DIRECTORATE OF0
Soviet Views and Policy on (he Kashmir Crisis| Summary
Moscow is concerned about the Kashmir crisis but apparently believes an Iruio-Paidstam war is unlikely in Ihe near term. It will continue to urge Pakistan and India toeaceful solution because Moscowar would not serve any party's goals and could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. To avoid angering New Delhi, the Soviets will continue thev political and military support for India and will oppose multilateral settlement efforts or US proposalsuperpower arms cutoff. They probably judge that India already has enough
In the event of war, the Soviets would work for an immediate ceasefire to restore regional stability, ensure that Kashmir remains part of India, and avoid escalation to nuclear weapons. They would urge India io limit its offensive operations and try to deflect Indian requests for military supplies to avoid angering Islamic countries and appearing to fuel the conflict with more arms. Moscow, however, probably would send supplies if the US or China gave Pakistan substantial military supplies, the war became protracted, or India suffered military problemsajor defeat. Although the Soviets apparently believe tha the risk of nuclear escalation is low, they would urge India toavo, forcing Islamabad into using nuclear weapons in an act of desperation.
This memorandum was ptcparcd byOffice of Soviet Analyst, Information available a* of
0 waa uted in ks preparation. CommenU and queatiou ate welcome, and may be directed lo
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Moscow's Interesteaceful Settlement
Since tensions between India and Pakistan flared up again over Kashmir inoscow has repeatedly urged restraint to boih Islamabad and New Delhi, staling thai war is in do party* lntcrestS-The Soviets have continued to counsel both countries-etathe dispute should be settled on tbe basis of2 SxM Accord, in which India and Pakistan agreed to resolve the problem through bilateral discussions. Moscow praised proposaTi on confidence-building measures in lite May that included suggestions for joint WPakistani border patrolling and renewed negotiations,Theoveo/ihcJad piannea torntended to allay tensions over Kashmir. |
Moscoweaceful settlement because it probably believesontinuing crisis and possibility of war seriously threaten Soviet interests in tbe region.
-- The Soviets want to avoid tensions with the US and China over Kashmir.
about the level of Soviet military support for India would strain Moscow's relationship with New Delhi.
" Supporting India against Islamic Pakistan might cause further domestic unrest in USSR's Muslim-dominated Central Asian republic!
Backing India against Pakistan also would damage Moscow's diplomatic interests ia the Middle East, where the Soviets have been courting moderate Arab states and Iran.
do-Pakistani war would undermine Soviet efforts-espedally since tbe adventemocratic government in Islamabad-to improve tics to Pakistan. They also probablyar would leadoup and another conservative. Islamic military regime in Pakistan that would encourage anti-Soviet Muslim fundamentalism in the region.
A war also raises the possibility (hat Pakistan or India might use nuclear weapons.
The Soviets probably judge that an IndoPakistani war would disrupt US-Saudi-Pakistani arms support for the Afghan insurgents and thus strengthen the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. Nonetheless. Moscow also probably judges that this gain would be offset by the dangersar would pose to Soviet interests throughout the region. Moreover, the Soviets probablyutoff. support will eventually occur anyway because of declining support in Washington for the Afghan insurgents.
The Soviets have largely supported India in the crisis by publicly endorsing New Delhi's
K
sition on the status of Kashmir. During tbe visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary to mcow after tensions over Kashmir erupted. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that Kashmir was an "integral pan of India" and condemned outside interference in Indian affairs, according to press reports. The Chairman of tbe USSR Supreme Soviet repeated these views during his visit to India inoviet media also have highlighted Pakistani meddling in Kashmir over the last six months. Some Soviet officialsew of the more circumspect press reports, however, have indicated that Moscoweuase
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mrmoil in Kashmir stems from New Delhi's mishandling of the situation and its repressive tactics to control it ^gum
Although Moscow has shown concern over the Kashmir crisis for several months, Soviet statements and actions suggest it believes war is unlikely in the near term. Soviet media publicity about the possibility of war has been sporadic during the past few months. The Soviets so far have not viewed the situation as serious enough toigh-ranking envoymphasize Moscow's concerns to either Islamabad or New Delhi
Continued Effora to Pntvenl War. Moscow will rely primarily on bilateral channels to caution New Delhi and Islamabad about the danger of war andeaceful settlement through Inao-Pakjsiam discussions. Although they will continue to participate in discreet unofficial UNSC Permanent Five talks in New York on In do-Pakistani tensions, the Soviets will work against any formal UN discussions of the crisis or anyjoint PermFive action on it in deference toiew that Kashmiromestic issue. The Soviets probably iudecould have little influence toar if New Delhi decides to attack.
