Soviet Military Manpower: Sizing the Force
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Soviet Military Manpower: Sizing the Force
(reverse blank]
Sorit* Military Manpower: Sizing Ihe Force
.
M (All
in-depth demographic rcaearch have led
io conclude thai Sovieilorce levels ineaked alillion men. The force reductions now being implemented should bring total manpower down toillion by the end of this year.
, the Soviets were able to routinely supply sufficient conscripts to nun their force al high levels. The force structure gradually expanded during this period, and by the end ofnillion men were needed lo fill it cot Al tbe same time.
J indicated that military units were manned at fairly high levels of readiness. Derrscsgrapluc data also indicated thai the USSR could have cortscripted sufficient numbers toorce ofmillion men.
During theSovieis vrere further
expanding their force structure both in the interiof of tbe country and in Eastern Europe lo one thai would haveillion men lo keep the manning at earlier levels. Despite this expansion
J^lhcSovkt rnilitary intended to maintain roughly constant total manpower. Moreover C
3on Soviet ground forces in central Europe revealed that erosions in force structure were being accomplished by thinning out existing units, rather lhan increasing manning. Demographic data also indicated that the Soviets could maintain the manning levels ofnly by strictly limiting health and fairuly-basedthey did not appear to be doing
Despite these overall constraints on manpower levels, we did notinformation for most ofo determine Ihe extent ofout" of ihe Soviet militarv *truc.ure. Ii was notollowing oul was, indeed,
occurring in Soviet rear service and support units. Consequently, wc now believe lhal other units in the interior of ihe USSR- gucb as ground forces staffs, directorates, and oilier supportwere manned at lower levels inhan In.esult of these findings, we have concluded thai the Soviets maintained constant mitliiary manpower levels ofillion men during,ewer than we had esnmatedndeed. Defense Minister Yazov's recent claiman shortfall in Ihe military supports our conclusion that Ibe Soviets have not been able to fully man their forces
0
Wc have observed changes in Ihe Soviets' force structure thai suggest manpower ilrenglhs have been reduced toillion overall since9esult of the unilateralan cut announced by Gorbachev8 and the icteasc oftudent conscripts so that they could return to their studies. Tbe moat significant cuts have occurred in the Ground Forces The Sua logic Rocket Force* also are experiencing cuts with the elimination of INF forces and theof older itlo-based ICBMs. Smaller cuts are occurring throughout tbe otherxcept for the Navy. When the cuts are completede believe toial Soviet military manpovrer will beillion men.
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Contents
Scope
rVotdems in Assessing Soviei MilitaryAssessment of Manpower Avgabuity: The "Snpply"Deferment Policies
Draft Evaiion
Availability
Revised Force Struct arc Estimate: The "Demand"Forces
Air Force*
0
Defense Forces
Rocket Forces National Command and General Support MVP Internal Troop.
DerivationeatEsiirnate
2
Declincjn Military0
^taitVE BLANK)
Scope Note
Research Paper presents Ibe resultshree-year reanalysis of Soviet military manpower strength,eassessment of manpower requirements, the number of conscript-age males, and deferment practices. It highlights the new evidence that resultedevision of our estimates for the, with particular emphasist alio discuises tbe manpower implications of thengoing unilateral force cuts, including new estimates90 that take these reductions into
(REVERSE BLANK)
Soviet MiliUty Manpower: Sizing ihe Force
in Asstwitii Soviet Military Maasso-ti
The USSR hu never revealed detailed, verhuble infevmatton on its nxilitaryorac-queotly,ielli poor Comoninlty traditionally bar eatimated ibe manpower component of ibe Sc*setV force structure by meant ofbuilding-Nock approach. We idem.f, nearlyustiact type, of md-tary .nits in the five armed semces. tbe national cemsmand and soppcrt strstcture, and the tntliurixedforeca. We estimate tbe midyear mannini Jevdcd-eavcaiypeofanit andber of such umu fevcewsde. We tbco aggregate tbe personnel for all of the units in any given year.'
