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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9
Sfno- Soviet Relations: Tho Summit and Beyond
Summary
General Secretary Gorbachev's visitormally end the estrangement of the oast three decades. For Beijing, the summit offers an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the near-term Soviet military threat and build up Chines* levtraga in its relationship with the United States. For Moscow, the summitignal to Washington that the Soviets have nowore balanced position in the strategic triangle and will continue to use warming US-Soviet ties to prod China to be more cooperative. We believe Gorbachev views the summit as also advancing the Soviet goal ofignificantly larger rol* In Asia and Unifying the proposed unilateral troop cuts along the Sinc-Soviel frontier.
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While viSilmg Beijing Gorbachev i| likelynnounce Specifics on hi*an force reduction in the Jovial Far Eait. and he will prats Baijing to respond. Beijing appaars In no hurry to offer reciprocal reductions, and win probably opt to discuss potentiei eonftdance-buiiding measures instead Gorbachev could eiso matedramaticf unilateral cult in the Soviet Pacific Fleet or propose some other arms control Initiative to Influence governments In non-Communist Eeit Asia. Although we do notorder demarcation agreement to be Ironed out before Ihe summit the Soviets may offer to relinquish the disputed islands opposite Khabarovsk If selling essurei them of Chinese compromises on the western lector An imponent achievement of the eummrt mayoint communique establishing the foundationew relationship, but It may also contain dissenting Chinese and Sovieta-^bod.a.
in the will of the lummit. we see the likelihood of some significant new areai of Smo-Soviet interaction, particularly In the mtlitarv-mdustrlei iphere. China ii exploring Soviet alternatives to Western military hardware end technology increasing the possibility that Chinese firms will provide Moscow with controlled Western technology China is unlikely to mk its access to advanced Weitern technology by deliberately violating reexport controls on dual-uie technology, but Belong lacks an effective means to control the export of high technology by its several Ihousend trading companies.
improving Smo-Sovietariety of aou'ces indicate Chine will continue to place priority on good ties to Washington. Br.jing looki to the United States toounterweight to the Soviet Union end Japan, end believes that only the West can provide the levels of Investment, advanced technology, and large markets required for Chinese economic end miliary developmentradual reiuvenation ofkt between the Communist giantsnevitable, we believe Chine and the Soviet Union will remain aeperated by Beijing'i lingering diitrust of Moscow's ultimate goals and thair rivalry for influence In Asia Hjaaa
he Summit
Beliing end Moscow hopeordial lummit to demonstrate thatears of acrimonious Smo-Soviet relations ara ending and toocument establishing the foundetionew relationship we believe that from Chinas vantage point Pres.denth lo Beijing in Februaryucceisful Deng-Gorbechev summit promote Beijing'! desire to havt better refetions with Moscow and Washington than they have with each other. Belling hat nervously watched the Increasing warmth in us-Soviat contacts over the past two vaars and probably acheduled thebefore the ao-cei'ed three obstacles* to normeined relations were fully
ensureaintains its leverage with both superpowers.
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A Preview of Gorbachev's Key Meetlnge
Gorbachev's moil Importers meeting will be with Ding Xleeplng. The Deng-Gorbechev meeting will be the first leadership summit since Khrushchev met with Maoven though Deng's official post is not head of atate or party but Chairman of the Chinese Military Commission. Chinese enaiysts end omcieli are ponrevlng the summitersonal triumph for Deng, one that setsa new basis for the development of bilateral ties before he finally retires.
Deng and Gorbachev haveegacy of bold reformsevitalize economies sagging from overreliance on central planning. They have attempted to decrease the official role In controlling the economy and cut bloated military establishments. Deng end Gorbachev hold sharply different views on the value of political liberalization, however, as Deng has pursued merket-oriented economic reforms end openness to the West with only feeble attempts to make the Communist Party more responsive to criticism, aMajajaj
Gorbachevs meeting with General Secretary Zhao Ziyang will effectively mark the reestablishment of perty-to-perty ties. Beijing will look for Gorbachev to admit mistakes in past party relations and promise noninterference end equality in the future. Chinese media may carry only limited coverage of theircomparison with the press fenfare anticipated for Gorbachev's other^neetlngs--to play downsignificance of the restoration of perty ties.
Gorbachev's meeting witheng will include substantive discussions on ullaterel issues. During his meeting with President Buih Lireater foreign policy role then he hes in the past, and we anticipate his talks with the Generalill include discussions of troop strengths along the Sino-Soviet border and the Soviet troop presence in Mongolia, the Cambodian issue, economic cooperation, and progress on demarcating the Sino-Sovietay be the Chinese leader who will pey the first high-level return visit to Moscow, perhaps this year, I
LI would be an unusual cho.ee. hi it notoes not correspond to any that Gorbachev holda.
