A Compendium of Recent Insiirgency Analyses
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USSR: Prospects fot in Insurgency in Azerbaijan
Uoeity Calm
Ptccondiiioni (or an insurgency in Axrbaljan have developed rapidly since Ian (aD. Moscow,irrwrium bai suppressed the eyrert nian.'e-.Ulkms ofiurieocj bat baiew,violent at port io anti-Mcacow tenunsent in the republic. Tbe longer Moscow continues iu occupation withoutpolitical concessions to the Aaeri People'a Fronthe tnorc difliculiy the Front leaden wifl have in controlling radical elements that have shown the will and the ability to use insurgent lactlct. Our analysis of insurgencies haa identified several indict-ian
natselp in nsotutnnng
i aa anti-Moscow iniurgency in Arer-
batian
0 military intervention in Azerbaijan was prompted primarily by the Aaeri nationaliiti' threat to overthrow the republic regime, as well as by growing ethnic violence. Tlie Armenian-Atcri conflict, which sparked the growth of Aaeri nationalism, began in8 over the sovereignty ofroup of Aaeri Intellectuals formed the APF iaartially in rcspooae to the Ntgc. no Ka rtbskh dispute but aboay to prorisotc political reform ia Azerbaijan. Since then, the APF'l grab have csrjanded lo includefor the republic. As tension wiih the Armenians grew, iwo factions developed within Ine APFwho seek immediate independence, andwhoote gradual approach. In earlyhe radicals took control of Ibe Front,ogrom sgsirtst Armenians in Baku, and beganakeover of republic leadership In response lo ihese developments. Moscow intervened militarily onanuary
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The Krcmlin'a actions calmed ihe situation for the moment. Soviet troops killed alicrit in the crackdown, and lhc retime arrested many of tbe radical leaders of tbe APF. returning the more tnoder-ale lead en so centrol. Calls for independence died deywn, and ccasc-tVc talks between Armenian aad Axcri aatkjoi litu began. The tituatioa remains vesa-tile, however: violeocc between Arer it and Armenians continues, the deaths of Aaeri cmliini at Soviet bandsresh memory, and ihe iceurily parsence0 MVD and tegular troops ccmalruhlgh
Fertile Ground for Insurgency
Given recent developments and currentertile ground for tbe devcloprucatomesticumber of eondiiions or pseditpoaing factors underscore thit potential:
andreligion. Nationalist insurgencies against regimes perceived lo represent foreigncan drawrood and determined base of uppoel and be difficult to quell. Over Ihe btl two years, Aicri nationalism has grown exponentially. Some of lhc ortoe predominantly secular Aierii have begun lo show signs of renewed inlercil In lilam; in one of the most radicalised areas of Ibe republic, Nakhichevan', Islamic slogans have become the tallying call.
conduit* political cllnatr Academic and(Indies indicate that iruorgencXs and otber revolutionary enovensenu often gain moment tun when promised reforms do not meet eipcctaiioot
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central governments are perceived at weak or indecisive. Although Aicri complaints aretbe recent loosening of Mcaeow's control and growth ot independence movements cite* here in the USSR have given rise to the percept ion that central authority can successfully behai beencase repeatedly In the Baltic states. Although Moscow's intervention io Baku bas demonstrated Ihat Il Is willing to put down violent moves against its authority, its tolerance for peaceful organizational activities gives potential insurgent groups breathing space for political organizing.
Populationast cases Indicate that large-scale dislcot lions of people can siimulaieieris who Bed Armenian areas are horricless and jobless, living in tent cities near Baku and Nakhichevan'. Press reports indicate thai Ihis group was the inost active in ihe January violence. If the refugees are not absorbed into Azerbaijan, they couldecruiting pool for arid-Moscow and anti-Armcniaa action.
Favorable geography. The geography of Azerbaijan is favorable for ihe development of an insurgency. The terrain Is rugged and largely undeveloped, providing concealnt'handicappingdeployments. Azerbaijan's border with Iran Is difficult to police, and sketchy evidence indicates tbc Aicri population in northern Iran mightupport network
Challenges for Both Sides Moscow
Moscow's decisions will be the greatest single variable determining whether or not an insurgency develops in Azerbaijan. The Kremlin now faces ihe choicerolonged occupation of Azerbaijan or turning over effective control of ibe republic to the APF. An occupation ihat could maintain order would be costly in both rubles and manpower. Unless these resources are complementedolitical strategy to defuse the moonling nationalist fervor. Aicri organizations ate likely to search fot new ways lo apply pressure. Soviet forces would be vulnerable to hit-and-run raids.
