TERRORISM REVIEW - CHILE: PROSPECTS FOR TERRORISM

Created: 7/7/1990

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

lATIN AMERICA

CHILE

LEFTIST TERRORIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES

AT LEASTOMBS WERE SET AROUND SANTIAGO IN TWO APPARENTLY COORDINATED BOMBING ATTACKS ON AY ANDAY, HITTING TBE US CONSULATE AND TWO MORMON CHAPELS, AMONG OTHER LARGELY FOREIGN TARGETS. THE ATTACKS CAUSED ONLY MINOR DAMAGE. THE TWO SETS OF BOMBINGS AS WELL AS THEAY ASSASSINATIONETIRED CAHABINERO COLONEL--ACCUSED OF H'JMAN RIGHTSRE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BY MEMBERS OF THE DISSIDENT FACTION OF THE KANUEL RCOHIGUXZ PATRIOTIC FRONT tFTPHR/O' . RESPONSIBILITY HAS NOT BEEN CLAIMEDOMB THATHILEAN EXPLOSIVESOKE. OR FOR THE BOMBINGS OF SEVERAL MORMON CHURCHES THROUGHOUT CHILE.

itemhile: prospects for terrorism

recent shifts ik international and domestic politics- are fkjstrat:ns Chilean far-left terrorist croups, making increased violence over the next tear likely. the groups will probably be unable to sustain terrorist campaigns over the longer term. however, because of their continued disunity and declining political and financial support.

AGAINST THE MODERATE TIDE

WRING THE PAST DECADE, ROUPS OF VARIOUS STRIPES HAVE ADVOCATED VIOLENCE TO UNSEAT DICTATOR AUGUSTO PINOCHET AND

AVENGE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY HIS REGIME. THESE ORGANIZATIONS IAUNCKED WELL-ORGANIZED ASSAULTS ON PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND GOVERNMENT FACILITIES, EMPLOYING ASSASSINATIONS, BOMBINGS, AND ROCKET ATTACKS. ALTHOUGH THEYS INTERESTS LESS OFTEN. THEY BECAME VERY ACTIVE IN MOUNTING AWTT-US ATTACKS FOLLOW IKG THE US INTERVENTION IN PANAMA.

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THE TERRORISTS STILL CLING TO THEIR STRATEGY CF ARMED STRUGGLE DESPITE THE NEW POLITICAL CMKATE RESULT INC FROM THE END OFYEAR PINOCHET DICTATORSHIP ANO FROM REFORMIST TRENDS IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT WORLDWIDE. AS THE ORGANIZED LEFT. PARTICULARLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PCCH), HAS TRIED TO STAKE OUT POLITICAL SPACE IN NEWLY DEMOCRATIC CHILE, IT HAS SHOWN INCREASING RELUCTANCE TO

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PTEO TO REIN IN TERRORIST GROUPS, THE COMMUNISTS SUCCEEDEO IN CURBING JE2 PATRIOTIC FRONT} WITH PCCH SUPPORT--DURING THE8 PLEBISCITE AND THE ELECTION LAST DECEMBER. THEY REPORTEDLY HAVE ONLY LIMITED INFLUENCE WITH THE OTHER HARDLINE GROUPS--NOTABLY THE MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT/DISSIDENTS ADICAL SPLINTER GROUP FORMEDND THE LAUTARO YOUTH ORGANIZATION. THEAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE TERRORIST VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST YEAR.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

CHILEAN PRESIDENT AYLWIN'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH IN ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF THE PINOCHET REGIME MAY ALSO FOMENT GREATER TERRORIST ACTIVITY OVER THE SHORT TERM. THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN CAREFUL TOONFRONTATION WITH THE MILITARY AND WITH PINOCHET IN HIS CURRENT CAPACITY AS ARMY CCtfMANDER, STRESSING THE NEED TO SEEK REDRESS FOR THE VICTIMS RATHER THAN REVENGE. ACCORDINGLY, AYLWIN HAS PLACED STRICT LIMITS ON HIS NEWLY CHEATEO COMMISSION TO :NVESTICATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF THE PINOCHET ERA AND HAS SAID PUBLICLY HE WILL CONSIDER PARDONS ONCE THE TRUTH IS OUT.

TO TERRORIST OFFENSIVE

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WE BELIEVE CHILEAN LEFTISTS WILL BE UNABLE TO SUSTAIN LONG-TERM TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS BECAUSE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES AND THE DECLINE OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THE GROUPS REPORTEDLY MAINTAIN LOW-LEVEL CONTACTS. THEIR EFFORTS TO UNIFY OVER THE YEARS HAVE FAILED. POPULAR REJECTION OF EXTREMISM, DEMONSTRATED BY THE ELECTION OF AYLWIN'S CENTRIST COALITI JIST ORGANIZATIONS TO UNITYl |BuT EACH HA? ITS CWN VIEW ALLIANCE SHOULD EMPLOY.

TERM PROSPECTS FOR CHILEAN TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS WILL BE LARGELY DETERMINED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF AYLWIN'S ADMINISTRATION AND HIS ABILITY TO GIVE TBE FARTAKE IN THE SUCCESS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. INCLUSION OF THE LEFT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND EVEN MODERATE ATTENTION TO ITS AGENDA OF SOCIOECONOMIC

I'ago 16

REFORM WOULD HEX? ISOLATE TERRORIST GROUPS AHO UNDERCUT THEIR APPEAL TO PROSPECTIVE RECRUITS. MOREOVER, IF THE GOVERNMENT SUCCEEDS IN STRENGTHENING ITS INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS AHO IMPROVING CHILE'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. THE TERRORISTSAVE REASON TO RECONSIDER THE EFFICACY* OF ARMED STRUGGLE.

Pago 17

Original document.

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