Defense Decisionmaking in the USSR: Looldng for Legislative Oversight
CIA HISTORICAL REViEW PROGRAM RELEASEES SANITIZED 9
Defense Decisionmaking in the USSR: Looking for Legislative Oversight
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Defense DeclslonmakinR In tbe USSR: Looking for Unlive Oversight
Defense tnd Slate Security Committee (DSSQ in the Supreme Soviet, responsible forroad range of defense issues, is looking to model many of its activities after US Coitgresadonatn ho testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) inormer Chief of the General Staff Sergey Akhromcyev claimed that tbe DSSC will scrutinize the Soviet defense budget "wilh as much detail as you doince then, the DSSC has developed close contacts with the HASC, and DSSC members haveUS officials for advice on how they can gain authority over tbe Soviet defense csublishmcnt.
Divided into three subcommittees, theharged with reviewing and approving the defense budget, monitoring the KGB. and overseeing defense industry activities, including conversion. In pursuing thesethe committee has Ihe authority to hold hearings, request reports, review treaties, approve high-level mkbtetial ar^ntmcnU. conductirjveatigaiions. and propose relevant legblation.
Despite iu broad charter, the DSSC has yd to eatablbb ittelfajor player in shaping Soviet defense policy. It has exerted some influence, however, by exposing defense mitiatlves to scrutiny and byg public opinion. For example, the DSSC and the Supreme Soviet have already established themselves at tbe forefront of the growingmovement in the USSR and have forced the mihiary to be more accountable to the public for its actions in this realm. During the past year, in an effort to address local environmental and health concerns, the military suspended constructionarge phased-array radar (LPAR) near Mukachevo and rxocosed closing the Scmipalatinsk nuclear test range3 By holding public bearings and allowing nongovernmental officials to testify, tbe commitlceoice for those who have been shut out of defense policy debates andorum for other agencies, civilianand public groups to push their own agendas.
The committee-and the full Supreme Soviet-has not denvoristratcd the power to impose policy over the objections of the executive branch. Although thetbe legal authority to mandate changes in legislation, it has not issued directives and has instead presented suggested changes to proposed legislation, including to0 defense budget. In addition, the committee apparently lacks the crucial line-item authority to reorder budgetof tbe primary tools
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US Congressional committees have for acting on defense legislation. The committee is also hindered by structural problems such as Ihe lack of staff and administrative support. Unlike their US counterparts, who have large personal and committee staffs. DSSC members have little or no personal stalT support, and the committee itself has only six staff members, three of whom are retired generals. The DSSC has also been limited by the short amount of time allotled io review the defense budget and by the absence of the many research organizations that provide valuable data and analysis to Ibe US Congress, such as the General Accounting Office, Ihe Congressional Budget Office, and ibe Congressional Research Service.
", The real test of the DSSC's ability io place its stamp on the military establishment should come during Ihe fall session, when il considers two competing proposalsew Law ondraftedpecial commission establishedSSC subcommittee and tbe other by the Defense Ministry. This law will be the primary vehicle for insulating fundamental reforms in the military. Tbe subcommittee draft calls for dramatic changc$-sucn as movingmaller all-volunteerivilian defense minister, and reorganizing Ihe political elements in the military. Abo on Ihe committee's fall agenda will be consideration of1 defense budget and laws governing the KGB and theconversion program.
Over the long term, the DSSC's authority should increase if iu staff size grows and iu members serve long enough to gain experience and expertise in defense issues. In lateommittee chairman Vladimir Lapygin, who had been roundly criticized for weak leadership, resigned and was replaced by Leonid Sharin. who may push the DSSC to be more aggressive. Already. Sharin has hinted that the DSSC will establish additional subcommittees to handle the vast array of issues facing theumber of committee members wouldore assertive posture. While over half of iheSSC members have close lies to Ihe national security apparatus, the committee isool of the military-industrialumber of members, particularly the DSSC's younger generation, haveajor role in pushing for fundamental military reform
More generally, the committee It likely to benefit fromfforts to ahift power away from the party and toward itate structures. Ai party organi/aiiujiv continue to tiecay, tbe DSSC is well positioned to fill the povnng power vacuum at tbe center. Thus, the transformation of tbe USSRtate "governed byorks to tbe committee sand. given lime and sufficient resources, thewith the entire Supremedevelopowerful check on the President
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The Unitedodei: Pursuing Contacts With the US
Committee Suueture*
The Effective Power of tbe
The Defense tod Stale Security Committee la Action; How
Defease Budget Renew for
Monitoring Defense-InduHriil
Oversight of the
Facsori Hsjsperissg
Staffing and Administrative
I imjtwt Research and Analytical
More Intractable Problem*
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Review Conversion
Clarify Powers of the Security
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Review Aims Cetatrol15
Draft -War Powers- LegssUlxm
Coasfom Key
Approve Arms Saks
Potrnii.il for Influencing Defense
Continuing
Prospects
of DSSC
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paper describes ihe funclions of ibe Supreme Soviet'! DefenseSecurity Committee and assesses its ability to influencepolicy.iscussion of the activities and respond bihtie* ofSupreme Soviet, see DI Intelligence Assessmentht Supreme Soviet: Wilt It Be Supreme?
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Defense Decisionmaking in tbe USSR: Looking for Legislative Oversight'
Gorbachcv'i attempts to move ihe locus of power in the USSR from party to stale organizations began in eameathea be engineered the establrth-meritew regulative body,SO-member Congrcu of Peoples Depulie* (CPOk Two-thirds of its member* are popularly elected, while one-third are drawn from public organlrations such as Ibe CPSU. From iu ranks, the CPDicameral legitla-tarc. the USSR Supreme Soviet, composedem ben Fleeted inhe Su^rrerne Sewiet became the first Handing parliament ia SovietIt meetsear, in the *pring and In tbe fall, and each seaiion lasts three to fourn contrail with its rubberstamp predecessor, which metear for three days, the Supreme Soviet has already er erased its powers to pass lawsensti-aire government decisioni
There areoioi standing commllteea and eighi commissions in the Supreme Soviet that cover Issues ranging from agriculture lo health. The membership of each com mil tee is equally spirt betocen members of the Congress of People'i Deputies that belong to
the Supreme Soviet and deputies that do act. The
Supreme Soviet organization responsible for oversee.
ing defense and intelligence issues is the Defense and
State Security Committee (DSSC).
