YUGOSLAVIA EMERGENCY MEASURES STILL POSSIBLE (DELETED)

Created: 11/1/1988

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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OF INTELLIGENCE

1ugoslavia: Emargency Measures Still possible,

Summary

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we do not anticipate major nationwide unrest in theseveral months, we believe there isne In three chance of localised ethnic or labor unrest serious enough that Yugoslav authorities would Impose at least limrtad emergency measures. The measures would probably included restrictions on public gatherings, imposition of curfews, and jailing of instigators. The prime potential iroubiespots are areas Inhabited by Albanian majorities (Kosovo Province and parts of western Macedonia and southern Serbia) where either Albanians or their antagonists (Serbs and Macedonians! may provoke inter-ethnic violence. Repression is also possible if mass rallies get out of hand in Serbia or Montenegro, If major labor or other ethnic violence were to break out somewhere, or If serious anilmiliiarv demonstrations resurface in Slovenia. Retribution would probably be swift If. as in Montenegro last month, protests turn violent or are aimed at overturning regional or national leaderships. Any imposition of emergency measures would promote short-termould likely include some Infringements on human rights.

memorandum was prepared by. information available as of7 w* leome and may be directed to

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Analysis.

Discussion

Threat ot Repressive Measures

State President Half Diziiarevlc. in his speech ctober at the isight ofenr crisis overtionaiism. Uireetenod lo do 'all that the constitution and laws permit" if disorders create 'extraordinaryizdarevic's comments followed the overthrow of the leadership of Serbia's vojvodina Provincesupporters of Serbian party chief Slobodan Milosevic and subsequent dashes In the Republic of Montenegro between militant pro-Milosevic demonstrators and security forces. Oizdarevic provided no specHlcsjsjg what he hsd In mind, and since then the crisis has at least temporarily abated.

The national leadershiphis key allies on the

Communist Party Presidium tr.athroats. Military

leaders publicly signaled supponTo^rrl^WTl^Wl^taTeTresiaency. which Dizdarevic now heads, and their readiness to carry out orders. Several speakers at the national Communist Party plenumctober, including Dizdarevic, implied that such measures were not imminent, but It Is also clear that they were being considered. The option of using repression may revive If major ethnic or labor unrest resume

Broad But Vague Constitutional Authority

The constitution4 that Olzdarevlc referred to does not explicitly authorize the declarationtate of emergency, but It does provide national civilian and military leaders with broad, if vague, power to employ repressive measures. For example:

0 weeplngly authorizes the armed forces to protect not only the country's unity and territorial Integrity but also its "social system" as defined by the constitution

o Articlecharges the national government broadly with 'pfotecting constitution ality^and legality."

o uthorizes the State Presidency to "order the use of the armed forces in peacetime.'

Precedents Indicate Wideranglng Measures

Yugoslav authorities in Tito's day and shortly after his death demonstrated that they could use these constitutional powers to employ a'wide range of repressive measures to subdue perceived threats to stability. The last two of these cnses were1 against the Croatian natio^jiTst movement and1 against rioting by Albanian youths in Serbia's Kosovo Provinct

In both cases, the leadership deployed miiftary and federal police units to reinforce local authorities, ordered institutions of higher education closed, imposed controls on movement, banned public gathenngs rested and sentenced the ringleaders o' protests, denied access to

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viSHOfS end lOurnellSlS-press freedom, jndont and mteUectuelS The Croatian crackdown was so sweepingS ol oolitic*ollowed--including light press controls andl enacts on ine Catholicooiy now beginning to aast. The Kosovo authorities1 have maintained ordtr by imprisoning hundreds of real and alleged Albanian natione*isis '

in the early stages of the latest crisis, national and regional leaderships showed hesitancy and disarray In stemming potentially disruptive street proiem by Milosevic lupoorters eflects their lack of confidence and The authority Me hsd as well as the fact that nationalist disruptions wererom Croats or Albanians but from Serbs, the country'sercent In1nd historically most powerful ethnic group During tna virtual seige of the capital of Serbia's Vojvodina Province onctober byitoievic backers, the national Party Presidium^ no red the Vo|vodlna leadership's pleas for help end then lamely endorsed its overthrow.'

