Perestroyka andooperation: Opportunities and Pitfalls
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Perestroyka andooperation: Opportunities and Pitfalls
This paper was pcepated
Soviet Analysis Comments snd corere welcome and mar be directed to tbe Chit!
SOVA
Pertstroyka and US-Soviet SAT Cooperation: Opportunities ant. Pitfall'
During the put five yean, the Gorbachevncreasingly has come to recognize tbe deficiencies of Soviet science and technology aad the adverse impact of tbe USSR's isolation from the world scientific cocununi-ty on Soviet SAT developrneot- Accordingly, the regime has moved abend with cooperation agreements designed to link (he Soviet SATto the West, particularly Ihe United Slates. Further progress ia thiswill hinge. In part, on President Gorbachev's ability to press
forward with mow radical domestic reforms in tcieacc aad thecould give the United Stales insight into Soviet SAT performance and capabilities and maybe even tome influence over Soviet policy. At the same
time, the KGB could gain greater opportunities to target US scientists
Gorbachev has identified SAT progressinchpin of his strategy to revitalize the economy, but bis efforts to spur Soviet scie-ce andhave failed. With respect to science, be and his advisers have tended to overemphasize tho role of Ihe science sector in the USSR'i economic rnodcrnixation.raditional Soviet faith to acienceeans to solve social and economic ilia, they have looked to tbe scienceto make up for the fadings of an industrial system hostile lo innovation and the assinuUtion of advancedhus far, the Gorbachev leadership has failed to implement the economic reforms thai would provide the incentives to sustain technological advance in the prod net ion sectoi
Al ihe same time, Gorbachev has placed Utcreased emphasis on SAT cooperation with tbe Weal lo support ptreilroyka and his dometlic rcatnscturirig program. During tbe period of detente in, Mcacow favored more technology-oneoted cooperation, restricted Western access to scientists and information that nude exchanges cine-way itreeta. aad pursued technological assistance from the West as an alternative toeform. Under Gorbachev, however, (here hasread toward greater balance between cooperation in basic sciencehasedwillingness to engage ia two-way exchanges of information, and rcttance on cooperation with the West as an essential element of SAT progress and the domestic reform process
Under Gorbachev Moscow has made major strides in revitalizing scientific exchanges with the United States after their decline in thend. Bnilding on the steady progress achieved during las summit
SOY tO-lOOilX
meeting! with l'i > Reagan. Gorbachev hai pushed over tbe past year for closer SAT iateraction consistent with his larger effort to integrate tbe USSR more closely into the world eexynoenic system Moscow's new imttaUves 'include
A variety of proposals for ccrxxtadon in "big science"probing outer space to deciphering the geneticwell as ia more practical areas such as nuclear reactor safety and the management of tosic waste,
Aa offer tooint "Soviet-American'" universityaculty from both countries on two campuses in or near the respective capitals.
Proposals for agreements that would allow Soviet organizations to contract out research tasks to US firms and. alternatively, to accept research contracts from US otganLzaiiorii
An increase in ihe numbers of Soviet scientists, engineers, and managers working or training in US high-tech firms, research laboratories, and academic institutions To garner hard currency, some Soviet institutes are seeking to lease the services of their scientists to US companies. The Soviet leader almost certainly hopes that tbe new toe ntific zgreemenu and economic accords signed al the recent Washington summit with President Bush will impart new impetus to broadening the scope and forms of cooperation
Looking ahead over the next few years, Moscow is likely to press for new scientific agreements in areas such as conventional (nonnuclear) energy and research on global climate change. In addition, the Soviets will seek to expand the scope of existing bilateral agreements to include such topics as CTviroomcoul monitoring of the earth by satellites, maternal and child health care, aad the developrnent of new pharmaceutical drugs. Where possible. Moscow probably win push the boundaries of cooperation beyond pare theoretical science toward engineering and industrial applications in order to increase the technological and economic benefits of scientific exchanges
Steps taken to expand bilateral cooperation, however, will contribute only slightly to providing the technological modernization needed to boost the Soviet ecooomy and to close the technology gap with the West. Gorbachev understands that progress in these areas winadical restructuring of Soviet scientific activity and tbe mechanisms for incorporating new technology into tbe economy Moscow will have to make greater progress witssas easing travel restrictions, promoting greater gVns-nwt, allowing moreation aad increased ooenpetition. and encouraging innovation and enttcprcnenrship inrapid and braid technological advances arc to be achieved. Moreover, further reforms also are rtsential to support and sustain closer SAT cooperation with the West
Despite Gorbachev's coaumlmcai to reritaliring science and hasieoing iccbixi logical advance, the Soviet SATill replete withsistant to change, and SAT poucy over Ibe put year bai dropped down on the agendaeadership preoccupied with economic deterioration, consumer discontent, and ethnic on rest. The national forum on science held in Moscow in February presumablyenewed effort to press ahead with the SAT reforms needed to ensure both faster technological progress and closer US-Soviet coopcraiioo. but ll remains uncertain whether the leadership has tbe will and ability to implement the needed changes. Moreover, while reforms in the truragernent of science may help Soviet science, they will do link for economic modernization until the economic system itself is radically reformed and becomes less hostile to innovation and new technology
Moscow ii concerned that an eating of travel restrictions andemigration policies may leadbrainccordingSoviei scientific leaders
have expressed concerns that some of the nation's "best and brightest" researchers are leaving to work and study in tbe Wat Tbe defection of numbers of Soviet scientific exchangees couldreater irritant in the future as more top scientists participate in various ccoperative pro-
Ai the same time, increased US-Soviet cooperation will provide (be KGB with greater oopoftunities to target US scientists. Soviet emigres waking in American high-tech companies and academe, aad joint ventures to gain access to US data and technology
Jroe relaxation of COCOM controls could make it easier for Moscow to obtain previously reslricled technology and allow Soviet Intelligence agencies to better concentrate collection efforts on items remaining under COCOM control.
If Ibe pace of pmsiroyka falters, Soviet backsliding with respect to bilateral cooperation is possible. We could then see greater Soviet bureau-cralic iiucrocnanagemcat of bilateral exchanges as well as moves away from reciprocal access and exchange of technicali tumbling-blocks in past ccoceratrvc efforts. Furthermore, SAT cooperation willin thebe vulnerable lo swings ia overall US-Scviet relations and could become hostage Io disrupting political events
Contents
Sunt mil) Scope Note
Riyxfll SkBKl
View of SAT ReaJitks
USSR'i Ut in Saence trd TrnArxJop
Cmtam of Ceoitgl Control ind botstioi
cJiey of Clcta SAT CocoOTtion Withatedofnisie
Bips tided Scops of tohantes
Fstwof Cooperation
Oraataro Shire
Easing Tnrel Reetiiciioan
OisMtst gJaswost
Decompilation aad Increased Ccenpssition
So online sod TechncJomcal fcnirepreoeutihm
Picupecti (or Increased SAT Cooperation
New Opewitinilies for the United Sutes
rVnsolUl DirBcahiesPit/aik
A Chtnjirtg Soviet InteDi fence Threat
Scopecooperation coven a. wide range of activities ranging from aslrophys-
ks research to investigate tbe origins of the universe to more practical projecti to develop technologies for artificial hearts. During. the United States and tbe USSR signedntergovernmental SATcovering areas from transportation aad housing to atomic energy and tbe world ocean. This pattern of cooperation cooled in thendith the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, the downturn in US-Soviet tclalions, and (he West's tightening of restrictions on (ho Iranifr' of technologies of use to the Soviet military
With the unwinding of East-Weal tensions under Gorbachev. US-Soviet scientific and technical cccsperation is gaining new mcenentum andAt the intergovernmental level. Moscow a, seeking to eipand bilateral agreements, especially in areas of basic scientific research. At the same time, Moscow, more than In tbe past, has opened the door to Soviet institutes and firms to cooperate with US private-sector organiialions, not only to gain access to US technology but alsoeceive help conunerciBlii:-nag iu own research and drvetoprnent effort.