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"" however, Sharin is politically shrewd and shouldar stronger committee leader
Tbe DSSC is divided into threermed Forces. Defense Industry, aad State Security. The Armed Forces Subcommittee is headed byVelikhov. Vice President of tbe USSRofho is particularly interested in arms control, verification, aad SDI. The chief of theIndustry Subcommittee is aircraft designer Mikhail Simonov of Ihe Sukboy Design Bureau. Grigoriy Kharchenko, first secretary of tbeObkom (oblssls the chairman of the Slate Security Subcommittee Two committee members nerve as secretaries. Sergeyn organinng officialtate optical institute, is responsible for legislative and foreign affairs, and Vitallyormer filteretallurgical plant, is responsible for committee correspondence.
While members of the national security apparatus are well represented on the committee, the DSSC isool of the military-Industrial complex, (seeist of committeeumber ofly tbe DSSC's youngersupport fundamental military reforms (see inset)
DSSClance
The DSSC is composed ofajority of whom work in either military, state secarlty, or defense irvdustry organisations. The originalchairman was Vladimirareer defcese industrialist who helped design K'BM guidance ays-terns and who worked on thepace shuttle program Lapygia resigned in late0 and was replaced by DSSC member Leonid Sharin. Unlike Lapygia, paity official Sharin has no knownties to the defense-industrial oomplcs. but he does
Tbe United Statesodel: Pursuing Contacts With tbe US Cewgres*
Since the DSSC's inception. It has aggressively sought contact and exchanges with the USwith the House Armed Service* Committeeembers of the HASC visited ihe Soviet Union in9 as guests of tbe DSSC and
The DSSCiee Generation:iffettmi Fenpectirt
Although many DSSC members have backgrounds tit iher In ihe defente-lndutirial sector, mot all are uitquestioeUngly sympathetic lo ihe military's news laumber of younger military officers and civilians mate advocated policies thai re/lea ihe Independent nature of the DSSC Although Ii would be an oversimplification lo claim thai youn ger deputies support reform while the olderresists It, there art dUternoble differences in their approaches to problem solving that can be traetd to the unlaut outlook each generation brings to ihe committee. '
pepperedn* by committee members on how Ihe DSSC should structure itself to influence Soviet defense budgets and plans During0 members of the DSSCeciprocal visit to the Untied States and comitttted to probe IS officials for information on how the US defertse budget ii foimulsied and for advice ots bow io obtain ihe necessary budget dataometimes reluctant military bureaucracy. At Ihe concluiwii of their visit.
DSSC membersumber of proposals to espand eichanges wich ihe HASC in the future. Proposals included organizing trips and meeting the leaders of their respective defense industries to stjointlyethodology tomilitary budgets, and eaehanging the teals of bills each committee adopts
function! in tbe DSSC In addition, because tbe DSSC is resoeetsibic for overseeing. KGB activities, it perfonns duties that In the United States are carried out by two select committees on intelligence. The committee is also reportedly responsible for approving tbe budrcts of si* defense-industrnl ministries and for mooitoeinf tbe conversion effort now under way in the defense sector (see inset, pageAnother Soviet natmisat-security-related committee is tbeAffairs Committee, whosethe conduct of foreign policy, reviewing treaties, and approviDg ambassadorial appointments and foreign aidibose of tbe US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee
lf retower of Ibe DSSC On paper. Ihe committee ha* many of the same legal responsibilities and powers possessed by US (cmgrcs-ssooal committees The DSSC it eapeded to:
Review and approve the defense and KGB budgets
Oversee defense programs and defense-induainal conversion.
Hold bearings and requesi reports
Review nestles both during nefotiilioes aad in ratification
high-level ministerialonduct special studies and investigations
relevant legislation, which most ihen be approved by the fall Soprcnsc Soviet.
During the committee's Aril three sessions, iiaome of these duties, but il did not dwell al length on any issue. Hoi example, the DSSCa cursory review of tbe budgets for the Mmuiry of Defense (MOD) and tbe KGB aad al tempted io monitor defense-industrial conversion. Tbe committee also approved the appointments of Defense Minister Dmitri. Yaw and KGB ChairmanKryachkov
Committee Structures Compared
The DSSC has primary- responsibilily Tor defense and intelligence matters and combines ibe ma)oi functions of al least six US Congressional committees In contrast with tbe US system, tn which two commillces aulhorireifferent two committees appropriate funds for defense, the Supreme Soviet combine* both
The committee's real power depend* upon us ability io influence the content of polity and, in ihe etircme. to impose the will of ibe Supreme Soviet on ihe executive branch Tbe DSSC'* laetperieocc as well as its structuralihe lack of stall
cm DSSCmm-tti iwii'if WrA nrmOrri 0/
US COnp-ruseia?
administrativeimpeded the dcvel-opmeol of legislative tools and political cloot. Because the Supreme Soviet has yet to vote againstpolicy preference* and thuseto, the full constitutionalf the Supremehence theuntesicd. Nevertheless, if tbe Supreme Soviet is facedeto and succeeds in mustering the two-thirds vote necessary lo override it, Gorbachev could not ignore the legislature withoutonstitutional crisis andock-cry of bis professed desire to turn the USSRule-of-law state
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The Defense and Stale Security Committee la Actioo; How Effecti*?
Defease Budget Review0 During the9 session the DSSC reviewed the defense budget plan0 submitted by theof Ministers. The budget called forercent reduction from9 level3 billion rubles'
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down9 billion rubles. Budget hearings beganeport by Defense Minister Yazov on tbe intenuiiona! miliury/political situation and the status of the Soviet tniliury. Yazov was followed by Chief of tbe General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev, and in subsequent sessions committee members beard from specialists representing the State Planning Committeend the Ministries of Finance and Defense. Most hearings were closed, and. for the most part, oo stenographic notes were taken. Some hearings were held in makeshift rooms al tbe Moskva Hotel while others, which dealt with more sensitive subjects, werehe General Staff Headquarters. In contrast with the International Affairs Committee, which has published some committee proceed in as, DSSChave not been published
The quality of the testimony varied, and someparticularly Defense Minister Yazov, wereto share mfocmatioc. Some committeecomplained that Yazova report was inadequate; they said it was not specific, contained no comparative
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nd that some formula (iocs were not becked up by figures. DSSC members abo compUiaed that, while0 defease plan called for apeoficcuts in tank, aircraft, aad ammunitionit did not give tbe actual figures from which these cuts were to be mane. Throughout its hearings, the DSSC was plagued by Ita inability to acquire relevant defense information L
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would prewvoe tnewttauoad outlineprocurement programs The fullhas had similar problems obtainingon thebudgot provsoeo tr> the legislature took onlycompared with ibe thousands of pagesinformation provided to the US Congress.