r
estimate, ihough given assingle figure for each year. Iseat estimateange that differs by asilbon men between the low and high values
In the past, using the force structure methodology we eatimated that tbe Soviet mililary slowly increasedevel ofillion men In. Our
* <
eeaaolpts. la .ddstion so it*
.mud -nee, nsa Soviet, eeuwerkat mn* Intoanuition. ihsi htvs na us counterpart the KUBht Miniutry of InttmaJrnl Defease,lrtsU IrcCea
iww- sail ihe
estimate* of nuroowcr availability would have supportorce of tbts size inseeowever, because of ibe decline in draft-age men in, we predicted that the Soviets would have to take orKOrmorc of the following steps: cut deferments, recruit more career enlisted personnel, eatend the term of service for conscripts, call up more reservltti (and retain them for longer rjeriodsl or possibly even reduce the sire of the armed forces
During: ihe early and. we tawain is, bat the (horugcnot severe enough to force the Soviets toconseriptaori politic* as we had expected.major change we observed was eliminationdeferments' The number of Itreached Its low pointet 'suggesU thai Gorbachev'i
78 enoourscetneot at the UNnilateral cut ofillion menas politically and economically- -not, motivated. Finally, the reusnaletnent ia9 of student defermentsove bt the oppositetbe draftable population by almost the same amount as was being saved by the unilateral cut.
According to
Warsaw Pact plansalled for roughlytotal manpower Any stew militaryto be manned by reallocating personnelout saspport and rear service units,6 Case/
or the General Stall Marshal Viktor Kulikovthe goal of stable manpower levels. Mb failure to outline compensatory measures to accommodatechanges further suggests that tbe Soviets have notdidie problems that would constrain force levels.
The Corns.Tripiion Process
The conscription process In the Soviet Union begins when Kittles reachlthough they ere not actually Inducted until they areears old oreries of annual mtiUary-retattd physicalbegins as aget the local draft
adetermine how many of the youths are qualified for military srrvice While finishing high schoolocational equivalency, they also participate In one to three years of premllltaryActual notification af an Induction dale Is either by postcard or verbal notice at the physicalbefore Induction. In addition, each April and October. Soviet officials publidy announce thecallup of conscriptt for their two- or three-year tours of active duty. The announcementhree-month started of notification, further medical examinations, selection for assignments, andto military facilities ofPreviously, the draft eailupt were announcedefense Ministry order. This year, theore being made by government resolution so that KGB. Railroad, and IdVD Internalwho are no longer considered part of the armedstill be conscripted. In making this change. Moscow emphasised that the government Is responsible for allocating human resource^
inability to reconcile the retiuiiemenis-based martpower estimates with the predicted supply of Soviet conscripts led us to review both methodologies separately. Tbe estimates for every year5 to ihe present were reviewed, but we8 as oar base year because K. was tbe last year before the beginning of thean unilateral force reductions and the earlythe falltudent conscripts Thus, the ase8 as our baseline facilitate* the comparison
' I*salb cumt sac wm at biVi br (oraenptsigher sawcalBn look placa lait prodilcd the demographic decline, however, end aflntad only apcrccaaaga cf thegc popataiMairaaaoraina of ikeaefcrswaaai ca itst. tSia ausuKwet eitenuM has bee* windedil onscripiiither rduratln* serve one MS
of our new estimate with tbe previous one withoutOn*ider"li0nntanpower
Revised aiseasaseot erf Manpower tveilal aaV
One check ots the estimates produced by the force structure methodology is to compare our estimated number of conscripts In the force with the number of Soviet males available for coasscriptkei (see inset) To obtain this latter figure, we use estimates of Soviet
^CVTt-
male* prepared by Ibe US Departf Commerce, bated on adjusted Soviet population data. Soviei conscription law provides for deferment! bated on health, higher education, family hardship, or uri-specificd "other" reasons. The application of these deferment* changes over tune, affecting the size of the conscripted force. Inouth can avoid conscription by workingriority job (although this is specifically prohibited byy being an officer cadet, by evasion, or by being in prison. Evidence it available-]^
'he percentage of aratt-agc males who arc not conscripted because of various deferments or who illegally evade thee believe, on the basis of the Commerce Department's estimates, that the main variables that affect the availability of conscripts arc the rates of deferment and evasion.
The number of le^ year-old males in the Soviet Union has fluctuated uynslderably (see figuren, thereramatic60the draft-age population, the first "echo" of sharply decreased birthrates during World War II. Partlyesponse, Khrushchev reduced military manpowerillion In Ihend announced that the manpower level hadillionteudy increase inyear-old population followed until,econd, smaller echo resulting from the reduction in birthsuringeduced the numberyear-old males by almostercent. Although tbe number began to increase slowlyt will remain below the high levels ofntil the turn of the century.