Moscow will continue to refuse joint superpower efforts to defuse the crisis, again citing Indian opposition to making Kashmir an international issue. They also would fear that
perpower condominium' to its friends
in the Third World. Soviet chents-Syna, PLO, Iraq. Algeria and Libya-already are anxious that Moscow will sell them out in favor of improved relations with the US.
The Soviets probably will continue to ignore US suggestions that the superpowers cut us-supplies are Moscow's key link to India, which the USSR regards as one of its most valued allies in tbe Third World and among its most profitable customers. The Soviets probably judge that their ability toutoff to
upplies were stopped. In Moscow's experience with Iraq andutaary deliveries or an arms cutoff do not necessarilylients behavior and risk Soviet relations with the client. |
^anv mediating or monitoring role between
Pakistan and India. Although the Soviets sponsored talks between New Delhi and klamabad:-most notably ^Tashkent6 following5 war-the Soviets have
domcsVc "or are the Soviets likely to h w ffer to allow foreign observers to monitor theess,n8 mternauonal and domestic issues,ending offer to
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.Soviet Behaviorar. Moscow would urge restrain! on both India and Pakistan in (be event of war and would work towards an immediate cease-Eire through ibe UN. Moscow's major goals ionew conflict-that Kashmir remain in India, stability be restored in South Asia, and avoiding escalation to nuclearbest achieveduick bait to hostilities. For these reasons, the Soviets probably would advise India to use restraint in any conflict with Pakistan. The Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation signed by the USSR and India inwhlch requires mutual consultations if war thr catena-would provide the Sovietsegal basis for demanding close consultations with New Delhi. |
The Soviets probably believe India would quicklyar-in two to three wecks-and therefore Moscow would not have to face the decision of responding to an Indian request fox more military equipment, la the unlikely event that war continuedew months, chances are better than even that the Soviets would deflect New Delhi's requests for more supplies, unless India were losing the war, because Moscow would not want to be seen as fueling the conflict. Although not refusing Indian requests outright, the Soviets would probablyariety of excuses to delay deliveries. Soviet restraint, however, would depend on similar US reserve with Pakistan and the Soviet judgment that any Chinese supplies to Pakistan would not alter the course of the war.
In ihe highly unlikely event that hostilities lasted for moreew months, Moscow eventually would feel compelled to resupply India with spare parts and ammunition and replacements of Indian equipment-such as tanks and airaah-losi io battle. Air delivery of such hardware would be difficult. Direct flights arc impossible because the aircraft would have to fly over Pakistan or its ally China. An indirect, longer route would take Soviet transports over Muslim Middle East nations who alio probably would not permit overflights. Resupply by sea, therefore, is ihe most likely option for Moscow.apidly deteriorating situation, however, Indian rruntaryefforo might suffer because Soviet resupply by sea would take at least two weeks.
Moscow apparently believes that the risk ofdo-Pakistan; war escalating to the use of nuclear weapons is low. especially if New Delhi pursues limited military objectives. The possibility of either side using nuclear weapons has been raised in the Soviet media, but only in passing. In late May, for example, Pjflyrja noted the Indian public's concern about Western press reports alleging that Pakistan might use nuclear weaponsar. The Soviet media apparently addressed this issue, however, because of Indian distress over press rumors, not becauseoviet perceptionising danger that nuclear weapons would be used. At least two Soviet press articles, however, recently criticized India for iu nonaccession to the nuclear nonprolife ration treaty, indicating that this will likely become more contentious bilateral issue io tbe future,
The Soviets probably have only limited leverage to persuade either belligerent not to use nuclear arms. Their main focus would be to encourage India to cease hostilities before Pakistan became so desperate that ituclear strike. Moscow probably iudces that_ Pakistan wouldew weeks toeliverable nuclear weapon. The Soviets also would work through any available channels-including the UN and the US-to pressure the belligerents to forgo the use of nuclear weapons. I
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Original document.
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