Committee members look particular interest In the welfare of servicemen, noting that "the poverty line runs close" to those in the military. Former chairman Lapygln said that providing for the needs of soldiers was the DSSC's "number-oneoits concern, the committee demanded additional information on tbe provision of housing and socsil facilities for acrviccmen
Lapygio claimed that debates on the budget were often heated and emotional C_
Jdunng some sessions, openerupteo among MOD. CvaspUn. and Finance Ministry representative* and that commute: members watched in stunned fascination. Some men herstheir authority by proposing to restructureof the armed forces. Meanwhile, variouscalled for trimming Ihe "bloated" military stafT structure, while ethers wanted to reorganize theof placing political officers ia the military These suggestions, however, did not meet with widespread support and were not adopted
In Ibe end. the committee approved the defense budget thai was submitted. But, while it did not cut the budget beyondillion rubles already announced, it dad back up its concern for the welfare of servicemen byhiftillion rubies from other spending categoric* to increase the salaries
of officers,ad warrant officers. Thefunds arc also to pay for housing andfor semcemen. Although somehave touted this shift as aa eumpie ofinfluence on the defense budget,proposal to reallocate funds came fromthe committee "backed
an MOu proposal to useillion rubles to improve Ihe material and living conditions of service -nest and their famines.-*
Committee members claimed that, to finance this increase, funds were reallocated from procurement, research and development (RftDk and operations and maintenancehe final budget, however, did not fully reflect the changes tbe committee claims lo have made In fact, funds for OAM and personnel increased over the original plan by lust WO million rabies, while RAD .pending did not change at all. and procurement ipeoding fell bymall amount. Further, some DSSC members claimed that tbeincreared funds for pensions, but tbe amount allocated for pensions showed no change. Subsequent statements on the monthly salary increases plaaned for officers and other personnel indicate thatfunds have been allocated for servicemen, but this increase was meet likely drawn from otheraccounts within tbe OcTtM and peoooadand from cuts ia constructionas dsitned, from additional cuts in procurement
Mordioring Dufanse-lBduTttrlal Couvrrsloa
Following the defense budget review, the DSSC turned to the issue ol conversion, and at least one hearing on this topic was held in aa opensptan First Deputy Chairman Smyslo* appeared before the DSSC tothat the conversion program "will Involve. In various degrees,imed Forces Subcommittee chairman Vc&kbov supported protests by aircraft manufacturers that have been tasked to produce consumer items and argued against sacrificing hard-won technicalInstead, he called for con vers too to bein areas where advanced techmJogtcal potential had already been created He atgued that tbe USSR
ibould not irj Io do everything itaelf. but rather should focui on selling competitive goods abroad and buying consumer goods with ibe earnings. Other DSSC mgrpbcn supported Velikbov's views, and the committee probably will use any influence it bat toconversion efforts in ibis direct ion
in addition to conversion, Ihe
cucuinillee would review and approve the budgetssix dcfense-indutftriel ministries but noted that,nr. with defs-.se produvtkax the DSSC badreatstaacc from the Planning. Budget, aadCommission la what mayisputejurisdiction.
number of comrades from ihls commission do not understand ibe role of the defense industry and questions of conversion, or bow to imp'eme ;i:e pointed lo "tharp discuiiiom aheadli remains unclear, however, whether the DSSC has the aalhor-iiy to approve the budgets of the defease-industrial ministries.
of Dae KCB
The KGB has been more adept than the military in adjusting to legislative oversight, and il probably views It aa aa opecetuanty to justify and legitimize iu dorncstJc aad foreign open two Unlike DefenseYaGB Chairman Kryuehkoviffer -cni tack In his dealings with the DSSC by being more forthcoming and willing to share information. He used his confirmation hearing before tbe committee to continue his ongoing public relations effort lo reator* the tarnished image of Ihe KOB by emphasising its role ia fighting crime, terrorism, and raareceica.of the State Security Subcommittee were told they could ask questions on any topic, and they would receive answers. Some members asserted that they would have full oversight powers similar to those pessseaaed by the US House and Senate Intelligencend citing US practice, they voted to keep the KGB budget secret Despite the prramasaa made by the KGB. it Is doubtful DSSC members will be privy to the type of information on covert action program* and other sensitive issues thatinely shared with US intdligence commit tea
Factors Mnmperlag Performance
SuOaui aadrwWissw
Although committee members have movedto assert Ihe authority and power of iheumber of obstacles that limit iu effectiveness surfaced in ibe initial committee hearings. These obstacles must be surmounted before the committee canore thorough review of national security programs. Chief amongbe lack of staff support and expertise c-
-.Jihe DSSC bat only six stall experts three ot whom are retired generals with tics to Iha MOD. Inumber of civilianncluding the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada (ICSACl reportedly are pro* id nag informal staff supper: to the committee.have no staffs of tbcar own. Reliance on retired generals, while probably necessary ia the abort run, could reduce the commitndependence and effec-tjvetteaa if these staffers arc notand their numbersexperts loyal to therather than to tbe MOD. Future preupects for staffing remain unclear because DSSC memberson ibe eventual staff require menu for thesome want the staff to remain small, while othersarger staff is necessary to bolster the DSSC's infittcoce In any case, aeveral mean ben have rude ii clear that they do not intend lo replicate the aire itaffi found on US Congressional committees.
Administrative support and office space are also in short supply. At present, many members live and work out of rented room* in the Moskva Hotel Eventually each Supreme Soviet member is to receive Ms/her own office in Moscow. Currently, onlychairmen have private offices. Moreover,members are expected to be provided with one aideecretary, few now have any help. Inbac the US Ccsssgraas. which cemirou its own budget for physical plant aad staff uUnci, ibe Supreme Soviet depends on the Council of Ministers
for its budget allocations'; L
he Council of Minister* is not microveu in .ttcrcasing funding for Supreme Soviet needs,to give tbe Supreme Soviet greater authority over itsbudget is pending, however, and may be considered in tbe0 session
Finally, unlike US representatives and senators,tbe mostleave from theirwhile in office, few Supreme Soviet members have given up their outside jobs. For those Supreme Soviet members from outside of Moscow, obtaining tune off fromifficult, and many are often absent from plenary sessions. Free housing is supplied to those from outside of Moscow, but, because these Supreme Soviet members are not exempt fromstrict consumer residency requirements, tbey reportedly cannot purchase essential goods andIn addition, many members ate reluctant to give up their outside careers because tbey arc uncertain about the future of the Supreme Soviet and about how long they will wantbe allowedin the legislature.