This Research Paper examines Gorbachev's attempt to increasewith tbe United States and its relation to his larger effort toSoviet science and society. It also sssesses tha prospectsof increased cooperation for the United States and theThe paper does not ductus tbe details of trsecific inter governwhich arc described in the Technology TransferSubcommittee on Exchanges (COM EX) publication.TXtt/XSK Sdmutl mid TtiJmat
RtwtM turn*
Perrslroyka and US-Sotkl
Seal Cooperation:
Op port imi ties and Pitfalls
View of SAT Reabdea
Since Mikhail Gorbachevowere haspressed Tor Increased interna oonaV colJbnition ia science aad technology (SAT) ai part of his larger effort to integrate the Soviet Union more cloady into tbe world eccaacany. In public speeches sod toea<iafls with Western kaeleri. be has urongty endorsedscientific exchanges and tbeog of technology and know-how Behind Gorbachev's effort* to increase SAT cooper*tion with the Unitedthe West asoreleadership perception of the USSR's lag ia SAT and Ihe pernicious effects of isolation from the world scientific community and technological mainstream.
ag in Science aad Technology
In speeches and article* in the Soviet press.and hb advisers have expressed the idea that the Soviet Union has nsisaed the global scientific and techik>logical revolution (STR) aad aaded up "oa thehe Soviet kadertudent forum in Moscow last November, for example, thatIhe STR was perhaps tbe "gravest mistake" made by the Breihnev leadershipVnWo, Gorbachev charged that theregime's failure to adapt Soviet policy andto world SAT trends sinnded tbe USSRygone teeflooioglcal era while Western countriestew era ef high IccSutcSogy aad consumer prosperity. According to Gorbachev. In thehe leadershippecial plenum of tbe Central Committee aimed at airing issues of the STR. The result, he daimcd. was thefaad retarding ust processes of change that were comingead in all socialist countries.bserved, "Weears at the very least.'
Although Soviet leaders before Gorbachev were aware that the USSR lagged the Westomber of technology areas, Gorbachev from the beginningthat tbe USSR's pronounced lag intccautotcuriea the pivot of tbe contemporary
a key factor underlying tbe country's cconorruc woe* Dcepur his effort* to boost these areas, however, Soviet industry baa fallen far short of the planned goal for microti ectronici, computers, and telecommunication* equipment, and the Soviet Union bat fallen even fun her behind the Wot in Use-empeech to stodenu inha Soviet leader acsusc**tcdacd that the gap in information technologies baa widened during bis tenure
fne Gorbachev leadership also has becomeaware that Sonet science lags tbe West in many neat. Before Gorbachev, the Politburo saw Soviei sciencetrength and believed that the main problem impeding SAT progress lay in the economy's lack of rssceptivestcaa to tcehssologsoal iassovsuo*.initially shared this perception8 when he highlighted problems in basic science at the Party Conference In June. Iaolitburo member Aleksandr Yakovlcv actaowledged that tbe Politburo had been underhenow realize* that in basic scsasace, loo. stagnation under Brezhacv hat taken iu toll and that therailing the West in several critical areas
Soviet commentator* cite the following indicators as evidence of the USSR's systemic lag in maay areas of
science;
Sobel meisei Siaot World War II. only eightmore thaamerican* have woo ihe Nobel Prize forin the aataralf the Soviet prizes, moreover, all ware awarded for prewar work or for work done In the-
ndex. Soviet sdcatinc publication*do not fare well in terms of the duiion ratenumber of references to an article in ether puhacatio** the method widely used ia woetd science lo judge the importancecientist'* work According to Paveleading
4>TTf1
historian of science, Ihii indicator baabeen ignored ia tbe USSR "apparently because on ibe average It la cne-eighth toigh ai ia tba Unitedut two decades ago we lagged behiad the Americans onlyactor of two"
Major arirwnjfe rfucownVi Soviet science baa cou-tributcd onlyo the world regliter of significant discoveries. Of tbe ddaea fundamental elements ry particles discovered ia recent rears, Soviei physkbia coairibuied none. Of the hundreds of Other subatomic particles and resonance*derivative* of tbe atala panicles. Sovietcan claim the discovery ofercent. In astronomy they have added littlehe knowledge of the origin and development of ihe universe. In the biological and life sciences, tbe Soviets have yet to recover from ibe damaging legacy of
A few proeniaenl incladingRoal'd Sigdeyev. Viub, GoTdaaskiT. aad NikiUeesraa to talk openlycrisis" bj Soviet science
The Gorbachev regime's aew concern over the USSR's lag ia toeace and its caDreater role for tbe sciencethe USSR Academy ofeconomic modernization betray an overemphasis oa the role of science in technological and industrial progress. An elimination of the eiperience of Japan. South Korea, and other rriodernking oountriea saggeststrong science sector isrccorulruOr. for technological and economic advances While progress in basic science can Lay the gieiandwarfc for advances In technology, the prisuary rcspcoaihauty for iechr>enagy deveiopoenliara boo lies with indaatrisl authorities- Unfor-ictuiery. for the So* .its, Gorbachev has yet made reJalirety link headway toecocoank
ssaghl wsw rejects* Darwaawamssilw. rliiami UUi aMaateaikwu>by ona fntnuva at staau aal imlimUauloWrt ftnmuoaa Haawaanl wen Stab* siadiwnonOctalloiKil doclnnr. Lewis's vwaa mm* inrihali pDiioaodararata-iad airoltan ter eecaeei
reforms thai would provide greater incentives for technological innovation and diffusion in the Soviet production sector. The impact on tbe economy aside, the Soviet leaden hip probably perceivesontin-ned lag in science could threaten the USSR's claim io superpower status
sap Centralad fobtsaw
Soviet commentators havetwo main factors contributing to the lag in Soviet science andFirst and foremost, tbe administrative-command system thai has led to the deterioration of tbealso has stifled scientific creativity and impeded the now of ideas aad infix mat ion Exccaaiveaad secrecy havw rendered ibe USSR's vast SAThimed giant, aad in the words of one Soviet cntic "Science. lite Gulliver, has wound up tied by its hair to hundreds aadof pegs of different instrsKSiona and decries.*
Second, as Soviet press commentary has notedihe USSR'i isolation from the worldcomraanity and Western technology transfer restrictions haveeleterious effect on Soviet SAT. Restrictions on travel, communication with foreign colleagues, and access to Western SAThave kept many Soviet scientist! well behind the frontiers of science. The political leadership appears to have come around to the view of leading scientists like Sagdeyev and Yevgeniy Vcsikbov that internaooperation is waeatial so SAT advancementolicy of autarky leads to catastropheby key Soviet oflictab radicate thai they view the way out of this sit usuon to be in both arettrweteriag of Soviet scbac* and she closer integration of tbeht world economy and SAT nsaiastream. For eaarnpse. Politburo member sod party eceaseaauea secretary Nikoby ShunYov ia0oscow forum oa managiag science thai "Science, bat hha society, needsaad structural reform" Ine aboentral Ccmearttce conference on SAT progress, "We need to get away from theof autarky, which has all bui uulalcd us from the world scientific community. Science band we mini draw the practical conclusions from that fact.'