Gorbachev's meeting with his nominal host President Vang Shangkun, may be more symbolic then substantive. Vang extended tht official Invitationtate ratherartyout of deference to Western sensitivities. As Gorbachev's host, he will probably receive an Invitation to visit Moscow. I
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Beijingws lha lummit at an unprecedented opportunitv lo reduce the near-term Sovitt mllitirv thr*et tohina almost carta inly mil percalvas the Soviet Union at Its most credible long-term threat, but lessened securltv tensions until at least early in the next century can assist Beijing In building the economic and military strength rt now lacks The summit also allows Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping nowo set the parameters of Sino-Soviet relations before he loses his ability to assert hla political will.
Forejuvenated relationship with Bailing meant the ebilrty to divert resources from military preparedness on yet another long border, advances the Soviet goal ofarger role in Asia, androcess of halting the steady expansion in Slno-US cooperation In Eest Asia Gorbachev probably views hla meeting with Dengtrong menage to the United States and domeiticeily that he haaajor breakthrough with the Chinese by overcoming opposition from the Chinese leader who has been the most auspicious of Moscow. Gorbechev also seas the summit as Justification for Soviet military reductions in the Far East which he hopes to translate into savings for the domestic economy. Moscow win also continue to use warming US-Soviet ties to prod China to be mora cooperative The Soviets, for example, scheduled Secretary Baker's visit to Motcowew days before the summit pjajpjjeji
Parameters of the Joint Communique
Aside from the first face-to-face discussions between Gorbachev endhes met only Piemier LImost importantof the summit is Utah/ tooint communique. Moscow hesa document for year) and probably aees it es the equivalent of theofhich formally ended Smo-US enimosity and definedof the relationship. Beijing, for in pert finds such documentsin diplomatic interactions offering the Chinese the tool to Influence thethe other nation by claiming violation* of the principles or the aplrlt of
the five principles of peaceful coe<iu*nce--nonlntertarence In each other's domestic affeira. respect for sovereignty end terrltoriel Integrity, nonuseorce, good-netghborliness. and friendship. |
Soviet and Chinese diplomats have already he'd extended meetings to shape the document, and trie moat contentious points probably have not yet been resolved and may be skirted entirely. Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev'a let* April vielt to Beijing reportedly focused on Ironing out dissgreements, with Cambodia apparently the main stumbling block:
Cambodia: Room For Compromltt?
AH hough Soviet and Chinese press ereprospectsreakthrough on Cambodia at the summit both sides seem to be moving closer on the composition of en international control mechanism to monitor the Vietnemesend the convening of en Intermtloner conference. Beijing he* Increased pressure on Moscow, probably out of concern thet Henoi hes se-zed the diplomatic initiative with Its recent ennouncement of en 'unconditionel' Vietnemese pullout from Cambodia by September. The Chinese also worry that People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) Premier Hun Sen's recent initiatives end his growing international stature will enhance rut ability to dominate Cambodia after tha Vietnemese pun out
The Chinese heve tried to gein Soviet commitment to several aspectsomprehensive settlement Including:
* Endorsement of Prince Sihanouk as the headuadripartite provisional government and dissolution of the present PRK Government
Support for reducing the four Cambodlen military forces to the seme low level00 men per faction) and their reintegrationnified defense force.
Moscow *as increased pressure on Hanoi to be more responsive on key Issues on the eve of the summit, but is unlikely to go beyond the positions Vietnam is advancing at the Sino-Vietnamese Talksoay:
In an attempt to break the stalemete over power-sharing arrangements, Moscow has been advocating en expanded version of en old PRK proposal onuadripartite 'supreme council of national reconciliation' which would be 'above* the PRKIn place ofresponsible tor holding elections.
Moscow probably will continue to support the PRK's stance against the Chinese propoaal to reduce each party's forces to en equal level because ft would leeve the PRKisadvantage end could ellow the Khmer Rouge to regain exclusive power Moscow will also push Beijing to cut off aid to the Khmer Rouge during Instead of after Hanoi's puliout.
