NESAR: PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO AND THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ISSUE

Created: 5/5/1989

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Near East and South Asia Review I

9

Near East and South Asia Reiicw

Articles

Prime Minister Bhutto andthe Pakistani Nuclear Issue!

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Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's influence ca nuclear issues Lt sharply circumscribed by the miiilary's firm control over nuclear decisionmaking and strong commitmentuclear weaponsBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBJBBBBJIiB^pMoreOver. Pres;cen Gtiulamsupport to tbe military'i dominance and direction of nuclear policy. Although Bhutto's access and leverage on nuclear issues have incirascd since the assumed office last December, she is unlikely to gain control over nuclear decisionmaking anytime soon Even if she were to gain ibe upper hand, we do not believe she would try to atop Pakistan's nuclear weapons effort or significantly reduce existing capabilili

Prime Minister Bhutto agreed not to interfere with Pakistan's nuclear policies as one of several editions levied by the Army on ber In exchange for milil support for her becoming Prime Minister.!

advisers with close ties to the military, discussing nuclear nutters with foreign leaders and diplomats, and making statements on nuclear issues supportive of longstanding Pakistani positions, Bhutto probably has gained entree to certain nuclear policyparticularly those involving US aid rcquircmcnu.l

reports on Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, demarches on the nuclear issue presented by foreign governments, and information her national security advisers have obtained

Prime Minister Bhutto's positionuclear weapons option for Pakistan is not clear and possibly not relevant at this sUge. Although she has publicly stated that she does not favor developing nuclear weapons and that PakisUn is noteapons optic

has also been quoted as blaming ZU for undermining Pakistan's dream ofuclear power. The Prime Minister clearly does not want Pakisun's nuclear progress toutoff of US aid, but we believe shetrong interest in promoting the policies and initiative* cf he late father. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who started PakisUn's nuclear weapons program. Because of the military's commitmentuclear weapons option, ber father's involvement in Ike program, and ihe broad consensus among Pakbtanis about the needclear weaponseter possible Indian aggression, we believe Bhutto would not try lo abolish or significantly cut back the weapons program. H

Bhutto, however, may be more sensitive and responsive than the miliUry to US concerns over the nuclear issue. Her recent public denials of Pakistan's nuclear weapons intentions, for example, have come dose to promising thai Pakistan will not assemble or lesi nuclear weapons. Bhutto's statements probably arc in response to much-publicized US concerns stemming from the US review In8 of Pakistan's nuclear capabiliiies. Her public posiure

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Nuclear Arm Control

Bhutto wants to reduce tensions with India, and toward that rod ihepublicly endorsed regional and bilateral approaches lo nuclear and conventional arras control in South Ana. la her first month in office she concluded an agreement with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi not to attack each other's BBCtcar facilities. The pledge, enc of three treaties signed with India al Ihe cad ofad been under consideration for three years. The pact has not bean ratified, but we believe it win be. Bhutto probably ass encountered Utile opposition from the Pakistani Army or President Ishaq Khan oa tbe agreement, since, tn our view, neither country's military in recent years had teriously contemplated thir type of attack during peacetime. |

Outlook

olon" of US assistance toof US concerns over Pakistanigh priority for Bhutto. During herWashington in June, she probably will makeatlempl lo convince US oflicisb thatacting with restraint on ihe nuclear issue and lhatcontinue to do so At Ibe same time. Bhuttoappear overly conciliatory lo US concernsmmlimits of discission

Bhutto's performance carefully during her visit. Skillful and diplomatic handling of the nuclear issue within guidleiocs they have set probably will help assure Bhutto continued participation in their dialogues on selected nuclear latues. In the longer term, we eipect the military will retain firm control over nuclear decisionmaking In Pakistan, leaving little room for Bhutto to gain significant additional influence on the nuclear weapons mur |

other nuclear arms control itatements have generally followed traditional Pakfstanl policy positions, such as agreeing to sign the Nuclear Non-Prolifcratioe Treaty simultaneously with India andouth Asian nuclear weapons free waa appraachta Islamabad probably behaves India will not accept. India's strongly held position lhat nuclear arms control must take placelobal, not regional or bilateral, context and longstanding Indian concerns about Pakistani threats to Indian security and internal stability snake additional accords on sensitive nuclear issues unlikely in the near or medium

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