Limited Research and Analytical Support
In addition to weak staff and administrative support, the committee lacks the many institutions andas the Congressional Budgetthat provide valuable information and analysis to tbe US Congress (see tablehese resources strengthen (he hand of Congress in dealing with the executive branch, enabling representatives to challenge themonopoly on information and providing authoritative data that are crucial in budgetaryFurthermore, Congress has at its disposalthehat enhance its powers to oversee tbe implementation of legUUtion, These organizations also belp point out deficiencies in programs and assist in drafting remedial legislation Armed with such information and investigative resources.authority is elevated, making it more of an equal partner with the executive branch
Aware of the importance of such institutions, the Supreme Soviet announced in0 the creationesearch center called the Analysis and Forecasts Center, which will be under tbe direction of
diplomat and scholar Vladimir Lukin. The goal of the center, according to Lukin, is toreliable research service of the Soviet parliament similar to the US Congressional Researchnlike CRS. however, which has several hundred full-time research analysts, tbe Soviet center hasandful ofactor that will limit its capabilities. Moreover, Lukin was recently appointed chairman of tbe International Affairs and Foreign EconomicCommittee in tbe RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and be may have left the center. The ccntci T J} is expected to perform polls and assist the Supreme Soviet with hearings. To date, however, it haslittle. '
More latractable Problems
While the shortage of staff and information can be eased inumber of structural and institutional factors will continue to impede the DSSC.
Recommendations Venus Direct ires. Although the committee has Ihe legal authority to mandate changes to legislation, it has not sought to unilaterally impose its preferences on the defense budget, and thus it* actual ability to do so remains unclear. Becauseack of willack of information, the DSSC has not issued directives and instead has only presented to tbe MOD suggestions, which subsequently were not included in0 defense budget. Unlike US Congressional decisions, which are often written into (he authorizing legislalion. the DSSC failed toany changes to defense programs and merely went along with the changes proposed by the MOD.
No Line-Item Authority. Another key legal hurdle tbe DSSC will have to overcome if it Is to exercise significant power is iu apparent lack of the crucial line-item authority needed to reorder budget priori-tics. During the0 defense budget review, no specific weapons programs were singled out for change beyond those included in the original budget. One of the key tools US Congressional committees have for acting on tbe defense budget is their ability not only to change the overall budget total but also to increase or decrease funding and production requests
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particular weapon* or programs During their review of the fiscal0 defense authorization bill, for example, the US House and Senate Armed Services Committees reduced proposed purchases of several weapons, includingomber7 cargo aircraft, while adding funds to purchaseavy fighters and allocating money for2 UH-rotor aircraft tbe administration bad proposed canceling. Nevertheless, the US armedcommittee* gained line-item authority onlyears ago, and, in time, tbe DSSC could acquire this power as well.
Too Utile rime To Renew iheroblem limiting the committee's effectiveness so far has been the short amount of time allotted to review the budget- According to press reports, the DSSC*of0 defense budget lasted three to four weeks and was followed by several weeks of review on
defense-industrial conversion and the KGB budget. In contrast, the US defense budget authorization process last* almost all year (seeaced withew weeks to review the budget, the DSSC could not possiblyhorough review and develop rec-ommeodations. By compressing the process of holding bearings, reviewing budget proposals, questioningand working out compromises intohort period, the budget escaped dose scrutiny. Unless more time is allocated, or unless the DSSC can influence ihe MOD budget drafting process, the Defense Ministry will continue to hold the high cards in future budget debates
Subcommittee Charters Are Too Broad. Because the jurisdiction* of the three subcommittee* are so broad, thorough reviews of the budget are almost impossible. In the United Slates, much of the in-depth review of
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Scfwrftrkl for SoitctUS UgUUthe Defense Budgci Re.ier.
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tubtmaioaw it done inor example, hare jurisdiction overslices of the defense authorization budget. The DSSC in contrast, has oneArmed Forceswith covering the entire budget. While the large number of US subcommittees inevitably leads to duplicative efforts, it docs ensure that the budgetloseand it offers Congress many opportunities both
to make iu feelings known and to offer amendments. One subcommittee cannot cover tbe full range of mililarystrategic and conventional force requiremenu, research and development plans, and personnelmonitor all five services in any detail
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glaring difference it Ibe way tbe US and Soviet legislature* deal with intelligence issues, which in the United States are handled by two committees and three subcommittees and in the USSR by one subcommittee. Moreover, because the KGBumber of different tasks in addition to gathering foreign intdligence, such as guarding the borders and maintaining internal security, the one subcommittee wHi be even further used. The Law and Order Committee, however, which also has jurisdiction cer the KGB's internal activities, could help ease tbe burden on the intelligence, subcommittee. In addition, recent information indicates that the Supreme Soviet is seriously consideringull committee to monitor the KGB.
Tataottr ia iktSmprtmt Soritt. Another institutional hindrance to tbe DSSC it the requirement that up toercent of the members of the Supreme Soviet be replaced every year. The fust rotation is scheduled to take place before the end of tbe year and could lead to the introduction of eight or nine new DSSC members. If fully implemented, such turnover would make it harder for DSSC members to develop the expertise on defense issues that is essential if tbey arc tochallenge MOD prerogatives. The institutional memory the US Congress has developed over themembers spend decades serving onadded to its ability to influence defense issues. It is possible, however, that the Supreme Soviet will ease this restriction in the near future. The only similar constraint on tenure in the US Congress is the eight-year limitation for membership on either of the intelligence committees.