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Bailing reportedlyoviet commitment tocomprehensive Cambodian settlement that Includes power-eharing arrangementsuture government in Phnom Penh headed bv Prince Sthanoulc
hadt would^elp resolve tha Intarnal aid* ofSoviets Inaiat they cannot dictate policy to Vietnam or ihe PRK.
ramatic breakthrough onpossibility butikelihood during the Sino-Vletnamese Vice Ministerial Talks in Beijingoay-the communlqua
oscow agreeing
9 andnax Moscow seeks waysnasse Cambodia and other outstanding Issues, i
A sacond major complication Is whether tha document will codify the resumption of party flat,that tha Soviets are pushing forset of principles end objectives of party-to-party ties possibly similar8 Sovlet-Yugoslev folnt declaration. The Chinese reportedly are demurring, arguing that this would upset the United States and would prefer that the meeting between party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Gorbachev signal, withouteturn to normalcy. Chinese party leeders, however, may see edvanteges In spelling out In writing that the Soviet paternalism ofas ended and that future ties ere based on Independence, equality, mutual respect and noninterference in each others internal effairs. Beijing might attempt to uie the prospectstatement on party relations to entice Moscow to be more response on Cambodia.m
Whether party ties are codifiedummitradual rejuvenation of party links across the board is Inevitable. Chinese party representatives are likely to attend future world Communist meetings convened by Moscow, and regular party exchanges will begin. The Soviet All-Union Komsomol end the Communist Youth League of China have already agreed to resume contacts after the summit end both sides are discussing future exchanges of journalists, teachers, and students, according to Soviet radiobroadcasts. Beijing reportedly Is especially Interested In sending Youth League members to apprentice In Soviet scientific research Institutes and Industrial enterprises. While party-to-party connections mey not accomplish much more than transactions through existing government channels, they willpecial dimension In Sfno-Soviet ties that the West does not enjoy.
Security end Border laauee
Gorbechev la likely to bring to Beijing specifics on thaen forcereducuonsir^heSQ^ei 'a- East but win push Betting tocete not only will military manpower In tha Far EaTT^P
cjt-a: all butmen Soviet division In Mongolia win be withdrawn by
The Sovietsomprehensive border accord that could trade Hebueii island opposite the Soviet cKv of Khabarovsk for Chines* conceislons in the -ait Theemand for the repudiation of th* unequal treaties and appear willing to settle for the Soviets giving back the lend that they took beyond the border marked by the treaties in the west. I
In our Judgement, Moscow has been prepared for aoma time to giv* Habdail beck. Gorbachev sat the stag*ompromis* when he publicly ennounced Soviett with th* long-held Chln*s* positron that th* eastern border passes along th* mam channel of the Amurn his Vladivostok ap**eh. Th*greedal photography of th*sector, which Moscow must hav* realized would show Heixlazl on the Chinas* side of the mein channel. Th* Soviets will probebiy b* careful to claim that the natural flow of th* nver has changed the border to avoidt that could apply to any other disputed territories along the USSR'Setioneiizaticn that Moscow would be unable to us* in th* western sector. Beijing will also approach th* more legalistic terrttorlaf dispute In the west with caution to avoio setting damaging precedents for Its territorial clelma on the border with India and in the Spratly Islands. I
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that forces will b* restructuredefensive configuration. The reduction and restructuring of Soviet units could affect half of the ground force divisions opposite China--through reductions In personnel strength, conversion to stetic defense divisions, and disbendment Although the Soviets wouldualitative superiority, the changes could cut Soviet. China hasanks In regions opposite the Soviet Union. Thua far, China has pointed to usillion-man reduction In the site of its armed forces5 end appears In no hurry to schedule meetingsilitary and diplomatic experts group that was agreed to In principlehe Foreign Ministers' discussions in December end February. |
Chinese leaders probably calculate that because Gorbachev's offer of cuts was unconditional, they stand to gain little et this lime by offering reciprocal reductions. We believe Beijing first wishes to see some of the Soviet cuts implemented end. in our Judgment, the extent of Beijing's willingness to offer reciprocal Chinese actions will depend on the ultimate outcomeurrent debate within the Chinese leedership over defense strategy and the nature of the strategic threat to China.-At the summit. Beijing will probably opt simply to discuss with Gorbachev potential confidence-buildingas limiting the scope and number of exercises and providing advance notice of training activities. |
Marked Increases in the number of meetings involving the border demarcation issue In the past few weeks suggest to us that both sides are seeking at least an agreement in principle on the disputed territories at the summit. To date, most of the territorial issues in the eastern sector have been settled and only the areas near the Pamirs in the west remain largely unresolved. We judge that If the Soviets are assured of future compromises in the west. Gorbachev may concede the Islands opposite Khabarovsk to the Chinese during this visit. Accordinghinese-controlled Hong Kong newspaper. Zhenbeo (Demansky)site of bitter clashes Inalready been turned over to China. Chinese troops are reportedly now patrolling the Island unarmed, which couldignal to Moscow that China will not place major military installations on Heixiazi island if it is returned.