Soviet Deferment Policieseonstant deferment/evasion rate ofercent In our estimates, indicating that the USSR cotiM conscript up toercent ofyear-old males.Indent deferments were legally reduced, and we adjusted our cUferment/cvasion downwardercent. Beginningowever, even this low deferment and evasion rale would not have allowed Moscow to maintain iu armed forces al
" Tht Soncuam eaty temporaryOI.outh who we*ihree ev more yean wte uuUkdy to be vUniervpted once*"d
ilinjlimliinliinl
-iWudaSp
i!
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our estimated levels. Moreover L.
ndicated thatrates were in fact wellercent (see inset)
Toore accurate picture of tbe cohort, we reviewed the evidence to determine what percentage of young males are deferred from service. For each of the categories, wc reexamined historical and current evidence and tested the comparability of our data with historical information on conscription in Eastern Europe. The deferment rates for alt categories arc shown In tablehe percentages are presentedange because thefor more recentfragmentary
Medical Defermentis Deferments for reasons of health are the largest category of deferments out also ihe most difficult to predict because tbe Soviets
r
J
change corucripiion standards depending oo theand quality of men available. Wc alsodata on health standards and how strktlv ihev are sootied However^
^access to deferrnent data in therovided ui with an nasi rnedical deferment ratea)hia evidence thowa thatndercent of the draft-age population were fouad physically unfit in the period The trend over lime is consistent with tbe demof rapfaic chances. The lowest deferment rate occur red during the early andhen the number of draft-age male* dropped precipitously, and tbe highest rate took place in tbe, when there were Increasing numbers of lS-year-oJdence, the Soviets have been more selective when demographic trends were'
From fragmentary ^formation, we estimated tbe range of medical deferments separately for each of tbe decadesa each case, we have taken tbe prevailing demographic situation into account:
We believe health-related deferments forere in the range ofoercent ofyear-old cohortaverage medical deferment rate04 wasercent. Later In (be decade, the It-year-old population steadily increased, and tbe Soviets could either have become more -elective and raised the deferment rate or have kept tbe rate steady and used the growing papulation to espaad the number of men coetscripted. Tbe upper end of our estimated20the possibility that the Soviets became more selective.
Health-related deferments Inrobably were betweenadercent Because of tbe decline In tbe draft-age population, the Soricta probably lowered their deferment rates during the decade. An open-press article criesrate of "almostercent"hich, because that year was
Whan rau aoasfeayutu-uM auuVa raauuuded la fa*tharon tatwt-rrmi termi(four la Ibe leiiotitiloa myiti torn (three la With (he orvvkraa ihrut-yau leva eg tarvica,draft aaiy car <fcjd aa eetuty eeaa aa then were
la the armed forcca. urn.wo-rear lorra.nml drart quota ha* in uecUa half ai iaaa> Dwa at then wen
eligible tor coriseriptioo after graduation, but infew were drafted. '
itudeat defermenU were restrictedhe deferment late gradually declined toercent. This judgment ii based on an analysis of press statements that link the reinstatement of student deferments to the recently announced unilateral troop reducttoc. Because the Soviets changed the deferment rate from year to year and much of the evidences fragmentary, we have leas confidence in our estima'e for those years
^-ieponing supports
, undent deferment! were granted only to those individuals attending certainlthough we do not know which institutions were included An analysis of Soviet published dataeduced number of graduates from higher education four years after deferments were cut back, allowing us to estimate that the deferment rate felt fromoercentnderceni. This analysis and press reporting suggest that Ibe list of specified schools gradually became iltorter. so that7 they allegedly coo Id be "coonied on the fingars of botheclining trend
theow point in ibe numberycar-oldt. might have been the Icrwett rate in the decade.'
Dtftrmrmu. Focept. tbegranted deferment! to those enrolled full-timeeducation. We estimate that the studentrate roteercent in2 and then declined toercentbecause of changes in Soviet educationalestimate combinea Soviet iiamuc* on th-iiieStradent population
eating that aboutercent of undents eventually were conscripted. Technically, deferred iludents were
* TW inxk*Mlbee ihiaIhe uaiiuaat rate or laal
lor Mono- Ikeilutbk. though, mn if hmiicd lo
i .i iiieenoaihihirccdlheopaUUon that Ihe daw Ii muilkilfv reliableafe lo Humi thai ihe aarioaal rawbe eoeacwfau barber than umi fo> Kan brcavi* of the eary'a highly pcivlkgcd rutin vKh
ito batah care.