0 Agenda
0 session is only half completed, and already the DSSC has tackled many sensitive issues. During the spring session, which began in February and ended in mid-June, the DSSC reviewed the long-awaited conversion plan, considered measures for regulating the MVD and KGB. held hearings on ending nuclear testing at Scmipalatinsk. and reviewed the plans of the Strategic Rocket and Air Defense Forces. The agenda for the fall session, scheduled to
begin In September, promises to be even moreThe DSSC willaw onomnibus piece of legislation introducing fundamental reforms in tbetbe full Supreme Soviet. In addition, the committee will consider the defense plan and budget forclose attention to the bousing needs of soldiers returning from Easternshould complete action on legislation governing tbe MVD and KGB
Review Conversion Pisa
Although committee members have claimed thatwillital role in tbe conversionseries of recent reports suggests that it willinor player in the effort tofrom defense to the civil sector. InMoscow announced that tbe long-awaitedconverting defense productionforwarded to the Council of Ministers. Thedrafted by Gosplan, the Military IndustrialfVPKk and the Ministry of Defense.
3heDSSC played no meantnglu! roie in the plan's formulation.
Shortly after the plan was unveiled, the DSSCa report from Gosplan deputy chairman Smyt-lov, who reiterated previous statements that tbeprogram will involventerprises. He added, however, thatillion rubles will be needed to reconfigure defense plants and build new facilities for civilian production. The plan callseduction in tbe output of tanks, strategic missiles, mililary aircraft, infantry combat vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, and "othermost affected by the START and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. During the bearing, DSSC members called for increased exports ofequipment, particularly civil aircraft.of DSSC actions, the Council of Ministers has withdrawn the plan and is now reworking some of itsew draft of the conversion planwill be submitted to the commit tee in the fall session. The DSSC will continue to monitor tbe progress of defense-industrial conversion, but it is
being consulled aboutto the plan, and it is doubtful ft will have much leeway to make lignifi-cant changes to the plan once it is completed
owers of the Security Setrlce* The DSSC is also in the process of reviewing bills to establish guidelines for the Ministry ofn February the DSSC and theand legality Committee considerrafton the "Right* and Duties of Internal Security Troops in Protecting Publiche decree was drafted by the Council of Ministers in response to the brutal suppression of protesters by the military in Tbilisi Inn whicheople were killed and hundreds were wounded. In an effort to avoid such tragedies in the future, the draft law clarifies the MVD'* authority to use force and provides stricter guidelines governing method* to restore order. In addition, during the hearings the DSSC agreedroposal to man five MVD unitsolunteer basis. and several offictab have claimed that, in time, all MVD troops may be volunteer.
This year the DSSC Is alsoew law governing KGB activities. Some DSSC members have already expressed interest in US Congressionalof intelligence activities and have requested andUSmaterials and Documentation of US laws on intelligenceAdditional information it being forwarded to the committee, and two DSSC members stated that, as tbe DSSC proceeds with drafting oversightthey may callS expert on intelligence oversight to visit the committee to exchange views.
For their part.fficials have expressed support for new lawso security service. Inwith US officials. KGB Deputy Chairman Vladi-mir Pirozhkov has strongly endorsed tbeof legislative oversight of the KGB. Pirozhkov has cbimed that the KGB wants to operate under clear legal obligations andto those that govern security services in democratic countries. Reports indicate, however, that KGBare confident that committee members will be too intimidated to place many restrictions on tbe security service. On the other hand, recent statements
by retired KGB Gen Oleg Kalugin charging that the KGB has changed little under Gorbachev and that it still closely monitor* internal dissent may spur tbe DSSC to amotion KGB activities more closely
Al the sameumber cf legnlalrve proposals are beans; considered lo redress crime* committed by the KGB and by other government agencies against individual* during the period fromo the. For example, the DSSC recentlyearing aimed at accelerating the process ofof those who suffered under Stalin. During the past two years,eople werebutillion casea remain outstanding, according to the KGB. Although thismall portion of those who actually suffered during the Stalinist period, the rehabilitation of these individuals may spur efforts to acknowledge more widespread persecutions under Stalin and his successors The DSSC isaw on Archives that aims to accelerate the rttbabiUtatJdn process by casing access to all Soviet archives, indadiag tboseof the KGB
Lasaet Navcseaa TewOw*
Growinghroughout the USSR about the environment have prompted the Supreme Soviet and the DSSC to address issues that impinge on defense programs and plans, la early March the DSSCoint bearing with the Ecology Committee onto halt nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk test range in Karskhstan. Col. Oen, Vladimir Gerasimov testified that the military It ready to end testing at Semipalatinskfter It catrlcs outore explosives tests After that, all nuclear teats would be concentrated at Novaya Zemlva. aa island north of the Arctic Circle whose harsh climate will limit testing operations In July the Soviets announced new yield limits for tests at Semipalatinsk before it closes:ilotons lkt)the rest of this year andt12
The fa tore of any testing at Seem pal* iirtsk remain* ia doubt, howeveruggestion has raised the hackles of those living near Novayaaddition to those in the Nordichas
railed toumber of Supreme Sovietespecially those frorn Kaiakhsian, who still call for an immediate end to teaiiag at Semioeeove *
t^Xr*roposal was "out of tbend lorrae cocnmiltoc rnembers have indicaied that they will pushomplete ban oo nuclear testing tbls year. At tbe same lime,nifteanl number of DSSC mem ben appear reluctant lo prohibit all nuclear lettingof national security cooccnu. Further oompii-cating Soviet testing plans Is Boris Yel'tsin'tto testing at Novaya Zemlya and the possibility that tbe Russian Supreme Soviet, which he heads, mayan on all testing in Ihe Russian republic
The Soviets' increasing concerns about tbeimpact of military programs was furtherin February, when Defense Minister Yszov announced thatad been halted on tbe Mtikaehevo Large Phased Array Radar (LPARX pending the reportommits ion established to review tbe project. The radar, partew act work of large ballistic missile early warning radars, hi located in the western USSRilcaneters from the Hungarian border and bat been tbe subject of protests in both countries during the past several moot hi Soviet officials claim that two-thirds of the funds allotted to theanterior com (ruction of which ks almostalready been spent. Critics have labeled the radar an environmentalof the large amount of water needed to cool its components ealth harard because It will emit dangerous levels of olcciromsgnetle(US analysis of similar Sovietowever, suggests that the one al Mukaehevo would operate within US electromagnetic radiation exposure
urprise move, the review coonniunn. headed by Armed Forces Saboommitlec Chairman Vdikfaov. coodwded that it waa no! "expedient- to continue construction of the LPAR aad directed thai the facility be handed over to tbe Civil economy. Although the militaryublic relation* campaign to cemrince the local populace thai the radar would be safe, the USSR Council of Ministers bowed to public pressure aad annouaccd In early August that ihe
LPAR will be moth balled. This episodelear trend: growing public awareness and tbe ability to voice concerns to tbe legislature mean the military will no longer be able to ad with Impunity.