Addressing the World Stage
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In many ways, Gorbachev and Deng will be playing as much to the United States, the rest of Asle, and the world as to each other during the summit. Gorbachev, for example, could announce plans to unilaterally reduce the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet or propose other dramatic new arms control proposals to impress Japan. South Korea. Taiwan, the ASEAN nations. Australia, and New Zealand with his sincere desire for better
conomic Cooperationlanea
Bilateral economic inttraction hes grown steadily tor tha pait tour yaenack of normellied political relationsor example, me two aides signed their first five-year trade agreement in more theneert;
Sino-Soviet tradeillion last year, far less than the Su biliioi Stno-US trade butimes the level of Smo-Soviet trede2 Cross-bordermade upercent of overell trede InMOO millionccounting for more thanercent of trade.
6 the Soviets egreed to renovateectories and construct seven new facilities, most in northeastern China Several hundred Soviet technie.ens ultimately will be sent to Chine for these end other industrial programs, and an equal number of Chinese will be sent to the USSR for training One roadblock to progress hei bean Chinese dissshsfectlon with the Quality and technical level of Soviet industrial equipmont Moscow has offered. LTaaaaaW
New areas of cooperetlon9 include joint ventures in the energy field, limited Soviet financial assistanee to Chinese projects, end Chineseons to the Soviet Far East:
nuc'ea' po-er plants ana I
lant IrTTiaonTng
lave oeen agreed upon but financial arrangements ere atitl under negotiation Moscow Isajor supplier of thermal power plantsozen contracts, mostly in northern China
The Soviets recently agreed to5 millrttn credit to Beijing for steet-menufacturing equipment the third known Soviet credit to China in the pest year. Previously. Chine had evoidedcredit arrangements became of the bitter experiences of 'Soviet eld' in credits In the.
B mg Is sending0 Chinese laborers to the Soviet Umon si pan of three lebor agreements signedccording to the Chinas* prasa. This Is pert of completed compensatory-trad* arrangements which-Hn ,Chineseercentage of th* goods produced from eucn labor. i
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China has traditionally purchased passenger aircraft, transport helicopters, and trucks Irom the Soviets, and we believe theretrong possibility that this cooperation will extend to military hardware and technology. Chine'a military would almost certainly like to acquire Soviet radar and electronic warfare gear, axport versions of Soviet main battle tanks and attack helicopters, particularly if the sales package includes productionn our Judgment the unresolved question is hnw far Moscow Is willing to go in transferring capabilities that ean markedly Improve the quality of Chinese fo-ces lacing the Soviet Union and its allies
The Chinese and Soviet military establishments may alsoialogueaffairs end limited Intelligencewhich Beijing had In theto consider
Sharing of dual-use technologies in electronics research and production is another area in which Sino-Soviet cooperation may reach new levels China is already providing its highly advanced gallium arsenide technology-used in microelectronics to enhance remote sensing and high-speedMoscow in exchange for silicon proouct.on technology, and Beijing recently proposed exchanging top experts in microelectronics. Soviet technology is enrective to meny Chinese because it is cheaper and more easily assimilated than comparable Western
Closer Sino-Soviet science and technology relations Increase the prospects thatone of the several thousand trading companies Moscow with controlled Western technolo_.