Despite the apparent near end to student deferments during this period, alower number were still granted Some iludents and university employees auert thai their schools were not affected by the official cutback5 or later C
_3he cu'backighly uneven impact. The military press noted thatof higher education frequently were draftwhich indicates that these iacUviduaa had been deferred until they completed their education.
Latehe downward trend was partially reversed. Press articles stated that defer menu had been reinstated for an unspecified number of schools;ew months afternnouncement of the unilateral force reduction, tbe Soviets fully
reinstated educationali cm staternce-ismg Ibe ranitatement witb ibe unilateral cut of )SfJ.OD0 oonicripus to estimate both tbe number of ittideali who wero conscripted and the defermentpercentfter fill re-insutemeattudent deferments yumped toercent-
l><ftrmraii for Jkoii la Priori ir OtXM/miami. We
categories may refer to occu-
gnored deferments of individuals with priorityven though we have numerous, reports of such deferments, because they arc specifically prohibited ia Soviet conscription law. Tbe law docs permit, however, deform cots to be granted by tbe Council ofases of "speciale know of at least case press atsaouncetrsentouncil of Ministers decree eatablUhing andcfcrmenl for teachers in rural areas. Inpress repealing implies that draft boards havelatitude to pve special deferments to indh-idualt
We estimate thatmall portion of theis deferred from service on the bastsprior to
he occupational deferment rate was probablyercent An East European country which appears to have similar occupational defermentalsoeferment rate of about^percent.
lo recent years, the level of occupationalbeenercent of theoccu-
pational deferments at military-related enterprises were to be eliminatedf both civil- and military-related dele-menu were cut byercent, as one report predictedercent of Soviet youths would have remained eligible fordeferment* Tbe upper bound of ourrange reflect* Ibe chance that reductions indeferments were less severe than predicted
Offictr Cadrii. Officer cadets are not part of the cooscriptaDie population because they arc already in tbe service We have ea lima led tbe number of cadets
commissioned annually -at least prior to the USSR's unilateralthe number of officer schools identified In the opea press,
cadet enrollment, and from pressnicies during use pastears that list the percentage of omorrs with higher education. By our estitnatc.grew from0 lo0rercent of the IB-year-olds With the ongoing cut in the number of officers in the Soviet armed forces, there undoubtedly will be scene reduction in the number of cadets
Dtfttmtmt afoviet conscription law states that personsriminal sentence or involvedriminal investigation cannot be drafted. Ea-cocrvictt receive no exempt ion and
and the open press, arc conscripted lato nontentitlve units like the Cotutruction Troops. Many men are no doubt released while still voting enough to be digibte for service, but we do not know whether
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r five-yearrepealeda person from the draft, but we cannot explain the disparities betweex f Jreporu.
A recent interview with tbe USSR's deputy general preaccuior revealed that, out of every0 men are not inducted because of repeated ccasrieriions or convictionerious crime. Because there are two iadncttoe periods each year, it is uncertain wbetb-et this is an annual or semiannualtbe Utter, it should be doubled to obtain an annual level. The lower end of the estimated deferment rangeercent assumes0 is an annual figure; the upper end assumes it is semiannual.
Ilariikif tHfttmemt- According to the conscription law, hardship deferments are granted to iboae who arc the sole supporter of one or both parents, if one or both are either retired or disabled The youth must be an only child or have no siblings of working age who could beource of parental support. Evidence point*-ercent deferment rate for hardship-
Official Soviet daU0 isted the national rateercent.
On ihe basis of Soviet densographic data and US orabil;-jr ratci, thererile fox the period
academic, place the hardship defermem rale in theeeccni range o> higher.
