SOVIET POLICY AND INTERESTS IN THE GULF

Created: 4/11/1989

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Soviet Policy and Interestshe Gulf

USSR's primary Interest In the Gulf Is to prevent the US from regaining Its past special relationship with Iran, which the Soviets view as the strategic prize In the region.

has sought to capitalize on the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the strains in

J2p Iranian-Western relations over the Rushdie affair to bolster Its position In Tehran.

The Soviet's quick response to Khomeini's January letter toMinister Shevardnadze's visit to Tehran the nexta clear sign the Kremlin believes Improved ties are possible under Khomeini's rule.

scow will probably restore Its military relationship with Iran Incrementally. It has already eased restrictions on East European arms. The Soviets are unlikely to sell large quantities of major weapons until it becomes clear the war with Iraq will not resume and the political situationran has settled, but we cannot rule out that Moscow may sellajor weapon system.

In the rest of the Gulf, Moscow Is working hard to bolster Its relations with Gulf states and to reduce suspicions over Its growing ties to Iran. The further reduction of the US military presencehe Gulf remains an important goal for Moscow.

Soviets will probably try to soothe Iraqi Irritation over Soviet-Iranian rapproachement by providing advanced weaponsas the recent sale ofight bombers tomay be flexibleenegotiating Iraq's military debt.

oscow will portray Itselfoderating force In the region In an attempt to cement relationships with smaller Gulf states and obtain full diplomatic ties to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Iran Internal: Radicals in the Ascendancy

Ayatollah Khomeini's use of the Rushdie affair to rekindle revolutionary VtJv fe"or In Iran has greatly strengthened radical leaders and increased the

prospects for severe political turmoil. adical-dominated Iran will remain

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deeply hostile toward the West and slow down or reverse Iran's Improving relations with Arab stateshe Persian Gulf.

The radicals are exploiting the anti-WesternIncreased access too consolidate their power.

hey have forced the resignation of two leading proponents of pro-Western policies from the Foreign Ministry.

The resignation of Ayatollah Hontazerl as successor to Khomeini further bolsters the radicals.

homeini ordered Montazerl to step down because of displeasure with the pragmatic positions Montazerl had embraced.

ension appears to be high over the resignation with reports of large demonstrations in Montazerl's hometown protesting his removal. Montazerl has written an open letter urging calm, fjp^pj

With no clear favorite to succeed Khomeini, the regime may resorteadership council ratheringle leader. ouncil would increase paralysis In decisionmaking and sharpen factional differences.

lthough the pragmatlsts/conservatlves are on the defensive, Khomeini probably will allow Rafsanjanl and his key supporters to continue to hold government positions, making It likely that bitter factional strife will continue Into the post-Khomeini era. |

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Original document.

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