cently told -uae techn
cannot obtain from the West particularly computer technology Although we judge Beijmg iso risk Its access to advanced Western technology by deliberately violating reex.-o't controls, Chine's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade lacks an affec'.ve means for controlling the export of high-technology goods
*elated area. Beijing and Moscow are talking Increasingly shout cooperationspace programs asssssssseasseaai^
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Although we expect economic ties lo continue Ihelr steady growth efierdisappointed with the pace ol expenslon to date
na^esuggeste^natTs^mbltious programs be discussed end probably want to sae results on existing agreementsajor problem hat been met while many agreements in principle have been signed, bureaucratic and other problems have delayed their implementation. Nonetheless. Smo-Soviet trade probably will3 billion average annual figure for the rest of the five-year barter trade egreemem lhat extendsnd new cooperation in such areas as border trede. joint ventures. Soviet financial credits, end laborthe export of Chinese construction, agricultural, and timber workers tonew promise of mutualenefit
Regional Implications
Better Sino-Soviet relations are likely toositive impact on some aspects of East Asian security. Sino-Soviet repprochement hes already contributed to reducing aomewhat Chinese tensions with Vietnam. India, and Mongolia. Both Beijing and Moscow alsoested interest In easing tension on the Korean penlniule anday to establis'* official relation* with Seoul Should the Soviets and Chinese begin to cooperate on sjch issues as jointly encouraging North Korean res'refnt. this cooperation could have positive implications for regional stability. |
The continued improvement In Smo-Soviet lies that we foresee in the neat veer or two will give Moscow end Beijmg more weignt in regional affairs, but we bsheve there are few major arenas of potential bilateral cooperation in East Asia, as each win SMk to advene* its own competing influence In pen.cular. as Moscow steps up overtures to the non-Communist Asian countries, increased competition lor Investment and trade opponunlt.es es wen es political influence is likely Moscow win probably noterious economic competitor in the neer term because economic development in the Soviet Far East lags behind Chinese reform efforts. In the long term, however, competition for investment and trade almost certainly win increase, especially if the Soviets are willing to compromise on political Issues Important to reglonelaa Japan's claim to tht Northern Territories and pressure on North Korea to be more accommodating towerd Seoul. The Soviets are also beginning to develop specialcones In the Fereftercould compete with those In China. Beijing is likely to look with suspicion upon any future Soviet inroada In Iheich China has traditionally viewed as ItsjTfSSJfSSj
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implications For Washington
Improved 5ino-Soviet relations will increase Chmaia and Soviat lavsrage in relations with ina Unitod States end add to Gorbachev's Imageeacemaker. The already minimal potential for Sino-Sovlet military conflict will recede even further, presenting new challenges to US foreign policy. In an atmosphere of triangularapan probably will be under greeter pressure to Improve Its reletions with the Soviet Union Moreover. rf th* imege of th* Soviet milltery threat In East Asl* is diminished. non-Communist East Asltns may sea less need to spend money on defense or to permit US military access, especially if Moscow announces ft will abandon its military base at Cam Ranh unilaterally, further curtail its navat deployments In the Asia-Pacmc region, or return the contested Northern Territories to Japen. It is conceivable that the Soviets will eventually make all of these moves, with the withdrewel from Cam Ranh probably the most likely in the near term. If Slno-Soviet reletions improve too rapidly, however, others may turn more to Washingtonounterweight to the two Communist giants Some Asianas indie endseek greater Interaction with th* United States if they perceive werming Sino-Soviet relations as threetening |
Moscow and Beijing may etso cooperateumber of UN issues, arms control Questions, and in multilateral forumi where Soviet and Chinese positions ere closer than China'sto the United States, in some of tnese cases, however. Chine's positions are largelyas on Nicaragua and the debtare primarily aimed atThird World audience to demonstrete China's independent foreign policy In our judgment, Beijing looks to the United States totrong role in maintaining stability In Asia and wilt reme'n extremely wery of Soviet cells for an international forum to discuss Asian security Chin* elmost certainly believes thet eny such collective Asian security pact would lend legitimecy to Soviet attempts toinfluence in Eest Aata and. In any event,use for obtaining US miirtary force cuts. |
While Beijing seeks to enhance Its leverage In triangular relations, the Chinese have gone to some lengths to reeskure the United Stetes thet improvements in Slno-Soviet relations do notadically different US-Chine relationship. Chinese leaders have reportedly decided that relations with the United States must remain paramount and have apparently evoided trying to score geins with th* Soviets at th*of th* united Stetes. In rec*nt meetings with Chinese leaders. US officials have
The United Stetes will remeln central to Chinese foreign policy beceuie of the continuing Andounterweight to the Soviet Union end Japan, end the belief thet only the West cen provide the investment edveneed technology, end large herd currency peylng markets required for Chinese economic and military development We believe the Chinese leadership continues to judg* that although th* Soviet Union sincerelyeriod of extended peaceuild Its aconomy. rt win eventually again attempt to bring China under tts sway. Moreover. Chinas* leaders probably calculate
Sino-US relations prod Moicow lo be more forthcoming on Chinese demands
But ir. their
A if, irai of uncertainty is how Beijing will uu Improved lies with Moicow as leverage againit the United States. The Chinese deny they wouldoviet card, but they eppeer to genuinely believe that the United Stetes hes abiding concerns about Slno-Sovlet rapprochement that Beijing could exploit They might decide, for example, to be more assertive on the issue of Taiwan, pointing up Moscow's long support for their position.
Ini
the Ch.nese will have to balance possible gains egainst the fact that new stu relations with Washington could also be exploited by Moscow.
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