cmcy of Oeuer SAT Cecawtatteai
oefceu Mcacow has made majoratonng acauatsaewithiled Sraid. Iq Ukbe two count ties signedilateral if icecKnti that provided the framework forthnrigc* in SAT areas. The hlgb point in bilateral cooper* (ion was the rcedezvona and docldrtf of the Apollo and Soyuz roacecraliailateral cooperation deciiard during the coolinc <af political relations In thendapilauz-iaa en the Mcady pragrta* achieved during hit summit meetings with Prcaadetrt Reagan, Goabacbcv hat preaaed steadily ewer the past year for greater SAT colUUjeatkoa appropriateew era of dcacr US-Sovietii
0 Washington summiteries of- and other accords. Bealdea joint itate-menta endorsing increased collaboration on theand ia the area of nuclear reactor safety, new and revised cooperative agreements wcra signed on ocean stadias and aa the peaceful use* of atomic energy Moscow also has mteosihed its assaall oa US restrictions oa technology transfer and oa the Coordi-natlog Committee oa Multilateral Export Controlsernselic of th* Cold War."
In seeking closer SAT collobcnatioo with the Unitedcsscow professes different principles and approaches than during detente in. More than in the past, Ihe leadership recognizes tbe close links between domestic and foreign policy, and its approach emphasize* an expended scope and new form* of cooperation and fewer one-way exchanges.
Recognition af DoeaeWk-Fe-ttgn linkage
Gorbachev and hi* closest allies in tbe leadership appear coniroiued lo major systemic change inthe Soviet Unionarket-orientedand poliikal pluralism. They recognize (batin East-West relations and the amount of American and Western help will depend on the image Scwiets project of themselves as well as their actions in
implementing promised economic and9 press mtervicw, Shevard-cadre said, "Oar main goal is la create the most favorable external conditions to accomplish internal cereiiroyksDuring the boated debate oscr retrieve policy at the Central Commute* pleaam idhevardnadze"Only throughinternational cooperation wit] we be ibie to solve our moat acute domestic problems '
This radical course contrasts with tbe approach under Brezhnev, where domestic change was not the driving force behind detente and cooperative efforts Oa the contrary, tbe Brethaev regime sought Westerncredit aad icehacvogyeans to achieve mode miration cat the cheap and quiet and to avoid internal refcaua. la theelation* cooled in tbe wake of the Soviet invaamo of Afgaaaastaa. aad SAT o. -peiwith the West largely broke down Other factors behind the breakdown were Moscow's insensitrvity to Western concerns over Soviet human rights abuses and its lack of reciprocity is terms of access and information exchange.
The current leadership also hasreater willingnes* to work together with ether nations on common "globar SAT problems such as the eavircuv ment. As Shevardnadze stated io the Soviet proas iaNow ecoaogsraJ inactivity and aa-tarkyort of tbe Fast tor is Tku Sovietonfirming in word aad deed its readiness for broad internationalhe area oft the same lime, Moscow recognize* that the USSR's participation in solving global problems can become an important channel for increasing the involvement of iu scientists ia world science
Frasaadid Sena*af Ti rtiagll
A growing and increasingly drverac nuasbcr of Soviet individuals aad grotm* are atctaag increased dnlogue and engagement with there counterparts in taw United Statesidening range of SAT areas. Tbey have tendered proposals for cooperation us new areas such aa environ mental protection, biocMdlcalaad social aspects of technology -areal In which tbe
USSR ptrdously bad e* pressed little interest. While some Soviet officials Kill thow keen imereat in "big science" cooperativeprobing outer ipacc through noorioeioj the earth by means of remote semio* to deciphering the geneticother* arc focusing oa mere practical areas such as collaborative efforts ha nuclear reactor safety and the nutrsagement and haof toxic aad radioactive waste. These effortsrend towardaimed at sotving serious domestic problems and supporting efforts to restructure science and the ccon-
Infloentlal Soviet officials also are showing increased interest In how SAT policy is organized and managed in UK United Sutesiew toward applying US practices in the USSR. With their own management system discredited, Soviet SAT officials are looking to emulate the American model and methods:
J Soviet authorities were planning toovernmentthe lines of the US Office of Technologystudy the social, economic and environmental impact of technology in the M Soviet leaders now recognize the importance of doing broader technology assess mcnts and abandoning the narrow techrtocraiic approaches used in the past.
J stated that the USSR is studying the possibility of crating an organiration similar ia function to Ihe National Scienceoc. (NSFi The Soviets appear to be intrigued by several coaKcat* convnaon to NSF such as theaspect of funding research, aa open system forystemroject directed, and the notion of peer review.
J inarliamentary research and analysis arm similar to tbe US CongressionalService. Members of various science-related committees aad cornmiassoaa ander the Supreme Soviet have indicated inter cat in learning about tbe
oversight role* and workings of their counterparts in the UShe rceeal Moscow forum oa science also raised the idea of establishing aof SAT Advisersalong Use lines of President Bush's new biuc-ribbon panel on SAT policy or the Presidential Sciencethe Soviet executive presidency. '
A growing number of Soviet research cvgaaaatioas and high-tech hrms have embarked oa major efforts with coMlerparu ia the American private sector through jcaal vent are* aad Cthcr crxver* tireherea* commercial agreement* iamphatiifd the transfer of hardware aad tccsutcaogy. the focus of cooperation bow spans the latsovatioa process.acrascd Soviet interest intechnological know-how. management technique, training, and. more generally, how SAT works la market economies. Indeed, this enhanced Sovietin mastering the conversion of scientific knowledge into technology and use, rather than science Itself, has the potential toeal difference in Soviet SAT capabilities. Some Soviei RAD organisations are *ecking to become partrar* with Western firms. Byhe USSR Academy of Science* had already entered intooint ventures and wasnegotiating bo additionalgrremeuts "
Underlying this newoscow's desire act only to gain access to US technology as wellore sophisticated deaiga aad test baseajorand brttleneck In Sovietalso to develop and market in the West tbe results of the USSR's can research and engineering effort* to corn bardSovieteiag diructcd away from trory tower research to practical applications designed to make science snore relevant, competitive, andWhile the switch of osuch of Soviet aoeuce to self-financing baa provided Soviet Rati) orsaunzalions with powerful new incentives for eipaodcd cccrimrr-dal contact and scientific cooperation with American industry, the economic benefits of these contacts continue to be limited by the slow pace cf reform* needed to encourage insovatioa in Soviet Industry.