indicated an averagefoe tbe4
ate of .too, 4
pereeot toe an lias* Ituropran country ia the catiy
Draft Evasion
The predominant attitude of Soviet youth toward military service is dislike or apathy?an's lifeood book, then mlltlaiy service i* two pages lorn oui of thishi, aitjiude is apparent^
Zt even in tbe open press, Muchommonpl.ee and jradual-ly becoming mote widespread. A* one snide noted "Teapfc used tod loathe" evaders; no- they are utdifferent. -Gradually over hangoral atmosphere ha* come about .hereby chdd/co< -oriers aad other .aftueotral people have "aded service by boot or by croc*la addition, rismg ruOooalum. particularly in ibe Bailie and TranscsDcasiana. tedpenveron and refusalepori for service
The pcnalt.es for evasion are iclaiively mild For not roistering, thereine ol up0 ruble*c.st Offense, ando iO ruble* for subseouen! 0IW5 Keneat offender, can also be .ailed, but only for two years (afie. whlcb theyll satisfy tlieir rn.li.ary obl.gntsoo if ,hey are under age >I) pltu .nicies complain ,ha,ender, In. because pec-eeuesoa i, baodkd by meals. fe- me. are aeiwall, ctai^cud and Ibote ihat are CO.mc.edpended seaieaees
Desermmm,ber ofI, dedr
ho we.e
w.iher deferred nor cooscnpicde.uemely dstsV cull because, bymh. suecWul draft dodtcrs have,he systemAn, g, Cl.ief of il* General SlafI Moiseycv ,Uled lhe numbr, o(
aueaiptsvk the diiifi hadg<
Table J
Allhough ihe number of Successful evaders C
Joo small io estimate trends reliably, the evasvnn rates are generally consutenitbe caKr.enceofothercouair.es for cumpk.C
J indicatederteaiyouihsn taw European coamry failedegister for tbe draft dtsvissg ibestariy. on the baits of eipertnxe dur.ra;S arwybdiutioa Ptaamssg
.
CMbiasnc the est.rn.ie.tact of .he defe.caiecor.rs-.th tbe evasion esfmateofoxieem not drafted in ihe demoete.srsCSM raic*
Supporting Etidenctefer axe el Rein
Thtrt art collateral Indications that our new range of deferment eillmatei Ii more realUtlc than Ikeassessment:
Deferment rates for East Germany. Ciechoslova-kle, Poland, and Hungaryere within or above the new estimated range for the USSR. C_
well as itatentenls bj
j supported deferment rata within our estl-maitd range.
hief af the General Staff Ogarko* noted thatubstantial number" of cllltens art not cocistripied. He cited historical examples from Other countries loange for ihe Soviets of tS toercent, which is cotnparabir io our estimated range for ihe years
pukedpprojjrna tclyotent u> liehen ihe den>oarrapbica were favorable and miliiao' manpower leveli were being cut. In, whenyear-old cohort) were una Her aad tbe shorter lermi of service raised the demand for conscripts, tbe mint gradually declined to aboutercent. With the more favorable population trends of, defer-meat rates gradually increased again to betweenndercent. These figures contrail aharply with our previous estimate ofrercent, as shown intec inset)
Uncertainly regarding the annual deferment and cation ratesirm estimate of theactually conscripted into military service over
t?-rr: -.
Soviet MVD Firemen
oviet firemen
under the
Misdiagnosed health problems result in theo/acme conscripts aftertw enxths of service L_
ercent ot those conscniMceJ were discharged
The evidence thai some of these firemen art con-scripted comet from
^ ' well as from hints in the open prtii
J3.
els, in.
^Jan open-press article states that firefighter -Jis. In contrast with students at other MVD civilian officer schools, are excused from military lervice. Finally, the open press typically describes firefighters as -militarised(voyeoijiroranX aJ-though she exact meaning of that tent, remains unclear
We have no Indication of the number of conscripts In theOO-man force. On the high side, we useercent for the number conscripted, abased on one reportormer firefighter and by analogy with the MVD Internal Troops. For the low side, weigureercent,eedarge cadre of professional and long-tern, volunteer firemen. For instance.7 France had afirefight-lag farce0 professionals,ililary conscripts.
ppling forward of eligible manpower from limes of relative ntxias and thereby mitigate the effea ofshortdovmturo. sache <me thai occurred ia the.
Some East European countries, such as Romania and Poland, are known to use conscripted firemen, and other, are reported io ute them In atl case, ,nvul..ng fa" European countrits. data are fragmentary, andhere are no reports of the actualconscripts.