sabotage, and otberassassinations of Sovietwould heighten lhc pain of occupation and discredit Moscowlaim oforder. *
Moscow appears lo be aware of these possibilities and isolitical as welliliiary strategy. It is encouraging talks with moderates, while stilla heavy military presence in Baku. Moscow will probably, in the long term, be willing to allow moderate Front members to take charge. The regime has nol blocked tbc appointment of the new republic premier, who is an ally of tbe From, and Moscow has encouraged direct talks bet ween moderate Frontand the miliiary commandant in Baku. If the moderates can maintain Iheir hold over ibe APF, these moves will greatly lessen Ibe chances of an insurgency. '
Continuing occupationove lo suppressFront leaders, however, couldatalyst fot an insurgency. By talkinghe APF, Moscow has conferred political legitimacy upon it. Furthermore, local guerrilla groups will continue to operate against Armenian targets. These units could become tbe core for recruiting andarger force to fight Moscowolitical settlement were not found or if Moscow were to renege on Its pledges lo allow more poliiical autonomy in Azerbsijin-
TIm Front
On the Atari side, tbe balance between APFand extremists will alsoeyhether or not an anii-Moteow insurgency develops in Aterbai-jan. Prior lo the extremists gaining power in the Front, anti-Mcacow and ami-Soviet feeling jn the republicistant second lo anli-ArmenianAnti-Soviet feeling is much stronger in tbe aftermath of lhc intervention and will grow If Moscow it perceived as frustrating Azcri objectives. This will increase popular sympathy for the radicals. However, until anti-Moscow sentimenti-Armenian emotions as (he driving force for violence, (he radicals will probably be unable to gain sufficient popular supportrolonged insurgency
Known Natioaalitt Gtaupt ia Attrbaijaa
Rtmarks
Peoples' Front
Blrlik (Unity)
Brothers of Rttlgion national Liberal ton
In9 by Intellectuals and osteon to have branches throughout Azerbaijan, postlbly Including military uniu; etTectlrety con-troll rtpubllc't politics: temporarily taken over by radicali Inell has an executive council
Goal It Fan-hlamtc slate and unity of Soviet and Iranian Aserls. Some grasiiooli sympathy from Industrialworkers; has worked with AFF since ot least
Fundamentalist Muslims: have agreed to work with AFF moderates to gain autonomy for Azerbaijan,
Described by diaident Movement est Aterbaijon sources as radical, anil-(Mlltt Gurulush) Soviet: goal It lo create pluralist society tn Atrrbaijan.embers, branchts ihrttugkouirawn from Attn refugees from Armenia.
APF letters are atrrenlly ia colrol ia Baku, but they tut ten yet rdrted in extremists oo the periphery, panicularly iaf ibe Front in Nakhichevan"ore moderate line, "sacking away from in declaration of irvjepeooence. then lhc chance* for an insurgency will be appreciably rrjduced. If the Nakhichevan' Front remains radicul-ired, however, lhc region couldenter for ami-Moocow il.l* location, *epa-rate from the real of Arerbakjaa. would make it more useful for political work than for military activities.
aula Slgatl an Insurgency
Tbe current situation in Arerbaijan already meets some pre.renditions for an iniurgency. Despite ihe continuing presence of Urge numbers o! Soviet troops, eatremist act!vilies have not been eoritrsletely stamped oat. Press report ing indicate* that some APFhave roneand are publishing leaf-leu calling for armed strugglef tniping. atucks on miliury patrob. and
discoveries of aim caches are abo continuing.tbete adMtlca arcuch sasaflce scale lhan beforeanuary, their cemtinuation indicate* thai tbe tiluation remainsie and that scene eitremisu remain committed lo the use of violence^ includinc insurgent uctica against Meacow
On the basit of our analysis of uwurgctsdeo. wc haveumber of develop menu lhatull-blown Insurgency. Tim indicator* associated with each vrould aUo provide Intlghu Into the strength and staying power ofebel movemenl.
Insurgent
Aa insurgency requires ttrgmnliatlon and centralas wellonsensus on hey goals among iu members In the case of thersmework for an Insurgent rxgaabmlioa already eiitu. The APF ha* become an umbrella organisation made up of several differcsil groups, including scene with more radical goals (tee tnaetk The Front ho* cell*the republic thai appear to act cm the orders of
ia Baku. We do not know, however, be* firm (he leaden" control really If ot if moderate leaden will be able to control the radical! and nuintalo their auiboriiy aa Soviet troop strength Is drawn down. Any rebalance to try io control tie radicals may itself be an indicatorascent Iruurgcncy. Although med-cralt* and radlcali are largely united oa the goal of eventual independence, they differ on timing and willingness to take up arm against Moscow.