Newof Cooittntioa
In the past. iiu<il primarilytop-down.directed approach to ceopention.esell. US-Soviet SAT cacbanges became bobtaco by !tr ra jcricy sad of tea faded to produce expected benefits Wbik web aatill reflected ra broad umbrcUa intergovernmental agreements (with tbe Imprimatur of the highestointn. and working groups, tbe Soviets arc showing more flexibility and increasingly are movingore bottom-up. decentralisedon individual projects aad direct soentaa-lo-soeouiiby tbe Uarted States,i)
Articles ia tbe Soviet press iBdicaie that Moscow has gained aa appreciation of tbe Importance of informal conunuaicalions and face-to fsce contacts ai well as aa appreciation of tbe limits of publishedoviet soeolists recogrure that in ternscetingi and vbits to foreign bboratones are particularlyfor collecting the bleat information on advances and trends ai well as providing insight about problems andin rapidly developingareas. By contrast, success stories generallyprinted SAT literature, and delays in publishing make printed mfecmation less timely, la the judgment ef some Soviethe USSR's highly centralised technical informationworld's largest service for translating and abstracting foreignailure because of its excessive focus on published material
Sagdeyev has argued that Soviet Nobel ctr Kxpitta could not have made his advance! inphysics without hb many years atora lory in, nor could Nobel Laurent Lev Landau have clarified Use nature of liquid helium without hasai Nkb Bohr's institute In. As part of this effortevelop closer and more permanent contact* with American soeumta. the Soviets have begun lo explore posaibiliues of sendingmbers of scientists, engineers, aad managers io work or train in US high-tech firms, research bboratccics. aadir.itminors,ccording to the Soviet press,cientists from ihe USSR Academy of Sciences left to take up keg-term workof up to five years in the United Stales.
To gainer hard currency, some Soviet insiiiaica are abo seeking lo lease the services of their sckntiits to US companies. Some US firms have already agreed to
such Soviet offers, t
addition, Soviet organization* also are placing iacrcaaed priority on gaininglegally andWestern electronic data bases andblest toob for communication among US and Western socotitis. Academician Boris Pawn recently complained that the USSR'sIn Information technology creates an "dec-Iroak curtain" separating Soviet toco litis from Western computerised SAT data bases.1
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A number of Soviet eegaaaealioas are seckJagthai would allow Soviet scientists to spend more time ia the United States. To support this policy.
Fordetailed took ti Sond effari" -brtbctttUu:trKarch Piped.gsawaaaa Compute' Ni"rafkmt
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Moscow also has moved toesnnnd bilateral eachanges of undercraduate>
jrip to tbe United States incademy of Sciences Vice President Yuriy Osipysnoint "Soviet -American university"aculty from bothon two campuses, possibly in or near tbeproposal be claimed bad Gorbachev's
full support. Al0 Walking! on summit, ibe lwo leaden signed an agreement lo iocrcuo ibe numbci of undergraduate exchange iludenU. '
A ourobet of Soviet organizations arc trying toout research tasks lo US firms and,to accept research cod tracts from USonversatioo wilh[,
JcaiVaal espreaasa tope that Aancncao aad soviet trms would be abac to bad oa Use other uboe'i research contra^tsnf ia the area of coervea-tsceaal eaergy C
that the Academy was tooling for easportumtiea to provide direct unclassified technical lapport locompanies and universitiesffset its projected lenses in govrrnmcet funding
At tbe same time, tbe Soviets are encouraging US scientists to come to work In Soviei institutes and newly formedesearch centers C-
3t"
is discussingAmerican andd en lists to be members of Soviet scientific councils, peer review panels, and editorial boards
To better andersuad US SAT proccehire* aad im-prove their own managetncikt procesaey Soviet Gov-eriuTsettt agencies sasch as the Seats Comimttee foe Science aad Technology. State Committee for the Protection of Nat*re. and the Academy of Sciences have proposed or are reportedly consideringstaffshort-term basis with US counterpart orgsaszstfioos. The Ml As new sdministrauon for interestAT cooperatioa also recently requested close and regular consultations with the StaleBureau of Oceans and Internationaland Scientificnhe USSR
Academy of Sciences scat the first AcsSAT counseloroviet embassy. Assigned to Washington, the new "Academy counselor" joins the current SAT counselor, eesignated by Ihed bis staff of four or five officers.
Greater Whuhgncas To Sear* bfforunthc*
Some Soviets seem to utsoersuad thai, to obtain the hoped-for benefits from expanded SAT cooperation, the USSR mast be more forthcoming svithand access than in the past. Sagdeyev, for one, has attached Ihe traditional directives given to Soviet scientists attending international meetings "toopeck's worth of information in exchangeuble'sccording toSuchthinking has hurt Soviet science far moreatther Sonets have observed that the path of "hold back and keep out" has led to theof Soviet science "
The OocWchcv regime seems to be coming around to this view and has taken initial steps to snakelessne-way street. Over the past year, for example. It has granted US visitors Increased access to Soviet RADpreviously closed organiratsoas. Gorbachev aad Shevardnadze in recent public speeches have insisted that, if the USSR warns to be part of the "civilized world" aadinto the world eerancuuc system, it mast adopt new rules of engagement and abide by internationaland values
At the sarin* lime, tbe Soviets have become more wllli hi to discuss questions of intellectual property rights (IPR) and procedures forbaring information oa scientific advances and RADhe US side has insisted that new aad revised mtergovcr vtenexl igteeaDcuts with Moscow krsdede prcwuuOu* to protect intellectual property such as patents, trade secrets, and copyright* Such proviiion* were written into the cooperatioa agreements oa transports lion (signed inad bask sciences (signed ins well as the revised intergovernmeenaloa oceaa stadias and atomic energy at0
Washington lummil. Soviei negotiator* initially re fused lo include specific commitments on IPR protec-lion or dale* lor implementation of protection in the new US-Soviet trade agreement to be ligaed at the turnout meeting By lateowever, after much effort aad US prodding, they agreed to alio duec1 draft lawa aeceaaary to MMi their IPR oeligstsoau.
The Soviet* realize that the lack of Sovietto protect the significant rcacarcbcoats involved in creating newUS arms rcluctar.'.nter IntoMoreover, protective meaiurcs couldincreasingly important (or Soviei fir micegasunitioa* as they seek toresults of their own RAD efforts During amoviet legalTor such legislation. Quotingountry without aand without firm laws, which protectof inventors, israyfish, which cantideways or
Pcrtilrtf/kM In Soviet Science: Real Key lo SAT Progress
While increased cooperation with tbe United States may yield suhaiaailal benents ia selected arena, it probably win havearginal impact on the advance of Soviet science and lechncJogyhole. Gorbachev'a statement* over the past trve years about the necessity for funds menial rcstritcturiag indicate he recognizes lhat internal reform* are essential to boost SAT. Pirtttroyka inrevamping of tbe organluuoosl iixuctusc, management system, and research environment plus the unproved coupling of science withthe key to faster SAT progress. At Ike same time, further txfilrorka ia seseaea. society, and tbe economy will be required to snataia thi* movement toward cioaer SAT cooperation with the United Slates
The Gorbachev leadership has become increasingly aware of the needajor restructuring of ibe scientific sector. At tbe8 CPSU Conference. General Secretary Gorbachev andressed
serious concern over ihe stale of Soviet science and argued ihe seed for fundamental reforsns. Theand complaint* have continued aaabated in tbe Soviet press as the debate over SAT policy has intensified. At the0 Moscow forum on science, Pobtburo member Sryuaaovtinging indictment of the organization tadof science, emphasizing that progress in saence requires "radical treatment."