Only afterwords, when similar demonstrations spread outside ol Serbia to Montenegro, did local and national authorities act decisively and effectively to control what they termed an ntlempted pro-MilosovIcontenegrin officials issued prior warnings to demonstrators, ordered security forces into the fray when they became violent, and imposed limited controls on movement and public gatherings. The national Party Presidium sided with the Montenegrin leadership, and military units in several areas of the country were also placed on atrecautionary alert, although they evidently were not daplovad 4

Renewed Unrest: Localised Emergency More Liken*

We believe that there isne in three chance of renewed serious unrest In the next several months that would lead to the imposition ot at least limned emergency measures. The main variables will be the actions of Milosevicetback at the recent plenum and the reaction of workers nationwide to government-sponsored austerity measures if unrest develops, we believe It Is much more likely to be localited than the kind of nationwide disturbances that we believe wouldountrywide state of emergency or Imposition of martial law Official retribution would be swift if. as In Montenegro, demonstrators became violent or sought to overturn local or notional leaderships Measures could include at 'east shon term restrictions on movementend public gatherings, imposition ol curfews, and arrest and tailing of unrest instigatorsi

The following are the most likely areas where unrest might occur, in descending order of probability:

o Unrest is most likely inhere ethnic Albaniansalorlty-Kosovo Province and pans of western Macedonia and southern Serbia. Albanians and local Slavic groups (Serbs and Macedonians) are about equally likely to stert it Local authorities, backed by federal special police end military units, would probably stage prompt, overwhelming shows of force to bring any inier-othnic strife under control. Hederal police now stetioned In Kosovo are particularly wotl-trained. motivated, and experienced in crowd control.

o Emergency measures against Serbs in Serbia proper or Montenegrins in Montenegro are conceivable, either to forestall violence against Albanians or to enforce any bans on Milosevic-orchestrated or spontaneous rallies, flue police or military units of mixed ethnic origins would probably be used first Such actions wou'd become more likely it Milosevic resumes his defiance of federal authorities and tries to use public protests to intimidate national leaders

o Selective repressive measures are possible anywhere in the country if seuous. violent tabor or other ethnic unrest breaks out. Inter-ethmc conflict is possible, but (or now unlikely, in the ethnically mixed republics of Bosnia and Croatia.

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o Comparable repressive measures are also possible, but less likely, in Slovenia if youth groups organize ma(or new protests against the military in the wake of lhB recent sentencino^fseveral Slovene ioumalisr-i eaders are now calling tor calm on

Authorities probably woulfl quell Albanian-Slav violence quickly and without hesitation, but would be more constrained in several other contmgencies;

In moving against Serbs, national leaders recognize that vigorous efforts mightew, more serious resurgence of Serb nationalism end political alienation. Although military commanders have reaffirmed support tor and loyaltyhe present political leadership, political and military leaders almost certainly ere concerned about potential unresponsiveness by the heavily Serb officer corps, at lesst somo elements of which may be sympathetic to Milosevic. Similarly, there may be concern that Serb troops would be reluctant to use force against peaceful Serb demonstrators. In the eventajor Crisis, maintaining control over Serb nationalists would be difficulthorough crackdown on Serbian leaders. Journalists, and intellectuals comparable to actions taken In Croatia.

o In any moves against Slovenes, federal leaders almost certainly would expect to encounter massive civil disobedience and passive resistance, as evidenced by the large, welt-organlzed rallies staged by Slovene youth earlier this veer. National leaders would elso have to expect Slovene appeals in Western media and actions by Western human rights groups that could demage Yugoslavia's relations with the West

o Yugoslav leaders will probably continue to be reluctant to forcibly suppress labor

unrest for fear of losing further credibility with workers. They ere likely to issue broad prior warnings, such as Implied threats made by Premier Mlkulic last year. If worker protests gradually build. They would probably react harshly end more precipitously if major labor violence suddenly e'upif.

Mixed Impact on US Interests

US interests in Yugoslav stability and observance of human rights ere likely to be at odds if repressive measures are used. At least In the short term, such measures would likely help maintain stability. But while the national leadership ultimately may be unable to delimit disruptive Serbian nationalism without resorting to some repression, this would invariably mean infringements on human rights. These infringements could range from short-lived curbs On Imedoms of speech and movement to more serious setbacks to political liberalization and democratization, such as occurred In Croatia after1 events."

To promote the longer-term stability supported by the West, even Yugoslav leaders recognise that emergency measures are only stopgaps and that more serious political and economic changes are needed. National leaders will have to be more nrompt and effective in mediating mter-ethnic disputes, such as in Kosovo Province. It they want to prevent ambitious politicians like Milosevic from exploiting such developments The national leadership also will have to more successfully implement economic reforms needed to improve longer-term economic performance end ultimately relieve economic sources of pubtic discontent. B

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