies to mistrust and should be replacedew openness about military doctrines, forces, levels of spending, and ihe file.
Rejection of nulury meant for resetviaf interna-uonal conflicts All conflicts should be resolved through peaceful means became any local conflict could lead to nuclear escalation Involving the superpowers.
Rejection of Osusev.itt'l formula The axiom that war Is an extension of politics by violent means Is no longer applicable to confrontation Involvingpowes
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Original document.
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