Thus far. the focus of pt'iumyka In science has been onore open atmosphere for the exchange of ideas, dcmocmUatioo and decentralization ofrejuvenation of an aging cadre, and organizational, economic, and social measure toscientific creativity and spurew measures deal directly with foreign cocceraiioei. domestic reforms already arc having and will continue to have an appreciable impact on US-Soviet SAT cooperation
Easing Travel Rtstrktiaa*
Restrictions on foreign travel by Soviet scientists have been scoscaed under Gorbachev Receiving permission to go abroad has become simpler andfor Academy scientists. Since9 all decisions on foreign travel by Soviet Academya* well as visits by foreign scientists to tbe USSR at tbe invitation of the Academy, arc settled in its presidium or within the departments, rather than in the Central Committee and other agencies.C
edition, inhe USSR Academy of Sdcnccs along with tbe State Committee for Science and Technologyreceived permission to issue foreign traveltor "cencial business" (including SATon behalf of the USSR Foreign Ministry and to apply directly so foreign embassies aad coratauatca tor visas
esult, more Soviet sciential* are attending international coherence* aad going abroad.norecseataau from tha USSR Academy of Sciences alone accepted foreign Invitation* to work or study in the West. The number of Soviets visiting
Growth in Soviet Sciess-flats Vkutlng th*tates Compared With Otbee CaUaufics of So-let
I-mtolSca-Ht Vauor-Ht outcry)
sUctananca
la algls-toch
tbe United Sutes oo SfcT ewbange visas bat more that doubled annually over tbe past two years (see uble) and0mong (hemcientists In key high-tech areas where thereotential for technology loss. Although the number of these visiting scientists has not risen as sharply as total Soviet SeYT exchangees, the increase it stilloviet scientists also are staying abroad for longer periods. According to the Soviet press, the number of Soviet scientists visiting the United Sutes for three months or lower increased more than fivefold8
While civilian scientists including former refuseto be tbe main beneficiariesrela nation of travel curbs, researchers involvedwork and those with access toinformation have also gained greater freedomabroad. Indeed, Gorbachev innterceded to allow five prominent Academyresearchers involved in classifiedto travel to tbe United Sutes. He foundthat scientists "who hadlives to tbe defense of the Sen-let Icouldtrusted io travel
iodicates that over tbe past
year Increasing numbers of Soviet scientists who previously worked at defense-industrial RADaad held secret or top-secret clearances have been allowed to emigrate in Use West. Some held their yobs and clearances almost rightto the time erf their leaving themajor departure from theSoviet practice of re/enuring person, with access to "state secrets" to wait u> years or mere before receiving pertrtission to leave the country
Impending Soviet legniat-on could further relaaon foreign travel Officialew emigration law wouldat
any Soviet citizen wishing to emigrate or travel and work abroad tooreign passport. Those with access to tuie secrets will generally be restricted from travelingeriod of five yean, but this period could be cateaded in eaccreioaal casesupremeirrnmruaoa
Soviet press consarscBtaryrowing concevii thai the new law could resultbrain drala" and undermine thetrength as sdentlsu, abeautiad front Ufc ia Sovietne to the West for higher salaries, fully equipped labs, aad better cocsditic-us for eeofessuoaal developenent Some Soviets have charged thai Western firms already arc competing to late awsv kiow ofSSR's most oroductive
J tbe
directors of two prestigious academy institute* decried the "newspecially the liberalizedconduciveUrsgerou* brain drain to the West of the nation's "heat aado avert this, one direct or has proposed setting up an internaloundation where Soviet scientist* would share their lime between work in tbe USSR and work in the West. He said. "Having them only sis rnoniba is better than not having them at all" (see inset. ,
Sarieii 'peak Out om Ihe DangerBrain Drain"
Soviet scientists and sciencehave begun lo express alarm over ihe growing exodus af ihe country's scientific brainpowerfrom Moscow's easing of restrictions on foreign travel and emigration. The following remarks are taken from speeches at the general meeting of the USSP. Academy af Sciences In0 andOther recent statements In ihe Soviet press.
Crowing Concern
'The so-called brain drainelatively new but already acute problem for the USSR Academy of Sciences. The departure of Soviet scientists abroad for practical scientific training and work hasatural process, but II Is necessary to give serious considerationnsuring that It Is not detrimental to the development of SovieiAcademy Pieii-deol GuHy Marcmik)
"If the movement of Soviei scientists to ihe West continues or the sameear that there will limply be no one left to wvrk in our Institutes and laboratories. And this wouldlow not only to iht present but also to the future of iheuriy Osipyan, Academy vice president and member of Gorbachev 'a Presidential Council)
"An enormous outflow of ihe best people abroad Is occurring. This Is nowery conspicuous phenomenon. Buthite it threatens to turnandslide, which In general will carry away all our basiccademician Alcksey Abrikceov)
"The brain drain could kill all hope of overcoming the USSR's growing SAT lag behind iheV. Katasoctov, science commentator)
Reasons for Going Abroad
"Our scientists and engineers are interested Inariety af reasons. Pint, they go abroad to improve their material situation. Our scientists are among the world'staff membtrat one of our research institutes, with IS orears af education under his belt, earns lessusdriver.
Second, iherels ihe professional poverty'factor: Soviet science's physical facilities and equipment are very poor by comparison with ihe West Third, the overregulation of scientificeontrttt rnamtfeitaUon of the admimattrasive command lystem in the realm ofreteurtherthole Series of political, religious, and ethnic factors came Into play. The Inertastd farumng af ethnic discord In our country in recent years, the growth In political Instability, and the ftar af civil war art all factors thai serve lo Increase iht scale of the brainV. Kaisjotaov)
'The atmosphere In our tocitiy and its ailtlude toward telenet and toward ihe labor and rtsults of scieuttiti give rite to ihe longing lo go abroad."