n Defease
Scheduled to be debated in ihe Supreme Soviet in the fallbe Law on Defense is considered to be Ihe major vehicle for instituting reform In the Soviet military and probably will be the most important piece of legislation the DSSC addressesesigned to provide the legal bails for Soviet defense efforts, the Law on Defense is an omnibus piece of legislation that addresses military doctrine, tbeand duties of state Institutions, Ibe participation of enterprise* in defeasend the rights and dunes of ciUreas in defense of the ceajntry. It will also serve as the basis for all future legislation on defense issues. US officii Is familiar with tbe iatent of this legal* tic* have likened il to the US National Security Acthich outlined the roles and missions of the various components of the US national security establishment
In9 Ihe MODpecial legisUiive commission headed by Chief of the General StalT Moescyev to draft this new law, an laitlal version of which was circulated in the springt tbe same time, the DSSC's Armed Forcesof the importance ofommisssoo headed by radical reformer Maj. Vladimir lopaun to draft anemonstration of Ihe growing independence ft the DSSC both the military'* and the subcomnutiec't drafts will be considered by Ibe full DSSCml bsB is aprxewed by the DSSC it is expected to be presented ia the fall to the full Supreme Soviet for considers tic.
While both drafts agreeewas disbanding construction troops serving civilianmilitary's proposal fall* far short of tbe major reforms found In the tubcommit lee's draft (sees support for radical reform has grown, however, the MOD batumber of concession* in an attempt to co-opt those who would otherwise support the subcommittee draft. Nevertheless, debate
Tabic 2
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iht extent of reform will be cxmunuous. White wfTw ofsubcommittee's trjore radical poslttoos may be softoied or dropped before le^btafioti reaches ihe Supremeunrest may dtmiade the DSSC from pfotnotint tbe creation of regionaltcgUlAture mayarge portion
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creation o( aa alternative service and the requirement that tbe defense ministerivilian. There isrowing awareness in (he Supreme Soviet that, as the USSR movesystem, theapparatus la the mililary cannot survive in its present form aad will have lo be reorganized. (Indeed, at the recent Ztth Party Congrcaa.souaced that politicalf the military's Mainrain it tra two will be moved from party to state control aad will conduct patriotic education and "Wa!-cultural" work. Party organizations willin the military, but Gorbachev said earlier that other political parties arc free to organize within theoreover, it t* increasingly likely that the DSSC and Supreme Soviet will support the transitionmaller, professional, all-volunieei military,the pace ofransition ms bebecause of coti concerns. Many of thesewhile opposed by the current military leadership, are widely supported by rank-and-file military personnel and by the populationhole. Tbe legislature is also likely to seek lighteron presidential authority than those found in the MOD's draft
Review Areal TfMfk*
The DSSC will hold iu first arms control ratitscaiion hearings in the carry fall,onsiders4 Threshold Test Ban6 Peacefulvcoions Treaties and ihe accompanying verification protocols signed at the0 summit inIt is likely that during Ibis ratification process some Supreme Soviet members may push for further reductions in nuclear testing. In addition, themay soon have the opportunity to review both the START and the CFE ueatiea before they arefor full Supreme Soviet ratification. (Ratificationreaty requires approvalim pie majority of tbe full Supreme Soviet, while in the Unitedwe-thuds vote in the Senate isumber of DSSC members are particularly interested in arms coot roe and can be es pected to push tbe committee to aggressively review any signed treaty. DSSCreportedly win soon travel to the STARTin Geneva, and perhaps to the CFE talks in Vienna, in an effort to demonstrate that thev are plavers in Ibe process C
Jibe committee does not receive regular status reports on the progress of the negotiations, but when the comnl tec asks for Information it is
Last spring, Oleg Griacvskiy, chief of the Soviet CFE negotiating lean, and Yoriy Nazarkin. chief of the Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks delegation, testifiedint bearing of the DSSC and theAffairs Committee en the status of the arms control tails During the bearing. DSSC members referred favorably to tbe ability of Westernto maintain close scrutiny of arms control negotiations and implied that tbey intend to do the same. Committee members were particularly Inierest-cd in the potential economic benefits from arms control and tbey welcomed Nazarkintatement that START will permii the sue of some ICBMs and SLBI-ts at space launch vehicles. For their part. Soviet arms control negotiators have used to use the newfound authority of the Supreme Soviet to bolster Moscow's negotiating positions (sec inset)
The DSSC could alsoole in nxasitoeing Soviet compliance with international arms agreements. Tbe committee may review future defense plans to ensure thai ihey comply with Soviet treaty obligations and. in so doing, avert such problems as the Krasnoyarsk radar, which Moscow now admiu violates the ABM Treaty
Draft -War Pawns" legsslaUoa The DSSC. perhaps in concert withice national Affairs Committee, is scheduled to consider legist*-tioa control ling tbe use of the nsilsisry emu use Soviet borders Legislatures in Czeclvoslovasja. Hungary, and Poland have declared that their naiional forces cannot be used outside national borders withoutapproval In his inaugural address as President inorbachev affirmed his adherence to Ibe principle approved by Ihe Congress of People's Deputies that "the use of force ouUide the country without the sanction of the Supreme Soviet or the Congress is ruled out categorically forever, withee pi ion. ia Ihe event of sudden attack fromAs President. Gorbachev has the statutory authoriiv toeneral or partial mobilization and to declare war in the event of military attach.ecision must immediately be referred to the Supreme Soviet, which must then approvewo-thirds vote
Using ihe DSSCoil in Arms Coatee! Negotiations
a page aul of US negotiating techniques, the SovitU have claimed that some of their arms control positions In START are necessary to ensuretsf the treaty by the Supreme Soviet. ForSoviet START negotiators hare argued that many in the Supreme Soviet believe Moscow has given in on too many negotiating positions. This view was bolstered by General Chervov of the General Staff, who reportedly testified against the USSR's air-launched cruise missile (ALCMI positionearing before the DSSC, charging that the agreed counting rule put the USSRisadvantage. In view of this discontent. Soviet negotiators claimed that, in ordervoid problems during the raltfica-tion process, the United Slates must agree IO ihe Soviet position on the range threshold of accountable ALCMs; Ihe US tide has since agreed to the Soviet range thresholdilometers.