Oiveo the range of uncertainty, our -supply" side estimate of Ihe number of military conscripts8 isillion men. The low end ofstimate aa^mes somewhat more liberal health ekfersneotspercent evasion rate. It also assumes all ec-sacriptioo occurs at age It and that the Soviet Umon, lightingargelyThe high end of the estimate, ia turn, results from more conservativen defermentrefigbllng force that is composed largely ofand Ihe calling up of some ccoacripts in their early twenties
The raogecrfcosucr.pt avaitabihty. ia turn,otal Sewiet military force of between AO eoillionillion men
On tbe bailsetailed analysis cf unitwe estimate thatercent of the force are career acsnconsmbsioned or warrant ocTtccn The Soviets have long complained about the shortage of volunteers for career NCO aad warrant orBcer pceatioas, aad we have evidence that canary of these billets are filled either by conscripts or oomrnis-ssoned officers.ercent of militaryare officer cadets. The cadet catimale is, based on the number ofoob. dpeximenlcd by both open proa* and eatimate of enrollmeots broken down by type of school
We believe the USSR had aa active-duty officer corps ofillion menhis estimate Is supported by the number of graduates from officer schools, based on cadet enrollment estimated above, and officer retention rates, and by publbhed Soviet data on Communist partyrates among officers, career NCOa. aad
Force Strmctwn Estimate* of SerHet Military Ma.pemer. IW.
Soviet,prat articles haveigure ofercent foe tbe tharesuorul rrUliury peraoa-ad. the tame figureerived frome lysis.
Re-bed ForceFatimate: The "Demand" Sid,
As evidence mounted that ihe avauabihiy ofmight not support oursiimatca based on force urweture.ask force (ia CIA's Oftee of Soviet Anaiyus) to catherand revititon unit order of battle) and manning. The purpose was to del ermine whether we could improve tbe manning dau in our "building-block" estimates. Much ol these data bad remained unchanged over the pastears.
New dau aad reanalyses of old dau produced changes in manning aadhich is turnadjusted force structure estimates for tbeeriod, the impacthown in Ublesing Ibis methodology, we derived an overall estimate of the peacetime "demand" for oniformed pcrtonDelillioneduction ofrom our previous estimate
C^auaud Forces
We increased our estimate of ground8etailed aaalysiSCL. eporting indeed that our estimates of divisional and headquarters personnel
were loo low and thai auppon unit manning wai probably lower al ihe army and corps levels and higher at the military district levels than we had previously estimated.'
At tbe time of this tean>lysis, we bad received evidence thai manning levels for two rear service and support units in the forward area wereaa we were estimating and below levels reported for. We made adjustments to include these data but did not have sufficient detailed information to lower the manning estimates for all such uaits.we luspeetcd thathinning" wagin other units, we bad no specific evidential basis for malting further adjustments in our force structure estimate '
Air Forces
We decreased our estimate of Soviet Air Forces manning afterouble-counting error involving0 personnel associated with helicopter forces. Theae men were being counted as part of both the Air Forces and tbe Ground Forces. Although they arc functionally assigned to tbe Ground Forces, organisationally theyan of the Air Forces. We decided to count them in tbe Ground Forces only. The remaining decline resulted from lowered estimates of' and unit manning levels.'
Air Defers* Forces
More tban half the reduction in our animate ofForces manpower8 was the result ofof the effects of the Soviethe reorganiutionsubordination (but not the mission)umberand air defense units. We reduced Ihe estimateassociated with PVO interceptor aircraft(be reorganization and the asscaacdindividual airfields. In addition
7C
C 3indieaicJ lower manning levels at early warning and ground control intercept units. Although another reorganization of the Air Defense Forces occurred in tbe, the available evidence indicates tbat it bad little or no effect on thetout for tbe forces.
