THE DENG-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

Created: 5/10/1989

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NATIONAL 'INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Special Analysis

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General Secretary Gorbachev's trip to Beijing next Monday till formally end the Slno-Sorlet estrangement of the past three decades and mark the attainment of one of his major foreign policy goals. pjjM-fJJJjJj

Gorbachev hopes the rejuvenated relationship will allow Moscow iouch larger role in Asia and put some constraints on Si no-US cooperation in ihe region. It will also allow Moscowontinue to reduce its military forces along ihe Sino-Soviet border to the ultimate benefit of ihe civilian economy. Deng Xiaoping views the summiteans to set ihe parameters of Sino-Sovicl relations before he loses his ability to assert his political will and as an opportunity lo reduce Ihe near-term Sovicl mi'iurv. "fJJ^pH

The General Secretary has met only one senior Chinese leader toli Peng in lateso his faceto-face discussions wnh Deng will be an imporiani milestone of the summit. Another will be the communique establishing the foundationewcow warns totaiemcni of principles governing party-to-parly lies, which will be resumed when Gorbachev meets General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. China preferslay down ihose aspects of normalization,radual rccsublishmcnt of parly contacts is likely.

Gorbachev's -Gifts-Gorbachev is likely lo offer specifics about previously announced troop cuts in Asia and push Beijingeciprocate and to open discussions on muiual force reductions. China will probably opl simply lo discussV- onfidencc-building proposals, calculating thai, since Gor offer of cuts wastandsain liltle by offering reciprocalccenl flurry of meetings on border demarcalion suggests both sides arc seeking at least an agreement in principle on the disputed territories. If the Soviets are assured of future Chinese compromises in the wcsicm secior. Gorbachev might concede the nvcr islands opposite Khabarovsk in the castrand gesturejJiTfssjj

Cambodia apparentlytumblmgblock Beijing reportedly is pushingritten Sovicl commitmentomprehensive Cambodian settlement, bui Moscow is reluctant to go beyond (he positions Hanoi" advances ai the Si no-Vietnamese talks in Beijing thts week. Both sides may have to agree lo disagree onpoints. "

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Soviet* Consider2 Tanks1th Chinese

Special intelligence suggests the Sov,C| defense industry has been invest.gating the feasibility orcoproductngan export model of2 tank with Beijing. In early February the Nixnniy Tagil Tank Plant was to draw up lists of components furI tankma could produce on its own and those the Soviets would have to supply. At aboui the sameelegation from the plant apparently was in China, presumably to inspect facilities that would be involved in any coproduction deal.

1 has been widely exported by the Soviets,ecision to offericense would undoubtedly be controversial in Moscow:

* ,he mo*nccd Soviet tank in the Far East The USSR has onlyf themall in units currently stationed in Mongolia, most of which are slated for withdrawal by the end of next year.

The Soviets have long relied on the firepower and mobility of their armored forces to ofhcl China's numerical superiority, and anything that might reduce that edge would indicate Moscow is countingarger political accommodation and believes that military conflict wuh China is highly unlikely

The Soviets may be considering coproduciion as party of the larger normalizationeal isoregone conclusion, however, and any formal agreement will require extended discussions.

China ii unlikely to become dependent again on the USSR for military hardware, butwelcome tbe opportunity to purchase advanced tank production technologyhas been unable to acquire from the West.

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Gorbachev and Deng will in pan be playinghe US. the rest of Asia, and the world. Gorbachev might announce unilateral plans to reduce the size of the Soviet Pacific Meet or propose other dramatic new arms cont'rol initiatives targeted at other Asian countries, but he must be careful to avoid giving Beijing the impression that Moscow is using the summit merelyehicle to advance its relations with other countries. The Chinese will take steps not to reawaken fears in the West and Asia of the rebinh of monolithic Communism Beijing's invitationS naval task group to visit Shanghai the day Gorbachev leaves there is designed to highlight Sino-US military lies and maintain pressure on Moscow, bjjj pjjjj

Beyond (he Summit

Normalization of relations may yield significant new areas of interaction between (he USSR and China, particularly in military-industrial cooperation. China is exploring Soviet alternatives to Western military hardware and technology, and improved relations could lead to increased sharing of dual-use technology in electronics research and production. Although China is unlikely to risk access to advanced Western technology by deliberately violating reexport controls, it docs not have an effective means to monitor its several thousand trading companies. The Chinese and Soviet military also mayialogue on regional affairs and limited intelligence exchanges.

Moscow and Beijing for the most part will remain competitors in East Asia, but normalization will improve regional security. It has already helped reduce China's level of tension with Vietnam. India, and Mongolia. Both countries also have an interest in encouraging Nonh Korean restraint but are more likely to proceed in parallel than formally cooperate. PjTataVj9atJH

As Gorbachev's imageeacemaker takes root throughout Asia and perceptions of the Soviet miliiary threat recede. US policy may soon face new challenges. Some non-Communist East Asians may sec lew need to spend money on defense or to permit US military access.

The US will remain central to Beijing's foreign policy because China needs investment, advanced technology, and large hard currency markets. Beijing apparently believes- however, that US concerns about Sino-Soviet tics can be exploited. For example. China may be more assertive on the issue of Taiwan. But Beijing will have to guard against possible gains Moscow might makeesult of new strains in Sino-US relations. mmmm-CIA. DIA. INR NSA

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