External Support
The growih of aa insurgency can be eceelcr*tcd by tupptcsnenLing local sutvort with or mi. money, and
political support from ouiilde (nicer ft. In our view, an Aicri revolutionary movement would drawsympathy and recruits from the generalSasUirted effortscQ-cjcgaaixed, centrally directed Aicri movementoood chance of finding unofficial foreign support andclandestine old networksugment this base.
Front rncmbers arc building diplomatic and eeooomi-.
tics to Muslim countries, primarily Iran aad Turkey.
and are seeking to have tbe republic's coosiiiuiion
mandate special diplomatic reUtiomhips with those
two states C
C
1
Aren nstionalbts, including at least one Front leader, have trsrded to tbe United Slates to seek support from Aicriignificant Increase la tuck minions woulddting indicator Ihateloping.
An effective military challenge to ibe Soviets would require that tbe Areris obtain Increased numbers of sophttilcored arms. Soviet press reports claim ihsl many Areris itready have light mscfaiaeguns. rocket laaachers. and mortars and have even captured some
armored vehicles. Although ihese Slocks would enable' ibc Amisarry out hit-aad-rua raids and do basiled damage to Soviet forces, they are notto enableove beyond random attacks or brief defensive actions. To our kriowlcdge, Ihe Arcr ii have ox yet begun organliedwapoaa acatdii-tlon abroad; inchlhc purchase of
used to make common insurgent weapons, such as homemadelhc discovery at delivery routes from Iran or Turkey weald signal the emergencedl-caginiied and fiasnced insurgent
Militarisation
The development of an insurgency ia Azerbaijan wouldransition front mob violence and rsndom lotganired rniliiary action The Aieris appear lo haveilitaryell-suited for rural skircrushes against similar Armenian units but not agiinsl rcgulsr Soviet forces. Press reporting indicates that APF leaders tried to recruit Azcri conscript* and officers from lhc Soviet aimy to fight Armenians last fan, and aapress Hera reported Azcri guerrilla training camps la the roouolsinj outside Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the form*lienefense Ceasvctl and the apparent naminginuter of War by APF radicals, tbe Aicri rcsiitanoe in Baku In January appear* to hat been poorly cvsaaized. indicating that Ihc APF was not yet prepared for urban warfare or to fight against ibc better trained and equipped Soviet forces. SimulUneous attacks on several targets wouldigh degree of central eoordiaatica aad thai training and weapons problems are bring
of iht Armenlen-Altrl Conflict
Sovirl Govemntnl makes
Nagorno-Karobokh-hhtorlcally nn Armenianregion wtlhln ihe Sovirl Republic tf Azerbaijan.
Latareopen Uiue af reunion
wilhcology art! at Ion suddenly ikifti to mass dtjutwtmton* an Ihe Issue.
4 Demonstrations in Yerevan
JO0iots In Sam-tall. Azerbaijan cost JJass exodus of Armenians and Ateri refugees from thetrikes begin In Nagorno-Karabakh.
Aterl Peoples' From lead, general tirlke and rail blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh andzerbaijangives cffccial recognition to Front.
9 Roll blockade ends after regime sends additional Iroops to escort trains and makes toncesslons toommunal violence com!noes.
9 USSR Supreme Soviet abolishes
specialautkorlty restored wilkof local autonomy torotests continue.
Attris reject Armeniancall for Moscow rule ofuccessive dtmonstratlonsn Baku andarty leadenIn Armenia and Aierbaljan.
Violence resumes In Nagorno-Karabakh, regimetale cfiots break out In smaller diles cf Azerbaijan.
tinman iw
Special administration established in Nagorno-Karabakh undermttttt directly accountable lo M'sieaw.
Julyviolence resumes In
rmed Axtrl vigilante bands block roads between villages and lo Armenia.
0 Radical, gain control ofadicals foment large demonstrations on Sovttl-irardan border, pogroms against Armenians, and plan coup against republic leadership.
9 Emergency situation declared Inoviet Iroops ^ttlntu republicevest.
8 Soviet iroops assault Baku against
wishes of republiczeris killed.
0 Inltrethnlc violence.
imall-scale attacks an Soviet Iroops In Armenia and Azerbaijan also widespread.
Original document.
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