Similarly. Soviei negotiators hove said that the Supreme Soviet is interested in the economic savingsTART agreement and thus may not support the US proposal that Moscow tomplele the costly destructionarge number of Soviet ICBMs and that up toSBNs be eliminated under START during ihe first two years of ihe agreed seven-year drawdown pe'iod. Likewise. In the Conventional Forcesropetolkt. Soviet negotialort na>v> uted the ipeeler of Supreme Soviet dttapproval lo argueO should abandon Us proposal calling for Ihe destruction of ail sreaiy-limsted items
[except helicopters) and permit the conversion of some equipment lo civilian purposes
Although these claims ore clearly being usedofficialstrengthen Moscow'sthese officialt appear genuinelyIhe luccessful ratification of both STARTCFE treatyupreme Soviet that is noa rubbe'Siamp. Unlike the pro formaof the ISF TreatyTART willclose scrutiny lit ihe DSSC and in afull Supreme Soviei thai has surprisedIhe past.
President Gorbachev and Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze have poimed toratification problems. Of major concernumber of Soviets are press reports claiming that under START Moscow wilt have to tut morearheads while ihe Unitedof permissive counting rules for heavy bombers -may choose to make only modest reductions. They fear that such unequal reductions could spark opposition to START in ihe Supreme Soviei. Still, while these ratification concerns arereaty must obtainimple mc. irily in the full Supreme Soviet, according toar less rigorous requirement than the two-thirds majority necessary in ihe USit is doubtfulreaty the leadership supported would be blocked by the Supreme Soviet
Supremeihe DSSC playingikely attempt io codify: i -iei low in Ihe neat fttlalfe Will such legislation, some commiuee members argueoi icpeai mistakes such as ihe invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan Ihe establishment ofhich would requite Supreme Soviet approval prior lo ihe dispatch of WOOpS. wouldmore restrictive than the US War I'owen Act. which requires Congees iinnal approvaluays after troops have been introduced into hostilities or into an area where hostilities appeal "imminent.'
Confirm Key Ministers
Beloic the reorganisation ol eaeCutive power in March, the DSSC had been expected to confirm members of Ihe Defensehe keybody on defense issues. Asresuli of the ciestiontrong presidency, however, all mention of the Defense Council in the Constiiulion -a* removed,ember USSR Presidential Council waswhose funeiioiM have been likened to ihosc of Ihe US Cabinet Although repons indicateew Delense Council ha* been createdorking group under the Presidential Council. Ihe DSSC will nolthe power to confirm members of this new
defensehe DSSC, however, will icuin iheuihotilyonfirm ibe mif defense and ilie chairman of (be KGB, with (be knowledge thai tbesc oftcials will serve as members of both iheand Defence Coo nob
Approveales
Some Supreme Soviet members have argued that arms sales abroad should be made public and subject lo review by the DSSC. At present, according to Defense Minuter Yarov. tbe Supreme Soviet la not consulted sales arc bandied by tbe Ministry ofCconomlc Relation* in conjunction with tbe Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries Somehave critsdied Soviei arm* export pessscie* to cocaines such as Syria and Iraq aad have pointed favorably to the US practice of publishing detailed iaforrnalion on arms export* and to Congress's ability to review proposed transfer* of weapons Again, ibe US esperienoe couldodel for Soviet legislation. In the United States, the administration must submit lo Congress any propoanl to tell arms that moeii one of two thresholds:ingle weapon system eotti more than SI4 million enackage saleillion. Congress can bloc* any salemeets one of these criteria byoncur -reat resolution [both bouses vote) of disapproval wstb-in JO days of receiving Useroposal It is increasingly likely thai some lorm of legislationill be introduced soon to give the Supreme Soviet comparable aulhoeiiy to review aims esporis
Potential for Influencing Defense Policy
reports, the defense budgetI will be submitted Tor Supreme Soviet approval in0 at ihe earliest leaving link time for close acrutlny. Further. DSSC action* to influence defense policy through tbe budget process have beenby the fact thai spending pesos submitted by tbe Defense Ministry do not reflect total military expends lures-Thererowing recognition among committee members, however, that the budget undertime* Soviet defense efforU. Reformer Lopatin. for example, has elaimed thai ibe MOD budget doe* not include full defense-related eipenditures ofifferent ministries and of republic* sod enterprises
In an attempt toore realistic defense budget. Ochirov ha* said that the DSSC will pool the various defense accounU that are now spread across ministries and republics and place them under the MOD budget Ochirov'i statement luppoiU the claim DSSC suffer Kapranov made in April thai Ibe committee isudget that includes all defense activities and uses 'acinar (umubsidizcdl prices for miliUry hardware. The resultudget that is about twice a* large as theillion rubles announced0 and is generally consilient in sire wiib ihe Intelligence Community's estimate of Soviet defense expendlluies. Kapranov Bated thai ibe new estimate doct not reflect any real change in Soviet defense activity, rather, it represents the DSSC* effort touch more realistic defease budget by esiablisbing stnet financial ie count* baliu Ii is not cleat, however, if the MOD wilf accept ibe DSSC-drallrd budget, and. even if ii does, whether ihe DSSC hat the ability io alter priorities within it
the DSSC it looking to expand iu powci* this year and in future legislative sessions. Ihe problems that surfaced duung nasi seauont will continue io actrake on iu influence
Ccwttiawiag I'reMrtn*
The DSSC clearly latcnd* so give the nestnore eateaotva review -DSSC Deputy Chssenaasi Vj. lcii> Ocbwovhat "work (on1 defenseill proceed more thoroughly, line byhe shortage of staff coupled with the limein thai affected0 budget review, however, will again come into play According to press
Still, while the DSSC may not be able to radically reorder budget priorities, it is not powerless Oiber options available to the comrailiec include using iu ability to puhtirly challengeriorities throughout ihe legislative session lo inPuencedebate* aad plans ladeed. it is heic oei issues such as nuclearthe committee bat bad ihe moat success In attmlion. ihe DsttCa ability lo place iu stamp on delcmc policy it greater in areas where it hat dialled viable alternatives -such as the Law on Defense
Al the same time, shortages of staff and analytical support and persistent problems in obtaining data "ill continoe lo limii ibe comraiitee'* Influence. In April, for example. Georgiy Arbntov, director of IUSAC. publicly rebuked Ibe committee for ii* failure to obtain essential defense information- It will be tome time before the recently established research center can provide strong support to the Supreme Soviei, lei alone to the DSSC. Although it will continue to beisadvantage relative to tbe MOD. tbe DSSC "ill increase it* authority over time as it* staff sire grows and members gain experience and expertiseoreover, as tbe research center gains Strength, it may prompt the Supreme Soviet toadditional support facilities as counterparts to those used by the US Congress.'