Strategic Rochet Forces
Wa have adjusted our catitnate of Strategicmanpower frequently, because of theof Ihe force and the increasingreporting. New deployments of mobilewith deactivations of older silo-basedthe drawdown of the INF force iocomplicated our efforts to estimateAt the same time, however, we haveincreasing number ofon man-
rung for tbe force
3
Although tho overall new estimate for StrategicForces manpower8 is the same as the old estimate, we bare made corrections to several fo.ee components, rrcvsously, we used average manning factors for ICBM division and group headquarters. Tbe new data we obtained, however, allowed us to disaggregate the estimates for these headquarters by missile type. This research tndacated lower manning levels fornd SSeadquarters. In addition, we eliminated theendejunrtert from our estimate once we learned that tbe program had been canceled. These reductions were offset by evi-deavee of an increase ia the number of warrant officer schools and tbe intrcductioneparateivision headquarters
National Command aad General Sap sort
National command and general support consists of aof subcategories, the most Important of which are Construction. Railroad, and Civil Defense Troops. As pait of our reaiseasment, we developed newfor estimating the sue and structure of the Construction and Railroad Troops by building up the entire organization from deiailed reports. In Ihe case
JasiSM
of (he Constructioncsnalysis of alldata resultededuced count and average manning levd of constructionew analysis of the Railroad Troopsower Dumber of brigades than had been previously assessed andbrigade model" that was normally organized with fewer battalions than the previously applied standard configuration, which again resultedmaller average unit size,
MVD Internal Troops
We reduced our estimate of the number of men assigned8 to the MVD Internal Troopss the resultew. morehorough analysis of the data on thesehis research indicated that the number of dim5ions was one-third less than we previouslyand that we bad overestimated the average manning
J
Derivationest Estimate
Our estimating methods combine toide range of manpower levels throughoutseeor, we believe actual uniformed manning levels were al the level implied by the Soviet force structure. Although Soviet officials did not publicly discuss manning levels during this period, the availability of conscripts and the detailed evidence on unit manning levels suggest thai Moscow could routinely supply sufficient conscripts to nun this force without scraping the bottom of the barrel. Indeed, ourructure estimate remains feasible8 when compared with the demographic data; we cannot deraonsttate conclusivelyiU-Ury manpower was less than thi> toul-
We can demonstrate with our analysis thatrecniircntcnts exceeded thend accumulative, fragmentaryoo manpower shortfalls suggests tbeexperienced increasing difficulty in fillingsteadily
tC3 Warsaw Pact plans
ndicate, for example, that the Soviet military intended to maintain roughly stable manpowerMoreover, extensive data from then Soviet Ground Forces in central Europe reveal that expansions In force structure wereby personnel reallocations instead ofincreases.
0 J? on ground forces rear service and support units suggest short/alls in manning in. If this "hollowing out" were replicated throughout ground forces staffs, directorates, and other support units, manpower for the ground forces alone wouldower than our forceestimate.
Sinceave been reinforced by high-level Soviet officials"who have openly acknowledged that demographic shortfalls hase constrained military manpower. Indeed,Minister Yarov's recent claiman shortfall In the military supports our conclusion that the Soviets have not been able to fully man their forces
These data are insufficient io justify revision of out detailed force structure estimates. Soviet military readiness standards and operating practices, however, would argue that any shortfall would be coo centra ted in headquarters and support units, especially In the ground forces, and this is supported by ourdata.
"t
Moreover, although tbe upper end of our on mile of manpower availability just exceeds our force structure ealirasic, it i. .cryhat actual manpower avaUabilily tana high. Statistically,ery
rate* for all of tbe independent categories fall at the low extreme* of tbe rangea^ecessary to sustain manpower availabilityilliononet crrSciaU try to tighten exempeiom ia time* of teaucrty. *bich argue* that marepower availability tbiougbout much ofoil in tbe middle lo upper portions of our range
On balance, we Judge that Soviet military manpower levels were fairly constant during, although oar estimates are less certain than for earlierindicated by the line labeled "Dest estimate"
in futureur baseline estimate forpproximated justillion men (sechis figure is generally coeuratrnt with Soviet Hate-before the UN Inlthough setrne of these statements were inconsistent and vague, they Implied an overall manpower levelillion and somethingillion men8 (see inset).
1 -limited Decline La MIHtary Maxtnower
We estimate thai osahtary ranpowet inropped1 levelsenillion as tbe Soviets began to Implement their
Soviet Slalemtna mm>.
iht paj, fewoviet official, havelo
on
Gorbachevannouncedthai "iht armedM OtUBfl men,"
but ht did not explain who, ikls loial Included. In iht previous month, the Presidium of Ihe USSR
forte,xclude ihe UVD Internal Troops. KGB Bordernd Railroadumber probably excluded these three categories of iroopsew day, lour. General Baienln reiteraied iht Gorbachev figure ofI! million but alsothat, when UVD Internal Troops. Civil De/tnsend KGB Border Guards were
over 5
million.