(Ye. Poeuiine. touettabt)
Rtcommend at rout far Stanching tht Brain Drain
"Under no circumstances must we cut short ihe aspiration of our scienllsis to travel lo otherhecaute science It International and exchanger of scitniittt and ideas are absolutelyYariy Otipyaa)
-Fint of all. It ts tntportara mx to panic. Il Is necessary lo umdeestamd that nips of sciemlstt abroad ore an absolutely normal process, which is advantageous for the country, and there are not the
slightest grounds to hinderIs also necessary
to crease conditions In our own country so thai our sclemiiu. having done some work abroad, would willingly return, while Western sctcnllsts wouldio comecademician Viuliy Goldanskiy)
"It fx wrong to conclude thai we must return lo the Ironlnceroblems art precisely Us handiwork Ii is meet si try io get used to the logic of an openex. vnt will lose part of our ictftific cadre potential by opening up fretbut we must work all ihe harder to ensureorthy young generation takes the place of those who haveeommenutor)
KGB Vie of Soviet Scienllut To Collectnformation
Soviet Intelligence tervices have long used Sovieithose affiliated wiih the Academy ofcollection
J almott all Soviei xdcn-lltti traveling to the Wtafwere lasted to some degree lo collectnformation end personal data on Western scientists. By the Soviets' awn evaluation. Ike Academy of Sciences and ihe Slate Committee for Science and Technology, along with the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, account-edforercent of the technology acaulsltlons judged io be most "significant" lo their military research projects during this period
^Indicates thai there has been lUtlc change under Gorbachev In the KGB's presence at the Academy or In Us acQvlsiiion effort! and technique, C
J KGB officer,
during these year, continued lo be assigned lounits af Ihefficershe Foreign Relationsto Us institutes. The KGB briefed and debriefed almost all Soviei scientists traveling to the
Tasking generally Involve, reouesti for specific SB, Tpubllihed materials, preprints, and unclaiitfirdrd from foreigncomoas. Soviet scientists also are tasked to collect biographic and assessment data on Western eounier-
gathering of personal Information on high-level foreign tetentlstt was the "main interest" of the Institute's deputy director farGB
,undertcltntlsts who are allowed lo travel abroadnow given "propaganda messages'for usewithhose responsesalto
obliged lo irdtiaie conversations on the Impactn Estonia
Traveling Soviei scientists sometimes are asked to obtain Western equipment and software but arenot tasked to acautrt controlled technology^^
On ocean,owever. Academy sdenilili hawto obtain controlled hardwareht
KGB4 was actively recruiting scientists at Ihe Estonian Academy's Instllute of Cybernetics load as Inter nttdtai its In the acaultitloa of Westernsecurity technology C-
institute ptrtonrurl agreed la cooperate with Ihe KGB In hope, of obtaining hard currency with which lo buy additional computer equipment to sup-pan other projects
Apparently most Soviet scientists have been willingas Intelligence collectors for maurleJlstle.and patriotic reasons. The opportunity io[,to the Wistowerful Incentive -travel urns usually tntpJIc-
itly. if explicitly, contingent upon cooperation.'In addition, tuck travel is career enhancing and often directly helps ihe Sonet tcicntiit'i own work ami advancement. Such cooperattam might be diminished tf.esult af ptiatroyka. travel opportunities and profttslonal careers become less dependent on ihe KGB
While procedure* for obuiningravd permits have been simplified for Soviethe USSR Corotnittee for Stale Security (KGB) remainsinvolved in the approral process, although perhaps
not
' ^permlasJon to go abroad apparently norecjurres the acdve ajyproval of the KGB.the peocea* of obtaining approval requiredwith the KGB. Now, the director ofia reporjodly responsible for approvingtravel and Touchingcico list's(iiroctor provides the KGBopy of aHowever, unless tbe KGB objects,is autxenatfc. This aimphficalion ofprocessing foreign travel he KGB continues to
use traveling Soviet scieoiisTsto collect SATand provide personality aM vulnerabilityon Western scientists (see inset)
Greater Glttmrtt
Glasnosi or openness in science hasoticeable impact on US-Soviet SATver tbe past year, the Soviets have granted US visitors increased access to leading scientists and institutes, including some previously off-limits toonushave expressed unusual candor in discussing research and development programs, activities, and policies- In general, Soviet researchers have become more open and more willing to admit failures,and lack of insight on particular topics as well as to solicit American advice and comments.
To date, however, gtainosl has spread unevenly in
that tome Soviet scientists are still lKrvousto exptain and expose 1ir activities.there is uncertainty and crmlusiouranks over ttuiuat. Though manywith the new openness policy, someare uncotnfortable with tbe removal of "rules"bteraction or exchange of InformationUncertainty about how long| farill last is prompting some Sovietsadvantage of exchange opponttrulies aspossible, while others are paying it safe.on the part of some Soviet scientistsmore openly was
and distrust. rtTsald,"It bnmeasy toroncentration campree society."
At the same time, tbe regime has not renounced scientific secrecy or the need to protect state secrets. SAT Information remains subject lo intenseTbe Soviet legislature bat yet to pass new laws that dearly define the rules and until* oTglainosi in general, much less in science and technology. Soviettheir contacts withto come under the watch oftetiigcocehe "Fornan Relations Irepartment" within each industrial institute still handles all contacts and coordinate* nutters through iu miitistry's foreign relations administration (seen Academythis component reports lo the Foreign Relations Department under the presidium of the Academy. KGB and Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officers continue to bead and staff tht* adnslnistrative apparatus:
. Ai the USSR Academy of Sciences GRU officer Sergey Markiaoov has been chief of tbe Academy's foreign roUtioru office since
At the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) KGB general Akksey Voskoboy hastbe Main Administration for Scientific and Industrial Cooperatione reviews,and approves all request* for technology acquisition and for scientific cooperation with other countries.
Under this GKNT mam administration, anfor Capitalist and Developing Countries is heavily involved in arranging and mooiloring both cemvmetcial and intergCAeromenial SATwith Western countries. AleksandrGB officer expelled from France3 for espionage, ha* headed this adntinistration since late
DsesmtrsOtXaliou aad Increased Ceuapetitiou
Under ptreiiroyka. Academy institute* have also gained authority to enter into colUborative efforts
Meedtating Wtttrr* Contacts atrnSorielmi tote
eoukdedsnvtdat Urn txunstve eSons to moedior andwtlh Wtilemm
rformed tome mu^tary-rtlattd research. Il wotosed orgmmttattom and Wersernert rtstted tl almostot If basis,9 the institute retmtwed the right to deal directly wlih foreign firms and no longer had io gooreign tradeBy midyear the Institute tarns In the final itaget ofolm venture arrangement wiih American and British firms
Nonetheless, all contacts withvtsltt. phone calls, andto be cleared and channeled through the Institute's "group for foreign relations.-with approval required from the thief of the ministry's foreign relationsIn Moscow The groupist afauthorited to deal with foreigners. The Hit was limited to about IS names
Institute personnel were required so conductwith Westerners U, designated rooms, andmembers of tht foreign economic depart mem sat in on all negotiations. All phone calls to and from Wet tcners were strictly controlled Institutehad topeciai phone so speak with foreigners, and personnel from the 'groupremained in ihe room while core motions were conducted with foreigners. Each call had lo be logged in andprovided on vdih whom one tpokr. where, and the reason. The Institute had only one outsidehne. and all incoming calls weret the group for foreign tela tlons
with Western counterparts without higher approval. Many institute directors and scientists are trying to capital this new freedom to sign SAT agreements in order to gain increased visibility, travel abroad, meet with US scientists, and obtain computers andfor their own facilities
Casaagca In ibe Scwiot system fur fmancingio partksskr tbe increased comjxijtioo fee fussdaag among researchsic imparting asy meotem to tocaeaicd US-Soviet cctoperatioii. Under mounting pressure to generate their owa funding. Soviet scientists arc kxniag to joint research so retain their programs aadssmber of Soviet adaacc orrsciala have Indicated that their protraaa wcmld be severely pared bach if tbey cannot obtain funding from Western organizations. Joint work is especially important for bask research peograms that lack the possibility of generatina funding on the CTpnrtalion of immediate commercial applscaucata. To gaia fandiag, some Soviet scaenlists are rirtually "storming- their US ccarn terpen* with coc^eration proposals, lo use the words of one Soviet academician. He claims that the most ssire-tire wayown researcher to receive government financing is to Bad aaollaborator
A desire to "get ia oa the action'" of bilateral cooperation is yet another factor behind increased competition within (be Soviet acientiAc community. Scientists in the regional establishments area growing iatereat In breaking the tnceiopoly that leadia Moscow andhave king bad on contacts with the United States. Republic academies art pressing for morefromd greater freedom to determine their own program* andcl adiugefforts with US scientists and crgaairatioaa Soviet scientists increasingly arc vcacing the view that they will need closer cooperation with US aadontacts over the next several years In order to be ooenpelitive with Other Soviet uotitutea that do. Al the same lime, efforts by some instilste directors to crust* new mortopoiie* based oa East-Wealare alienating officials in other institute*.