The recent selection of Leonid Sharin to replace jLapygin as DSSC chairman presentswith the opportunity to strengthenoversight capabilities. Sharin. aparty official, lacks Lapygin's dose lies tosector and probably will not beof this sector's Interests. At ihe sameSharin spent mosl of his career in theEasi. home of the Soviei Pacific Fleet, heclose lies to ihe military.
acknowledged many of ibe
committee's shortcoming* such as ihe cursoryreviewclaimed that improvements will be made in the near future. Similarly, he also admitled that the DSSC requires additional staff supcori. bul he poinled oul lhal Ihe Supreme Soviei Presidium, not committee chairmen, controlsstaffing. Nonetheless. Sharin will mosl likely iiush Ihe DSSC lo be more assertive in establishing itsan oversight commit lee and has already voiced support for establishing additional subcommittees lo deal wjih aims control and space issues
Prospects
F.ven il these problems can be overcome, the COM issue remains ihe committee's desire and abilityry its wayolicymaking arena dominated by institutions that view the DSSC a* an unwelcome intrusion Further complicating Ibe DSSC* efforts io carveiche in defense policymaking has been the Creationew USSR presidency Despite Ihe
role Gorbachev has played in promoting tbe Supreme Soviet and the DSSC, he has made it clear that the DSSC is to remain subordinate to Ihe executive leadership on decisions affecting national security. While the Supreme Soviet appears, on paper, to have ihe power to challenge the central leadership, many Supreme Soviet members have espeessed concern that the legislature may not use its power toihe newly invigorated executive authority. To date, tbe DSSC and the Supreme Soviet have yet to challenge Gorbachev's policy preferences, and until ihey do, thdr full ability to make policy will remain
Still, the Supreme Soviet ond tbe DSSC arc likely to gain in the long run if party Structures continue lo lose power to state institutions and If the political cenier retains substantial authority. As the parly continues io lose legitimacy, the Supreme Soviet ishe resulting power vacuum. Indeed, the effort under way to transform ihe Soviet Unionlate "governed by laws" workshe Supreme Soviet's and the DSSCs advantage, and. as the committee gainsxperience,eeii*e. it could develop intopowerful check on the
Regardless of ihe additional powers it can accrue, however, the mere esislencc of the commilleea new dynamic in tbe formulation of defense policy. Now thai represenlnlives of ihe Defensemust justify their budget requests to ihe DSSC. the military will haveonsider how its proposals will be viewedprospect some members of the military apparently do not welcome Chief of the General Staff Moiseyc recently complained that dealing with the Supreme Soviet -as an "absolute nightmare" and that lis members were constant ly demanding additional information Similarly.Akhromeyev has said that many in the military do not like answering io ibe legislature, although he added Ural ihey will have to gel used io it. The DSSC alsooice lor those wlio have been shutof the policy debates andorum for olhei agencies and civilian analysts to push their own
(reverse blank)
(REVERSE BLANK)
B
List of DSSC Members
(AciIhmJ. Leonid Sharin. Firii Secretary, Amur Obkom
Deputy Chairman. Col. Valeriytudeni. Voroshilo. General StaB. Acndem,
Chairman. Slat* Security Subcommitlee. Grigoriy Kharcbenko, Fin! Secretary. Zaporozhye Obkoen
Chairman. Defense Industry Subcommittee. Mikhail Simonov. general designer, Sukboy Design Bureau
Chairman. Armed I'octet Subcommitttt. Yevgcniy Vefa'khov. Vice President. USSR Academy oldirector. Kurcaalc" Atccnic Energy Institute
Marshal Sergey Akhronscyev. mililary adviser to President Gorbachev
Veniamin Baluyev, chairman, Bctorustian Republic KGB
Oieg S. Belyakov. chief. Defenae Department. CPSU Central Committee
Vitally A.ecretary of the DSSC
Keshrim Bortaycv. First Secretary. Semipalatinsk Obkom
Nlkolay Brivtin. chief. KGB Border Gvardi Political Directorate
Vasily Bykov. secretary. USSR Union of Writers
Anatoliy A.irector. "Progress" aerospace plant
Andiey Gapranov-Grekhov, director. Academy ofApplied Physics Institute
Stanislav Gosovia. radio apparatus loner, machine-building plant
Ivan Gorelovskiy, former chairman. AictbaijanKGB
Yariy lsayev, director, product Km association
A dm Viuhyomma oder. Baltic Fleet
Arnold Klauuen, First Secretary. Riga Gortom
Alekscy Kolbeshkin, team leader, production association
Nikolay Kuchertkiy. director, mining and metallurgy combine
Vladimirirector, Moscow automation and machine building plant and former DSSC chairman. He may no longer participateSSC member.
Mechlsink us, scientist, Philosophy Institute. Lithuania
Vladimir Lukin. cutter, dicacl engine building plant
Yevgcauy Nemlsev. team leader, productioa associalioa
Rudolf Nikitin. director, productioa association
Gearikh V.irector and generalttyinshia aircraft design bureau
oreman, shipyard
Ll Col. Viktor Podiirnk. instructor. military onrt
Valeriy Ryumin, deputy chief designer, production association
Yuriy Samsonov. First Secretary. Ulyanovsk Obkom
Vitaliy M.eputy Minister of Defense fa* Anna menu
Igor D.hief desliner and diiector. marine technology bureau
Pclr Talanehuk. Rector. Kiev Polytechnical Institute
Setfey A.ccrcUry of the DSSC.state optical institute
Senior Lt. Nikolay Tutov, Cochairman, Social-Demo-critic Association
Vladimir Tniov. chairman. Radio and Electronics Workers Union
Vladimir Ulkin. director, production association
Velio Vare, staffer, Estonian Academy of Scientific History Institute
Arkadiy Volskiy. member, Scientific-Production Trade Union
j
Anatoliy Yelimov, Second Secretary, Communist Party. Uzbekistan
Munavarkbon Zokirov,OSAAF sportsember of ifethat "pled lb* linked Sum
I
Original document.
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