Defense Minister Yatov staled8W International Institute for Strategic Studies fllSSf overstated Soviet combat powerillion men. The flSS. at the time estimated Soviet armed forces manpower at )'i mO-tton men with anaramilitary 'roots rata*,here of,he terminder, our undrnttndtng of wkot categories of troopthe Included. He ma, have been referringevelillionrrived at by tubtiractingillion from theillion armed forces figure He also may have IncludedaramilitaryIs. KGB. UVD. and Rail, roadsubtractedillion from the rill,* otal of
On IIhairman of Ike Council of AtRythkov noted that Ike early release from military serviceonscripted students In August and9 would reduce theaf combatrivate,ercent. These numbersorce site ofm He may hove used this term to Indicate only enllsied personnel, as Us addition afthe wordt privates and sergeants Implies. If we add in our estimate af the number ofedficert, we arrtre al an overall totalillion ' '
mik ome exception, the Scwid, iurwr described the unilateral cutalf million menpercent reduction,aseline lolalUUonmem.loneneralrusenufm b. General Batentn that Ihe cutsS-pertent reduction, whicholalillionossible explanation for this discrepancy Is that Ba-'cninnwsy have excludedillion men In national command and tupport. KGB Border Guards and UVD Internal Troops. Soviet affinals nave also' provided manpower numbers for some brttnehes of military service. Gorbachev naied In9 thai Ike Soviet Ground Forces numbered IJKjXC and that the Navy haden. In addition, two other reports9 Indicate thaien were In ihe KGB Border Guard.-
The Soviets1 statements on their overall manpower level, suggest they seem to be focusing at two different definitions when they refer to military nutnpower:
The most cxmpeeke^e* defuUticm Ihe, hove used appears lo Include all uniformed personnel, which total,illion."
ruuskerick excludes KGB Bcvsc. Guards. UVD Internal Troops, and Railroad Troop,-covtr, what the Soviet, now call "armedhis figure was announced
Tabic 5
Estimated So-let Military Manpower
j'i
tarcaa
Defense lorec*
trcm
tkvnm
tm*mm**n
nn
bdrtto OoiSi
laaanatl Troop.
Ml 1| i 1
KGB.od ralVoMl
ifoopl
njon.laownsn: for nwtyear.TV, ma, not .dd u>n.uw of -ffiiidiia la the0 vn. For both yean, we
tx-rulo icombI lb.
the USSRunilateral force
tbew
their -araaedmthda*.uill count then lacf total unformedeotate they oorua. qf hBSSataatf,
unilateral force reductionroops (seeV most significant cult occurred io ibe Groundhich dropped by an estimatedem. particularlyesult of dcnwbditatioa of units in tbe Groups of Force* in Eastern turopt. All of the caber forces were assessed to hare sustained reduction, in tbe rangeoercent from8 kvelt. with ibe caccption of the MVD Internal
Troops, which0 men. and theTroops, which maiauisyod the prrrioatt year's earmsated lewdtrfMS/joOmet C. .
he ScwietS are carrying out Ibe reductions at the speed and in the manner they saidL
Recently released officers who are unable to
find jobs. and. more important, housing for their families
Out estimate forssume* the Sovietsto carry out their aiiisouoced reductions. In making assessments for each service, are made cutsnd unit manning, taking into account the evidence oo the acope and pace of tbe reduction* to date.0 level for total Soviet unlfcrmed forces i* projected to beillion men.9" Tbe inosta filial cuts are projected to take place in the Groundnd in the Constructionn addition, tbe Strategic Rocket Forces ate eapeeled tout of0 men because of tbe elimination of INF forces and deactivation of older silo-bated ICBMs-actions that are being otTietsome eilect by the transfer of men to units supporting other missile lysteros Tbe MVD Internal Troop* wiD again increase0 men. and the temaining services will sustain reductions at rates similar to thosedditional collection and researchll serve to reduce uncertainties in theseut we arc unlikely toevel of accuracy sufficient to confidently monitoror negotiated force reductions (see inset)
Ain Soon mgttUsrf
lew**the USSR'seaitjresnate- -aUw talld iw -
undent ennwipu so thai ihry eouU return to
tni toSovIrs itnitmenu.release ii not pan
un letaeiiancintfor bi
"SSatpasanTo tie uattat >ovmemaai of ika
oawaenta whw mmM aeevaaB) t* s> ibe CsWWM Troop.
Moironet ottos- bin piopcvd that Ibe Coaauwsno Itime -orlmt on civilianlaluctssaarom these iiateawau.cannot
illint <abelhe' the Sovieu in emrrenilr irbulldia| the tur at
lhaw CeMrvctioo Tfoaps tot* Umi, aad sua so draw then.
asaiaaitodrvrrwa m
.<lu.ll! pmumnihe overall susfMrr rwJwt-
( |VR*>tO could he ai link as JODOOO mm Orbwnv
asSTtXCO. >
Original document.
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