In sum, perestroyka hasost of new grassioots organizations, giving Soviet science and technology an even more "polycentric" basb and form. New scientific unions and professionalederation of engineers. SAT ccoperatives, ecology groups, and other "informal" organizations have their
ownand concerns and desire ircalcr itvdcpcn-dcnce from Mcnoow and dour baks 'o ibe world teacananV oraramuarity.Tbcac bodies rapracnl poten-uaUr newia ibe arewa of expand me dialogue tnd cooperation wilb (be United Suic*
Tbe twitch of So*ict tcicace to sure aeU-nnancing and meaiurea allowing SAT cooperative* arc creating conditions and incentives for ataea'taU and engineer* to boc-irnee with US private-sector organizations. Soviei ipttitarxi are bcirut puabed to ccanmercUIiie their activities
ia tucb leading
Academy facifatam a* the Oeaeral Phvrvca Imiitote aad the Futon Electric Weldiag Institute
^thal the message from inaiiiatc leaden ii la move out of research for It* own take and market new technology Cievcfcsprncat* to pay for futureand support their labs
To raise bard currency, Soviet RAD organizations artariety of prod seta, including atmospheric data, laser glass, and engineereda well as services, such as the use of occanograpbic research vessel* and windven Soviet de-fcnsc-indBStrial 'ma haveeclassify and market high-leebooiogy products developedor it* part, the GKMT hasew department, headed by an esperl on "smallo promote tcchssological entree*eneurrhm. and in0 itew technology park exhibition Into help market Sovietin the Weal
-L
uineer of cases, Soviet institute* aad design bureaus are looking (or ventures with US high-tech firm* to obtain US assurtanoc In developing practical applications for Soviet research, testing andthe design of technological prototypes, andSoviet products in theareas where
iv'-
Soviet science aad industry are weak. Rcacarcfaare rac-iog away from rtsatkaashaps withccatipanksoyalty is paid for use of an Institute'a lecbnology.elationship where the Soanet institute profiuot tare partner
While otrtiirayka has led to the sproutingew entrepreneurial spirit. Gorbachev's reforms have not yet createdouruh its growthirm legal aad eoonomic iafrastruc-ture lupporting and protecting creative people is still sacking. Neither the leadership aor many Sonet institutes and firmsood grasp of the corscepu of entrepreneurs hip, competition, and fro* markets. Thus, the new breed of Soviet enirepreaeurs emerging oa the scene aad their Western partnersough road ahead
Praapicti far Ucranaad SAT Ceap truth
Esurring circutnsUnces that could dtsrupt US-Soviet relations. Mescow will coniiase to press to expand the number aad scope of bilateral SAT agyecaseatts. It probably will puah for new cooperative agree menu in area* such aa omveniiorul (ncwauclesr) energy and reaearch on global climate change la addiuce, the Soviets will seek to broaden gating agreements lo Include topic* such as environmental monitoring of the earth byaternal aad child health care, and the development of newrugs Where possible, they will push the boundaries of coopers lion beyond purecience toward cngmeering aad industrial application* hi order to
increase theand ecooocoic benefits
adentific exchange?
Cooperatioa will be alowed. however, by the' i- of parttiroyka in science and tha delays with domestic reforms designed ioew round of ncnaagca aad ensure their success. Sotuggub Soviet buieaucracy. lack of bard currency, andof Acrofiot flight* to the West continue to be obstacles to crnperatire cecorle artier While globaluking cooperation much causes- to
arrange and maintain. nlOCtl "old (hint ret" Continues
to permeate central organsSAT policy and achintoL laC, '
that XJCfi central organ* are incapable of rcpre-rSovieteyond tbe Moscow ringhe Soviet SAT exchange burcaacracy remain* largely tatiiii! al both local and central government leucss.
rowing evidence that the kaekrabip it hrirvriiac lacreasiagiy concerned abeam thia problem aad the need tohead with bolder reform* in science aad the economy, lacademy President Mircbuk critictred regime measure* during the peat four year* to rrstructure science a* "half'ncapable of pulling science out of tbe doldrarns. The leadership, however, ha* been slow to take action. Clearly, sdcace and technology matters over the past year have dropped down Ihe leadership's agenda as tbe Politburo turned most of its attention to crises erupting from oonti-uing economicconsumer discontent*and ethnic unreal. The0 forum oa science presumablyew effort by the leadership to get SAT policy and scseauhc ptftooyka back oa track, but whether the leadership has the attention train, will, and ability to implement the needed cbangca remains uncertain Moreover, farther reform* in science, even if they improve science, will not result la faster ccoecenic progress until the ecooosnic system is revamped and Soviet industry becoenea lea* hostile to innovation and new technology
New Oupce Usui tie* far the Untied Sea tea
Beyond the direct SAT benefits of bilateral tytotrsms, increased coo tacts and cooperatioa offer the United States the tmportunily to gain access and Insight Into the USSR's SAT cstablisbmeat, plans, andas well as Influence Ibe reformthe oesening and loosening of Soviet science and
ly tee openir eociel* f_
Moscow's interest In broader dialogue and esxbangesast range of areas offers the US opportanity to influence Soviet' hin [saues key to ptrti-trofka and to gain acocas to Soviets wbo make policy. Soviet ofBcial* have asked US officials for advice on such issues as private property fiodudingroperty rig btil antimeucpoly leguuatieia. aecaoeco-noustc and icchtological forecasting, the rote of imiE innovative firms, aad the aurmaferacsst of acaeuoe and Ihe acieece ofreal essential lo the USSR'* ecoaonuc future Such Uterchaagcs provide US OfTictab with ocportaaitiea to iaflaencc theecoac-enic and scientific restructuring.
At the same lime the ability of Use United Sutes to influence, much leas change, Soviet domestic policy and development remains limited. The United Sutes may offer technical assistance and guidance, but tbe choices and decisions are ultimatelyo make
PoteotUI thrhctdde* and Fltfah As eichangea Intensify, US scientist* andwille drawn Into the Internal politics of Soviet science aad be used by Soviets to advance personal careen, various public causes, aad private agftgajMUE
-c- _
Jlhal fatare elections to the Academy would depend in large parternaoooalrather than party reu'abiJity. Support from leading scientists in the West thus could weigh heavily in determining wbo woald be elected full academician. Corresponding member* oflready began to solicit letter* cf rccom-nsendation from US colleagues lo bolster their chances of becoming full members.
Soviei ertrirofiovenulifU arc pressing for assurance from Ihe Unitedin their battle to halt the rprad of errvironmcnta] decay in the USSRC
J requested large color US Mtcuilea major flood control project la Leningrad.bUc*-end-white aerial photos not
the (ell effects of thht billion-ruble project, which he termed angh im* re. -
the face of
rtrong public distrust of Soviet nndeur technology aad policy growing out of tbe Chernobyl* cliaaster. have reiki ted US assistance in certifying the safety of Soviet audear reactors and of the co ml reel ion of reactor iltca In terms of local lebmological condition*
The evolving domestic lituatioo ia tbe Soviet Union likely will complicate the condoct and management of bilateral SJtT relation!ay frustrating to USbe uncertainty and confusion mrrouad-ing pererfroylo. for eaxaspte, arc bound to spall overooperative activities. Mesoow has railed expect*-taraas of less bureaacratsc, enore Open SJtT exchanges, but it has net yet impteraented the reforms accessary to mpport and auttafn such exchanges, la particular, major inititutional barriers corrtlnue to impede the flow of Information and commtmlcallon among Sovietbetween Soviet and USregarding cooperative opporturritks and activities,bacaslidiag with reapect to burcuueratic mkro-managemeal ai weD as Issues of access and technical data cannot be ruled out. In addition, the issue of intellectual property prouxtioD couldmbling block in US-Soviet cooperation in the years ahead. The enactment and enforcement of new Sovieta long-awaited pa lent lawitmus test of Moscow'* ability to lay the groundwork needed for Increased bilateral cooper-atloa
In the Kremlin'scrioui outflow of the USSR'i scientific cadre taking advantage of new cropeaative cpcortaaitka and freedom to travel abroad couldarticularly wearriacenergef Soviei scaeueasU tortodeanigres or rasrtkipaot* la work/studyeueerbate Soviet eosKsaraa over the dangerbrainhe defection of growing numbers of Soviei exchangees wouldurther irritant
A Choaglag Swrtet Istrihgeace Threatomestic and global changes pose ato the Soviet Intelligence services With reapect to SAT bnclatgeisce collection against the United Suits, these changes will hiely complicate scene Biitaioea aad simplify Others, and they wiD demand changes ia Ihe Soviet intelligence services' focus and methods On one band, tbe KGB and GRU are probably apprehensive shout tbe indications ofcooperation for Increased US ncceai to Soviet SAT Information and facilities, potential adence and technologynd possible defection* of Soviet soentuls On the other band, increased cooper*lion and improved relation* enhaoc* Moscow's espraortsoi-bes to greaser access to US SAT inform* octa aadelaxation of COCOM raitrola conld ease the wsy to obtain previously restricted techno! -ogy and allow the KGB to better concentrateeffort* on sensitive hem* still oa the COCOM list
'Krtiy-.
raw Sagaew Soviet Tattmt Law
by ike Gorbachev leadenhip to reform ike Soviet Urton'iS Central Committee meeting oh problem* of acceteratsng SATrun into dtffvculiles from the very btpJmHng. The long awaited draftew law on tnventire met,'dtp. for example, reportedly generated itormy debate In ike USSR Council of Ulnisters and war nsurmd three timer to the State Committee for Imnmitont and Ditcoveriet forbefore It wot made availablehe public In lateublic discussion of the draft, la turn,ood deal of controvert. Despite the FruHtburo't ettaortemtnt Inhelow was killed In committee during ihe9 lesnon cf the Supreme Soviet
Ftalures of ihe proposed legiiiailon provoking the sharpen criticism from inventor, imdmdtd the provi-tions on Joint ovrnertklpatent between the Inventor and ihe enterprise where he works. Ike lengthy review process, and the Issue ofSome critics told tkat the new law puts the cart before theproblem in Increasing Ihe flow cf nevr technology Isack of Innovations but rather the unwillingness of production enterprises to use these Innovationsimely fashion. Some Inventors stated thai as long as there It no market fat their Invewitrms. meat af the lour is mcominglest and IrrelevonT
A substantially revised draft of the new law on inventions was published In the Soviet press In early0 for redUcusstom before Us tubmtstson to ihe Supreme Soviet, possibly tr. ihe fallhis latest vmim gtrer broader property rights andlo Soviet Inventors end refects the notion of dual patent ownership. It also increases the tire of ecotutmic rewards to inventors and alto eeatomic Incentives toan prises to use tmvrettoms. The low provides paleru protection for biological, nmcrobicdogiced. and chtmltoJ tvmUMmmeetu but mot computet tetftwatt. For the first lime, the law detallt patent rights and provides sanctions, tuck atdamages, for Infringement or violationsew system of patent courts to review patent Infringement cases will also be
The general thrust of thest proposed changes would move ike USSR closer toward International patent standordt and practices. Al present, however. Soviet legislation is stilltate afflux, mad much controversy continues to surround the tubfect of tuvsoenyIntellectual property.
ikely to test increased cec<orturut>e* lot urge tins US defense contractors. Soviet emigres, and joint ventures:
US defense cxruractors Increased contacts besweca tbe US and Soviet rail nary talablrxhrnrnlf and beisreen their respective defecse-ird ustrisI complex-ea provide Soviet iateallaesscc agencies eaibanord opportonities for arc-ess to US defense contractors and factinic" Soviet defense (inns' participation in joint venture* In "civilian" high-each areas such as aerospace will provide access to US technologiesow of use in military ptogranss. The
number of Soviet military RAD tiaperts attending imernatioaal meetings, engaging in informal direct contacts with USnd propoaiagresearch projects Is also likely to grow.
Soviet emigres. Mcascow incrtaanilylooking to Sovietthe moreho came to the United State*1 aada source of luvestment andew science coenmuaion formed8 under the
USSR Uraoo of Sciertflnccering Sodcl-iot to enlijl tbe help of emigre* now working ia VVeaterotech Ii mi. ramadcoold becometcecUl urget for KOB exploitation and rcerurtinrnt mam*
3.
1 u
At the mo- time, with Motcow* increaMng emphaiii on modernizing the economy, KOB collection effort* wtli pve iacrrntcd tturetsoo to tcchaotogioi with apptacatkas* to the crrtbu economy. The focal win ahta broaden bcyoed lecaricadgy hardware into *rea* of "intellectualith crnphau* oa technical data aadow. Here, lha Soviet* probably hopepl..ia lack of coeaeaiui la the United Sutes about whether controls are appropriate or effective in theseet, there arc also ground* for oaeatioo-Ing whether Moscow will derive economic bcciefitiwith the whaaord KGB acquiaitloo efforts. As lone as tbe Soviet lyitem retaias it* reliance en central pfenning and Its hostility tothe Impact of these technology acquisition* win fall far short of Soviet esmecutiona
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